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Preface 
AMADOU-MAHTAR M ' B O W 
Director-General of Unesco 
For a long time, all kinds of myths and prejudices concealed the true history 
of Africa from the world at large. African societies were looked upon as 
societies that could have no history. In spite of important work done by 
such pioneers as Leo Frobenius, Maurice Delafosse and Arturo Labriola, 
as early as the first decades of this century, a great m a n y non-African 
experts could not rid themselves of certain preconceptions and argued that 
the lack of written sources and documents m a d e it impossible to engage 
in any scientific study of such societies. 
Although the Iliad and Odyssey were rightly regarded as essential sources 
for the history of ancient Greece, African oral tradition, the collective 
m e m o r y of peoples which holds the thread of m a n y events marking their 
lives, was rejected as worthless. In writing the history of a large part of 
Africa, the only sources used were from outside the continent, and the 
final product gave a picture not so m u c h of the paths actually taken by 
the African peoples as of those that the authors thought they must have 
taken. Since the European Middle Ages were often used as a yardstick, 
modes of production, social relations and political institutions were visual-
ized only by reference to the European past. 
In fact, there was a refusal to see Africans as the creators of original 
cultures which flowered and survived over the centuries in patterns of 
their o w n making and which historians are unable to grasp unless they 
forgo their prejudices and rethink their approach. 
Furthermore, the continent of Africa was hardly ever looked upon as 
a historical entity. O n the contrary, emphasis was laid on everything likely 
to lend credence to the idea that a split had existed, from time immemorial, 
between a 'white Africa' and a 'black Africa', each unaware of the other's 
existence. T h e Sahara was often presented as an impenetrable space pre-
venting any intermingling of ethnic groups and peoples or any exchange 
of goods, beliefs, customs and ideas between the societies that had grown 
up on either side of the desert. Hermetic frontiers were drawn between 
the civilizations of Ancient Egypt and Nubia and those of the peoples south 
of the Sahara. 
It is true that the history of Africa north of the Sahara has been more 
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closely linked with that of the Mediterranean basin than has the history 
of sub-Saharan Africa, but it is n o w widely recognized that the various 
civilizations of the African continent, for all their differing languages and 
cultures, represent, to a greater or lesser degree, the historical offshoots 
of a set of peoples and societies united by bonds centuries old. 
Another phenomenon which did great disservice to the objective study 
of the African past was the appearance, with the slave trade and coloniza-
tion, of racial stereotypes which bred contempt and lack of understanding 
and became so deep-rooted that they distorted even the basic concepts 
of historiography. F r o m the time w h e n the notions of 'white' and 'black' 
were used as generic labels by the colonialists, w h o were regarded as 
superior, the colonized Africans had to struggle against both economic 
and psychological enslavement. Africans were identifiable by the colour 
of their skin, they had become a kind of merchandise, they were earmarked 
for hard labour and eventually, in the minds of those dominating them, 
they came to symbolize an imaginary and allegedly inferior Negro race. 
This pattern of spurious identification relegated the history of the African 
peoples in m a n y minds to the rank of ethno-history, in which appreciation 
of the historical and cultural facts was bound to be warped. 
T h e situation has changed significantly since the end of the Second 
World W a r and in particular since the African countries became inde-
pendent and began to take an active part in the life of the international 
community and in the mutual exchanges that are its raison d'être. A n 
increasing number of historians has endeavoured to tackle the study of 
Africa with a more rigorous, objective and open-minded outlook by using -
with all due precautions - actual African sources. In exercising their right 
to take the historical initiative, Africans themselves have felt a deep-seated 
need to re-establish the historical authenticity of their societies on solid 
foundations. 
In this context, the importance of the eight-volume General History of 
Africa, which Unesco is publishing, speaks for itself. 
T h e experts from m a n y countries working on this project began by laying 
d o w n the theoretical and methodological basis for the History. T h e y have 
been at pains to call in question the over-simplifications arising from a 
linear and restrictive conception of world history and to re-establish the 
true facts wherever necessary and possible. They have endeavoured to 
highlight the historical data that give a clearer picture of the evolution 
of the different peoples of Africa in their specific socio-cultural setting. 
T o tackle this huge task, m a d e all the more complex and difficult by 
the vast range of sources and the fact that documents were widely scattered, 
Unesco has had to proceed by stages. T h e first stage, from 1965 to 1969, 
was devoted to gathering documentation and planning the work. Opera-
tional assignments were conducted in the field and included campaigns 
to collect oral traditions, the creation of regional documentation centres 
for oral traditions, the collection of unpublished manuscripts in Arabic 
xx 
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and Ajami (African languages written in Arabic script), the compilation 
of archival inventories and the preparation of a Guide to the Sources of 
the History of Africa, culled from the archives and libraries of the countries 
of Europe and later published in eleven volumes. In addition, meetings 
were organized to enable experts from Africa and other continents to discuss 
questions of methodology and lay d o w n the broad lines for the project 
after careful examination of the available sources. 
T h e second stage, which lasted from 1969 to 1971, was devoted to 
shaping the History and linking its different parts. T h e purpose of the 
international meetings of experts held in Paris in 1969 and Addis Ababa 
in 1970 was to study and define the problems involved in drafting and 
publishing the History: presentation in eight volumes, the principal edition 
in English, French and Arabic, translation into African languages such 
as Kiswahili, Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba or Lingala, prospective versions in 
G e r m a n , Russian, Portuguese, Spanish and Chinese, as well as abridged 
editions designed for a wide African and international public.1 
T h e third stage has involved actual drafting and publication. This began 
with the appointment of the 3 9 - m e m b e r International Scientific C o m -
mittee, two-thirds African and one-third non-African, which assumes 
intellectual responsibility for the History. 
T h e method used is interdisciplinary and is based on a multi-faceted 
approach and a wide variety of sources. T h e first a m o n g these is archae-
ology, which holds m a n y of the keys to the history of African cultures 
and civilizations. Thanks to archaeology, it is n o w acknowledged that Africa 
was very probably the cradle of mankind and the scene - in the neolithic 
period - of one of the first technological revolutions in history. Archaeology 
has also shown that Egypt was the setting for one of the most brilliant 
ancient civilizations of the world. But another very important source is 
oral tradition, which, after being long despised, has n o w emerged as an 
invaluable instrument for discovering the history of Africa, making it 
possible to follow the movements of its different peoples in both space 
and time, to understand the African vision of the world from the inside 
and to grasp the original features of the values on which the cultures and 
institutions of the continent are based. 
W e are indebted to the International Scientific Committee in charge 
of this General History of Africa, and to its Rapporteur and the editors 
and authors of the various volumes and chapters, for having shed a new 
light on the African past in its authentic and all-encompassing form and 
for having avoided any dogmatism in the study of essential issues. A m o n g 
these issues w e might cite: the slave trade, that 'endlessly bleeding wound' , 
which was responsible for one of the cruellest mass deportations in the 
history of mankind, which sapped the African continent of its life-blood 
while contributing significantly to the economic and commercial expansion 




of Europe; colonization, with all the effects it had on population, economics, 
psychology and culture; relations between Africa south of the Sahara and 
the Arab world; and, finally, the process of decolonization and nation-
building which mobilized the intelligence and passion of people still alive 
and sometimes still active today. All these issues have been broached with 
a concern for honesty and rigour which is not the least of the History's 
merits. B y taking stock of our knowledge of Africa, putting forward a variety 
of viewpoints on African cultures and offering a n e w reading of history, 
the History has the signal advantage of showing up the light and shade 
and of openly portraying the differences of opinion that m a y exist between 
scholars. 
B y demonstrating the inadequacy of the methodological approaches 
which have long been used in research on Africa, this History calls for 
a n e w and careful study of the twofold problem areas of historiography 
and cultural identity, which are united by links of reciprocity. Like any 
historical work of value, the History paves the way for a great deal of further 
research on a variety of topics. 
It is for this reason that the International Scientific Committee, in close 
collaboration with Unesco, decided to embark on additional studies in an 
attempt to go deeper into a number of issues which will permit a clearer 
understanding of certain aspects of the African past. T h e findings being 
published in the series 'Unesco Studies and Documents - General History 
of Africa'2 will prove a useful supplement to the History, as will the works 
planned on aspects of national or subregional history. 
T h e General History sheds light both on the historical unity of Africa 
and also its relations with the other continents, particularly the Americas 
and the Caribbean. For a long time, the creative manifestations of the 
descendants of Africans in the Americas were lumped together by some 
historians as a heterogeneous collection of Africanisms. Needless to say, 
this is not the attitude of the authors of the History, in which the resistance 
of the slaves shipped to America, the constant and massive participation of 
the descendants of Africans in the struggles for the initial independence 
of America and in national liberation movements, are rightly perceived 
for what they were: vigorous assertions of identity, which helped forge 
the universal concept of mankind. Although the phenomenon m a y vary 
in different places, it is n o w quite clear that ways of feeling, thinking, 
dreaming and acting in certain nations of the western hemisphere have 
2. T h e following eight volumes have already been published in this series: The peopling 
of ancient Egypt and the deciphering of Meroitic script; The African slave trade from the 
fifteenth to the nineteenth century; Historical relations across the Indian Ocean; The his-
toriography of Southern Africa; The decolonization of Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn 
of Africa; African ethnonyms and toponyms; Historical and socio-cultural relations between 




been marked by their African heritage. T h e cultural inheritance of Africa 
is visible everywhere, from the southern United States to northern Brazil, 
across the Caribbean and on the Pacific seaboard. In certain places it even 
underpins the cultural identity of some of the most important elements 
of the population. 
T h e History also clearly brings out Africa's relations with southern Asia 
across the Indian Ocean and the African contributions to other civilizations 
through mutual exchanges. 
I a m convinced that the efforts of the peoples of Africa to conquer or 
strengthen their independence, secure their development and assert their 
cultural characteristics, must be rooted in historical awareness renewed, 
keenly felt and taken up by each succeeding generation. 
M y o w n background, the experience I gained as a teacher and as chair-
m a n , from the early days of independence, of the first commission set 
up to reform history and geography curricula in some of the countries 
of West and Central Africa, taught m e h o w necessary it was for the education 
of young people and for the information of the public at large to have 
a history book produced by scholars with inside knowledge of the problems 
and hopes of Africa and with the ability to apprehend the continent in 
its entirety. 
For all these reasons, Unesco's goal will be to ensure that this General 
History of Africa is widely disseminated in a large number of languages 
and is used as a basis for producing children's books, school textbooks 
and radio and television programmes. Young people, whether school-
children or students, and adults in Africa and elsewhere will thus be able 
to form a truer picture of the African continent's past and the factors that 
explain it, as well as a fairer understanding of its cultural heritage and 
its contribution to the general progress of mankind. T h e History should 
thus contribute to improved international cooperation and stronger 
solidarity a m o n g peoples in their aspirations to justice, progress and peace. 
This is, at least, m y most cherished hope. 
It remains for m e to express m y deep gratitude to the m e m b e r s of the 
International Scientific Committee, the Rapporteur, the different volume 
editors, the authors and all those w h o have collaborated in this tremendous 
undertaking. T h e work they have accomplished and the contribution they 
have m a d e plainly go to show h o w people from different backgrounds but 
all imbued with the same spirit of goodwill and enthusiasm in the service 
of universal truth can, within the international framework provided by 
Unesco, bring to fruition a project of considerable scientific and cultural 
import. M y thanks also go to the organizations and governments whose 
generosity has m a d e it possible for Unesco to publish this History in 
different languages and thus ensure that it will have the worldwide impact 
it deserves and thereby serve the international community as a whole. 
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Description of the Project 
B. A. O G O T 
Former President, International Scientific Committee 
for the Drafting of a General History of Africa 
T h e General Conference of Unesco at its 16th Session instructed the 
Director-General to undertake the drafting of a General History of Africa. 
T h e enormous task of implementing the project was entrusted to an Inter-
national Scientific Committee which w a s established by the Executive 
Board in 1970. This Committee, under the Statutes adopted by the Execu-
tive Board of Unesco in 1971, is composed of thirty-nine m e m b e r s (two-
thirds of w h o m are African and one-third non-African) serving in their 
personal capacity and appointed by the Director-General of Unesco for 
the duration of the Committee's mandate. 
T h e first task of the Committee was to define the principal characteristics 
of the work. These were defined at the first session of the Committee 
as follows: 
(a) Although aiming at the highest possible scientific level, the history 
does not seek to be exhaustive and is a w o r k of synthesis avoiding d o g m a -
tism. In m a n y respects, it is a statement of problems showing the present 
state of knowledge and the main trends in research, and it does not hesitate 
to show divergencies of views where these exist. In this way , it prepares 
the ground for future work . 
(b) Africa is considered in this work as a totality. T h e aim is to show 
the historical relationships between the various parts of the continent, too 
frequently subdivided in works published to date. Africa's historical con-
nections with the other continents receive due attention, these connections 
being analysed in terms of mutual exchanges and multilateral influences, 
bringing out, in its appropriate light, Africa's contribution to the history 
of mankind. 
(c) The General History of Africa is, in particular, a history of ideas and 
civilizations, societies and institutions. It is based on a wide variety of 
sources, including oral tradition and art forms. 
(d) T h e History is viewed essentially from the inside. Although a scholarly 
work, it is also, in large measure, a faithful reflection of the way in which 
African authors view their o w n civilization. While prepared in an inter-
national framework and drawing to the full on the present stock of scientific 
knowledge, it should also be a vitally important element in the recognition 
Description of the Project 
of the African heritage and should bring out the factors making for unity 
in the continent. This effort to view things from within is the novel feature 
of the project and should, in addition to its scientific quality, give it great 
topical significance. B y showing the true face of Africa, the History could, 
in an era absorbed in economic and technical struggles, offer a particular 
conception of h u m a n values. 
T h e Committee has decided to present the work covering over three 
million years of African history in eight volumes, each containing about 
eight hundred pages of text with illustrations, photographs, m a p s and line 
drawings. 
A chief editor, assisted if necessary by one or two co-editors, is responsible 
for the preparation of each volume. T h e editors are elected by the C o m -
mittee either from a m o n g its members or from outside by a two-thirds 
majority. T h e y are responsible for preparing the volumes in accordance 
with the decisions and plans adopted by the Committee. O n scientific 
matters, they are accountable to the Committee or, between two sessions 
of the Committee, to its Bureau for the contents of the volumes, the final 
version of the texts, the illustrations and, in general, for all scientific and 
technical aspects of the History. T h e Bureau ultimately approves the final 
manuscript. W h e n it considers the manuscript ready for publication, it 
transmits it to the Director-General of Unesco. T h u s the Committee, or 
the Bureau between committee sessions, remains fully in charge of the 
project. 
Each volume consists of some thirty chapters. Each chapter is the work 
of a principal author assisted, if necessary, by one or two collaborators. 
T h e authors are selected by the Committee on the basis of their curricula 
vitae. Preference is given to African authors, provided they have requisite 
qualifications. Special effort is also m a d e to ensure, as far as possible, that 
all regions of the continent, as well as other regions having historical or 
cultural ties with Africa, are equitably represented a m o n g the authors. 
W h e n the editor of a volume has approved texts of chapters, they are 
then sent to all m e m b e r s of the Committee for criticism. In addition, the 
text of the volume editor is submitted for examination to a Reading 
Committee, set u p within the International Scientific Committee on the 
basis of the m e m b e r s ' fields of competence. T h e Reading Committee 
analyses the chapters from the standpoint of both substance and form. T h e 
Bureau then gives final approval to the manuscripts. 
Such a seemingly long and involved procedure has proved necessary, 
since it provides the best possible guarantee of the scientific objectivity 
of the General History of Africa. There have, in fact, been instances w h e n 
the Bureau has rejected manuscripts or insisted on major revisions or even 
reassigned the drafting of a chapter to another author. Occasionally, 
specialists in a particular period of history or in a particular question are 
consulted to put the finishing touches to a volume. 
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T h e work will be published first in a hard-cover edition in English, 
French and Arabic, and later in paperback editions in the same languages. 
A n abridged version in English and French will serve as a basis for trans-
lation into African languages. T h e Committee has chosen Kiswahili and 
Hausa as the first African languages into which the work will be translated. 
Also, every effort will be m a d e to ensure publication of the General 
History of Africa in other languages of wide international currency such 
as Chinese, Portuguese, Russian, G e r m a n , Italian, Spanish, Japanese, etc. 
It is thus evident that this is a gigantic task which constitutes an immense 
challenge to African historians and to the scholarly community at large, 
as well as to Unesco under whose auspices the work is being done. For 
the writing of a continental history of Africa, covering the last three million 
years, using the highest canons of scholarship and involving, as it must 
do, scholars drawn from diverse countries, cultures, ideologies and historical 
traditions, is surely a complex undertaking. It constitutes a continental, 
international and interdisciplinary project of great proportions. 
In conclusion, I would like to underline the significance of this work 
for Africa and for the world. At a time w h e n the peoples of Africa are 
striving towards unity and greater cooperation in shaping their individual 
destinies, a proper understanding of Africa's past, with an awareness of 
c o m m o n ties a m o n g Africans and between Africa and other continents, 
should not only be a major contribution towards mutual understanding 
a m o n g the people of the earth, but also a source of knowledge of a cultural 
heritage that belongs to all mankind. 
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Note on chronology 
It has been agreed to adopt the following method for writing dates. 
With regard to prehistory, dates m a y be written in two different ways. 
O n e way is by reference to the present era, that is, dates B P (before 
present), the reference year being + 1950; all dates are negative in relation 
to +1950 . 
T h e other way is by reference to the beginning of the Christian era. 
Dates are represented in relation to the Christian era by a simple + or 
— sign before the date. W h e n referring to centuries, the terms B C and A D 
are replaced by 'before our era' and 'of our era'. 
S o m e examples are as follows: 
(i) 2300 B P = - 3 5 0 
(Ü) 29OO BC = — 29OO 
AD 180O = +180O 
(iii) 5th century B C = 5th century before our era 
3rd century AD = 3rd century of our era 
Africa and the colonial 
challenge 
A. A D U B O A H E N 
Never in the history of Africa did so m a n y changes occur and with such 
speed as they did between 1880 and 1935. Indeed, the most fundamental 
and dramatic - though tragic - of these changes took place in the m u c h 
shorter period from 1890 to 1910, the period that saw the conquest and 
occupation of virtually the whole continent of Africa by the imperial powers 
and the establishment of the colonial system. T h e period after 1910 was 
essentially one of consolidation and exploitation of the system. T h e pace 
of this drama was truly astonishing, for as late as 1880 only very limited 
areas of Africa had come under the direct rule of Europeans. In the whole 
of West Africa, only the island and coastal areas of Senegal, the town of 
Freetown and its environs (now in Sierra Leone), the southern parts of 
the Gold Coast (now Ghana) , the coastal areas of Abidjan in Ivory Coast 
and Porto N o v o in D a h o m e y (now Benin) and the island of Lagos (in 
what is n o w Nigeria) had come under the direct rule of Europeans. In 
North Africa, it was only Algeria that had by 1880 been colonized by the 
French. Not an inch of the whole of East Africa had come under the control 
of any European power, while only the coastal stretches of Mozambique 
and Angola of the whole of Central Africa were being ruled by the 
Portuguese. It was only in Southern Africa that foreign rule had not only 
been firmly implanted but had even been extended a considerable distance 
inland (see Fig. 1.1). In short, by as late as 1880, about as m u c h as 
80% of the continent of Africa was being ruled by her o w n kings, queens, 
clan and lineage heads, in empires, kingdoms, communities and polities of 
various sizes and shapes. 
However, within the next thirty years, this situation underwent a phe-
nomenal and indeed a revolutionary change. By 1914, with the sole exception 
of Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole of Africa had been subjected to the 
rule of European powers in colonies of various sizes which were generally 
m u c h larger physically but often bore little or no relationship to the pre-
existing polities. But it was not African sovereignty and independence alone 
that had been lost at that time. It represented also an assault on established 
cultures. As Ferhat Abbas pointed out in 1930 in reference to the French 




















FIG. i.i Africa on the eve ofpartition showing extent of conquest by 1880
Africa and the colonial challenge 
and economic venture defended thereafter by the appropriate adminis-
trative regime'. But for the Algerians, it was 'a veritable revolution, over-
throwing a whole ancient world of beliefs and ideas and an immemorial 
way of life. It confronts a whole people with sudden change. A n entire 
nation, without any preparation, finds itself forced to adapt or perish. This 
situation is bound to lead to a moral and physical disequilibrium, the barren-
ness of which is not far from total disintegration." T h e nature of colonial-
ism depicted here is true not only of French colonialism in Algeria but 
of European colonialism throughout Africa; the difference being one of 
degree not of kind, one of style not of substance. In other words, then, 
during the period 1880 to 1935, Africa did face a very serious challenge, 
the challenge of colonialism. 
T h e state of African preparedness 
W h a t was the attitude of the Africans themselves to the establishment of 
colonialism, involving as it did such a fundamental change in the nature 
of the relationships that had existed between them and the Europeans over 
the preceding three hundred years? This is a question that has so far not 
been seriously considered by historians, African or European, but it needs 
to be answered. T h e answer is quite clear and unequivocal: an overwhelming 
majority of African authorities and leaders were vehemently opposed to 
this change and expressed their determination to maintain the status quo 
and, above all, to retain their sovereignty and independence, an issue on 
which virtually all of them were not in any way prepared to compromise. 
This answer can be documented from the very words of the contemporary 
African leaders themselves. In 1891, w h e n the British offered protection 
to Prempeh I of Asante in the Gold Coast, he replied: 
T h e suggestion that Asante in its present state should come and enjoy 
the protection of Her Majesty the Queen and Empress of India I 
m a y say is a matter of very serious consideration, and which I a m 
happy to say w e have arrived at this conclusion, that m y kingdom 
of Asante will never commit itself to any such policy. Asante must 
remain as of old at the same time to remain friendly with all white 
m e n . I do not write this in a boastful spirit but in the clear sense 
of its meaning . . . the cause of Asante is progressing and there is 
no reason for any Asante m a n to feel alarm at the prospects or to 
believe for a single instant that our cause has been driven back by 
the events of the past hostilities.2 
In 1895, W o b o g o , the M o r o Naba, or King of the Mossi (in modern 
Upper Volta), told the French officer, Captain Destenave: 
1. F. Abbäs, 1931, p. 9; quoted by J. Berque in Chapter 24 below. 
2. Quoted by J. Fynn in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, pp. 43-4. 
3 
Africa under Colonial Domination i88o—igjs 
I know that the whites wish to kill m e in order to take m y country, 
and yet you claim that they will help m e to organize m y country. 
But I find m y country good just as it is. I have no need of them. 
I know what is necessary for m e and what I want: I have m y o w n 
merchants: also, consider yourself fortunate that I do not order your 
head to be cut off. G o away n o w , and above all, never come back.3 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Lat Dior, the Darnel of Cayor 
(in modern Senegal) in 1883 (quoted in Chapter 6 below), by King 
M a c h e m b a of the Yao in what is n o w mainland Tanzania in 1890 (quoted 
in Chapter 3 below) and by Hendrik Wittboi, a king in what is n o w 
Namibia (quoted in Chapter 3 below). But the last and most fascinating 
piece of evidence I would like to cite here is the moving appeal addressed 
by Menelik of Ethiopia to Queen Victoria of Great Britain in April 1891. 
Similar letters were sent to the heads of state of France, Germany, Italy 
and Russia. In this appeal, Menelik first defined the then boundaries of 
Ethiopia, and - expressing personal expansionist ambitions - declared his 
intention to re-establish 'the former boundaries of Ethiopia as far as 
Khartoum and the Niza Lake, including all of the territories of the Gallas', 
and added: 
/ have no intention at all of being an indifferent spectator, if the distant 
Powers hold the idea of dividing up Africa, Ethiopia having been for 
the past fourteen centuries, an island of Christians in a sea of Pagans. 
Since the All-Powerful has protected Ethiopia up until n o w , I a m 
hopeful that H e will keep and enlarge it also in the future, and I 
do not think for a m o m e n t that H e will divide Ethiopia among the 
other Powers. 
Formerly the boundary of Ethiopia was the sea. Failing the use 
of force and failing the aid of the Christians, our boundary on the 
sea fell into the hands of the Muslims. Today w e do not pretend 
to be able to recover our sea coast by force; but w e hope that the 
Christian Powers, advised by our Saviour, Jesus Christ, will restore 
our seacoast boundary to us, or that they will give us at least a few 
points along the coast.4 
W h e n in spite of this appeal, the Italians launched their campaign against 
Ethiopia with the connivance of Britain and France, Menelik issued a 
mobilization proclamation on 17 September 1895 in which he stated: 
Enemies have n o w come upon us to ruin our country and to change 
our religion . . . O u r enemies have begun the affair by advancing and 
digging into the country like moles. With the help of G o d I will not 
3. Quoted by M . Crowder, 1968, p. 97. 
4. Archives of the Ministère degli Affari Esteri (Rome), A S M A I , Ethiopia Pos. 36/13-
109 Menelik to Queen Victoria, Addis Ababa, 14 Miazia, 1883, encl. in Tarnielli to M A E , 
London, 6 August 1891. 
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deliver up m y country to them . . . Today, you w h o are strong, give 
m e of your strength, and you w h o are weak, help m e by prayer.5 
These are the very words of the m e n w h o were facing the colonial 
challenge and they prove beyond any doubt the strength of their deter-
mination to oppose the Europeans and to defend their sovereignty, religion 
and traditional way of life. 
It is equally clear from all these quotations that these rulers were con-
fident of their preparedness to face the European invaders, as well might 
they have been. First, they were fully confident that their magic, their 
ancestors and certainly their gods or god would come to their aid, and 
m a n y of them on the eve of the actual physical confrontation either resorted 
to prayers or sacrifices or to herbs and incantations. A s Elliot P . Skinner 
has recorded: 
It is generally believed by the Mossi that when the French attacked 
Ouagadougou, the deposed M o g h o Naba W o b o g o m a d e sacrifices to 
earth shrines. Tradition has it that he sacrificed a black cock, a black 
ram, a black donkey, and a black slave on a large hill near the White 
Volta River, beseeching the earth goddess to drive the French away 
and to destroy the traitor Mazi w h o m they had placed upon the 
throne.6 
A n d as will be seen in m a n y of the following chapters, religion was indeed 
one of the weapons used against colonialism. Moreover, m a n y African rulers 
had been able to build empires of varying size only a couple of decades 
back, and some were still in the process of expanding or reviving their 
kingdoms. M a n y of them had been able to defend their sovereignties with 
the support of their people using traditional weapons and tactics. S o m e 
of them, like Samori Ture of the Mandinka empire in West Africa, and 
Menelik of Ethiopia, had even been able to modernize their armies. Because 
of this, the African rulers saw no reason w h y they could not maintain 
their sovereignty at that time. Furthermore, some thought they could stave 
off the invaders through diplomacy. A s w e shall see below, in 1889, while 
Cecil Rhodes was preparing to occupy the land of the Ndebele, their king, 
Lobengula, dispatched a delegation to London to see Queen Victoria; and 
while the British invading army was marching towards Kumasi in 1896 
to seize Prempeh five years after he had turned d o w n the British offer 
of protection, he dispatched a powerful diplomatic mission to Queen 
Victoria. As seen above, Menelik addressed a similar appeal to the same 
monarch as well as to other European heads of state. 
It is also obvious from some of the quotations above that m a n y African 
rulers did in fact welcome the new changes that were steadily being intro-
duced from the third decade of the nineteenth century since these changes 
had hitherto posed no threat to their sovereignty and independence. In 
5. Quoted in H . Marcus, 1975, p. 160. 
6. E . P. Skinner, 1964, p. 133. See also E . Isichei, 1977, p. 181. 
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West Africa, for instance, thanks to the activities of the missionaries, Fourah 
Bay College had been founded as early as 1827 in Sierra Leone, while 
elementary schools and a secondary school each in the Gold Coast and 
Nigeria had been established by the 1870s. Indeed, a call for the establish-
ment of a university in West Africa by the Caribbean-born pan-Africanist, 
Edward Wilmot Blyden had already gone out. A s early as 1887 some of 
the wealthy Africans had even begun to send their children to Europe 
for further education and professional training and some of them had 
returned to the Gold Coast as fully qualified barristers and doctors. 
Above all, following the abolition of the hideous and inhuman traffic 
in slaves, the Africans had been able to change over to an economy based 
on the exportation of cash crops - palm oil in Nigeria, groundnuts in 
Senegal and T h e G a m b i a — all before 1880 and cocoa had just been re-
introduced into the Gold Coast by Tetteh Quashie from Fernando Po in 
1879. A n d all this had occurred without the establishment of any direct 
European rule except in small pockets on the coast. Indeed, the relatively 
small group of West Africans w h o had benefited from European-style 
education were—by 1880 - doing extremely well. T h e y were dominating the 
few civil service posts offered by European administrations; on the coast, 
some of them were running their o w n import-export businesses and were 
monopolizing the internal distribution of imported goods. It was in East 
Africa that European influences were still minimal, although after the 
epoch-making journeys of Livingstone and Stanley and the subsequent 
propaganda by missionary societies, it was only a matter of time before 
churches and schools, and with them roads and railways, would m a k e their 
appearance. 
A s far as Africans were concerned, then, they did not see any need for 
any radical change in their centuries-old relations with Europe, and they 
were confident that if the Europeans wanted to force any changes on them 
and push their w a y inland, they would be able to stop them as they had 
been able to do for the last two or three hundred years. Hence the note 
of confidence, if not of defiance, that rings through the words quoted above. 
But what the Africans did not realize was that by 1880, thanks to the 
diffusion of the industrial revolution in Europe, and the subsequent tech-
nological progress signified by the steamship, the railway, the telegraph, 
and, above all, the first machine gun - the M a x i m gun - the Europeans 
w h o m they were about to face n o w had n e w political ambitions, economic 
needs and a relatively advanced technology. That is, they did not k n o w 
that the old era of free trade and informal political control had given way 
to, to borrow Basil Davidson's words, 'the era of the n e w imperialism and 
rival capitalist monopolies'7 and therefore that it was not only trade that 
the Europeans n o w wanted but also direct political control. Secondly, the 
African leaders were not aware of the fact that the guns that they had 
used hitherto and stockpiled, the muzzle-loading muskets - the French 
7. B . Davidson, 1978(a), p. 19. 
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captured 21365 muskets from the Baule of Ivory Coast after the suppression 
of their final revolt in 19118 - were totally outmoded and no match for 
the new breech-loading rifles used by the Europeans, which had about 
ten times the rate of fire at six times the charge, and the new ultra-rapid-
fire M a x i m s (see Plate 1.1). T h e English poet Hilaire Belloc s u m m e d up 
the situation aptly: 
Whatever happens w e have got 
T h e max im-gun and they have not9 
It is here that African rulers miscalculated, in m a n y cases with tragic con-
sequences. A s will be seen later, all the chiefs quoted above, except one, 
were defeated and lost their sovereignty. Lat Dior, moreover, was killed; 
Prempeh, Behazin and Cetshwayo of the Zulu were exiled and Lobengula 
of the Ndebele died in flight. Only Menelik, as will be seen in a later 
chapter, defeated the Italian invaders and thereby maintained his 
sovereignty and independence. 
The structure of Volume VII 
It is evident, then, that relations between Africans and Europeans did 
undergo a revolutionary change and Africa was faced with a serious colonial 
challenge between 1880 and 1935. W h a t then were the origins of this 
phenomenal challenge, the challenge of colonialism? O r put differently, 
h o w and w h y did the three-centuries-old relations between Africa and 
Europe undergo such drastic and fundamental change during this period? 
H o w was the colonial system established in Africa and what measures, 
political, economic, psychological and ideological, were adopted to underpin 
the system? H o w prepared was Africa to face and h o w did she face this 
challenge and with what success? Which of the new changes were accepted 
and which were rejected? W h a t of the old was retained and what was 
destroyed? W h a t adaptations and accommodations were made? H o w m a n y 
institutions were undermined, or h o w m a n y disintegrated? W h a t were the 
effects of all this on Africa, its peoples and their political, social and 
economic structures and institutions? Finally, what is the significance of 
colonialism for Africa and her history? These are the questions that this 
volume will attempt to answer. 
For the purpose of answering these questions, and explaining African 
initiatives and responses in the face of the colonial challenge, this volume 
has been divided, apart from the first two chapters, into three main sections. 
Each section is preceded by a chapter (3, 13, 22) in which the theme of 
the section is surveyed in a general way and from a continental perspective, 
and the subsequent chapters are dealt with on a regional basis. T h e intro-
ductory section comprising this and the next chapter discusses African 
8. T . C. Weiskel, 1980, p. 203. 
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attitudes and preparedness on the eve of this fundamental change in the 
relations between Africa and the Europeans, and the reasons for the par-
tition, conquest and occupation of Africa by the European imperial powers. 
It should be pointed out, since this is often ignored, that the phase of 
actual conquest was preceded by years of negotiation and treaty-making 
between the imperial powers and African rulers. This phase of negotiation 
shows that the European powers originally accepted their African counter-
parts as their equals, and, secondly, that the former did recognize the 
sovereignty and independence of the African states and polities. 
T h e second section deals with a theme that had until the 1960s either 
been grossly misrepresented or entirely ignored by the colonial school of 
African historiography, namely, African initiatives and reactions in the face 
of the conquest and occupation of Africa. T o the m e m b e r s of this school 
such as H . H . Johnston, Sir Alan Burns and, more recently, Margery 
Perham, Lewis H . G a n n and Peter Duignan,1 0 Africans in fact welcomed 
the establishment of colonial rule since not only did it save them from 
anarchy and internecine warfare but it also brought them some concrete 
benefits. T h u s Margery Perham: 
most of the tribes quickly accepted European rule as part of an irresist-
ible order, one which brought m a n y benefits, above all peace, and 
exciting novelties, railways and roads, lamps, bicycles, ploughs, n e w 
foods and crops, and all that could be acquired and experienced in 
town and city. For the ruling classes, traditional or created, it brought 
a n e w strength and security of status and n e w forms of wealth and 
power. For m a n y years after annexation, though there was m u c h 
bewilderment, revolts were very few, and there does not appear to 
have been m u c h sense of indignity at being ruled. ' ' 
Such ideas are also reflected in the use of such Eurocentric terms as 
'pacification', Pax Britannica and Pax Gallica used to describe what 
amounted to the conquest and occupation of Africa between 1890 and 1914. 
Those historians w h o did pay some attention to this subject mentioned 
it almost accidentally or casually. In their A Short History of Africa which 
first appeared in 1962, one of the very first modern professional surveys 
of the history of Africa, the English historians, Roland Oliver and J. D . 
Fage, devoted only a single paragraph to what they termed 'bitter resistance' 
by Africans in a chapter of fourteen pages dealing with what has become 
k n o w n as the European Scramble for African colonies. It is to correct this 
wrong interpretation of the colonial school and to redress the balance and 
highlight the African perspective that w e have devoted as m a n y as seven 
chapters to this theme of African initiatives and reactions. 
It will be seen from these chapters that the view that Africans received 
10. H . H . Johnston, 1899, 1913; A. C . Burns, 1957; M . Perham, 1960(a); L . H . Gann 
and P. Duignan, 1967. 
11. M . Perham, 1960(a), p. 28. 
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the invading soldiers with elation and quickly accepted colonial rule is 
not borne out by the available evidence. In fact, African reactions were 
the very reverse. It is quite evident that Africans were faced with only 
two options, either to readily surrender their sovereignty and independence, 
or to defend them at all costs. It is most significant that the great majority 
of them, as will be amply demonstrated in this volume, irrespective of 
the political and socio-economic structures of their states and in the face 
of all the odds against them, did decide to defend their sovereignty and 
independence. T h e weight of the odds against them on the one hand and 
the strength of the determination to resist at any price on the other are 
both captured by the relief reproduced on the jacket of this volume. This 
relief, painted on one of the walls of the palace of the kings of D a h o m e y 
in A b o m e y , depicts an African armed with only a b o w and arrow defiantly 
and squarely facing a European armed with a gun. 
John D . Hargreaves, for instance, poses this interesting question. Given 
the: 
range of possible attitudes on the part of the European invaders, a 
number of options might be open to African rulers. A m o n g the short-
term advantages obtainable from treaties or from collaboration with 
Europeans were not merely access to fire-arms and consumer goods, 
but opportunities to enlist powerful allies in external or internal 
disputes. W h y then did so m a n y African states reject such opportuni-
ties, choosing to resist the Europeans in battle?12 
This m a y sound enigmatic, but only so to somebody looking at the whole 
issue from a Eurocentric point of view. T o the African, the issue at stake 
was not short-term or long-term advantages but rather the fundamental 
question of his land and his sovereignty, and it is precisely because of 
this that virtually all African polities, centralized and non-centralized alike, 
sooner or later chose to maintain or defend or try to regain their sovereignty. 
T o them, there could be no compromise on that, and indeed m a n y of 
the leaders of these states chose to die on the battlefield, go into voluntary 
flight or face exile rather than surrender their sovereignty without a 
struggle. 
A great majority of African rulers, then, did opt for the defence of their 
sovereignty and independence. It is in the strategies and the tactics that 
they adopted to achieve this universal objective that they differed. Most 
African rulers chose the strategy of confrontation, using either diplomatic 
or military weapons or both. A s will be seen below, Samori Ture, and 
Kabarega of Bunyoro resorted to both weapons while Prempeh I and 
M w a n g a of Buganda relied on diplomacy. Others such as Tofa of Porto 
N o v o (in what is n o w Benin) chose the strategy of alliance or co-operation, 
not of collaboration. 
This question of strategy should be highlighted here because it has been 
12. J. D . Hargreaves in L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1969, pp. 205-6. 
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grossly misunderstood hitherto and this has led to the classification of some 
of the African rulers as collaborators and their action as that of collaboration. 
W e are opposed to the use of this term collaboration not only because 
it is inaccurate but also because it is derogatory and Eurocentric. As w e 
have seen above, the fundamental issue at stake between the 1880s and 
the 1900s as far as the African rulers were concerned, was that of sove-
reignty, and on this, it was quite clear that nobody was prepared to 
compromise. Those African rulers w h o have been mistakenly termed 
collaborators were those w h o thought that the best way of safeguarding 
their sovereignty or even regaining the sovereignty that they might have lost 
to some African power previous to the arrival of the Europeans was not 
to collaborate but rather to ally with the European invaders. A collaborator 
is surely one w h o betrays the national cause by colluding with the enemy 
to pursue the goals and objectives of the e n e m y rather than the interests 
of his o w n nation. But as w e have seen, the Africans were all faced with 
the question of surrendering, retaining or regaining their sovereignty. 
Those w h o threw in their lot with the Europeans therefore had their o w n 
objective, and it is therefore totally wrong to call them collaborators. 
In any case, since the Second World W a r , the term collaborator has 
assumed very pejorative connotations and the interesting thing is that some 
of the historians w h o use it are aware of this. R . Robinson, for example, 
stated: 'It should be stressed that the term [collaborator] is used in no 
pejorative sense'.13 T h e question then is if it can be so used, w h y 
use it at all, especially in the African case where it is so inaccurate? W h y 
not use the word ally which is indeed the more appropriate term? Tofa, 
the king of the G u n kingdom of Porto N o v o has always been cited as 
a typical example of a collaborator. But was he? As Hargreaves has clearly 
shown, 1 4 Tofa was facing three different enemies at the time of the arrival 
of the French - the Yoruba to the north-east, the F o n kings of D a h o m e y 
to the north and the British on the coast — and he must have seen the 
arrival of the French as a god-sent opportunity for him not only to protect 
his sovereignty but even to m a k e some gains at the expense of his enemies. 
H e naturally chose, therefore, not to collaborate but to ally with the French. 
Surely only those historians w h o are not aware of the problems with which 
Tofa was confronted at that time, or w h o deny the African any initiative 
or an awareness of his o w n interests, or w h o see the whole issue from 
a Eurocentric viewpoint, would describe Tofa as a collaborator. Moreover, 
the fallacy of this term is further demonstrated by the fact that the so-
called collaborators w h o at some points were prepared to ally with Euro-
peans often later became the opposers or resisters of the Europeans: 
W o b o g o , the king of Mossi, Lat Dior, the Darnel of Gayor, and even the 
great Samori Ture himself are examples of such rulers. This makes the 
classification quite absurd. 
13. R. Robinson in R . O w e n and B . Sutcliffe (eds), 1972, p. 120. 
14. J. D . Hargreaves, in L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1969, pp. 214-16. 
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Finally, only those historians w h o are really ignorant of or hold very 
simplistic views about the political and ethno-cultural situation in Africa 
on the eve of the European partition and conquest would use that term. 
They assume that all African countries, like m a n y European countries, 
are inhabited by the same ethno-cultural group or nation, and therefore 
that any section of that group that allied with an invader could be termed 
a collaborator. But no African country or colony or empire was m a d e up 
of any such single ethnic group. Each country or empire was populated 
by numerous ethno-cultural groups or nations w h o were as different from 
each other as, say, the Italians are from the Germans or the French. M o r e -
over, prior to the arrival of the European invaders, relations between these 
different groups were often hostile while some might even have been sub-
jugated by others. T o label such subjugated or hostile groups w h o chose 
to join the invading European group against their former foreign enemies 
or rulers as collaborators is to miss the point. Indeed, as will be d e m o n -
strated in some of the chapters of this volume, the nature of African 
reactions and responses to colonialism was determined not only by the 
ethno-cultural and political situation with which the Africans were con-
fronted but also by the very nature of the socio-economic forces at work 
in the particular society at the time of the confrontation, and the nature of 
its political organization. 
M a n y European historians have condemned the opposers as being 
romantic and short-sighted and have praised the so-called collaborators 
as being far-sighted and progressive. A s Oliver and Fage put it in 1962: 
If these [African rulers] were far-sighted and well-informed, and m o r e 
particularly if they had had access to foreign advisers such as mission-
aries or traders they might well understand that nothing was to be 
gained by resistance, and m u c h by negotiation. If they were less far-
sighted, less fortunate or less well-advised, they would see their 
traditional enemies siding with the invader and would themselves 
assume an attitude of resistance, which could all too easily end in 
military defeat, the deposition of chiefs, the loss of land to the native 
allies of the occupying power, possibly even to the political fragmen-
tation of the society or state . . . A s with the slave trade in earlier 
times, there were gainers as well as losers, and both were to be found 
within the confines of every colonial territory.ls 
Ronald E . Robinson and John Gallagher have also described opposition 
or resistance as consisting of 'romantic reactionary struggles against the 
facts, the passionate protests of societies which were shocked by the n e w 
age of change and would not be comforted'.16 But these views are highly 
questionable and the dichotomy between resisters and so-called collabor-
ators is not only mechanistic but simply unconvincing. There were certainly 
15. R . Oliver and J. D . Fage, 1962, p. 203. 
16. R . E . Robinson and J. Gallagher in F. H . Hinsley (ed.), 1962, pp. 639-40. 
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losers and gainers in the slave trade, but there were no gainers this time. 
Both resisters and so-called collaborators lost in the end, and what is 
interesting is that it is the so-called romantic leaders and diehards w h o 
are still remembered, and have become a source of inspiration to the 
nationalist leaders of today.17 I entirely agree with the conclusion of 
Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A . Mazrui that 'there is no gainsaying that 
the introduction of western norms and power, and accompanying controls 
and constraints, was everywhere in Africa questioned by the peoples 
affected'.18 
However, whatever strategy the Africans adopted, all of them - with 
the sole exception of the Liberians and Ethiopians - failed, for reasons 
that will be discussed below, to maintain their sovereignty, and by the 
beginning of the First World W a r , the cut-off date for the first section 
of this volume, Africa had been subjected to colonial rule. H o w and w h y 
the Liberians and Ethiopians managed to survive in the face of this colonial 
onslaught is treated in Chapter n . 
W h a t then did these colonial powers do with their n e w colonies in the 
political, social and economic fields after the interlude of the First World 
W a r ? It is this question which is answered in the second section of this 
volume. Here, since the various political mechanisms devised for the 
administration of their colonies, and the ideologies behind them, are well 
covered in m a n y of the existing works surveying colonialism in Africa,19 
only a single chapter has been devoted to this theme. Instead, m u c h more 
attention is given to the economic and social aspects of the colonial system 
and its impact on Africa so as to redress the balance. It will be seen from 
these chapters that the period after the First World W a r and up to 1935, 
the period which has been described by some recent historians as the high 
noon of colonialism, did see the building of an infrastructure of roads and 
railways and the introduction of some social changes such as primary and 
secondary schools. However, the colonial rulers had one principal end in 
view, namely, the exploitation of the resources of Africa, 'animal, vegetable 
and mineral', for the sole benefit of the colonial powers and their mercantile, 
mining and financial companies in the metropolitan countries. O n e of the 
chapters in this section to which particular attention should be drawn is 
the one dealing with the demographic aspects of colonial rule, a theme 
which is not normally found in existing surveys of colonialism in Africa. 
W h a t were African initiatives and reactions in the face of this consoli-
dation of colonialism and the exploitation of their continent? This is the 
17. For further developments of this point see A . A . Boahen, 'Towards a new cate-
gorization and periodization of African responses and reactions to colonialism' (unpublished) 
on which parts of this chapter are based. 
18. R . I. Rotberg and A . A . Mazrui (eds), 1970, p. xviii. 
19. See S. H . Roberts, 1929; Lord Hailey, 1938 and 1957; S. C . Easton, 1964; L . H . 
G a n n and P. Duignan (eds), 1969 and 1970; P. Gifford and W . R . Louis (eds), 1967 and 
1971; J. Suret-Canale, 1971. 
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question which is answered in the third section of this volume and a great 
deal of attention is paid to this question in conformity with the philosophy 
underlying this work, that is, to view the story from an African standpoint 
and to highlight African initiatives and reactions. African attitudes in this 
period were certainly not characterized by indifference or passivity or ready 
acceptance. If the period has been described as the classic era of colonialism, 
it is also the classic era of the strategy of resistance or protest in Africa. 
A s will be shown both in the general survey as well as in the subsequent 
regional surveys, Africans did resort to a number of devices and measures -
and indeed a whole variety of these were devised — to resist colonialism. 
It should be emphasized that the objectives at this time were, with the 
exception of those of the North African leaders, not to overthrow the 
colonial system but rather to seek its amelioration and an accommodation 
within it. T h e main objectives were to render the colonial system less 
oppressive, less dehumanizing and to m a k e it beneficial to the Africans 
as well as the Europeans. African leaders sought the correction of such 
specific measures and abuses as forced labour, high taxation, compulsory 
cultivation of crops, land alienation, pass laws, low prices of agricultural 
products and high prices of imported goods, racial discrimination and 
segregation, and to improve inadequate facilities such as hospitals, pipe-
borne water and schools. 
These grievances against the colonial system were felt, it should be 
emphasized, a m o n g all classes of society, the educated as well as the illiterate 
and the urban as well as the rural dwellers, and generated a c o m m o n con-
sciousness a m o n g them as Africans and black m e n as opposed to their 
oppressors, the colonial rulers and the white m e n . It is during this period 
that w e see the strengthening of African political nationalism which had 
its beginnings immediately after the completion of the establishment of 
the colonial system in the 1910s. 
T h e articulation of this feeling and the leadership of the movement , 
which during the period up to the 1910s was the responsibility of the 
traditional authorities and developed within the framework of the pre-
colonial political structures, was n o w assumed by the n e w educated elite 
groups or m e m b e r s of the new middle class. Those n e w leaders were, rather 
paradoxically, the products of the colonial system itself, created and sus-
tained through the schools and the administrative, mining, financial and 
commercial institutions that it introduced. It is the concentration of the 
leadership of the nationalist and anti-colonialist activities in the hands of 
the educated Africans w h o lived mainly in the n e w urban centres which 
has led to the incorrect identification of African nationalism in the inter-war 
period exclusively with that class and its characterization as primarily an 
urban phenomenon. 
N u m e r o u s groups and associations were formed for the articulation of 
these nationalist aspirations. A s is evident in the chapters in this section, 
the strategies and tactics that were devised during this period in order 
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to give expression to these aspirations were equally diverse. A s B . O . 
Oloruntimehin and E . S . Atiento-Odhiambo have shown (Chapters 22 and 
26 below), these groups included youth associations, ethnic associations, 
old boys' associations, political parties, political movements of both a 
territorial and inter-territorial nature and inside as well as outside the con-
tinent, trade unions, literary clubs, civil servants' clubs, improvement 
associations, and various religious sects or movements. S o m e of these had 
been formed in the period before the First World W a r but there is no 
doubt that they proliferated during the period under review, as the chapters 
show. 
T h e weapons or tactics adopted during the period, unlike those of the 
pre-First World W a r period w h e n rebellions and so-called riots were more 
prevalent, were petitions and delegations to the metropolitan and local 
governments, strikes, boycotts, above all the press and international con-
gresses. T h e inter-war period was easily the hey-day of journalism in Africa 
in general and in West Africa in particular, while pan-African congresses 
also became a typical feature of the anti-colonial movement . These con-
gresses were calculated to give nationalist and anti-colonial movements 
in Africa an international flavour; they hoped also to draw the attention 
of the metropolitan powers to events in the colonies, and it was for this 
reason that the pan-African congresses organized by the American black, 
D r W . E . B . D u Bois were held in Paris, London , Brussels and even Lisbon. 
This theme is taken up in greater detail in Chapter 29, which deals with 
the interactions between the blacks of Africa and the blacks of the diaspora 
in the Americas during the entire period under review. 
However , despite the diversity of associations and the complexity of 
the tactics they developed, with the sole exception of Egypt, very little 
real impact had been m a d e on the colonial system by the early 1930s. 
A n d w h e n in 1935, the imperial forces of Fascist Italy under Mussolini 
seized and occupied Ethiopia, one of the two remaining bastions of hope 
and the main symbol of Africa's future revival and rejuvenation, it looked 
as if the continent of Africa was doomed to be for ever under the yoke 
of colonialism. But this was not to be. T h e resilience of the African people, 
the occupation of Ethiopia itself, the intensification of African nationalism 
and anti-colonialist sentiment after the Second World W a r , coupled with 
the emergence of n e w mass political parties and a n e w radical leadership 
dedicated not to the amelioration but rather the complete uprooting of 
colonialism - all these factors combined, as Volume VIII of this work 
will show, to bring about the liquidation of colonial rule from the continent 
at a rate as quick, and within about the same twenty-year period, as it 
took to establish it. However , between 1880 and 1935, colonialism appeared 
to be firmly imprinted on Africa. W h a t marks then did it leave on Africa? 
This is the question that is answered in the last chapter of the volume. 
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Sources for the writing of Volume VII 
T w o final topics should be considered in this introductory chapter. These 
are the sources for the study of, and the periodization for, the history 
of colonialism in Africa. A s far as sources are concerned, the authors and 
research students enjoy some advantages as well as disadvantages over those 
of the other volumes. T o take the latter first, this volume and Volume 
VIII cover periods in which, unlike those of the other volumes, part of 
the archival materials is still inaccessible to scholars. Indeed, some archival 
material in several metropolitan countries such as that in France for the 
period up to 1930 was opened to scholars only after some of these chapters 
had already been completed. Moreover, with the partition and the entry 
of so m a n y different European powers into Africa, the problem of language 
that faces research students becomes a difficult one. 
T o compensate for this, more journals and periodicals become available 
and published parliamentary papers, debates, commissions of inquiries, 
papers of private companies and associations, and published annual reports 
become more numerous than in the periods before; all of these are available. 
Above all, some of the actors in the colonial drama themselves are still 
alive and can be and have been interviewed. Others, both African and 
European, have also begun to publish their memoirs and autobiographies 
or to recall them in novels, plays and learned treatises. In all these respects, 
the authors of this volume enjoy some advantages over most of the authors 
of the other volumes. 
Finally, it appears far more research has been and is still being done 
on the subject of colonialism and far more has been published and is still 
being published on it than on any other theme in African history. Indeed, 
within the last ten years, a five-volume history of colonialism in Africa 
edited by L . H . G a n n and Peter Duignan and published by the Cambridge 
University Press has appeared. T h e theme has also attracted far more 
attention in the Eastern European countries than probably any other theme. 
This of course makes the work of synthesis relatively easier as far as sources 
are concerned but rather more exacting with respect to the mass of material 
to be absorbed by authors. 
Periodization of colonialism in Africa 
T h e question of the periodization of the history of colonialism in Africa, 
which has been ignored by m a n y historians but was raised by A . B . 
Davidson and Michael Crowder in the 1960s, should be briefly looked at. 
S o m e historians have proposed 1870 as the date for the beginning of 
the European Scramble for Africa and the imposition of colonial rule. This 
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date, however, seems to be too early. A s G . N . Uzoigwe shows in Chapter 2, 
it was the activities of the French in the Senegambia region, of King 
Leopold of the Belgians represented by H . M . Stanley, and the French 
represented by Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza in the Congo region, and of 
the Portuguese in Central Africa that touched off the Scramble and all 
these activities surely did not commence until the late 1870s and early 
1880s. It seems, therefore, that 1880 would be a more appropriate date 
than 1870.20 F r o m 1880 to the collapse of colonialism in the 1960s and 
1970s, therefore, the study of colonial rule,and African initiatives and 
reactions should be divided into three eras: 1880-1919 (subdivided into 
1880-1900 and 1900-19, the periods of conquest and occupation respect-
ively), which w e would term the era of the defence of African sovereignty 
and independence using the strategy of confrontation or alliance or tempor-
ary submission; the period 1919-35 which w e would call the period of 
accommodation using the strategy of protest or resistance; and the period 
since 1935 which is the period of the independence movements using the 
strategy of positive action.21 
It is our contention that the period from 1880 to about 1919, the so-called 
era of pacification in the view of some historians, was the period which, 
from the European perspective, saw the completion of the partition on 
paper, the deployment of troops to effect the partition on the ground, and 
the effective occupation of the conquered areas, signified by the intro-
duction of various administrative measures and an infrastructure of roads, 
railways and the telegraph for the exploitation of the resources of the 
colonies. 
F r o m the African perspective, as w e have seen already, this period saw 
African kings, queens, lineage and clan heads all dominated by one over-
riding consideration, that of maintaining or regaining their sovereignty, 
patrimony and culture by the strategy of confrontation or alliance or sub-
mission. B y 1919, in practically the whole of Africa, with the conspicuous 
exception of Libya and some parts of the Sahara, and Liberia and Ethiopia, 
the confrontation had been resolved in favour of the Europeans, and all 
Africans, the so-called resisters and the so-called collaborators alike, had 
lost their sovereignty. 
T h e second phase is from 1919 to 1935, and this is the phase in which 
w e can properly categorize African reactions in terms of resistance, or as 
w e would prefer to call it, of protest. W e have chosen 1919 not only 
because it succeeds influential events such as the end of the First World 
W a r , the October Revolution in the Russian empire and the calling of 
the first Pan-African Congress by D u Bois — all of which had a revolutionary 
impact on the course of world history — but also because by that date 
20. See M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 17-19. 
21. For different periodizations, see A . B . Davidson, in T . O . Ranger (ed.), 1968(c), 
pp. 177-88. Also M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 17-19. 
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opposition to the European occupation of Africa as such had ended in 
most parts of the continent. 
W e also chose 1935 rather than 1945 as the terminal date of the volume 
because that was the year of the invasion and occupation of Ethiopia by 
the Fascist forces of Mussolini. That crises shocked and outraged Africans, 
especially the educated Africans, and blacks the world over. It also awakened 
them more dramatically to the inhuman, racist and oppressive nature of 
colonialism far more than the Second World W a r did. As K w a m e N k r u m a h , 
later first President of Ghana , described his reactions on hearing the news 
of that invasion, 'At that m o m e n t it was almost as if the whole of L o n d o n 
had declared war on m e personally';22 and as he confessed, that crisis 
exacerbated his hatred for colonialism. Indeed, it seems most likely that the 
struggle for the liberation of Africa from colonialism would have been 
launched in the late 1930s but for the outbreak of the Second World W a r . 
T h e final period from 1935 to the era of the independence revolution 
belongs properly to the next and final volume of this work and should 
not be discussed here. 
22. K . Nkrumah, 1957, p. 27. 
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conquest of Africa: 
an overview 
G. N . U Z O I G W E 
Introduction: a generation of war and revolutionary change 
T h e generation following 1880 witnessed one of the most significant his-
torical movements of modern times. During this period Africa, a continent 
of over 28 million square kilometres, was partitioned, conquered and occu-
pied effectively by the industrialized nations of Europe. Historians have not 
yet come to grips with the deleterious impact of this generation of con-
tinuous war on both the colonized and the colonizer. But that it was a 
generation of revolutionary change of a fundamental nature is generally 
stressed. 
T h e great significance of our period, however, goes beyond the war and 
the change that it witnessed. Empires have risen and fallen in the past, 
conquests and usurpations are as old as history itself, and models of colonial 
administration and integration have been tried and tested in days gone 
by. Africa was the last continent to be subdued by Europe. W h a t is most 
remarkable about our period is the co-ordinated manner, speed and c o m -
parative ease - from the European point of view - with which the occupation 
and subjugation of so vast a continent was accomplished. Nothing like 
it had happened before. 
W h a t gave rise to such a phenomenon? O r , to put it another way, w h y 
was Africa partitioned politically and systematically occupied in the period 
that it was? A n d w h y were Africans unable to keep their adversaries at 
bay? These questions have exercised the skills of historians of the partition 
and of the n e w imperialism since the 1880s. N o generally acceptable ex-
planation exists; on the contrary, the historiography of the partition has 
become one of the most controversial and emotive issues of our time. It 
presents the historian with the awesome task of making sense of an extra-
ordinary phantasmagoria of conflicting interpretations. 
T h e partition of Africa and the n e w imperialism: a review 
There is need, therefore, to bring sanity to the jumble of theories regarding 
this crucial movement in African history. T h e y m a y be conveniently cate-
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gorized as follows: economic, psychological, diplomatic, and the African 
dimension. 
T h e economic theory 
T h e popularity of this theory has changed, like fashion, with the times. 
Before c o m m u n i s m became a threat to the capitalist system of the West, 
no one seriously questioned the economic basis of imperial expansion. It 
was no accident, therefore, that Joseph Schumpeter's attack upon the notion 
of capitalist imperialism1 was extremely popular among non-Marxist 
scholars. T h e onslaught against this theory which he initiated has been 
pressed h o m e so devastatingly that, today, it has reached the point of dimin-
ishing returns. Consequently, the theory of economic imperialism, in 
modified form, has begun increasingly nowadays to win acceptance. 
W h a t is the meaning of economic imperialism? Its theoretical roots can 
be traced back to 1900 when the G e r m a n Social Democrats .placed the 
subject of Weltpolitik, that is, the policy of imperial expansion on a global 
scale, on the agenda of their annual party congress held at Mainz. It was 
here that Rosa Luxemburg first pointed out that imperialism was the final 
stage of capitalism. It was here also that George Ledebour noted that 'the 
central point of the Weltpolitik'' was 'an upsurge of all capitalism towards 
a policy of plunder, which takes European and American capitalism into 
all parts of the world'.2 T h e classic and clearest statement of this theory, 
however, was provided by John Atkinson Hobson. H e argued that over-
production, surplus capital, and under-consumption in industrialized 
nations led them 'to place larger and larger portions of their economic 
resources outside the area of their present political domain, and to stimulate 
a policy of political expansion so as to take in n e w areas'. This he saw 
as the 'economic taproot of imperialism'. Admitting that non-economic 
forces did play a part in imperial expansion, he was nevertheless convinced 
that although ' A n ambitious statesman, a pushing trader, m a y suggest or 
even initiate a step of imperial expansion, m a y assist in educating patriotic 
public opinion of the urgent need of some fresh advance . . . the final deter-
mination rests with the financial power'.3 
Borrowing freely from the central arguments of the G e r m a n Social 
Democrats as well as from those of Hobson, V . I. Lenin emphasized that 
the n e w imperialism was characterized by the transition of capitalism from 
a 'pre-monopolist' orientation 'in which free competition was predomi-
nant . . . to the stage of monopoly capitalism to finance capital' which 'is 
connected with the intensification of the struggle for the partition of the 
world'.4 Just as competitive capitalism thrived on the export of c o m m o d i -
1. J. Schumpeter, 1955. 
2. Quoted in L . Basso, in N . Chomsky, et al., 1972, p. 114. 
3. J. A . Hobson, 1902, pp. 59, 80-1. 
4. V . I. Lenin, 1916, p. 92 (emphasis in original). 
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ties, so monopoly capitalism thrived on the export of capital derived from 
the super-profits amassed by the cartel of banks and industry. This 
development, according to Lenin, was the highest stage of capitalism. 
Following Luxemburg , and in opposition to Hobson, Lenin believed that 
capitalism was doomed to self-destruction because having finally par-
titioned the world, the capitalists, n o w rentiers and parasites living on 
incomes from their investments, would be threatened by the growing 
nations w h o would demand a repartition of the world. T h e capitalists, 
greedy as ever, would refuse to comply. T h e issue, therefore, would be 
settled by war which they would inevitably lose. W a r , then, is the inevitable 
consequence of imperialism, the violent death of capitalism. 
It is not surprising that this rousing propaganda has been accepted by 
m a n y Marxist scholars. 'Third World' nationalists and radicals also 
accepted the views of Hobson and Lenin as a matter of course. A n d in 
alliance with radical western scholars, they portray imperialism and 
colonialism as the outcome of blatant economic exploitation.5 
Although Hobson and Lenin were not particularly concerned with Africa, 
it is obvious that their analyses have fundamental implications for its 
partition. Consequently, a disparate army of non-Marxist scholars has, 
more or less, demolished the Marxist economic imperialism theory as it 
relates to Africa.6 A typical reaction of Marxist scholars to this apparent 
victory is that although the criticisms of Hobson and Lenin are basically 
correct, they are nevertheless misdirected. ' T h e target', writes B o b 
Sutcliffe, 'is often a mirage and the weapons inappropriate' because im-
perialism, conceived as a general phenomenon, views the value of empire 
as a totality, and therefore 'a national balance sheet has very little meaning'.7 
A more compelling argument, however, is that even a thorough demolition 
of the classic theory of economic imperialism does not necessarily refute 
the conclusion that imperialism was essentially economic in its fundamental 
impulses. T o belittle other economic views of imperialism and then to 
jubilantly hang their proponents because of their suspected association with 
Hobson and Lenin is rather unscholarly. It is n o w clear from more serious 
investigations of African history in this period that those w h o persist in 
trivializing the economic dimension of the partition do so at their o w n 
peril.8 
T h e psychological theories 
I discuss these theories - usually classified as Social Darwinism, evangelical 
5. W . Rodney, 1972; also Chinweizu, 1975, especially Chapter 3. 
6. Representative of these criticisms are D . K . Fieldhouse, 1961; M . Blaug, 1961; 
B . Sutcliffe in R . O w e n and B . Sutcliffe (eds), 1972, pp. 316-20. 
7. B . Sutcliffe in R . O w e n and B . Sutcliffe (eds), 1972, p. 318; cf. idem, pp. 312-23. 
8. See, for example, A . G . Hopkins, 1968, 1973; C . W . Newbury and A . S. Kanya-
Forstner, 1969; J. Stengers, 1962. 
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Christianity, and social atavism — in psychological terms because of their 
proponents' c o m m o n belief in the primacy of the 'white race'. 
Social Darwinism 
T h e appearance in November 1859 of Charles Darwin's The Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races 
in the Struggle for Life9 seemed to some to provide scientific backing for 
the belief in the primacy of the European race, a theme that has figured 
continuously, in various guises, in European writing since the seventeenth 
century. T h e later Darwinians, therefore, were elated to be able to justify 
the conquest of what they called 'subject races' or 'backward races' 
by the 'master race' as the inevitable process of'natural selection' by which 
the stronger dominates the weaker in the struggle for existence. T h e y 
preached, therefore, that might was right. T h e partition of Africa was con-
sequently seen by them as part of this inevitable, natural process. T h e 
interesting aspect of this flagrant racial jingoism which has been described 
appropriately as 'Albinism' is its affirmation of imperial responsibility. ' ° 
T h e fact remains, however, that Social Darwinism, applied to the conquest 
of Africa, was more a rationalization after the event than its originator. 
Evangelical Christianity 
Evangelical Christianity, in whose eyes the Origin of Species was damnable 
heresy, had no qualms, nevertheless, in accepting its racial implications. 
T h e racial content of evangelical Christianity was, however, tempered with 
a generous dose of humanitarian and philanthropic zeal - sentiments wide-
spread a m o n g European policy-makers during the conquest of Africa. It 
has been argued, therefore, that the partition of Africa was due, in no 
small measure, to a 'broader missionary' and humanitarian impulse which 
aimed at the regeneration of African peoples. ' ' It has been asserted, more -
over, that it was the missionaries w h o prepared the ground for the im-
position of colonialism in East and Central Africa as well as in Madagascar. ' 2 
Although it is true that missionaries did not resist the conquest of Africa, 
and that they did, in some areas, actively pursue that conquest, the 
missionary factor cannot be sustained as a general theory of imperialism 
because of its limited application. 
Social atavism 
It was Joseph Schumpeter w h o first explained the new imperialism in 
9. C . Darwin, 1859. 
10. For more details of these views see R . Maunier, trans, and ed. by E . O . Lorimer, 
1949; and G . Himmelfarb, i960. 
11. See J. S. Galbraith, 1961, pp. 34-48; G . Bennett, (ed.), 1953; C . P. Groves in L . H . 
Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1969, for surveys of the missionary impulse towards imperial 
expansion. 
12. R . Oliver, 1965; R . I. Rotberg, 1965; P. M . Mutibwa, 1974. 
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sociological terms. T o h im, imperialism was the consequence of certain 
imponderable, psychological elements and not of economic pressures. His 
argument, couched in humanistic rather than in European racial terms, 
is based on what he saw as the natural desire of m a n to dominate his 
fellow m e n for the sake of dominating them. This native impulse to 
aggression is governed by m a n ' s universal thirst for usurpation. Imperial-
ism, therefore, is a collective national egotism: 'the objectless disposition 
on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion'.13 T h e n e w imperial-
ism, he argued, was also atavistic in character,I * that is, it was a reversion 
to earlier primitive political and social instincts in m a n which m a y have 
been justified in pre-modern times but were certainly not in the modern 
world. H e then demonstrated h o w capitalism was, by its nature, 'anti-
imperialistic' and benign. Presided over by innovative entrepreneurs, it 
was opposed entirely to the aggressive, imperialistic motivations of the 
ancient monarchies and warrior classes, whose ambitions had no clear 
objects. Capitalism, on the contrary, had clear objects and was, therefore, 
opposed completely to this atavistic behaviour characteristic of ancient 
regimes. T h u s he concluded that the economic explanation of the n e w 
imperialism, based as it was on the logical development of capitalism, 
was invalid. In spite of the attraction of this argument, its major weakness 
is its nebulous and ahistorical quality. While the psychological theories 
m a y have an element of truth in them as an explanation of the partition, 
they do not explain w h y the partition occurred w h e n it did. They do 
suggest, however, w h y it was possible and considered desirable. 
T h e diplomatic theories 
These constitute the purely political, and perhaps the most popular, ex-
planations of the partition. But in an interesting way they provide specific 
and concrete backing to the psychological theories. In these diplomatic 
theories w e see the national egotism of European states either in conflict 
with one another, or acting in concert to ensure self-preservation, or reacting 
decisively against the forces of primordial African nationalisms. It is pro-
posed, therefore, to treat these theories in the following terms: national 
prestige; balance of power; and global strategy. 
National prestige 
T h e greatest exponent of this theory is Carlton Hayes. In a perceptive 
passage he contends: 
France sought compensation for European loss in overseas gain. 
England would offset her European isolation by enlarging and glorify-
ing the British empire. Russia, halted in the Balkans, would turn anew 
13. J. Schumpeter, 1955, p. 6. 
14. ibid., p. 65. 
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to Asia, and Germany and Italy would show the world that the prestige 
they had w o n by might inside Europe they were entitled to enhance 
by imperial exploits outside. T h e lesser powers, with no great prestige 
at stake, managed to get on without any new imperialism, though 
Portugal and Holland displayed a revived pride in the empires they 
already possessed and the latter's was administered with renewed 
vigor.1S 
Hayes concludes therefore that 'the n e w imperialism' was basically 'a 
nationalistic phenomenon' and that its proponents hankered after national 
prestige. European leaders, in short, having consolidated their nations and 
realigned their diplomatic forces at h o m e , were propelled by a nebulous 
or atavistic force which expressed itself in a 'psychological reaction, an 
ardent desire to maintain or recover national prestige'. T h u s , he concludes, 
the partition of Africa was not an economic phenomenon. 1 6 
Balance of power 
F . H . Hinsley,17 on the other hand, emphasizes Europe's need for peace 
and stability at h o m e as the primary cause of the partition. According to 
him, the decisive date for the shift towards an extra-European age - an 
age of imperialism - was 1878. F r o m that year, at the Congress of Berlin, 
Russian and British rivalries in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire 
brought the nations of Europe to the very verge of conflagration. European 
statesmen averted this crisis in power politics and drew back. Power politics 
from that point on to the Bosnian crisis of 1908 were removed from Europe 
and played out in Africa and Asia. W h e n conflicting interests in Africa 
threatened to destroy European peace, the European powers had no choice 
but to carve up Africa in order to preserve the European diplomatic balance 
that had stabilized itself by the 1880s. 
Global strategy 
There is a third school which maintains that the European interest in Africa 
which gave rise to the Scramble was a matter of global strategy, not 
economics. T h e foremost exponents of this view, Ronald Robinson and 
John Gallagher, w h o stress the strategic importance of Africa to India 
for Britain, blame the partition of Africa on the impact of atavistic 'proto-
nationalist' movements in Africa which threatened the global strategic 
interests of European nations. These 'romantic, reactionary struggles' — 
gallant anachronisms in their view — compelled reluctant European states-
m e n , hitherto content to exercise informal paramountcy and moral suasion 
in Africa, to partition and conquer the continent. Africa was occupied, 
15. C . J. H . Hayes, 1941, p. 220. 
16. ibid. 
17. F. H . Hinsley, 1959(a), 1959(b) in E . A . Benians, J. Butler and C . E . Carrington 
(eds), 1959. 
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therefore, not because of what it could offer materially to the Europeans -
for it was economically worthless - but because it was threatening European 
interests elsewhere.18 
O n e primary aim of the psychological theories as well as of their cousins, 
the diplomatic theories, has been to debunk the notion that the partition 
of Africa was motivated by economic impulses. But the prestige argument 
only appears unconvincing w h e n its economic concomitant is eliminated 
or unduly played d o w n . Hayes, for example, has documented in detail the 
tariff war which took place between the European nations during the crucial 
period of the partition. ' 9 H e even concedes that, ' W h a t actually started 
the economic push into the "Dark Continent" and the sun-baked islands 
of the Pacific was not so m u c h an overproduction of factory goods in Europe 
as an under-supply of raw materials';20 and that therefore 'to prevent too 
m u c h of the world from being . . . monopolized by France, G e r m a n y , Italy, 
or any other protectionist power, Great Britain moved mightily to gather 
the lion's share into her o w n free-trade empire'. In other words, neo-
mercantilism, once established, had very important consequences for the 
emergence of imperial rivalries.21 A n d yet, on the very next page, Hayes 
sets out to argue confidently, as w e have seen, against the economic under-
pinnings of the n e w imperialism. H . Brunschwig, too, while positing a 
non-economic interpretation of French imperialism was faced with the stark 
economic dimension of empire, and was thus compelled to assign it some 
role. Thus , while he sees Anglo-Saxon imperialism as economic and 
philanthropic, that of France is seen as being motivated by prestige.22 
With respect to the global strategy thesis, informed reactions have been 
largely negative. Its attraction, however, for non-Africanist historians -
or for the lay reader - has been simply overwhelming. Yet w e k n o w that 
this thesis, developed from the more eclectic assumptions of Langer2 3 and 
the more considered analysis of Hinsley, is too neat and too circumstantial 
to be acceptable. It has been tested in West, Central, Southern and East 
Africa and found wanting.24 A n d with respect to Egypt and North Africa, 
it has been shown that there were strong reasons unconnected with Britain's 
Indian imperial strategy necessitating a British presence.25 It is gratifying 
to note that Robinson, at any rate, has begun to de-emphasize the exagger-
18. See J. Gallagher and R . Robinson, 1953; R . E . Robinson and J. Gallagher in 
F . H . Hinsley (ed.), 1962. R . E . Robinson and J. Gallagher, 1961. 
19. C . J. H . Hayes, 1941, pp. 205-8. 
20. ibid., p. 218. 
21. ibid., p. 219. 
22. H . Brunschwig, 1966, pp. 4-13. 
23. W . L . Langer, 1935. 
24. See J. Stengers, 1962; C . W . Newbury and A . S. Kanya-Forstner, 1969; G . N . 
Uzoigwe, 1974 and 1977; W . R . Louis (ed.), 1976. 
25. G . N . Uzoigwe, 1974. 
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ated repercussions of the baton Egyptien on the Scramble elsewhere in 
Africa.26 
T h e African dimension theory 
T h u s far, the theories of the partition have treated Africa in the context 
of European history. Clearly, this is a major flaw. Even the 'proto-
nationalist' atavism approach of Robinson and Gallagher is not fully 
developed precisely because the focus of their interest is Europe and Asia. 
T h e need, therefore, to look at the partition from the African historical 
perspective becomes crucial. Contrary to general belief, such an approach 
is no ingenious discovery of the 'new' African historiography. J. S . Keltie's 
remarkable book, The Partition of Africa,27 published in 1893, does note 
perceptively that the Scramble of the 1880s was the logical consequence 
of the nibbling at the continent which started some 300 years ago. It 
also gives a nodding acceptance to the view that the partition was economic-
ally motivated although that is not its central argument. In the 1930s, 
George Hardy, the prolific French colonial historian, also demonstrated 
the local African dimensions of the partition, and he treated Africa very 
m u c h as a historical unity. Like Keltie, he argues that although the 
immediate cause of partition was the economic rivalry of the countries 
of industrial Europe, it was at the same time an important phase in the 
longstanding contact between Europe and Africa. H e suggests that African 
resistance to increasing European influence precipitated the actual conquest 
just as the increasing commercial rivalry of the industrialized nations led 
to the partition.28 
For a long time such views of the partition were ignored. But with the 
publication in 1956 of K . O n w u k a Dike's classic Trade and Politics in the 
Niger Delta,29 the African dimension of the partition was resurrected. 
Although Dike's book is limited in its time span and geographical range, 
it nevertheless encouraged a generation of historians to begin to treat the 
partition in the context of a long period of contact of different races and 
cultures. Unfortunately, while Roland Oliver and J. D . Fage demonstrate 
this extended relationship in their very popular Short History of Africa,30 
they still emphasize the European rather than the African dimension of 
the partition. It is therefore refreshing that A . G . Hopkins' important 
study,31 although limited in its geographical scope, should attempt an 
African-oriented reinterpretation of imperialism in West Africa. His con-
clusion is worth quoting: 
26. R . Robinson in R . O w e n and B . Sutcliffe (eds), 1972. 
27. J. S . Keltie, 1893. 
28. G . Hardy, 1930, pp. 124-37. 
29. K . O . Dike, 1956. 
30. R . Oliver and J. D . Fage, 1970. 
31. A . G . Hopkins, 1973. 
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At one extreme it is possible to conceive of areas where the transition 
from the slave trade was m a d e successfully, where incomes were main-
tained, and where internal tensions were controlled. In these cases 
an explanation of partition will need to emphasise external pressures, 
such as mercantile demands and Anglo-French rivalries. At the other 
extreme, it is possible to envisage cases where the indigenous rulers 
adopted reactionary attitudes, where attempts were m a d e to maintain 
incomes by predatory means, and where internal conflicts were pro-
nounced. In these cases an explanation of imperialism will need to 
place more weight on disintegrative forces on the African side of the 
frontier, though without neglecting external factors.32 
T h e present writer agrees with most of the views of members of this 
school.33 Like them, he explains the partition in both African and European 
terms, and therefore sees the African dimension theory as supplementing 
the Eurocentric theories already discussed. H e sees the partition and con-
quest as the logical consequence of European nibbling at Africa which 
started well before the nineteenth century; he accepts that the essentially 
economic impulse that necessitated that nibbling changed drastically during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century; that the change was caused by 
the transition from slave to legitimate trade and the subsequent decline 
in both the export and import trade during that period, and that it was 
this economic change in Africa and the consequent African resistance to 
increasing European influence that precipitated the actual military con-
quest. It would appear, indeed, that the African dimension theory provides 
a better rounded, more historically focused theory of the partition than 
any of the purely Eurocentric theories. 
T h e beginnings of the Scramble 
Although by the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the 
European powers of France, Britain, Portugal and G e r m a n y had acquired 
commercial interests and were exercising considerable influence in different 
parts of Africa, their direct political control there was extremely limited. 
Both G e r m a n y and, especially, Britain were able to wield all the influence 
they wanted, and no statesmen in their right senses would have freely 
elected to incur the costs, and court the unforeseen contingencies of formal 
annexation when they could derive the same advantages from informal 
control. 'Refusals to annex', it has been remarked perceptively, 'are no 
proof of reluctance to control'.34 This explains both the attitudes of 
32. ibid., pp. 165-6. 
33. T h e African dimension theory is more fully developed in A . G . Hopkins, 1973 and 
in G . N . Uzoigwe, 1973. 
34. J. Gallagher and R . Robinson, 1953, p. 3. 
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Salisbury and Bismarck and indeed of most of the major actors in the 
partition. 
But this attitude began to change as a result of three major events which 
occurred between 1876 and 1880. T h e first was the new interest which 
the D u k e of Brabant, crowned a constitutional king (Leopold I) of the 
Belgians in 1865, proclaimed in Africa. This was signified by the so-called 
Brussels Geographical Conference which he convened in 1876 and which 
resulted in the setting up of the African International Association and the 
employment of H . M . Stanley in 1879 to explore the Congos in the n a m e 
of the Association. These moves culminated in the creation of the Congo 
Free State, whose recognition by all the great European nations Leopold 
managed to obtain before the Berlin West African conference had ended 
its deliberations.35 
T h e second significant series of events was the activities of Portugal 
from 1876 onwards. Piqued by the fact that it was invited to the Brussels 
conference only as an afterthought, Portugal sent out a flurry of expeditions 
which by 1880 had resulted in the annexation to the Portuguese crown 
of the practically independent estates of the Afro-Portuguese rulers in 
Mozambique. So far as the Portuguese and King Leopold were concerned, 
then, the Scramble was under way by 1876. 
T h e third and final factor which helped to set the partition in motion 
was undoubtedly the expansionist m o o d which characterized French 
colonial policy between 1879 and 1880. This was signified by her partici-
pation with Britain in the dual control of Egypt (1879), the dispatch of 
Savorgnan de Brazza into the Congo and the ratification of his treaties 
with Chief M a k o k o of the Bateke, and the revival of French colonial 
initiative in both Tunisia and Madagascar.36 
These moves on the part of these powers between 1876 and 1880 gave 
a clear indication that they were all n o w committed to colonial expansion 
and the establishment of formal control in Africa, and it was this that 
finally compelled both Britain and Germany to abandon their preference 
for informal control and influence in favour of a formal policy leading 
to their annexations in Southern, East and West Africa from the end of 
1883 onwards.37 T h e G e r m a n initiative, for instance, resulted in the annex-
ation of South West Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons, and G e r m a n East 
Africa, which in turn further accelerated the pace of the Scramble. 
B y the early 1880s, the Scramble was well under way, and it was out 
of fear of being pushed out of Africa altogether that Portugal proposed 
the calling of an international conference to sort out the territorial disputes 
in the area of Central Africa. It seems evident from the above, then, that 
35. P R O F O 403/192, ' M e m o r a n d u m by Sir E . Hertslet on the most important Political 
and Territorial changes which have taken place in central and East Africa since 1883 (with 
Additional Notes by Sir P. Anderson)', February, 1893. Confidential. 
36. P. M . Mutibwa, 1974, Chapters 6 and 7. 
37. See G . Cecil, 1932, pp. 225-6; F . D . Lugard, 1929, p. 13. 
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it was not the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 that triggered off the 
Scramble, as has been argued by Robinson and Gallagher,38 but rather 
the events of the period 1876 to 1880 in different parts of Africa. 
T h e Berlin W e s t Africa Conference, 1884-5 
T h e idea of an international conference to settle the territorial disputes 
arising from European activities in the C o n g o region, first suggested by 
Portugal, was later taken u p by Bismarck w h o , after sounding the opinions 
of the other powers, was encouraged to bring it about. T h e conference 
was held at Berlin between 15 N o v e m b e r 1884 and 26 N o v e m b e r 1885. 
T h e news that such a conference was to be held increased the intensity 
of the Scramble. T h e conference did not discuss seriously either the slave 
trade or the lofty humanitarian idealism that was supposed to have inspired 
it. It nevertheless passed empty resolutions regarding the abolition of the 
slave trade and the welfare of Africans. 
It was not, ostensibly, the initial intention of the conference to attempt 
a general partition of Africa. It nevertheless ended up disposing of territory, 
passing resolutions pertaining to the free navigation of the Niger, the Benue, 
and their affluents; and laying d o w n 'the rules to be observed in future 
with regard to the occupation of territory on the coasts of Africa'.39 Accord-
ing to Article 34 of the Berlin Act, the document signed by the participants 
in the conference, any European nation which, in the future, took possession 
of an African coast or declared a 'protectorate' there, had to notify such 
action to the signatory powers of the Berlin Act in order to have its claims 
ratified. This was the so-called doctrine of spheres of influence to which 
was linked the absurd concept of the hinterland, which came to be 
interpreted to m e a n that possession of a coast also implied ownership of 
its hinterland to an almost unlimited distance. Article 35 stipulated that 
an occupier of any such coastal possessions had also to demonstrate that 
it possessed sufficient 'authority' there 'to protect existing rights, and, as 
the case m a y be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions 
agreed upon'. This was the so-called doctrine oí effective occupation that 
was to m a k e the conquest of Africa such a murderous business. 
In recognizing the Congo Free State, permitting territorial negotiations, 
and by laying d o w n rules and regulations for the 'legal' appropriation of 
African territory, the European powers had arrogated to themselves the 
right of sanctioning the principle of sharing out and conquering another 
continent. There is no precedent in world history where a group of states 
in one continent felt justified in talking about the sharing and occupation 
of the territory of another continent in such a bold manner. This is the 
major significance of the conference for African history. T h e argument 
38. R . Robinson and J. Gallagher, 1961. 
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that the conference, contrary to popular opinion, did not partition Africa40 
is correct only in the most technical sense. T o all intents and purposes 
the appropriation of territory did take place at the conference and the 
question of future appropriation is clearly implied in its decisions. B y 1885, 
in fact, the broad lines of the final partition of Africa had already been 
drawn. 
Treaty-making 1885-1902 
Prior to the Berlin Act, European powers had acquired spheres of influence 
in Africa in a variety of ways — through settlement, exploration, the 
establishment of commercial posts, missionary settlements, the occupation 
of strategic areas, and by making treaties with African rulers.41 Following 
the conference, influence by means of treaty became the most important 
method of effecting the paper partition of the continent. These treaties 
took two forms — those between Africans and Europeans, and bilateral 
agreements between the Europeans themselves. T h e African-European 
treaties were basically of two kinds. Firstly, there were the slave trade 
and the commercial treaties; these had generated friction, which in turn 
led to European political interference in African affairs. Secondly, there 
were the political treaties by which African rulers either purportedly 
surrendered sovereignty in return for protection, or undertook not to enter 
into treaty obligations with other European nations. 
These political treaties were in vogue during our period. T h e y were 
m a d e either by representatives of European governments or by those of 
private organizations w h o later transferred them to their respective govern-
ments. If a metropolitan government accepted them, the territories in 
question were usually annexed or declared a protectorate; if, on the other 
hand, it suspected their authenticity, or if it felt constrained by the vicissi-
tudes of Weltpolitik to exercise caution, these treaties were used for 
bargaining purposes during the bilateral European negotiations. Africans, 
on the other hand, entered into these arrangements for a variety of motives, 
but particularly because of the interests of their people. In some cases, 
they desired treaty relations with Europeans because they hoped that 
the prestige of such a relationship would endow them with certain 
political advantages in dealing with their neighbours. Sometimes a weak 
African state would desire a treaty with a European power in the hope of 
using it to renounce allegiance to another African state that claimed 
sovereignty over it. A n African sovereign would also desire a treaty in 
the hope of using it to keep recalcitrant subject states in line. A n d sometimes 
a treaty with one European nation was seen by some African states as 
a means of preserving their independence which was being threatened by 
40. S. E . Crowe, 1942, pp. 152-75. 
41. G . N . Uzoigwe, 1976(a), pp. 189-93. 
31 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-igjS 
other European nations.42 Whatever was the case, the African-European 
political treaties played an important role in the final partition of Africa. 
T h e treaties between the Imperial British East Africa C o m p a n y ( I B E A C ) 
and B u g a n d a represent an instance w h e n an African sovereign sought the 
help of the representative of a European c o m p a n y in his dispute with his 
o w n subjects. K a b a k a M w a n g a II had written to the c o m p a n y asking that 
it should 'be good enough to c o m e and put m e on m y throne' and 
had promised to repay the c o m p a n y with 'plenty of ivory and you m a y 
do any trade in U g a n d a and all you like in the country under m e ' . 4 3 W h e n 
he received no reply to this request, he sent two ambassadors, S a m u e l 
M w e m b a and Victor Senkezi, to Zanzibar to request the assistance of the 
British, French, and G e r m a n consuls. 'If they want to help us', he instructed 
his ambassadors to ask, 'what repayment should w e m a k e them? Because 
I do not want to give them (or you) m y land. I want all Europeans of 
all nations to c o m e to U g a n d a , to build and to trade as they like.'44 It 
is clear that in making a treaty, M w a n g a did not m e a n to give u p his 
sovereignty. Later, he was to discover, to his cost, that the Europeans 
thought otherwise. Captain F . D . Lugard's treaties with M w a n g a in 
D e c e m b e r 1890 and M a r c h 1892, which offered M w a n g a 'protection', were 
imposed upon h i m rather than negotiated with h i m . It is true that the 
I B E A C did help to restore h i m to his throne but the victory of the Baganda 
Protestants (decided by Lugard's M a x i m gun) over the Baganda Catholics 
at the Battle of M e n g o (24 January 1892) had left the K a b a k a in a very 
weak position. W h e n the c o m p a n y ceased operations in B u g a n d a (31 M a r c h 
1893) it then transferred these treaties to the British government. Colonel 
H . E . Colvile's final treaty with M w a n g a (27 August 1894) confirmed all 
the previous treaties. But it went further than t h e m . Colvile d e m a n d e d 
and secured for his country 'control of Foreign affairs and revenue and 
taxes' which passed from M w a n g a 'to H . M . G o v t . , whose representative 
should also be the supreme court of appeal on all civil cases'.45 In the 
s a m e year Britain declared a protectorate over B u g a n d a . 
It is revealing that Lugard should later on write in his diaries with respect 
to treaties offering c o m p a n y protection as follows: 
N o m a n if he understood would sign it, and to say that a savage chief 
has been told that he cedes all rights to the c o m p a n y in exchange 
for nothing is an obvious untruth. If he has been told that the c o m p a n y 
will protect h i m against his enemies, and share in his wars as an ally, 
he has been told a lie, for the c o m p a n y have no idea of doing any 
such thing and n o force to d o it with if they wished.4 6 
42. S. Touval, 1966, p. 286. 
43. P R O F O 84/2061, M w a n g a to Jackson, 15 June 1889 (emphasis added). 
44. P R O F O 84/2064, M w a n g a to Euam-Smith, 25 April 1890. 
45. P R O F O 2/72, Colvile to Hardinge, 28 Aug. , 1894 (encl.) contains text of this treaty. 
46. M . Perham and M . Bull (eds), 1963, Vol. I, p. 318. 
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Lugard was saying, in essence, that his o w n treaties were fraudulently 
obtained! W e do not have space to discuss the numerous other African-
European treaties. But a passing mention m a y be m a d e of the requests 
m a d e by the Emir of N u p e in what is n o w Nigeria to Lieutenant L . A . A . 
Mizon to form an alliance with him against the Royal Niger C o m p a n y , 
with w h o m he had quarrelled,47 as an example of an African sovereign's 
desire to seek the help of one European power against another European 
power threatening his independence. 
T h e bilateral European partition treaties 
T h e acquisition of a sphere of influence by treaty was usually the first 
stage in the occupation of an African state by a European power. If such 
a treaty was not contested by any other European power, the incumbent 
power gradually turned its treaty rights into sovereign rights. A sphere 
of influence arose, therefore, in the first instance, by a unilateral declaration; 
it became a reality only w h e n it was accepted or not contested by other 
European powers. Often spheres of influences were contested, but these 
territorial difficulties and boundary disputes were eventually settled and 
ratified as a result of mutual agreements between two or more imperialist 
powers operating in the same region. T h e limits of these territorial settle-
ments were determined, as closely as possible, by a natural boundary, or, 
where no such boundary existed, by longitude and latitude. Occasionally 
they took account of indigenous political boundaries. 
T h e Anglo-German Treaty of 29 April (and 7 M a y ) 1885 which defined 
the 'spheres of action' of the two countries in certain parts of Africa is 
regarded as perhaps the first serious application of the spheres of influence 
theory in modern times.48 B y a series of similar treaties, agreements and 
conventions, the paper partition of Africa was virtually concluded by the 
end of the century. W e can deal only briefly here with the most significant 
of them. 
T h e Anglo-German delimitation treaty of 1 N o v e m b e r 1886, to take 
one example, is particularly significant. It placed Zanzibar and most of 
its dependencies within Britain's sphere of influence; on the other hand, 
it assured Germany's political influence in East Africa, thereby providing 
official recognition of the breach of Britain's monopoly in the area.49 In 
effect the treaty thus partitioned the O m a n i empire. B y the terms of the 
subsequent clarificatory agreement of 1887, Britain undertook 'to dis-
courage British annexations in the rear of the G e r m a n Sphere of Influence, 
on the understanding that the G e r m a n Government will equally discourage 
G e r m a n annexations in the rear of the British Sphere'. It was further agreed 
47. For details see R . A . Adeleye, 1971, pp. 136-9. 
48. S. Touval, 1966, p. 286. 
49. P R O F O 403/192, M e m o by Sir E . Hertslet, February 1893. 
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that if either country occupied the coast, 'the other could not, without 
consent, occupy unclaimed regions in the rear'.50 T h e vagueness of these 
hinterland arrangements regarding the westward 'sphere of influence' of 
both countries led to the famous Heligoland Treaty of 1890 which con-
cluded comprehensively the partition of East Africa. Most significantly, 
it reserved Uganda for Britain; but it also destroyed Britain's grand illusion 
of a Cape-to-Cairo route, surrendered Heligoland to G e r m a n y and put 
an end to the independence of Zanzibar. 
T h e Anglo-German Treaties of 1890 and 1893 and the Anglo-Italian 
Treaty of 1891, taken together, recognized the Upper Nile as falling within 
the British sphere of influence. T o the south, the Franco-Portuguese Treaty 
(1886), the German-Portuguese Treaty (1886), and the Anglo-Portuguese 
Treaty (1891 ) both recognized Portugal's influence in Angola and 
Mozambique as well as delimiting the British sphere in Central Africa. 
T h e Anglo-Congo Free State Treaty (1894) is equally significant because 
it settled the limits of the Congo Free State in such a way that it acted 
as a buffer between French territories and the Nile valley and provided 
for the British a Cape-to-Cairo corridor from Uganda via Lake Tanganyika 
(withdrawn in June because of G e r m a n protest). In West Africa, the most 
important arrangements were the Say-Barruwa Agreement (1890) and the 
Niger Convention (1898)51 by which Britain and France concluded the 
partition ofthat region. Finally, the Anglo-French Convention of 21 March 
1899 settled the Egyptian question while the Peace of Vereeniging (1902) — 
which ended the Anglo-Boer war - confirmed, temporarily, at any rate, 
British supremacy in South Africa. 
H o w legitimate were the political treaties with African rulers, and the 
bilateral European agreements on which were based the partition and 
conquest of Africa? A n examination of the political treaties suggests the 
conclusion that some of them were legally indefensible, some morally bank-
rupt, while others were procured legally. Nevertheless, they were essentially 
political acts defensible only in the context of European positive law which 
saw force as the basis of all law. Even where Africans openly sought treaty 
arrangements with Europeans, their decisions were invariably based on 
their perceptions of European strength. There were occasions, too, when 
Africans w h o suspected the Europeans' motives for seeking treaties and 
refused to enter into such a relationship, were induced, through unbearable 
pressures, none the less to do so. There were also numerous instances in 
which the Africans and the Europeans disagreed on the interpretation of 
the arrangements between them. In such cases, as far as the African rulers 
were concerned, these political treaties did not imply any loss of sovereignty. 
They tended to regard them as co-operative arrangements, forced or u n -
forced, which might prove to be of mutual advantage to the parties con-
50. P R O F O 403/142, Salisbury to Malet, 14 June 1890. 
51. For the most detailed account of the Niger Convention see G . N . Uzoigwe, 1974, 
Chapters 5 and 6; cf. B . I. Obichere, 1971,' Chapter 8. 
34 
European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview 
cerned. European views on the question of the legitimacy of these treaties 
varied. While some regarded them as legitimate, others, like Lugard, were 
convinced that nearly all of them were fraudulently obtained, some were 
outright forgeries, some were plainly bogus, and most were illegally 
executed.52 A n d yet, in most cases, these absurd treaties were accorded 
recognition in terms of European diplomatic convention - including, for 
example, Karl Peters' bogus East African treaties and the I B E A C treaties 
which Lugard himself dismissed as 'utter fraud'.53 There were only very 
few instances w h e n , on closer scrutiny, such treaties were found wanting 
and - as was the case with Lugard's treaties with Nikki - were invalidated 
at the conference table. 
T h e idea, too, that the European bilateral treaties, which disposed of 
African territory in some European capital without the presence or approval 
of those whose future was being determined, could be held to be valid, 
was explained in terms of European positive law. T h e European leaders 
were quite aware that a sphere of influence by treaty between two European 
nations did not affect the rights of the African sovereigns within that sphere. 
But because a sphere of influence was a political rather than a legal notion, 
a friendly power might choose to respect this fact while an unfriendly power 
might choose to ignore it. T h e same was true of the hinterland doctrine, 
notorious for its evocation of the principle of 'manifest destiny' and the 
wild claims m a d e on its behalf. Both doctrines, in short, had no legitimacy 
in international law.54 ' T h e modern doctrine of Hinterland', Salisbury 
observed in 1896, 'with its inevitable contradictions, indicates the u n -
informed and unstable condition of international law as applied to territorial 
claims resting on constructive occupation or control.'55 In other words, 
'a claim of sovereignty in Africa can only be maintained by real occupation 
of the territory claimed'.56 A n d since the notion of effective occupation -
with which the vast majority of the African states were unfamiliar - and 
the African notion of the real meaning of these treaty relations with Euro-
peans were in fundamental contradiction with one another, the situation 
of conflict was bound to be intensified. T h u s the stage was set for the 
systematic military occupation of the hinterland by the European powers. 
Military conquest, 1885-1902 
For whatever reason, the French were the most active in pursuing this 
policy of military conquest. Advancing from the upper to the lower Niger, 
they promptly defeated the Darnel of Cayor, Lat Dior, w h o fought to the 
52. See F . D . Lugard, 1893, II, p . 580; M . Perham and M . Bull (eds), 1963, Vol. I, p. 318; 
J. M . Gray, 1948. 
53. M . Perham and M . Bull, 1963, Vol. I, p. 318. 
54. M . F . Lindley, 1926, pp. 234-5. 
55. Quoted in G . N . Uzoigwe, 1976(a), pp. 196-^7. 
56. Quoted in F . D . Lugard, 1929, p. 13. 
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death in 1886; they beat M a m a d o u Lamine at the battle of Touba-Kouta 
(1887), thus ending the Soninke empire he had founded in Senegambia; 
they succeeded in breaking the prolonged and celebrated resistance of the 
great Samori Ture when they finally captured him (1898) and exiled him 
to Gabon (1900); and by a series of victories - Koundian (1889), Segu 
(1890), and Youri (1891) - Major Louis Archinard brought to an end the 
Segu Tukulor empire although its ruler, A h m a d u , continued a stubborn 
resistance until his death in Sokoto in 1898. Elsewhere in West Africa 
the French conquered the Ivory Coast and the future French Guinea where 
they set up colonies in 1893. A n d between 1890 and 1894 the conquest 
and occupation of the kingdom of D a h o m e y was accomplished. B y the 
late 1890s, the French had completed the conquest of Gabon, consolidated 
their position in North Africa, completed the conquest of Madagascar 
(exiling Queen Rana valona III in 1897 to Algiers), and in the eastern 
Sahara-Sahel borderlands ended the obstinate resistance of Rabih of Sennar 
when he was killed in battle in 1900. 
Britain's military imperialism was equally spectacular and bloody; the 
African response, as will be seen in the following chapters, was also resolute 
and often prolonged. Operating from its coastal possessions on the Gold 
Coast (now Ghana) and in Nigeria, Britain halted effectively French 
expansion towards the lower Niger and into the Asante hinterland. T h e 
last Kumasi expedition (1900) was followed up in 1901 by the annexation 
of Asante, and Nana Prempeh was exiled to the Seychelles. T h e Northern 
Territories to the north of Asante were also formally annexed in 1901, having 
been occupied between 1896 and 1898. F r o m the Lagos colony, Britain 
launched its conquest of Nigeria. B y 1893 most of Yorubaland had been 
proclaimed a protectorate; the conquest of Itsekiriland was accomplished 
in 1894, and Nana O l o m u , its resourceful 'merchant prince', was exiled 
to Accra; and while apparently unable to challenge King Jaja of O p o b o 
in open battle, Harry Johnston, the British Consul, tricked him into attend-
ing a meeting aboard a British warship, where he was made prisoner and 
shipped to the West Indies in 1887. Both Brass and Bini were duly con-
quered by the end of the century. By 1900, British supremacy in southern 
Nigeria was more or less assured. T h e effective occupation of Igboland 
and some other areas of the eastern hinterland, however, were not accom-
plished until the first two decades of this century. T o the north, British 
conquest was accomplished from N u p e , where — by 1895 — George Goldie's 
Royal Niger C o m p a n y exercised influence from Lokoja to the sea. Ilorin 
was occupied in 1897; and after the establishment of the West African 
Frontier Force in 1898 the Sokoto sultanate was conquered by Lugard 
in 1902. 
In North Africa, Britain, already in a commanding position in Egypt, 
waited until 1896 when the reconquest of the Sudan was authorized. This 
was achieved in 1898 with savage and unnecessary bloodshed. Over 20000 
Sudanese, including their leader, Khalifa 'Abdallah, died in battle. France's 
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occupation of Fashoda in the south of the Sudan (1898) was understandably 
not countenanced by Lord Salisbury, and the French were forced to 
withdraw. 
T h e formal declaration of a British protectorate over Zanzibar in 
November 1890, and the efforts then made to abolish the institution of 
slavery, led to revolts which were easily crushed. It was from Zanzibar 
that the rest of British East Africa was conquered. T h e major prize sought 
by Britain in this region was Uganda, where the battle of M e n g o (1892) -
in Buganda, the centre of operations - led eventually to the formal 
declaration of the Uganda Protectorate (1894). T h e way was thus cleared 
for the conquest of the rest of Uganda which was accomplished with the 
capture of King Kabarega and King M w a n g a and their exile to the 
Seychelles in 1899. In Kenya, however, it took Britain some ten years 
before it established effective rule among the Nandi. 
In Central and Southern Africa, Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa 
C o m p a n y ( B S A C ) undertook the occupation of Mashonaland without 
Lobengula's sanction. In 1893 the king was forced to flee from his capital, 
and he died the following year. His kingdom was not conquered finally, 
however, until the bloody suppression of the Ndebele-Mashona revolt of 
1896-7. T h e conquest of what is n o w Zambia was less eventful and was 
completed in 1901. T h e last of Britain's partition wars was fought against 
the Boers in South Africa. T h e particular interest of the Anglo-Boer war 
( 1899-1902) is that it was fought between the Europeans themselves. 
T h e other European powers found effective occupation equally arduous. 
T h e Germans, for example, were able to establish their rule effectively 
in South West Africa by the end of the century, primarily because of the 
more than one hundred years of hostility that had prevented the N a m a 
and the Maherero from working together. In Togoland, the Germans allied 
themselves with the small kingdoms of the Kotokoli and the Chakossi to 
facilitate the crushing of the resistance of the non-centralized K o n k o m b a 
(1897-8) and Kabre (1890). In the Cameroons, the German commander, 
Major Hans Dominik, encountered the greatest difficulty in the north, 
but by 1902 he had managed to subdue the Fula principalities. T h e conquest 
of G e r m a n East Africa, however, proved to be the fiercest and most pro-
longed of all these effective wars of occupation. It lasted from 1888 to 
1907. T h e most notable expeditions were those sent against the celebrated 
Abushiri, the lion-hearted (1888-9); the W a h e h e (1889-8); and the leaders 
of the Majï Majï resistance (1905-7). 
Portugal's military occupation of its territories, which started in the 
1880s, was not completed until well into the twentieth century. For the 
Portuguese it was a particularly arduous enterprise but it nevertheless led 
eventually to the consolidation of Portuguese authority in Mozambique, 
Angola and Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau). T h e Congo Free State, too, faced 
very grave problems before it was able to accomplish a military occupation 
of its sphere of influence. It started by allying with the Congo Arabs w h o 
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were particularly hostile to it. W h e n the futility of this alliance became 
obvious, Leopold ordered an expedition against them. It took some three 
years (1892-5) before they were subdued. But the conquest of Katanga, 
initiated in 1891, was not completed until early in this century. 
Italy fared worst in its wars of effective occupation. In 1883 it had 
managed to occupy a part of Eritrea. It also obtained the eastern coast 
of Somalia during the first partition of the O m a n i empire in 1886. T h e 
Treaty of Wuchale (or Uccialli) (1889), signed with Emperor Menelik II 
of Ethiopia, later defined the Ethiopian-Eritrean boundary. It was a result 
of a curious interpretation placed upon this treaty that Italy informed the 
other European powers that Ethiopia was an Italian protectorate. Although 
Italy's attempt to occupy its fictitious protectorate ended in ignominious 
defeat at A d o w a (1896), it managed, nevertheless, to retain its portion of 
Eritrea and Somalia. In North Africa, it was not until 1911 that Italy was 
able to occupy the coastal areas of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (Libya). 
Morocco managed to preserve its independence until Spain and France 
ended it in 1912. B y 1914, therefore, only Liberia and Ethiopia remained -
at least nominally - independent. 
W h y were European powers able to conquer Africa? 
European powers were able to conquer Africa with such relative ease 
because in virtually every respect the dice was so heavily loaded in their 
favour. In the first place, thanks to the activities of European explorers 
and missionaries, Europeans were by 1880 far more knowledgeable about 
Africa and its interior - its physical appearance, terrain, economy and other 
resources and the strength and weakness of its states and societies - than 
Africans were about Europe. 
Secondly, owing to the revolutionary changes in medical technology and 
in particular the discovery of the prophylactic use of quinine against malaria, 
Europeans became far less fearful of Africa than they had been before 
the middle of the nineteenth century.57 
Thirdly, as a result of the uneven nature of the trade between Europe and 
Africa up to the 1870s, and even after, as well as the increasing pace of 
the industrial revolution, the material and financial resources available to 
Europe were overwhelming in comparison with those of Africa. T h u s while . 
European powers could afford to spend millions of pounds on overseas 
campaigns, African states were unable to sustain any protracted military 
confrontation against them. 
Fourthly, while the period after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 was 
marked, according to J. Holland Rose, by 'a state of political equilibrium 
which m a d e for peace and stagnation in Europe',5 8 the same period in 
57. P . Curtin, S . Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, p. 445; J. H . Rose, 
1905, PP- 508-72. 
58. J. H . Rose, 1905. 
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Africa was marked by inter-state and intra-state conflict and rivalry - the 
Mandingo against the Tukulor, the Asante against the Fante, the Baganda 
against the Banyoro, the Batoro against the Banyoro, the Mashona 
against the Ndebele, etc. T h u s , while Europe could focus her attention 
militarily almost exclusively on her imperial activities overseas without any 
distraction at h o m e , African states and countries had their attention divided. 
Moreover, in addition to enjoying peace at h o m e , however divided the 
European powers were on imperial and colonial issues, throughout the 
era of partition and up to 1914 they always managed to resolve these 
questions without resort to war. Thus , in spite of the intense competition 
and the numerous crises in Africa, the European powers involved in the 
partition displayed a remarkable spirit of solidarity which not only elimi-
nated wars a m o n g them but also prevented the African rulers and c o m -
munities from effectively playing one European power against the other. 
Throughout the period under review, various European powers took on 
the African states one at a time, and on no occasion was an African state 
assisted by one European power against another. 
B y contrast, the behaviour of the African states was not only marked 
by lack of solidarity, unity or co-operation but some of them did not hesitate 
to ally with the invading European forces against their neighbours, only 
to be vanquished later themselves. T h e Baganda allied with the British 
against the Banyoro, and the Barotse with the British against the Ndebele, 
while the Bambara teamed up with the French against the Tukulor.59 A s 
a result of all this, the heroic and memorable stands which the Africans 
took against the European invaders were - as will be seen in subsequent 
chapters60 — more often than not, isolated forms of uncoordinated resist-
ance, even at the regional level. 
T h e final and easily the most decisive factor was, of course, the over-
whelming logistic and military superiority that Europe enjoyed over Africa. 
While Europe was using professional and well-drilled armies, very few 
African states had established standing armies and fewer still had pro-
fessional armies. Most African states recruited and mobilized individuals 
on an ad hoc basis for either defence or offence. Besides, in addition to 
their o w n armies, the European powers could always, as A . Isaacman and 
J. Vansina have contended, rely on African mercenaries and levies which 
gave them the numerical superiority they needed.61 In fact, as A . Laroui 
puts it, most of the armies were African in recruitment and only European 
in c o m m a n d . Above all, by the terms of the Brussels Convention of 1890, 
the imperial powers agreed not to sell arms to Africans. This meant that 
most African armies were armed with completely outmoded, old and often 
unserviceable guns, mainly flint-locks or muzzle-loading muskets, and had 
59. M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 81, 85; R . Oliver and G . Mathew (eds), 1971; V . Harlow 
and E . M . Chilver (eds), 1965. 
60. See Chapters 3-9 below. 
61. See Chapter 8 below. 
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plates 2.2(a)-(f) Weapons used by Africans and their European opponents during the
wars between 1880 and 1935
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plate 2.2(a) The Asante War of 1896 (Gold
Coast): throwing axes and knives
plate 2.2(c) A nineteenth-century Yoruba
(Nigeria) oba (king) with his generals armed
with outmodedflintlock Dane guns
plate 2.2(b) Kavirondo warriors (Kenya) with spears and shields
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plate 2.2(d) Soldiers of the King's African Rifles with a Maxim gun
plate 2.2(e) A Catling gun
(for Plate 2.2(f) see next page)
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plate 2.2(f) Aeroplanes used in the colonial wars of the 1920s
no heavy artillery or naval power whatsoever. The European armies, on
the other hand, were armed with the most up-to-date heavy artillery, and
guns such as the repeater rifle, and above all the Gatling and the Maxim
guns. They also used the heavy artillery of naval forces. As Laroui has
pointed out, even motor vehicles and aeroplanes62 were used in the later
campaigns. It is significant that the two African leaders who were able
to inflict some defeats on the Europeans, Samori and Menelik, managed
to obtain some of these up-to-date weapons. But in the end even Samori
too was overpowered by the French. The overwhelming superiority that
Europe enjoyed over Africa is summed up succinctly in Hilaire Belloc's
famous couplet already quoted in Chapter 1.
In view of these economic, political and above all military and techno¬
logical advantages enjoyed by European powers over African polities, the
contest was a most uneven one and it is not at all surprising that the former
could vanquish the latter with such relative ease. Indeed, for Europe, the
timing of the conquest could not have been better; for Africa it could
not have been worse.
The map of Africa after partition and occupation
The new geopolitical map of Africa that evolved after about a generation
of systematic boundary-making and military occupation was quite different
from what it had been in 1879 (see Fig. 1.1). The European powers had
partitioned the continent into some forty political units. The new boun¬
daries have been regarded by some scholars as unacceptable because they
were deemed to be arbitrary, artificial, precipitate and haphazard and to
have distorted the national pre-European political order. Others, such as
Joseph Anene and Saadia Touval, have regarded them as making more
sense than they did by 1879.63
There is some truth in both points of view. Some 30% of the total
62. See Chapter 5 below.
63. J. C. Anene, 1970.
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FIG. 2.1 Africa in 1914 (after R. Oliver and J. D. Fage, 1962)
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length of the borders were drawn as straight lines, and these and others 
often cut right across ethnic and linguistic boundaries. O n the other hand, 
the remaining borders did follow national boundaries and cannot therefore 
be considered as arbitrary or as ill-considered as the criticisms would 
suggest. Moreover, African political units evolving as a result, for example, 
of the O y o - D a h o m e y conflict, the Fulani djihâds, the Mfecane in Southern 
Africa, or the internal struggle for power in both Ethiopia and Uganda 
during the second half of the nineteenth century, testify to the fluidity 
of African boundaries, frontiers and enclaves prior to the partition. W h a t 
is not often realized is the extent to which the partition solidified these 
fluid boundaries, or the extent of the efforts m a d e by the boundary c o m -
missioners to rectify anomalies, where politically possible, during the 
numerous boundary delimitations. O n balance, then, although the m a p 
of Africa in 1914 (see Fig. 2.1), compared to what it was in 1879, m a y 
have looked very confusing, the delimitation had nevertheless been a 
remarkably efficient job, thanks to the n e w advances in cartography. A n d 
although the partition must be condemned as illegal and immoral, and it 
must be recognized that s o m e of the boundaries were indeed artificial and 
arbitrary, it would be undesirable - indeed dangerous - to continue to 
advocate a return to the fluid, pre-European international boundaries -
except after a very close scrutiny - because of the 'mess' said to have been 
created by the partition. 
B y 1902 the conquest of Africa was all but concluded. It had been a 
particularly bloody business. T h e devastating power of the M a x i m gun 
and the relative sophistication of European technology must have been 
a sobering experience for the Africans. But though the conquest of Africa 
by Europe was accomplished with such relative ease, the occupation and 
the establishment of European administration in Africa — as the following 
chapters will demonstrate — were not. 
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resistance in the face of 
partition and conquest 
T. O. R A N G E R 
In tropical Africa the twenty years between 1880 and 1900 presented a 
strange and brutal paradox. T h e process of European conquest and occu-
pation was clearly irreversible. But it was also eminently resistible. It was 
irreversible because of the revolution in technology. For the first time the 
whites had a decisive advantage in weapons, and for the first time the 
railway, the cable and the steamship enabled them to offer some answer 
to the problem of communication within Africa and between Africa and 
Europe. It was resistible because of the size of Africa; because of the 
strengths of its peoples; and because in the event Europe did not deploy 
very m a n y m e n or very m u c h technology. True, the whites m a d e up for 
their shortage of m e n by recruiting African auxiliaries. But they were not 
diabolically clever manipulators of divided and outmatched blacks. T h e 
Europeans were merely running through the repertoire of old imperial 
devices. In detail they often knew m u c h less about a situation than African 
rulers did. T h e implementation of the strategy of advance was very 
haphazard and clumsy. Europeans b u m p e d into, provoked and even 
invented through ignorance and alarm, a multitude of African resistances. 
T h e Europeans were 'bound to win in the end', and after they had w o n 
they tidied up the untidy process. Books were written about what was 
called 'pacification'; the impression was given that most Africans had thank-
fully accepted the so-called Pax Colonica; and the facts of African resistance 
were glossed over. But the victory of the Europeans does not m e a n that 
African resistance was unimportant at the time or undeserving of study 
n o w . A n d in fact it has been studied a good deal in the last twenty years. 
Most of this research of the last two decades has been sober, detailed, 
scholarly, not avoiding the ambiguities of m a n y of the resistances. But 
most of it has been based upon, or used to demonstrate, three dogmatic 
assumptions, which I believe still to be essentially true, even though each 
has been modified by recent research and analysis. It has been argued, 
first, that the fact of African resistance is significant because it proves that 
Africans did not acquiesce placidly in a European 'pacification'. It has 
been argued, secondly, that this resistance was neither despairing nor 
irrational, but that it was often powered by rational and innovative 
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ideologies. It has been argued, thirdly, that these resistances were not futile; 
that they had significant consequences in their time and still have significant 
resonances today. These three arguments are worth restating here, together 
with the modifications proposed to them. 
T h e generality of resistance 
In 1965 the Soviet historian, A . B . Davidson, called upon scholars to refute 
'the traditional European historiographical view' in which 'the African 
people apprehended the coming of the colonialists as good fortune; as 
deliverance from fratricidal internecine wars, from the tyranny of neigh-
bouring tribes, from epidemics, and periodic starvations'; in which peoples 
w h o did not resist were described as 'peace-loving' and those w h o did 
resist were described as 'blood-thirsty'. Davidson remarked that 'protectors 
of colonial rule refused to consider rebellion a regular phenomenon' . T h e y 
explained it in terms of 'primitive and irrational' responses, or in terms 
of the agitation of the 'blood-thirsty' minority. 'They rejected the only 
correct explanation which regards rebellions as just wars for liberation, 
which is w h y they were supported by the overwhelming majority of 
Africans.'l 
In 1965 Davidson emphasized that ' m a n y rebellions are not yet k n o w n . . . 
Often w e do not have concrete information about those rebellions that 
are considered an established fact'. Since then, the job of 'discovering' 
resistances has gone on apace. Historians have begun to classify revolts 
m o r e rigorously, distinguishing 'social banditry' from 'peasant rebellion', 
and guerrilla warfare from the clash of armies. In some cases episodes 
trumpeted by the colonialists as rebellions have been shown to have been 
forced upon the people by ignorance and fear on the part of the whites.2 
In m a n y more cases considerable and significant resistances have been 
rescued from obscurity. W e n o w possess detailed studies for most of the 
'major' uprisings and in some cases a vigorous argument about h o w best 
to explain and interpret them has been taking place. F r o m all this it is 
quite clear that Davidson was right to think that resistance was a 'regular 
phenomenon' . 
It is clear also that the old attempts to distinguish naturally warlike 
from naturally peaceful African societies are beside the point. I have argued 
myself in a n u m b e r of articles that so far as large-scale African polities 
are concerned it makes no sense to discriminate between so-called warlike, 
raiding states, and so-called peaceful, trading and cultivating ones, since 
virtually all states m a d e some attempt to find a basis on which to manipulate 
the Europeans without recourse to arms; virtually all of them had some 
crucial interests or values which they were prepared to defend, if necessary 
1. A . B. Davidson in T . O . Ranger (ed.), 1968(c), pp. 181-3. 
2. S. Marks, 1970. 
46 
African initiatives and resistance in the face of partition and conquest 
by armed resistance.3 But I was myself mistaken to go on to argue that 
the foremost a m o n g the societies engaged in either resistance or manipu-
lation had m o r e in c o m m o n with each other 'than with those small-scale 
societies that could neither resist nor exploit colonial rule'.4 A m o n g others, 
Shula Marks has shown in her study of Khoisan resistance in South Africa 
that non-centralized peoples are just as capable of putting up a determined 
fight against white advance as centralized ones. John Thornton has con-
trasted the resistance potential of states and of stateless societies m u c h 
to the advantage of the latter: 
States are often praised for their role in resistance to the European 
invasion . . . actually . . . their role was ambiguous. S o m e , it is true, 
resisted fairly well . . . But m a n y other state societies collapsed on 
impact with the Europeans . . . O n the other hand the resistance of 
stateless societies was often long-lived and heroic... it was the stateless 
societies - Igbo, Baule, Agni and others - that carried on the guerrilla 
wars.5 
In short, virtually every sort of African society resisted, and there was 
resistance in virtually every region of European advance. W e can n o w accept 
this as a fact which no longer needs elaboration. W h a t w e need to do n o w 
is to m o v e from cataloguing to interpretation; from merely demonstrating 
resistance to assessing and explaining its degrees of intensity. Historians 
of particular national territories have been concerned to demonstrate that 
there was resistance in their area and to claim it as part of the local protest 
tradition; and it is always possible to do this since there was some resistance 
virtually everywhere. But this piecemeal approach can obscure the fact 
that there were striking differences in the intensity of resistance from one 
region to another. There were armed resistance in Northern Rhodesia (now 
Zambia) but on nothing like the scale and for nothing like the duration 
of those in Southern Rhodesia (now Z i m b a b w e ) , which in turn cannot 
be compared for 'regularity' with resistances against the Portuguese in the 
Zambezi valley. It is plain that w e need rigorous comparative regional 
studies. T h e chapters which follow suggest further patterns of contrast 
and some of the explanations and consequences of them. 
T h e ideology of resistance 
Colonial apologists stressed the irrationality and desperation of armed 
resistance. T h e y claimed that it was often the result of 'superstition' and 
that peoples otherwise content to accept colonial rule had been worked 
upon by 'witch-doctors'. M a n y European critics of colonialism, sympathetic 
to African protest, nevertheless also accepted that Africans had little in 
3. T . O . Ranger in L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1969, pp. 293-304. 
4. S. Marks, 1972, pp. 55-80. 
5. J. Thornton, 1973, pp. 119-20. 
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their 'traditional' patterns of thought which helped them to c o m e to an 
effective or practical response to attacks on their way of life. T h e ideologies 
of revolt were thought of as 'the magic of despair', bound to fail and 
incapable of pointing to the future. In such a view the resistances, however 
heroic, were tragic dead ends.6 
Over the last decade or so historians of resistance have sought to combat 
this sort of interpretation. They have done this in two ways, by asserting 
strictly secular ideologies of revolt, and by 'disinfecting' religious ideologies. 
T h e chief secular ideology which has been proposed is the concept of 
'sovereignty'. Jacob Ajayi has written that 'the most fundamental aspect 
of the European impact was the loss of sovereignty . , . once a people lose 
their sovereignty, and they are exposed to another culture, they lose at 
least a little of their self-confidence and self-respect; they lose their right 
of self-steering, their freedom of choice as to what to change in their o w n 
culture or what to copy or reject from the other culture.'7 
A similar point is m a d e with more emphasis by Walter Rodney: 
T h e decisiveness of the short period of colonialism . . . springs mainly 
from the fact that Africa lost power . . . During the centuries of pre-
colonial trade some control over social, political and economic life 
was retained in Africa, in spite of the disadvantageous commerce with 
Europeans. That little control over internal matters disappeared under 
colonialism . . . T h e power to act independently is the guarantee to 
participate actively and consciously in history. T o be colonised is to 
be removed from history . . . Overnight, African political states lost 
their power, independence and meaning.8 
That Ajayi and Rodney can see the decisive importance of the loss of 
sovereignty is far from demonstrating, of course, that African resisters 
conceived of sovereignty in this way. Rodney himself deplores the 'partial 
and inadequate view of the world' which prevented African leaders from 
fully understanding what was at stake in the encounter with Europe. Ajayi 
asserts, however, that the rulers of African states 'as guardians of the 
sovereignty of the people' were 'hostile to whatever powers challenged this 
sovereignty'.9 A n d historians have recovered some striking explicit state-
ments of sovereignty. 
There are statements of simple autonomy like the retort of chief 
M a c h e m b a of the Y a o to the G e r m a n commander , H e r m a n n von Wissman, 
in 1890: 
I have listened to your words but can find no reason w h y I should 
obey you "- I would rather die first . . . I do not fall at your feet, 
for you are God's creature just as I a m . . . I a m Sultan here in m y 
6. M . Gluckman, 1963, pp. 137-45. 
7. J. F . A . Ajayi in T . O . Ranger (ed.), 1968(c), pp. 196-7. 
8. W . Rodney, 1972, pp. 245-6. Emphasis in original. 
9. J. F . A . Ajayi in L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1969, p. 506. 
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land. Y o u are Sultan there in yours. Yet listen, I do not say to you 
that you should obey m e ; for I k n o w that you are a free m a n . . . 
A s for m e , I will not come to you, and if you are strong enough, 
then c o m e and fetch m e . ' ° 
There are statements which express the desire to modernize but not 
at the expense of sovereignty, as in the case of chief M a k o m b e H a n g a , 
ruler of Barue in central M o z a m b i q u e , w h o told a white visitor in 1895: 
'I see h o w you white m e n advance m o r e and more in Africa, on all sides 
of m y country companies are at work . . . M y country will also have to 
take u p these reforms and I a m quite prepared to open it u p . . . I should 
also like to have good roads and railways . . . But I will remain the Makombe 
my fathers have been.'11 
A n d there are also striking expressions of a wider philosophy of sove-
reignty. T h e most striking come from South West Africa. T h e Ñ a m a leader, 
Hendrik Wittboi, confided to his diary that: 'By colour and m o d e of life 
w e belong together and this Africa is in general the land of the Red Captains 
[i.e. Africans]. That w e form different kingdoms and regions reflects only 
a trivial subdivision of Africa.' Wittboi told the G e r m a n administrator, 
Theodor Leutwein, in 1894, that 'the Lord G o d has established various 
kingdoms in the world. Therefore I k n o w and believe that it is no sin 
or crime that I should wish to remain the independent chief of m y land 
and people.'12 
In any case, whatever problems people m a y have found in understanding 
the initial impact of European advance, there was no doubt about the con-
sequences of loss of sovereignty once European rule was established. 
Wittboi's old enemy, chief Maherero, leader of the Herero rising, wrote 
to him appealing for joint action in 1904: 'It is m y wish that w e weak 
nations should rise u p against the G e r m a n s . . . Let the whole of Africa 
fight against the G e r m a n s , and let us rather die together than through 
maltreatment, prison or in any other w a y . ' 1 3 T h e elders of the n o n -
centralized and fiercely independent M a t u m b i of eastern Tanganyika (now 
Tanzania), a m o n g w h o m the Majï Majï rising broke out in 1905, said of 
the G e r m a n regime: 'This has n o w become an absolute ruler. Destroy 
h i m . ' 1 4 
T h e idea of sovereignty clearly did provide an ideology for resistance. 
Nevertheless, important modifications must be m a d e . Rulers were not 
always very clearly 'guardians of the sovereignty of the people'. In 
nineteenth-century Africa - in the west, east and south - n e w states had 
10. Quoted by B . Davidson, 1964(a), pp. 357-8. 
11. Quoted by A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 128-9. 
12. A m o n g studies of South West African resistance are: H . Dreschler, 1966; H . Bley, 
1968 and 1971. The quotation here is from J. Iliffe in G . Kibodya (ed.), 1968. 
13. Iliffe in Kibodya (ed.), 1968. 
14. Mzee Ndundule Mangaya quoted in G . C . K . Gwassa and J. Iliffe (eds), 1968, p. 5. 
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arisen, based on 'the military technology of Europe'. ' 5 Such states often 
resisted the direct extension of European power but their resistance was 
undermined by the disaffection of m a n y of their subjects. Thornton tells 
us of West African states like those of Samori Ture or of Shehu A h m a d u 
that 'they were burdened by constant revolts caused mainly by their high-
handed and exploitative state structures . . . by and large the leadership 
of the states, exploitative and tyrannical as they were, did not possess the 
legitimacy to go to the country and carry on the wars'. ' 6 Allen Isaacman 
writes of the 'secondary states' of the Zambezi valley that their 'imposition 
of the alien rule of the mestizos generated African opposition, as did the 
forced mobilization of labour'; their history 'was marred by numerous 
revolts . . . resistance to this form of alien rule as well as to predatory slave 
raiding activities. Such a situation obviously did not lend itself to an ongoing 
and unified effort' against the whites.17 
States such as these m a y be contrasted with longer-established polities 
in which the rulers had achieved 'legitimacy'. But even here it would be 
over-romantic to suppose that all ancient aristocracies enjoyed popular trust 
and support. T h e ruling groups a m o n g some long-established peoples took 
their o w n advantage of the opportunities offered by nineteenth-century 
weapons and commerce to develop an arbitrary power, with the result that 
they could not count on popular support in a confrontation with the whites. 
This partly accounts for the ineffectiveness of resistance in Northern 
Rhodesia, where the B e m b a chiefs faced what Henry S. Meebelo has called 
'a popular revulsion against the ruling class', and where the aristocracy 
of Barotseland feared a slave uprising if they attempted to oppose the 
extension of British influence. ' 8 
A number of historians, indeed, have stressed the importance of dis-
criminating between resistances which were motivated by the desire of 
a ruling group to retain its exploitative power, and resistances on a m u c h 
wider scale, which were often directed as m u c h against the authoritarianism 
of African rulers as against colonial oppression. Edward Steinhart urges 
that 
protest and resistance can be and are directed . . . against domestic 
forms of oppression . . . Protest must be viewed as something other 
than the expression of national aspirations . . . by focusing on leader-
ship w e have accepted the interpretation of anti-colonialism as 'African 
nationalism', a m o v e m e n t to expel aliens and to restore 'national' 
independence. If instead w e look within the protest movements . . . 
w e are apt to discover that the impulses which the leaders organize 
and interpret are profoundly anti-authoritarian and revolutionary 
rather than anti-foreign and 'nationalist'.19 
15. P. Bohannan and P. Curtin, 1971, p. 271. 
16. J. Thornton, 1973, pp. 120-1. 
17. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 103-4. 
18. H . S. Meebelo, 1971, p. 68. 
19. E . Steinhart, unpublished paper. 
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Even where a long-established polity enjoyed a leadership with recog-
nized legitimacy and was able to mobilize the majority of its population 
into resistance, recent historians have been inclined to criticize 'the narrow 
sense of primordial loyalty' and the 'parochialism' which did no m o r e than 
to focus on sovereignty as previously understood. Such historians have 
emphasized instead the significance of those resistances in which the idea 
of sovereignty was redefined. T h u s Isaacman argues that the 1917 revolt 
in the Zambezi valley was unlike previous resistances there, 'which were 
designed to regain the independence of a historical polity or a group of 
related peoples'. T h e 1917 revolt 'sought to liberate all the peoples of the 
Zambezi from colonial oppression', appealing especially to the oppressed 
peasantry of whatever ethnicity. ' T h e shift in primordial loyalties repre-
sented a n e w level of political consciousness in which the Portuguese were 
perceived for the first time as the c o m m o n oppressor.'20 
T h e role of religious ideas 
Meanwhile historians have been re-examining the role of religious ideas 
in the resistances. W h a t they have found bears little resemblance either 
to the 'fanatical witch-doctors' of colonial reports, or to 'the magic of 
despair'. T h e y have found, to begin with, that religious teachings and 
symbols often bore very directly on the question of sovereignty and 
legitimacy. Rulers were legitimized through ritual recognition, and w h e n 
a ruler and his people determined to defend their sovereignty they naturally 
drew heavily on religious symbols and ideas. Rodney, in a paper on 
O v i m b u n d u resistance in Angola, remarks that 'a great deal of attention 
has been paid to spiritual resistance in a later stage of the African struggle -
notably in cases like the Maji Maji wars . . . but for "primary resistances" 
there is a tendency to under-emphasize the fact that African peoples every-
where automatically resisted not only in material terms but also with their 
o w n metaphysical religious weapons. ' 2 1 
In another paper, this time on the resistance of the Gaza state to the 
Portuguese in southern M o z a m b i q u e , Rodney writes of the possible 
traumatic consequences of the commitment of spiritual resources to the 
struggle. ' T h e Ngoni of Gaza suffered not only the destruction of their 
political capital but also the defilement of their principal shrine'; after 
military defeat in 1895 the royal ritual objects were lost; diviners threw 
away their divining bones after the incomprehensible event of defeat; the 
'high priestess' was dismissed and executed. 'Awareness of crisis at a deep 
spiritual level was quite widespread.'22 
It was,out of crises of legitimacy of this sort that the great movements 
which attempted to redefine sovereignty often emerged. Such movements 
20. A. Isaacman, 1976, pp. 343, 345, 370. 
2i. W . Rodney, 1971(b). 
22. W . Rodney, 1971(a). 
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almost invariably had the advantage of spiritual leaders, enunciating the 
message of wider unity. Sometimes this sort of development took place 
in the context of Islam - and Islamic ideologies of millennialism and 
resistance spread right across the Sudanic belt from east to west. S o m e -
times it happened because of the influence of Christian ideas - and Hendrik 
Wittboi drew upon Protestant Christianity for his doctrine of sovereignty, 
while an African independent Christian prophet was active a m o n g the N a m a 
at the time of their rising against the Germans. Very often it happened 
in the context of African religion. 
I have argued myself that this happened in Southern Rhodesia and that 
the risings of 1896 were inspired and co-ordinated by religious leaders. 
Isaacman argues that the 1917 rising in the Zambezi valley was given moral 
fervour by the teachings of the spirit m e d i u m , M b u y a , w h o did not call 
for the restoration of her o w n Barue state but preached instead the gospel 
of the brotherhood and oppression of all Africans, and of the concern for 
their welfare and for the redress of their wrongs on the part of the high 
god, M w a r i . 2 3 In the case of the Majï Majï rising of 1905 the ideology 
of revolt was powered by both Islamic and African millennial enthusiasm. 
T h e great Tanganyikan coastal resistances of 1888 to 1891 had been led 
by members of the Swahili commercial and urban elite; there had been 
no development of a religious ideology of protest, either Islamic or 
'traditional'; resistance depended upon the idea of defending established 
sovereignties.24 But after the defeat of this coastal opposition and the co-
option of m a n y of the Swahili elite into G e r m a n service, the basis of protest 
changed and widened. Majï Majï was inspired by a combination of a n e w 
prophetic message, emerging from the African cult centres of the hinterland, 
and populist enthusiastic Islam.25 
T h e prophetic teaching which underlay some of the great resistances 
is slowly being rescued from the garbled accounts of their adversaries. 
Gilbert Gwassa's account of the development and character of Kinjikitile's 
Majï Majï ideology is a classic example of this sort of rescue work. Another 
striking, and as yet unpublished, reconstruction has been m a d e by 
Mongameli M a b o n a for the teachings of the great militant Xhosa prophet, 
M a k a n a , whose message, enunciated in the early nineteenth century, 'lost 
its force only in 1890, when Xhosa national resistance finally collapsed'. 
As M a b o n a remarks, his teaching has usually been seen as 'a salmagundi 
of incompatible or unrelated religious concepts'. M a b o n a shows instead 
that it was 'a skilfully tailored pattern of Khoisan, Xhosa and Christian 
elements', put together with very great creative imagination. 
M a k a n a m a d e brilliant word coinages to express his concepts of divinity -
concepts of space and of the scattering of light. 'His powerful mind and 
religious genius . . . moulded a body of doctrine which was to serve as 
23. T . O . Ranger, 1967; A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 304-5, 307, 310, 313, 316, 326. 
24. R . D . Jackson in R . I. Rotberg and A . Mazrui (eds), 1970. 
25. G . Gwassa in T . O . Ranger and I. K i m a m b o (eds), 1972. 
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an ideological d y n a m o for the Xhosa nation.' In some ways Makana's 
teaching was an African version of the Protestant Christian ideology of 
sovereignty, which later gave Wittboi confidence in the divine right of 
the Red Captains. M a k a n a explored the fundamental differences between 
black and white - different customs, different divinities, different destinies. 
T h e creator was Dali'dephu, great ancestor of the Xhosa, w h o had m a d e 
Uthixo to be the god of the white m e n . Uthixo was an inferior to Dali'dephu, 
and the white m e n were morally the inferior of the Xhosa — continually 
vexed with the idea of sin. But this difference did not matter until the 
two moral universes came into contact and into conflict; then Dali'dephu 
would assert himself to ensure that his o w n particular children, the Xhosa, 
and their o w n particular and superior w a y of life triumphed over the super-
ficial powers of the whites. M a k a n a appealed for pan-Xhosa unity; for 
confidence in their moral universe. Dali'dephu would sweep the whites 
away; the Xhosa dead would return; 'a n e w era would begin'.26 
Conceptual and symbolic innovations such as Makana's had a relevance 
which long outlasted the particular resistance with which they were first 
associated. S o far from being desperate nonsense, prophetic messages of 
this kind were a systematic attempt to widen and redefine the idea of deity 
and its relation to the moral order, and involved wide-ranging changes 
in Xhosa internal assumptions and relationships as well as providing the 
'bedrock of ideology for resistance'. Peter Rigby has argued strongly against 
the idea that African prophetism was 'merely the result of exogenous forces 
of disruption during the colonial period' or sprang 'from a breakdown of 
African religions'. Prophetism was certainly, in his view, very m u c h a matter 
of protest, and had played 'a major part in most protest movements in 
Africa', but the prophet emerged 'not merely as a reaction to exogenous 
experience but upon the grounds of the viability and adaptability of African 
religions'.27 W i t h this view of African religious systems regularly able to 
throw up prophetic leadership out of their o w n tensions and potentialities, 
and of prophetic leaders able to create n e w syntheses which simultaneously 
revalidated the old and allowed for the n e w , w e have m o v e d a long way 
from the idea of prophetic ideologies of resistance as 'the magic of despair'. 
Valuable as all this work has been, the emphasis upon religious ideology 
in resistance has been challenged from two sides. O n the one hand some 
scholars argue that the role of religion in resistance has been overstated; 
on the other hand some scholars argue that the role of resistance in religion 
has been exaggerated. 
T h u s colonial writers spoke of a 'witch' as leading the Giriama rising 
in the coastal hinterland of K e n y a ; more recent historians have reinterpreted 
her as a 'prophetess'. But Cynthia Brantley Smith, in her admirable and 
exhaustive account of the Giriama, establishes that she was no sort of 
26. M . A. Mabona, 1974. 
27. P . Rigby, 1974. 
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religious leader: merely a respected and assertive w o m a n . 2 8 This is a case 
in which a retranslation of colonialist terms like 'witch' and 'witch-doctor' 
is not enough to correct the distortion of official accounts. It has been 
suggested by two researchers on Ndebele and Shona history that the same 
is true of m y o w n account of the 1896 risings in Southern Rhodesia; the 
British South Africa C o m p a n y said the risings were fomented by 'witch-
doctors'; I argued that they were powered by a profound prophetic ideology; 
Julian Cobbing and David Beach assert that the spirit mediums were of 
m u c h more restricted influence than I allowed and that the priests of M w a r i 
participated in the risings hardly at all.29 It will perhaps not be found 
surprising that I a m unready for such drastic revisions. But it certainly 
is true that recent work on African religion in Southern Rhodesia shows 
that its relationship to resistance cannot have been so straightforward as 
I had supposed. It is plain that neither the M w a r i cult nor the system 
of spirit mediums was capable of committing itself wholly to resistance 
or wholly to anything; both were based on constant and intense competition 
between and within shrines; the astonishing survival of the cults depended 
upon the fact that priests or mediums w h o had backed a mistaken or 
defeated cause could rapidly be replaced by rivals waiting in the wings, 
and upon the fact that some important cult centres would always adopt 
positions different from others. S o m e M w a r i shrines backed the rising and 
others did not, and at the shrines which did support it the families in 
charge were replaced after its suppression. I was wrong to suppose that 
the total religious leadership of the Shona would commit itself wholly to 
the risings; the risings were crucially important but not so important that 
they could - or should — disrupt the long-term patterns of persistence 
and effectiveness of the cults.30 
All this is relevant to the argument over the centrality of protest to 
prophetic movements. A prophet emerges in response to a popular sense 
that there is need for radical and innovative action, but such a popular 
sense need not arise only because of external threat. A prophet can be 
thrown up because of deep anxiety over internal tensions or transformations, 
or even because of a general desire to accelerate the pace of change and 
to seize on n e w opportunities. T h u s a prophetic leader often directs his 
teaching to the internal morality of African societies - sometimes leading 
a protest movement against internal authoritarianism, sometimes 'protest-
ing' more against the facts of h u m a n nature. It emerges clearly from the 
work that is n o w being done on the remarkable number of prophetic leaders 
in nineteenth-century Africa that m a n y of them were not concerned with 
resistance to the whites, or even directly with the whites at all. 
Even those prophetic leaders w h o were primarily concerned to find a 
28. C . B . Smith, 1973. 
29. J. Cobbing, 1974 and 1977; D . Beach, 1971 and 1979. 
30. M . Schoffeleers in Schoffeleers (ed.), forthcoming. 
54 
African initiatives and resistance in the face of partition and conquest 
restatement which would help to define the relations of their people to 
the Europeans were by no means unanimous in recommending rejection 
or resistance. A s M a b o n a remarks, Xhosa prophetism produced both an 
'ideology for resistance' and an ideology 'for a process of controlled 
accommodation'. T h e prophet of resistance was M a k a n a ; the prophet of 
'controlled accommodation' was Ntsikana. Ntsikana was a creative religious 
genius of the same order as M a k a n a ; the debates between them on the 
nature of divinity had very immediate practical consequences and divided 
the Xhosa into factions, but they were conducted in profound theological 
terms. A n d in fact Ntsikana was not primarily concerned with the problems 
of relationships to the whites, his intention was rather to bring about 
changes in Xhosa society by means of accepting some of the dynamics 
of Christian thought, while at the same time repudiating m a n y of the 
cultural assumptions of the whites. A s O . P . R a u m tells us, a m o n g m a n y 
Xhosa today 'the beginning of Christianity is not credited to the missionaries 
but rather to a Christian forerunner in the person of Ntsikana'.31 
T h o u g h no other case presents us with so dramatic and direct a prophetic 
clash as the debate between M a k a n a and Ntsikana, the same range of 
prophetic possibilities comes out clearly even in areas of very determined 
resistance, like the areas in which Majï Majï took place, or the Shona areas 
of Rhodesia. After the defeat of Majï Majï the cluster of symbols and 
claims to spiritual power which Kinjikitile had m a d e use of was drawn 
upon by a succession of prophetic figures w h o were concerned with the 
internal purification of African societies, and w h o led what have been called 
'witchcraft eradication movements' . 
A s for the Shona, Elleck Mashingaidze has written a fascinating paper 
on the sequence of prophetic advice given to the Shona people of the M a z o e 
valley area. T h e most influential m e d i u m s first advised the people to listen 
carefully to missionary teaching; then advised them to take part in the 
risings and drive out the whites; and then advised them once more to 
send their children to mission schools to gain what they could of white 
'wisdom'. Mashingaidze does not see this as a sequence of confusion or 
betrayal. H e writes: 
Military defeat in 1897 . . . did not result in an abandonment of the 
traditional world as the whites had naively anticipated . . . T h e Shona 
began to try to understand the whites . . . Traditional religion, as 
represented by Nehanda and other m e d i u m s , was not opposed to the 
Christian faith as such. T h e role of traditional religion from the 
beginning of the encounter of the two systems was to moderate 
change . . . It kept on reminding the people that in spite of the military 
outcome . . . they should not lose their cultural identity. In fact, 
traditional religion remained the source of Shona constructive and 
creative response to Christianity and the Western culture as a whole. 
31. O . P. Raum in E . Benz (ed.), 1965, pp. 47-70. 
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It reminded people that there was still r o o m for accepting or rejecting 
certain aspects of the n e w order.32 
O n e might say that the S h o n a prophets were seeking to mitigate the effects 
of the loss of political sovereignty by preserving a certain spiritual auton-
o m y . Yet the potentialities of S h o n a prophetism for producing an ideology 
of resistance were not lost and in the 1970s s o m e m e d i u m s were deeply 
involved in the nationalist and guerrilla struggle. 
Seen from the perspective of the history of resistance the inward-turning 
focus of m u c h prophetism, which identifies the source of evil as internal 
sin rather than external oppression, m a y seem like 'false consciousness'. 
Seen from the perspective of the history of African religion the interest 
of these m o v e m e n t s lies precisely in the extent to which they succeed in 
answering the inner-directed anxieties of African societies. T h u s Professor 
B . A . Ogot has taken issue with those w h o interpret K e n y a n prophetic 
m o v e m e n t s as essentially anti-colonial. H e writes of one such prophet, 
S i m e o O n d e t o , that he was indeed 'revolutionary' but that his revolution 
w a s in the moral rather than the political sphere and was to take place 
within the individual. T h e essence of prophetic m o v e m e n t s , writes Ogot , 
is that they are 'transforming spiritual and social agencies creating n e w 
communities capable of facing the challenges of the m o d e r n world' . 3 3 T h e 
great prophetic ideologies of resistance thus fall into place as part of a 
larger attempt to redefine the moral basis of society. 
T h e consequences and relevance of African resistance 
U p to about twenty years ago it w a s generally accepted that resistances 
had been dead ends, leading nowhere . Since then it has been strongly argued 
that resistances looked in all kinds of ways to the future. In so far as they 
were concerned with sovereignty they can be seen as anticipating the 
recovery of sovereignty and the triumphs of African nationalism; in so 
far as they possessed prophetic ideologies they can be seen as contributing 
to n e w communities of concept. S o m e of t h e m resulted in improving the 
position of the peoples w h o had revolted. Others threw u p an alternative 
leadership to the officially recognized chiefs. I have argued myself that 
the resistances were 'connected' to mass nationalism by virtue of having 
been m o v e m e n t s of mass c o m m i t m e n t ; by m e a n s of a continuity of a t m o -
sphere and symbol which ran through other m a s s m o v e m e n t s in the inter-
mediary period; and finally by reason of the explicit inspiration which 
the nationalist m o v e m e n t s d r e w from the m e m o r y of the heroic past.34 
T h e s e arguments have been developed by other writers and the con-
temporary relevance of the resistances b e c a m e an axiom of nationalist and 
32. E . Mashingaidze, 1974. 
33. B . A . Ogot, 1974(a). 
34. T . O . Ranger, 1968(a). 
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guerrilla theorists. T h u s Rodney , at the end of his examination of the 
O v i m b u n d u resistance to the Portuguese, wrote: 
T h e resurgence of armed resistance on the Benguela plateau has taken 
place within the past few years. H o w it came about and what links 
it owes to earlier epochs are such major questions that no attempts 
will be m a d e here to provide any answers, which would inevitably 
be inadequate. It is enough to note that Angolan freedom fighters them-
selves affirm a connexion between their wars of national liberation and 
previous resistances, and that (on their authority) the mass of the people 
are said to recall positively the spirit of such events as the Bailundu 
war. Idle academicians are in no position to challenge this.35 
Academicians - whether idle or not — have challenged the postulated 
connection between the resistances and the subsequent freedom struggle. 
Such challenges have c o m e both from the 'right' and from the 'left'. 
Writing from a position somewhere on the 'right', Henri Brunschwig 
has denied that there is any clear line of descent from the resistances to 
modern nationalist movements . In Brunschwig's view there has been over 
m a n y centuries in Africa a struggle between the adaptation of, and the 
resistance to, externally derived ideas. T h e 'adaptors' created the great 
Sudanic empires: the resisters endeavoured to repudiate them. T h e adaptors 
m a d e use of the enlarging principles of Islam and Christianity: the resisters 
drew upon what Brunschwig calls 'animism' and 'ethnicity'. L o n g before 
colonialism there had been 'innumerable revolts' against African innovators; 
most of the resistance to colonialism sprang from the same 'animist' and 
'ethnic' roots. M o d e r n African nationalism and pan-Africanism, on the 
other hand, are manifestations of the tendency towards centralizing in-
novation and the adoption of 'large' ideas, and thus stand in a tradition 
quite opposite to that of resistance.36 
Writing from the 'left' a number of other historians have challenged 
the postulated link between resistance and nationalism on the grounds that 
this is an intellectual device to allow the ruling, and sometimes selfish, 
minorities of the n e w states to claim revolutionary legitimacy. Steinhart 
has m a d e the most explicit statement of this challenge: 'Instead of examining 
anti-colonial resistance through the distorting lens of nationalist mythology, 
w e must create a better " m y t h " , one better suited to interpreting the reality 
of African protest . . . A " m y t h " of revolutionary upsurge m a y lead 
us further and deeper in our understanding of twentieth-century m o v e -
ments of protest and liberation than the failing "myth of nationalism" 
has brought us.' In this w a y Steinhart seeks to claim the heritage of the 
resistances for radical anti-authoritarian protest within the n e w national 
states of Africa.37 
35. W . Rodney, 1971(b), p. 9. 
36. H . Brunschwig, 1974, pp. 63-4. 
37. E . Steinhart, unpublished paper. 
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A more recent full-length study of resistance — Isaacman's book on 
African revolt in the Zambezi valley - implicitly seeks to deal with both 
Brunschwig's and Steinharte objections. Isaacman deals with Brunschwig 
by placing his emphasis not on the 'parochialisms' of ethnic revolts but 
on the redefinitions of sovereignty which he claims to have taken place 
in the 1917 rising. H e deals with Steinhart by linking up this sort of 
enlarged resistance not with an elite nationalism but with the radical 
Mozambican liberation movement , F R E L I M O . In Isaacman's restatement 
the idea of a link between earlier resistance and contemporary freedom 
movements assumes this form: 'the nature of the appeal, which was phrased 
in broad anti-colonial terms and the scope of the alliance which this appeal 
m a d e possible suggest that the 1917 rebellion occupied a transitional 
position between earlier African forms of resistance and the wars of 
liberation of the mid-twentieth century . . . T h e 1917 rebellion constituted 
both the culmination of the long tradition of Zambezian resistance and 
simultaneously became the progenitor of the current liberation struggle.' 
In 1917, as in F R E L I M O ' s struggle, 'the issue was oppression and not 
race'. Moreover, 'the links with F R E L I M O extended beyond a shared 
ideological commitment' since the tradition of resistance 'served both as 
a source of pride and a model for future activity'.38 
T h e periodization of resistance: the economic 
interpretation 
I began this chapter by describing the situation in the last twenty years 
of the nineteenth century. Yet it has proved extremely difficult in practice 
to discuss resistance within this chronological limitation. At one extreme 
I have discussed M a k a n a , the Xhosa prophet of the early nineteenth 
century. At the other extreme I have discussed the Zambezi rising of 1917 
and its links with F R E L I M O . But at least I have so far limited discussion 
to armed resistance to white invasion or to armed uprisings against colonial 
rule as it began to 'bite'; the chronological extensions arise from the uneven 
nature of white advance into Africa and from the still more uneven establish-
ment of effective colonial control. Using this essentially political definition 
the period between 1880 and 1900 emerges as a crucial period of resistance, 
even if m a n y of the great attempts to redefine sovereignty through protest 
took place later. 
If w e n o w turn in conclusion to the developing emphasis on economic 
resistance, the chronological limits become even less clearly defined. 
Perhaps the most radical reinterpretation is that of Samir A m i n . A m i n 
argues that the really crucial West African resistances to Europe came in 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and he dismisses the resist-
ances of the Scramble period itself as the half-hearted, rearguard actions 
38. A. Isaacman, 1976, pp. 344, 345, 375. 
58 
African initiatives and resistance in the face of partition and conquest 
of an already compromised ruling class. In A m i n ' s eyes what was essentially 
at stake in the confrontation between Africa and Europe was not formal 
political control but Europe's attempts at economic manipulation. T h e truly 
significant African resistance was directed against such economic manipu-
lation. 
A m i n argues that the trade across the Sahara had 'strengthened state 
centralization and stimulated progress'. T h e European-controlled Atlantic 
trade, on the other hand, 'did not give rise to any productive forces: on 
the contrary, this caused a disintegration of society . . . African societies 
obviously opposed this worsening of their situation, and Islam served as 
the basis for their resistance . . . T h e Mus l im priests tried to organize a 
resistance m o v e m e n t ; their aim was to stop the slave trade, i.e. the export 
of the labour force, but not to end internal slavery . . . Islam changed its 
character from being a religion of a minority group of traders, it became 
a popular m o v e m e n t of resistance.' 
A m i n identifies three important resistances of this kind - the wars of 
1673 to 1677; the Torodo revolution of 1776, which 'overthrew the military 
aristocracy and ended the slave trade'; and the movement of the prophet 
Diile in 1830 in the kingdom of Waalo , which failed 'in the face of French 
military intervention'. A m i n is here describing resistances which were 
directed against an African aristocracy, but which were also a response 
to French economic aggression. 
A s the nineteenth century developed, A m i n goes on to argue, the French 
ceased to d e m a n d slaves and c a m e to d e m a n d raw materials and agricultural 
produce instead. In Waalo they began to experiment with agricultural 
plantations but these failed because of 'the resistance of the village c o m -
munities'. T h e French could not succeed in overcoming resistance to 
proletarianization until they had occupied the whole area and were able 
to use continuous force. But this colonial conquest came so late in the 
progression that resistance to it was not very effective. B y this time Islam 
had ceased to be an ideology of resistance and had become the spiritual 
solace of the defeated aristocracy, w h o used it to discipline peasant culti-
vators and to ensure that they produced whatever the French demanded 
from them. 3 9 
If A m i n argues that the really important resistances came before the 
Scramble, other historians employing the economic perspective seem to 
be arguing that the really important resistances to formal colonial rule came 
only in the twentieth century. Certainly there was plenty of economic resist-
ance during the Scramble. In particular, the Europeans broke away from 
their old alliance with African traders and middlemen and used force to 
set up a monopoly of commerce . T h e result was fierce resistance on the 
part of African traders - whether it was led by chief N a n a O l o m u of 
Itsekiri in the Niger delta (Nigeria), w h o m A . G . Hopkins describes as 
39. S. Amin, 1972. 
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the very type of the homo economicus, or by the African and Swahili chiefs 
w h o had dominated the slave trade in northern Mozambique , or by the 
great trader, Rumaliza, w h o fought against both the Belgians and the 
Germans in East Africa. 
Immanuel Wallerstein has seen this war of the traders as one of the 
decisive events of early colonialism: ' M a n y parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
. . . [had been] engaged in a process of relatively autonomous development, 
tied to the European world in a limited but important manner through 
the intermediary of merchants or state trading agents on each side . . . Yet 
in 1879 this whole structure began to crumble, and by 1900 it had ceased 
to exist.' With the imposition of colonial rule, 'the characteristic link 
between Africans and Europeans was no longer that between trading 
partners . . . T h e most immediate effect of colonial rule was its impact 
on African traders by the end of World W a r I the radical decline of 
the relative importance of the African, as well as of the Arab, trading class 
had become an accomplished fact.'40 
But in general recent historians have been unsympathetic to trader resist-
ance. Hopkins warns us not to imagine that Niger delta traders like N a n a 
O l o m u were forerunners of nationalism or spokesmen for popular griev-
ances, pointing out that their 'vision of social justice did not include the 
emancipation of their o w n slaves'. Nancy Hafkin stresses the purely selfish 
interests of the resistant chiefs of northern Mozambique: 'In no sense', she 
concludes, 'was their resistance popular or progressive.'41 
T h e capacity of the great traders to resist, like that of the rulers of the 
secondary states, was undercut because they had generated too m a n y 
African grievances. W h e n the British Imperial East Africa C o m p a n y 
wanted to break the power of Arab, Swahili and African traders it was 
able to build a new trade route inland from Malindi 'supported by stockades 
built by communities of slaves w h o had run away from their Arab masters 
on the coastal plantations'.42 T h e 'important entrepreneurs' of the Lagos 
hinterland found it hard to offer effective resistance to the advance of the 
British because of the unrest of their 'large labour force consisting mainly 
of slaves and serfs'.43 T h e conditions of international trade, which had 
brought about the rise of powerful African traders, had also ensured that 
their success would have to be brought at the price of m u c h internal tension 
and resentment. 
There were exceptions to this situation of tension between the powerful 
traders and the general populace. T h u s in the Bailundu kingdom in Angola 
'everyone was engaged in commerce'; during the 1870s ' U m b u n d u entre-
preneurs discovered and developed a new type of root rubber' and 'during 
the next decade an unprecedented number of Bailundu moved into private 
40. I. Wallerstein in L . H . Gann and P . Duignan (eds), 1970, pp. 402-7. 
41. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 147; N . Hafkin, 1971. 
42. C . B . Smith, 1973, pp. 112, 113. 
43. A . G . Hopkins, 1966(a), p. 141. 
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trade'. This widespread commercial prosperity c a m e to an end with the 
drop of rubber prices in 1899-1902. ' T h e problem w a s intensified after 
1899 in Bailundu by the intrusion of European traders . . . W h e n rubber 
prices plummetted, both Portuguese merchants and a n e w wave of poor 
whites . . . arrived to establish themselves in c o m m e r c e . ' In the opinion 
of the most recent study of the Bailundu war of 1902, resentment at this 
European trade aggression had a great deal to do with the massive popular 
uprising which broke out against the Portuguese.44 
B u t in general historians of resistance w h o work from the economic per-
spective associate m a s s revolt not with resentment at the European attack 
on trade, but with the m o r e slowly developing realization on the part of 
African populations that the whites were determined to obtain cheap labour. 
M a n y Africans might at first we lcome the Europeans as protectors against 
over-demanding chiefs, or rapacious Swahili traders, or slave-masters. But 
they very soon discovered that European d e m a n d s u p o n t h e m were equally, 
if not m o r e , intolerable. At first m a n y African slave-owners, chiefs and 
traders might respond to the Europeans with fear and hatred, but m a n y 
of t h e m found that in the longer run the interest of black and white holders 
of p o w e r often coincided. In this w a y a profound transformation of the 
pattern of resistance took place. 
Dona ld D e n o o n has put the point neatly: 
W h e n w e speak of the Scramble for Africa, w e generally m e a n the 
European division of African territory and sovereignty. There was 
another aspect to this p h e n o m e n o n - the scramble for African re-
sources. D i a m o n d s and gold were a m o n g these, but perhaps the most 
valuable resource, and that for which the colonial authorities scram-
bled passionately, was African labour. Just as the old European and 
A r a b traders had bought slaves elsewhere in Africa, so the n e w labour-
recruiting agencies scrambled for unskilled labour to w o r k in the 
mining fields . . . In Angola and Zambez i and Katanga (by the turn 
of the century) recruiting agents from the mines of the south were 
competing with agents from the Portuguese forced labour plantations 
in the Bight of Benin. 4 5 
Just as the first Scramble for territory and sovereignty was resisted so 
was this second Scramble for labour. It was resisted in arms, and m u c h 
of the support given to the great revolts of the early twentieth century 
which tried to redefine sovereignty c a m e from m e n w h o hated forced labour. 
It w a s also resisted by desertion and strikes, by refusal to work underground, 
by c o m p o u n d riots. In the w o r k of scholars like Charles van Onselen w e 
have a n e w dimension for studies of resistance - no longer the dimension 
o f 'Zambian resistance' or o f ' B e m b a resistance' but the dimension of resist-
44. D . L . Wheeler and C . D . Christensen in F . - W . Heimer (ed.), 1973, pp. 54-92. 
45. D . Denoon, 1972, p. 74. 
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anee along the whole early colonial inter-territorial network of labour 
migration.46 
Conclusion 
It can be seen, then, that the historiography of resistance is a lively and 
argumentative one. Yet the modifications and n e w perspectives enlarge 
rather than controvert the three basic propositions I have been discussing. 
T h e 'regularity' and 'generality' of resistance emerges yet m o r e clearly 
w h e n w e add to our catalogue of armed opposition and revolt during the 
Scramble the earlier indirect resistances to E u r o p e a n economic aggression. 
Exploration of the ideological basis of resistance gains a n e w richness w h e n 
w e add the first manifestations of 'consciousness' o n the part of workers 
or peasants to the idea of sovereignty and to the search for a n e w moral 
order. A n d the exploration of the links between resistance and the present 
situation of Africa gains a n e w resonance from the idea of economic resist-
ance. T h e last w o r d m a y rest not with a historian but with a political 
scientist, Colin Leys , w h o has called for a m o r e dynamic and historically 
founded theory of 'underdevelopment': 
in one critical respect underdevelopment theory tends to resemble 
'development theory' - it concentrates o n w h a t happens to the under-
developed countries at the hands of imperialism and colonialism rather 
than on the total historical process involved, including the various 
forms of struggle against imperialism and colonialism which g r o w out 
of the conditions of underdevelopment . . . what is needed is not a 
theory of underdevelopment but a theory of underdevelopment and 
its liquidation . . . a theory of this kind implies nothing less than a 
theory of world history from the standpoint of the underdeveloped 
countries, a theory of the oppression and liberation of these countries; 
something . . . in a fairly rudimentary stage of development, however 
keenly the need for it m a y be felt.47 
T h e study of the resistances is not a romantic dwelling u p o n the futile 
glories of the past but can m a k e its o w n contribution to a theory of 
oppression and liberation. 
46. C . van Onselen, 1973, pp. 237-55. 
47. C . Leys, 1975, pp. 20-1. 
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resistance in North-East 
Africa 
H . A. IBRAHIM 
based on a contribution by the late A B B A S I. A L I 
Nowhere in Africa were African initiatives and resistance in the face of 
European partition and occupation of Africa as determined and protracted 
as in the modern states of Egypt, Sudan and Somalia. These reactions 
started in 1881 with the military uprising in Egypt, and continued in some 
parts of the area until as late as the 1920s. Never in the history of Africa 
did a people put up such a strong fight in defence of their freedom, their 
sovereignty and above all their culture and religion. In this chapter, a survey 
of these initiatives and reactions will be attempted, beginning first with 
those in Egypt, then Sudan and finally Somaliland. 
Egypt 
T h e Urabist revolution 
T h e financial maladministration of Khedive Ismail (1863-79) and the huge 
loans that he borrowed from Europe had, by 1880, placed Egypt on the 
verge of bankruptcy. While half of Egypt's revenue had been strictly 
allocated to the service of these debts, heavy taxes were imposed on the 
Egyptian people and the fallähin (sing, falläh: 'peasant') majority w h o 
could not afford to pay them were mercilessly flogged. This economic hard-
ship and humiliation created widespread discontent and bitter opposition 
to Khedive Tawfik (1879-92) and his corrupt government. Tawfîk was 
further despised for his total subservience to the European powers w h o 
took advantage of his weakness and Egypt's indebtedness to control the 
country's finance and government. It soon became virtually impossible 
for any Egyptian government to initiate any administrative or economic 
reform without the prior and unanimous approval of fourteen European 
powers. While the Egyptians were suffering all this misery, resident 
foreigners were leading a comfortable life. They were not even subject 
to the law of the land, but had their o w n laws and courts. Foreigners had, 
furthermore, exploited this privileged position to enrich themselves at the 
expense of the Egyptian masses; often through corrupt and immoral 
FIG. 4.1 Politics and nationalism in North-East Africa 
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means. T h e desire to eradicate this humiliating and repugnant foreign 
domination was to prove a major reason for the outbreak of resistance led 
by Colonel A h m a d 'Urâbï: the Urabist revolution.1 
Another reason for it was the maturity of liberal political ideas among 
Egyptians as a result of the spread of education and the development of 
the press in the course of the nineteenth century. This maturity was largely 
responsible for the emergence and development of a constitutional m o v e -
ment in the country from the 1860s onwards, particularly among the 
western-educated Egyptians w h o opposed European control and Khedival 
absolutism. This movement found considerable support in the revolution-
ary ideas of the Muslim reformers, Djamäl al-Dïn al-Afghânï and 
M u h a m m a d ' A b d u h . Led by M u h a m m a d Sharif Pasha, w h o was nicknamed 
Abu al-Dastür (the father of the constitution), these constitutional national-
ists pressed for the enactment of a liberal constitution and the formation 
of a representative government.2 S o m e of them m a y even have hoped to 
overthrow M u h a m m a d 'Alfs dynasty, which had ruled the nation since 
the turn of the century. 
T h e most important immediate factor in the outbreak of the revolution 
was, however, the discontent and frustration of the Egyptian military. While 
the soldiers received very low salaries - 20 piasters a month 3 - Egyptian 
army officers were not allowed promotion to higher ranks in the army. 
These were, in fact, exclusively monopolized by the foreign Turco-
Circassian aristocratic army officers w h o despised and ill-treated their 
Egyptian subordinates. T o end this inferior status and to achieve the 
country's national demands, the Egyptian military therefore actively inter-
fered in politics for the first time in the modern history of Egypt and 
launched a revolution early in February 1881 against European colonialism 
and Khedive Tawfîk. 
T h e leader of the revolution - Colonel A h m a d 'Urâbï (1839-1911) was 
an attractive person with a strong fallâh origin. T h o u g h 'simple and lacking 
in subtlety and political refinement',4 'Urâbï was a courageous m a n and 
a forceful speaker w h o often interspersed his speeches with passages from 
the Kur'ân, 'a trait that m a d e him popular a m o n g the masses'. These 
qualities of leadership had soon m a d e 'Urâbï the undisputed leader of the 
revolution, and he was instrumental in the formation of al-Hizb al-
Watanï (the Nationalist Party). Its members were a mixture of m e n of 
falläh origin and some of the Turkish notables w h o were all united in 
their discontent at the autocracy of Tawfik's rule. 
In its initial stages the revolution achieved a remarkable degree of success. 
' U t h m â n Rifkï, the notorious Circassian Minister of W a r and the master-
mind of the discriminatory policy in the army, was sacked and a dis-
1. A . al-Râfî, 1966, pp. 82-5. 
2. P. J. Vatikiotis, 1969, pp. 126-30. 
3. Public Record Office, K e w , F O 141/168, Dufferin's report, p. 4. 
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tinguished poet and revolutionary politician - M a h m u d Sâmï al-Barudï -
replaced him. Subsequently a full-fledged Urabist Cabinet was formed in 
which A h m a d 'Urâbï himself became the Minister of W a r . 5 Tawfîk was 
so scared that he ordered the formation of a People's Assembly and enacted -
on 7 February 1882 — a relatively liberal constitution. Knowing that this 
gesture to constitutionalism was not genuine, the Urabists remained intent 
on overthrowing Tawfîk and might even have planned to declare Egypt 
a republic. This development threatened foreign privileges and interests 
and consequently brought the revolution into direct confrontation with 
European powers. 
Meanwhile the Khedive was conspiring behind the scenes to crush the 
revolution. T o provide a pretext for foreign intervention - some Egyptian 
historians maintain — the Khedive and the British organized the Alexandria 
massacre of 12 June 1882 in which m a n y foreigners were killed and a great 
deal of property was damaged.6 Whether this accusation is true or not 
is irrelevant as the Khedive had in fact invited the British to intervene 
and they responded enthusiastically and quickly. But the Egyptian Cabinet 
unanimously decided to repel the invasion and rejected the British ulti-
m a t u m to desist from fortifying shore defences, and to dismantle gun 
emplacements around Alexandria. This gave the British fleet a further 
pretext to bombard Alexandria on 11 July 1882. T h e Egyptian army and 
people put up a gallant resistance against the invaders, but they were 
defeated by superior arms. About two thousand Egyptians were killed in 
this battle. 
After the fall of Alexandria the Egyptian army withdrew to Kafr 
al-Dawär, a few miles away. B y then, 'Urâbï had declared a djihäd against 
the British in a proclamation that was distributed to the Egyptian people. 
Fighting around Kafr al-Dawär broke out several times during August 
1882. T h e solid resistance of the Egyptian army and people m a d e it very 
difficult for the invaders to occupy Cairo from this direction. They there-
fore decided to occupy the Suez Canal and launch a major attack against 
the capital from there. 
T h e Egyptian masses readily sent financial support to their army and 
thousands of young people offered to join as conscripts. Nevertheless, all 
the odds were against the Egyptian resistance movement . 'Urâbï could 
not muster more than 16000 trained troops, and even this small number 
was dispersed around Kafr al-Dawär, Dimyät (Damietta) and the Suez 
Canal area. Moreover, the Egyptian army lacked training, modern arms 
and ammunition, and efficient means of transport. A modern army of 20000 
m e n under the c o m m a n d of Sir Garnet Wolseley quickly crossed the Canal, 
occupied Ismailie, broke the backbone of the revolution in the battle of 
al-Tall al-Kabïr on 13 September 1882,7 and occupied the country. T h o u g h 
5. M . Shibayka, 1965, p. 604. 
6. M . al-Murshidi, 1958, p. 58. 




African initiatives and resistance in North-East Africa 
the British had deceitfully promised speedy evacuation, the British occu-
pation of Egypt was to last seventy-two years. 
T h e failure of the Urabist revolution to rid the country of European 
influence and to end the arbitrary rule of the Turks in Egypt can easily 
be explained. Although supported by the bulk of the Egyptian people, 
the revolution did not have sufficient time to mobilize this support. M o r e -
over, a serious rift soon occurred in the united nationalist front as a result 
of a growing conflict between the military party and the constitutional 
nationalists. While the latter opposed on principle the involvement of the 
army in politics, the former insisted that their control of the government 
would be the best safeguard for the revolution. T h e revolution, furthermore, 
suffered from internal intrigues from the Khedive and his Circassian 
supporters w h o betrayed the revolution and aided the British occupation. 
'Urâbï himself m a d e a number of mistakes. His reluctance to depose 
the Khedive at the beginning of the revolution on the grounds that this 
would invite foreign intervention and cause chaos inside the country gave 
Tawfik valuable time in which to intrigue and conspire against the revolu-
tion. Another fatal mistake was 'Urâbîs refusal to listen to the advice of 
some of his military advisers to block the Suez Canal, his o w n view being -
mistaken as it proved - that France would not allow Britain to use the 
Canal to invade Egypt. Ultimately, however, the Urabist revolution was 
defeated by British military superiority. 
Egyptian initiatives and reaction to British conquest 1882-1914 
T h e military defeat of the Urabist revolution broke the national spirit and 
created an atmosphere of despair and disillusionment during the first decade 
of the British occupation of Egypt (1882-92). Within Egypt itself there 
was no effective resistance to the occupation during this decade, and the 
most important nationalist voices were those of the nationalists in exile. 
Djamâl al-Dïn al-Afghânï and M u h a m m a d ' A b d u h began the publication 
of a pan-Islamic magazine in 1883 - al-'Urwa al-Wuthkä (the indissoluble 
bond) - which aimed to free Egypt from the British occupation by stirring 
up public opinion in Egypt. Though this magazine closed d o w n after p u b -
lishing only eighteen issues, it had a profound influence on the few groups 
of Egyptians w h o read it - students, 'alamo" (Muslim scholars), and 
intellectuals. Al-'Urwa provided a source of opposition to the British and 
kept alive the spirit of self-determination.8 Its anti-British message was 
taken up in the 1890s by a group of political pan-Islamist writers. T h e 
most prominent of them was Shaykh 'Ali Yüsuf, w h o published a news-
paper, al-Mu'ayyad in 1900, and in 1907 he formed Hizb al-Isläh al-
Dustüri (the Constitutional Reformers) an organization which forcefully 
attacked British hegemony in Egypt. 
8. A . L . al-Sayyid, 1968, pp. 87-90. 
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In 1893 the Egyptian nationalist movement began to emerge from this 
quiescent phase when certain Egyptian elements started to criticize and 
resist the British occupation of Egypt. First a m o n g them was the ambitious 
new Khedive 'Abbas Hilmï ('Abbâs II, 1892-1914), w h o encouraged the 
development of a nationalist movement demanding the immediate evacu-
ation of the British. His financial assistance to the press, which enabled 
the movement to become articulate, was of particular importance. During 
the first three years of his reign, 'Abbas placed himself at the forefront 
of this movement and he became a very real challenge to the autocratic 
rule of Lord Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General, and succeeded 
in forcing the pro-British prime minister to resign on 15 January 1893. 
Although he was unable after that to act so openly owing to pressure from 
the British, Hilmï nevertheless attracted some dedicated recruits w h o were 
willing to carry on the struggle against the British occupation. They were 
a group of young intellectuals, w h o were familiar with the ideas of the 
French revolution and with modern social and political theories.9 T h e old 
Egyptian society with its strict code and religious restrictions was, in fact, 
gradually breaking up, a development that led to considerable instability. 
T h e educated Egyptians were particularly alarmed by the British domin-
ation of the civil service, the only area of advancement that remained open 
to them. B y 1905, 42% of the higher posts were occupied by the British, 
30% by Armenians and Syrians, and only 28% by Egyptians.l ° 
T h e most vehement opponents of British rule at that time were Mustafa 
Kâmil, a charismatic leader and eloquent orator, and his Nationalist Party. 
Kâmil had at first concentrated his efforts on winning European support 
for the cause of Egypt's independence. H e had apparently felt that other 
European states were so jealous of the British occupation of Egypt that 
they would actively support any attempts to remove them. With generous 
funds supplied by the Khedive, Kâmil toured European capitals during 
the period 1895-8 where he addressed meetings, gave interviews to news-
papers, and wrote articles and pamphlets. ' 1 These activities aroused a great 
deal of interest in Europe, but that was as far as it went. KämiPs optimistic 
belief that Europe in general, and France in particular, would support 
the Egyptian cause was wholly unjustified. Since France had her o w n 
colonies in North Africa, it is not surprising that she was not w o n over 
by KämiPs arguments in favour of self-rule. N o r was she ready to go to 
war with England over Egypt, as the Fashoda incident had shown in 1898. 
T h e most urgent task facing the young nationalists was to disprove 
Cromer's biased claim that the Egyptians were incapable of ruling them-
selves on civilized principles, and to convince the Egyptians themselves 
that they formed a nation capable and indeed deserving of self-rule. Kâmil 
9. ibid., pp. 99-136. 
10. Milner report, p. 30 (Egypt, N o . 1, (1921), C m d 1131, Report of Milner Mission to 
Egypt). 
11. P. M . Holt (ed.), 1968, pp. 308-19. 
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was preoccupied with this task from 1898 onwards. Until 1906 his views 
were expressed in numerous speeches and articles in the newspapers of 
the day, particularly in al-Liwä (The Flag) which he founded in 1900. 
H e stressed Egypt's past to combat defeatism and to show that the Egyptians 
were capable of great things. ' H a d I not been born an Egyptian, I would 
have wished to become one', and 'there is no sense in life when it is coupled 
with despair, and no sense in despair as long as there is life'12 - such 
were the slogans he devised. Kämil's speeches and articles aimed to break 
d o w n local rivalries and unite all the population in a nationalist front, and 
to develop national education in order to strengthen patriotic sentiment. 
His political activities began to bear fruit as he was able to organize a 
strike of law students in February 1906. 
T h e Dinshäway incident of M a y 1906 profoundly boosted K ä m i P s 
campaign in Egypt. Briefly, a group of British officers came to Dinshäway 
village on a pigeon-shooting trip, which the villagers objected to since 
pigeons were their means of livelihood. A clash followed in which one 
of the British officers was fatally wounded. T h e British authorities over-
reacted to this incident and passed very severe sentences on the villagers. 
Four were sentenced to be hanged and m a n y others were sentenced to 
long terms of imprisonment. Although public executions had been stopped 
two years previously, the hangings were carried out in public, and the 
whole village of Dinshäway was forced to watch the executions. •3 This 
barbaric behaviour had, in Kämil's view, done more to awaken people's 
feelings against the occupation than the passage often years of occupation. ' 4 
T h e incident certainly caused an upsurge of Egyptian nationalism and for 
the first time since 1882, the British became aware of the insecurity of 
their position in Egypt. It was this which forced the British to reconsider 
their oppressive policy and to declare their intention of preparing the 
country for self-government. Cromer retired in 1907 to make way for a 
n e w Consul-General, Eldon Gorst, to implement the n e w policy. This 
represented a great triumph for Kämil and his Nationalist Party, which 
was inaugurated publicly in 1907. 
After the premature death of Kämil in February 1908 M u h a m m a d Farïd 
succeeded him as president of the Nationalist Party. Farïd lacked m a n y 
of the qualities of leadership that Kämil had possessed, but he continued 
to write, and to address public meetings demanding the evacuation of British 
troops. His nationalist activities earned him six months' imprisonment in 
1911, after which he went into exile.15 
B y 1907 some prominent Egyptian intellectuals had come to believe that 
Britain was too strong to be expelled from Egypt by revolutionary action. 
Moreover, they felt that there were real signs of a change in British policy 
12. A. L . al-Sayyid, 1968, p. 161. 
13. M . G . al-Masada, 1974, pp. 84-91. 
14. M . H . Haykal, n.d., p. 148. 
15. A . Sabrî, 1969, pp. 81-109. 
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after the Dinshäway incident. Consequently they saw no harm in co-
operating with the British in Egypt in order to secure such concessions 
as could be extracted until such time as full independence could be achieved. 
This group formed a new political party called the Umma Party (the Peoples' 
Party) in October 1907, which had its o w n newspaper, al-Djarida. Led 
by the prominent journalist and educationalist, A h m a d Lutfî al-Sayyid, 
w h o was referred to by educated Egyptians as Faylasüfal-Djil (the philoso-
pher of the generation), the Djarida-Umma group urged the Egyptians 
to modernize their Islamic tradition by adopting such European ideas and 
institutions as they considered necessary for progress.16 T h e programme 
of the Umma Party called for the creation of an Egyptian personality, for 
without it, it was felt that Egypt could not achieve real independence. It 
stressed the importance of agricultural reform and asked for an increase 
in the powers of the provincial councils and the assembly in preparation 
for eventual constitutional rule. Most important of all, the party emphasized 
the need for education as an essential means for training capable admini-
strators and attaining national independence. But the Umma Party was 
not very popular among the Egyptian nationalists because of its co-operation 
with the British authorities. Its secular liberalism had, furthermore, failed 
to take root a m o n g a great number of Egyptians because of their instinctive 
adherence to their Islamic traditions.17 
Before the First World W a r the Egyptian nationalist movement was 
thus a disunited and a predominantly elitist movement unable to c o m m a n d 
popular following. Consequently it was too weak to wrest any significant 
concessions from the British authorities and m a d e little progress along the 
path of self-government. T h e nationalists had to wait until 1919 before 
coming out in open revolt against the British occupation. 
The Sudan 
T h e Mahdist revolution 
F r o m 1821 the Sudan was governed by the Ottoman government of Egypt, 
and by 1880 the people of the Sudan - like the people of Egypt - were 
also fighting to rid themselves of an alien ruling aristocracy. T h e themes 
of the djihäd and Islamic resistance to alien rule, propagated by 'Urâbï 
in Egypt, were also evident in the militant revolutionary movement under 
the leadership of M u h a m m a d A h m a d al-Mahdï in the Sudan. His m o v e -
ment, the Mahdiyya, was essentially a djihäd - a holy war - and as such 
claimed the support of all Muslims. Its fundamental objective, as stated 
repeatedly in the M a h d F s letters and proclamations,18 was to revive and 
return to the pure and primitive faith of Islam, 'purged of heresies and 
16. P. J. Vatikiotis, 1969, pp. 229-30. 
17. ibid., p. 234. 
18. For a good collection of those letters and proclamations see M . I. A b u Salïm, 1969. 
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accretions',19 and to spread it to the whole world, by force if deemed 
necessary. T h e genuine spiritual fervour of the Mahdist revolution was 
expressed in the bay'a, the oath of allegiance that the supporters of the 
M a h d ï - w h o m he styled the Ansßr following the example of the Prophet20 -
had to give to the M a h d ï or his representative before being admitted to 
the Mahdiyya. In this bay'a, the Ansßr swore allegiance to the M a h d ï in 
'renouncing this world and abandoning it, and being content with what 
is with G o d , desiring what is with G o d and the world to come, and w e 
will not flee from the jihäa".21 
T o say that the Mahdist revolution was religious does not m e a n that 
religion was the sole factor in its generation. For there were also other, 
secondary, factors — all arising from the faults of the corrupt Turco-
Egyptian administration - that caused general discontent in the Sudan. T h e 
violence that accompanied the original conquest in 1820-1 had created a 
strong desire for revenge, while the heavy taxes that the Turks imposed and 
levied by force led to widespread discontent. In addition, the attempts of 
the government to suppress the slave trade had alienated some northern 
Sudanese as they struck at an important source of wealth and the basis of 
the domestic and agrarian economy of the country. Finally, the govern-
ment's partiality to the Shaykiyya people and the Khatmïyya sect seems to 
have aroused the jealousy of other local and religious groups, and stimu-
lated them to support the M a h d ï . 2 2 
T h e leader of the Mahdist revolution, M u h a m m a d A h m a d Ibn 'Abdallah 
was a pious m a n whose ideal was the Prophet M u h a m m a d himself. Just 
as the Prophet before him had assumed leadership of his community at 
the age of 40, so M u h a m m a d A h m a d assumed the Mahdï-ship at the same 
age, secretly communicated it to a group of trusty followers, and then 
declared it openly to the general public. This brought him into direct 
military confrontation with the Anglo-Egyptian government, a struggle 
which lasted for four years (1881-5). T h e government at first under-
estimated the M a h d ï and dismissed him as a mere darwtsh (a mendicant) -
an attitude reflected in the weak and disorganized expedition that was sent 
to deal with him in A b a Island. A brief skirmish followed in which the 
Ansßr achieved a quick and easy victory, and the administration was thrown 
into utter confusion. T h e M a h d ï and his followers considered their victory 
to have been a miracle.23 
T h e M a h d f s political foresight and his military genius was clearly 
reflected in his decision to 'emigrate' after this encounter from A b ä to 
Djabal Kadir in the N u b a mountains. Apart from being another parallel 
19. P. M . Holt, 1970, p. 19. 
20. Ansßr ('helpers') was the name originally given to the supporters of the Prophet 
M u h a m m a d in Medina. 
21. P . M . Holt, 1970, p. 117. 
22. N . Shouqair, 1967, pp. 631-6. 
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with the life of the Prophet, this hidjra moved the revolution from an 
open and defenceless area that was within reach of the government's forces 
to a remote and strategically fortified region. This hidjra was indeed a 
turning-point in the history of the Mahdiyya. Its main significance was 
that in moving the revolution from the riverain regions to the western 
Sudan, the westerners thenceforward became its key administrators and 
military commanders, while the riverain people in the movement declined 
in significance.24 
Another turning-point in the history of the Mahdist revolution was the 
battle at Shaykän on 5 November 1883. B y that time Khedive Tawfïk 
and his government were determined to crush the Mahdï , n o w in control 
of the key towns of Kordofân province. Consequently, the Egyptian govern-
ment organized an expedition that was composed of the remnants of 
' U r a W s soldiers and commanded by a British army officer, Hicks Pasha. 
T h e Ansär completely annihilated their enemy at Shaykän's forest in the 
neighbourhood of al-'Obeid.25 T h e victory was a great boost for the M a h d ï 
and his revolution. While m a n y Sudanese joined the revolution, delegates 
from some Muslim countries came to congratulate the M a h d ï on his victory 
against the 'infidels'. However, the immediate consequence of the triumph 
at Shaykän was the total collapse of the Turco-Egyptian administration in 
the western Sudan and the establishment of Mahdist rule in the provinces 
of Kordofân, Därfür and Bahr al-Ghazäl. T h e M a h d ï was n o w ready to 
turn to his next objective, to gain control of Khartoum and end Turco-
Egyptian rule in the Sudan. 2 6 
T h e Mahdists struck next in the eastern Sudan under the able leader-
ship of ' U t h m ä n Digna. Digna w o n m a n y victories against government 
forces and posed a threat to the Red Sea ports which Britain had pledged 
to defend. T h e British then attempted to intervene militarily, but to very 
little effect. Except for Sawäkin, the Ansßr controlled the whole of the 
eastern Sudan and prevented any supplies and reinforcements from Egypt 
reaching Khartoum through the Berber-Sawäkin route. 
Meanwhile, British policy towards the Sudan question had undergone 
a significant change after the battle at Shaykän. While previously maintain-
ing that it was an exclusively Egyptian concern, after Shaykän the British 
government felt that its imperial interests necessitated Egypt's immediate 
withdrawal from the Sudan. 2 7 Hence it ordered the Egyptian government 
to abandon the Sudan and sent General Charles Gordon to see that this 
was done. As the M a h d ï advanced towards Khartoum Gordon found 
himself in a very dangerous situation. After a long siege, the Mahdist forces 
24. M . I. A b u Salïm, 1970, pp. 21-2. 
25. I. Zulfu, 1976, pp. 203-29. 
26. M . A . Al-Hasan, 1964, p. 4. 
27. M . Shibeika, 1952, pp. 107-9. 
76 
African initiatives and resistance in North-East Africa 
attacked the t o w n , killed G o r d o n o n 26 January 1885, and put an end 
to Turco-Egypt ian rule in the S u d a n . 2 8 
D u r i n g its first four years (1881-5) , the M a h d i y y a developed from a 
m o v e m e n t of religious protest into a powerful and militant state that d o m i n -
ated the S u d a n for fourteen years. Its administrative, financial and judicial 
institutions, and its legislation, were based strictly u p o n the dual found-
ations of the K u r ' a n and the S u n n a , though the M a h d ï occasionally passed 
n e w forms of legislation on such pressing problems as the status of w o m e n 
and landownership.2 9 
T h e relations of the Mahdis t state with the outside world were strictly 
governed by the djihäd. Both the M a h d ï and his Khalifa, 'Abdullah Ibn 
al-Sayyid M u h a m m a d , had written letters of warning (indhärät) - virtually 
ultimatums - to s o m e leaders of the world, such as the K h e d i v e of Egypt , 
the O t t o m a n e m p e r o r and the e m p e r o r of Abyssinia, to accept the M a h d F s 
mission, or be faced with an immediate djihäd if they they did not respond 
positively.30 
W h i l e the M a h d ï did not live long e n o u g h to pursue such a policy -
he died in June 1885 - the djihäd b e c a m e the cornerstone of the foreign 
policy of his successor, Khalifa 'Abdullah. In spite of the tremendous 
administrative and economic problems facing h i m , Khalifa 'Abdullah 
pressed forward with the djihäd o n t w o fronts: against Egypt and Ethiopia. 
U n d e r the leadership of ' A b d a l - R a h m ä n a l - N u d j ü m l , the Mahdis t forces 
invaded Egypt , but they were defeated at the battle of Tushki in 1889. 
T h e Mahdists ' advance on the eastern front w a s also checked a n d the 
Ansär lost T o k a r and Kassala respectively in 1891 a n d 1894. T h e ideological 
c o m m i t m e n t of the Khalïfa to the djihäd had frustrated the attempts of 
the Ethiopian e m p e r o r to conclude an African alliance between the S u d a n 
and Ethiopia against E u r o p e a n imperialism. For , as a prerequisite to this 
alliance, the Khalïfa insisted that the emperor should accept and believe 
in M a h d i s m and Islam. T h e o u t c o m e of this d o g m a t i s m w a s a long military 
confrontation that weakened both states and m a d e t h e m an easier prey 
for E u r o p e a n imperialism.31 
B y M a r c h 1896 the British imperial government had decided to invade 
the S u d a n and an Anglo-Egyptian force w a s formed for this purpose u n d e r 
the c o m m a n d of General H . H . Kitchener. D u r i n g the first phase of this 
invasion — M a r c h to September 1896 - the e n e m y forces occupied the 
whole of Dongo la province without encountering any serious resistance 
from the Sudanese people, partly because of their technical superiority 
and partly because they took the Khalifa by surprise. 
A s the Khalifa h a d rightly surmised, the occupation of D o n g o l a w a s 
no m o r e than a prelude to a full-scale invasion of the Mahdis t state. W h i l e 
28. M . M . Hamza, 1972, pp. 159-83. 
29. P. M . Holt, 1970, p. 128. 
30. N . Shouqair, 1967, pp. 921-9. 
31. M . S. Al-Kaddäl, 1973, pp. 105-7. 
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Kitchener was advancing southwards, the Khalifa mobilized his forces, 
determined to resist the invaders. C o m m a n d e d by Emir M a h m u d A h m a d , 
the Ansär tried unsuccessfully to repel the enemy attack at the battle of 
Atbara on 8 April 1898.32 Three thousand Sudanese were killed, and over 
4000 were wounded. Mahmiid himself was captured and put in prison 
at Rosetta in Egypt, where he died some years later. 
After the defeat at Atbara the Khalïfa decided to meet the enemy in 
the vicinity of his capital, O m d u r m a n , because he understood that the 
difficulties of supply and transport would prohibit the movement of any 
large force of troops. Hence the Sudanese fought the enemy with 
magnificent courage at the battle of Karari on 2 September 1898.a3 Once 
again they were defeated by superior armaments. Nearly 11000 Sudanese 
were killed and about 16000 wounded. W h e n he saw that the day was 
lost, the Khalïfa withdrew to the east of Kordofan where he hoped to 
gather his supporters and make a fresh attack on the invaders in the capital. 
H e continued to be a problem for the new administration for a whole 
year, but was finally defeated at the battle of U m m Diwaykrät on 
24 November 1899. After the battle, the Khalïfa was found dead upon 
his sheepskin prayer-rug,34 all the other Mahdist generals and leaders 
having been either killed or imprisoned. This marked the collapse of the 
Mahdist state, although the Mahdiyya as a religious and political sentiment 
never died. 
T h e Mahdist risings 
Although under British colonial rule the Mahdist sect was outlawed, a 
sizeable section of the Sudanese community remained Mahdist at heart. 
T h e majority expressed their resentment of British rule by continuing to 
read the ratïb (the Mahdfs prayer-book) and to practise other Mahdist 
rituals. But a dedicated Mahdist minority repeatedly tried to topple the 
'infidel' rule by force. Hardly a year passed between 1900 and 1914 without 
a Mahdist rising in the northern Sudan. T h e main source of inspiration 
and strength for these risings was the Muslim doctrine of Nabt 'Isa 
(Prophet Jesus). It was generally believed a m o n g Muslims that the M a h d ï 
would reappear in order to bring justice to the world after it had been 
filled with injustice. But his mission would be temporarily halted by al-
tnasïh al-dadjdjäl (the anti-Christ). Nabï lTsä would, however, soon appear 
in order to secure the permanence of the glorious Mahdiyya. T h e Ansär 
had apparently identified the British with al-dadjdjäl and m a n y of them 
assumed the Hsâship to expel them from the country.35 
32. M . A . Ibrahim, 1969, pp. 196-237. 
33. For information about the imprisoned Mahdist emirs, see H . ' A . Ibrahim, 1974, 
PP- 33-45. 
34. P. M . Holt, 1970, p. 243. 
35. H . ' A . Ibrâhîm, 1979, p. 440. 
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Mahdist uprisings occurred in February 1900, in 1902-3 and in 1904. 
But the most important of these Mahdist risings was organized and led 
in 1908 by a distinguished Mahdist, \Abd al-Kâdir M u h a m m a d I m a m , 
usually called W a d Habüba. W a d Habüba preached Mahdism in the 
Djazïra and defied the government from his c a m p in Tukür village near 
Kamlïn. A government force advanced towards him, but it was resisted 
and two government officials were killed in this encounter. While the 
authorities were shocked by this incident, W a d Habüba launched a surprise 
attack in M a y on the enemy at the village of Katflya. 
T h e Mahdists fought bravely, but within a few days the backbone of 
the revolt had been broken. In the manner of the Mahdï , however, W a d 
Habüba had 'emigrated', presumably to find asylum in O m d u r m a n where 
he apparently hoped to secretly continue to propagate the Mahdist cause. 
But he was arrested en route and publicly hanged on 17 M a y 1908, while 
m a n y of his followers were sentenced to death or to long terms of imprison-
ment . 3 6 During an unfair trial, W a d Habüba defied the British imperialists 
by telling the court trying him: 
M y desire is that the Sudan should be governed by Muslims 
according to M o h a m m a d a n law and the M a h d ^ s doctrines and pre-
cepts. I know the people of the Sudan better than the government 
does. I have no hesitation in saying that their friendliness and flattery 
is nothing but hypocrisy and lies. I a m ready to swear that the people 
prefer Mahdism to the present government.37 
Though uncoordinated and unable to c o m m a n d any large following, 
these numerous messianic risings provided an element of continuity with 
the era of the Mahdist state, and proved that Mahdi sm was still alive as 
a vital religious and political force in the Sudan. T h e risings had, further-
more, demonstrated that the m o o d of resistance to colonial rule remained 
entrenched in the hearts of m a n y northern Sudanese. 
Protest movements in the N u b a mountains and the southern S u d a n 
T h e struggle of the Sudanese people in the N u b a mountains and the 
southern Sudan was one of the most serious challenges that the British 
colonialists faced before the First World W a r . T h e numerous risings and 
revolts that broke out in these parts of the country were, however, essen-
tially local in character. They were, furthermore, direct responses to the 
changes that colonialism introduced into the social fabric of those diversi-
fied communities, a product of the destruction by the British of social 
and political institutions of those communities and their replacement by 
new structures of their own. 
36. ibid., p. 448. 
37. Sudan Intelligence Report, M a y 1908. 
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In spite of the ruthlessness of the colonial forces, various N u b a c o m -
munities had actively opposed British domination. While A h m a d al-
N u ' m a n , mek of Kitra, declared his open hostility, in 1906 the population 
of Talodi launched an uprising in which a number of government officials 
and soldiers were slaughtered. A more serious revolt was that of mek Fakï 
'Alï of the Miri hills. 'All harassed government forces for two years, but he 
was arrested in 1916 and imprisoned in W â d ï Haifa.38 
In the southern region of the Sudan, resistance was led and sustained 
by the Nuer people living in the lands adjoining the river Sobat and the 
White Nile. Under previous administrations, the Nuer were accustomed 
to managing their o w n affairs, since these administrations did not exercise 
effective control over them. But n o w the Nuer refused to recognize the 
supremacy of the new government and continued to show hostility towards 
it. T w o of their leaders, Dengkur and Diu, were particularly active in this 
respect. T h o u g h these two influential leaders died in 1906 and 1907 respect-
ively, Nuer activism never died, and in 1914 another Nuer leader, D o w l 
Diu, attacked a government post. In spite of the numerous indiscriminate 
punitive measures, the Nuer resistance continued to gain m o m e n t u m until 
it broke out in the popular and widespread Nuer revolt of 1927. 
T h e Azande under the leadership of Yambio , their chief, were deter-
mined not to allow any foreign troops to enter their land. T h e y faced the 
danger of invasion from both the Belgians and the Condominium govern-
ment. T h e Belgians were increasing their activities on the southern borders 
of Zandeland. Yambio seemed to have feared Belgian invasion more than 
the British. H e therefore thought that the best policy open to him was 
to neutralize the British with signs of friendship and thereby gain a free 
hand to deal with the imminent Belgian danger. H e invited the British 
to establish a trading post in his kingdom. T h e invitation was m a d e in 
the belief that the British would not be able to come, but that if they 
did he would fight them. His true intention seems to have been to play 
the British off against the Belgians, for he had apparently become convinced 
that British interests in his country would make the Belgians think twice 
before attacking him. 3 9 
But the British took up the invitation and in January 1903 a patrol left 
W a u for Yambio's territory. While on the march it was attacked by the 
Azande. T h e patrol escaped to R u m b e k . In January 1904 the government 
in Khartoum sent another patrol, which was also attacked by the Azande, 
and ultimately it was forced to retreat to Tonj. 
While the Belgians were preparing an attack on Yambio's territory, the 
latter mobilized a force of 10 000 Azande and launched a daring attack 
on the Belgian post at M a y a w a . T h e Azande courageously harassed the 
intruders, but they could not stand up to the Belgian rifle fire with spears 
alone. This battle seriously weakened Zande military power and morale. 
38. A . S. Cudsi, 1969, pp. 112-16. 
39. ibid., p. 220. 
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W i t h his military p o w e r broken, Y a m b i o had to meet a government ex-
peditionary force in January 1905. H e w a s ultimately defeated and i m -
prisoned, and died soon afterwards, o n 10 February 1905. His people, 
however, continued the struggle. In 1908 s o m e of Y a m b i o ' s warriors 
attempted to stir u p a rising while others fought the British during the 
First W o r l d W a r . 4 0 
Somaliland 
T h e Somal i reaction to partition 1 8 8 4 - 9 7 
F r o m the middle of the nineteenth century the Somali peninsula was d r a w n 
into the theatre of European colonial competition between Italy, Britain 
and France. W i t h their interests in India and other parts of Asia in the 
early 1880s, Britain and France sought to establish themselves on the Somali 
coast because of its strategic and commercial importance. Eventually, with 
Italy joining in, they extended their influence in the interior and each of 
t h e m established a protectorate in Somaliland. Whi le the activities of the 
French had led them to establish a protectorate in 1885, the British govern-
m e n t did not declare its protectorate until two years later - this w a s on 
the Somali coast from Djibuti eastwards, and included the Bender Ziadeh. 
T h r o u g h the good offices of the British East Africa C o m p a n y and the 
British government, Italy was also able to acquire control of the towns 
of Brava, M e r c a , M o g a d i s h u and Warsheikh in N o v e m b e r 1888. T h e Italian 
government declared a protectorate over those portions of the coast con-
necting the towns, and this was subsequently extended to include O b b i a 
and the Majerteyn Somali in the north (see Figure 4.1). 
Ethiopia had also expanded into Somali-inhabited territories, and had 
m a n a g e d to establish a tentative administration in the H a u d and O g a d e n . 
O n e view suggests that while the European invasion of Somalia was 
motivated by imperialist and capitalist considerations, the Ethiopian expan-
sion there w a s essentially 'a defensive reaction to the establishment of 
European colonies in the vicinity'. Since Italy, Britain and France were 
pushing inland from their respective coastal possessions - this interpretation 
argues - the Ethiopian emperor , Menelik, 'endeavoured to keep t h e m as 
far as possible from the centre of his power in the highlands, through 
the expedient of extending his o w n frontiers'.41 Yet it should be noted 
that S h o a n expansion under Menelik had begun before the Europeans had 
b e c o m e involved in the area, first against the O r o m o and later against the 
Somali. 
T h e partition of Somaliland, formally virtually completed by 1897, 
ignored the legitimate interests of the Somali people and deprived t h e m 
of their freedom and independence. H e n c e it was b o u n d to awaken their 
40. ibid., pp. 238-54. 
41. S. Touval, 1963, p. 74. 
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suspicions and stimulate them to resent and resist this alien conquest. T h e 
Somali chiefs and sultans were particularly disturbed by this encroachment 
because of its effect upon their political influence. They never willingly 
gave up their sovereignty and it was they w h o provided the leadership 
for the numerous local risings against European and Ethiopian rulers during 
the era of partition. 
Being aware of the rivalry between European powers in the field of 
colonial expansion, the Somali chiefs tried to play them off one against 
the other. They did this by concluding treaties with one or other of the 
European powers in the hope that the exercise of diplomacy would counter 
the growing menace to their independence. T h e Somali chiefs, for example, 
signed m a n y treaties with the British. Little was really conceded to Britain 
by those treaties. T h e preamble to each treaty explained that they were 
entered into, on the Somali side, 'for the maintenance of our independence, 
the preservation of order, and other good and sufficient reasons'. Nor did 
the clans concerned expressly cede their land to Britain; they specifically 
pledged themselves 'never to cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for 
occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory 
presently inhabited by them or being under their control'.42 Ultimately 
these treaties failed in their objective as the European powers and Ethiopia 
managed to settle their mutual colonial disputes in this area peacefully. 
Besides this diplomatic effort, some of the Somali clans took up arms 
to try to preserve their sovereignty. T h e British were obliged to send four 
expeditions: in 1886 and 1890, against the Isa; in 1893, against the Habar 
Gerhajis; and in 1895, against the Habar A w a l . 4 3 T h e Italians also suffered 
heavy losses of life. In 1887 a party of Italians was massacred at Harar 
and in 1896 a party of fourteen Italians was killed by the Bimal people. 
T h e frequent clashes between the Ethiopian forces and the Somali clans 
did not permit the former to complete their occupation of the Ogaden 
nor to extend their authority far beyond scattered military posts established 
throughout the region.44 
It must, however, be remembered that the Somali, in spite of their 
cultural identity, did not then constitute a single political unity. Foreign 
aggression thus encountered not a single nation, but congeries of disunited 
and often mutually hostile clans.45 Moreover, the Somali peoples were 
still armed with spears and bows and arrows, and were not immediately 
able to import firearms and ammunition in any quantity. Nevertheless, 
the Somali resistance during the partition era kept alive the nationalist 
spirit, and consequently stimulated the subsequent djihäd of Sayyid 
M u h a m m a d Abdule Hasan against the European and Ethiopian occupation. 
T o this w e n o w turn. 
42. I. M . Lewis, 1965, pp. 46-7. 
43. A . Hamilton, 1911, p. 47. 
44. S. Touval, 1963, p. 74. 
45. I. M . Lewis, 1965, p. 43. 
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T h e Somali fight for freedom 1897-1914 
Sayyid M u h a m m a d was born in 1864. H e mastered the Ku'ran at the age 
of 7. At 19 he left his h o m e to acquire learning in the major centres of 
Islam in eastern Africa, Harar and Mogadishu. It is also believed that 
he travelled as far afield as the Sudanese Mahdist strongholds in 
Kordofan.46 In 1895 the Sayyid set out on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and 
spent a year in Arabia, also visiting Hejaz and Palestine. While in Mecca, 
he studied under Shaykh M u h a m m a d Sälih, and joined his sect, the 
Sâlihïyya order. Possibly this extensive travel and periods spent abroad 
in different parts of the Muslim world had brought the Sayyid into contact 
with the then current ideas of Islamic revivalism.47 O n his return h o m e , 
he settled for a time in Berbera where he taught and preached to his 
countrymen, urging them to return to the strict path of Muslim devotion. 
Sayyid M u h a m m a d was conscious that the Christian (European and 
Ethiopian) incursions had threatened the social and economic foundation 
of Somali society. As early as July 1899, he wrote to a Somali clan and 
gave them this warning: ' D o you not see that the infidels have destroyed 
our religion and have m a d e our children their own?' B y this, he was 
apparently referring to the establishment of Christian schools in Somalia 
which he considered a threat to the Ku'ränic schools. Al-Sayyid felt that 
the effectiveness of Christian proselytization could also be seen in the 
adoption of Christian names such as 'J°hn 'Abdullah!1. All this confirmed 
al-Sayyid's belief that Christian colonization sought to destroy the Muslim 
faith. 
T h e Mahdist movement in the Sudan had strong repercussions in 
Somaliland, and the Sayyid, like other religious leaders, was inspired by 
the brilliant career of the M a h d ï . T h e awareness on the part of the Somali 
of the earlier revolution in the Sudan and their sympathy for adherents 
of a c o m m o n faith were indeed a contributory factor in the rise of Sayyid 
M u h a m m a d . 4 8 In one of his speeches, the Sayyid accused the British 
military authorities of exporting animals for the war against the M a h d ï -
the holy m a n of the Sudan - to w h o m G o d had given victory.49 But the 
extent to which Sayyid M u h a m m a d viewed his djihäd in the general 
context of Islamic revival, and h o w far he was inspired and influenced 
by the Mahdist revolution in the Sudan, remains unclear. Even the assump-
tion that he conferred with the Mahdist emir of the eastern Sudan, 
' U t h m a n Digna, during his visit to the Sudan cannot be amply substan-
tiated, though some Somali traditions claim that the guerrilla tactics 
46. A . Sheikh-Abdi, 1978, pp. 61-2. 
47. M . O . Abd al-Halim, 1975, p. 339. 
48. I. M . Lewis, 1965, p. 69. 
49. L . Silberman, n.d., p. 47. 
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employed by the Somali in the course of the djihäd were copied from the 
Mahdists of the eastern Sudan. 5 0 
O n e of the more serious factors hampering unity a m o n g the nomadic 
Somali was the traditional lineage system with its sectional loyalties. But 
through his personal charisma and brilliant leadership, al-Sayyid managed 
to c o m m a n d a heterogeneous following, consisting of various Somali clans, 
and to create a standing army which was estimated at 12000 m e n . 5 1 In 
this successful mobilization against alien colonial rule, al-Sayyid appealed 
to the religious sentiments of the Somali as Muslims irrespective of clan 
allegiances. H e had, furthermore, composed a large number of poems, of 
which m a n y are still well known throughout Somalia, by means of which 
he 'successfully rallied a host of contentious clansmen behind the twin 
banners of Islam and homeland'.52 
Al-Sayyid started his djihäd at Berbera where between 1895 and 1897 
he tried to arouse the people against the imperialists. But his first revolu-
tionary action was the occupation of Burao in the centre of British 
Somaliland in August 1899. T h e British were so harassed by this that 
between the years 1900 and 1904 they sent four expeditions to repel al-
Sayyid's attacks. T h o u g h the British were helped in these operations by 
the Italians, al-Sayyid's exceptional military skills and his successful use 
of cavalry and guerrilla tactics w o n his warriors a number of victories. 
O n e of these was at G a m b u r u hill in April 1903 in which nine British 
officers were killed. 
B y the end of 1904, however, the Sayyid's force had been greatly 
weakened. H e therefore withdrew to the Italian Majerteyn Protectorate 
where, on 5 March 1905, he signed the Treaty of Illing with the Italians 
in which he dictated his o w n terms. B y 1908 al-Sayyid had mobilized his 
forces for a new round of fighting that forced the British to withdraw 
from the interior in November 1909, and concentrate on the coast. But 
al-Sayyid threatened to attack the coastal towns as well. In August 1913 
he gained a major victory by annihilating the newly established camel 
constabulary. This disaster forced the British to ally with the Ethiopian 
Governor of Harar and to mount joint expeditions against al-Sayyid until 
his death at Imi in Ethiopia in N o v e m b e r 1920. 
U n d e r the able leadership of Sayyid M u h a m m a d , the Somali people 
had thus continued to harass the European imperialists and the Ethiopians 
for twenty years. T h e y were able to win military, political and even diplo-
matic victories. T h o u g h this Somali djihäd ultimately failed to rid the 
country of alien rule, it encouraged a strong nationalist feeling. T h e Somali 
people had come to see themselves as a single whole fighting against foreign 
incursions. Besides that, Sayyid M u h a m m a d ' s struggle left in the Somali 
50. M . O . Abd al-Halim, 1975, pp. 369-70. 
51. D . Jardine, 1923, p. 69. 
52. A . Sheikh-Abdi, 1978, p. 62. 
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national consciousness an ideal of patriotism which could never be effaced, 
and which was to inspire later generations of his countrymen.5 3 
Conclusion 
Perhaps no part of Africa resisted European conquest and occupation in 
the period 1880-1914 so forcefully as the north-eastern part of the con-
tinent. This is shown by the thousands of Egyptians, Sudanese and Somali 
w h o lost their lives in the battles and skirmishes fought between them 
and the colonial forces. T h e strength of this resistance was due to the 
fact that besides the patriotic sentiment which inspired it, there was an 
even more fundamental sentiment at work, namely an intense religious 
faith. T h e peoples of Egypt, the Sudan and Somaliland were not fighting 
in defence of h o m e alone, but also in defence of religion. Mus l ims there, 
like their fellow adherents in other parts of the Islamic world, were conscious 
of the social and religious disruption that would be caused by alien en-
croachment on hitherto M u s l i m territories. It was also against the spirit 
of Islam that a Mus l im population should accept a position of political 
subordination to a Christian power. T h e revolutionary movements of 
'Urâbï, the M a h d ï and Sayyid M u h a m m a d should therefore be understood 
in the context of the numerous reforming movements that spread and pro-
foundly affected the Mus l im world during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
53. I. M . Lewis, 1965, p. 91. 
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and the Sahara 
A. LAROUI 
T h e subject of this chapter is highly complex, not so m u c h because of 
the facts, which are on the whole fairly well known, but w h e n it comes 
to interpreting them. O u r task is to study the initiatives taken by the 
people of the Maghrib and the Sahara to counter the colonial thrust, 
and their reactions to the conquest in progress. T o give a preliminary 
idea of the complexity of the situation, let us examine the situation in 
1907 (see Fig. 5 .1) . 
In the west, Morocco was having a revolution, which was to overthrow 
Sultan ' A b d al-cAzïz (1894-1908), because he had ratified the French 
conquest of Tuât province and agreed to the reforms imposed by the 
European powers at the Algeciras Conference in April 1906. T h e pro-
tagonists of this revolution were members of the Makhzen1 and were 
connected with the zawäyä (sing, zâwiya), the local centres of Sufi religious 
brotherhoods (tartqa), and with local chieftaincies. 
In the east, Tunisia was seeing the birth of a nationalist movement 
in the true sense of the term. Associations of the first graduates turned 
out by modern education were being set up, while opposition newspapers 
were appearing in the language of the colonial power. A n e w elite was 
making itself conspicuous by taking unprecedented initiatives. 
In the south, the western Sahara was the scene of a large-scale French 
operation aimed at encircling and strangling independent Morocco. Spain 
was soon to follow the French example in Morocco itself, and Italy in 
Tripolitania, in this case at the expense of the Sultan in Constantinople. 
T h u s , in our period and area, w e need to distinguish between three 
levels: 
(1) that of the organized state,2 Moroccan in the west and Ottoman 
in the east of North Africa. That is where w e must look for 
initiative properly so called. 
1. T h e Government of Morocco, and more broadly the political and religious elite 
of the country. 
2. T h e structure of this state must not be interpreted in terms of that of European 
liberal states; this would be falling into the trap of colonial ideology. 










































































































































































African initiatives and resistance in North Africa and the Sahara 
(2) the level of the Sufi brotherhoods, no doubt religious in inspira-
tion but unquestionably political in function. In North Africa 
and the Sahara they were always defensive organizations against 
external threats. W h e n the state was strong the brotherhoods 
were part of its mechanism; w h e n it became weak or broke u p 
they became independent and took the initiative. T h u s , w h e n 
Constantinople gave up its sovereignty the Sanûsï brotherhood 
became the core of the resistance to the Italians in Cyrenaica, 
and w h e n the Moroccan state was powerless to do anything, 
that of the Kettânïs rallied the anti-French forces at Shinkït 
and in the Shawiya. 
(3) the level of the djema'a,3 which only came out into the open 
w h e n the other levels had been put out of action by armed 
force. T h e djema'a began by refusing all contact with the colonial 
authorities, despite their tempting offers. W h e n it eventually 
gave in, it had only one limited m o v e left: it would only react 
to colonial policy, which in a w a y was what set it up as an 
independent force. 
Colonial historians knowingly distort the facts w h e n they ignore the 
level of the organized state, reduce brotherhoods to some kind of super-
ethnic group and see nothing in Maghribi society but ethnic groups. 
These, moreover, they interpret according to anthropological models of 
kinship which are m o r e theoretical than real. B y this skewed approach, 
they break the resistance u p into a sporadic set of disorganized reactions 
to a policy of conquest that seems eminently rational by contrast. 
W h e n speaking of the state or the brotherhoods, w e shall use the word 
'initiatives'; at the local level the word 'reactions'. Although both ideas 
coexist in the history of the Maghrib, each can nevertheless be used 
separately to define the characteristics of a given period (before and after 
1912 in M o r o c c o , before and after 1922 in Libya). 
O u r source material for Maghribian initiatives to resist colonial ambitions 
is political and diplomatic. It is familiar material, and the problem for 
historians today is to assemble and preserve it. T h e evidence for local 
reactions is mainly written statements and oral accounts. Obviously, the 
accounts must be recorded and the handwritten statements assembled 
before they get lost; but the serious problem is to evaluate them, that 
is to k n o w what w e m a y legitimately expect of them. 
Here two points must be m a d e . First, as regards statements by educated 
townspeople, w e must remember that the military conquest was preceded 
by lengthy psychological and political preparation. Meanwhile , the urban 
elite had lost all their will to resist. Those of its m e m b e r s w h o have 
left memoirs were not m e m b e r s of the resistance at the time, whatever 
m a y be said of them today. Secondly, as regards the oral accounts, w e 
3. A n assembly representing one of the various levels of ethnic division. 
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must not forget that the witnesses were bound to have been exposed 
to two sorts of influences. T h e first was European. Accounts of engage-
ments seen from the colonial standpoint were published almost immediately 
in the specialist press;4 it was also colonial policy to send the sons of 
subject chiefs to French schools in the hope of turning them into faithful 
allies. Barely ten years after the event, for example, a son might give 
details of his father's battles which the latter knew nothing about, though, 
from then on, he would knit them into his account in all good faith. 
T h e colonial version, though contemporaneous with the events, is not 
perfect; it is tainted with the hostility that existed in the armies of the 
colonial powers between metropolitan and colonial regiments. T h e officers 
of the latter did not hesitate to portray their campaigns in Africa in such 
a way as to make them look comparable to the battles waged in Europe 
by the former.5 
T h e second influence was nationalist. Operations for conquest were 
contemporaneous with reformist and nationalist activity in the towns. Even 
when they were taking place far from the towns, the townspeople eagerly 
followed their ups and downs and immediately used them for ideological 
ends. It was often the militant townsman w h o got the old highland warrior 
to dictate his recollections. 
For the two reasons given, the statements w e n o w have cannot transform 
the colonial account or the nationalist version: but they can throw a different 
light on them, always provided w e go beyond their strictly local setting. 
The Maghrib states and the Europeans 
T h e nineteenth-century colonialist drive in North Africa was unusual 
in being a sequel to earlier campaigns (see Fig. 5.2). 
T h e Moroccan government had for four centuries been resisting the 
Spaniards w h o had established themselves at Ceuta and Melilla. It always 
forbade the inhabitants to have anything to do with them; and it was 
to break this blockade that Spain launched the 1859-60 war that was 
so disastrous for Morocco. She was forced to pay a heavy fine, to agree 
to the enlargement of the fortified part of Melilla and to cede a port 
on the Atlantic coast as a refuge for fishermen from the Canary Islands.6 
With the acquisition of the bay of Rio de Oro - whose occupation was 
notified on 26 December 1884, to the signatories to the Berlin Act on 
4. T h e chronicle of the pacification was published monthly from 1898 onwards in 
Afrique française, journal of the Comité de r Afrique française. 
5. General Guillaume wrote of the conquest of the Middle Atlas, 'But it was not 
so unusual as to be exempt from the general principles of the art of war': A . Guillaume, 
1946, p. 457-
6. After years of argument agreement was reached on the port of Sîdî Ifnï, but it 
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the division of Africa into zones of influence - Spain by the end of the 
century had three bridgeheads on the North African coast. 
In 1880 and 1881, when the Madrid Conference on the protection 
of individuals in Morocco met in two sessions, the M a k h z e n m a d e a 
last attempt to get its independence and sovereignty over a clearly defined 
territory accepted at the international level. Despite English support, the 
attempt failed in the face of the selfish alliance of France, Spain and 
Italy. France, which had briefly thought all was lost in Morocco, raised the 
Tuât problem immediately after the end of this conference. Indeed, there 
was m u c h talk in Paris at the time about the plan for a trans-Saharan railway 
line, which would open up Central Africa to French trade. But the plan ran 
up against a serious obstacle: the oases of the central Sahara were politically 
dependent on Morocco. France tried to convert the Sultan to her view, but 
buttressed by English support, he rejected the French demands while at 
the same time strengthening his administrative and political presence in 
Tuât. 
In the east of the Maghrib, the Tunisians had for centuries been fight-
ing the Italians as the Moroccans had been fighting the Spanish. United 
Italy certainly had designs on the Regency of Tunis: it sent immigrants 
there, invested capital there and propagated its culture there. But the 
real danger threatening Tunisia came from France, which had already 
been established in Algeria for over half a century. 
T h e Sultan in Constantinople had taken advantage of his misfortunes 
in Algeria to bring Tripolitania and Cyrenaica back under his direct 
administration and regain his political influence in Tunisia.7 There is 
no doubt that there was considerable pro-Ottoman feeling a m o n g the 
elite in the Regency of Tunis. T h e Bey, w h o saw this as a threat to 
his prerogatives, thought he would do best to rely on Italy and France. 
This more or less deliberate course of action was fatal for him. W h e n 
the French government took advantage of a favourable diplomatic situation 
to attack the country, the Bey found himself isolated at h o m e and abroad, 
and on 12 M a y 1881 was constrained to sign a treaty putting him 
under the protectorate of France. But the inhabitants of the Sahel and 
of the religious capital, Kayruwän, at once revolted, hoping for a rapid 
Ottoman intervention. A second French expedition was then raised, 
and was to meet strong resistance in the mountainous areas of the 
north-west, the centre and the south. Safakis and Käbis were bombarded 
by naval units; Kayruwän withstood a long siege in the autumn of 1881; 
and the southern territories near Tripolitania for long remained an insecure 
area. 
Italy maintained her claims to the country; but the Tunisians obviously 
could not play that card. O n the other hand, they remained faithful to 
7. See E. Kuran, 1970. 
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Islamic sovereignty; the link with Constantinople was never completely 
broken, and this was to be one of the foundations of early Tunisian 
nationalism. 
W e need not concern ourselves here with the intense diplomatic activity 
that enabled the various European states to define their respective spheres 
of influence. This preparatory period ended with the general agreement 
of April 1904 between France and England. Until that date each power 
interested in the Maghrib was content to keep its claims alive, and on 
occasion took some territory as security. 
Thus , at the end of Hassan I's reign, Morocco sustained a defeat in 
the 1893 war, which allowed Spain to consolidate her i860 gains in the 
neighbourhood of Melilla. Seven years later, at the end of the regency 
of the vizier B ä A h m a d , France judged that the time was ripe to settle 
the Tuât problems to her advantage once and for all. O n the pretext 
of scientific exploration a strong expedition gradually approached the 
coveted oases, and in December 1899 appeared before In Saläh and 
demanded immediate surrender. T h e local chief, appointed by the Sultan 
of Morocco, surrounded by soldiers of the Makhzen and assisted by the 
sherifs of In Saläh, resisted fiercely. After bloody battles, such as that 
of In Ghâr on 27 December 1899, where the outcome was not in doubt 
given the disparity between the two sides, the whole oasis region was 
conquered; the last battle took place at Talmïn in March 1901. England 
and Germany , warned by the young Sultan ' A b d al-'Azïz, advised him 
to accept the fait accompli; and this he did, signing under duress the 
draft treaty of 20 April 1902. In return for this major concession, h o w -
ever, he tried to have the line of demarcation in the south and east between 
Morocco and the French possessions clearly defined; but to no effect, 
for France preferred the vagueness which offered her the prospect of 
further conquests. 
T h e loss of Tuât was one of the main reasons for the break-up of 
the Sultan's authority, which got worse and worse until 1911. T h e members 
of the Makhzen were aware that France planned to encircle Morocco 
in order to isolate and subjugate it; they also knew that England no longer 
opposed French designs. T h e domestic reforms the Makhzen had intro-
duced to strengthen the army and administration had not had the desired 
results. F r o m Germany it no longer counted on anything but diplomatic 
help; and Germany did indeed uphold Moroccan independence until 
November 1911, when she signed an agreement with France giving the 
latter a free hand in Morocco in exchange for compensations in equatorial 
Africa. 
After 1905 France decided to precipitate matters and occupy the so-called 
bilâd al-sibä.s These were poor, underpopulated desert areas which because 
8. Colonial ideology represented the bilâd al-sibâ as independent territories, in which 
the Sultan's sovereignty was purely nominal and amounted only to religious influence. 
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of their character the Sultan had left to be administered by local chiefs, 
though without giving up his sovereign rights. H e was regularly kept 
informed of colonial intrigues, and when the French threat took definite 
shape, he sent a duly authorized representative to direct the resistance. 
This is what happened in the Kenädza area and at Shinkït. 
Having always refused to define the frontier with Morocco beyond 
Figuig, France pursued a policy of slowly nibbling away at territory. 
Working their way up the valley of the Sawra, her forces gradually occupied 
the territory between W â d ï Gïr and W â d ï Züsfänä, on the pretext of 
ending lawlessness and insecurity and allowing frontier trade to expand. 
T h e French government also suggested to the Makhzen that it should 
share customs receipts with it, and obtained satisfaction in M a r c h 
IOIO. 
Further south, France had imposed the protectorate on the emirs of 
the Trarza and the Brakna. Then, in 1905, a specialist in the affairs 
of the Islamic clerisy, Xavier Coppolani, came from Algeria to introduce 
the policy of 'peaceful penetration' which took the form of making direct 
contact with chiefs and the leaders of religious brotherhoods with a view 
to winning them over to French influence. H e found himself up against 
a worthy opponent in Shaykh M a ' al-'Aynayn w h o for more than thirty 
years had acted as the Sultan of Morocco's representative. Muläy ' A b d 
al-'Azïz was informed, and sent his uncle Muläy Idrîs, w h o galvanized 
the resistance forces. Meanwhile, Coppolani's camp at Tidjikdja was 
attacked in April 1905 and the apostle of peaceful penetration was killed. 
Taking advantage of the internal crisis racking Morocco, France demanded 
the recall of Muläy Idrîs, and obtained it in January 1907; but resistance 
continued none the less. A strong expedition led by Colonel Gouraud 
moved northwards; it suffered a serious reverse at a l - M u y n ä m on 16 
June 1908, but succeeded in entering Atar on 9 January 1909. Shaykh 
M I ' al-'Aynayn withdrew with his followers into the Säkiyat al-Hamrä, 
whence his forces continued to harass the French and the Spaniards until 
1933-
During the same period Spain advanced on France's coat-tails. W h e n 
France occupied Shinkït, Spain moved out of her settlement on the bay 
of Rio de Oro and in 1906 organized the Saharan intervention force which 
penetrated 30 k m inland. In the north, the Spaniards waited until the 
French entered Wadjda in 1907 before mounting a 45 ooo-strong expedition 
which in September 1909 set out to conquer the Rïf. In response, the 
local population, inspired by Shaykh Ameriyän's call to djihäd, mounted 
a fierce resistance which was only to die out in 1926. 
At the other end of North Africa, Ottoman Tripolitania came under 
attack from Italy in 1911 (see Fig. 5.3). T h e Young Turk revolution 
had greatly weakened the Ottoman state; and meanwhile Italy had been 
given the green light by England and France. O n 28 September 1911 
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spiritual leader of the
Sanusiyya, 1902-33
negligence and the prevailing anarchy in the country, and then, without
taking any notice of the Turkish Government's conciliatory reply, landed
armies at Tripoli, Benghazi, Horns and Tubruk in October which easily
captured the cities. However, when the Italians ventured outside the city
limits, they faced fierce resistance. A series of battles took place on the
outskirts of the cities among which was al-Häni on 23 October 191 1
outside Tripoli. The Italians suffered a humiliating defeat and committed
great atrocities against the population of the city of Tripoli.9 Outside
Benghazi, the Italians fought three major battles at Djuliana, al-Kuwayfiya,
and al-Hawwäri, on 28 November 191 1. They were defeated and forced
to retreat to Benghazi. At al-Khums the Italians and the Turkish-Arab
forces fought desperately from 23 October 191 1 to 2 May 1912 for control
of the strategic point of al-Markib, before the Italians succeeded in driving
the defenders out.10
9. P. Maltese, 1968, pp. 210-24.
10. K. al-Tillïsî, 1973, pp. 463-7. The sections on Libya in this chapter were based
on contributions by I. El-Hareir and Jan Vansina (Editor).
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In Derna, the small Turkish force withdrew to the mountains overlooking 
the town and, with the help of the indigenous population, clashed with 
Italians. T h e resistance in Derna was buttressed by the arrival of a group 
of Turkish officers under the c o m m a n d of Anwar Pasha (Enver), and 
Mustafa K a m a l (later Atatiirk). With the help of A h m a d al-Sharïf, the 
spiritual leader of the Sanüsiyya, A n w a r and his group mobilized the 
Arabs of the hinterland and succeeded in recruiting a formidable 
army. 
Anwar led this army in two battles against the Italians at al-Karkaf 
and Sïdï 'Abdallah on 8 October 1912 and 3 March 1912.11 At Tubruk 
the Arabs met the Italians in two major encounters: al-Nädüra on 3 March 
1912, and a l -Mudawwar on 17 July 1912, in which the Italian commander, 
General Salsa, was killed.12 It is difficult to cover all the battles fought 
against the Italians in Libya in a survey history; however, it is sufficient 
to say that in and around every city, town and valley, there was an encounter 
against the Italians. It was because of this fierce resistance that the 
Italians gained little more than the five towns in the first six months of 
the war. 
By the end of 1911, m a n y Italians had begun to show signs of dis-
appointment about the duration of the war in Libya. In order to pressure 
Turkey to withdraw from Libya, the Italian government attacked the 
Turkish Straits, the Dodecanese Islands, and the Dardanelles. Italy's n e w 
action in the heart of the Turkish land threatened world peace and the 
revival of the 'Eastern Question', an issue no European power wanted 
raised because of its complications. T h e major European powers therefore 
put pressure on Turkey and Italy to come to a peaceful agreement, and 
succeeded in inducing, if not forcing Turkey to sign the Lausanne Agree-
ment with Italy on 18 October 1912. According to this treaty, Turkey 
- to save her face before the Islamic world - granted independence to 
the Libyan people, and, in return, Italy promised to withdraw from Turkish 
waters.13 
T h e reaction of the Libyans to the peace treaty — on which they were 
not consulted - was divided. S o m e wanted to negotiate with the Italians, 
while others wanted to fight to the end. T h e people of Cyrenaica under 
the spiritual leader, A h m a d al-Sharïf, belonged to the former camp. 
Seizing the opportunity of the Turkish withdrawal from Libya, the 
Italians launched an attack on A h m a d al-Sharïf's forces south of Derna, 
but suffered a stunning defeat at the battle of Y a w m al-Djuma' on 16 
M a y 1913.14 This battle was very important because it was the first large-
scale encounter between the Arabs and the Italians after the Turkish 
withdrawal. Citing the decree issued by the Turkish Sultan which granted 
11. ibid., p. 27. 
12. ibid., pp. 344-6. 
13. Al-Zâwï, 1973, pp. 140-56. 
14. Al-Tillïsï, 1973, pp. 321-2. 
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the Libyans independence, A h m a d al-Shanf declared the formation of 
a government called 'a l -Huküma al-Sanüsiyya', the Sanûsï government. ' s 
In Tripolitania, the Italians launched a similar attack directed at the 
major force in the Western Mountains where they defeated the Libyans 
at the battle of Djandüba on 23 March 1913. This victory opened the 
way to the Fazzän region for the Italians. They formed an expedition 
commanded by Colonel Miani w h o succeeded in defeating the Libyan 
warriors in three consecutive battles and occupied Sabhä in February 
1 9 1 3 . 1 6 
Until the eve of the First World W a r , resistance in North Africa17 
was the work of an organized state. T h e invading forces were met by 
contingents of regular soldiers although there were fewer of them than 
of local warriors. W h e n the state found itself compelled to accept the 
fait accompli, given the relative strengths of the two sides, it implicitly 
delegated its duty to resist to a leader of a brotherhood w h o never broke 
off relations with the political leader of the Muslim community.1 8 T h u s 
what was happening in this first period was a political war waged explicitly 
in the n a m e of Islamic sovereignty. 
B y 1914 resistance organized by a centralized indigenous political 
authority had come to an end except in Libya. But the situation created 
by the First World W a r prevented the colonial powers from moving on 
to the phase of effective occupation. French, Spaniards and Italians sought 
only to maintain what they had already gained. But they suffered serious 
reverses; and this led General Lyautey, the French Resident in Morocco, 
to remark that: ' H e w h o does not advance retreats'. T h e Germans and 
Turks called on the people of North Africa to throw off the colonial 
yoke; pan-Islamic leaders such as the Tunisian Bach H a m b a and the 
Moroccan al-Attâbï were received in Berlin, and took part in propaganda 
tours in neutral countries; emissaries were sent into the Rïf and to the 
W â d ï N u n area; and arms were shipped to the Tripolitanian resistance 
fighters through the port of Misuräta. There is no doubt that some of 
the people believed that the colonizers could be driven back into the 
sea. T h e fragility of the occupation in the territories conquered immediately 
before the war is shown by the extreme nervousness of the proconsuls 
of this period and the 'liberalism' they had to parade. Lyautey went so 
far as to behave like a mere minister of foreign affairs to the Sultan 
of Morocco. 
This waiting period came to an end in 1921. In Tripolitania the n e w 
proconsul, Volpi, carried away by the tide of nationalism that was to 
15. A h m a d al-Shanf documents at the University of Kir YOnis, Benghazi, Libya. 
16. Al-Tillïsî, 1973, pp. 46-7. 
17. For the resistance of the Libyans during the First World W a r , see Chapter 12. 
18. Note that the position of the two Sultans, Moroccan and Ottoman, was only c o m -
parable until 1919, when the Sultan in Constantinople renounced sovereignty over several 
Arab territories. Moreover in 1925 the Ottoman caliphate was abolished. 
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allow Mussolini to march on R o m e , put an end to an allegedly liberal 
policy and denounced all earlier agreements reached during and after 
the First World W a r . This was followed by the launching of a number 
of invasions for a 'reconquista'. A large army under the c o m m a n d of 
General Graziani marched on Gharyän, capital of Tripolitania, which 
was captured on 7 November 1922. Another attacked Misuräta and took 
it on 20 February 1923.19 T h e central committee of the United Republic 
set up on January 1922,20 torn by disputes among its members as well 
as the civil war between Misuräta and Warfalläh on the one hand, and 
the civil strife between the Arabs and the Berbers of the Western Mountains 
on the other, could not mobilize sufficient force to stop the Italians. 
Consequently, the central committee collapsed and its members fled the 
country to Egypt, the Sudan and Tunisia. 
T o worsen the situation even further, on 21 December 1922, Emir 
Idrïs al-Sanusï, the Union's spiritual leader and supreme commander, 
went into voluntary exile to Egypt. His unexplained and sudden departure, 
which is still being debated a m o n g historians, completely demoralized 
the people and caused many of the warriors either to leave the country 
or surrender to the Italians. However, before leaving, al-Sanusï appointed 
his brother Al-Ridä as his deputy, and ' U m a r al-Mukhtär as commander 
of the National Forces in the Green Mountains, and it was under his 
leadership and because of the efficient guerrilla warfare that he developed 
that the resistance continued until 1931. H e divided his forces into three 
major mobile companies (adwär) and camped in the mountainous area 
south of al-Mardj at Jardas. T h e series of attacks launched against him 
in the s u m m e r of 1923 were all repelled. Another army sent against 
his c a m p in March was routed. 
It was Tripolitania that fell first. By June 1924, all arable land was 
occupied. But aware of their weakness as long as they did not control 
the desert, the Italians began a long campaign to control the desert and 
finally Fazzän. This was not marked by success despite the use of 
aerial bombing and poison gas. Several Italian advances were stopped. 
As late as 1928 the Libyans blocked the main Italian force at Faqhrift 
south of Surt. But by the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930, 
Fazzän was finally occupied and the Libyan resistance in the west and 
south collapsed. 
Meanwhile, the resistance in Cyrenaica continued and succeeded in 
inflicting heavy defeats on the Italians. W h e n the Fascists failed to suppress 
the revolution of ' U m a r al-Mukhtär in Cyrenaica through direct military 
attack, they resorted to some measures unprecedented in the history of 
colonial wars in Africa. They first erected a 300 km-long wire fence along 
the Tripoli-Egyptian border to prevent any aid coming from Egypt. 
19. Al-Tillïsï, 1973, pp. 63-76; see also R . Graziani, 1976, pp. 98-104, 161-71, 339-67. 
20. See Chapter 12. 
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Secondly, continually enforced, they occupied the oases of Djalo, 
Djaghabüb and Kufra to encircle and isolate the warriors in Cyrenaica. 
Finally, they evacuated all the rural population of Cyrenaica to the desert 
of Sirt where they kept them in fenced concentration camps. This measure 
was meant to deprive al-Mukhtär's forces of any local assistance. Other 
mass prisons and concentration camps were established at al-Makrfln, 
Sulük, al-Aghayla and al-Barayka. Conditions in these camps were so 
bad that it is believed that more than a hundred thousand people died 
of starvation and diseases, not to mention their animals which were con-
fiscated. In al-Barayka prison camp alone, there were 80000 persons of 
w h o m 30000 are said to have died between 1930 and 1932, according 
to the Italians' o w n statistics.21 
Despite these wicked measures, the revolt continued and hit-and-run 
tactics were resorted to. T h e Italians again offered to negotiate with 
al-Mukhtâr. A series of meetings were held between the two sides. A m o n g 
them was the one held near al-Mardj on 19 July 1929, attended by Governor 
Badoglio. At this meeting, the Italians offered to bribe al-Mukhtlr w h o 
turned down the offer and insisted on liberating his country.22 Later, 
w h e n al-Mukhtär discovered that the Italians were trying to apply the 
policy of 'divide and rule' a m o n g his followers, he broke the talks with 
the Italians and resumed his tactics of guerrilla warfare which included 
skirmishes, raids, ambushes, surprise attacks and incursions spread all 
over the country. In the last twenty-one months before his capture, he 
fought 277 battles with the Italians as Graziani himself admits.23 In 
September 1931, however, al-Mukhtär was captured and taken to Benghazi. 
H e was then court-martialed and executed before thousands of Libyans 
at the town of Sulük on 16 September 1931. 
After the capture of al-Mukhtär, his followers elected Yflsuf A b u Rähil, 
his deputy, as commander. H e continued the struggle for six months 
and then decided to suspend and withdraw to Egypt. H e was killed in 
his attempt to cross the Libya-Egyptian border. O n 24 January 1932, 
Badoglio announced the conquest and occupation of Libya and one of 
the longest resistances to European imperialism thus came to its more 
or less inevitable end. It is worth remembering that at this very time 
northern Morocco was the scene of an equally fierce war and an equally 
heroic resistance.24 
Until 1931 enormous areas of the Atlas and the Sahara, regarded as 
economically unprofitable, existed outside any colonial control; and this 
was where those w h o did not wish to surrender to the French or Spanish 
armies took refuge. But the inhabitants did not remain entirely isolated; 
21. M . T . al-Ashhäb, 1947, p. 482. 
22. I. El-Hareir, 1981. 
23. R . Graziani, 1980, p. 296. 
24. The Rïf war is dealt with in Chapter 24 below. 
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ation until his execution in 1931
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they were in touch with the subjugated areas, whose markets and dis-
pensaries they visited. This was the period of peaceful penetration and 
a policy of contact; an ambiguous period, from which w e must be careful 
not to draw general conclusions. 
In 1931 a change took place in French colonial policy. Worried at 
Germany's rebuilding of her strength, the French Minister of W a r , 
Messimy, set the year 1935 as the terminus ad quern for conquest and 
occupation. All necessary means were given to the army in Africa, and 
arrangements were m a d e to co-ordinate operations with the Spaniards; 
the advent of a republic in Madrid m a d e this co-ordination easy. Thus 
every spring an expedition was mounted to put d o w n one of the 'dissident 
spots'. 
T o understand fully what was about to happen w e must remember 
that the conquest was carried out in the name of the Sultan;25 that the 
army of pacification was mainly indigenous; that the policy of contact 
had enabled the colonial authorities to understand the contradictions within 
communities encircled for years; and that every community contained 
both indigenous people and refugees w h o had sometimes come from a 
great distance. Above all w e must consider w h y on earth people should 
fight to the death for customs which the colonial power was obviously 
prepared to preserve and strengthen. 
Yet despite that final conquest was nowhere easy.26 T h e Middle Atlas 
was reduced in two campaigns in 1931 and 1932; from 12 July to 16 
September of the latter year the bloody battle of Tazïkzaût took place. 
T h e French army surrounded 3000 families w h o had been retreating 
before the colonial advance since 1922. T h e battle lasted from 22 August 
to 11 September. Neither massive bombardment nor blockade could break 
the resistance led by al-Wakki A m h o u c h and his brothers. T h e shelters 
had to be cleared by grenades. After the battle, they counted 500 killed 
among the Moroccans. This battle clearly demonstrated the limits of the 
policy of contact with the ethnic groups. In 1933 it was the turn of the 
Djabal Saghrü, where the battle of B ü Ghäfir (13 February to 25 March) 
was equally bloody. In 1934 the last resistance fighters were surrounded 
in the Anti-Atlas; after which the French could enter Tindüf in March . 
A week later, on 6 April 1934, the Spaniards were at last able to take 
possession of Sïdï Ifnï. 
In 1930 and 1931, when the colonial powers might reasonably have 
supposed that the conquest was nearing its end, the Italian leaders were 
talking about Pax Romana and the French were ceremonially celebrating 
the centenary of the capture of Algiers and the fiftieth anniversary of 
25. 'It thus took 22 years of continuous effort to reach the heart of the Berber mountains 
and bring the last rebels under the authority of the sovereign of Morocco', A . Guillaume, 
1946, P- 456-
26. 'Not one tribe came over to us without first being defeated', ibid., p. 9. 
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the protectorate over Tunisia. Theoreticians of colonization saw this as the 
revenge of R o m e over Islam and the West over the East. But at that time 
nationalism, already established in the towns, was preparing to spread 
into the country areas. For those involved, the last battles were not so 
m u c h the end of an era as a sign of the rejection of any voluntary 
submission.27 
Stages of resistance 
T w o phases can thus be distinguished in Maghribi resistance to the colonial 
drive: one from 1880 to about 1912, the other from 1921 to 1935 (the 
intervening period being the ambiguous one of the First World W a r ) . 
Let us n o w , over and above the chronicle of military events and subjective 
reports, consider some questions that might pave the w a y to thinking 
and research. 
During the first phase the campaigns always followed a pattern that 
had been developed by France during the conquest of Algeria, and had 
then been taken up by Spain and Italy. Before invading a coveted territory 
a colonial power took good care to obtain its competitors' consent, either 
through a bilateral convention or in the lobbies of an international con-
ference.28 O n c e this had been done, the following stages in the conquest 
took place: 
(1) A n incident was identified and used as a justification for inter-
vention: hence the usual stories of raids and plundering groups 
(the case of the Krumirs on the Tunisian-Algerian frontier has 
remained famous). T h u s the Tidikelt was annexed on the pretext 
that it had served as a refuge for B ü Shüsha, w h o fought the 
French from 1869 to 1874, the Gurära because K a d d u r b. H a m z a 
found help and succour there during his struggle from 1872 to 
1879, and Shinkït because the M o o r s often crossed the River 
Senegal.29 
(2) T h e objections of the Powers and the Sultan, the sovereign of 
the coveted territory, were disposed of by stressing the admini-
strative sloppiness and insecurity rife in the said territory. 
(3) Territorial pawns were taken at the first opportunity, for example 
during a period of national tension or a change of ruler. T h u s 
France unexpectedly occupied In Saläh in January 1900. T h e 
27. This is a fundamental point in modernist Islam. Total submission to G o d , which 
is what the word islam means in Arabic, implies non-submission to anyone except G o d . 
28. France was given carte blanche in Tunisia in the lobbies of the 1878 Congress of 
Berlin, and in Morocco at the 1906 Algeciras conference. 
29. South-east of Morocco the French complained endlessly about the depredations 
of the Awlâd Dzârïr and D a w ï Maniya. This was the excuse for taking Bechar which 
(in order to deceive French public opinion itself) was given the name Colomb. 
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inhabitants called for help and the Sultan of Morocco protested; 
but France refused to discuss the matter on the grounds that 
inability to maintain law and order amounted to a loss of 
sovereignty.30 W h e n sovereignty was undeniable, as at Wudjida 
and Casablanca (occupied in M a r c h and August 1907 respectively), 
the French m a d e evacuation of their forces contingent on restora-
tion of order (which their very presence m a d e impossible). 
(4) Through a series of pressures and promises, delegated sovereignty 
(tawßd) was obtained, which legalized the occupation. This was 
the effect of the protectorate treaties. 
(5) T h e next stage was true conquest, known in the typically Euro-
centric way as pacification. Its speed depended from n o w on 
solely on the order of priorities drawn up by the colonial 
power. 
A s w e have already noted, this first phase was marked by political 
and diplomatic activity that makes it part and parcel of international history; 
it thus poses no n e w problems for the historian. 
This is not the case for the second phase, that of total conquest or 
the so-called pacification. For obvious reasons, resistance in the towns 
and in the plains was always short-lived. T h e mountains, initially regarded 
as economically valueless,31 were sealed off by a security belt, and this 
was to be tightened over the years. T h e desert areas were watched over 
from strong points on the Atlantic coast.32 This policy was imposed on 
the colonial power by force of circumstance, for it reflected ecological 
and socio-political facts.33 It is important to grasp the reality of this 
situation which has been masked by the ideological distortions introduced 
by colonial historians. At this stage in our knowledge all w e can do is 
to raise some questions that seem relevant to us: 
(1) W h y was it necessary to obtain a formal treaty from the Sultan 
of Morocco or Constantinople to legalize the conquest and turn 
it into mere 'pacification'? 
(2) W h y were the inhabitants taken by surprise at every colonial 
attack? 
(3) W h y was the army so North Africanized that it could be said 
to have European officers in c o m m a n d of indigenous troops? 
30. But France still insisted that the Sultan should recognize the fait accompli. 
31. Until indications of mineral wealth were discovered there, as in the Rïf. This 
was what impelled the Spaniards to speed up their conquest. 
32. Hence the role delegated by the French and Spaniards to the Rakibat, because 
their nomadic life took them from the Adrar to the Anti-Atlas and the Hammâda Dar'a. 
33. T h e colonial leaders were aware of this, and were keen to appear to be continuing 
their predecessors' work. General Guillaume, after describing the pacification campaigns 
in the Middle Atlas, appended an account of the battles of the great Moroccan ruler 
Muläy Ismail (1672-1727) in the same area. 
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(4) W h y was there division in the resistance movement which could 
not be overcome even at times of the greatest danger? 
These questions among others help to bring out the reactions of the 
inhabitants during the so-called pacification phase. 
T h e failure of African initiatives and resistance 
In spite of the strong determination of the people of the Maghrib to 
maintain their sovereignty and way of life, and despite the protracted 
nature of the resistance, the whole of the Maghrib had fallen to the imperial 
powers of France, Spain and Italy by 1935. T h e final question to be 
considered then is w h y the Maghribians failed. 
Contrary to what might be supposed the demographic, ecological and 
economic circumstances were for most of the time against the North African 
resistance fighter. 
W e now k n o w that the population of North Africa was overestimated 
in the nineteenth century. M e n old enough to carry arms were limited 
in number and also available only for a very short period because of 
the requirements of agriculture and stock-rearing; and this left the initiative 
in the hands of the enemy. Tidikelt was conquered by a column of 1000 
m e n , having a population not exceeding 20000. At Tit on 7 M a y 1902, 
w h e n the Tawärik of the Ahaggar were defeated, they numbered 300 
as against 130; but that was the most they could muster, and the loss 
of 93 dead was a blow from which they did not easily recover. T h e 
supposedly overpopulated highland areas were little better off; in every 
decisive engagement the assailants had the advantage of numbers. T h e 
people of the Rïf were attacked by 300000 French soldiers (not counting 
the Spaniards) - i.e. the equivalent of the whole population of northern 
Morocco. At the height of the resistance in the Middle Atlas, a total 
number of 10 000, including w o m e n and children, had to face an army 
of 80000 m e n . In the Djabal Saghrü 7000 fighting soldiers were assailed 
by 34000 m e n equipped with the latest weapons.3 4 Admittedly not all 
the colonial troops were combatants; but it is undeniable that in terms 
of sheer numbers, the advantage always lay with the colonial army, which 
set out to strike 'the natives with terror and despondency'.35 
M u c h is often m a d e of the indigenous fighters' mobility and knowledge 
of the terrain; but these were tactical advantages that counted for less 
and less as the war went on. T h e exploit at Tidjikdja in June 1905, 
in which the apostle of peaceful penetration, Xavier Coppolani, was 
killed and which delayed the conquest of the Adrar until 1909; the battle 
of Kasîba, from 8 to 10 June 1913, in which the French lost 100 dead 
34. E . F. Gautier, 1910, pp. 12 and 129; A . Guillaume, 1946, pp. 114 and 414; 
A . Ayache, 1956, p. 332. 
35. A . Bernard and L . N . E . Lacroix, 1921, p. 332. 
106 
African initiatives and resistance in North Africa and the Sahara 
and 140 wounded; the even bloodier one at al-Harï on 13 November 
1914, when they left behind 510 dead and 176 wounded; the battle of 
Anwäl , from 22 to 26 July 1921, in which the Spaniards lost 15000 dead, 
700 prisoners, 20000 rifles, 400 machine guns and 150 field guns; all these 
heroic feats of arms (showing admirable knowledge of the terrain, and 
decisively influenced by mobility and ruthlessness in battle) stopped the 
colonial advance for a few years but did not help to regain lost territory. 
Neither the desert dwellers nor the highlanders could take m u c h time 
off from their orchard farming and stock-rearing; and this allowed the 
invader to launch real economic warfare against them. During the Adrar 
campaign in 1909 the French soldiers occupied the oases at the time 
of the date harvest and waited for the m e n to be compelled by hunger 
to come and surrender (admittedly not for long). In areas where seasonal 
migration with stock took place, they closed off the winter pastures and 
relied on cold and hunger to bring the inhabitants to terms. W h e n opera-
tions began, a total blockade was imposed, as against the Zayyän in 1917-18 
and the people of the Rïf in 1925-6. In 1928-9 the Italians, as has been 
pointed out above, deported the people of Cyrenaica to the north and 
concentrated them in camps surrounded by barbed wire. O n e consequence 
of the nagging hunger created by such policies, harder on the livestock 
than the people, was that the colonial army found volunteers immediately 
after the end of operations. 
T h e resistance fighters' great asset, mobility, soon became only relative. 
F r o m 1901 onwards the French army began to use racing camels, to 
such good effect that the conquest of the Sahara has been described as 
due to Sha'amba camel-riders.3 6 T h e railway also preceded conquest almost 
everywhere: it reached 'Ayn Sifrä in 1887, Bishâr in 1905 and Zîz in 1930. 
In 1915 motor vehicles were tried for the first time, and Epinat lorries37 
drove up and d o w n the roads of the Atlas in anticipation of the 1931-3 
campaigns. Lastly, aircraft were used from 1920 onwards, for aerial 
photography in preparation for the campaigns and to demoralize the in-
habitants during operations.38 
This brings us to the problem of weapons, which not being produced 
locally had to be taken from the enemy. France had always m a d e an 
international issue out of arms smuggling to the Maghrib, accusing 
Germany and Turkey of being suppliers, and Spain and even England 
of tolerating arms traffic on the coasts of the Rïf and the Atlantic coast 
in the case of Morocco and via the Libyan oases for Tunisia and the 
central Sahara. It is true that this traffic had always existed; but never-
36. T h e Sha'amba are nomads of the Algerian Tell. 
37. N a m e d after a French businessman at Marrakesh with interests in the mines. 
38. Italy was actually the first to use aircraft in a colonial war, in 1911. In the 1921-6 
campaigns, aircraft under the c o m m a n d of the future Marshal Badoglio played a decisive 
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theless, the fact remains that the French authorities themselves admitted 
that they found hardly any G e r m a n weapons in the Middle Atlas or 
Anti-Atlas. A s each large clan grouping was forced to surrender, it passed 
its rifles on to its neighbours w h o were still free; so that it was at the 
end of operations in M a r c h 1934 that the French recovered the largest 
number of rifles, namely 25000. W e must remember that these weapons 
were often useless because of lack of ammunition, and above all that 
they were of doubtful effectiveness against the aircraft, long-range heavy 
artillery and armour with which the invading armies were equipped 
after the First World W a r . It was this that m a d e the French generals 
say that the 1931-4 campaigns were 'real manoeuvres with a live 
enemy' . 3 9 
T h e final adverse factor was a political and ideological one. T h e people 
of North Africa and the Sahara are all Musl im, and Islam lays d o w n 
strict rules for people's wars. Contrary to the idea c o m m o n in the West, 
the djihâd as understood in recent centuries is defensive: that is, military 
service and the taxes that flow from it are only compulsory for everyone 
if the country is the victim of aggression. In the case of an offensive 
war (and there have been none in North Africa for centuries), contribu-
tions and service are only voluntary. In the circumstances of the nineteenth 
century, this left the military initiative to the invader. Defence of the 
realm was traditionally one of the provisions of the bay'a (sovereign's 
investiture contract). In the event of attack, were Muslims supposed to 
organize resistance themselves immediately, or ought they to await the 
sultan's instructions? T h e question has been discussed at length by the 
doctors of law, and the view that prevailed was that responsibility should 
be left to the sovereign so as to stop demagogy and extravagant promises. 
This explains w h y , when French or Spanish soldiers appeared in a district, 
as they did in Tuât in 1864 and 1890 or Tarfaya in 1885, the inhabitants 
sent a delegation to the Sultan and then awaited his orders. Responsibility 
was thus left with the sovereign; and he was in a dilemma, for if he 
held aloof, he jeopardized the legitimacy of his authority, and if he replied 
favourably to the request, the powers would hold him responsible for 
anything that happened. Usually he advised calm, delegated a chief to 
maintain order, and allowed those involved to hope that the problem 
was being solved through diplomatic means (which m a n y of those on 
the spot were all too ready to believe).40 Here w e c o m e to the heart 
of the matter. W h e n the Sultan failed,41 and a religious or lay leader 
39. A . Guillaume, 1946, p. 398. 
40. T h e situation of the Sultan in Constantinople in the nineteenth century was little 
different. 
41. H e sometimes succeeded either in delaying the conquest, as at Tuät in 1890, or 
in winning back a district as in the case of Tarfaya, which the English gave back in 
1898. 
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felt obliged to take up the banner of the djihäd in his stead but without 
his blessing, he would certainly not get unanimous support. T h e colonial 
powers could then play on all kinds of rivalries and hostilities. 
Within the framework of a society which had become de facto leader-
less, the colonial army could easily take advantage of a divided opposition. 
Fully to appreciate h o w this worked, w e must remember that the sultan's 
administration was often indirect, being delegated to local chiefs, Islamic 
clerics or shaykhs. W h e n the sultan was unable to lead the resistance 
himself, every individual thought of safeguarding his o w n privileges, or 
'climbing on the bandwagon' as one specialist in native affairs put it.42 
France had no difficulty in obtaining help to conquer Tuât from the 
Sherif of Wazzän (who could take up ziyâra (collections) among his 
followers in Algeria only with the permission of the French governor), 
at Shinkït from Shaykhs Sïdiya and Sa'd B ü h , in the Tafilälet from the 
leader of the Násiriyya zäwiya, and lastly in the Rïf from the chief 
of the Darkäwa. In Tripolitania, the Italians w o n over to their side the 
Ibädites of the Djabal Nafusa, w h o were opposed to the Sunnï majority 
in the country. W h e r e a great chief had built up a principality, the colonial 
authorities waited for a succession dispute to arise and then offered their 
support to each of the claimants in turn; this is what happened with 
the Trarza between 1901 and 1904 and among the Zayyän between 1917 
and 1919. But the impact of this 'native policy' must not be exaggerated. 
Whenever a chief favoured the French, he immediately lost his prestige 
and was no longer of any use: so m u c h so that in the end the authorities 
no longer sought public submissions. 
T h e tendency of leaders of zarväyä and the great chiefs to compromise 
and play a double game thus resulted not so m u c h from ethnic divisions 
and rivalries as from the disappearance of the supreme political power, 
whose successive defeats exposed its military weakness. 
History has handed d o w n to us the names of some thirty chiefs w h o 
led the resistance against the French, Spaniards and Italians during the 
period 1900-35, not counting M u h a m m a d Ibn ' A b d al-Karïm and ' A b d 
al-Malik.43 T h e others can be divided into two quite distinct groups 
regardless of their success or failure. 
O n e group was in continual touch with the Sultan, served him and 
appealed to him when the colonial threat loomed; the others acted under 
the influence of the local djema'a. T h e former were more far-seeing but 
were handicapped by the military weakness of the Sultan; the latter were 
more tenacious in their actions, but their influence was limited to the 
narrow boundaries of their commands . 
42. L . V . Justinard, 1951, p. 105. 
43. 'Abd al-Karïm is not discussed here because his story is to be dealt with elsewhere. 
As for 'Abd al-Malik, grandson of the emir 'Abd al-Kâder of Algeria and an officer 
in the Ottoman army, he seems to have been an adventurer w h o served the interests 
of Turkey, Spain and France in turn. 
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W h e n Muläy ' A b d al-Hafiz rose against his brother Muläy ' A b d 
al-Azïz and tried to restore Moroccan sovereignty over the whole area 
recognized as belonging to it at the end of the nineteenth century, his 
chief supporters were the following: Shaykh M a ' al-'Aynayn and his sons 
Hassana and al-Akdäf (who led the resistance at Shinkït), his other sons 
al-Hibä, Murâbbih Rabbuh and al-Ni'mat (who retreated before the French 
advance from Marrakesh in 1912 to Tiznït in 1917, and then to Kerdüs 
and Widjdjän in 1934) and the great Azaghar chiefs M u h ä Ü Said and 
M u h ä U H a m m ü (who held up the French thrust into the Atlas until 
1922). W h e n the attempt failed, mainly because of their geographical 
isolation, they did not surrender, like other southern chiefs w h o had long 
been in contact with the French. But, deprived of the Sultan's support, 
they could no longer operate effectively. Al-Hibä proclaimed himself sultan 
in 1912, but found no support in the towns or among the great chiefs. 
The others shut themselves up within their commands , defending them-
selves against all comers and each hoping to die before seeing 'the face 
of the French', as chief al-Madanï of the Akhäs put it so well.44 
In contrast to these were the local chiefs. S o m e were extempore ones, 
like M u h a m m a d al-Hadjdjamï in the neighbourhood of Fez in 1911 and 
Nafrûtan al-Samladï and his disciple al-Nakkâdï in the Tafilälet between 
1919 and 1934. Others were traditionally acknowledged ones, like 'All 
A m h a w ü s h , his sons al-Makkï and al-Murtadä and his disciples Ibn al-
Tayyibï and M u h a n d U al-Hädjdj (who successively led the struggle in 
the Middle Atlas from 1919 to 1934), or Hassü ü Bäsalläm, leader of 
the resistance at B ü Ghäfir in February and March 1933. T h e latter 
group refused to compromise; when defeated they moved on until they 
were h e m m e d in in mountain or desert retreats and subjected to a barrage 
of fire. H o w are w e to understand such dogged tenaciousness when in 
complete isolation? 
W e must remember that throughout the nineteenth century, a popular 
movement was growing up which advocated war to the death; it was 
disparaged by the 'ulama and the members of the Makhzen because it 
was accompanied by an appeal to the supernatural and belief in the millen-
nium. There is an account of al-Hibä and his brother Murâbbih Rabbuh, 
on the eve of the battle of B ü ' U t h m ä n on 6 September 1912, calling 
on the angels to help the resistance fighters. At the time of the battle 
of 26 June 1922 there is mention of the Kerkür of Tafesaset, a rock 
at whose foot the colonial advance would supposedly stop on pain of 
a cosmic cataclysm.45 This was a natural belief on the part of sherifs 
and clerics leading mostly unlettered peoples; but it was also an attitude 
44. M . al-Susï, 1961, Vol. 20, p. 202. 
45. A . Guillaume, 1946, pp. 219-20. O n al-tîibâ see Ibn Ibrahim, Al-Hamla al-
Faransiyya 'aid Marrâkush, manuscript K.320 , Archives of Rabat, p. 16. 
Ill 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1Ç35 
which the urban elite was bound to regard as dangerous because it was 
archaic and unrealistic. A b u Shu'ayb al-Dukkâlï, one of the pioneers 
of the reformist movement , well expressed this critical attitude to this 
sort of resistance by saying of al-Hibä's action: 'I a m against resistance 
fighters w h o give the Europeans excuses to occupy Musl im land, like 
B ü A m ä m a , the chiefs of the Shäwiya and the Banï Matïr, and m a n y 
more whose number is countless in the East and the West ' . 4 6 
Just as there were two stages in colonial policy and two kinds of resistance, 
so likewise there were two quite distinct groups of resistance leader. C o n -
centrating on the phase of conquest and occupation, the phase of stubborn 
scattered resistance led by chiefs and Islamic clerics with millenarian ideas 
little to the taste of the urban elite, w e find the following charac-
teristics: 
(1) they had broken with the historic elite, which understood the 
real relative strengths of the colonial army and the indigenous 
fighters; 
(2) they expected a miracle to stave off the conquest; 
(3) they were disunited and scattered by exile, hunger and distrust; 
(4) they refused to accept what seemed inevitable after the event. 
These characteristics differentiate this stage fundamentally from the 
resistance during the first stage, i.e. from the political war waged by an 
organized state whose purposes the nationalists were to m a k e their o w n . 
Hence the difficult question of whether this scattered, localized resistance 
can be regarded as an early form of nationalism. 
In the event, it was considered archaic and ineffectual and was left 
to its fate by the historic leaders. But immediately after its final failure 
it was selectively taken up again for the purposes of the cause. T h e point 
was that the nationalists celebrated successful attacks, remembered the 
names of chiefs w h o died without surrendering, but forgot those w h o 
survived to become the pawns of European officers even w h e n they too 
had put up a fierce resistance before submitting. 
This resistance served at least to some extent as a legend to galvanize 
others. T h e battles of Tazikzaüt and B ü Ghafír and the figures of M u h ä 
O H a m m ü , al-Nakkâdï, and so on, allowed the nationalists to ask the 
embarrassing question whether a surrender obtained by overwhelming 
force was a real surrender. T h e colonial generals, w h o spoke of peaceful 
penetration w h e n conquest was easy, reverted after 1926 to Bugeaud's 
46. Ibn Ibrahim, Al-Hamla, pp. 13 and 30-5. B ü A m ä m a fought the French around 
Figuig between 1880 and 1885; B O Himära rose against Sultan Muläy 'Abd al-'Azîz, 
who was accused of being pro-European, and led a revolt which lasted from 1902 to 
1909; in Shäwiya M u h a m m a d B ü 'Azzawï led the resistance fighters from 1907 to 1909; 
and among the Ban! MatTr, Akkä Bü Bidmäm made a stand against the invading army 
from 1911 to 1913. 
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ideas that the enemy must be destroyed and that as m a n y troops were 
needed to hold North Africa as to conquer it.47 
This is as good as saying that the 'conquest of men's hearts and minds' 
never took place. 
47. G . Spillmann reports Lyautey as saying at the end of 1924, ' S o m e people apparently 
venture to argue that a tribe is only really subjugated when it has been given a bloody 
thrashing.' G . Spillman, 1968, p. 60. T h e Spanish attitude always smacked unpleasantly 
of the Crusades, a mixture of hate and fear. In Tripolitania in 1921 Volpi spoke of 
a policy of blood. 
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African initiatives and 
resistance in West Africa, 
1880-1914 
M'BAYE GUEYE and A. ADU BOAHEN 
During the period 1880 to 1914, the whole of West Africa, with the 
sole exception of Liberia (see Chapter 2), was brought under colonial 
rule. This phenomenon which meant essentially the loss of African 
sovereignty and independence as well as land, was accomplished in two 
phases. T h e first phase lasted from 1880 to the early 1900s, and the 
second from the early 1900s to the outbreak of the First World W a r 
in 1914. Each of these phases saw different European activities which 
produced different initiatives and reactions on the part of the Africans. 
It should be emphasized that these reactions were very m u c h determined 
by the local African situation. Variables included the nature of the polity 
(whether or not centralized, whether or not dominated by another African 
power, and whether or not on the upswing or settled and declining),1 
the nature of the leadership provided, the extent of the penetration of 
European political, religious and economic influences by the 1870s and 
the experiences gained from this. Another equally important variable was 
the method adopted by the European imperialists in the establishment 
of their control over the area between 1880 and 1914. 
T h e first phase saw either the use of diplomacy or military invasion, 
or both, by the Europeans. This was the classical era of treaty-making 
in practically every nook and corner of West Africa followed in most 
cases by military invasions, conquests and occupation by armies of varying 
sizes and discipline. T h e period from 1880 to 1900 was the high-water 
mark of European conquest and occupation of West Africa. Never in 
the known history of the continent has so m u c h military action been 
seen and so m a n y invasions and campaigns launched against African states 
and communities (see Fig. 6.1). Particularly memorable were the French 
campaigns in the Western Sudan, Ivory Coast and D a h o m e y (now Benin) 
between 1880 and 1898, and the British campaigns in Asante (in what 
is n o w Ghana), the Niger Delta region (Nigeria) and in Northern Nigeria 
between 1895 and 1903 (see Fig. 6.2). 
During this first phase, practically all Africans had the same objectives, 
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that of defending their sovereignty and traditional way of life. It is the 
strategies or methods adopted that varied. Three options were open to 
the Africans, that of confrontation, that of alliance and that of acquiescence 
or submission. T h e strategy of confrontation involved open warfare, sieges, 
guerrilla tactics, scorched earth policies as well as diplomacy. A s will 
be seen below, all three options were resorted to. T h o u g h three main 
European powers were involved in the conquest and occupation of West 
Africa, w e shall confine ourselves in this chapter to the two principal 
ones, namely, Britain and France. 
Conquest and reaction in French West Africa, 1880-1900 
It is quite clear from the available evidence that the French - from 1880 
onwards - adopted a policy of extending their control over the whole 
region from the Senegal first to the Niger and then Chad and linking 
these areas with their posts on the Guinea coast in Ivory Coast and 
D a h o m e y . T h e execution of this policy was entrusted to officers of the 
Senegalese area. As one would expect, therefore, in their occupation of 
West Africa, the French resorted almost exclusively to the method of 
military conquest rather than the conclusion of treaties of protectorate 
as the British did. In terms of African reactions, all the options open 
to them were resorted to, namely, submission, alliance and confrontation. 
However, as will be seen below, far more of the rulers opted for the 
strategy of militant confrontation than those of submission and alliance 
while opposition here was far more protracted than anywhere else in West 
Africa for two main reasons. T h e first, as pointed out already, was that 
the French used the method of military conquest almost exclusively, which 
consequently evoked militant reaction. T h e second was that the people 
were far more Islamized than those of the other areas of West Africa, 
and as Michael Crowder has pointed out, since 'for Muslim societies 
of West Africa the imposition of white rule meant submission to the 
infidel which was intolerable to any good Muslim',2 they tended to resist 
the Europeans with added fervour and tenacity often lacking among non-
Muslims. Let us illustrate these general conclusions by a study of the 
events in Senegambia, the Tukulor and Mandingo empires, in the Baule 
areas of Ivory Coast and finally in D a h o m e y . 
Senegambia 
In Senegal, where the conquest had been going on since 1854, France 
had by 1880 obtained firm bases of operations with the annexation of 
Walo , the northern part of Cayor and Diander. Since i860, a French 
protectorate had been imposed on the states of Upper Senegal. However 
meagre these results were, they had not been obtained without difficulties. 
2. M . Crowder, 1968, p. 72; see also A. S. Kanya-Forstner in M . Crowder (ed.), 
1971. PP- 53-4-
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Although expelled from Cayor in 1864 by France, Lat Dior Diop, the 
Darnel of Cayor, nevertheless chose the strategy of confrontation by con-
tinuing the struggle against the French. In 1871, with the defeat of the 
French by Prussia, the Governor of Senegal abandoned the annexation 
of Cayor and recognized Lat Dior once again as Darnel. Consequently, 
friendly relations were established between him and the French administra-
tion in Senegal. 
In 1879, the governor, Brière de l'Isle, obtained permission from the 
Darnel to build a road connecting Dakar with Saint-Louis. But when 
Lat Dior learned in 1881 that a railway was what was actually involved, 
he declared his opposition to the project. H e realized that the railway 
would bring the independence of Cayor to an end. In 1881, informed 
that construction was about to begin, he took steps to prevent it. Orders 
were issued to all the chiefs to punish severely any Cayor subject w h o 
supplied anything whatsoever to the French workmen . 3 Thereafter, 
emissaries were dispatched to Ely, the emir of Trarza, Abdul Bokar K a n e 
of Futa Toro and Alboury N'Diaye of Djoloff. Lat Dior invited them 
to join a holy alliance and to synchronize their struggle in order to facilitate 
the eviction of the French from the land of their forefathers.4 
O n 17 November 1882 he sent a letter to Governor Servatius, forbidding 
him to begin construction even in the suburbs of the territory that was 
an integral part of Cayor. 'As long as I live, be well assured', he wrote, 
'I shall oppose with all m y might the construction of this railway . . . 
T h e sight of sabres and lances is pleasing to our eyes. That is why every 
time I receive a letter from you concerning the railway, I will always 
answer no, no and I will never make you any other reply. Even were 
I to go to rest, m y horse Malay would give you the same answer.'5 Nothing 
could better refute those w h o regard Lat Dior's position in this matter 
as merely the caprice of a feudal chieftain without regard for the welfare 
of his people than these sentiments. Be that as it m a y , noting the persistency 
of the governor in carrying out his project, Lat Dior forbade his subjects 
to cultivate groundnuts. H e was convinced that if the French could not 
obtain groundnuts, they would return h o m e . H e also ordered those of 
his subjects living near the French posts to resettle in the Cayor heart-
land. T h e villages of those w h o disobeyed these orders were burnt d o w n 
and their possessions confiscated. 
In December 1882, Colonel Wendling invaded Cayor at the head of an 
expeditionary column composed chiefly of African riflemen and auxiliaries 
from the annexed territories. Having fought the French since 1861, Lat 
Dior knew that he had little chance of defeating them in conventional 
warfare. H e withdrew at Wendling's approach and went to settle in Djoloff. 
In Cayor, Wendling invested Lat Dior's cousin, Samba Yaya Fall, with 
3. A N S O M - Governor Lanneau to the Minister - Senegal I, 466, 24 May 1881. 
4. A N S O M — Governor Vallon to the Minister — Senegal I, 67b, 23 July 1882. 
5. A S A O F - Lat Dior to the Governor - Senegal I, 68b, 8 January 1883. 
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power. In August 1883, he was dismissed and replaced by Samba Laobe 
Fall, Lat Dior's nephew. T h e governor was convinced that Lat Dior 
would never make war on his nephew. H e was not mistaken: Lat Dior 
contrived a compromise with his kinsman w h o , in 1885, authorized him 
to return to Cayor. 
In October 1886, S a m b a Laobe Fall was killed at Tivaouane by a 
detachment of spahis. Governor Genouille thereupon decided to abolish 
the title of Darnel. H e divided Cayor into six provinces which were entrusted 
to former captives of the crown.6 A decree was also passed expelling 
Lat Dior from Cayor. W h e n he was notified of this measure, Lat Dior 
went into a towering rage. H e mobilized the 300 partisans w h o had remained 
faithful but released from oath all those w h o were not resolved to die 
with him, and took to the field against the French and their allies, his 
former subjects. Lat Dior was firmly resolved to sell his life dearly. H e 
therefore feigned compliance with the expulsion order by heading for 
Djoloff. B y one of his bold counter-marches, he managed to slip undetected 
into a position between his enemies and the railway. O n 27 October 1886, 
at about 11 a . m . , he surprised the French and their allies at the well 
of Dekhle and inflicted heavy losses on them. H e fell there, as did his 
two sons and eighty of his partisans.7 T h e death of Lat Dior naturally 
spelled the end of Cayor's independence and facilitated French seizure 
of the rest of the country. 
Tukulor empire 
In the Tukulor empire (see Fig. 6.1), A h m a d u , w h o succeeded his father, 
Al Hadj ' U m a r , the founder of the empire, was, like most African rulers, 
determined to ensure the survival of his state and maintain its independence 
and sovereignty. T o achieve these objectives, he chose the strategies of 
alliance and militant confrontation. However, unlike most of the rulers 
of the region, he relied more on the former rather than on the latter. 
Indeed, as will be seen below, from his accession until as late as 1890, 
he still stuck to his policy of alliance or co-operation with the French 
and it was only in the last two years that he resorted to warfare. 
But that A h m a d u should have chosen these strategies should not sur-
prise us since the political and economic realities facing him left him 
no other alternatives. Politically, right from the beginning of his reign, 
A h m a d u was forced to fight on three fronts: against his brothers w h o 
contested his authority, his subjects - the Bambara, Mandinka, Fulani 
and others - w h o deeply detested their new Tukulor masters and sought 
to recover their independence by force, and against the French. T o worsen 
his plight, not only had the army which his father had used to establish 
the empire become weakened numerically, numbering only 4000 talibés 
6. A N S O M - Genouille to the Minister - Senegal I, 86a, 13 November 1886. 
7. ibid. 
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(i.e. students of religion w h o formed the backbone of ' U m a r ' s a r m y ) and 
11000 sofas (infantry) by 1866, 8 but he did not have the s a m e sort of 
control over it nor could he inspire it to the same extent as his father 
had been able to do . A s one would expect, A h m a d u ' s immediate concerns, 
then, were first and foremost to consolidate his o w n position by dealing 
with his brothers — indeed in 1872 s o m e of his brothers had tried to over-
throw h i m , and then ensuring the survival of the empire by suppressing 
the rebellions raging a m o n g the subject groups, especially the B a m b a r a . 
T o do this, he needed arms and ammunit ion as well as financial resources 
through trade, both of which necessitated friendly relations with the French. 
Furthermore, most of the talibés were recruited from Futa T o r o , the 
homeland of his father, and, as this area was under the French, he had 
to win their co-operation. Confronted with all these internal problems 
as he was , is it surprising that soon after his accession he agreed to negotiate 
with the French? T h e negotiations took place between h i m and Lieutenant 
M a g e , the representative of the French. Both agreed that in return for 
the supply of cannon and for the recognition of his authority, A h m a d u 
was to allow French traders to operate in his empire.9 
T h o u g h this treaty was not ratified by the French administration nor 
did A h m a d u receive any cannon, and though the French continued to 
assist the rebels and in 1878 even attacked Saboucire, the Tukulor fortress 
in Kuasso , A h m a d u continued his friendly attitude towards the French. 
This served h i m well for it enabled h i m to quell the rebellions of his 
brothers in 1874, and those in the B a m b a r a territories of Segu and Kaarta 
by the late 1870s. H e therefore readily agreed w h e n the French w h o , in 
their preparation to conquer the area between the Senegal and the Niger 
needed the co-operation of A h m a d u , renewed their request for the re-
opening of negotiations in 1880. These negotiations, concluded by Captain 
Gallieni, led to the treaty of M a n g o between h i m and the French. U n d e r 
the terms of this treaty, A h m a d u undertook to allow the French to build 
and maintain trade routes through his empire and granted them permission 
to build and sail steamboats on the Niger. In return, the French recognized 
the sovereign existence of his empire, agreed to grant h i m free access 
to Futa, and promised not to invade his territory or build any fortifications 
in it. A b o v e all, the French agreed to give in payment four field guns 
and 1000 rifles, and to pay a yearly rent of 200 rifles, 200 barrels of 
g u n p o w d e r , 200 artillery shells and 50000 flints.10 
This treaty w a s obviously a great diplomatic victory for A h m a d u , and 
had the French ratified it and sincerely implemented its terms, there 
is n o doubt that A h m a d u ' s empire would have survived. But of course 
even Gallieni himself had n o intention of implementing the treaty and 
in any case his government did not ratify it. U n d e r the n e w U p p e r Senegal 
8. A . S. Kanya-Forstner in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, p. 61. 
9. ibid., pp. 63-4. 
10. ibid., p. 65. 
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military c o m m a n d headed by Lt.-Colonel Borgnis-Desbordes, the French 
began their invasion of the empire in 1881 and by February 1883 they 
had occupied B a m a k o on the Niger without any opposition. N o r did the 
Tukulor attack the gunboats launched on the Niger in 1884. A h m a d u ' s 
only reaction was to forbid the sale of any item whatsoever to the French.11 
In 1884, at the head of an imposing army, A h m a d u went up the Niger 
towards Bamako. However, contrary to all expectations, he suddenly headed 
for Kaarta not to attack or threaten the fragile lines of communication 
of the French but rather to besiege Nioro, the capital of Kaarta with 
a view to deposing his brother Moutaga, its king w h o m he considered 
as too independent of the central authority. ' 2 
It is obvious from A h m a d u ' s attack on his brother rather than on the 
French, and the fact that the Bambara of the district of Beledugu near 
Bamako were still in rebellion, that he was still not fully in control in 
his o w n territory and that he still needed the support of the French. This 
surely must account for his reaction to the French invasions between 
1881 and 1883. His need for French co-operation was further strengthened 
by the fact that the siege of Nioro further depleted his military resources. 
T h e French, on their part, were also desperate for an alliance with A h m a d u . 
Between 1885 and 1888, they were engaged in the suppression of the 
rebellion of the Soninke leader M a m a d o u Lamine and they were most 
anxious therefore to prevent any alliance between him and A h m a d u . Hence, 
although A h m a d u was aware that the French were still aiding the Bambara 
rebels, he nevertheless agreed to conclude another treaty, the Treaty of 
Gori, on 12 M a y 1887. Under its terms, A h m a d u agreed to place his empire 
under the nominal protection of the French while the French in turn 
pledged not to invade his territories and to remove the ban that they 
had placed on the purchase of arms by A h m a d u . 
However, by 1888, the French had suppressed Lamine's rebellion and, 
as will be seen later, concluded another treaty with Samori and therefore 
did not need an alliance with A h m a d u any longer. This together with 
the aggressiveness of the French military c o m m a n d led to the assumption 
of the offensive against A h m a d u signified by their attack on the Tukulor 
fortress - of Kundian - 'that troublesome obstacle on the road to Siguiri 
and Dinguiray' in February 1889.13 T h e operation was not concluded 
with all the speed desired. T h e 'tata' was very solidly built with double 
walls of masonry while the garrison had removed the thatch roofing to 
prevent the rapid spread of fire. It took an intensive bombardment of 
eight hours' duration by Archinard's 8 0 - m m mountain guns to breach 
the walls. T h e Tukulor, w h o had held fast under this deluge, put up 
a fierce resistance to the French, meeting their bombardment with con-
11. Y . Saint-Martin, 1972, p. 301. 
12. ibid., p. 316. 
13. ibid., p. 379. 
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tinued musket fire followed by a house-to-house fight. M a n y of them 
perished with their weapons in their hands.14 
A h m a d u , at grips with his internal difficulties, thereupon transferred 
the struggle to the religious plane. H e appealed to all the Muslims of 
the empire to take up arms in defence of the faith. Letters requesting 
help were dispatched to Djoloff, Mauritania and Futa.15 These steps 
failed to produce satisfactory results, and Archinard, after careful prepara-
tion and the acquisition of adequate arms including 'two 95 m m field-
guns with 100 of the latest melinite shells',16 seized the capital of the 
empire in April 1890. F r o m there he marched against the fortress of 
Ouessebougou, defended by the Bambara loyal to A h m a d u . All of them 
were slain in battle though not without inflicting heavy losses on their 
assailants. T w o of the twenty-seven Europeans were killed and eight of 
them were wounded while thirteen African soldiers were killed and 876 
wounded. F r o m there, Archinard captured Koniakary after having beaten 
the Tukulor resistance put up against him. Faced with the stubborn 
resistance of the Tukulor garrisons, Archinard called a halt and requested 
A h m a d u to capitulate and to go and settle in a Dinguiray village as 
a mere private individual. 
It was not until this point that A h m a d u abandoned his weapon of 
diplomacy in favour of a military one. In June 1890, his soldiers attacked 
the railway at Talaari and engaged the French in numerous skirmishes 
between Kayes and Bafulabe. In one of them, the French lost forty-three 
killed and wounded out of a force of 125. In September, taking advantage 
of the isolation of Koniakary by flood, they attempted but failed to reconquer 
it.17 
A h m a d u was, however, also preparing to defend Nioro. H e divided 
his troops into four groups with the main body concentrating around 
Nioro under the c o m m a n d of the Bambara general Bafi and the former 
king of Djoloff, Alboury N'Diaye. 1 8 O n 23 December 1890, Bassiru's 
army was routed by the French using their 8 0 - m m and 9 5 - m m guns, 
and on 1 January 1891, Archinard entered Nioro. Alboury's attempt to 
retake Nioro on 3 January 1891 failed after the Tukulor army had been 
routed. T h e Sultan lost more than 3000 killed or taken prisoner. H e 
retreated to Macina, which he left after the hard-fought battle of Kori-
Kori. Even in exile in Hausa territory, he maintained an attitude of 'un-
compromising independence' toward the French.J 9 
14. ibid., p. 381. 
15. ibid., p. 390. 
16. A . S. Kanya-Forstner in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, p. 69. 
17. ibid., p. 70. 
18. ibid., p. 73. 
19. Y . Saint-Martin, 1972, p. 427. 
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Samori and the French 
Unlike A h m a d u , Samori Ture chose the strategy of confrontation, not 
of alliance, though he used the weapons of both diplomacy and warfare 
but with the emphasis on the latter. B y 1881, Samori had already moulded 
'the southern part of the Sudanese savannas all along the great West 
African forest' between the northern parts of modern Sierra Leone to 
the Sassandra River in the Ivory Coast, into a single empire under his 
unquestioned authority20 (see Fig. 6.1). Unlike the Tukulor empire, the 
Mandingo empire was still in the ascendant by 1882 when the first encounter 
between Samori and the French occurred. T h e conquest of the area had 
also enabled Samori to build a powerful army relatively well equipped 
with European arms. This army was divided into two wings, the infantry 
wing (the sofa) which by 1887 numbered between 30000 and 35000 m e n , 
and the cavalry wing numbering no more than 3000 by 1887. T h e infantry 
was divided into permanent units of ten to twenty m e n known as the 
sé (feet) or kulu (heaps) commanded by a kuntigi (chief), and ten sé formed 
a bolo (arm) under the c o m m a n d of a bolokuntigi.21 T h e cavalry was divided 
into bands of fifty called sèrè. T h e bolo formed the main striking force 
while a sèrè rode alongside each bolo. Since each of these units was per-
manent, its members developed feelings of friendship first among them-
selves and of loyalty first to their local leader and then to Samori. Thus 
the army soon assumed 'a quasi-national character because it achieved 
a very remarkable homogeneity'.22 But the unique features of Samori's 
army were its weapons and training. Unlike most of the armies of West 
Africa, not only was this army virtually professional, but it was armed 
by Samori himself. U p to 1876, he armed them with old guns which the 
local blacksmiths could repair themselves. But from 1876 onwards he also 
began to order more modern European weapons, mainly from Sierra Leone, 
and carefully studied them to find those that were most suitable for his 
area. T h u s from 1885, he replaced the Chassepot rifles, whose large 
cartridges soon rotted in humid conditions, with the more suitable Gras 
rifles with lighter cartridges, and Kropatscheks which were Gras repeater 
rifles. H e continued to rely on these types until the 1880s since he was 
able to train a group of blacksmiths w h o could effectively manufacture 
copies. F r o m 1888, he also added to his stock some of the new quick-
firing rifles and by 1893 he had about 6000 of them which he used until 
his defeat in 1898. However, he never acquired any artillery which was 
a great handicap in his campaigns against the French. A r m s purchases 
were financed from the sale of ivory and gold mined from the old medieval 
goldfields of Bure in the south and from the exchange of slaves for horses 
in the Sahel and Mossi regions. T h e army was, however, not only well 
20. For a detailed study of the life and activities of Samori, see Y . Person, 1968-^75. 
21. Y . Person in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, pp. 121-6. 
22. ibid., pp. 121-2. 
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armed but also well trained and disciplined and it developed a high level 
of esprit de corps and homogeneity. 
It is evident, then, that Samori was virtually at the height of his power 
when he first came into contact with the French in 1882. In February 
of that year he was called upon by Lieutenant Alakamessa w h o notified 
him of the order from the Upper Senegal-Niger high c o m m a n d to withdraw 
from Kenyeran, an important market centre barring Samori's way to the 
Mandingo areas. A s one would expect, Samori refused. This led to a 
surprise attack on his army by Borgnis-Desbordes w h o was however forced 
to beat a hasty retreat. Samori's brother, K é m é - B r e m a , attacked the French 
at W e n y a k o near B a m a k o in April. T h o u g h he w o n the battle on 2 April, 
he was defeated on 12 April by a m u c h smaller French army. Samori 
thereupon tried to avoid conflict with the French and directed his action 
towards Kenedugu. 
In 1885, when C o m b e s occupied Bure, the gold of which was important 
to the economy of Samori's empire, Samori realized h o w great was the 
threat that hung over his state. H e resolved to expel the French from 
the area by force. Three armies, his o w n and those of K é m é and Masara-
M a m a d i , were charged with this operation. B y a vast pincer movement, 
Bure was easily recaptured and the French were forced to decamp for 
fear of being encircled. Samori thereupon decided to cultivate his relations 
with the British in Sierra Leone. After having occupied Falaba in 1884, 
he dispatched emissaries to Freetown, to propose to the governor that 
he place his entire country under the protection of the British government. 
T h e offer was a mere manoeuvre on the part of Samori, whose intention 
was in no way to relinquish his sovereignty but to make the French 
respect it by allying himself with a powerful government.23 
W h e n that move failed, Samori turned to the French and signed a 
treaty with them on 28 March 1886. H e agreed to withdraw his troops 
to the right bank of the Niger, but maintained his rights over Bure and 
the Mandingo of Kangaba. 2 4 In another treaty with the French on 25 
March 1887 which amended that of the previous year, Samori ceded the 
left bank of the river to the French and even agreed to place his country 
under French protection. 
Samori had perhaps signed the second document in the hope that the 
French would help him against Tieba, the Faama of Sikasso w h o m he 
attacked in April 1887 with a 12000-strong army, while the French had 
signed it because they needed to prevent any alliance between Samori 
and M a m a d o u Lamine w h o m they were then fighting. W h e n he saw 
that instead of behaving as allies and assisting him, the French were 
rather encouraging dissidence and rebellion in the areas recently subdued 
and were attempting to prevent him from obtaining supplies of weapons 
23. J. D . Hargreaves in L . H . Gann and P . Duignan (eds), 1969, pp. 207-8. 
24. ibid., p. 208. 
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from Sierra Leone, he raised the siege in August 1888 and prepared 
to take up arms against the invader.25 H e reorganized the army, concluded 
a treaty with the British in Sierra Leone in M a y 1890 which enabled 
him to buy modern weapons for the next three years in increasing quantities, 
and trained his troops in the European manner. Platoons and companies 
were activated. H e adopted defence as his military tactic. O f course, there 
could be no question of using the 'tatas' for shelter, as there was no 
chance that they could hold out against artillery. His strategy consisted 
of endowing his troops with great mobility, so that they could surprise 
the enemy, inflict heavy losses upon him, and then disappear.26 
In March 1890, Archinard captured Segu and in his attempt to defeat 
Samori before ceding the Upper Senegal-Niger c o m m a n d to Humbert, 
attacked him in March 1891. Archinard thought that Samori's empire 
would collapse at the first onslaught. Though that attack resulted in the 
capturing of Kankan on 7 April and the burning of Bissandugu, its 
effect was quite the opposite since it not only provided Samori with a 
salutary warning but it also enabled him to continue the attacks on the 
French at Kankan and to defeat them at the battle of Dabadugu on 
3 September 1891. 
T h e major confrontation between the French and Samori, however, 
took place in 1892. Bent on defeating Samori, Humbert launched an attack 
on the central part of the Empire in January 1892 with 1300 carefully 
picked riflemen and 3000 porters. Samori took personal c o m m a n d of his 
carefully chosen army of 2500 m e n to meet Humbert . Though these m e n 
'fighting like demons, clung fiercely to every defensive point on the way', 
to quote Yves Person's words,2 7 they were defeated and Humbert 
succeeded in capturing Bissandugu, Sanankoro and Kerwane. It is im-
portant to note, however, that Humbert himself admitted that the results 
were very meagre in comparison to the heavy losses that he had sustained. 
Furthermore, Samori had ordered the civilian population to withdraw at 
the approach of the French troops. 
However, Samori had no illusions. After the violent encounters with 
the Humbert column in which he lost over a thousand m e n of his elite 
units as compared with only about a hundred lost by the French, he 
became convinced of the futility of confronting the French. There were 
then two options open to him: either to surrender or to withdraw. H e 
ruled out the former and decided to abandon his homeland and move 
to the east to create a new empire out of the reach of the Europeans. 
Still continuing his scorched-earth policy, he began his move eastwards 
towards the Bandama and C o m o e rivers. T h o u g h in 1894 he lost the 
last route supplying him with modern weapons - the one to Monrovia 
- he nevertheless fought on. At the beginning of 1895, he encountered 
25. ibid., p. 209. 
26. Y . Person in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, p. 134. 
27. ibid., p. 135. 
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and beat back a French column coming from the Baule country under 
the c o m m a n d of Monteil, and between July 1895 and January 1896 went 
on to conquer the Abron (Gyaman) kingdom and the western part of 
Gonja. B y that time, he had succeeded in creating a new empire in the 
hinterland of the Ivory Coast and Asante (see Fig. 6.1).28 In March 
1897, his son Sarankenyi-Mori met and defeated a British column under 
the c o m m a n d of Henderson near W a while Samori himself attacked and 
destroyed K o n g in M a y 1897 and pushed on to Bobo where he encountered 
a French column under the c o m m a n d of Caudrelier. 
Caught between the French and the British and having vainly attempted 
to sow discord between the British and the French by returning to the 
latter the territory of Bouna coveted by the former, Samori decided to 
return to his T o m a allies in Liberia. O n the way, he was captured in 
a surprise attack at Guelemou by Gouraud on 29 September 1898 and 
deported to G a b o n where he died in 1900. His capture brought to an 
end what a recent scholar has described as 'the longest series of campaigns 
against a single enemy in the history of French Sudanese conquest'.29 
D a h o m e y 
Behanzin, the king of Dahomey (Abomey), like Samori, chose the strategy 
of confrontation in defence of the sovereignty and independence of his 
state.30 Direct conflict occurred during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century when France declared a protectorate over Porto Novo , a vassal 
of A b o m e y . This m o v e constituted a serious blow to the economic interests 
of A b o m e y . In 1889, the heir to the throne, Prince K o n d o , informed 
the governor of the Rivières de Sud, Bayol, that the Fon people would 
never accept such a situation. In February 1890, Bayol ordered the occupa-
tion of Cotonou and the arrest of all the Fon notables in the town. 
Prince K o n d o , w h o had begun his reign in December 1889 under the 
n a m e of Behanzin, reacted by mobilizing his troops. At the time, A b o m e y 
had a permanent army which, in peacetime, numbered 4000 m e n and 
w o m e n . In wartime military service was compulsory for all males, supported 
by the Amazons, w h o were dreaded female warriors. 
T h e French garrison was attacked at dusk, at the same time as part 
of the army dispatched to the region of Porto N o v o set about destroying 
the palm trees. According to Behanzin, those economic counter-measures 
quickly induced the French to sue for peace. O n 3 October, Father Dorgère 
presented himself in A b o m e y with proposals for peace. In return for 
the recognition of Cotonou as a French possession and the right of the 
French to levy custom duties and station a garrison of troops there, the 
French were to pay Behanzin an annuity of 20000 francs. T h e king accepted 
these terms and the treaty was signed on 3 October 1890. However, to 
28. ibid., p. 138. 
29. T . C . Weiskel, 1980, pp. 99-102. 
30. D . Ross in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, p . 144. 
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defend the rest of his state, the king started to modernize his army. Between 
January 1891 and August 1892 he purchased, '1,700 rapid-firing rifles, 
six Krupp cannon of various bore, five machine-guns, 400,000 assorted 
cartridges and a large quantity of shell'31 from G e r m a n firms operating 
in L o m e . 
However the French were determined to conquer D a h o m e y and obtained 
the necessary excuse when the Resident of Porto Novo , w h o was making 
a trip up the Werne River in the gunboat Topaz, was fired upon on 
27 March 1892 by some Fon soldiers. Colonel Dodds , a Senegalese mulatto, 
was placed in charge of this mission and arrived at Cotonou in M a y 
1892. Porto N o v o , where the French assembled 2000 m e n , became the 
centre of operations. Dodds moved his m e n up the Werne river and, 
on 4 October, began his march to A b o m e y . T h e Fon united all the three 
divisions of their army of about 12000 strong and moved it against the 
invading French army between the river and A b o m e y . However, all the 
efforts of the F o n soldiers using their traditional methods of surprise 
dawn attacks, unexpected strikes, defensive stands, harrying invading forces 
and other guerrilla tactics, failed to halt the French let alone beat them 
back and they suffered heavy casualties. T h e losses of the Fon were esti-
mated at 2000 dead (including virtually all the Amazons) and 3000 wounded, 
while that of the French was only 10 officers and 67 m e n . 3 2 But what 
upset the Fon military plan most was the destruction of the harvest by 
the Yoruba slaves released by Dodds ' army. A b o m e y was faced with an 
acute problem of provisions. T o avoid starvation, some soldiers went h o m e 
to search for food and to defend their villages which were being pillaged 
by the liberated slaves. 
With the disintegration of the Fon army, the only solution, needless 
to say, was peace. Dodds encamped at Cana, accepted the proposals of 
Behanzin, but demanded payment of a heavy war indemnity and the 
surrender of all weapons. Such conditions were obviously unacceptable 
to the very dignity of the Fon people. In November 1892, Dodds, continuing 
his inexorable advance, entered A b o m e y , which Behanzin had set on fire 
before heading to the northern part of his kingdom where he settled. 
Instead of submitting or being deposed by his people as the French had 
expected, he rather set about reorganizing his army for which he had 
the full support of his people. In March 1893, he was able to regroup 
2000 m e n w h o carried out numerous raids in the areas held by the French. 
In April 1893, the notables m a d e new proposals for peace. They were 
prepared to cede the southern part of the kingdom to France but could 
not accept the deposition of Behanzin, in w h o m they saw the incarnation 
of the values of their people and the symbol of the independent existence 
of their state. T h e French therefore launched another expeditionary force 
31. ibid., p. 158. 
32. ibid., p. 160. 
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in September, again under the c o m m a n d of Dodds , now a general, which 
succeeded in conquering northern D a h o m e y . Goutchilli was appointed 
and crowned king on 15 January 1894 and Behanzin was arrested following 
a betrayal on 29 January 1894.a3 
T h e Baule and the French 
It used to be thought that opposition to the French in the forest regions 
of Guinea and Ivory Coast did not begin until after 1900.34 However, 
recent research especially among the Lagoon people and the Baule of 
Ivory Coast has revealed that this view is erroneous and that French pene-
tration from the coast inland evoked hostile reactions from the people 
right from the beginning.35 T h e first French missions into the Baule 
country from the coast were launched by two expeditions, the military 
expedition of Lieutenants A r m a n d and de Tavernost in February 1891 
and the commercial one of Voituret and Papillon in March 1891. Etien 
K o m e n a n , the chief of the Baule of Tiassalé, was determined to stop 
this penetration and refused to give A r m a n d and de Tavernost an inter-
preter to accompany them to the north. They were therefore obliged 
to return to the coast; meanwhile, Etien K o m e n a n had Voituret and Papillon 
assassinated before they could ever reach Tiassalé.36 T o punish the Baule, 
the French launched a military expedition under the c o m m a n d of Lt 
Staup but this was attacked by Etien Komenan ' s forces on 11 M a y 1891 
and forced to beat an ignominious retreat to the coast. W h e n force failed, 
the French resorted to diplomacy and succeeded in concluding a treaty 
with the Baule of Tiassalé and N i a m w é on 29 December 1892 under 
which they agreed to pay a tribute of 100 oz of gold in exchange for 
free trade with the Africans and Europeans on the coast. It was in the 
light of this treaty that the French sent their second exploratory mission 
into Baule country in March 1893 under the c o m m a n d of Jean-Baptiste 
Marchand w h o was already well known for his military exploits in the 
Western Sudan. Halfway up the Bandama en route to Tiassalé, Marchand 
encountered the opposition of Etien K o m e n a n w h o had resolved that 
'no white m a n would pass through Tiassalé'.37 Marchand therefore 
returned to Grand Lahou and having collected a force of about 120 m e n , 
embarked on an invasion of Tiassalé on 18 M a y 1893 which he occupied 
a week later after Etien K o m e n a n had fled. F r o m there, Marchand resumed 
his march northwards and in November 1893 entered Gbuékékro which 
was later to be renamed Bouaké by the French. Here, he was opposed 
by the chief of the town, Kouassi Gbuèké, w h o was then in alliance 
33. ibid., p. 166. 
34. M . Crowder, 1968, p. 95; J. Bony, 1980, pp. 14-15. 
35. T . C . Weiskel, 1980, pp. 33-141; S. Koffi, 1976, pp. 120-89. 
36. T . C . Weiskel, 1980, pp. 38-9. 
37. ibid., p. 44. 
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with Samori. Marchand had therefore to press on to K o n g from where 
he sent a strong appeal to Paris to dispatch an expedition to occupy 
K o n g with a view to forestalling both Samori and the British as well 
as signing a treaty with the Dyula of K o n g . It was in response to this 
appeal that the expedition under Monteil was launched in September 
1894, which entered Tiassalé in December 1894. 
Monteil's expedition encountered an even more determined resistance 
from the Baule w h o revolted and attacked them at Ouossou north of 
Tiassalé, at Ahuakro and at Moronou between 25 and 28 December. 
It was because of this determined Baule opposition that Monteil was 
ordered to return to the coast in February 1895. 
T h e period from 1895 to 1898 was one of peace in Baule territory. 
However, after defeating and capturing Samori in September 1898, the 
French decided to begin an effective occupation of Baule territory, and 
therefore began to build a permanent military post at Bouaké without 
consulting the Baule. They also began to free slaves and they captured 
and executed Katia Kofi, the chief of Katiakofikro, for fomenting anti-
French feelings in that area. Mainly as a result of these provocations, 
the Baule groups in that area once again rose up in rebellion and on 
22 December 1898 launched an all-out attack on the French garrisons 
in that area, led by Kouadio O k o u , chief of L o m o ; Yao Guié, a N g b a n 
chief; Kasso, the brother of the murdered chief of Katiakofikro; Akafou 
Bulare, another N g b a n chief; and K o u a m é Die, the paramount chief of 
the Warebo Baule. In reply, the French declared the Baule area a military 
territory and launched a series of campaigns. These resulted in the capture 
of the Baule gold-mining centre of K o k u m b o from a Baule defence force 
of 1500 to 2000 m e n in June 1901, in the capturing and shooting of 
the great K o u a m é Die in February 1902 and the capture of Akafou Bulare 
(Akafou, the M a n of Iron) who was beaten to death in his cell in July 
1902. But, resorting to guerrilla tactics, the Baule continued to harass 
the French forces and peace was not restored until François-Joseph Clozel, 
w h o became the acting governor of the colony in November 1902, realized 
the futility of force and ordered a halt to military operations.38 
Conquest and reaction in British West Africa, 
1880-1900 
While the French resorted mainly to warfare in their occupation of French 
West Africa during the period 1880 to 1900, the British, by contrast, 
used a combination of peaceful diplomacy and warfare. Using the former 
approach, they concluded a number of treaties of protection with African 
states as they did in the northern parts of Sierra Leone, the northern 
38. For details of all these campaigns and the guerrilla and other methods that the 
Baule used, see T . C . Weiskel, 1980, pp. 98-141. 
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parts of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and in some parts of Yorubaland. 
In other parts, as in Asante, Ijebu in Yorubaland, in the Niger Delta 
areas and especially in Northern Nigeria, however, the British by and 
large used force. In reacting to the British, the peoples of the area in 
question, like those in French West Africa, resorted to all the options 
open to them, those of confrontation, alliance and submission or a 
combination of any of these options. Let us analyse what happened in 
Asante, Southern Nigeria and in Northern Nigeria as cases in point. 
Asante (Gold Coast) 
Nowhere in West Africa had there been a longer tradition of confrontation 
between Africans and Europeans than in the Gold Coast between the 
Asante and the British. This started in the 1760s and culminated in 
a military engagement in 1824 in which the Asante defeated the British 
forces and their allies and killed their commander, Sir Charles MacCarthy, 
the then Governor of the Gold Coast.39 T w o years later, the British 
avenged this defeat at the battle of D o d o w a . In 1850 and 1863 war was 
narrowly averted but between 1869 and 1872, the Asante launched a 
three-pronged attack which resulted in the occupation of virtually all the 
southern and coastal states of the Gold Coast. T o beat back the Asante, 
the British government launched one of the best organized campaigns 
of the period under the c o m m a n d of one of the most famous British 
officers of the day, General Garnet Wolseley. A r m e d with the latest 
weapons, this army succeeded in pushing the Asante army across the 
Pra river and entered and sacked Kumasi in February 1874 after a very 
fierce last-ditch stand by the Asante army at Amoafo near Bekwai.40 
This decisive defeat of the Asante by the British in 1874 had very 
far-reaching consequences and was to influence, to a great extent, the 
reactions of the Asante during the period 1880-1900. T h e first obvious 
effect was the disintegration of the Asante empire. By the Treaty of F o m e n a , 
Asante recognized the independence of all the vassal states south of the 
Pra. Taking advantage of the weakening of the military power of Asante, 
the vassal states to the north of the Volta river also broke away. Even 
the core of the empire that remained began to break up. Anxious to 
see that the Asante empire was never revived, the British instigated some 
of the m e m b e r states of the Asante Union to assert their independence, 
and D w a b e n , Kokofu, Bekwai and Nsuta began to defy the Asantehene.4 ' 
T h e conflict between Kumasi and D w a b e n in fact led to a civil war 
which ended in the defeat of the former and the mass migration of the 
39. For details about the rise of Asante, see J. K . Fynn in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, 
pp. 19-33; A . A . Boahen, 1966; A . A . Boahen in J. F . A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 
1974-
40. J. K . Fynn in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, pp. 36-42. 
41. ibid., p. 43. 
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people into the recently proclaimed British Protectorate and Colony of 
the G o l d Coast. A b o v e all, the Asantehene w a s deposed partly as a result 
of the o u t c o m e of the 1874 w a r . O n the death of his successor only seven 
years later, a civil w a r broke out over the succession and it w a s not until 
1888 that P r e m p e h I e m e r g e d as the n e w Asantehene. 
Fortunately, P r e m p e h proved equal to the crisis with which he w a s 
confronted. Within three years of his succession, he w a s able to reunite 
the m e m b e r states of the Asante U n i o n (or Confederacy) and even to 
persuade the D w a b e n to return h o m e . A l a r m e d partly b y this revival 
of Asante and partly by the possibility of either the French or the G e r m a n s 
taking over Asante, the British offered to place Asante under their pro-
tection. P r e m p e h ' s firm but polite rejection of this offer is quoted else-
w h e r e . 4 2 P r e m p e h followed u p this rejection with an invasion and defeat 
of the Nkoransa , the M o a n d the Abease in 1892. In reaction, the British 
offered to station a British Resident at K u m a s i in return for the p a y m e n t 
of annual stipends to the Asantehene and his other leading kings. N o t 
only did the Asantehene reject this offer but dispatched a high-powered 
mission to the Q u e e n of Eng land 'to lay before your Majesty divers matters 
affecting the good estate of our k i n g d o m ' . 4 3 This diplomatic mission left 
K u m a s i in N o v e m b e r 1894 attended b y over three h u n d r e d retainers. 
It entered C a p e Coast o n 10 D e c e m b e r and left for England on 3 April 
1895. N o t only did the British government refuse to see the Asante mission 
but, while it w a s still there, instructed the governor on the coast to issue 
an ultimatum to the Asantehene to receive a British Resident and pay 
the w a r indemnity of 5 0 0 0 0 oz of gold imposed on Asante in 1874. O f 
course, the Asantehene refused to c o m p l y with these requests, all the 
m o r e so since he w a s awaiting the o u t c o m e of the mission to L o n d o n . 
Us ing this as an excuse, the British launched a full-scale expedition 
against Asante under the c o m m a n d of Sir Francis Scott. T h i s expedition 
entered K u m a s i in January 1896 without firing a shot since P r e m p e h 
and his advisors had decided not to fight the British but to accept British 
protection. In spite of this, P r e m p e h , his m o t h e r w h o w a s also then the 
Q u e e n , his uncles and s o m e of the w a r chiefs were arrested and deported 
first to Sierra L e o n e a n d thence to the Seychelles Islands in 1 9 0 0 . 4 4 
(See Plate 6.2.) 
W h y did the Asante decide not to fight the British o n this occasion? 
Fortunately, w e have P r e m p e h ' s o w n answer to this question while he 
w a s in exile o n the Seychelles Islands. W h e n his chiefs d e m a n d e d w a r 
with the British, P r e m p e h first recalled the days of the civil w a r in K u m a s i 
and the role the British h a d played in bringing about peace as well as 
his enstoolment and then added: 'through this favour received in the 
hands of the English G o v e r n m e n t , I a m not prepared to fight the British 
troops in spite [sic] I a m to be captured b y t h e m - secondly, I would 
42. See Chapter 1 above. 
43. I. Wilks, 197s, pp. 637-41. 
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rather surrender to secure the lives and tranquillity of m y people and 
country m e n . ' 4 5 . 
T h e unfortunate Prempeh thought that he could break with tradition 
and use the weapon of diplomacy instead of military confrontation in 
an age of bitter imperial rivalry. But in view of the experiences of 1874 
and the undoubted military superiority enjoyed by the British over Asante, 
Prempeh's decision was most realistic, sensible and dignified. 
Southern Nigeria 
T h e agencies and methods that the British adopted to bring the whole 
of modern Nigeria under their control varied, as did the initiatives and 
reactions on the part of the Nigerians. Yorubaland was w o n by the mission-
aries and the Lagos government; the Oil Rivers by the missionaries and 
the consuls; and Northern Nigeria by both the National African C o m p a n y 
(from 1886 the Royal Niger C o m p a n y ) and the British government. T h e 
main weapons used by the British were diplomacy and military confronta-
tion. Nigerian reactions therefore varied from open military confrontation 
to temporary alliances and submission. 
Mainly as a result of the activities of the missionaries, British influence 
and trade had penetrated from Lagos, occupied in 1851, to most parts 
of Yorubaland, and a number of anti-slave trade, and trade and protection 
treaties had been concluded between the British and m a n y Yoruba rulers 
by 1884. In 1886, the British administration was also able to convince 
Ibadan and the Ekitiparapo (comprising the Ekiti, Ijesha and Egba), w h o 
had been at war since 1879, to sign a peace treaty. That the British 
had accomplished so m u c h in Yorubaland by 1886 should not surprise 
us. Apart from the activities of the European traders and missionaries, 
which had preceded the wars, after fighting a m o n g themselves since the 
1850s, the Yoruba were themselves war-weary and needed peace; hence 
their acceptance of the intervention by the British. T h e only state in 
Yorubaland that had effectively resisted the missionaries, the British 
traders, and the Lagos administration, until the 1880s was Ijebu. Bent 
on occupying Yorubaland from the early 1890s, the British decided to 
teach Ijebu a lesson and at the same time demonstrate to the remaining 
Yoruba states the futility of opposing them. 4 6 Using an alleged insult 
to Governor Denton in 1892 as a pretext, the British launched a well-
prepared expedition of about 1000 m e n armed with rifles, machine guns 
and a M a x i m gun. T h e Ijebu courageously raised an army of between 
7000 and 10000 m e n but in spite of this huge numerical superiority and 
in spite of the fact that some of them were armed with firearms, they 
were routed by the invaders.47 It would appear that all the remaining 
45. Quoted in ibid. 
46. M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 126-7. 
47. R . Smith in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, p. 180. 
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Yoruba states learnt a lesson from this invasion, and it is not surprising 
that between 1893 and 1899 Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ekiti-Ijesa and O y o readily 
agreed to negotiate treaties and accepted British residents. It was merely 
to ensure the total submission of the Alafin that the British bombarded 
O y o in 1895. Abeokuta remained nominally independent until 1914. 
While the Yoruba, by and large, chose the strategy of submission, the 
rulers of the kingdom of Benin and some of the rulers of the states of 
the Niger Delta chose that of confrontation. T h o u g h Benin had signed 
a treaty of protection with the British in 1892, she none the less guarded 
her sovereignty with determination. This, of course, would not be tolerated 
in that age, and using the killing of the British acting consul-general 
and five other Englishmen on their way to Benin as an excuse, the British 
launched a punitive expedition of 1500 m e n against Benin in 1897. T h o u g h 
the O b a himself would have liked to submit, a majority of his chiefs 
raised an army to beat back the invasion. T h e y were, however, defeated 
and the capital was looted of its precious bronze treasures and then burnt.48 
In the Niger Delta, as in m a n y other areas of Nigeria, the British 
had signed treaties of protection with most of the chiefs by 1884. However, 
while some, like Calabar and Bonny, had allowed missionaries to operate 
in their states, others had not. Moreover, all of them were insisting on 
their sovereign rights to regulate trade and to levy duties on British 
traders. This, the new British consuls, such as Hewett and Johnston, 
would not tolerate. A typical example of the rulers w h o stood up to the 
British consuls and missionaries was Jaja of O p o b o (see Plate 6.3). H e 
insisted on payment of duties by British traders and ordered a complete 
stoppage of trade in the river until one British firm agreed to pay duties. 
T h e consul, Johnston, ordered him to stop levying duties on English 
traders. But instead of doing so, Jaja dispatched a mission to the Foreign 
Office to protest against the order. W h e n Jaja still refused to comply 
in spite of Johnston's threats to bombard his town with British gunboats, 
Johnston enticed Jaja on board a ship in 1887 under a promise of safe-
conduct but arrested him and sent him to Accra49 where he was tried 
and deported to the West Indies. T h e other Delta states - Old Calabar, 
N e w Calabar, Brass and Bonny - stunned by this treatment of one of 
the most powerful and wealthy rulers of the Delta states and divided 
internally, surrendered and accepted governing councils imposed on them 
by Johnston. 
Another ruler w h o defied the British was Nana , the governor of the 
river in the Itsekiri kingdom. Like Jaja, he insisted on controlling the 
trade on the Benin river and therefore the British raised an army to 
seize his capital. T h e first attempt in April 1894 was repulsed but the 
second, in September, succeeded. Nana escaped to Lagos where he sur-
48. J. B . Webster and A . A . Boahen, 1967, pp. 247-9. 
49. M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 119-23; O . Ikime, 1973, p. 10. 
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rendered himself to the British governor w h o promptly tried him and 
deported him first to Calabar and then to the Gold Coast.50 
Conquest and Reaction in Northern Nigeria 
If the conquest and occupation of Southern Nigeria was the work of 
the British government with the assistance of the traders and the mission-
aries, that of Northern Nigeria was accomplished by the National African 
C o m p a n y (from 1886 the Royal Niger C o m p a n y - R N C ) and the British 
government, and the main method used, like that of the French in the 
Western Sudan, was military conquest. This had been preceded by a 
series of treaties between the rulers of Northern Nigeria and the R N C . 
These treaties were calculated to secure the area for the British rather 
than the French or the Germans w h o were encroaching from the west 
and east respectively. 
Following the establishment of the principle of effective occupation 
at the Berlin Conference and to forestall the French and the Germans, 
the R N C felt compelled to move in. T h e doors to the north lay through 
Ilorin and N u p e , both of which were determined to maintain their inde-
pendence and sovereignty. N u p e was therefore invaded in 1897. T h e R N C ' s 
force, according to D . J. M . Muffett, 'consisted of Major A . R . Arnold, 
commanding thirty-one officers and other Europeans, including Sir George 
Goldie himself, and 507 rank and file formed in seven companies, supported 
by 565 carriers and one 12-pounder B . L . gun and one 9-pounder B . L . 
gun (both Whitworth's), five R . M . L . (rifled muzzle loading) 7-pounder 
guns and six .45 M a x i m s ' . 5 1 It was supported by a flotilla consisting 
of eleven vessels. T h e Etsu of N u p e and his huge army, estimated at 
25000-30000 cavalry and infantry m e n and armed mainly with the 
traditional weapons of bows, arrows, spears and swords, put up a spirited 
fight. Nevertheless, the R N C came out victorious in the end, deposed 
the Etsu and installed a more pliable one. N u p e was defeated because, 
as Crowder has pointed out, it failed to realize that 'head-on cavalry 
charges against rapid-firing rifles, artillery and maxim guns was the worst 
military strategy possible'.52 A similar invasion was launched against Ilorin 
in the same year. After meeting another spirited defence, the R N C brought 
Ilorin into subjection. 
Surprisingly, other rulers of the north were not intimidated by these 
victories. O n the contrary, apart from that of Zaria, all the other emirs, 
spurred on by their implacable hatred for the infidel, were determined 
to die rather than surrender their land and faith. As the Sultan of Sokoto 
informed Lugard in M a y 1902, 'Between us and you there are no dealings 
except as between musulmans and unbelievers . . . W a r as G o d Almighty 
50. O . Ikime in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, pp. 227-8. 
51. D . J. M . Muffett in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, pp. 283-4. 
52. M . Crowder, 1968, p. 131. 
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has enjoined on us'.53 T h e British therefore had to launch a series of 
campaigns — against Kontagora in 1900, A d a m a w a in 1901, Bauchi in 
1902, Kano, Sokoto and Burwuri in 1903.54 T h e rulers of all these emirates 
rose to the occasion but they had no effective answer to their enemies' 
M a x i m guns, rifles and muzzle-loading 7-pounder cannon and therefore 
suffered defeat. 
African Reactions and Responses in West Africa, 
1 9 0 0 - 1 4 
As is evident from the above, by 1900, the efforts of the Africans to 
maintain their sovereignty and independence had been frustrated and the 
period from 1900 to the outbreak of the First World W a r saw the intro-
duction of various kinds of machinery for the administration and above 
all, for the exploitation of the newly acquired estates. As Angoulvant, 
who was appointed Governor of the Ivory Coast in August 1908, put 
it: 
What has to be established above all is the indisputable principle 
of our authority . . . O n the part of the natives, the acceptance of 
this principle must be expressed in a deferential welcome and absolute 
respect for our representatives whoever they m a y be, in the full 
payment of taxes at a uniform rate of 2.50 francs, in serious co-
operation in the construction of tracks and roads, in the acceptance 
of paid porterage, in the following of our advice [sic] in regard to 
labour, in recourse to our justice . . . Signs of impatience or disrespect 
towards our authority, and the deliberate lack of goodwill are to 
be repressed without delay.55 
In all the newly acquired colonies, the objectives outlined here were pur-
sued and the methods were applied. District commissioners and travelling 
commissioners were appointed, new courts were established, new codes 
and new laws were introduced, chiefs were confirmed or deposed and 
new ones appointed, direct and indirect taxation was introduced, and 
forced labour was demanded for the construction of roads and railways. 
All these measures naturally generated various reactions. 
During this second phase, while there were differences in the objectives 
in view, the strategy adopted for the attainment of these objectives by 
West Africans was the same. The main objectives were three: to regain 
their independence and sovereignty, which implied expelling the colonial 
53. D . J. M . Muffett in M . Crowder (ed), 1971, pp. 284-7. 
54. T h e British campaigns in Northern Nigeria and the brave resistance of the rulers 
are too well known to be discussed here. For details, see D . J. M . Muffett in M . Crowder 
(ed.), 1971; R . A . Adeleye, 1971; M . Last, 1967. 
55. Quoted by J. Suret-Canale, 1971, pp. 97-8. 
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rulers altogether; to seek to correct or redress certain specific abuses or 
oppressive aspects of the colonial system; or to seek accommodation within 
it. T h e strategy that was adopted during this phase was neither submission 
nor alliance but that of resistance and this took m a n y forms: revolts or 
rebellions, migrations, strikes, boycotts, petitions and delegations and 
finally ideological protest. T h e leadership during this period also remained 
virtually the same as that between 1880 and 1900, that is mainly that 
of the traditional rulers. Briefly let us illustrate each of these strategies. 
T h e most popular weapon used by West Africans during this period 
was rebellion or revolt. Notable a m o n g rebellions was that led by M a m a d o u 
Lamine in Senegal between 1885 and 1887; that led by Fode Silla, the 
marabout king of K o m b o ; and Fode Kabba , the Muslim ruler of Niamina 
and the Casamance districts in T h e G a m b i a between 1898 and 1901 ; the Hut 
Tax rebellion of 1898 in Sierra Leone led by Bai Bureh; the Asante 
rebellion of 1900 in the Gold Coast led by Yaa Asantewaa, the queen 
of Edweso; the E k u m e k u rebellion of 1898-1900 and the Aro rising between 
1898 and 1902 in eastern. Nigeria; the rebellions of the Bariba of Borgu 
and the S o m b a of Atacora in D a h o m e y between 1913 and 1914; the Mossi 
rebellions in Koudougou and Fada N ' G u r m a in Upper Volta from 1908 
to 1914; that of the Gurunsi in 1915-16; that of the Lobi and the Djoula 
in French Sudan between 1908 and 1909; the uprising in Porto N o v o in 
D a h o m e y ; the revolts of the Baule, Akouse, Sassandra and the Guro 
in Ivory Coast between 1900 and 1914; and the numerous uprisings in 
several parts of Guinea between 1908 and 1914. It is interesting to note 
that these rebellions increased in intensity during the First World W a r . 5 6 
Three typical examples which must be looked at in a little detail to illustrate 
the nature and motives of these revolts are the rebellion led by M a m a d o u 
Lamine, the Hut T a x rebellion, and the Yaa Asantewaa rebellion. 
T h e rebellion of M a m a d o u L a m i n e 
T h e rebellion of M a m a d o u Lamine was directed against foreign domina-
tion. T h e Soninke population was scattered among the various states c o m -
prising the territory of Upper Senegal. S o m e of them were by 1880 more 
or less subjected to French authority, the others to that of A h m a d u . 
Construction work on the telegraph line and the Kayes-Niger railway 
line required large numbers of workers, recruited principally among the 
Soninke. T h e exhausting labour and the precarious living conditions which 
were their lot caused a high death rate among them. A s a result, a m o v e -
ment of protest arose directly not only against the daily humiliations but 
56. For details of all these revolts, see O . Ikime, 1973; A . E . Afigbo, 1973; B . O . 
Oloruntimehin, 1973(b); J. Osuntokun, 1977; M . Crowder, 1977(c); J. Suret-Canale, 1971, 
pp. 93-107; M . Crowder, 1968; (ed.), 1971; A . Duperray, 1978; I. Kimba, 1979; 
G . Yapé, 1977; M . Michel, 1982; T . C . Weiskel, 1980; S. Koffi, 1976. See also Chapter 12. 
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especially against foreign presence in the region.57 M a m a d o u L a m i n e 
acted as a catalyst to this m o v e m e n t by grouping around h i m all the 
past or present victims of the n e w socio-political order. It w a s with the 
envied title of pilgrim that he returned, in 1885, to his homeland , then 
in the throes of a triple crisis, at once political, economic and social. 
In his first public sermons, he applied himself to transferring the crisis 
to a religious plane, favouring the strict Sanüsiyya doctrine, which refused 
to permit M u s l i m s to live under any non-Islamic authority. T h a t was 
e n o u g h to bring about the spontaneous adherence of the Soninke to his 
p r o g r a m m e . His travels in K h a s s o , G u o y , B a m b u c k and B o n d u daily 
saw n e w n u m b e r s of his countrymen rally to the cause. B y the end of 
1885, he had imposing forces at his disposal, ready to go to battle for 
freedom. 
T h e death of Boubacar Saada, the A l m a m y of Bondu and a French 
protege, provided him with the opportunity to launch his offensive. O m a r 
Penda, imposed by France as the late Almamy's successor, refused to 
grant M a m a d o u Lamine permission to pass through Bondu on his way 
to T h e Gambia. T h e Soninke chief thereupon invaded Bondu in January 
1886. Frey, w h o was on the Niger, dispatched contingents to Kayes and 
Bakel to secure his rear. M a m a d o u Lamine then gave his movement a 
radical turn. His sermons thereafter concerned only total war against 
Christians.58 T h e Soninke condemned the French as well as their African 
allies such as O m a r Penda of Bondu, Sambala of Medina and the farmers 
established in Bakel, Medina and Kayes. S o m e Soninke in French service 
joined M a m a d o u Lamine's camp while others established in the French 
posts furnished him with information concerning French troop movements. 
Against the superior weaponry of the enemy, M a m a d o u Lamine could 
count on the numerical superiority and fanaticism of his soldiers, w h o 
were convinced they were fighting for G o d and their country. After his 
defeat at Bakel, he resorted to guerrilla warfare. In March 1886, M a m a d o u 
Lamine decided to attack Bakel, which symbolized the French presence 
in the area and the humiliation of the Soninke people. H e established 
a blockade of the city, occupying all its approaches with troops. W h e n 
Captain Jolly attempted to loosen his grip by attacking the Soninke based 
at Koungani, he was forced to beat a hasty retreat, leaving ten dead 
and a cannon on the scene. M a m a d o u Lamine thereupon stormed the 
city with his 10000 m e n . T h e assault failed. With victory but a hair's 
breadth away, the Soninke headquarters was wiped out by a shell. In 
the confusion which followed, M a m a d o u Lamine's warriors fled.59 Never-
theless, on his orders, the telegraph line between Bakel and Kayes was 
cut. 
T h e experience at Bakel taught Lamine that with the weapons at his 
57. A . K . Tandia, 1973, p. 83. 
58. ibid., p. 89. 
59. ibid., p. 92. 
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disposal, he would never be able to seize fortified French posts. H e there-
fore took to guerrilla warfare. Frey, w h o had returned from Niger, terrorized 
the populations of Guidimakha to wean them away from M a m a d o u 
Lamine's cause. Their villages were burned, their crops and livestock 
confiscated. That policy only strengthened the Soninke in their determina-
tion to rid their country of the French. M a m a d o u Lamine devoted the 
rainy season of 1886 to reorganizing his forces. H e set up his headquarters 
at Diana in Upper Gambia, where he erected a fortress that became 
a centre of propaganda and a base of operations. In July, the Soninke 
attacked Senoudebou, reconquered Boulebane and executed O m a r Penda, 
the French protege of B o n d u . 6 0 After 1887, the alliance between Gallieni 
and A h m a d u against the Soninke precipitated the failure of the uprising. 
Souaibou, M a m a d o u Lamine's son, attacked by A h m a d u ' s army, was forced 
to surrender Diafounou and Guidimakha to the son of Al Hadj ' U m a r . 
While attempting to rejoin his father, he was captured and executed. 
In December 1887, Lamine was finally defeated at Touba-Kouta by the 
French with the help of the auxiliaries furnished by Moussa Molo of 
the Upper Casamance. 
T h e H u t T a x rebellion 
T h e Hut T a x rebellion of 1898 was the response of the T e m n e and the 
M e n d e of Sierra Leone to the consolidation of British rule over them 
by the appointment of district commissioners, the expansion of the frontier 
police, the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, the implementation 
of the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896 which empowered the government 
to dispose of waste land and, finally, the imposition of a tax of 5s a 
year on all two-roomed houses and 10s on all larger houses in the Pro-
tectorate.61 All the T e m n e chiefs unanimously decided not to pay the 
tax and rose up in rebellion under the leadership of one of them, Bai 
Bureh (see Plate 6.4). They were joined by the M e n d e people thereby 
involving almost three-quarters of the Protectorate. T h e rebel forces 
attacked and looted trading stations and killed British officials and troops 
and all those suspected of assisting the colonial government. A s one district 
commissioner reported in April 1898, 'The object appears to be the massacre 
of all Sierra Leoneans (i.e. the Creoles of Freetown) and Europeans and 
thoroughly it is being done. T h e country is destroyed as regards Trade 
— several traders being killed and places burnt'.62 By M a y 1898, the 
rebel armies were within about 40 k m of Freetown and two companies 
of troops had to be hastily brought in from Lagos to defend the town. 
W h a t was the true nature of this revolt? T h e British governor of Sierra 
60. ibid., p. 95. 
61. This section is based on J. A . Langley, n.d. 
62. ibid. 
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Leone, w h o was stunned by the rebellion, attributed not only that rebellion 
but the general resistance to colonial rule that was raging at the time 
to 'the growing political consciousness of the African, and his increasing 
sense of his worth and autonomy'. A s he put it, 'the native is beginning 
to feel his strength from the value that is set on him for the products 
of his country and his labour by the white m a n and in future the latter 
will not be able to trade so m u c h on his simplicity and ignorance of 
the world as in the past'.63 Governor Cardew's analysis cannot be faulted 
and is equally true of most of the rebellions and guerrilla wars that occurred 
in West Africa between the late 1890s and 1914. 
T h e Y a a Asantewaa W a r 
Like the H u t Tax rebellion of 1898, the Asante uprising of 1900 was 
precipitated by the attempts of the British to consolidate their rule by 
the deposition of some of the anti-British chiefs and the appointment 
to replace them of people w h o were not traditionally qualified, and by 
the imposition of a tax, in this case 4s per head, as a war indemnity 
in 1897. But the last straw that really precipitated action was the demand 
of the British governor, Arnold Hodgson, for the Golden Stool to be 
sent to him so that he could sit on it. T h e Golden Stool was the most 
sacred object of the Asante, which they considered as the embodiment 
of their soul and a symbol of their survival as a nation. That demand, 
therefore, could not but touch off an instantaneous rebellion of nearly 
all the principal states under the leadership of the Queen of Edweso, 
Nana Yaa Asantewaa (see Plate 6.2).64 
T h e Asante forces attacked the Governor and his party w h o had to 
seek refuge in the fort at Kumasi which the Asante then besieged. W h e n 
the governor and his party escaped from the fort, the Asante fought several 
pitched battles with the British which lasted from April to November 
1900 w h e n Yaa Asantewaa was arrested and deported with other Asante 
generals to the Seychelles. 
Similar revolts, pitched battles and guerrilla warfare raged in the Ivory 
Coast in response to the brutal methods including forced labour and high 
taxation used by that cruel Governor, Angoulvant, for the consolidation 
of French rule and the exploitation of the colony. This resistance by 
the Baule which broke out in 1908 continued until 1910 when, using 
the notorious search and destroy tactics, the French suppressed all remain-
ing opposition with a brutality and wickedness unparalleled in the annals 
of African resistance (see Plate 6.5a). At the end of this, the population 
of the Baule had dropped from about 1.5 million in 1900 to about 260000 
63. ibid. 
64. For details, see J. K . Fynn in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, pp. 46-9. 
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=N nas*.:
plate 6.5(b) Chiefs surrender to Lieutenant Boudet after resisting the French conquest of
the Ivory Coast
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by .191 i.6S T h e neighbours of the Baule, the Guro , the D a n and the 
Bete held out till 1919. 
M a s s Migration 
But revolts and rebellions were not the only strategy of resistance adopted 
by West Africans from 1900 to 1914. O n e widespread method of resistance 
was mass migration in protest against the harshness of colonial rule. This 
was particularly c o m m o n in the French colonies where, unable to resort 
to armed revolt owing to the stationing of military control units in the 
annexed sector, the Africans resorted to fleeing, in order to elude the 
measures that they found so oppressive and humiliating. Thus between 
1882 and 1889, the Fulani population of the suburbs of Saint-Louis 
migrated in large numbers towards A h m a d u ' s empire. O f the 30000 Fulani 
living in the suburbs in 1882, only 10000 remained in 1889. In 1916 
and 1917 more than 12000 people left the Ivory Coast for the Gold 
Coast. Large numbers also left Senegal for T h e Gambia , Upper Volta 
for the Gold Coast, and D a h o m e y for Nigeria during the period.66 It 
should be pointed out that these rebellions and protest migrations were 
resorted to, by and large, by the rural folk and in the inland parts of 
those colonies whose direct contact with the Europeans dated only from 
the i88os and 1890s. In the coastal areas and n e w urban centres where 
the educated elite lived and where a working class was emerging, less 
violent options were resorted to. These included strikes, boycotts, 
ideological protest, the use of newspapers and, above all, the dispatch 
of petitions and delegations to the local as well as the metropolitan colonial 
governments by various societies and movements. 
Strikes 
Strikes as a weapon of protest became more c o m m o n after the First World 
W a r , but there were a few in the period before. A strike by railway 
workers on the Dakar-Saint-Louis line occurred as early as 1890; in 1891 
there was the strike of D a h o m e y w o m e n w h o were employed in the 
Cameroons; labourers went on strike for higher pay in Lagos in 1897, 
an action described by Basil Davidson as 'the first major colonial strike';67 
in 1918-19 occurred a strike of the Cotonou and Grand Popo paddlers 
in D a h o m e y ; and in 1919 the first strike of dockers at the Conakry port 
in Guinea.68 
65. J. Suret-Canale, 1971, pp. 95-103. For details of the final phase of Baule resistance, 
see T . C . Weiskel, 1980, pp. 172-210; J. Bony, 1980, pp. 17-29. 
66. A . I. Asiwaju, 1976(b). 
67. B . Davidson, 1978(b), p. 173; A . G . Hopkins, 1966(b). 
68. J. Suret-Canale, 1977, pp. 46-50. 
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Ideological protest 
Ideological protest was seen during the period under review mainly in 
the religious field: among Christians, Muslims and Traditionalists. Thus , 
as B . O . Oloruntimehin has shown, the adherents of the traditional religion 
among the Mossi of Upper Volta, the Lobi and the Bambara of French 
Sudan banded together against the spread of French culture as well as 
the Christian and Muslim religions. T h e adherents of the Islamic religion 
especially in the Western Sudan belt also revived M a h d i s m or founded 
movements such as Mouridiyya led by Shaikh A h m a d u B a m b a and the 
Hamalliyya led by Shaikh Hamallah to protest against the French 
presence.69 T h e African Christians, especially in the British West African 
colonies, also rebelled against the European domination of the churches 
and the imposition of European culture and liturgy. This resulted in 
the breakaway of these members to form their o w n messianic or millen-
arian or Ethiopian churches with distinctively African liturgies and 
doctrines. Such, for example, was the Native Baptist Church, the first 
African church formed in Nigeria in April 1888.70 
Elite associations 
M a n y clubs and associations were also formed by the educated Africans 
mainly in the urban centres as vehicles for protest against the abuse and 
iniquities of colonial systems during this period. These associations used 
newspapers, plays, tracts and pamphlets as their main weapons.7 ' Examples 
of such bodies, which acted as watch dogs of colonial rule, were the 
Aborigines Rights Protection Society ( A R P S ) formed in the Gold Coast 
in 1897, the Young Senegalese Club founded in 1910, and the Peoples 
Union and the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society formed 
in Nigeria in 1908 and 1912 respectively. T h e A R P S was easily the most 
active. It was formed to protest against the Land Bill of 1896 which 
was to give control of all so-called waste or unoccupied lands to the 
government. As a result of a delegation it dispatched to London in 1898 
which met the Secretary of State for Colonies, this obnoxious Bill was 
withdrawn. F r o m then on, the A R P S sent a series of petitions to the 
local administration as well as the Colonial Office protesting against various 
projected Bills. It sent two delegations to England, one in 1906 to demand 
the repeal of the 1894 T o w n s Ordinance and the second in 1911 to oppose 
the Forestry Bill of 1910. It was certainly the most successful of the 
mouthpieces of the elite and traditional rulers of West Africa and the 
greatest opponent of colonialism until the formation of the National 
Congress of British West Africa after the First World W a r . In French 
69. B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1973(b), pp. 32-3. 
70. E . A . Ayandele, 1966, pp. 194-8. 
71. F. Omu, 1978. 
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West Africa, the Y o u n g Senegalese Club formed in 1910 also actively 
campaigned for equal rights. 
It should be evident from this discussion that the peoples of West 
Africa devised all kinds of strategies and tactics first to oppose the establish-
ment of the colonial system and second, after the failure of their early 
efforts, to resist certain specific measures and institutions of the system. 
These various strategies and measures proved on the whole unsuccessful, 
and by the end of the period under review, colonialism had become firmly 
entrenched in the whole of West Africa. 
T h e causes of failure 
Every case of resistance and armed insurrection went d o w n to defeat, 
at least if one considers only the results at the scene of action. A n d 
yet the West Africans lacked neither courage nor military science. But 
they were at a heavy disadvantage in the face of the invaders. Apart 
from the technical superiority of their enemies' weapons, they had no 
real compensatory advantage over the conquerors. T o be sure, they had 
a better knowledge of their country, and the severity of the climate, 
which forced the Europeans to suspend operations during certain periods 
of the year, occasionally provided them with some respite. But the bulk 
of the conquering troops were Africans officered by Europeans. Hence 
these riflemen were not out of their element. Frequently the West Africans, 
like the Maghribians (see Chapter 5) did not even have the advantage 
of greater numbers. Often behind the regular troops of the invaders, there 
marched thousands of African auxiliaries from annexed or protected 
territories whose chief function was systematically to pillage the country 
in conflict with their protector so as to disrupt its internal organization. 
Moreover, the West African states never succeeded in setting up an organic 
alliance that would compel their enemies to do battle simultaneously on 
several fronts. Certain states clearly perceived the necessity for this, but 
their attempts to bring it about came to naught. Most of the resisters 
resorted to guerrilla warfare too late, when they had learned through 
defeat that neither conventional warfare nor the defensive systems of the 
'tatas' left them any chance of success in the face of enemies possessing 
weapons capable of greater destruction. T o all that must be added the 
fact, already pointed out above, that in 1890 the imperialists, by the Brussels 
Convention, reached an agreement that no further arms should be sold 
to Africans. Thereafter, the Africans encountered severe logistic problems. 
Finally, like Africans elsewhere, those of West Africa, except Samori, 
had to use outmoded weapons such as dane guns and bows and arrows 
in the face of cannon and the M a x i m gun. In the combination of all 
these factors lay the source of the African defeat. 
Looking back over this heroic period of African history, the question 
obviously suggests itself whether resistance was not 'heroic madness' or 
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a criminal attitude. These authors do not believe so. It matters little, 
from their standpoint, that the African armies should have suffered defeat 
at the hands of better equipped enemies, so long as the cause for which 
the resisters laid d o w n their lives continues to haunt the minds of their 
descendants. 
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H. A. M W A N Z I 
M u c h has been written about the African response to foreign penetration 
and eventual rule towards the end of the last century and the beginning 
of the present. Most of the discussion, if not all of it, has been centred 
on the dichotomy between resisters, w h o by implication are to be praised 
as heroes, and so-called collaborators, w h o also by implication are to be 
condemned as traitors. This classification came about as a result of the 
nationalist struggle for independence in Africa, as elsewhere in the world. 
Those involved in the movement tended to see themselves as heirs to 
a long tradition of struggle whose roots go back to the beginning of this 
century, if not earlier. It was assumed that independence was a good 
thing and to strive for it was natural. Consequently, all those w h o had 
resisted European penetration of Africa, in order to preserve its inde-
pendence, were heroes to be emulated and given an honourable place 
in the histories of the countries that had gained their independence through 
resistance to colonial rule. Put in these terms, this view is an attempt 
to use the standards of the present, with the aid of hindsight, to interpret 
the events of the past. In the colonial situation, those w h o resisted were 
described by colonial officials as short-sighted while those w h o collaborated 
were seen as far-sighted. Today, nationalist historians in East Africa con-
d e m n so-called collaborators, especially chiefs, and praise resisters.1 
A m o n g the resisters, there were also divisions. There were those w h o 
took to armed confrontation with the intruders - active resistance. T h e n 
there were those w h o , though they did not take to arms, refused to co-
operate with the intruders. This form of resistance is referred to as passive 
resistance. There has not been a similar treatment of the so-called 
collaborators. They are often put together as simply one undifferentiated 
group. 
However , as Professor A d u Boahen has correctly pointed out, it is 
a distortion of African history to see it in terms of heroes and villains. 
This approach fails to consider the prevailing circumstances under which 
various groups or individuals operated. T h e options available to them 
1 
1. G . Muriuki, 1974, p. 233. 
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and their interpretations of these options m a y have been different from 
those imposed on them by politicians and scholars alike. It makes sense, 
as Boahen has suggested, to see the events of the time and their key 
actors in terms of diplomacy, pursued independently or backed by force. 
T o appreciate the extent to which diplomacy could go, it is necessary 
to understand the socio-economic forces operating in a particular society 
at the time of the encounter. For East Africa, a survey of such factors 
in the 1890s will be an appropriate setting for the events that followed. 
But, as R . I. Rotberg and Ali Mazrui state: 'There is no gainsaying 
that the introduction of Western norms and power and accompanying 
controls was everywhere in Africa questioned by the people affected'.2 
This questioning, however, took various forms. 'The response to the in-
vasion was determined by the structure of each society at the time. Though 
all societies were determined to preserve their sovereignty, the reaction 
to invasion was not uniform.'3 Variations occurred in accordance with 
the social cohesion or otherwise of a given society. 
In the 1890s - the period that preceded European occupation of East 
Africa - the societies of the region had achieved differing stages of social 
organization.4 S o m e , such as the Baganda and the Banyoro in Uganda, 
the Banyambo in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and the W a n g a in Kenya, 
had achieved a high degree of centralized government (see Fig. 7.1). In 
such societies, response to foreign penetration tended to be dictated by 
the king or the leadership as a whole. W h a t had existed in Europe at 
one time - ' T h e religion of the king is m y religion' - sums up the attitude 
well. Other societies, such as the Nyamwez i in Tanganyika or the Nandi 
in Kenya were in the process of forming centralized governments. This 
process is often referred to as state formation. However, the vast majority 
of societies in this region did not have centralized governments. But lack 
of central governments does not imply lack of government, a mistake 
which some foreigners commenting on African societies have m a d e in 
the past. 
Again various societies had had different levels of contact with Europeans 
or Arabs, the two external forces impinging on East Africa at this time. 
O n the whole, coastal areas had had a longer contact with Europeans 
and Arabs than the interior areas. O f the interior peoples, three or four 
groups had had longer contact with the Arabs than the rest. T h e A k a m b a 
in Kenya and the Nyamwez i in Tanganyika were involved in the caravan 
trade from the interior to the coast - a phenomenon often referred to 
as long-distance trade.5 T h e Baganda as well as the W a n g a in Kenya 
had also had contact with Arabs trading in ivory and slaves prior to 
2. R . I. Rotberg and A . A . Mazrui (eds), 1970, p. xviii. 
3. M . H . Y . Kaniki in M . H . Y . Kaniki (ed.), 1980, p. 6. 
4. For a detailed discussion of Tanzanian societies before the advent of colonialism, 
see A . M . H . Sheriff in M . H . Y . Kaniki (ed.), 1980. 
5. See I. Kimambo, 1970. 
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the 1890s. Again the degree of exposure to these outside influences 
determined the type and extent of resistance put up by various societies. 
Apart from these h u m a n influences, there were ecological changes taking 
place in East Africa in the 1890s, which also affected response to foreign 
penetration. T h e whole region underwent ecological stress resulting in 
drought with consequent famines. Rinderpest epidemics also occurred.6 
Again, some societies were affected by these natural calamities more deeply 
than others. Pastoral societies, such as the Maasai of Kenya, seem to 
have been hit worst of all. A number of Maasai families such as the 
Waiyaki and Njonjo families took refuge a m o n g the neighbouring Gikuyu 
where they were to play a different role both in relation to their response 
to colonial advance and in relation to the colonial system that was conse-
quently set up, as well as to the post-colonial society.7 Others took refuge 
a m o n g the Nandi . 8 Still others were to offer their services as soldiers, 
first to King M u m i a of W a n g a a m o n g the Abaluyia as mercenaries, and, 
second, to British imperial agents as part of the expeditionary force that 
was used to conquer the country that is n o w called Kenya. This was 
especially the case against the Nandi. 9 T h e Maasai example serves to 
illustrate the kind of dislocation that had taken place among the economies 
of various societies in this general area. T h u s , colonialism came to an 
area already suffering from an economic crisis with all its attendant effects. 
T h e European Scramble for East Africa and the 
patterns of African resistance 
T h e colonialist Scramble for East Africa involved three competing powers: 
the Sultanate of Zanzibar, G e r m a n y and Britain. T h e first on the scene 
were the Arabs w h o operated from Zanzibar. Their interests both on 
the coast and in the interior were largely commercial, revolving around 
the trade in slaves and ivory. Before the 1880s and 1890s, these Arabs 
and Swahili traders were content to operate from the coast. But during 
the closing decades of the last century, Arab interests in the interior 
of East Africa began to be threatened by G e r m a n and British interests 
that had been steadily penetrating the area. In the face of this, the Arabs 
attempted to take political control of some areas in order to protect their 
commercial concessions. T h u s , they set up a colony at Ujiji on the shores 
of Lake Tanganyika; and in Buganda, they staged a coup at the expense 
of the Christians after co-operating with them to remove M w a n g a from 
the throne.10 T h e Europeans in the interior included traders and mission-
aries, all of w h o m wanted the occupation of East Africa by their h o m e 
6. W . Rodney, n.d., p. 4. 
7. G . H . Mungeam, 1970, p. 137; K . J. King, 1971(a). 
8. H . A . Mwanzi, 1977. 
9. K . J. King, 1971(a). 
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governments in order to provide them with security as well as a free 
hand to carry out their enterprises without hindrance. 
T h e methods of European advance varied from place to place. But, 
on the whole, they were characterized by the use of force combined with, 
where it was possible, diplomatic alliances with one group against another. 
Force took the form of invasions which were often also looting exercises. 
T o facilitate advance inland, railways were constructed. T h e Uganda rail-
way, linking the interior of Uganda and Kenya with the coast, reached 
the Lake Victoria basin in 1901. T h e Germans likewise started the con-
struction of railways and road networks. T h e first railway was started 
on the coast at Tanga after 1891 and reached the foothills of the Usambara 
mountains in 1905. 
T h e response in K e n y a 
African response to all this was, as already indicated, both military and 
diplomatic, though at times there was withdrawal, non-co-operation or 
passivity. T h e Nandi in Kenya , for instance, resisted militarily the construc-
tion of the railway through their territory. O f all the peoples of Kenya , 
they put up the strongest and longest military resistance to British im-
perialism; it began in the 1890s and did not end until their leader was 
murdered by the British commanders in 1905, on his way to the negotiations 
which had been treacherously arranged. That event weakened Nandi 
resistance and eventually led to the British occupation of their territory. 
That the Nandi resisted the British for over seven years was due to 
the nature of their society. Nandi society was divided into territorial units 
called pororiet. Warriors from each unit were responsible for the defence 
of the territory. For this reason, the warriors slept in a c o m m o n hut. 
This was the nearest thing to a standing army. These territorial armies 
came together under the leadership of an orgoiyot, or traditional leader. 
It was he w h o decided w h e n the army would go on a raid. T h e armies 
were linked to him through a personal representative w h o sat at each 
territorial council. Because territory rather than clan was the centre of 
Nandi social life, this meant that clan rivalry was absent. T h e result 
was a cohesive society, and it was this cohesion that gave the society 
military superiority over its neighbours. Maison writes that 'It is surprising 
that so small a tribe as the Nandi was able to terrorize m u c h larger peoples 
and to continue to do so almost with impunity for several decades.'11 
Given the social cohesion of the society as well as the confidence of the 
warriors both in themselves and in their leaders, it is not surprising that 
they became a military power to reckon with. Their military successes 
led them to believe that they were superior to other people, white m e n 
included. A s G . W . B . Huntingford noted, 'The Nandi thinks himself 
at least the equal, if not the superior of the whiteman; and any estimate 
11. A. T . Matson, 1970, p. 72. 
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of the changes brought about by the impact of our civilization must be 
considered in the light of this fact'.12 T h e Nandi successfully resisted 
this occupation for over seven years, then, because of the success with 
which the society had been knit together as a fighting force. 
This contrasts with the response of some other communities in Kenya. 
In central Kenya, for instance, each leader or group or clan reacted 
separately to this foreign intrusion.J ? A typical example was the reaction 
of Waiyaki among the Gikuyu. His parents were originally Maasai w h o , 
because of the upheavals that took place in Maasailand in the nineteenth 
century, had moved to settle in southern Gikuyuland. Here, Waiyaki had 
gained influence partly because of his contact with caravan traders. T h e 
Imperial British East Africa C o m p a n y ( I B E A C ) regarded him as the para-
mount Chief of all the Gikuyu people. But his conduct, as Muriuki has 
pointed out, 'right from the beginning demonstrated that he was genuinely 
interested in friendship with the whiteman'.1 4 H e ensured the safe passage 
of Count Teleki's expedition through southern Gikuyu and entered into 
a blood brotherhood treaty with Frederick Lugard w h o was then a company 
agent. T h e blood brotherhood ceremony was the highest expression of 
trust a m o n g the Gikuyu. After this treaty, Waiyaki allowed Lugard to 
build a fort on his land. But when later Waiyaki's requests, such as the 
possession of firearms were turned d o w n by these agents of British im-
perialism, he turned against them and stormed the company's station 
at Dagoretti. Subsequently, he again changed his tactics and m a d e an 
alliance with the foreigners in a diplomatic effort to safeguard his position, 
but he was deported. Waiyaki's behaviour illustrates the point, sometimes 
missed, that no one was a résister or a so-called collaborator all his life. 
People changed their tactics in accordance with the prevailing situation 
and probably as their understanding of the forces surrounding them 
deepened. T h e colonial situation was dynamic, not static, and so were 
the reactions of the Africans. 
Lenana of the Maasai similarly allied himself with the British by contrast 
with another section of the Maasai w h o were opposed to a foreign presence 
in their area. Often those w h o m a d e an alliance with the British were 
rewarded with posts such as chiefships in the colonial system. So Lenana, 
like m a n y others, was m a d e a paramount chief of the Maasai in Kenya. 
African resistance varied in accordance with the nature of the society 
and in accordance with h o w each community perceived the external threat 
to its sovereignty. ' s W h a t differed was the extent or otherwise of resistance. 
A s Ochieng puts it, 'practically everywhere in Kenya the imposition of 
colonial rule was resisted. Better armed and employing groups of 
12. Quoted by S. K . Arap Ng'eny, 1970, p. 109. 
13. See G . Muriuki, 1974. See also G . H . Mungeam, 1970. 
14. G . Muriuki, 1974, p. 152. 
15. R . I. Rotberg and A . A . Mazrui (eds), 1970, p. xviii. 
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mercenaries, the British imposed their authority only by violence'.16 
O n the coast, the Mazrui family resisted the take-over by the I B E A C . 
This resistance was led by M b a r u k bin Rashid w h o organized hit-and-run 
warfare against the superior weapons of the British forces. It took reinforce-
ments of Indian troops brought in by the British to defeat him. H e fled 
Tanganyika, only to fall into the hands of the Germans. T h e Mazrui 
resistance came about as a result of British attempts to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the coastal societies. After the Mazrui family had settled 
in Takarungu on the Kenya coast, they had gradually begun to extend 
their influence to many parts of the coast. They acquired, for example, 
the monopoly of buying grain from the Mijikenda people along the coast 
and had thus come to control the sale of food crops on the coast. T h e 
monopoly was resisted by the Giriama between 1877 and 1883 when 
war broke out between the two groups. T h e Mazrui were defeated. There-
after, they had come to some understanding with the Giriama whereupon 
the two communities became trading partners. T h e coming of the British 
interfered with this arrangement as well as the internal organization of 
the Mazrui society, providing one reason w h y the Mazrui resisted the 
imposition of British rule. 
W h e n in 1895, the Wali Takarungu died, the I B E A C chose their 
local friend to succeed him instead of M b a r u k w h o had a better claim 
to the throne but was k n o w n not to favour the British presence.17 It 
was for this reason that M b a r u k sought to drive the British away from 
the coast by force. 
Further inland, the A k a m b a did not like British interference in their 
affairs. T h e founding of Machakos station by the C o m p a n y in 1889 led 
to hostilities between the I B E A C and the local community. C o m p a n y 
agents looted the surrounding areas of food and property - mainly goats 
and cattle. They also interfered with religious shrines which people regarded 
as sacred. In response to this, the local population under Msiba M w e a 
organized a boycott of the I B E A C station in 1890,18 refusing to sell it 
food. Peace only prevailed when F . D . Lugard, a company agent, arrived 
to make a peace treaty which involved the signing of a 'blood-brotherhood' 
accord with the local population. 
In northern Kenya, behind Kisimayu hinterland, the Ogaden Somali, 
the Mazrui family and the A k a m b a resisted British intrusion. Again it 
took Indian reinforcements to defeat them in 1899. T h e Taita w h o had 
refused to provide porters and w h o had resisted caravan traders' inter-
ference in their country were besieged in 1897 by I B E A C troops under 
the c o m m a n d of Captain Nelson, w h o reported that they 'made a most 
determined attack . . . coming up to the guns. T h e fight lasted about 
twenty minutes and at last the enemy fled in all directions, leaving a 
16. W . R. Ochieng, 1977, p. 89. 
17. ibid., p. 90. 
18. ibid., p. 91. 
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large number of dead on the ground including M w a n g e k a . ' 1 9 Captain 
Nelson himself and eleven of his m e n were wounded by Taita poisoned 
arrows. 
Elsewhere in western Kenya, a m o n g the Abaluyia, the pattern of response 
was the same, involving military encounter as well as diplomatic alliance. 
King M u m i a of the W a n g a was particularly adept at the use of diplomacy. 
H e saw the British as an ally w h o m he could use to extend his influence 
over the whole of western Kenya, by helping him to defeat his neighbouring 
adversaries such as the Iteso and the Luo with w h o m he had been at 
loggerheads for quite some time. W a n g a kings had a tradition of employing 
mercenaries to fight for their cause. Thus , in M u m i a ' s thinking, the British 
were simply another group of mercenaries to be used. Likewise, the British 
saw in M u m i a a willing agent to help them to extend their control over 
the whole area. Indeed, the British occupation of western Kenya was 
accomplished largely through his help. This debt was freely acknowledged 
by British officials, among w h o m was Sir Harry Johnston w h o noted that 
'he [Mumia] from the very first regarded British officials and the idea 
of a British Protectorate with hearty good-will. His influence through 
all the troubled times of Uganda had done m u c h to ensure the safety 
of British communications with the east coast'.20 T h e same sentiments 
were echoed by another colonial official on the occasion of M u m i a ' s death 
in 1949. T h e then district commissioner who , with other high government 
officials, attended the burial service, concluded his speech at the ceremony 
by saying, 'so passed a great figure in the early history of East Africa'.21 
T h e response in Tanganyika 
T h e pattern of response in Tanganyika was similar to that obtaining in 
Kenya as described above, that is, it involved the use of force as well 
as diplomatic alliances.22 M b u n g a clashed with G e r m a n forces in 1891 
and in 1893 while the hinterland behind Kilwa had its armed resistance 
organized behind Hasan bin Omari . T h e M a k o n d e defied G e r m a n penetra-
tion till 189g.23 T h e Hehe, under their leader M k w a w a , clashed with 
G e r m a n forces in 1891, killing about 290.24 T h e Germans set out to 
avenge this loss. In 1894, they stormed the H e h e region and captured 
its capital. But the leader, M k w a w a , escaped. After being hunted for 
four years by his enemies, he committed suicide in order to avoid capture. 
19. Quoted in ibid., p. 24. 
20. Quoted in W . J. Eggeling, 1948, p. 199. Eggeling adds: 'Uganda has m u c h for 
which to thank M u m i a ' . 
21. Quoted in W . J. Eggeling, 1950, p. 105. 
22. For a detailed discussion of the responses of Tanzanian societies to colonial invasion 
see: A . J. T e m u , in M . H . Y . Kaniki (ed.), 1980. 
23. J. Iliffe, 1967, p. 499. 
24. J. Iliffe, 1969, p. 17; see also G . C . K . Gwassa in B . A . Ogot (ed.), 1972(a). 
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T h e coastal people of Tanganyika organized their resistance around 
the person and leadership of Abushiri.25 Socially, the coast of Tanganyika, 
like that of Kenya, had been dominated for centuries by Swahili and 
Islamic culture. Here a mixed population of Arabs and Africans inter-
married freely, and carried out local trade. Then , in the nineteenth century, 
coastal Arabs significantly increased their activities in the interior because 
of the demand for ivory and slaves. T h e result of this flourishing trade 
was the establishment of numerous new towns along the coast. T h e coming 
of the Germans threatened this trade as they sought to supplant it with 
their own. T h e local populations, especially the Arabs, resented this and 
organized a resistance. 
Abushiri, the leader of this resistance, was born in 1845 of an Arab 
father and an O r o m o ('Galla') mother. H e was a descendant of one of 
the first Arab settlers on the coast, a m e m b e r of a group w h o had come 
to regard themselves as local people. Like m a n y others, he opposed the 
influence of the Sultanate of Zanzibar on the coast and even 
advocated independence. As a young m a n , he had organized expeditions 
into the interior to trade in ivory. From the profits made, he bought 
himself a farm and planted sugar cane. H e was also engaged in a campaign 
against the Nyamwezi . This had enabled him to assemble warriors w h o 
were later to be used against the Germans. Under his leadership, the 
coastal people fired on a German warship at Tanga in September 1888 
and then gave the Germans two days to leave the coast. They later attacked 
Kilwa, killed the two Germans there, and then Bagamoyo with 8000 m e n 
on 22 September. But the Germans, w h o termed this 'the Arab revolt' 
sent out H e r m a n n von Wissman. H e reached Zanzibar in April 1889, 
attacked Abushiri in his fortress near Bagamoyo and drove him out. 
Abushiri escaped northwards to Uzigua where he was betrayed and handed 
over to the Germans who hanged him at Pangani on 15 December 1889. 
T h e coastal resistance finally collapsed when Kilwa was bombarded and 
taken by the Germans in M a y 1890.26 
These were among those w h o took to arms in Tanganyika in an effort 
to defend their independence. But the Germans, like the British in Kenya, 
were practised in the art of divide and rule by allying with one group 
against another. There were m a n y such allies. T h e Marealle and the 
Kibanga near the Tanganyikan mountains of Kilimanjaro and Usambara 
were, to name but two examples, among those w h o saw in the Germans 
an opportunity to make friends in order to defeat their enemies. These 
people, like others such as the W a n g a in Kenya, believed that they were 
using the Germans even though in the process they were made use of 
m u c h more by the Germans than perhaps they realized. T h e Arabs on 
25. A . J. T e m u in M . H . Y . Kaniki (ed.), 1980, pp. 92-9; for further discussion of 
the resistance of Abushiri, see R . D . Jackson in R . I. Rotberg and A . A . Mazrui (eds), 
1970. 
26. J. Iliffe, 1979, pp. 92-7. 
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the coast, however, were firmly in the employ of the Germans as they 
were in that of the British and they provided the first local personnel 
in the service of imperialism. 
T h e response in U g a n d a 
A similar pattern of response to British colonialism took place in Uganda 
(see Fig. 7.1). T h e period between 1891 and 1899 saw a clash between 
the forces of Kabarega, the King of Bunyoro and those of Lugard and 
other British agents. After some clashes in which Kabarega's forces were 
defeated, Kabarega turned to diplomacy. Twice he attempted to come 
to terms with Lugard, but the latter would not countenance these gestures.2 7 
M w a n g a , the Kabaka of Buganda, at times tried to intercede on behalf 
of the Bunyoro king but to no avail. Eventually, Kabarega resorted to 
guerrilla warfare, probably the first of its kind in East Africa. H e with-
drew from Bunyoro to the Lango country in the north from where he 
harassed British forces time and again. O n e of the British officials occupying 
Bunyoro at the time, Thurston, commented: 'Kabarega was at his old 
tricks - giving every possible trouble but never standing up for a fair 
fight, preferring to pursue his favourite methods of assassination. Kabarega 
caused poison to be given to a friendly chief and he died, but I have 
had the poisoner killed.'28 Thurston's description is a perfect example 
of the guerrilla tactic of withdrawing to a neighbouring country in order 
to harass occupying forces in one's o w n country. Kabarega was later joined 
in Lango by M w a n g a , but their hide-out was stormed in 1899 and both 
kings were captured and taken to Kisimayu where M w a n g a died in 1903. 
In this episode, w e have both military confrontation and diplomatic 
initiative by Kabarega and M w a n g a as will be shown in the sequel. 
Probably the greatest diplomat of all those w h o had to deal with the 
advent of imperialism in East Africa in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century was M w a n g a , the Kabaka of Buganda, which had been declared 
a British Protectorate in 1894. W h e n he ascended the throne in 1894, 
he seemed to be suspicious of Europeans, mostly missionaries at that 
time, so he sought to restrict his people's interactions with them. Those 
among the Baganda w h o had embraced the Christian faith and w h o would 
not obey his orders were put to death as traitors.29 Today, Christians 
regard them as martyrs. M w a n g a was, however, violently resisting attempts 
by British agents to take over his country even though disguised as mission-
aries. But his diplomatic ability also became apparent in the way he handled 
various, often warring religious sects. At one time, he would play the 
two Christian sects, Catholics and Protestants, against Muslims when he 
thought the latter were becoming too powerful and therefore threatening 
27. A . R . Dunbar, 1965, p. 82. 
28. Quoted by A . R . Dunbar, 1965, p. 93. 
29. R . Oliver, 1951, p. 54; see also R . P . Ashe, 1894, pp. 55-82. 
160 
plate 7.3 Mwanga (c. 1866-1903), ex-King of Buganda, and Kabarega (c. 1850-1923),
ex-King of Bunyoro, on their way to the coast and exile in the Seychelles
161
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-IQ35 
his control of the country. At another time, he would ally with Muslims 
against Catholics or Protestants or both depending on w h o he thought 
was dangerous to his rule. Thus , M w a n g a was adept at the diplomatic 
game of divide and rule, a tactic which the colonizing powers were able 
to use so effectively in controlling Africa. W h e n it was necessary, M w a n g a 
resorted to a revival of some old tradition in an attempt to drive out 
all foreigners as happened in 1888.30 O n this occasion, he intended to 
entice all foreigners and their Baganda followers to a naval parade on 
an island on Lake Victoria. There he would leave them to starve to death. 
It seems to have been a tradition of Baganda kings to carry out naval 
exercises on the lake. M w a n g a sought to do this as a trick to drive out 
foreigners. However, the plan was leaked to the foreigners w h o then staged 
a coup, deposed M w a n g a and put his brother on the throne as a kind 
of a puppet ruler. Later, however, in 1889, M w a n g a managed to regain 
his throne only to be exiled to Kisimayu, as already indicated, in 1899, 
where he died in 1903. 
There were, however, those among the Baganda w h o allied themselves 
firmly with British imperialism in what has come to be k n o w n as Baganda 
sub-imperialism with regard to the rest of Uganda. It was Baganda agents, 
especially after the 1900 Agreement, w h o were responsible for spreading 
British colonialism to the rest of the country. Notable a m o n g them was 
Kakunguru, a M u g a n d a general, w h o largely spearheaded the spread of 
British control to eastern and northern Uganda. It was he, for instance, 
w h o captured Kabarega w h e n the British decided to storm his hide-out 
in Lango country.31 T h e 1900 Agreement made the Baganda partners 
with the British in the advance of British imperialism in the area. Buganda 
became such a staging-point that m a n y of the early colonial administrators 
in Uganda were Baganda. Hatred for colonialism consequently came to 
be directed at the Baganda rather than at the colonial masters themselves. 
M a n y of the political problems that later plagued Uganda stem from 
this early partnership between the British and the Baganda. 
East Africa under colonial rule 
Having thus suppressed all opposition and resistance by the East Africans 
and having established firm control over their spheres of influence, the 
colonial powers set out to transform the region both politically, and, even 
more importantly, economically. O n e of the first economic activities was, 
as already indicated, to build railway lines both in Tanganyika to the 
Usambara and Kilimanjaro areas, and in Kenya to link the coast with 
the Lake Victoria basin. 
With the railways came European settlers. T h e aim was to orient East 
African economies towards export by making the area dependent on 
30. R . Oliver, 1951, p. 55. 
31. A . R . Dunbar, 1965, p. 96. 
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economic arrangements in Europe. In this regard, it was to be a source 
for raw materials rather than an area for industrialization. 
T h e attitude a m o n g some colonial officials as well as among white 
settlers, was that the region was there for the taking. A s the British C o m -
missioner of the East Africa Protectorate, Sir Charles Eliot put it: ' W e 
have in East Africa the rare experience of dealing with a tabula rasa, an 
almost untouched and sparsely inhabited country, where w e can do as w e 
wish, to regulate immigration and open or close the door as seems best'.32 
It is not, therefore, surprising that as commissioner, he encouraged Euro-
pean settlers to grab as m u c h land in the highlands of Kenya as possible. 
Ukambani was the first area in Kenya to be occupied by white settlers in 
the late 1890s. But of all the peoples of Kenya; the Maasai lost more land 
to white settlement than any other community. Twice land was taken from 
them,3 3 first in 1904 w h e n they were removed to a reserve in Laikipia, and 
then in 1911, when they were again removed to give room to white settle-
ment. O n both occasions, the Maasai were said by the colonial government 
to have entered into an agreement to surrender their land. However, on the 
last occasion, the Maasai challenged the decision in a British court which, 
not surprisingly, ruled against them. These so-callèd agreements ignored 
the nature of authority in Maasai land. Authority lay in the reigning age-
group. Since age-groups were not involved in the negotiations, the agree-
ments were not acceptable to the Maasai. At the same time, white settlement 
was also taking place in Tanganyika. B y 1905, there were 284 white settlers 
in Tanganyika,34 mainly in the Usambara and Kilimanjaro areas. 
F r o m the beginning, the settlers sought to dominate these colonies. 
In Kenya, for instance, they had by 1902 formed a Planters and Farmers 
Association to press for their demand to have the highlands of Kenya 
reserved for them.3 5 Though Indians had been used to construct the 
Uganda railway, they were excluded from this area. Eliot agreed with 
this demand and confined Indian settlement to land immediately along 
the railway. T h e policy of excluding Indians from the highlands was 
eventually adopted by every protectorate commissioner and colonial 
governor after Eliot. T h e response of the Indians to this was to form 
their o w n association to press for a share of the highlands. In 1907, they 
presented their case to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston 
Churchill, when he visited East Africa. However, the conflict between 
these two groups was not resolved until the 1920s. B y the beginning 
of the First World W a r , cash crops or the plantation economy in Kenya 
were firmly in the hands of white settlers w h o excluded both Africans 
and Indians from participation. This state of affairs influenced the African 
response to the white presence in Kenya. 
32. C . Eliot, 1005, p. 103. 
33. M . P . K . Sorrenson, 1968, p. 276. 
34. W . Rodney, n.d., p . 5. 
35. R . K . Tangri, 1967. 
163 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-igjs 
T h e position in Tanganyika and U g a n d a w a s different. In Tanganyika, 
beginning in the southern part of the country, Africans were encouraged, 
first by missionaries, then by colonial officials, to take to peasant production 
of cash crops, basically cotton and coffee. In addition, collective farms 
for cotton were introduced. B y 1908 Africans were producing two-thirds 
of Tanganyika's cotton exports, while by 1912, the African contribution 
accounted for over 7 0 % . 3 6 During the same period, African coffee 
production around the Kilimanjaro area had caught up with that of the 
settlers. T h e extent to which changes had taken place in Tanganyika 
can be seen in the amount of wage labour employed. It has been estimated 
that by 1931, the African wage-earning population in Tanganyika was 
172 000,37 or about one-fifth of the able-bodied male population at the 
time. O n the whole , 'economic activity in G e r m a n East Africa was at 
a higher level than in British East Africa o n the eve of the First W o r l d 
W a r . It was also m o r e varied, with a mining sector and several m a n u -
facturing sectors m a k i n g c o n s u m e r goods' . 3 8 T h u s by 1914, the organiza-
tion and utilization of labour in Tanganyika had been redirected towards 
the creation of surplus which w a s expropriated by the colonial state and 
European c o m m e r c e . A s in K e n y a , settlers in Tanganyika sought to control 
the colony and assumed a dominant role during this period. 
Probably the mos t far-reaching economic reorganization, in comparison 
with K e n y a and Tanganyika, took place in U g a n d a . T h e 1900 Agreement 
distributed land in B u g a n d a in an attempt to create a landed class that 
would be loyal to the colonial system. This land distribution led to the 
development of different class and property relations since landlords and 
tenants c a m e into existence. In addition, it w a s understood that U g a n d a 
w a s to be a country where African agricultural production predominated. 
This was one of the factors that acted as a barrier to large-scale white 
settlement, such as took place in K e n y a and Tanganyika. Unlike in K e n y a , 
but as was m o r e the case in Tanganyika, efforts were m a d e by the colonial 
regime to place the export-oriented e c o n o m y into the hands of the 
indigenous people. T h e peasant production of cash crops w a s to b e c o m e 
the mainstay of the e c o n o m y of U g a n d a . W h a t started in B u g a n d a was 
eventually extended to other parts of the colony, notably in the west 
where the climate, as in B u g a n d a , w a s favourable. B y 1907, cotton produced 
in this m a n n e r accounted for 3 5 % of all exports from U g a n d a . 3 9 Generally 
speaking, cash transactions were well entrenched in U g a n d a , as in the rest 
of East Africa, o n the eve of the First W o r l d W a r . Peasants sold their 
produce to Asian and European traders. A monetary e c o n o m y had set in 
and the grounds for further incorporation into the capitalist system had 
been laid. 
36. W . Rodney, n.d., p. 9. 
37. ibid., p. 10. 
38. ibid., p. 14. 
39. C . Ehrlich, 1957, p. 169. 
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T h e demands of the system brought Africans face to face with what 
had happened and was happening among them. These included introduc-
tion of a hut tax, labour requirements, loss of further land, lack of political 
freedom and corrosion of their culture. Various kinds of responses and 
reactions were elicited against or in acceptance according to the way each 
of these measures was experienced. 
Taxes were introduced not so m u c h as, or not entirely as a means 
of raising revenue, but as a way of forcing Africans away from their 
homes into the labour market and into the monetary economy. Labour 
was required for settler farms and for public works such as road con-
struction. T h e conditions under which Africans worked were often harsh. 
There were other influences introduced by more subtle agents of imperial-
ism such as missionaries and traders. 
Anti-colonial m o v e m e n t s in East Africa to 1914 
In these early days of colonialism, each locality responded differently, 
except in a few cases where there was co-ordinated action over a wider 
area. In Kenya, as elsewhere in East Africa, the early responses by such 
people as the Mazruis and the Nandi, were meant to protect their inde-
pendence against foreign threats. T h e subsequent responses in the interior 
of the country were meant to rid people of oppression and colonial domina-
tion. Although this was not a period of nationalist struggle in a modern 
sense, there are signs of the beginnings of it. A m o n g the L u o in western 
Kenya, protest against mission domination led to the establishment of 
an independent Church in 1910 under John Owalo . 4 0 H e had started 
as a R o m a n Catholic, then joined the Scottish Mission at Kikuyu only 
to change again and join the (Anglican) Church Missionary Society at 
Maseno. It was while at Maseno that he claimed to have received a call 
from G o d to start his o w n religion. A s B . A . Ogot puts it: 
After m u c h controversy, the P . C . Nyanza . . . authorized him to start 
his o w n mission, since his teaching was not subversive of good order 
and morality. So in 1910 Owalo founded his Nomia L u o Mission 
. . . proclaimed himself a Prophet, and denied the Divinity of Christ. 
Within the next few years, he had more than 10,000 adherents in 
the District, had built his o w n primary schools, and demanded . . . 
a secondary school free from 'undue missionary influence'.41 
T h e n in 1913 came the M u m b o cult, a movement which was against 
white domination but which used religion as an ideology. F r o m Luoland, 
it spread to the Gusii, thus showing that it had the potential of spreading 
to other parts of Kenya. T h e political content of the movement was not 
disguised. As the founder, Onyango Dande explained: ' T h e Christian 
40. M . P. K . Sorrenson, 1968, p. 280. 
41. See Chapter 26 below; see also B . A . Ogot, 1963, p. 256. 
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religion is rotten and so is its practice of making its believers wear clothes. 
M y followers must let their hair grow . . . All Europeans are your enemies, 
but the time is shortly coming when they will disappear from our country.'42 
T h e reaction of the colonial regime was to suppress this movement , as 
indeed they did to every other movement that challenged their domination. 
A similar movement to the one described above was taking place among 
the A k a m b a in eastern Kenya. Again, religion was used. It started in 
1911 when a certain w o m a n by the name of Siotume was said to be 
possessed with a spirit. However, the movement was soon taken over 
by a young m a n named Kiamba w h o turned it into a political protest 
against colonialism in Kenya . 4 3 H e formed some kind of police force 
to help him carry out his threat. H e was, however, arrested and banished. 
This event was a protest against the way in which settlers in Ukambani 
were treating their African labour force. 
O n the whole, early anti-colonial movements in Kenya, in the period 
before the First World W a r , took place in western and eastern Kenya. 
T h e Giriama on the coast took the opportunity offered by the war to 
revolt against colonial rule in 1914. They refused to be moved to provide 
land for white settlement on the coast. T h e Giriama had several times 
been involved in conflicts with the British. During the Mazrui resistance 
against the British, the former sought allies a m o n g the Giriama — their 
trading partners in the past - w h o supplied them with food. Late in 
the nineteenth century, the Giriama came into conflict with the British 
over the latter's ban on ivory hunting.44 Again in 1913, the Giriama 
resisted attempts to take away young m e n to work on European farms. 
T h e y also resisted attempts to replace their traditional council of elders 
with colonial headmen. T h e 1914 rising was therefore a culmination of 
a series of resistances. T h e British reaction was to burn d o w n houses 
and confiscate property. T h e Giriama like the Mazruis and others resorted 
to a form of guerrilla warfare, but were eventually defeated. 
Uganda was calmer than Kenya. But in 1911, the Acholi in northern 
Uganda revolted against British colonial rule.45 It was a reaction against 
labour recruitment as well as against an effort to disarm them. O n e of 
the chief concerns of colonialism was to make sure that the colonized 
were rendered helpless in the face of cruel exploitation. For this reason, 
it was important that they did not possess firearms; hence the campaign 
to collect arms and to disarm the colonized population. T h e Acholi refused 
to surrender their guns voluntarily. However, they lost the fight in the 
ensuing contest. 
T h e most serious challenge to colonial rule in East Africa during this 
42. Quoted by M . P . K . Sorrenson, 1968, p. 280. For a full discussion of the M u m b o 
cult, see B . A . Ogot and W . Ochieng in B . A . Ogot (ed.), 1972-
43. M . P . K . Sorrenson, 1968, p. 281. 
44. C . B . Smith, 1973, p. 118. 
45. A . B . Adimola, 1954. 
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period - the Majï Majï uprising - occurred in Tanganyika and it was 
one in which both religion and magic were resorted to (see Fig. 7.1). 
D r Townsend has accurately s u m m e d up the situation which characterized 
G e r m a n colonial history; pointing out that 'during the first twenty years 
of Germany's colonial history . . . the native had been most cruelly treated 
and unjustly exploited . . . Robbed of his lands, his h o m e , his freedom 
and often wantonly and cruelly of his life by the colonial adventurer, 
official or trading company, his continuous and fierce revolts were but 
the tragic witnesses to his wretchedness and helplessness.'46 T h e state 
of affairs was not confined to G e r m a n colonies. It was typical of colonialism 
in its entire period in Africa. Forced labour, taxation, harassment and 
conditions of work all combined to cause the Majï Majï uprising. However, 
the immediate cause was the introduction of a communal cotton scheme. 
People were required to work on this scheme for twenty-eight days in 
a year. But the proceeds did not go to the workers. They were paid 
such low sums that some refused to take them. This African response 
was not against growing cotton as such, which they had willingly started 
growing as a cash crop. It was a reaction against this particular scheme 
which exploited their labour and threatened the African economy by forcing 
people to leave their o w n farms to work on public ones. 
T o unite the people of Tanganyika in their challenge to the Germans, 
the leader of the movement, the prophet, Kinjikitile Ngwale, w h o lived 
at Ngarambe, m a d e use of their religious beliefs. H e taught them that 
the unity and freedom of all Africans was a fundamental principle and 
therefore that they were to unite and fight for their freedom against the 
Germans in a war which had been ordained by G o d , and that they would 
be assisted by their ancestors w h o would return to life. T o underscore 
and give concrete expression to the unity of the African people, Kinjikitile 
Ngwale built a large shrine, which he called the 'House of G o d ' and 
prepared medicinal water (majt), which, he said, could make his followers 
w h o drank it i m m u n e to European bullets. T h e movement, which lasted 
from July 1905 to August 1907, spread over an area of 26000 sq k m 
of the southern third of Tanganyika. According to G . C . K . Gwassa: 
It [Majï Majï] involved over twenty differing ethnic groups. In its 
organizational scale and ethnic variety, Majï Majï was a movement 
both different from and more complex than earlier reactions and 
resistance to the imposition of colonial rule, for the latter had usually 
been confined within ethnic boundaries. B y comparison with the 
past, Majï Majï was a revolutionary movement creating fundamental 
changes in traditional organizational scale.47 
T h e war broke out in the last week of July 1905 and the first victims 
were the founder himself and his assistant w h o were hanged on 4 August 
46. Quoted by J. Iliffe, 1969, p. 3. 
47. G . C . K . Gwassa in T . O . Ranger and I. K i m a m b o (eds), 1972, p. 202. 
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1905. H i s brother picked u p his mantle a n d a s s u m e d the title o f ' N y a m g u n i ' , 
one of the three divinities in the area, a n d continued to administer the mojí 
but it w a s ineffective. T h e ancestors did not return as promised a n d the 
m o v e m e n t w a s brutally suppressed b y the G e r m a n colonial authorities. 
T h e M a j ï M a j ï uprising w a s the first large-scale m o v e m e n t of resistance 
to colonial rule in East Africa. In the w o r d s of J o h n Iliffe it w a s 'a 
final attempt b y Tanganyika's old societies to destroy the colonial order 
b y force',48 and it w a s truly a m a s s m o v e m e n t of peasants against colonial 
exploitation. It shook the G e r m a n regime in Tanganyika w h o s e response 
w a s not just the suppression of the m o v e m e n t , but also the a b a n d o n m e n t 
of the c o m m u n a l cotton s c h e m e . T h e r e were also s o m e reforms in the 
colonial structure, especially with regard to labour recruitment and utiliza-
tion, w h i c h were designed to m a k e colonialism palatable to Africans. B u t 
the rebellion failed a n d this failure did indeed m a k e 'the passing of the 
old societies inevitable'.49 
O n the whole , between 1890 a n d 1914 dramatic changes took place 
in East Africa. Colonialism w a s imposed o n the people, violently in m o s t 
cases, even if the violence w a s somet imes disguised in the form of law. 
African responses to the initial impact c o m b i n e d military confrontation 
with diplomatic efforts in a vain attempt to preserve their independence. 
W h e r e Africans did not engage in military or diplomatic activity, they 
acquiesced or remained indifferent, except where direct d e m a n d s w e r e 
m a d e o n t h e m . T h e establishment of colonialism m e a n t the reorganization 
of the political and economic life of the people. T a x e s w e r e introduced. 
Forced labour and general deprivation of political rights were practised. 
S o m e Africans responded to these changes violently. Others acquiesced. 
In Tanganyika and U g a n d a , s o m e Africans had m o v e d to peasant pro -
duction of cash crops, particularly cotton a n d coffee. In K e n y a , Africans 
were denied the production of cash crops. T h e e c o n o m y there w a s settler-
based. Various African responses to this position have been outlined. M o r e 
were to follow in the period after the First W o r l d W a r . 
48. J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 168. 
49. ibid. 
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A. I S A A C M A N and J. VANSINA 
This chapter1 examines the changing nature of resistance to European 
rule in Central Africa from 1880 to 1914. Central Africa is defined as 
the area included in the states of Belgian Congo (now Zaire), Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia), Nyasaland (now Malawi), Angola and M o z a m -
bique. Like most regions of Africa on the eve of the Scramble, this zone 
was occupied by a host of peoples organized either in state or centralized 
political systems or in small-scale political units.2 A m o n g the first category 
were the Lunda and Luba kingdoms of the Belgian Congo, the H u m b e 
and C h o k w e states of Angola, the Mozambican kingdom of the M w e n e -
mutapa, the Undi kingdom in Nyasaland, and the numerous states founded 
by the Nguni and the Kololo in the Zambezi-Limpopo basins. A m o n g 
the latter were the Yao and lakeside Tonga of Nyasaland, the Bisa and 
Lala of Northern Rhodesia, the Sena, Tonga and Chopi of Mozambique, 
the Kisama, Bakongo and Loango of Angola, and the Loga, M o n g o , 
N g o m b e m Budja and B o w a of the Belgian Congo (see Fig. 8.1). Although 
historians m a y have overestimated the degree of turmoil and stress within 
these societies, political fragmentation, ethnic and regional particularism 
and internal conflicts between competing strata3 placed serious limitations 
on the capacity of the peoples of Central Africa to react to the Europeans. 
Despite these divisive tendencies, however, confrontation and resistance 
remained the dominant reaction to European imperialist conquest and 
occupation. 
1. This chapter was commissioned in 1975 and completed in 1976. 
2. For details, see Volume V I of this History. 
3. W e use the term 'strata' to indicate a socio-economic differentiation which existed 
in most pre-colonial Central African societies. Because of the absence of extensive field-
work analysing the organization of pre-capitalist economies and the related process of class 
formation, delineating with any certainty the actual degree of stratification in these societies 
is often impossible. There is no doubt that by the middle of the nineteenth century class 
had replaced kinship as the dominant social variable in a number of commercial societies, 
but in m a n y other cases insufficient data are available to enable one to make this distinction. 
T h e works of Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Claude Meillassoux, E m m a n u e l Terray and 
Maurice Godelier, though not in total agreement, represent an important theoretical break-
















African initiatives and resistance in Central Africa, 1880-1Q14 
Rather than merely describing the anti-colonial activity from country 
to country, w e have focused on the patterns of opposition which character-
ized the region as a whole. B y analysing African reactions in terms of 
the goals of the participants, three broad categories can be identified: 
(1) opposition or confrontation which attempted to maintain the 
sovereignty of the indigenous societies; 
(2) localized resistance which sought to ameliorate specific abuses 
imposed by the colonial regime; 
(3) rebellions which aimed to destroy the alien system which had 
generated these abuses. Although localized resistance and 
rebellions are treated as discrete analytical categories, it is im-
portant to emphasize that resisters tended to adjust their goals 
to the contemporary military and political realities. 
T h e struggle to maintain independence: the era of 
confrontation and alliance 
In the period after 1880 intensified imperialist competition a m o n g 
European nations precipitated an unprecedented invasion of Africa. T h e 
emphasis on conquest and occupation was most clearly articulated at the 
Congress of Berlin in which effective control became the accepted pre-
requisite for international recognition of European territorial holdings. 
Faced with this n e w threat to their sovereignty, the peoples of Central 
Africa reacted in a variety of ways. S o m e , such as the Lozi, engaged 
in a diplomatic delaying action while others, like the Inhambane T o n g a 
and Sena, allied with Europeans in an effort to free themselves from 
the oppressive rule of an alien African aristocracy. M a n y Central African 
states and smaller chieftaincies instead took up arms to protect their 
autonomy. Although sharing a c o m m o n goal, the opponents differed sub-
stantially in their short-term strategy, ethnic composition, scale and the 
degree of success which they achieved. 
T h e strategies of confrontation adopted by the Central Africans shared 
a c o m m o n raison d'être - to drive out the Europeans and protect their 
homelands, w a y of life and means of livelihood. While the goal of political 
independence remained paramount, m a n y African states were prepared 
tó mobilize their forces to prevent any infringement on their cultural 
autonomy or economic sovereignty. In Nyasaland, for example, the Nguni 
of G o m a n i attacked missionary stations in 1896, in part to protest against 
the debilitating effect of Christianity, while in M o z a m b i q u e the Barue 
frustrated Lisbon's efforts to incorporate them into its informal empire 
by using the Catholic Church to convert the royal family.4 Economic 
4. For a discussion of the Portuguese efforts to use Catholicism as a mechanism for 
social control, see A . Isaacman, 1973: this uses oral data to reinterpret the meaning of 
what was assumed to be a Catholic ritual. 
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encroachments also motivated a number of polities to adopt a hostile 
posture towards the European imperialists. A principal source of friction 
was the effort by European governments and their trading and missionary 
agents to undercut the middlemen position of several interior states and 
to terminate the slave trade which was no longer compatible with the 
desire of the capitalist powers for 'stable' markets and raw materials. 
During the last two decades of the century, the Yao , M a k u a , Yeke, 
Chikunda, O v i m b u n d u and C h o k w e , among others, forcefully resisted 
these alien pressures. Simultaneously m a n y peasants and agriculturalists 
fought to maintain control over the means of production and prevent 
the expropriation of their land, cattle, labour and w o m e n . 
African leaders recognized the necessity of neutralizing the European 
arms advantage if they were to survive. M a n y societies already participating 
in international trade benefited from access to the weapons market and 
had acquired vast arsenals in exchange for captives. T h e C h o k w e , 
O v i m b u n d u and Chikunda were so successful that their forces were often 
better armed than the respective Congo Free State and Portuguese troops 
w h o sought to conquer them. Other Central African peoples, previously 
not involved in extensive commercial ventures, increased their exports 
to obtain modern guns and ammunition. During the last quarter of the 
century, for example, the O v a m b o , Shangaan, and even several conserva-
tive Nguni offshoots acquired modern rifles in anticipation of a clash 
with the Europeans.5 Wherever possible, they expanded their arsenals 
through skilful diplomacy. Gaza leaders were able to play off the British 
against the Portuguese and acquire arms from the former, while B e m b a 
(Plate 8.1) militants acquired arms from the Arabs w h o feared Britain's 
growing presence.6 Other states such as Quitanghona in northern M o z a m -
bique and the Chikunda polities of the Zambezi valley even agreed to 
recognize Portugal's nominal rule in exchange for large caches of weapons 
which were ultimately used against Lisbon's forces.7 
A number of African societies also expanded their defensive capabilities 
through internal military innovations. T h e Barue developed munitions 
plants which produced powder, rifles and even components for their 
5. W . G . Clarence-Smith and R . Moorsom, 1975, pp. 372-3: examines the impact and 
response of the O v a m b o to Portuguese and South African colonialism; I. Linden, in B . 
Pachai (ed.), 1972, pp. 246-7: some interesting information on initial patterns of interaction 
between the Maseko Nguni and the British; D . L . Wheeler, 1968, pp. 585-602: an analysis 
of Gungunyane's unsuccessful efforts to maintain Shangaan independence through 
diplomacy. 
6. D . L . Wheeler, 1968, p. 591; A . D . Roberts, 1974, pp. 202-3: the best study on 
the B e m b a published to date. 
7. N . Hafkin, 1973, pp. 375^7: an important analysis of the slave trade and conservative 
resistance to the Portuguese; A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 22-49: an analysis of the various 
types of resistance movements with a special emphasis on the growing political consciousness 
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artillery.8 N e w and expansive defensive structures such as the fortified 
town of J u m b e of Kota and the aringas of the Zambezi and Luangwa 
valley were built to withstand European siege.9 Other Africans, a m o n g 
them the M a k u a , Lunda and the disparate bands w h o operated in the 
G a m b o region of southern Angola, developed guerrilla tactics that stifled 
the first imperialist advances. Around the turn of the century Barue, 
Tawara, Tonga and other Shona religious spirit mediums (svikiro) (see 
Fig. 8.1) provided divinely inspired medicines to neutralize the European 
weapons and turn their bullets into water.10 
Despite the c o m m o n commitment of some of the Africans to prevent 
foreign rule and to acquire modern weapons, the immediate tactics they 
employed varied substantially. In several cases African states reacted 
violently to the first European encroachments despite the overwhelming 
military advantage which the enemy enjoyed. Thus , the Chewa leader 
M w a s e Kasungu led his people in a futile effort against the British, 
ultimately committing suicide in 1896 rather than capitulating.11 At about 
the same time the Bihe of Angola ambushed a colonial force seeking 
to establish interior posts which would cut through their homelands, and 
the H u m b e , to the south, attacked a Portuguese force after Lisbon refused 
to pay rent for the right to maintain a small fort within its borders. ' 2 
Other African leaders sought to avoid initial confrontations in the hope 
that they could either strengthen their military capacity or negotiate a 
'just' treaty in which the sovereignty of their state would be recognized. 
For almost a decade Gungunyane (Plate 8.2) negotiated with both the 
British and Portuguese and was prepared to make a variety of concessions 
short of renouncing Shangaan independence. ' 3 T h e Barue royal family 
pursued a similar policy seeking to enlist the support of Karl Peters, 
a G e r m a n adventurer, w h o m they thought had close ties to Bismarck's 
government, while sporadic B e m b a resistance at the end of the century 
occurred only after fifteen years of diplomatic manoeuvring with Great 
8. J. de Azevedo Coutinho, 1904, pp. 46-^7: description'of Portuguese wars with the 
Barue at the turn of the twentieth century. 
9. M . D . D . Newitt, 1973, pp. 226-9: an important analysis of the powerful prazero 
families and their relations with Lisbon. The author has also published extensively on 
related matters in Race and the Journal of African History. 
10. J. Vansina, 1969, pp. 21-2. See also A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 49-74, 126-56: 
Shona uses of medicine to neutralize European weapons. 
11. R . Tangri, 1968, pp. 2-4: a summary of the initial protest patterns among Malawians. 
12. R . Pélissier, 1969, p. 67: a thoroughly documented account of the numerous wars 
which occurred in southern Angola. T h e author is currently completing a general military 
history of Angola. D . L . Wheeler, 1963, p. 334: a thorough examination of Portuguese 
colonial policy during the nineteenth century. 
13. J. J. T . Botelho, 1934, Vol. II, pp. 419-33: the standard military history of 
Mozambique. Volume II is of particular importance for the late nineteenth-century con-
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Britain.14 In the most extreme cases, states like Quitanghona in northern 
Mozambique and the Chikunda empires of the Zambezi valley willingly 
acknowledged the nominal authority of the Portuguese so long as no serious 
effort was m a d e to impose colonial rule.IS This strategy, however, 
invariably led to confrontation, since the Congress of Berlin explicitly 
demanded effective control as a pre-condition for international recognition 
of a claim to colonial possession. 
M a n y Central African societies that were unable to offer effective opposi-
tion or that failed to comprehend the implications of colonial rule sub-
mitted peacefully in the first instance but soon after rose up in an effort 
to regain their independence. This pattern of delayed confrontation 
occurred with great regularity in the Congo where the indigenous popu-
lation initially considered the agents of the Congo Free State trading 
partners and allies against the alien slavers. Only when Free State officials 
sought to impose taxes and conscript labour did the local societies recognize 
they had inadvertently yielded their autonomy. During the period between 
1885 and 1905 more than a dozen nominally 'subjugated' groups revolted 
in the lower and central Congo. ' 6 O f these, the most successful were the 
Yaka w h o effectively fought the Europeans for more than a decade before 
they were finally conquered in 1906, and the B u d ja and B o w a w h o revolted 
at the end of the century against forced labour on the rubber plantations. 
At their high point the rebels had mobilized more than 5000 workers w h o 
fought a protracted guerrilla war from their bases deep in the forest 
region. ' 7 
In addition to the variety of initial reactions, the resisters differed in 
their degree of parochialism and ethnic particularism. At one extreme 
were a number of societies, both large and small, that confronted the 
invaders without any effort to create broader alliances. In Angola the 
Bihe, H u m b e and Ganguela initially fought the aliens without the assistance 
of their neighbours w h o shared a c o m m o n hatred of the Portuguese,18 
while Lisbon benefited in M o z a m b i q u e from the intense competition 
between the Chikunda conquest states which precluded any effective 
alliance. Even the related Ngoni states were unable or unwilling to co-operate 
in the face of British expansion in Nyasaland. In the 1890s the Maseko, 
14. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 49-74; A . D . Roberts, 1974, pp. 229-92: for a fascinating 
contemporary account of Barue efforts to get German assistance, see C . [K.] Peters, 1902, 
p. 116. 
15. N . Hafkin, 1973, pp. 375^7; A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 22-48; M . D . D . Newitt, 1973, 
PP- 295-3II-
16. C . Young, 1965, p. 283 (Map 5); F . Flament et al., 1952, pp. 106-531; A . Lejeune-
Choquet, 1906, gives details about some of the smaller insurrections and a little more about 
primary resistance. See also R . Harms, 1975, pp. 73-88. 
17. F. Flament et al, 1952, pp. 162-4, 499. The territory remained under military 
occupation until 1908. Cf. M . Plancquaert, 1932, pp. 134, 138. 
18. R . Pélissier, 1969, pp. 67-72; D . L . Wheeler, 1963, p. 334. 
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G o m a n i and Mpeseni individually fought the undermanned British colonial 
force and were overwhelmed, enabling Britain to establish the Nyasaland 
colony. ' 9 T h e failure of competing factions within a given state to unify 
in the face of European incursions represented the logical extension of 
their short-sighted particularism. There are m a n y examples in which rivals 
actually assisted the imperialist powers in the hope of enhancing their 
internal position. Such divisive tendencies undercut the efforts of the 
Luba and Barue to remain autonomous.2 0 In the case of the latter, Lisbon, 
through its imperial agent, the Mozambican C o m p a n y , forced a secret 
alliance with Chipitura, a dissident m e m b e r of the Barue aristocracy. T h e 
latter agreed to recognize Portuguese sovereignty in exchange for assistance 
against his internal rival Hanga . 
Other African polities sought to overcome their limited military capacity 
by organizing broad-based multi-ethnic, anti-colonial alliances. T h e 
powerful Gaza ruler Gungunyane, for example, appealed to the Swazi 
to join the struggle against the Portuguese, while the Barue created a 
multi-ethnic network which included Tonga, Tawara and a variety of 
Shona peoples living in Southern Rhodesia (now Z i m b a b w e ) . 2 1 A s in 
the case of the Barue, such temporary unions occurred most often where 
economic, kinship or religious alliances had previously existed. T h e 
formation of the Yao confederation under Makanjuira and the M a k u a -
Swahili alliance combined all three elements, while financial considerations 
underpinned the ill-fated B e m b a - A r a b efforts at the end of the nineteenth 
century.22 Occasionally, historic rivals cast aside their animosity in an 
effort to survive, which explains the alliance of the central Lunda and 
C h o k w e against the Congo Free State's forces despite a mutual enmity 
which dated back over a generation. Similar considerations also moti-
vated the M b u r u m a Nsenga and Tawara to aid the Chikunda at the 
turn of the century and the C u a n h a m a - C u a m a t o alliance in southern 
Angola. 
Not surprisingly, a high correlation existed between the degree of ethnic 
particularism and the scale of the resistance movements. W h e r e African 
societies fought alone, the size of their army and their potential to resist 
were generally limited. T h e rapid demise of the Nguni states and the 
C h e w a of M w a s e Kasungu reflect the inherent disadvantage faced by 
isolated polities. T h e broad-based alliances were often able to field large, 
well-equipped armies and generally put up sustained resistance. T h u s , 
the forces of Makanjuira and his Y a o compatriots were estimated at 25 000 
19. J. McCracken in B . Pachai (ed.), 1972: discusses differential Nguni reaction to 
European penetration. I Linden in B . Pachai (ed.), 1972, pp. 241-4. 
20. J. Vansina, 1966, pp. 242-4: a comprehensive study of pre-colonial Central Africa 
with an emphasis on Zaire. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 49—74. 
21. P. Warhurst, 1962, p. 59. 
22. A . D . Roberts, 1974, pp. 242, 271. 
177 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935 
m e n , which was about the size of both the C u a n h a m a - C u a m a t o army 
and that of the Barue.23 
Because the resistance movements did not achieve their ultimate political 
goals, there has been a tendency to minimize or ignore their immediate 
military accomplishments and to brand them all as failures. In fact, varia-
tions in scale, access to modern weapons, and the size and preparation 
of the imperialist forces yielded a wide range of situations. While m a n y 
African polities were defeated quickly, an equally large number contained 
the initial European incursions and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. 
In southern Angola, the H u m b e and Cuamato repulsed several Portuguese 
attacks and in the battle of 1904 killed more than 300 of the 500 -man 
contingent.24 T h e Chikunda states repeatedly defeated Lisbon's dis-
organized army during the last decade of the nineteenth century while 
to the north, in Nyasaland, the Y a o kept the British colonial army at 
bay for almost five years.25 A similar situation occurred in the Congo 
where the C h o k w e inflicted heavy losses on the Force Publique for twenty 
years before : finally succumbing.26 Perhaps most successful were the 
Swahili-Makua alliance which remained outside the sphere of Portuguese 
rule until 1910, and the Cuamato and C u a n h a m a w h o were not finally 
defeated until 1915.27 
Despite these hard-won successes, all wars of independence in Central 
Africa ultimately failed. A combination of several factors, most antedating 
the Scramble, help explain.the African inability to thwart European 
advances. These include the conquest origin of m a n y of the most powerful 
states, ethnic particularism, and internal cleavages a m o n g the ruling strata 
or class and occasionally, between it and their subject population. Their 
net effect was to limit the likelihood of large-scale, broad-based and co-
ordinated anti-colonial efforts necessary to counteract the distinct advantage 
in firepower and military technology which the European imperialist forces 
enjoyed. 
African rivalries, moreover, facilitated a strategy of divide and rule 
which Harry Johnston and other colonial officials employed with consum-
mate skill. T h e annals of the struggle for the retention of the African's 
independence and sovereignty are replete with examples of Africans w h o 
not only, submitted but aided the colonial powers in" an effort to avenge 
23. E . Stokes (1966a) in E . Stokes and R . Brown (eds), 1966, pp. 267-8: examines survival 
strategy of Lozi under Lewanika; R . Pélissier, 1969, p. 103; J. de Azevedo Coutinho, 1904, 
P-43-
24. R . Pélissier, 1969, p. 79. 
25. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 22-48; E . Stokes (1966b) in E . Stokes and R . Brown (eds), 
1966, pp. 366-8: examines strategy of British and reaction of various Malawian peoples. 
26. J. Vansina, 1966, pp. 226-7. 
27. N . Hafkin, 1973, p. 384; M . D . D . Newitt, 1972(b), pp. 670-1: a discussion of 
the conflicting interests of the Portuguese and the African slave trading elite and the ultimate 
conquest of the region of Angoche. R . Pélissier, 1969, pp. 102-8. 
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past abuses perpetrated by their neighbours. T h e Inhambane Tonga and 
the Sena helped the Portuguese against their respective Shangaan and 
Barue overlords, while in the Congo a number of subject people co-operated 
with the Belgians to free themselves from Yeke and Arab rule or from 
the slave raiders. In addition, several African leaders recognized that 
alliances with the Europeans could fulfil their expansionist aspirations 
and simultaneously strengthen their o w n internal position. Such considera-
tions, for example, motivated Tippu Tib and the sons of Msiri to aid 
the Congo Free State.28 Other African societies, including some which 
initially opposed the invaders, later allied29 with them in exchange for 
material benefits and promises of improved status in the new colonial 
order. T h u s , once the Y a o were defeated, they helped to conquer the 
Mpeseni Nguni w h o , in turn, were used by the Portuguese to defeat 
the Barue. , •;/-.,-, 
Without African allies and mercenaries, it would not have been possible 
for the Europeans to impose their rule at such a minimal cost in m a n -
power. M o r e than 9 0 % of.the Portuguese armies which finally 'conquered' 
the Zambezi valley in 1902, for example, were African levies.30 Although 
not as extreme, a similar pattern existed in Angola. T o the north, the Congo 
Free State army consisted of African levies with some Zanzibari and Hausa 
mercenaries. Only, the officers were Europeans. T h e success of Harry 
Johnston's policy of divide and rule is also demonstrated by the large 
number of Africans w h o participated in the British occupation of Nyasaland 
and Northern Rhodesia. 
Early localized resistance against colonial rule and 
capitalism 
Unlike pre-colonial resistance, the major aim of which was to maintain 
independence, resistance by peasants and workers during the early 
twentieth century was directly motivated by the efforts of the colonial 
regimes to reinforce their hegemony and impose capitalist relationships 
designed to exploit the h u m a n and natural resources of Central Africa. 
Although a detailed examination and comparison of the Portuguese, British 
and Belgian colonial systems falls outside the scope of this study, it is 
28. L . Farrant, 1975, pp. 108-11; R . Slade, 1962, pp. 94-102. O n Mukunda Bantu, 
Msiri's son, see A . M u n o n g o , 1948; L . Bittremieux, 1936, pp. 69-83. H e was about to 
be swept completely aside by the Sanga. ' 
29. J. McCracken in B . Pachai (ed.), 1972,'p. 227; A . J. Dachs, 1972, in idem, pp. 288-9; 
A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 49-^74: one of the few articles which examines the motive and impact 
of collaborators. 
30. Instead of alliance, some historians would prefer the term collaboration and for a 
theoretical analysis of collaboration, see A . Isaacman and B . Isaacman, 1977, pp.'55-61. 
For the volume editor's reasons for objecting to that term, see Introduction, above. 
179 
Africa under Colonial Domination i88o-iQ35 
useful to examine their inherent abuses, which generated recurring patterns 
of localized resistance.3 ' 
T h e most immediate concern of the colonial officials was to institu-
tionalize an administrative system to control the activities of the subject 
peoples. Towards this end they removed a substantial number of unco-
operative 'traditional' rulers, thereby violating the religious and cultural 
sanctity of kingship. T o reinforce their tenuous rule, they dispatched 
African police, drawn from the ranks of mercenaries and allies, to oversee 
the activities of 'colonial chiefs' and to intimidate the local population. 
Given their desire for self-aggrandizement and their monopoly of power, 
it is hardly surprising that members of the Force Publique of the Congo, 
the 'Guerras Prêtas' of Angola, the Sepáis of Mozambique , and the British 
Native Police of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland engaged in predatory 
activities and repeatedly abused their authority. 
T o provide a pool of cheap labour for government projects and Euro-
pean capitalist interests, the colonial powers resorted to forced labour 
practices coupled with repressive taxation. In the Congo, Africans were 
compelled to collect rubber and to work on the railways and in the mines, 
while in Mozambique a variety of multi-national concessionary companies 
were the principal beneficiaries of the forced labour. Other Mozambicans 
were exported to Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Sao T o m é . In 
Sao T o m é , on the cocoa plantations, they were joined by thousands of 
Angolans. Although the details differed, this pattern of coercion and 
intimidation was repeated in recruiting Africans to work on the European 
plantations of Nyasaland and subsequently in the mines of Northern 
Rhodesia.32 
T h e peasants w h o remained at h o m e were not exempted from conscrip-
tion. M a n y m e m b e r s of the rural population were required by law to 
provide several weeks of free labour on public works projects or face 
immediate imprisonment. T h e y were also subject to the capricious demands 
of local officials and were often compelled to sell their produce at deflated 
prices. 
In short, Africans incurred heavy social and economic costs under 
colonial rule. Families were separated either temporarily or permanently, 
and the local peasantry lived in fear of the abuses which the Europeans 
and African mercenaries perpetrated. In the economic sphere, the export 
of an appreciable part of the labour force in m a n y areas intensified the 
31. For a discussion of the policies of the respective colonial regimes, see T . O . Ranger 
in L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1969; J. Stengers in idem; R . J. H a m m o n d in idem; 
G. J. Bender, 1978; E . Mondlane, 1969, pp. 23-58; H . Mebeelo, 1971, pp. 71-90; B . S. 
Krishnamurty in B . Pachai (ed.), 1972, pp. 384-405; A . A . Boavida, 1967; a broad overview 
of Portuguese exploitation in Angola. 
32. For a discussion of forced labour, see J. Duffy, 1967; H . W . Nevinson, 1906; 
C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972. 
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existing m a n p o w e r shortages, resulting in rural stagnation and under-
development. 
These abuses generated recurring protests by peasants and workers 
aimed at ameliorating specific grievances rather than eliminating the 
repressive system which created them. Because of its sporadic nature, m u c h 
of this local opposition has been ignored by contemporaries and historians 
alike. Nevertheless, 'day-to-day resistance', withdrawal, 'social banditry'33 
and peasant revolts constituted an important chapter in the anti-colonial 
legacy of Central Africa. 
Like the slaves in the American South, m a n y African peasants covertly 
retaliated against the repressive system. Because both groups lacked any 
significant power, direct confrontation was often not a viable strategy. 
Instead, they expressed their hostility through tax evasion, work slowdowns 
and surreptitious destruction of property. T h e dominant European popula-
tion, as in the United States, perceived these forms of 'day-to-day 
resistance' as prima facie evidence of the docility and ignorance of their 
subordinates rather than as expressions of discontent.34 
T a x evasion occurred with great frequency throughout all of Central 
Africa. Just before the arrival of the tax collector, all or part of a village 
would flee into an inaccessible region until the state official departed. In 
Northern Rhodesia, the G w e m b a Tonga were notoriously successful 
evaders, as were their Bisa and U n g a neighbours w h o fled into the Bagwelu 
s w a m p s . 3 5 This practice was so c o m m o n in M o z a m b i q u e that one official 
noted in disgust, 'It remains u n k n o w n h o w m a n y times six or more adults 
will flee from their kraal leaving only a blind, ill or elderly individual w h o 
is exempt from taxes'.36 Those Africans fortunate enough to live along 
international borders could slide back and forth across the frontier avoiding 
the tax collectors of both colonies. T h e Yaka periodically fled across the 
K w a n g o River which separated Angola and the Congo, while their 
compatriots took advantage of the unpatrolled frontier to cross into the 
French Congo where they remained until harassed by local tax officials.37 
33. This term is being retained on the insistence of the authors. T h e volume editor 
would have preferred ' c o m m a n d o activities'. 
34. For a pioneering discussion of this question, see R . A . Bauer and A . H . Bauer, 
1942, pp. 388-419. M o r e recently this theme has been discussed by such scholars as 
John W . Blasingame, Eugene Genovese and Peter Kolchin. 
35. R . I. Rotberg, 1966, p. 75: a political history of both countries with some information 
on early localized resistance to colonialism. H . S. Meebelo, 1971, pp. 97-8: an important 
study of resistance movements including localized forms rarely discussed. 
36. A . A . C . Xavier, 1889, p. 25-6: an important contemporary account of Portuguese 
rule. Includes examples of localized resistance. 
37. G . Moulaert, 1945, pp. 28-43: tells h o w in Manyanga the local population resisted 
attempts in 1885 and 1893 to delimit the border with French Congo so that the population 
could flee from porterage. A new incident in 1902 led to a diplomatic confrontation and 
the border was finally settled in 1908. Along all the borders inhabitants fled tax collectors 
or appeals for forced labour, going n o w to one side of the border, n o w to the other. Remarks 
to this effect abound in the literature and in the traditions. 
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A similar strategy was employed by disenchanted members of the rural 
populations living in the Milanje region along the Nyasaland-Mozambique 
border and in the Gaerezi Valley separating Rhodesia and Mozambique . 
T h e peasants also developed a number of techniques to avoid or minimize 
the discomforts of forced labour. In the most extreme situations, as in 
the case of the N a m w h a n a and L u n g u of Northern Rhodesia, they took 
up arms and drove the recruiters off their land.38 Labour grievances also 
precipitated the 1893-4 Manjanga insurrection in the lower Congo and 
countless uprisings in the rubber collecting areas.39 Other less dangerous 
tactics included feigned illness, work slowdowns, strikes and fleeing. In 
the Abercorn District of Northern Rhodesia colonial officials repeatedly 
complained that the Africans 'loafed and systematically had to be driven'. 
Ultimately, the workers ceased their labour entirely until they were 
guaranteed a salary.40 T h e lack of co-operation and the high rate of 
absenteeism convinced European officials of the inherently slothful nature 
of the Africans. O n e Portuguese administrator noted that 'None of them 
flee on account of bad treatment, nor do they have the slightest other 
justifiable reason . . . Thus , I a m left to conclude that the great reluctance 
which almost all of them exhibit towards work has been the sole cause 
of their fleeing the services in question.'41 
Other disgruntled workers sabotaged agricultural equipment, burned 
warehouses and robbed stores belonging to the concessionary companies 
and local traders, and destroyed transportation and communication lines. 
Flight across international borders was yet another c o m m o n expression 
of discontent. Although the clandestine nature of the exodus precludes 
any accurate assessment they appear to have been rather large in scale. 
Official British records indicate that more than 50000 Africans living in 
the Zambezi valley fled into Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 
1895 and 1907 in the misguided hope that British colonialism would be 
more benign.42 T h e existence of a c o m m o n or related ethnic group on 
either side of the frontier facilitated the withdrawal of the O v a m b o and 
Bakongo from Angola and the Shona and C h e w a from Mozambique (see 
Fig. 8.1). In Nyasaland large numbers of lakeside Tonga and T u m b u k a 
migrated from the Rukuru watershed to outside the sphere of British control 
to avoid paying taxes;43 
Creation of refugee communities in desolate areas constituted a variant 
of the withdrawal strategy. Rather than crossing international boundaries, 
the peasants, m a n y of w h o m had refused to satisfy their 'legal' responsi-
38. H . S. Meebelo, 1971, pp. 90-1. • : .' 
39. F . Flament et al., 1952, pp. 498-9. 
40. H . S. Meebelo, 1971, pp. 95-7. 
41. Arquívo Histórico de Moçambique, Fundo do Século X X , Cx. 4-185, m . 37: Antonio 
Gomes to Sub-intendente do Governi em Macequece, 18 November 1916. 
42. C . Wiese, 1891, p. 241. - :• 
43. J. McCracken in B . Pachai (ed.), 1972, pp. 227-8. 
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bilities, created autonomous enclaves. This phenomenon occurred with 
some regularity a m o n g B e m b a dissidents w h o fled into the interior. 'Out 
of reach, the m i tanda dwellers attained a kind of independence which they 
fiercely and jealously guarded'.44 A similar pattern occurred in the G a m b o 
region of southern Angola which became a hide-out for outlaws and the 
disenchanted, in the rugged Gaerezi mountains separating Mozambique 
from Southern Rhodesia, and in the forest and mountainous areas of the 
Congo . 4 5 Although little is k n o w n about the internal organization of these 
communities, their commitment to remain free and their location in harsh 
backwater areas is strikingly similar to that of the maroon communities 
of escaped slaves in the Americas.46 
Other fugitive communities, not content just to remain outside the sphere 
of European control, adopted an aggressive posture towards the colonial 
regimes. T h e y attacked specific symbols of rural oppression - the planta-
tions, labour recruiters, tax collectors and African police — in an effort 
to protect their natal villages and kinship groups from continued harassment 
and exploitation. Like the 'social bandits' of Sicily or north-eastern Brazil, 
analysed by Eric H o b s b a w m , 4 7 the attacks were led by individuals w h o 
were not regarded as criminals by their o w n society, although they had 
violated the laws of the colonial regime. T h e best known of'social bandit' 
leaders was Mapondera w h o successfully battled Southern Rhodesian and 
Portuguese colonial forces from 1892 to 1903 while protecting the local 
peasantry from tax collectors, labour recruiters, exploitative company 
officials and abusive administrators (see Plate 8.3). Mapondera and his 
band of followers repeatedly attacked the warehouses of the Companhia 
de Zambésia and the shops of rural merchants, both of which were symbols 
of economic exploitation. T h e rebels were able to survive against over-
whelming odds because they received the constant support of the rural 
population which regularly provided them with food, ammunition and 
strategic information.48 A number of other 'social bandits' operated in 
Mozambique , including Mapondera's successor, D a m b a k u s h a m b a , M o a v e , 
and Samakungu as well as in the Huila Highlands of southern Angola, 
suggesting that this form of resistance was not u n c o m m o n and needs to 
be explored for other parts of Central Africa as well.49 Preliminary research 
suggests that a similar pattern occurred with some regularity in the Congo. 
T h e actions of Kasongo N i e m b o in Shaba province, the raids of Kiamfu 
and his Yaka followers and the L u b a support of the rebel Kwilu all seem 
to conform to the 'social bandit' model. 
O n occasion, the African levies recruited to quash local dissidents them-
44. H . S. Meebelo, 1971, pp. 102-3. 
45. R . Pélissier, 1969, p. 76. 
46. See R . S. Price, 1973, pp. 1-30. 
47. E . J. Hobsbawm, 1969. 
48. A . Isaacman, 1977. 
49. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 97-125; W . G . Clarence-Smith, 1979, pp. 82-8. 
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PLATE 8.3 Mapondera (d. 1904), a leader ofguerrilla resistance to British and Portuguese
rule in Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique, 1894-1903
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selves revolted to protest against the colonial abuses from which they were 
not entirely i m m u n e . L o w wages, harsh punishment and the capricious 
actions of their European officers generally precipitated the insurrections. 
T h e most famous mutinies occurred in the Congo Free State where the 
entire Luluabourg garrison revolted in 1895. Led by dissident non-
commissioned officers, the soldiers killed the commandant of the post in 
retaliation for his abusive rule. For more than six months the rebels 
controlled most of Kasai province but they were ultimately defeated by 
loyalist troops.50 T w o years later the bulk of the field army revolted.51 
While documentation about the alienation of African elements in the 
Portuguese colonial army remains extremely sketchy, several instances of 
defections to anti-colonial forces, and the 1917 Tete mutiny suggest, at 
a m i n i m u m , an undercurrent of hostility.52 
During the early colonial period, there were also numerous peasant 
revolts which tended to be relatively localized and of short duration. Rarely 
did the peasants seek to solidify their initial gains or to shift their goals 
from an attack on the symbols of their oppression to an attack on the 
colonial system as a whole. A s a rule, increased or more strictly enforced 
taxation and labour demands precipitated the uprisings. In the Zambezi 
valley between 1890 and 1905 at least sixteen different uprisings occurred. 
Most of these revolts were directed against the Companhia de M o z a m b i q u e 
and the Companhia de Zambésia to which Lisbon ceded most of central 
Mozambique . Both of these undercapitalized firms sought to maximize 
profits by imposing a heavy hut tax and exporting forced labour, policies 
which precipitated the uprisings.53 During this period there were also 
several small-scale uprisings in Angola. Peasant revolts a m o n g the IIa, 
G w e m b a Tonga and Western L u n d a during the first decade of this century 
concerned British officials in Northern Rhodesia, while in the Congo 
conservative estimates place the number of localized rural uprisings at more 
than ten per year.54 
Although most of these uprisings were amorphous, kaleidoscopic and 
parochial, in several instances participation raised the political conscious-
ness of the peasants to such a level that they subsequently joined broader-
50. T h e best account so far is M . Storme, 1961, which is but the first part of a m u c h 
longer projected study. Elements of this mutiny fought until 1908. 
51. F . Flament et al., 1952, pp . 383-460. A doctoral dissertation by Bimanyu dealing 
with this topic is expected. 
52. Rhodesian National Archives, N 3 / 2 Ó / 2 / 2 , R . N . L . B . : K a n y e m b a to Managing 
Director, R . N . L . B . , 12 M a y 1917. 
53. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 97-125. 
54. Before 1909 scattered indications are available in Le Mouvement géographique and 
La Belgique coloniale. F r o m 1909 to 1959 more precise data can be found in C h a m b r e 
des Représentants: F . Flament et al., 1952, p. 530, mentions twelve major operations in Kasai 
alone from 1893 to 1911. Kasai, however, was the area where large-scale resistance, fuelled by 
armaments from Angola, was the most pronounced. T h e Rapport gives the number of police 
operations per year. See also R . I. Rotberg, 1966, pp. 73-5; H . S. Meebelo, 1971, pp. 97-8 . 
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based anti-colonial movements. This was the case in southern M o z a m b i q u e 
where the Tonga joined Gungunyane after the tax revolt of 1894 had been 
quashed and in the Zambezi valley where Sena and Tonga peasants joined 
C a m b u e m b a in the 1898 rebellion.55 T w o decades later Tulante Alavaro 
Buta, an alienated convert to Christianity, was able to organize a mass 
movement of alienated Bakongo w h o opposed Portuguese demands for 
additional labour recruits. Ultimately, his alliance included peasants not 
only in - the Catholic north but those Bakongo recently converted to 
Protestantism in the south.56 : > 
Buta's efforts were part of an emerging pattern of protest by disenchanted 
converts to Christianity. W h e r e Africans were either unable effectively to 
express their hostility to colonialism or resented the discrimination within 
the European-dominated Protestant churches, they often formed indepen-
dent or separatist churches to remedy their grievances. A proliferation of 
these autonomous religious bodies occurred in Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia during the first decade of the twentieth century. Perhaps the 
most famous was the Ethiopian Church founded by Willie Mokalapa. 
Mokalapa and his disciples repeatedly protested against discrimination by 
European missionaries and the existence of a promotion bar which limited 
the upward mobility of skilled Africans. Their long-term goal was to 
demonstrate that Africans could direct their o w n religious and secular 
activities independently of the Europeans.57 Other church groups such 
as the Watchtower movement in Northern Rhodesia and the A M E in 
Mozambique pursued similar programmes. 
In addition to this localized resistance in the rural areas, reformist 
agitation was beginning to take place in the urban centres where educated 
Africans and mulattoes quickly learned that their training and the egali-
tarian doctrines preached by the missionaries did not preclude social, 
economic and political discrimination. T h e mulatto intellectuals of Angola, 
such as José de Fontes Pereira were among the first to vent their frustration 
and hostility/Having adopted Portuguese culture in tot0, they were dis-
mayed at the growing racism that accompanied the influex of European im-
migrants at the end of the nineteenth century. In an effort to protect their 
privileged status, they published long editorials and essays bemoaning 
their declining position, while simultaneously urging Lisbon to guarantee 
their rights and to end the flagrant exploitation of the Africans. These 
expressions of discontent proved futile and in 1906 they organized the 
first mulatto association to lobby for their rights. Four years later, a union 
of mulatto intellectuals throughout the Portuguese colonies was formed.58 
55. J. de Azevedo Coutinho, 1904, pp. 28-30; A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 126-56. 
56. D . L . Wheeler and R . Pélíssier, 1971, pp. 89-90; J. Marcum, 1969, pp. 53-4.' 
57. T . O . Ranger, 1965; R . I. Rotberg, 1966, pp. 58-60. 
58. D . L . Wheeler and R . Pélissier, 1971, pp. 84-6, 93-8; D . Wheeler in R . Chilcote 
(ed.) 1972, pp. 67-87; J. Marcum, 1969, pp. 16-22. 
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At about the same time a small n u m b e r of reformist intellectual organiza-
tions emerged in M o z a m b i q u e . A m o n g the most important was the 
Associaçào African which published the newspaper Brado Africano, 
Mozambique's first protest journal. Like their Angolan counterpart, these 
writers were part of an emerging mulatto and African bourgeoisie which 
sought to protect their limited economic privileges and reaffirm their racial 
and cultural equality.59 
At about the same period in neighbouring Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia civil servants, teachers and other African professionals were 
organizing associations to protect their relatively privileged class position 
and to agitate for reforms within the existing colonial order. Between 1912 
and 1918 a number of such organizations, including the North Nyasa Native 
Association and the West Nyasa Association, were founded.60 These groups 
were to become a prominent force in Central African politics in the inter-
war period. 
Colonial insurrections to 1918 
Colonial insurrections can be differentiated from localized forms of 
resistance in terms of both their scale and goals. Unlike the sporadic protests 
which tended to be atomized and highly particularistic, the rebellions were 
based on mass mobilization and ethnic pluralism. T h e increased involve-
ment of an oppressed peasantry, at least in some of the uprisings, suggests 
that class considerations were also becoming an important factor. In-
extricably related to this broader base of support was a redefinition and 
expansion of goals. Protests against a particular set of grievances were 
rejected in favour of a strategy designed to destroy the repressive system 
which had generated them. 
While colonial insurrections reflected both a higher level of political 
consciousness and greater alienation, they were not entirely distinct analyti-
cally from the atomized opposition which generally antedated them. Like 
the fugitive communities, they rejected reform from within, seeking 
independence rather than amelioration. Their similarity to peasant revolts 
and 'social banditry' lay in their adoption of an offensive, or confronta-
tionist, strategy. Participation in localized protests, moreover, often height-
ened the level of political consciousness, motivating m a n y Africans to 
engage in more radical anti-colonial activity. 
F r o m 1885, w h e n the first areas of Central Africa were conquered, until 
1918, there were more than twenty insurrections.61 N o n e of the five 
59. E . Mondlane, 1969, pp. 104-6: written by the deceased founder of Frelimo, this 
book attempts to place the recent liberation struggle within a broader historical framework. 
60. R . Tangri, 1968, p. 5; J. Van Velsen in E . Stokes and R . Brown (eds), 1966, 
PP' 376-7: discusses formation of associations to protect the position of the subaltern 
elite and their efforts to seek reforms within the colonial system. 
61. This represents a m i n i m u m figure which will undoubtedly be revised as further 
research is done in this subject. 
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colonies - Angola, Mozambique , Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia or the 
Congo - were spared, although the overwhelming preponderance of 
insurrections occurred in the Portuguese colonies and the Congo, where 
the combination of extremely oppressive rule and a weak administrative 
and military structure precipitated recurring revolutionary activity. 
These insurrections, although differing in detail, all faced similar 
organizational problems which, in turn, generated c o m m o n characteristics 
and placed serious constraints on their capacity to succeed. A m o n g the 
fundamental problems which had to be resolved were: finding a leader 
with the prestige, commitment and expertise to mobilize and direct a mass 
movement; determining the principles around which to organize a broad 
anti-colonial movement; and locating a source of arms and munitions. 
T h e initial unsuccessful struggles to remain independent just before the 
imposition of colonial rule had resulted in the death or removal of m a n y 
of the most respected and militant leaders. A m o n g those killed were the 
C h e w a leader M w a s e Kasungu and the Yeke ruler Msiri. Others were either 
exiled like Gungunyane, and M w e n e m u t a p a Chioco, the royal family of 
the Barue, or were replaced by more pliable members of the royal family 
as was the fate of the H u m b e ruler Tehuango and the Quitanghona leader 
Shaikh M a h m u d . T h e destruction or co-option of the historic leadership 
convinced colonial officials that they had effectively 'occupied' their respec-
tive territories which, in turn, dramatically reduced the possibility of 
subsequent uprisings. They failed, however, to recognize the continued 
legitimacy and viability of indigenous political institutions, the availability 
of alternative sources of leadership, and the commitment of m a n y Central 
African peoples to be free. 
T h e prominent role played by a number of royal families in the insur-
rections challenged the generally held assumption that pronounced military 
setbacks at the time of the Scramble had undercut the position of the 
indigenous authorities. T h e sacred power inherent in the position of king-
ship and the strong anti-Portuguese sentiment among the masses enabled 
the exiled M w e n e m u t a p a ruler Chioco to organize the rebellion of 1897, 
a pattern repeated twenty years later when N o n g w e - N o n g w e returned from 
Southern Rhodesia to lead the Barue and neighbouring Zambezi peoples 
in the 1917 insurrection.62 Similarly, the Bailundu ruler Muta-ya-Kavela, 
despite his nominal acceptance of Portuguese authority, forged an anti-
colonial coalition during the 1902 rebellion and to the north the D e m b o 
ruler Cazuangonongo rose up with his supporters in 1908.63 In southern 
Angola the displaced Cuamato leader (soba) Sihetekela reasserted his 
authority and led his people into an anti-Portuguese alliance with the 
62. T . O . Ranger, 1968b, pp. 1-2; A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 156-85. 
63. D . L . Wheeler and C . D . Christensen in F . - W . Heimer (ed.), 1973, pp. 75-6; 
J. Marcum, 1969, p. 16: a very important work which includes the early twentieth-century 
antecedents of the recent war of liberation. 
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C u a n h a m a , setting the stage for the 1915 war. 6 4 Similarly, Congo Free 
State officials were dismayed to find their nominal subject the Lunda king, 
Mushidi, organizing a major rebellion which lasted from 1905 to 1909.6S 
Just as the colonial authorities failed to comprehend the resiliency of 
kingship, they also overestimated the power of their newly co-opted rulers 
- the 'colonial' chiefs - to impose requirements which violated the values 
and interests of their constituents. T h e Quitanghona rebellion of 1904, 
for example, was directed at both the Portuguese and their puppet ruler 
Said bin Amissi, w h o was overthrown in favour of the legitimate leader 
Shaikh M a h m u d . 6 6 A similar usurpation of power by a co-opted m e m b e r of 
the royal family precipitated the H u m b e rebellion of 1891.67 In other cases, 
such as in Makanga, the council of elders, reflecting the prevailing senti-
ment of their constituents, demanded that the 'colonial' chief Chinsinga 
renounce Portuguese rule or be deposed. H e reluctantly agreed to declare 
Makanga independent which led to a violent confrontation with Lisbon's 
forces.68 
Even where the legitimate leadership had been effectively removed or 
co-opted, other potential leaders emerged that enjoyed popular support. 
Often these m e n had played a prominent role in the wars of independence. 
Gungunyane's principal lieutenant and war leader Maguiguana organized 
the Shangaan insurrection of 1897.69 T h e famous mestizo soldier C a m -
buemba , whose anti-Portuguese exploits had become legendary, played 
a similar role in the Sena-Tonga rebellion which embroiled the entire lower 
Zambezi valley two years later.70 In several insurrections in the Congo 
the leadership came from commoners w h o were able to mobilize mass 
support. Kandolo, a disaffected sergeant in the Force Publique, for 
example, led a military revolt in 1897, which, unlike other mutinies, sought 
to drive out the Europeans and liberate the Congo Free State.71 
Cult priests and spirit mediums organized and sanctified a number of 
insurrections. This involvement, which antedated the colonial period, was 
a logical extension of their historic role as spiritual guardians of the h o m e -
lands. In 1909 the Tonga priest M a l u m a called for the immediate ousting 
of the colonial overlords in Nyasaland. 'The time has come for us to fight 
the white people, w e will start n o w and fight through the rainy season. 
T h e black people [will] rise and drive all the white people out of the 
64. R . Pélissier, 1969, pp. 100-1. 
65. E . Bustin, 1975, p. 48. 
66. N . Hafkin, 1973, p. 378. 
67. R . Pélissier, 1969, p. 73. 
68. A . Isaacman, 1972, pp. 132-3: an examination of the operation of the Zambezi prazos 
and the resistance of the Afro-Portuguese prazeros to Portuguese rule. 
69. T . Coelho, 1898, p. 83; J. J. T . Botelho, 1934, II, pp. 533-47. 
70. J. de Azevedo Coutinho, 1904, pp. 26-8; J. J. T . Botelho, 1921, Vol. II, pp. 549-57. 
71. F . Flament et al., 1952, p. 411. At the least, they sought to occupy the former Arab 
zone, i.e. about half of the state. 
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country'.72 M a l u m a subsequently led the Tonga into battle. Similarly, the 
M b o n a cult priests played an important leadership role in the Massingire 
rebellion of 1884, and there are suggestions that the K a n d u n d u cult officials 
were actively involved in the Bailundu rebellion of 1904.73 In the Congo, 
the cult priestess Maria Nkoie prophesied her war charms would 
neutralize European guns. With this assurance her followers began a five-
year campaign which lasted until 1921. At its high point the Ikaya rebel-
lion, named after the famous war charms, had spread throughout a vast 
region of the C o n g o . 7 4 Nowhere was religious leadership so significant 
as in the Zambezi valley. Shona spirit mediums mobilized public support 
behind the abortive rebellions of 1897, 1901 and 1904, claiming at various 
times that the divinely inspired drought, famines and cattle disease which 
threatened their economic survival, would end once the alien intruders 
had been driven away. In 1917 the spirit m e d i u m M b u y a threatened to 
withhold divine recognition from the Barue leader N o n g w e - N o n g w e 
unless he reversed his unpopular position and agreed to participate in an 
anti-colonial rebellion. Reluctantly, he agreed.75 
A s the influence of Protestant missionaries increased, several alienated 
African converts attempted to build anti-colonial movements phrased in 
revolutionary millennial doctrine. T h e most famous of these early leaders 
were K a m w a n a and John Chilembwe, both of Nyasaland. T h e former, 
a m e m b e r of the Watch to wer, prophesied that a n e w order of divinely 
sanctioned African states would begin in 1914. During the interim, 
K a m w a n a urged his 10 000 followers to purify themselves and specifically 
eschewed any violent resistance to British rule.76 While there is some un-
certainty as to Chilembwe's ultimate goal, he also envisioned a divinely 
inspired African state but, unlike K a m w a n a , he led his followers in an 
abortive and perhaps symbolic insurrection in 1915.77 In death he became 
an anti-colonial martyr whose significance exceeded his earthly accomplish-
ments. 
Like Chilembwe, almost all the leaders recognized the need to create 
alliances which transcended their local base of support. T h e unsuccessful 
wars of opposition had demonstrated that individual polities lacked the 
requisite resources to prevent European penetration. This fact was 
accurately foreseen by the leader of the Mozambican state of Makanga 
just before the 1899 rebellion. ' T h e Africans of all tribes must unite in 
good faith, in a coordinated effort to acquire large supplies of arms and 
72. Cited in R . I. Rotberg, 1966, pp. 75-6. 
73. W . Montagu-Kerr, 1886, pp. 275-6; D . L . Wheeler and C . D . Christensen in 
F . - W . Heimer (ed.), 1973, p. 75. 
74. G . Moulaert, 1945, pp. 187-8. 
75. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 126-85. 
76. G . Shepperson, and T . Price, 1958, p. 156. 
77. For the classic work about Chilembwe, see G . Shepperson and T . Price, 1958. This 
seminal study also includes important information on K a m w a n a . 
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ammunition and when w e have achieved this w e must expel all the 
Portuguese'.78 
Efforts to build broad-based revolutionary movements followed three 
general patterns. T h e first was an attempt to reactivate historical links 
with culturally related peoples in order to recruit entire polities into the 
camp of the insurgents. T h e rebels also sought to secure the assistance 
of powerful groups, which by virtue of their relative distance or past 
differences, had not been previously considered allies. Finally, the leaders 
directed economic appeals specifically at alienated peasants. All three 
organizing principles were used at various times and in different c o m -
binations to increase the scale of the rebellion and mobilize public support 
against a c o m m o n oppressor. 
Historic relations based on shared ancestry were often invoked to broaden 
the base of support. Muta-ya-Kavela benefited from the assistance of a 
number of related U m b u n d u kingdoms during the 1904 Bailundu rebellion 
in Angola, while to the south several O v a m b o chieftaincies joined with 
Cuamato groups in an insurrection three years later.79 In Mozambique , 
M w e n e m u t a p a Chioco received the aid of a n u m b e r of independent Tawara 
polities on the basis of his prestigious position as patrilineal descendant 
of Mtota, first king of the Tawara, and the Barue benefited from recurring 
marital unions with the T o n g a . 8 0 A c o m m o n ancestry, symbolized by the 
hierarchical network of spirit med iums , also helped to unify the disparate 
Shona chieftaincies in their uprisings of 1901, 1904 and 1917,81 while 
the spread of the Ikaya rebellion in the C o n g o was based on a shared 
system which facilitated the incorporation of the disparate peoples living 
along the bend of the Zaire river.82 
In search of additional allies, the leaders of the various insurrections 
often appealed to former adversaries w h o shared a c o m m o n hatred of the 
colonial system. T h e Bailundu were able to gain the support of a number 
of former subject people including the Kasongi, Civanda and Ngalanga, 
while the Shangaan benefited from the assistance of chieftaincies that they 
had alienated during their expansionist phase prior to the Scramble.83 In 
a number of cases, reconciliation occurred only after the leaders of a pro-
European group recognized the full implications of their act. T h e Lunda , 
under Mushidi, first aided the Congo Free State against the C h o k w e but, 
in a dramatic reversal in 1905, joined with their former enemies in a struggle 
78. J. Fernandes Júnior, 1955, p. 50. 
79. D . L . Wheeler and C . D . Christensen in F . - W . Heimer (ed.), 1973, p. 76; R . Pélissier, 
1969, pp. 85-7. 
80. T . O . Ranger, 1968b, pp. 1-2; A . Isaacman, 1973, pp. 395-400. 
81. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 126-85. 
82. F . Flament et al., 1952, p. 411. 
83. D . L . Wheeler and C . D . Christensen, in F . - W . Heimer (ed.), 1973, p. 76; 
J. J. T . Botelho, 1934, Vol. II, pp. 433-07-
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which was not crushed until the famine of 1910-12.84 (See Fig. 8.1.) In 
Mozambique the strategically located Sena, w h o fought on the side of the 
Portuguese in the 1901 Barue war, enthusiastically supported the Barue 
sixteen years later as part of a pan-Zambezian movement to destroy the 
repressive colonial system.85 
T h e insurgents also increased their numbers by incorporating alienated 
peasants and rural workers w h o individually opposed the continued 
demands of the colonial authorities and their capitalist allies. T h e appeal 
was not m a d e in ethnic or cultural terms nor was it necessarily directed 
at the chiefs, m a n y of w h o m had been co-opted. Instead, the rebels urged 
the economically oppressed to join the insurrection in order to eliminate 
both the abusive taxation and labour practices and the system which had 
spawned them. T h e K a m w a n a movement in Nyasaland was initially based 
on the support of the Lakeside Tonga but rapidly grew to include alienated 
Nguni, Senga and T u m b u k a peasants.86 Similarly, Chilembwe's appeal 
to the rural masses lacked ethnic overtones, addressing instead the need 
to end exploitation and create a divinely sanctioned African nation.87 T h e 
Bailundu gained adherents from a m o n g n o n - U m b u n d u peasants w h o 
suffered from forced labour and economic exploitation. In the Zambezi 
valley m a n y of the peasants w h o had previously expressed their animosity 
through localized resistance joined the recurring insurrections.88 A similar 
pattern occurred in the Congo where exploited rubber farmers precipitated 
the K u b a rebellion of io^.89 
T h e question of arms acquisition need not be examined at length. It 
suffices to say that the rebels obtained modern weapons through surrep-
titious trade agreements with European, Asian and African merchants, raids 
on European stockades, acquisitions from defecting African police and 
mercenaries, alliances with neighbouring peoples w h o were still indepen-
dent and, in some cases, construction of arms and munitions plants. While 
some of the rebels, such 3s the Barue and Cuamato, were able to build 
up relatively large arsenals, the insurgents rarely possessed the firepower 
that earlier resisters had amassed. 
Given the extremely unfavourable balance of military power and the 
expanded size of the African police and mercenary forces, it is little wonder 
that the insurrections all ultimately failed. Nevertheless, a number of them 
scored significant, though short-term, successes, challenging the commonly 
held belief in African docility. T h e Bailundu, for example, drove the 
84. E . Bustin, 1975, p. 48. 
85. This shift in allegiance is documented at great length in the Arquivos da Companhia 
de Mozambique, File 1633. 
86. G . Shepperson and T . Price, 1958, p. 156. 
87. See G . Shepperson and T . Price, 1958; G . S. M w a s e , 1967. 
88. D . L . Wheeler and C . D . Christensen in F . - W . Heimer (ed.), 1973, pp. 76-7; 
A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 126-85. 
89. T h e rubber farmers triggered the rebellion. J. Vansina, 1969, pp. 21-2. 
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Portuguese off the O v i m b u n d u highlands in 1904. Three years later the 
Portuguese suffered a similar defeat at the hands of the Cuamato in south-
ern Angola. Perhaps the greatest military accomplishment was achieved 
by the Barue and their allies w h o during the 1917 rebellion liberated the 
entire Zambezi valley for a fleeting m o m e n t . H a d it not been for the inter-
cession of 30 000 Nguni mercenaries, the rebellion would probably have 
spread to other parts of Mozambique . 
Conclusion 
This study has examined the early forms of African initiatives and resistance 
in the face of European rule. Throughout the essay w e have attempted 
to document the frequency and vigour of this anti-colonial activity. T h e 
desire of most Africans to be free was matched by the ambitions of a smaller 
group of mercenaries and allies without w h o m it would have been 
impossible for the Europeans to have imposed their rule so thoroughly. 
Thus , there existed both a tradition of confrontation and resistance and 
a tradition of co-operation. Although the political context had changed, 
the struggle between these two competing forces was to remain a vital 
factor in Central and Southern Africa during the struggle for independence 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Southern Africa on the eve of colonial rule 
W h e n discussing African respones to the European colonization of 
Southern Africa in the nineteenth century, it is important to understand 
the wider cultural and social environment in which they occurred. T h e 
major historical forces were expansionist settler colonialism, missionary 
Christianity and education, and finally, the Zulu revolution and its by-
products - the Mfecane and Nguni migrations; B y the time of the Berlin 
West African Conference (1884-5) with its feverish competition among 
European nations for colonial possessions in Africa, the Scramble between 
the British and the Afrikaners for Southern African territories had been 
going on for over seventy years. T e r m s such as 'treaty', 'sphere of 
influence', 'effective occupation', 'annexation' and 'frontier force', which 
became c o m m o n throughout the rest of Africa after the Berlin Conference, 
had been in widespread use in Southern Africa since 1815. European settlers 
in Southern Africa, unlike their counterparts in the rest of Africa, were 
from the beginning interested in establishing permanent homes in their 
n e w environment, attracted by its temperate climate, fertile agricultural 
land, cheap African labour and an abundance of minerals. 
B y 1880 there were a total of four white polities in South Africa: the 
Cape Colony and Natal, with their predominantly English-speaking white 
population of 185000 and 20000 respectively, and the South African 
Republic and Orange Free State, each with over 50000 Dutch-speaking 
whites. T h e n , on 12 September 1890, a further British colony, Mashona-
land, was established. In these five settler colonies, vast majorities of 
indigenous Africans were dominated by white minorities. For the San and 
Khoikhoi this domination had been going on for over two hundred years 
while others, such as the Xhosa, Mfengu, T h e m b u and M p o n d o peoples, 
had been subjugated to varying forms of colonial rule for nearly a century 
(see Fig. 9.1).1 
1. For African responses before the 1880s see W . M . Macmillan, 1963; C . W . DeKiewiet, 
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Under the Sand River Convention (1852), the British and Afrikaners 
had agreed not to sell firearms to Africans throughout Southern Africa. 
T h e Convention deprived the Africans of the means they needed for 
effective resistance and self-defence. 
T h u s , by the time the European nations adopted the Brussels General 
Act of 1890, forbidding the sale of firearms to Africans, whites in Southern 
Africa had for some time been attempting to implement a policy of disarm-
ing the Africans, although during the 1870s and 1880s some groups were 
able to purchase firearms with wages earned on the diamond fields. 
Additionally, the Afrikaners, English colonists and the British government 
maintained an aura of racial identity that transcended their political and 
economic differences. They felt it was in their c o m m o n interest to conquer, 
rule and exploit the Africans. T h u s , they not only acted to prevent firearms 
from passing into African hands, but generally refrained from using local 
Africans as allies in their battles against one another. All this considerably 
conditioned African initiatives and reactions and limited the options open 
to them. 
T h e Zulu revolution and its aftermath 
Added to this were the epoch-making events which had erupted throughout 
Southern Africa during the early nineteenth century. These included the 
Zulu revolution, and the Mfecane in South Africa; the Nguni migrations 
of the Ndebele into Southern Rhodesia (now Z o m b a b w e ) , the Kololo into 
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and the Nguni into Nyasaland (now 
Malawi) and Tanganyika (now Tanzania); the B e m b a activities in Northern 
Zambia; the Yao-Swahili alliance; and the slave trade in Malawi (see Fig. 
9.1). S o m e of these events spread with explosive speed and caused sudden 
changes in the political, economic, social and military systems of numerous 
African societies throughout Southern Africa. This was a period of nation-
building and political expansion which saw the strongest and most 
centralized states establish domains or spheres of influence over the weaker 
and less united ones. While countless contemporary European statesmen 
and observers regarded these far-reaching changes as mere outbursts of 
African barbarity, blood-thirstiness and heathenism, they should be seen 
rather as manifestations of political creativity which led to the emergence 
of n e w , inter-ethnic institutions and loyalties, the legacies of which are 
still visible today. 
T h o u g h creative, these far-reaching changes caused immeasurable 
destruction to h u m a n and natural resources. Natural disasters such as 
drought, epidemics and famine also often accompanied the violence and 
magnified the extent of the ensuing destruction. This continuing incidence 
of conflict and disasters created a perpetual sense of insecurity and despair 
a m o n g the small, unaggressive tributary communities, m a n y of w h o m were 
forced to adapt to living in caves or crude hilltop dwellings to avoid further 
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attacks by raiders. There arose ruling aristocracies, class distinctions and 
taxation without political representation or consultation. A s a result, there 
soon emerged rulers and ruled, oppressors and underdogs, and haves and 
have-nots. 
T h e missionary factor 
Both missionary Christianity and education were also important factors 
which determined the course and nature of African responses to colonial 
conquest. T h e missionaries had created an African class of evangelists, 
teachers, journalists, businessmen, lawyers and clerks w h o often seemed 
to accept the supposed cultural inferiority of the Africans, to accept settler 
colonialism as a fact of life and w h o admired the white m a n for his power, 
wealth and technology.2 Examples of these individuals were Tiyo Soga 
(1829^71), the first African missionary to be ordained by the United 
Presbyterian Church in Britain, founder of the Mgwali mission where he 
preached to both Africans and Europeans, and translator of John Bunyan's 
Pilgrim's Progress into Xhosa as U-Hambo Lom-Hambi, the first book 
written by an African to be published by the Lovedale Press, in 1867; 
John Langalibalele D u b e , a Methodist minister, an ardent follower of the 
black American educationalist, Booker T . Washington, founder-president 
of the Zulu Christian Industrial School, the Natal Bantu Business League 
and the first president of the African National Congress; John Tengo 
Jabavu (1859-1921), a devout Methodist, founder-editor of the English/ 
Xhosa weekly Imvo Zabantsundu; and Walter Rubusana, a Congrega-
tionalist minister and the only African ever elected to the Cape Provincial 
Council. 
Ideologically, these mission-educated Africans shared the universalism, 
utopianism and non-racialism of the missionaries and of the Aborigines' 
Protection Society. They were committed to constitutionalism, gradualism, 
and cultural assimilation as advocated by a few white liberals among the 
settlers. But they also were disciples of Booker T . Washington's doctrine 
of black economic self-determination and of his conservative politics of 
accommodation. 
Like the missionaries, they often categorized the African masses as 
'benighted people' and 'noble savages' and then assumed the responsibility 
of overhauling traditional Africa through introducing Christianity, educa-
tion, capitalism, industrialization, and the Protestant work ethic. T h e y 
generally acquiesced in colonial expansion and conquest, partly because, 
like the missionaries, they associated colonialism with Christianity and 
'civilization', and partly because they respected the 'overwhelming 
superiority' of European weapons and warfare. 
Thus , to Tiyo Soga, the Xhosa cattle-killing episode of 1857 was a 
2. For details, see D . Chanaiwa in A . M u g o m b a and M . Nyaggah (eds), 1980. 
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national suicide by his 'poor infatuated countrymen' w h o had become 
'dupes of designing impostors'. H e hoped, however, that 'this affliction 
will, in the providence of G o d , be productive of m u c h spiritual benefit 
to the Kaffirs'. H e claimed that: 'It is by terrible things that G o d sometimes 
accomplished His purposes. In the present calamities I think I see the 
future salvation of m y countrymen, both in a physical and moral point 
of view.'3 D u b e condemned the Bambata rebellion (1906-8) in his news-
paper, Hanget, lase Natal, and instead advised the Zulu to accept Christianity 
and education. Part of the reason w h y Jabavu boycotted the African 
National Congress was because he felt that the elite still needed the guiding 
leadership of white liberals. 
T h e elite was torn between its Utopian world of missionaries, humani-
tarians and white liberals, the traditionalist world of the African masses 
which it sometimes despised, and the colonialist world of settler racism, 
exploitation and oppression which determined the real life and status of 
its members . These created a moralist world of their o w n to which they 
attempted to lead both the African and settler worlds. 
Their mistake was to associate colonial conquest with the spread of 
Christianity, education and technology and then to despise African resist-
ance as heathenism and backwardness. Their condemnation of traditional 
Africa only bolstered and upheld the colonialist ideology which they 
opposed. O n the other hand, by their o w n sermons, lifestyles and beliefs, 
they helped to undermine psychologically the African's capacity to resist 
missionary-settler propaganda and in a way hindered the development of 
a truly African historical, racial and liberationist consciousness. They and 
their fellow African Christian followers either stood on the sidelines and 
watched, or took refuge in mission stations rather than join the armed 
resistance against colonial conquest and occupation. 
Models of African initiatives and reactions 
T h e above-mentioned factors significantly affected the nature and intensity 
of African responses to the encroaching European imperialism and 
colonization. Generally, there were three distinct models of initiatives and 
responses: (1) that of violent confrontation as exhibited by the Zulu, 
Ndebele, Changanana, B e m b a , Yao and Nguni; and the M a n g w e n d e , 
Makoni and Mutasa paramountcies; (2) that of protectorate or wardship 
chosen by the Sotho, Swazi, Ngwato, Tswana and Lozi, all independent, 
non-tributary states w h o sought protection from the British against the 
Zulu, Ndebele, B e m b a , the Nguni and the Boers; and (3) that of alliance 
adopted by the numerous small tributaries, raid victims and refugees such 
as the Khoikhoi, Xhosa, M p o n d o , T h e m b u , Mfengu and Hlubi in South 
Africa; the Bisa, L u n g u , Iwa and Senga in Northern Rhodesia; and the 
3. J. A . Chalmers, 1877, p. 140. 
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C e w a , Njanja, N k o n d e and Tonga in Nyasaland, in the hope of securing 
'protection, peace and security'. T h u s , there existed historical rivalries 
a m o n g the nascent and expansionist kingdoms, as Well as conflicts of interest 
amid the different cultural segments and dynasties within them. Each ruler, 
society and individual responded to the growing European intrusion in 
the context of pre-colonial, inter-regional relations and realities. 
T h e European colonizers did not fail to exploit the situation they found. 
Their study of contemporary African political systems enabled them to 
predict the forms of African reaction and resistance. T h e Zulu, Ndebele, 
Y a o and Nguni expansionism, for example, could only function smoothly, 
they found, when the aristocracies were powerful and supreme, and w h e n 
the tributary chiefs were weak and disunited, or at least felt the need for 
military protection and were confident that the ruling aristocracy could 
provide it. 
War-weariness and insecurity contributed greatly to the acceptance of 
British wardship or alliance on the part of several African polities and 
individuals. T h e y also provided pretexts for British interference in African 
affairs through offers of 'liberation' and 'protection' to the underdogs, 
'alliances' with less powerful kingdoms, and invasion of the militaristic 
ones. T h e British employed a deliberate tactic of 'divide and conquer'. 
A s a result, they exploited African rivalries, fears and weaknesses to their 
fullest advantage. 
The Zulu, Ndebele, Bemba and Yao: the politics of 
confrontation 
Violent confrontation, conquest and destruction were virtually inevitable 
for the Zulu, Ndebele, B e m b a and Y a o because they and the European 
colonizers sought to rule the same territories and the same peoples. A s 
a group, they occupied or dominated the most densely populated, fertile 
and mineral-rich lands of Southern Africa. Their interests m a d e it impos-
sible for them to compromise or coexist with the Europeans. Only the 
superior power would survive. 
T h e Zulu were the most powerful African nation south of the L i m p o p o , 
the Ndebele between the L i m p o p o and the Zambezi, the B e m b a in 
Northern Rhodesia and the Y a o in southern and northern Nyasaland 
respectively. But from the very beginning, the Zulu, Ndebele, Changana, 
Kololo and Nguni kingdoms found themselves surrounded by powerful and 
hostile neighbours: in the case of the Zulu, the Boers, British Sotho 
and Swazi; and for the Ndebele, the Boers, Portuguese, Lozi, Changan 
and Ngwato - each of these hostile neighbours capable of conquering and 
evicting them. T h e Boers and the Portuguese were uncompromising in 
their conduct of external affairs, pursuing a policy of raid and conquest. 
U p to the early 1870s, the Zulu, Ndebele, B e m b a and Yao had been 
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able to maintain their sovereignty, independence and security. They had 
also successfully resisted the intrusion of the missionaries, the European 
traders, concessionaires and labour recruiters w h o had by then reached 
the conclusion that the conquest and dismantling of these resistant African 
states was essential. They deluded themselves that Africans were yearning 
for Christianity, trade and western culture, but that the raids, tyranny and 
heathenism of their kings, administrators and soldiers were ruthlessly 
crushing 'their ambition, enterprise and desire for salvation'. Consequently, 
these outsiders adopted an attitude of conquest before Christianity and 
trade. 
The Zulu 
T h e Zulu under Cetshwayo and the Ndebele under Lobengula therefore 
decided on the strategy of confrontation using first the tactics of diplomacy 
and later those of armed resistance. In accordance with this strategy, 
Cetshwayo at first continued the isolationist, pacifist foreign policies of 
his predecessor M p a n d e . His inveterate enemies being the Transvaal Boers, 
he maintained an effective alliance with the English colonists of the Natal 
and he developed friendly relations with Theophilus Shepstone, the famous 
Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal. But when the British annexed the 
Transvaal in 1877 and m a d e Shepstone the Administrator, Cetshwayo's 
alliance system quickly collapsed. Shepstone then supported the Boers, 
w h o had crossed the Buffalo river into Zululand, pegged out farms and 
were claiming land titles. T h e n e w British High Commissioner for South 
Africa, Sir Bartle Frere, was also intent on achieving the federation of settler 
colonies.4 Shepstone convinced him that such a federation could not be 
achieved in South Africa until the military power of the Zulu nation had 
been broken, and that the very existence of the Zulu nation threatened 
the security and economic development of Natal. H e also argued that with 
the destruction of the Zulu, the Boers would be impressed that the British 
government had a sound view of race relations and the strength needed 
to enforce its decisions. 
Meanwhile, Cetshwayo had appealed to Sir Henry Bulwer, the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, to settle the Zulu-Boer border dispute. 
Sir Henry appointed a boundary commission, which reviewed the dispute, 
declared that the Boers' claims were illegal and recommended that they 
return to the Transvaal side of the river. Frere, however, was determined 
to break the power of the Zulu nation in order to achieve federation. So 
he concealed the report and recommendations of the commission until he 
had secured the pretext for invasion and received military reinforcements. 
T h e pretext came on 28 July 1878, when Mehlokazulu, Kuzulu and 
Tshekwana, chief Sirayo's sons and their uncle, Zuluhlenga, crossed the 
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Buffalo river and brought back the wives of the chief, w h o had crossed 
into Natal. Frere and Shepstone exploited this incident to the fullest 
advantage. Soon, South Africa and the Colonial Office were flooded with 
rumours of an imminent Zulu invasion of Natal. Missionaries were advised 
to leave Zululand. At this point, Shepstone and Frere began to misrepresent 
the Zulu army as a raiding and menacing force, and Cetshwayo as a blood-
thirsty tyrant. 
Frere then ordered Cetshwayo to surrender Sirayo's sons and brother 
to Sir Henry Bulwer for trial though the Zulu had never been conquered 
nor m a d e to submit to British rule. Cetshwayo proposed instead to pay 
£50 sterling and to apologize for the incident. O n 11 December 1878 Frere 
sent Cetshwayo an ultimatum. A m o n g its demands were the delivery of 
the accused along with 500 head of cattle, the disbanding of the Zulu army 
within thirty days, the admission of missionaries and the stationing of a 
British Resident in Zululand. Frere knew that no independent and self-
respecting ruler would comply with such extreme demands. 
Then , on 11 January 1879, under the c o m m a n d of Lord Chelmsford, 
a British army of over 7000 soldiers with some 1000 white volunteers and 
7000 African auxiliaries invaded Zululand from three points. O n 22 January 
the Zulu army achieved a memorable victory at the battle of Isandhlwana, 
when it killed 1600 of the invaders and turned back the assault. But on 
4 July the British forces returned and overran the Zulu nation. Cetshwayo 
was banished to Cape T o w n , and Zululand was divided into thirteen 
separate chiefdoms, which were placed under the supervision of puppet 
chiefs. These chiefs included Cetshwayo's rival, Zibhebhu, his cousin, 
H a m u , w h o had deserted to join the British forces during the war and 
John D u n n , a white m a n . T h e division of Zululand was a classic case of 
the systematic destruction of a nation achieved by the policy of divide and 
conquer. T o perpetuate this, the new chiefs were instructed to disband 
all existing military organization, prohibit the importation of arms and 
accept arbitration by the British Resident. 
T h e degree of rivalry among the chiefs was so great, however, and the 
threat of anarchy increasing so rapidly that, in an effort to 'restore order' 
within the most unstable areas of the former Zulu nation, Cetshwayo had 
to be brought back. Zibhebhu was allowed to keep his chiefdom. But soon 
civil war broke out between the forces of Cetshwayo and Zibhebhu. 
Cetshwayo died in flight at the height of the battle in 1884. T h e diminished 
Zulu nation was then placed under the leadership of Dinizulu, Cetshwayo's 
15-year-old son, whose power and authority was dependent on white 
support. T h e Zulu had at last succumbed to British control. 
The Ndebele 
F r o m 1870 to 1890 Lobengula, like Cetshwayo of the Zulu, consistently 
and successfully pursued a well-formulated diplomatic strategy to protect 
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the vital interest of the Ndebele nation. H e restricted immigration and 
informed alien whites that he was not interested in opening his country 
to them for mining or hunting. A d d e d to this, he had developed several 
tactics, such as constantly moving from one town to another, pitting one 
European nation, c o m p a n y or individual against another, and postponing 
decisions to frustrate impatient concessionaires. A s a longer-range strategy, 
he sought either military alliance or protectorate status with the British 
government to counter the G e r m a n s , Portuguese and Afrikaners, and so 
prevent uncontrolled South African colonial expansion. 
These forms of diplomatic resistance apparently worked effectively until 
1888, w h e n the South African financier, Cecil John Rhodes , convinced Sir 
Hercules Robinson, the H i g h Commissioner, and Sir Sidney Shippard, 
the Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland, to enlist the help of the 
Reverend John Smith Moffat. Moffat had left Matabeleland in 1865 after 
totally failing to convert the Ndebele. H e had ultimately b e c o m e Shippard's 
assistant commissioner. Moffat was eager to effect the colonization of the 
Ndebele to vindicate himself for his past failure. Moreover , he resented 
Mzilikazi, Lobengula and the Ndebele rulers generally for their successful 
resistance to Christianity. T h u s motivated by a combination of vengeance, 
arrogance and racism, he was keen to pave the w a y for the destruction 
of the Ndebele state.5 
Moffat chose to support Rhodes and the Chartered C o m p a n y because, 
as he noted, the C o m p a n y would inevitably bring about the conquest and 
the dismantling of the Ndebele nation 'unless history here should be 
different from history elsewhere in South Africa'. A t first, Moffat posed 
as a spiritual adviser, interested not in gold, g a m e or conquest, but in giving 
'friendly advice' to an 'old friend'. T h e 'advice' was that Lobengula should 
'ally' with the British, rather than with the Afrikaners, Portuguese or 
G e r m a n s . Moffat also led Lobengula to believe that he was doing no m o r e 
than simply renewing the old Anglo-Ndebele treaty, enacted in 1836 
between his father, Mzilikazi, and Sir Benjamin D ' U r b a n , the former 
British Governor of South Africa. S o on 11 February 1888 Lobengula 
signed what has since been canonized as 'the Moffat treaty'. U n d e r its 
terms, he promised to refrain from entering into any correspondence or 
treaty with any foreign state or power to sell, alienate, or cede, or permit 
or countenance any sale, alienation, or cession of the whole or any part 
of the said land he controlled, or u p o n any other subject, without the 
previous knowledge and sanction of H e r Majesty's H i g h Commissioner 
for South Africa.6 W i t h this treaty in force, the British occupation of 
Rhodesia began. Moffat had put both Matabeleland and Mashonaland 
squarely under the British sphere of influence. 
U n d e r the European international convention of the late nineteenth 
5. R . U . Moffat, 1969, p. 233. 
6. ibid., p. 370. 
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century, Lobengula had c o m m e n d e d himself to British colonialism. T h e 
Ndebele thereafter could deal only with the British. T h u s , their diplomatic 
options for playing European nations against one another had been 
terminated. Soon, hordes of British concessionaires and syndicates 
descended on Lobengula seeking mineral and land rights in Matabeleland 
and Mashonaland. In mercenary fashion, these zealous speculators readily 
offered h im stores of guns, ammunition, money , clothing, utensils and 
ornaments and performed all manner of services to gain his favour. 
Noting this, Rhodes dispatched R u d d , T h o m p s o n and Maguire7 to seek 
a monopolistic agreement with Lobengula, which would be used to apply 
for a royal charter to shut out other British concessionaires and syndicates. 
Rhodes wanted 'not merely local rights, shared with every casual adven-
turer, but the sole c o m m a n d of the mineral resources of the whole country'. 
O n the strength of the R u d d Concession, as the agreement is called, Rhodes's 
company occupied Mashonaland on 12 September 1890. 
T h e controversial R u d d Concession was obtained primarily by the 
conspiratorial deception of Lobengula by both British imperial officials 
and missionaries. Moffat had been sent to Matabeleland for a second time 
to condition Lobengula for the arrival of Rhodes's agents. Feigning friend-
ship and neutrality as a minister of G o d , Moffat introduced R u d d , 
T h o m p s o n and Maguire as 'honourable and upright m e n ' and endorsed 
Shippard highly. H e pleaded vigorously on their behalf during the four-
week negotiations that ensued. Thereafter, Shippard arrived with Major 
Gui ld-Adams and sixteen mounted policemen. After nine days of negotia-
tions with Lobengula, he departed, just six days before the concession was 
signed. According to Rudd's diary, by then 'almost all political matters 
had been talked out in a most friendly spirit'. 
T h e R u d d Concession consisted of two distinct and interrelated 
segments: the written segment, which was both important and advan-
tageous to the concessionaires; and the verbal, which was advantageous 
to Lobengula. U n d e r the written agreement - that is, the original draft 
of the proposals presented to Lobengula - the king granted to the conces-
sionaires complete and exclusive domain over all the metal and mineral 
resources in his kingdoms, principalities and dominions, together with full 
power to do all they deemed necessary to procure these resources. T h e 
grantees also were empowered 'to take all necessary and lawful steps' to 
exclude from competition all other persons seeking land, minerals or mining 
rights. Lobengula further agreed not to grant concessions of land or mining 
rights to any other persons or interests without the prior consent and con-
currence of the grantees. 
In return, the concessionaires agreed to pay Lobengula and his heirs 
£100 sterling per m o n t h in perpetuity. T h e y also agreed to give him 1000 
Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles and 100 000 rounds of suitable ball 
cartridges. T h e draft stipulated *hat 500 of the rifles and 50 000 of the 
7. For more details, see P. Mason, 1958; C . Palley, 1966; S. Samkange, 1967. 
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cartridges were to be delivered to Lobengula before the start of mining 
operations in the territory. T h e concessionaires also agreed 'to deliver on 
the Zambezi River a steamboat with guns suitable for defensive purposes 
upon the said river'. 
During the course of the negotiations, however, the king verbally set 
forth certain conditions which he apparently regarded prima facie as being 
thereafter an integral part of the agreement. According to H e l m , Lobengula 
thus stipulated and the concessionaires consented that: (1) the grantees 
would bring no more than ten white m e n at a time to perform mining 
work in his territories; (2) the miners would not dig in or near the towns; 
(3) the whites would 'abide by the laws of his country and in fact be as 
his people', and (4) the miners would fight in defence of the country under 
Ndebele c o m m a n d , if needed. T h e concessionaires also verbally clarified 
that by 'full power to do all things that they m a y deem necessary to win 
and procure minerals', they meant erection of dwellings to house their over-
seers, bringing and erecting the machinery they needed, and the use of 
wood and water. Unfortunately, these verbal conditions were not written 
into the final agreement, and thus, under European contractual law, were 
not enforceable parts of the agreement. 
F r o m disappointed rival concessionaires and especially from two literate 
Africans, John K u m a l o and John M a k u n g a , w h o sympathetically inter-
preted the concession, Lobengula and his indunas (councillors) learned that 
they had been cheated; that the concession had already been published 
in European newspapers and that Rhodes had already formed the company 
to occupy both Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Shock, fear and confusion 
took over the Ndebele nation as the people became aware of the full meaning 
and ramifications of the concession, and, especially, the dreadful in-
evitability of a great monarch and great nation moving towards catastrophe. 
Several of the indunas and warriors were furious, and Lobengula was 
terribly embarrassed and fearful of losing power. 
H e published notice of repudiation of the concession in the Bechuana-
landNews of February 1889. At his orders, the pro-British induna, Lotshe, 
was killed by the M b e s u regiment, together with his wives, children 
and livestock. Once he was aware of the collusion between Rhodes, the 
missionaries and the imperial officials in South Africa, he decided to appeal 
directly to the British government in England. Through letters and a 
delegation, he appealed to Queen Victoria to repudiate the treaty or to 
declare a protectorate over Matabeleland and Mashonaland. In January 
1889 he sent an official delegation to London consisting of indunas 
Motshede and Babiyance, w h o had audience with Queen Victoria and some 
leading members of the Aborigines' Protection Society. T h e indunas 
returned with royal greetings but no repudiation. Rhodes obtained his 
monopolist royal charter to colonize the area. In early 1890 his pioneers 
marched from South Africa, through Matabeleland into Mashonaland and 
hoisted the Union Jack at Salisbury on 12 September 1890. 
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F r o m September 1890 to October 1893 the Ndebele nation and settler 
colony of Mashonaland kept a wary eye on each other. A s had happened 
between the settlers and the Xhosa in the Cape as well as the settlers and 
the Zulu in Natal, it was a matter of time before the inevitable military 
showdown occurred. 
T h e whole scenario of the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893 was virtually 
a carbon copy of the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879, with Rhodes in place of 
Sir Bartle Frère, D r Leander Starr Jameson - the C o m p a n y Administrator 
of Mashonaland - in place of Shepstone, and the Victoria incident (August 
1893) for the Sirayo incident. Lobengula, like Cetshwayo, tried in vain 
to prevent the war by appealing to Jameson, Rhodes and the British govern-
ment. But by then he had no white nor African friends anywhere. T h e 
total force that invaded Matabeleland consisted of 1200 white soldiers from 
Mashonaland and South Africa — including 200 imperial troops of the 
Bechuanaland Border Police. T h e n there were 1000 African auxiliaries 
m a d e up of Shona, Mfengu, Khoikhoi, coloureds and 600 mounted Ngwato 
under the c o m m a n d of K g a m a . 
Rather than throw his estimated 20 000 soldiers in a suicidal attack against 
the well-armed settlers and their African auxiliaries, Lobengula and his 
people evacuated Matabeleland and fled northwards towards Northern 
Rhodesia. H e , like Cetshwayo, died in flight, either of smallpox or a heart 
attack. N o w leaderless, the Ndebele nation fell apart. O n e by one Ndebele 
indunas came to surrender to Jameson at the indaba (meeting) tree. T h e 
settlers immediately went about staking their n e w farms and mineral claims. 
T h e C o m p a n y expropriated 280000 Ndebele cattle, kept 240000 and 
distributed the rest to the white troopers and some of the African 
'friendlies'. 
After the conquest of Matabeleland, Britain granted the C o m p a n y the 
Matabele order-in-council, dated 18 July 1894, which empowered it to 
impose the hut tax and establish a 'Native Department' to control the 
whole colony of Southern Rhodesia. B y the end of 1895, the C o m p a n y 
had instituted an African administration modelled on those of the Cape 
Colony and Natal, including the hut tax, reservations, and passes, for the 
purposes of dispossessing the Africans of their land, livestock and minerals, 
as well as forcing them to work for the whites. 
The Ngwato, Lozi, Sotho, Tswana and Swazi initiatives 
and reaction: the model of protectorate or wardship 
Unlike the Zulu and the Ndebele, the Ngwato , Lozi, Sotho, Tswana and 
Swazi had in c o m m o n their alliances with strong humanitarian-imperialist 
missionaries of the 'government-from-London school'. These clerics were 
particularly opposed to 'the hammer-and-tongs policy of certain classes 
of colonial politicians - the conquest, spoliation and unending degradation 
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of all coloured people'.8 A m o n g these were Mackenzie for K g a m a , Setshele 
and Caseitsiwe, Casalis for Moshoeshoe and Coillard for Lewanika. These 
humanitarian missionaries were, however, only opposed to uncontrolled 
expansion by the white colonists of South Africa, especially on the part 
of the Boers and Rhodes, and to the accompanying instances of frontier 
violence and exploitation, which disrupted their earnest and successful 
work. They believed in the unquestionable superiority of the white race, 
culture and religion, and they viewed colonization, commerce and 
Christianity as inseparable allies. At the same time they also emphasized 
the need for imperial responsibility (paternal guardianship) over the 
Africans. They sought to smooth cultural contact between the colonizer 
and the colonized and to 'protect' and 'civilize' the African in an effort 
to m a k e him a more useful m e m b e r of the n e w colonial community. 
Through letters, delegations and personal appearances, they lobbied relent-
lessly with the High Commissioner, the Colonial Office and humanitarian 
groups in England to assure this 'protection'. Nyasaland became a British 
protectorate largely because of effective lobbying by the Scottish mission-
aries in their zealous efforts to defend their Christian Africans and mission 
stations at Blantyre, Banda w e and I banda against the encroachment of 
Rhodes's frontier m e n . 
A dominant characteristic of the pro-missionary rulers was their general 
political and military weakness. Their kingships had grown largely out of 
coups d'état. In 1875 K g a m a drove out Sekgoma, his father, and K g a m a n e , 
his brother, and named himself king. K g a m a n e fled with his followers and 
established his kingdom on the Transvaal side of the Limpopo river. T h e 
loyalist and conservative segments of the Ngwato, however, still remained 
loyal to the deposed Sekgoma. Thereafter, in 1884, Lewanika was also 
deposed and forced into exile at K g a m a ' s capital. H e returned in 1885 
and ousted the usurper, Tatila Akufuna. T h u s these pro-missionary kings 
had insecure positions, and were constantly faced with the imminent 
dangers of civil wars and unrest. 
Added to this, their states had barely survived the Zulu revolution and 
the Nguni subjection. N o n e the less, the Sotho and Swazi continued to be 
perennial targets of Zulu raids, while the Ngwato, Tswana, K w e n a and 
Lozi suffered the raids and invasions of the Ndebele. They were also the 
victims of land-hungry, often trigger-happy Boer 'filibusters', w h o 
launched c o m m a n d o raids on their villages, capturing livestock and seizing 
captive labourers, making frequent 'treaties of friendship' with neighbour-
ing sub-chiefs, then claiming land rights and spheres of influence. Through 
such infringements, the Zulu, Ndebele and Boers became inveterate 
enemies. 
M u c h as these kings m a y have abhorred the principles of westernization 
and colonialism, they none the less were in desperate need of foreign support 
to assure their survival. Thus , they ultimately adopted missionary alliance 
8. W . Howitt, 1969, p. 501. 
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and British (metropolitan) protection as essential instruments of policy. 
For the same reason, they turned to the missionaries for advice and spiritual 
guidance in matters relating to Europeans, and attempted to manipulate 
them to enhance their shaky internal situations. Coillard, Mackenzie and 
Casalis were the closest European friends, confidants and foreign ministers, 
of Lewanika, K g a m a and Moshoeshoe, respectively. 
Out of necessity, these kings acquiesced readily in Christianity and 
accepted protectorate status. K g a m a and Lewanika became practising 
Christians, and, like most converted doctrinaires, they occasionally proved 
to be more devout even than the missionaries. They not only abandoned 
their ancestral traditions, beliefs and rituals, but used their political offices 
to impose the tenets of western, Christian civilization on their people. Their 
spirited efforts to banish the public use of alcoholic beverages were near-
obsessive. T h e y imposed stringent liquor laws which included a ban on 
the brewing of African beer. T h e more they alienated their people by the 
enforcement of such measures, the more they were forced to rely on 
missionaries. 
In fact the connection these kings had with the missionaries lay at the 
heart of their resistance through diplomacy to those w h o sought to dis-
possess them of their lands. Through alliance with anti-Boer, anti-Zulu 
and anti-Ndebele missionaries, they were able to maintain their indepen-
dent existence up to the eve of the Scramble and subsequently w o n imperial 
protection at the expense of local, settler colonialism. These monarchs 
actively sought protectorate status, though it necessitated some restrictions 
upon their sovereignty, land rights and civil liberties. Under protectorate 
status they retained a nominal degree of self-government and enjoyed the 
defence provided by a permanent resident British police force, while their 
people were accorded the right to possess firearms provided they registered 
them. T h u s , those smaller African kingdoms which had been unable to 
prevent white settlement and economic development owing to their 
geographical location and modes of living, were granted protectorate status 
and survived, while the superior states, politically and militarily geared 
to withstand the threats of colonization, were invaded, conquered and 
dismantled. 
T h e T s w a n a 
The cases of the Tswana and the Swazi clearly illustrate this model. There 
were three major contending forces in the Scramble for Bechuanaland (now 
Botswana). These were the four Bechuanaland rulers (the rulers of the 
Kwena , the Ngwato, the Ngwaketse and the Tswana) and their missionary 
allies w h o wanted British imperial protection and trusteeship; the Transvaal 
Boers w h o looked upon Bechuanaland as their natural hinterland for land, 
livestock, minerals and labour; and the Cape colonists, represented by 
Rhodes, w h o wanted to forestall Boer expansion and alliance with the 
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G e r m a n s in South West Africa (now Namibia). T h e African rulers, like 
Moshoeshoe, sought to forestall settler colonial rule by acquiring pro-
tectorate status. W h e n alarmed by a dissident sect of the Dutch Reformed 
Church in the Transvaal - the Doppers - w h o wanted to cross through 
T s w a n a territories to Damaraland in 1876, K g a m a , king of the Ngwato 
section of the Tswana , had written to the 'Great Queen of the English 
People' requesting protection. H e wanted to k n o w the conditions for 
protection and he emphasized that the relationship would be guided by 
'Christian morality'. Furthermore, his rival brother, K g a m a n e , had settled 
in the Transvaal with his followers and was fighting with the Boers in 
the hope of gaining the Ngwato throne (see Fig. 9.1). 
T h e British were bitterly divided over Bechuanaland. T h e R h o d e s -
Robinson group wanted to eliminate the imperial factor in favour of settler 
colonialism - including joint annexation by the Cape and the Transvaal, 
which only failed because the Transvaal refused. But the Mackenzie-
Warren humanitarian-imperialist groups, like the African rulers, wanted 
to forestall settler colonialsim, because they were opposed to the brutality 
and destructiveness of settler colonialism over their Tswana Christian 
converts and church schools. Mackenzie in particular waged a very effective 
and successful campaign in South Africa and England.9 
T h e Transvaal, on the other hand, was practising the policy of expansion 
by infiltration and incorporation which Moshoeshoe was implementing 
a m o n g the southern Sotho. Individual Boers had signed bogus treaties with 
T h e Tlhaping and the Rolong of southern Bechuanaland and subsequently 
had declared the 'republics' of Stellaland at Vryburg under William V a n 
Niekerk, and of Goshen at Rooigrond under G e y V a n Pitius. T h e 
Transvaal's strategy was first to unite the 'sister republics' and then annex 
them. T h e accompanying misunderstandings over the bogus treaties 
exacerbated old African rivalries and led to wars between chiefs 
M a n k u r w a n e and M a s h a u w (Tlhaping) and between Montshiwa and 
Moshette (Rolong) in which the Boers were recruited as volunteers and 
assistants. Consequently, southern Bechuanaland was - as Mackenzie 
described it - 'the abode of anarchy, filibustering and outrage'. 
T h e n , in 1884, Britain sent Sir Charles Warren to restore law and order. 
Warren declared the southern part of Bechuanaland as a British crown 
colony, and Sir Hercules Robinson, the British High Commissioner for 
South Africa and Governor of the C a p e Colony, appointed Mackenzie as 
the n e w Deputy Commissioner, although he was soon replaced by Rhodes 
because Cape colonial public opinion objected to his 'pro-native, anti-Boer 
policy'. T h e n , after discussions with a number of Tswana chiefs, Britain 
declared a protectorate over northern Bechuanaland in 1885. U n d e r the 
charter of Rhodes's British South Africa C o m p a n y , the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate was supposed to be annexed to Southern Rhodesia, but the 
9. J. Mackenzie, 1887. 
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Tswana rulers and their missionary allies prevented that. In 1895, these 
rulers, K g a m a and Sebele, w h o had succeeded Sechele in 1892, and Bathoen 
(Ngwaketse) went to England, accompanied by London Missionary Society 
missionary, Rev. W . C . Willoughby, and through their audiences with 
Queen Victoria, the Colonial Secretary and leaders of philanthropic socie-
ties, they succeeded in retaining their protectorate status. 
T h e Swazi 
T h e Swazi did not have to deal with settler colonialism until the Great 
Trek and the founding of Natal and the Transvaal republic. B y then the 
kingdom was under Mswati. T h e society consisted of a dominant immigrant 
Nguni group to which the royal Nkosi-Dlamini dynasty belonged, and 
the indigenous Sotho people. T h e Nguni had established their rule over 
the Sotho by conquest and marriage alliance and had created a centralized, 
unified kingdom based on c o m m o n loyalty to the crown, on friendships 
and intermarriages. Like the southern Sotho and the Tswana, they had 
survived the ravages of the Zulu revolution, but were occasionally victims 
of Zulu raids. Their foreign policy was designed to secure defensive alliance 
against the Zulu. T h u s initially Mswati regarded the settlers of Natal and 
the Transvaal as well as the British government as potential allies against 
his traditional African enemies.10 
T h e settlers, on the other hand, were interested only in the land, live-
stock, labour and minerals of the Swazi. T h e Transvaal was particularly 
interested in the annexation of Swaziland in order to gain access to the 
sea through Kosi Bay. At the same time, Natal and Britain were particularly 
afraid of a German-Transvaal partnership in promoting a railway to Kosi 
Bay. But neither of them was willing to assume direct responsibility over 
Swaziland, a small area that was isolated from the larger colonies and the 
lines of communications, and where no substantial mineral discoveries had 
been made. Mswati was caught between this Boer-British Scramble. 
Furthermore, individual Boer and British settlers, traders and prospectors 
began to exert pressure upon Mswati for all kinds of concessions involving 
private ownership of land, leaseholds, trade monopolies, mining rights and 
even rights to collect revenue and customs. 
Mswati granted several concessions before his death in 1868. There was 
a succession crisis in Swaziland in which the Boers and the British 
intervened for the purposes of placing their o w n puppet in power. T h e 
Boers sent a force to defeat the other contenders and installed Mbandzeni, 
the youngest son of Mswati by his second wife, and a weak ruler w h o 
was m u c h addicted to the white man's liquor. Mbandzeni unwittingly 
granted all sorts of concessions 'of the most amazing scope, variety and 
intricacy', including some cases of land, mineral and trading monopolies 
10. J. S. M . Matsebula, 1972; R . P. Stevens, 1967. 
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which were granted to different individuals over the same area. By 1890 
there were 364 registered concessions covering almost every square yard 
of the small Swazi territory of under 10000 square miles. B y then the royal 
family was earning around £12000 sterling annually in concession fees. 
T h e granting of concessions, however, provided the Boers and the British 
with the pretext to undermine Swazi sovereignty. B y the 1880s, Mbandzeni 
was overwhelmed by the problems of law and order, of concession disputes 
between himself and the white concessionaires and a m o n g the conces-
sionaires themselves. At first he requested British protection and a British 
Resident, but the British refused. T h e n he turned to Theophilus Shepstone, 
the Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, w h o appointed his o w n son, also 
called Theophilus, in 1886 as a resident adviser to Mbandzeni in matters 
involving whites. Unwittingly, Mbandzeni authorized Shepstone to head 
a committee of fifteen elected whites and five appointed whites and in 
1888 he gave the committee a charter of rights which conferred the power 
of self-government. Most of the concessions were granted during 
Shepstone's term as resident adviser (1886-9). B u t m e white committee 
also failed to settle the concession disputes before Mbandzeni's death in 
1889, which was followed by the establishment of dual Boer-British rule 
in 1890. U n d e r the Swaziland Convention of 1890, the two powers 
established a dual provisional government committee to govern Swaziland, 
and a chief court to inquire into the validity of concessions, which confirmed 
352 of the 364 concessions. T h e committee installed N g w a n e , a 16-year-old 
son of Mbandzeni , and declared the mother, Gwamile Mduli , the queen 
regent. 
Dual rule did not work well because of the growing Boer-British rivalry 
in South Africa. Under the Convention of 1894 Britain pawned Swaziland 
to the Transvaal by conferring 'all rights of protection, legislation, juris-
diction, and administration over Swaziland' provided the Transvaal would 
not annex Swaziland. T h e queen regent and her council strongly protested 
and even sent a delegation to England, but to no avail. T h e Transvaal 
appointed a resident special commissioner in 1895, thereby supplanting 
Swazi sovereignty by settler colonialism. T h e n , under the Treaty of 
Vereeniging (1902) which ended the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902, Swazi-
land was taken over by Britain. T h e Swaziland order-in-council, proclaim-
ing the country a 'protectorate' was issued on 25 June 1903, and the South 
Africa Act of 1909 stipulated the conditions for the future transfer of Swazi-
land, Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Bechuanaland, together known as 
High Commission Territories, to the Union of South Africa. T h e transfer 
never materialized because of African opposition. 
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T h e Hlubi, Mpondomise, Bhaca, Senga, Njanja, Shona, 
Tonga, Tawara, etc., initiatives and reactions: the model 
of alliance 
Internally, each of these groups lacked the political unity and military 
strength to withstand the increasing threat of white colonialism. They were 
also without diplomatic and military alliances with their neighbours. 
Instead, they frequently raided, fought and generally distrusted each other. 
Their compositions ranged from autonomous chieftaincies to bands of 
nomadic refugees, captive slaves, and wards of either the colonialists or 
missionaries. Most were tributaries or raid victims of the Zulu, Ndebele, 
B e m b a , Y a o or Nguni. 
While some of these small groups, like the Barwe, M a n g w e n d e , Makoni 
and Mutasa paramountcies, chose armed resistance against the threat of 
colonialism as did the Xhosa, m a n y others such as the Hlubi, Mpondomise , 
Bhaca, Senga and Njanja allied themselves with the whites in the misguided 
hope of thereby assuring their protection and security. O n the whole, these 
small societies were accustomed to the diplomatic practice of switching 
allegiances and gravitating towards the stronger prevailing power, or of 
feigning non-alignment while manipulating the dominant powers to their 
o w n advantage. T h e Shona, Tonga, Tawara, Venda and N d a u had 
frequently employed these strategies throughout the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, during the rivalry between the Changamire and M w e n e -
mutapa dynasties, while the Sotho, M p o n d o , Mfengu, T h e m b u and Tonga 
had utilized similar strategies to exploit the rivalry between the Mtetwa 
and N d w a n d e confederacies. Thus m a n y of these peoples readily aligned 
themselves with the British against the Zulu, Ndebele, B e m b a , Nguni and 
Yao. Added to this, several of the small groups, such as the Mfengu, 
T h e m b u , Njanja, C e w a and Tawara, had for some time existed under strong 
military influence. As a result, they had among their people significant 
segments of Christianized, sometimes educated Africans, w h o not only 
rejected the traditional culture, but challenged the traditional leadership 
to the advantage of the colonizer. 
T h u s , by offering alliance, protection and/or liberation, the British were 
easily able to divide and conquer them. T h e y then established permanent 
white settlement in these areas. 
African initiatives and reactions, 1895-1914 
B y the late 1890s practically all the peoples of Southern Africa had been 
either fully or partly colonized and were everywhere being subjected to 
various forms of pressures, economic, political and religious. 
Before long, the hut tax, forced labour, severe suppression of traditional 
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beliefs and customs and especially land alienation were introduced. This 
foreign interference intensified in proportion to the settlers' increasing need 
for cheap indigenous labour to work on the farms and in the mines, and 
for the hut tax to meet at least part of the administrative expenses. Africans 
were compelled to vacate their homelands to make room for white settlers 
and to serve as army 'volunteers'. In Rhodesia (Northern and Southern) 
and Nyasaland, the Chartered C o m p a n y administrators simply trans-
planted the 'Native L a w s ' of South Africa. In Rhodesia, where white settle-
ment was the heaviest, the administration tolerated no obstacles to its 
economic ventures, even if these obstacles were Shona lives and rights. 
It readily commandeered Shona lands, livestock, crops and stores of food 
and subjected the Shona to forced labour to serve the interest of the settlers, 
w h o had been drawn to Mashonaland with promises of a better, easier 
and richer way of life. Above all, the colonial justice introduced was 
characterized by arbitrariness and irregularities. Coupled with all this was 
a succession of natural disasters, including epidemics of smallpox and 
rinderpest, drought and even a plague of locusts. ' ' 
T h e Africans did not of course watch these events unconcerned. In this 
atmosphere of colonialism, landlessness, destitution, oppression and 
westernization, most of them came to believe, like the Xhosa, that the 
white m a n was the cause of all their troubles. Resentment against alien 
rule engendered - during the 1890s and early 1900s - a growing attitude 
of resistance towards whites and a strong sense of unity among political 
leaders, followers, priests and even formerly hostile groups. Examples of 
such responses aimed at overthrowing the colonial system because of 
its unbearable oppression and exploitation were the Ndebele-Shona 
Chimurenga of 1896-7, the Herero revolt of 1904 and the Bambata or 
Zulu rebellion of 1906. 
T h e Ndebe le -Shona Chimurenga 
T h e Chimurenga, as the Shona termed their form of armed resistance, began 
in Matabeleland in M a r c h 1896, and in June 1896 in Mashonaland. T h e 
first casualty was an African policeman employed by the British South 
Africa C o m p a n y , killed on 20 M a r c h . 1 2 T h e first attack upon Europeans 
occurred in the town of Essexvale on 22 March, when seven whites and 
two Africans were killed. T h e Chimurenga then swiftly spread throughout 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland (see Fig. 9.1). Within a week, 130 whites 
had been killed in Matabeleland. 
Africans were armed with Martini-Henry rifles, Lee Metfords, elephant 
guns, muskets, and blunderbusses, as well as with the traditional spears, 
11. D . Chanaiwa, 1974; R . E . R . Martin, 1897; T . O . Ranger, 1967. 
12. For eyewitness account of the Chimurenga, mostly by European settlers, soldiers 
and reporters, see R . S. S. Baden-Powell, 1897; F. C . Selous, 1896; R . E . R . Martin, 1897. 
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axes, knobkerries, and bows and arrows, and they initiated the Chimurenga 
when the majority of the Company's troopers were in South Africa involved 
in mounting the Jameson Raid against the Boers. Furthermore, African 
policemen deserted the C o m p a n y with their guns and ammunition and 
joined their African comrades in such great numbers that, as a precaution, 
the remaining 'loyals' had to be disarmed. 
T h e C o m p a n y hurriedly mobilized the Europeans into the Matabeleland 
Relief Force, which consisted of imperial troops and the Rhodesia Horse 
Volunteers (settlers), as well as Africans. At its peak the force consisted 
of 2000 Europeans, 250 Ngwato sent by K g a m a , 200 'Colonial [South 
African] Natives', and about 150 Rhodesian Africans, under the supreme 
c o m m a n d of Sir Frederick Carrington, a veteran of the Xhosa-settler wars. 
Essentially, the Chimurenga was conducted as guerrilla warfare. T h e 
troopers relied on the siege and dynamite. They also destroyed crops and 
appropriated African cattle, goats, sheep, fowl and grain to starve the 
resisters, and to enrich themselves. 
In Matabeleland, the Chimurenga lasted from March to December 1896, 
and proved very costly for the Company . O n 15 July the C o m p a n y was 
forced to issue a proclamation of clemency for Africans w h o would 
surrender themselves and their arms. After the battle of Ntaba zika M a m b o 
(5 July 1896), Cecil Rhodes was 'determined to seize the first chance of 
negotiation, or to manufacture a chance if none arose'. B y then he had 
given up any hope of achieving a 'total and unconditional victory', because 
a prolonged Chimurenga or a military stalemate would have caused bank-
ruptcy, or forced the British imperial government to turn the colony into 
a protectorate. In August the Ndebele found themselves besieged at the 
Matopo hills and, after a protracted battle and generous peace offers by 
Rhodes, they finally chose to negotiate. W h a t followed was a series of peace 
talks between Rhodes and the Ndebele indunas that lasted from August 1897 
to 5 January 1898, when Rhodes included six of the Chimurenga chiefs 
{indunas Dhliso, Somabulana, Mlugulu, Sikombo, K h o m o and Nyamanda) 
among the ten C o m p a n y appointees. H e assigned them land for settlement, 
donated 2300000 kg of grain, and promised to redress their grievances 
against the C o m p a n y . 
With victory and peace in Matabeleland, the C o m p a n y then concentrated 
upon the Shona Chimurenga that had been raging simultaneously since 
June 1896 and continued, intermittently, to 1903. T h e leading centres of 
the Chimurenga were the paramountcies of M a s h a y a m o m b e in western, 
of Makoni in central, and of M a n g w e n d e in north-eastern Mashonaland. 
But several smaller paramountcies such as Nyandoro, Seke, Whata, Chiota, 
Chikmakwa, Swoswe, Z w i m b a , Mashanganyika, and Masembura, either 
took the initiative for a Chimurenga themselves or allied with others. 
T h e Chimurenga, like the Xhosa cattle-killing episode, has been labelled 
by Eurocentric historians as atavistic and millenarian because of the 
important role of the traditional prophets and priests, known as the 
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svikiro.13 T h e leading svikiro were Mukwati in Matabeleland, Kagubi in 
western Mashonaland and Nehanda (a female svikiro) in central and 
northern Mashonaland, together with a host of local junior prophets. T h e 
svikiro told the Ndebele and Shona that the white m a n had brought all 
their sufferings, namely forced labour, the hut tax and flogging, as well 
as natural disasters of locusts, rinderpest and drought. They convinced 
m a n y Africans that the Shona G o d , Mwar i (Mlimo in Sindebele), having 
been moved by the suffering of his people, had decreed that the white 
m e n were to be driven out of the country; and that the Africans had nothing 
to fear because M w a r i , being on their side, would turn the white man's 
bullets into harmless water. Generally speaking, m a n y Africans believed 
that the svikiro were announcing Mwari's commandments and that failure 
to obey would bring more sufferings to the paramountcies and personal 
misfortunes to individuals. 
T h e svikiro were primarily revolutionary prophets w h o articulated the 
real causes of the Chimurenga and the general consensus of the people 
without which they would have had relatively little credibility and 
influence. Furthermore, as the custodians of Shona traditions and 
acknowledged authorities on m a n y aspects of Shona life, they feared that 
their role was being usurped by the European missionaries. M o r e impor-
tantly, the apparently leading role of the svikiro was a function of the 
politico-military segmentation of the Ndebele and, especially, the Shona 
people. T h e svikiro were the only authorities whose influence extended 
across paramountcies. T h e spiritual provinces of Mukwati , Nehanda and 
Kagubi covered more than one paramountcy. Unlike the paramount chiefs, 
the svikiro had an elaborate but secret network of communication through 
which they exchanged numerous messages and co-ordinated their efforts 
adeptly. They even revived the old Rozvi dynasty and confederacy by 
proclaiming Mudzinganyama Jiri Muteveri, the great-grandson of a former 
Rozvi king, as the new king. M a n y Africans accepted the proclamation and 
pledged allegiance to Mudzinganyama, but the confederacy was short-lived 
because Mudzinganyama was soon arrested and imprisoned by the settlers. 
Simultaneously, Mukwati was assassinated, reportedly by a disillusioned 
follower. 
Kagubi and Nehanda were most influential over the young and militant 
princes of the paramountcies, such as M u c h e m w a of M a n g w e n d e , 
Mhiripiri of Makoni and Panashe of Nyandoro. But Kagubi was captured 
13. T h e word svikiro is derived from the verb kusvika meaning to arrive at or reach 
a place. Svikiro literally means the person, vehicle or instrument or m e d i u m through which 
gods and spirits communicate with the people. Thus , a priest, rabbi and prophet in western 
culture and a caliph and mallam in Musl im culture could be a svikiro in the Shona society. 
T h e svikiro should not be confused with a medical practitioner, nganga (so-called witch-
doctor in Europe) or with a fortune teller. T h e svikiro was a priest, an intellectual, an 
educator, and a leader wrapped into one person. Here w e are using the translation prophets 
for the convenience of non-Shona readers. 
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in October 1897 and Nehanda two months later. O n 2 March 1898 they 
were charged with murder and condemned to death by hanging. T h e two 
were buried in a secret place, 'so that no natives would take away their 
bodies and claim that their spirits had descended to any other prophetess 
or witch-doctors'. 
Without a highly centralized politico-military machinery, without guns 
and ammunition, and, more significantly, without the svikiro, Shona 
paramounts were defeated one by one in 1897. O n 4 September Makoni 
was handcuffed, blindfolded, and shot in the presence of the troopers, 
'friendlies', and his o w n subjects. A s reported by an eyewitness correspon-
dent of The Times (London), Makoni stood and died 'with a courage and 
dignity that extorted an unwilling admiration from all w h o were present'. 
Similarly, M a s h a y a m o m b e , w h o had nearly paralysed communications 
between Salisbury and Bulawayo, was defeated and killed on 25 July. 
Between July and September the settlers successfully carried out sieges 
against the paramountcies in central Mashonaland. M a n g w e n d e was 
conquered in September but his son, M u c h e m w a , together with a few 
councillors, continued the resistance until 1903 when the Chimurenga was 
finally contained. 
T h e toll of the Chimurenga has been estimated at 450 dead and 188 
wounded Europeans, and 8000 African deaths. O f the 450 Europeans, 372 
were resident settlers, representing one-tenth of the white population in 
the colony. T h e remainder were imperial troopers and mercenaries. But 
some of the most intransigent Shona continued the Chimurenga and even 
formed alliances with other Africans in Mozambique w h o were also 
resisting Portuguese colonialism. T h e most celebrated post-Chimurenga 
resistance was that of Kadungure Mapondera, the ruler of the Rozvi 
paramountcy, located in the Mazoe area, which previously had retained 
its independence against both the Ndebele and the Portuguese. Mapondera 
did not take part in the Chimurenga because, after refusing to pay the hut 
tax, he and his closest followers had emigrated to northern Mozambique 
in 1894 and joined the Barwe in their war against the Portuguese. H e 
returned to Rhodesia in 1900 and recruited a Shona army consisting of 
the Korekore, Tavara, and several young militants from the paramountcies 
of north-eastern and central Mashonaland, including M a n g w e n d e and 
Makoni. H e allied with the titular Mutapa, Chioco, and thus with the 
M w a r i svikiro. Until June 1902 he waged guerrilla warfare against settlers 
and loyalist paramountcies in northern Mashonaland. H e again emigrated 
to Mozambique to join the on-going Barwe Chimurenga, but the allied forces 
were soon overwhelmed by the Portuguese, due primarily to the latter's 
superiority in firearms. Mapondera returned to Rhodesia, and on 30 August 
1903 he surrendered and was sentenced to seven years' hard labour for 
murder and sedition. H e died in prison from hunger strike. 
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T h e Herero 
In 1904 the Herero, feeling the cumulative and bitter effects of colonial 
rule in South West Africa, took advantage of the withdrawal of G e r m a n 
troops from Hereroland to put down an uprising among the Bondelswarts, 
and revolted in January 1904, killing 100 Germans, destroying several farms 
and capturing cattle. Theodor Leutwein, the G e r m a n commander, was 
replaced by General von Trotha, w h o decided upon total military victory 
and complete destruction of the Herero people by ruthless tactics and 
massacres. Between 75 and 80% of an estimated Herero population of 
60000-80000 were slaughtered; 14000 were put in prison camps; and 2000 
fled to South Africa. Samuel Maherero and 1000 followers fled across the 
Kalahari desert to Bechuanaland. 
All land and livestock were confiscated, and the Africans were forbidden 
to form ethnic organizations and practise traditional ceremonies. They had 
no means of existence other than employment by white settlers. Their o w n 
gods and priests having been defeated and, thus, proved inferior, they 
submitted to Christianity in mass conversions. Then , in 1915, South 
African troops occupied South West Africa and kept it under martial law 
until 1921. B y that date, 10673 white South Africans had joined those 
G e r m a n settlers w h o had not been repatriated to Germany. T h e Africans 
were allowed to resume subsistence-level agriculture in barren reserves and 
were therefore forced to depend on migrant employment. 
Despite this fate, the Herero nevertheless left a legacy of resistance to 
colonial rule, of cross-ethnic allegiances and of cultural, historical, racial and 
nationalist consciousness that was inherited by later generations of freedom 
fighters throughout Southern Africa. 
Conclusion 
B y the first decade of the twentieth century there were practically no 
indigenous sovereign states in Southern Africa. T h e vast majority of the 
Africans had by then entered the third level of resistance characterized 
by the struggle to obtain a favourable modus vivendi under colonial rule, 
economy and culture. In reality it was a different form of response to the 
struggles against colonial conquest and occupation, and it belongs to a 
different chapter in African history. For by then both the political and 
religious leadership of the traditional societies had been conquered, colon-
ized and humiliated. T h e traditional kings had been supplanted by an alien 
Secretary for Native Affairs such as Theophilus Shepstone in Natal, or 
the so-called 'Native Commissioners' and 'Native Departments' elsewhere. 
T h e African masses were primarily recognized as the 'black problem' and 
were, as Jabavu described them, 'landless, voteless, helots, pariahs, social 
outcasts in their fatherland with no future in any path of life'.14 Further-
14. D . D . T . Jabavu, 1920, p. 16. 
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more , these were the first Africans to face the crisis in identity15 created 
by n e w artificial colonial boundaries which partitioned cultural-linguistic-
historical groups, by cultural shock in mining and farming c o m p o u n d s , the 
h o m e s of the whites, and in Christian churches and schools throughout the 
settler-dominated world. 
T h e thrust of African thoughts and actions n o w centred on the 
individualist acquisition of the knowledge, technology and material goods 
of the white world, and on exposing - and hopefully correcting - the 'native 
disabilities' ' 6 within the framework of colonial domination. This led to 
the beginning of the non-violent civil rights protests epitomized, as will 
be seen later, by the South African Native National Congress formed in 
1912, by the Southern Rhodesia Native Welfare Association, by the trade 
unionism of Clements Kadalie and by religious separatism and Ethiopian-
ism. T h e n e w leadership v a c u u m was filled by the mission-educated 
Christian elites w h o were committed not only to universalism, non-racialism 
and capitalist materialism, but also to non-ethnicity, and thus were the first 
to undermine ethnic and sectional co-operation by African chiefs, groups 
and individuals. T h e n e w course of African responses to colonial rule as 
opposed to colonial conquest came to be determined mostly by the urban 
masses under the leadership of the educated elites. T h e rural masses either 
lived by subsistence-oriented production in the reserves or drifted into 
the market-oriented capitalist economy as low-paid wage-earners in 
European mines, fields, kitchens or factories. 
15. R . F . Betts (ed.), 1972. 
16. See, for example, S. T . Plaatje, 1916; S. M . Molema, 1920. 
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African initiatives and 
reaction to colonial 
conquest and domination 
M . ESOAVELOMANDROSO 
T h e Anglo-Merina Treaty,1 which was signed on 23 October 1817 and 
ratified in 1820, conferred on R a d a m a I the title of'King of Madagascar' 
and on 14 February 1822 he went on to proclaim his sovereignty over 
the entire island (see Fig. 10.1). A kingdom which had the backing of the 
leading world power of the time accordingly m a d e its appearance on the 
diplomatic scene. But it was a kingdom whose sovereignty France initially 
contested, denied and fought against. It was not until 1862 that the 
government of Napoleon III signed a treaty with R a d a m a II recognizing 
him as king of Madagascar. This, in the eyes of the authorities in 
Antananarivo, sanctioned the kingdom's existence and signified the aban-
donment of France's territorial demands, even though the preamble to the 
treaty reserved 'France's rights', in other words, its specific claims to 
its former trading posts and establishments and to the Sakalava and 
Antakarana protectorates. 
A new situation was created by the assassination in 1863 of R a d a m a II 
by the ruling oligarchy, which regarded him as too liberal-minded and 
unduly favourable to the Europeans. Rainilaiarivony, w h o was prime 
minister from 1864 to 1895, adopted a fairly flexible policy in a bid to 
ensure that the independence of the kingdom would be respected. T h u s 
it was that, although unable to unify the territory completely, he set about 
organizing the government, administration and army. H e succeeded after 
a fashion in consolidating his power and in holding the conquered regions 
together, in spite of his rivals' plots, and the discontent and, at times, open 
rebellion of the masses. At the same time, however, colonialist imperialism 
was growing in Europe, and France again sought to dominate Madagascar. 
T h e diplomatic efforts which Rainilaiarivony deployed in an endeavour 
to steer clear of this danger were unsuccessful and the two wars waged 
by France - from 1883 to 1885, and from 1894 to 1895 - terminated in 
1. T h e Merina are the inhabitants of the Imerina, a region in the Central Highlands 
of Madagascar, with its capital at Antananarivo. T h e Merina kingdom set itself the task 
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PLATE 10.2 Ranavalona III, Queen ofMada¬
gascar (1883-97) in full court dress
PLATE 10. 1 Rainilaiarivony, Prime Minister
ofMadagascar (1864-95), husband ofRana¬
valona II and III
the eviction of the prime minister and the dismantling of the royal govern¬
ment. Although they gained control ofAntananarivo, the French very soon
encountered armed resistance in some of the rural areas of the Imerina
and in its subject provinces. In the independent regions, they found them¬
selves having to contend with kings and military leaders who put up spirited
opposition to them. Eventually, however, French technical superiority put
an end to these uncoordinated pockets of resistance. Even so, all over the
island, people rose up and organized themselves, first to combat the abuses
of the colonial regime and subsequently to recover independence for their
country.
A country divided in the face of the imperialist threat
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, France reverted to a policy
of colonial expansion. In the first place, between 1870 and 1880, following
its defeat at the hands of Prussia, the country went through a period of
introspection while it nursed its forces within its national borders. Then,
between 1880 and 1890, a number of republican figures, like Léon
Gambetta and Jules Ferry, felt that colonial conquests would restore their
country to its place among the great powers. Hostile public opinion
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compelled them to adopt a policy of 'small doses', but they were neverthe-
less able to impose a protectorate over Tunisia in 1881 and, despite the 
absence of an overall plan and limited resources, to dispatch expeditions 
to mainland Africa, Tonkin and Madagascar. F r o m 1890 onwards, France's 
ambitions came into sharper focus, as public opinion was largely w o n over 
by imperialist thinking and business circles began to display an increasing 
interest in colonial ventures.2 T h u s Madagascar, which was embellished 
by colonial propaganda as being a vast consumer market, a land of untold 
riches, and an island coveted by the British, became the target for a host 
of ambitions and designs. T h e government of Queen Ranavalona accord-
ingly had to contend with this foreign threat while simultaneously trying 
to smooth over the latent or overt tensions that were rife among the 
Imerina and throughout the entire island. 
T h e situation o n the eve of the first Franco-Mer ina w a r 3 
France's renewed interest in Madagascar stemmed from the propaganda 
which was deliberately orchestrated by the French parliamentarians of the 
island of Réunion, kept alive by right-wing Catholic circles and later 
supported by the colonial faction. These different movements joined forces 
to recall and defend France's 'historic rights' over Madagascar. That claim, 
which had its roots in the m e m o r y of the annexation proclaimed under 
Louis X I V and of the fruitless attempts m a d e in the eighteenth century 
to set up a prosperous France Orientale, based on the trading posts 
established in the eighteenth century and under the Restoration, was 
developed throughout the nineteenth century in a large number of written 
documents before being put to the French parliament officially in 1884. 
T h e Réunion lobby demanded the complete conquest of the island, so that 
the overflow of Reunion's Creole population could be settled there and 
the abundant resources which the British seemed likely to exploit could 
be reserved for their o w n use. French Catholic missionaries in Madagascar, 
for their part, were reduced to evangelizing the lower social classes since 
most of the noble families and the rich and powerful commoners had been 
converted to Protestantism. Consequently they demanded official support 
from France in their bid to overcome the competition of the Protestants, 
w h o m they portrayed as being a product of the innumerable 'underhand 
dealings' of the British. This 'perfidious Albion' theory found a favourable 
echo in certain business circles which, in an endeavour to conquer the 
Malagasy market at the expense of the British and Americans, sought to 
debar the latter by annexing the island rather than by reducing the prices 
of their o w n goods. Colonial propaganda appealed to people's chauvinistic 
sentiments and the belief in France's humanitarian and civilizing mission. 
In order to prime public opinion for the conquest, th*; 'Kingdom of 
2. G . Jacob, 1966, pp. 2-3. 
3. C. R. Ageron, 1978(a), pp. 114-18. 
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Madagascar' was presented, in blatant bad faith, as being a 'barbarous state', 
headed by a 'foreign tribe' which had exalted 'tyranny as a system of 
government' and still engaged in the slave trade. 
There was scarcely any foundation for all these arguments devised by 
the advocates of the colonization of the island. T h e royal government, which 
was accused of being pro-British, displayed in its attitude to foreign powers 
a subtlety dictated by its determination to defend the independence of the 
kingdom. It attempted to elicit from each of the powers the support which 
they were capable of giving to its o w n ambitions.4 Madagascar was not, 
it was argued, the vassal of Great Britain: the trust that existed between 
the two countries was solid solely because the British, unlike the French, 
were not intent on colonizing the island. That purportedly 'barbarous' 
kingdom, where the 'forces of darkness' predominated, was, in fact, ruled 
by a queen and a prime minister w h o had been converts to Christianity 
since 2i February 1869. It is true that they had been baptized as Protestants 
and that the majority of the leaders and the population had followed their 
example, but they had not prevented people from embracing Catholicism 
nor had they thwarted the activities of the French missionaries. This liberal 
attitude goes to show the separation that existed between the churches 
and the state, even though 'around the chapel in the queen's palace, the 
Prime Minister m a y have tried to form a national Church, the Palace 
Church, composed of Malagasy churchmen and evangelists in his service'.5 
These attempts gave rise to lingering fears a m o n g the Jesuits and to an 
'incorrigible mistrust' a m o n g the representatives of the London Missionary 
Society ( L M S ) . 
In 1877, the royal government freed the Masombika slaves imported from 
the African mainland and arranged for them to be settled on lands allocated 
to them. In 1878, it recast the legal system, which was henceforward 
entrusted to three courts whose task it was to conduct investigations, while 
decision-making lay with the prime minister. T h e 'Code of 305 Articles, 
a legislative innovation embracing civil law, criminal law and legal 
procedure'6 was promulgated in 1881. All these measures, and others 
besides, illustrate the determination of Rainilaiarivony to 'modernize' his 
country and to turn it into a 'civilized state' in its dealings with Europe. 
All these endeavours would have disarmed people moved by a genuine 
desire to civilize Madagascar and to spread the Gospel there. However, 
the elected representatives of Réunion, backed by the Catholic parliamen-
tarians and the colonial lobby, were unbending in their demands for the 
conquest of Madagascar. T h e y took advantage of three pretexts to pressure 
the French government into embarking on military action in Madagascar 
in 1882. 
In 1878, Jean Laborde - w h o had initially been a business partner of 
4. F. Esoavelomandroso, 1979. 
5. H . Vidal, 1970, p. 6, n. 20. 
6. H . Deschamps, i960, p. 181. 
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the leading dignitaries of the kingdom under Ranavalona I in the 
manufacture of arms and munitions and landed property, and w h o 
subsequently became French consul on the accession of R a d a m a II — died 
in Antananarivo, leaving real estate which his nephews, Edouard Laborde 
and C a m p a n , claimed without success. T h e demand for this inheritance 
emanating from Paris was founded on the treaty of 1868, which empowered 
French nationals to acquire landed property in Madagascar, while the 
refusal of the authorities in Antananarivo to countenance it rested on the 
law stipulating that land belonged exclusively to the sovereign. T h e 
'Laborde inheritance' case posed a problem of land ownership that was 
of direct concern to the settlers and traders living on the island. T h e issue 
at stake was whether they were entitled to o w n the land they worked or 
could at least expect to obtain a long-term leasehold on it.7 
In April 1881, relations between France and Madagascar became even 
more acrimonious over the Toalé affair. T h e Toalé was a d h o w whose owner 
- an Arab but a French subject - together with three other M u s l i m 
m e m b e r s of the crew, were murdered by the m e n of the Sakalava king, 
Bakary, in the bay of Marambitsy, an area outside the control of the Merina 
authorities. These people, w h o were gunrunners, had been verbally 
challenged and ordered to hand over their cargo; instead, they opened fire 
on the Sakalava, w h o fired back and killed them. T h e French claimed 
reparation from the Q u e e n of Madagascar for this smuggling incident.8 
In the course of the same year, two English missionaries, on a tour of 
the Sambirano coast on the north-west of the island, persuaded the Sakalava 
chiefs of the region to raise the Merina flag. France protested on the grounds 
of the protectorate treaties it had signed with the sovereigns of the region 
in 1840 and 1841. Rainilaiarivony, in response, reminded the French of 
the treaty of 1868 which the Government of Napoleon III had signed with 
the 'Queen of Madagascar'. 
T h e lack of sincerity evidenced in this exchange convinced Rainilaiari-
vony that the French were acting in bad faith and prompted him to adopt 
a policy for paying the reparations and purchasing arms and munitions. 
These activities proved unpopular on account of the heavy burden which 
they placed on the people. T h e difficulties with France did not give h im 
time to assimilate the conquests m a d e by R a d a m a II, still less to pursue 
the unification of the country. Hence it was a prime minister beset by 
domestic problems w h o had to negotiate with Baudais, the French consul, 
w h o was suddenly to break off diplomatic relations and to leave 
Antananarivo on 21 M a r c h 1882. 
T h e isolation of the Malagasy rulers, 1882-94 
In June 1882, Captain L e Timbre had the Merina flags removed from 
7. G . Jacob, 1966, p. 5. 
8. P. Boiteau, 1958, p. 172. 
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the bay of Ampasindava without meeting any resistance. Rainilaiarivony 
still thought that it was possible to avoid a conflict and to settle the 
differences by peaceful means. H e accordingly sent an embassy led by his 
nephew, Ravoninahitriniarivo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Europe 
and the United States from October 1882 to August 1883, in a bid to come 
to an understanding with France and to seek the support of the other 
powers.9 However, apart from the trade agreements signed with London , 
Washington and Berlin, and Britain's relinquishment of its nationals' right 
to land ownership in exchange for leases whose length would be determined 
by mutual agreement, the Malagasy plenipotentiaries achieved very little. 
T h e French, humoured by the British w h o wanted a free hand in Egypt, 
refused to come to any arrangement, although the envoys of Ranavalona 
II had agreed to remove their flags and garrisons from the bay of 
Ampasindava and had accepted long leaseholds for foreigners. T h e embassy 
was still in Europe w h e n the French navy bombarded Majunga in M a y 
1883 and thereby sparked off the first Franco-Merina war (1883-5). 
Diplomatic action had been unable to prevent war, therefore, and the 
authorities in Antananarivo were bitterly surprised to find that the leading 
powers were primarily concerned with their o w n interests and sometimes, 
indeed often, reached agreement a m o n g themselves at the expense of the 
small nations. T h e attitude of Great Britain, which had been looked upon 
as a faithful ally, was a disappointment, and is said to have prompted the 
prime minister to speak, with disillusion, of 'pretending to quarrel, like 
the French and the British'. 
T h e French thus attacked a kingdom that was diplomatically isolated. 
A small squadron, c o m m a n d e d by Admiral Pierre, bombarded the ports 
in the north-west and east of the island, and occupied Tamatave. France 
demanded that Rainilaiarivony cede the portion of Madagascar situated 
to the north of the 16th parallel of latitude and that he recognize the right 
of French people settled on the island to o w n land. T h e prime minister 
continued to hold out against the pressures on him, while leaving the door 
open to negotiations. During this 'bogus' war, in which negotiations 
were conducted with greater alacrity than military operations, the object 
of France's demands underwent a change: the issue was no longer one of 
recognizing France's historic rights in north-western Madagascar but of 
imposing a protectorate over the entire island. Rainilaiarivony maintained 
his original stand and refused to sacrifice the independence of his country. 
However, while the French and Malagasy leaders adopted two seemingly 
irreconcilable attitudes, their subjects were yielding to a growing sense of 
lassitude. O n the Malagasy side, the blockade and the war effort had 
brought on an economic crisis and had created quite serious political unrest. 
As for the French, the Tonkin expedition had prevented the reinforcement 
of the troops engaged in Madagascar. Furthermore, the views of the 
9. P. M . Mutibwa, 1974, pp. 218-46. 
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minister, Freycinet, w h o was inclined to be conciliatory, overruled those 
held by the advocates of a march on Antananarivo. T h e course of events, 
therefore, prompted the two governments to sign a peace treaty or, in other 
words, to be content with a compromise. 
T h e somewhat obscure treaty of 17 December 1885 put an end to a 
war in which there were neither victors nor vanquished. It was so vague 
and ambiguous that it was interpreted by both parties as each saw fit. T h e 
treaty granted France the right to 'represent Madagascar in all its foreign 
relations' and to maintain a resident-general with a military escort at 
Antananarivo. It granted French nationals the right to obtain long-term 
leases of up to ninety-nine years and the French navy the right to occupy 
Diego Suarez, while the French government was awarded an indemnity 
of ten million francs. This treaty, in which there is no mention of the 
word 'protectorate', recognized Queen Ranavalona as sovereign of the entire 
island and as sole owner of land. T h e 'Appendix' or explanatory letter 
which the prime minister demanded and secured from the French 
negotiators on 9 January 1886, before agreeing to ratify the treaty, laid 
d o w n the powers of the resident-general, fixed the size of his military escort 
at fifty m e n , and described the limits of the territory of Diego Suarez as 
being one nautical mile to the south and west and four miles to the north. 
These terms were meant to limit the scope of the treaty. T h e French 
administration, on the other hand, attached no significance to the 
'Appendix' and interpreted the agreement concluded on 17 December 1885 
as being a protectorate treaty. B y contrast, the Malagasy government, which 
was dominated by Rainilaiarivony, refused to consider the document as 
a treaty establishing a protectorate over the island and put forward a quite 
different interpretation of the document, in opposition to the French 
schemes. This interpretation was based on constant references to the 
'Appendix', which had limited the scope of the clauses that were regarded 
as being prejudicial to the independence of the kingdom. T h e rulers in 
Antananarivo accordingly attempted to prevent the protectorate from 
coming into being by playing on the differences between the French and 
the Malagasy texts and the clarifications spelt out in the additional 
protocol.10 
T h u s , a war of attrition came to be waged between the prime minister 
and successive residents-general as misunderstandings continued to 
multiply. Without waiting for the outcome of the endless negotiations on 
the demarcation of the French zone around Diego Suarez, the French navy 
occupied a broad strip of land to the south of the port. A second conflict, 
over the 'exequatur' ('a written official recognition and authorization of 
a consular officer issued by the government to which he is accredited'), 
dominated the ten years of the 'phantom protectorate' from 1885 to 1895. 
T h e resident-general demanded that he be granted the 'exequatur' in order 
10. F. Esoavelomandroso, 1977(b). 
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to prove that Madagascar was a protectorate, but Rainilaiarivony refused 
to grant it so as to assert the kingdom's independence. Until the signature 
of the Anglo-French agreement of 1890, whereby the French recognized 
the British protectorate over Zanzibar, in exchange for which Britain 
accepted 'the French protectorate over Madagascar with its consequences', 
the prime minister managed not to depart from the stand he had taken. 
These diplomatic difficulties were exacerbated by the economic problems 
which the kingdom experienced. 
In order to settle the indemnity due to France, the Malagasy government 
contracted a loan with the Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris ( C N E P ) , 
the guarantee for which consisted of the customs receipts of the island's 
six main ports: Tamatave, Majunga, Fenerive, Vohemar, Vatomandry and 
Mananjary. Agents - w h o were appointed by the French bank but paid 
by the royal authorities - supervised the tax collection, which deprived 
the Malagasy state of a substantial source of revenue. 
This need for funds, and the pressures exerted by L e M y r e de Vilers, 
the first French resident-general in Antananarivo, compelled the prime 
minister to grant vast concessions to the Europeans both for mining - of 
copper in the Betsileo and gold in the Boina - and timber exploitation. 
T h e Suberbie gold-deposit concession in the Maevatanana region, 
notorious for its use of forced labour in the mines, brought in very little 
income to the government. O n the other hand, it contributed to the weaken-
ing of authority on account of the number of workers w h o fled and swelled 
the ranks of the fahavalo or irregulars w h o created an atmosphere of 
insecurity in the north-west of the island. At the same period, twelve 
forestry concessions were granted to foreigners on the east coast. 
T h e limited resources of the concession-holders and the attitude of 
Rainilaiarivony w h o , in spite of appearances, was disinclined to m a k e their 
task any easier, meant that the attempts to exploit the Malagasy forests 
were not altogether successful. These concessions did not enrich the royal 
government or benefit the local population, nor did they produce as good 
a return as the foreign capitalists would have liked.11 
T h e proceeds of the customs duties were not sufficient to cover the six-
monthly payments due to the C N E P since the concessions granted to 
foreigners had not produced the results expected, and thus, in order to 
replenish the coffers of the state, the royal government increased the 
number of taxes and stepped up forced labour. In addition to the burden 
which they habitually had to bear, the inhabitants were required to pay 
an income tax of one piastre per person and the fitia tsy mba hetra, a sort 
of general contribution that was theoretically 'voluntary'. S o m e people 
refused to perform the tasks required of them under the fanompoana or 
forced labour system, while others took to banditry, and the gangs of 
11. M . Esoavelomandroso, 1979, pp. 186-93. 
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plunderers were bold enough to attack the holy city of Ambohimanga in 
1888 and even the capital in 1890.12 
These disturbances, which threatened the interests of the privileged 
classes and the expatriates, alarmed the resident-general and revealed a 
grave crisis of authority in the ' K i n g d o m of Madagascar'. T h e French 
parliament m a d e the most of this situation and dispatched L e M y r e de 
Vilers, w h o had been resident-general from 1886 to 1889, with a plan for 
setting up a real protectorate. W h e n Rainilaiarivony rejected this plan, the 
French parliament voted by a large majority to go to war, and the Merina 
government, in its bid to preserve independence, could only acquiesce. 
But the royal authorities embarked on this war in 1894 in circumstances 
that were not at all favourable to them. 
T h e ' K i n g d o m of Madagascar' in 1894: weakness and disarray 
O n the eve of the French conquest, the 'Kingdom of Madagascar' was 
sapped by serious internal tensions. At the official level at least, the baptism 
of Rana valona II marked the beginning of the decline in ancestor worship 
and the disappearance of the royal and even local sampy or shrines which 
formed the political and religious foundations of traditional Imerina; it 
was also responsible for the often forced conversion of thousands of 
subjects, the destruction of a number of long-established hierarchies 
through the dismissal of the sampy guardians, and the rise of a Christianized 
elite. Political, economic and religious affairs were all intertwined. T h e 
supporters of the Eglise du Palais (the Palace Church) not only handled 
the affairs of state, such as censuses, education and recruitment for the 
army and forced labour, but also took advantage of their positions and 
the economic system to enrich themselves through trade and moneylending. 
Guardians of sampy and local dignitaries w h o had been deprived of their 
traditional powers and privileges opposed the island's leaders by taking 
flight or by refusing to build churches or setting fire to them. ' 3 Moreover, 
the Christianized Merina were by no means unanimous in their support 
for the official Church. Those w h o were not integrated into the Church 
and w h o practised a sort of popular Christianity drawing its inspiration 
from the Bible and from local history and folklore, formed an educated 
elite which could lay claim to p jiitical leadership. 
They engaged in trade and m a d e a practice of preaching their ideas on 
market days. Other Christians reacted against the overbearing tutelage of 
the official Church by turning to Catholicism or placing themselves under 
the protection of a dignitary. Others struggled for the independence and 
freedom of their religious life, like the dissidents of Ambatonakanga w h o , 
in 1893, created their o w n church, which they baptized Tranozozoro, the 
12. F. Esoavelomandroso, 1977(b), p. 50. 
13. F. Esoavelomandroso, 1980. 
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house or church of reeds. ' * This dissident movement took shape in the 
very heart of the capital, which was a bastion of Christianity, and bore 
witness to the sense of unease felt by some of the faithful. 
These tensions added to the decline of the Imerina, which further 
exacerbated by foreign, and especially French, pressures and by the archaic 
nature of the economic domination wielded by the leading figures in 
Antananarivo, made it impossible for them to fulfil their ambition of 
creating a nation-state. T h e officer merchants recouped their losses by 
exploiting the forced labour system to the full, n o w that it had lost its 
former connotation as a ritual obligation, by investing in land and by 
engaging in moneylending. Opposing these magnates of the capital and 
devotees of the Palace Church were the host of small farmers and day-
labourers w h o were in debt to them and on w h o m the fanompoana bore 
down most heavily. 
All this laid bare 'the disintegration of the social fabric and the machinery 
of government'15 and revealed the existence of a deep-seated crisis within 
the 'Kingdom of Madagascar', which was thus incapable of resisting the 
French expedition. But there was more to Madagascar than the mere 
trappings of state. T h e ordinary folk a m o n g the Merina w h o did not identify 
with their leaders, the subject population w h o endeavoured, as best it could, 
to escape the oppression of the oligarchy, and the independent kingdoms 
of Antananarivo, each in turn, were to resist French penetration and 
conquest. 
A country offering uncoordinated resistance to colonial 
conquest 
T h e breakdown of society within the 'Kingdom of Madagascar', the 
collapse of the old order, the domination of the oligarchy, the economic 
crisis and the imperialist threat were all factors that gave rise to a profound 
moral and spiritual malaise among the mass of the people, w h o began to 
hark back to an idealized vision of the past and to advocate a return to 
traditional ways. It was not very long, therefore, before the leaders had 
to face a barrage of criticism. T h e colonial conquest, in 1894 and 1895, 
provided the opponents of the regime with an opportunity to give vent 
to their opinions and hastened the fall of the government, which was already 
under fire in both Merina and the subject provinces and was ignored or 
contested by the independent peoples. 
T h e failure of leadership 
Public opinion and parliament in France had decided to back the expedition 
to the hilt: the army had ample resources and a large number of troops 
14. S. Ayache and C . Richard, 1978, pp. 133-82. 
15. G . Jacob, 1977, p. 213. 
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at its disposal and the terrain had been thoroughly reconnoitred by explorers 
and military personnel and was therefore well known. O n the Malagasy 
side, however, the state was m u c h less firmly established than in 1883. 
T h e ageing and dictatorial Rainilaiarivony had become unpopular. Faced 
with having to put d o w n a whole series of plots involving his close associates, 
and even his o w n children, he could have complete confidence in neither 
the leading dignitaries of the regime, w h o coveted his high office and hoped 
one day to replace him, nor the army, which was disorganized by the 
increasing number of desertions and was demoralized by rampant 
corruption and greed. His strategy had not evolved with the times. In spite 
of his piecemeal and badly organized efforts to purchase arms and munitions 
and attempts to effectively mobilize the forces of the kingdom, the only 
allies he really trusted were 'General Tazo (fever) and General Ala (the 
forest)'. A s in 1883, he hoped that the lack of a road through the virtually 
impenetrable forest and the debilitating effect of the climate on the 
Europeans would prevent an expeditionary corps from marching on 
Antananarivo. 
Indeed, the campaign did take a heavy toll of the French, but this was 
due to the lack of foresight of certain departments in the Ministry of W a r . 
T h e troops had disembarked at Majunga and were to use the celebrated 
'Lefèbvre carts' in their advance on the capital. They were therefore 
compelled to build a road. Fever and dysentery broke out while they were 
laying the earthworks in the swamplands, and the expeditionary corps was 
turned into an 'endlessly straggling column caught up in its baggage trains 
and its dead and dying'.16 
T h e royal army did not mount any guerrilla attacks on the flanks or 
at the rear of the sorely tried French troops. Ranavalona's forces were 
dispersed at the various ports. Those w h o were sent to head off the French 
erected fortifications which they evacuated as soon as they were bombarded 
or circumvented. Neither the soldiers nor their officers had received any 
proper military training and they were bewildered rather than motivated. 
Rajestera, an officer at the front, recalled the dissension and strife in the 
army when he wrote: 'There was a feeling of discouragement on all sides, 
as m u c h a m o n g the ranks as among their chiefs, especially when it was 
learnt that, although the Prime Minister's relatives and friends, and 
especially his grandson, Ratsimanisa, had discreetly remained behind in 
Imerina, they were sharing in the honours which ought rightly to have 
been bestowed on those w h o had to suffer the fatigue and dangers of the 
war'. T h e announcement that Ratsimanisa, of w h o m the officers dis-
paragingly spoke as being 'a mere boy w h o no sooner wakes up than he 
falls asleep again and is just about fit to grill sweet potatoes', had been 
elevated to the rank of the 'Fifteen Honours', one of the highest in 
16. H . Deschamps, i960, p. 230; M . Brown, 1978, pp. 236-56. 
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the hierarchy, was the last straw that sapped morale and blunted the 
resistance.17 
In view of this situation, General Duchesne, commander-in-chief of the 
French expeditionary corps, detached a light column from the main body 
of the army, which was bogged d o w n by its sick and its carts and equipment. 
This column drove the queen's regular troops before it and put them to 
flight before taking Antananarivo on 30 September 1895. B y then, however, 
thefoloalindahy, or royal army, was only a pale shadow of Radama's former 
army. Rainilaiarivony had succeeded in humbling the Mainty and excluding 
the Andriana, w h o had formed the backbone of the armies of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, but he did not manage to forge a large, 
well-trained army properly c o m m a n d e d by m e n w h o were loyal to him, 
w h o respected the property of the state and w h o were intent on preserving 
their country's independence. T h e prime minister was surrounded by a 
bevy of courtiers w h o were willing to flatter him and quick to fill their 
pockets by every possible means, but w h o were incapable of giving him 
the slightest piece of useful advice on h o w to conduct the affairs of state 
and were determined to serve whomever held all the reins of power. Most 
of these people, w h o had been incapable of defending the kingdom's 
independence, became the often zealous allies of the colonizers. They 
disowned and at times fought the mass of the people w h o , seeing the 
ignominious flight of the royal army and the 'treason' of the island's leaders, 
rose up to combat the French. 
T h e Menalamba m o v e m e n t s in Imerina 
T h e behaviour of the Merina population under the conquest can be 
accounted for by the nature of the relations it maintained with the 
government, which was monopolized by the Andafiavaratra, in other 
words, the family and hangers-on of the prime minister, Rainilaiarivony.18 
T h e relations of the six toko, or districts, of Imerina with the reigning 
oligarchy were not all the same. For instance, the Vakinisisaony, the 
ancestral land of the Imerina kings and the initial region of adoption of 
sampy such as Ikelimalaza, held the privilege of conferring legitimacy on 
the sovereign. However, throughout the nineteenth century, the inhabitants 
of the Vakinisisaony, w h o had a reputation for toughness, suffered under 
the burden of forced labour and felt the full weight of-the power of the 
Avaradrano, the people w h o had supported Andrianampoinimerina. M a n y 
of the Andriana, or nobles, of the Vakinisisaony were eliminated, as in 
the case of the guardians of Ikelimalaza, which was first confiscated by 
Andrianampoinimerina and then burnt down in 1869. F r o m that time 
onwards, opposition to the Christian government crystallized round the 
worship of this sampy in the southern part of Vakinisisaony. In the northern 
17. Quoted by M . Esoavelomandroso, 1975, p. 62, n. 67. 
18. S. Ellis, 1980(a), 1980(b). 
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part of the toko, groups that continued to respect the traditional religion, 
and Christians existed side by side. However, splits occurred among the 
Christians in the villages, as in the case of Ambohimalaza, where the nobles 
and slaves were predominantly Catholic and the commoners were 
Protestants. T h e same contrast between advocates of the traditional cults 
and Christians was to be found in other districts. In the Ambodirano, 
Ramainandro, a locality with a large Christian population allied to nfoko 
or township in the Avaradrano, stood opposite Amboanana , which 
remained committed to the worship of the sampy. 
T h e capture of Antananarivo, which spelt the downfall of the urban 
Christian world, sparked off the mobilization of the rural areas in defence 
of the ancestral heritage. T h e uprising at Amboanana , which broke out 
in November 1895 on the day of the Fandroana (see Fig. 10.2), the queen's 
birthday and a public holiday, marked the beginning of the population's 
opposition to the French conquest. This big rebellion was known as 
Menalamba (or the 'Red Plaids'), because the rebels 'coloured their 
garments with the red soil of the country in order that they might not 
easily be recognized at a distance'. T h e insurgents seized Aribonimano, 
killed the governor and an English missionary and his family, and demanded 
the abolition of Christian worship, schools, military service and forced 
labour. In M a r c h 1896, other movements broke out in the north and south 
of Imerina, with demands for a return to the ancient beliefs and a purge 
of the governing class and with the aim of compelling the French to 
withdraw. 
T h e Menalamba took over the weapons of the soldiers w h o had deserted 
from the foloalindahy or purchased them from Indian or Creole traders, 
which suggests that communication with the coast was relatively easy. They 
were organized after the manner of the royal troops, complete with a table 
of honours and a division into regiments. They attacked the representatives 
of the oligarchy, w h o m they regarded as holding power illegally and as 
being responsible for the defeat, as well as foreign missionaries and 
Malagasy evangelists, w h o were the proponents of Christianity and hence 
the enemies of the traditional beliefs. They accordingly set about burning 
d o w n churches and schools and restoring the ancestral religion to a place 
of honour. T h e cult of the Ravololona sampy was fostered and ancient 
rites, such as the valirano and the sotrovakaka — two types of oath - were 
again practised. 
However, some of the actions of the Menalamba alienated part of the 
population. Their strategy included attacks on market-places, in a bid to 
m a k e an impression on people's imaginations, cause panic, and undermine 
an institution that was a symbol of the constraints and order imposed by 
the oligarchy. But these attacks also enabled them to replenish their 
supplies. These assaults on markets and the raids they m a d e to seize the 
crops of villages which had not come over to their side m a d e it easier to 
sow confusion in the minds of the sedentary population, which failed to 
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distinguish between the Menalamba and the jirika, or plunderers and 
brigands. T h e colonizers and their local allies took advantage of this 
confusion to isolate the insurgents. 
These Menalamba movements occurred on the confines of the Imerina, 
in areas where insecurity was a permanent feature. Since they were far 
from Antananarivo, they became the hiding places of irregulars and 
deserters. Contact was established with the Sakalava in the north-west and 
with the Betsimisaraka in the south-east, and this m a d e it easier to procure 
arms. Access to these areas was difficult, bordered as they were by the 
bare and desolate Tampoketsa range in the north-west and by the forest 
to the east. They were inhabited by herdsmen w h o were employed by the 
leaders in the capital and w h o enjoyed a measure of freedom from the 
central authority. T h e y were also the areas that provided forced labour 
for the gold mines, which accounted for the population's displeasure with 
the government. Hence, local dignitaries and the governors of small 
administrative posts like Rabazavana and Rabozaka in the north of the 
Imerina had little difficulty in setting these irregulars and malcontents 
against the foreigners and their allies w h o m they looked upon as being 
responsible for the economic, social, political and religious upheavals that 
had shaken the tanindrazana, the land of their forefathers. In fact, the 
attitudes of the emancipated slaves varied from one region to another, and 
even within the same region. In central Imerina, where slaves represented 
a high proportion of the population, they quite frequently reacted with 
enthusiasm to the conquest, converting to Catholicism, which was 
represented as being an act of allegiance to France, and returned to the 
regions from which they had originated. B y contrast, on the less populated 
edges of the Imerina, the freed slaves had to contend with material problems 
and joined the insurgents. 
T h e Menalamba were composed of an assortment of groups whose 
attitude to a number of issues appeared to be tinged with ambiguity. For 
instance, they despised the capital and yet, at the same time, they venerated 
it. Although it was a bastion of Christianity and the seat of the authority 
which they challenged, the capital was nevertheless the symbol of the 
kingdom and was still, in the popular mind, the capital of Andrianampoin-
imerina. Its fall was a forewarning of the chaos that had to be warded off. 
W h e n the Menalamba threatened Antananarivo, they were demonstrating 
both their disapproval of the urban world and their anxiety to remain in 
contact with the 'capital of the kingdom'. Their attitude was even more 
ambiguous w h e n they attempted to draw a distinction between Ranavalona, 
in their view the rightful monarch, and Rainilaiarivony, the prime minister 
and a usurper, when , in fact, the former had been chosen and appointed 
by the latter. T h e same can be said of their attempts to entice some of 
the leaders away from the rest of the oligarchy. T h u s , while there was 
a clear-cut enmity between the Menalamba and foreigners, hostility towards 
the oligarchy was less pronounced and more a matter of degree. 
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Popular resistance in Imerina failed because of the severity of the 
repressive measures taken, but above all because of the lack of co-ordination 
between the different movements and the failure to join up with the 
insurrections which broke out in the other regions of Madagascar. 
Popular opposition in the regions subject to the royal authority 
In some regions, the population's reaction to the French conquest stemmed 
from the influence wielded by the Menalamba. In 1896, in the M a m p i k o n y 
region in the north-west, Rainitavy, a former Merina governor, recruited 
a motley crew of Merina deserters and Sakalava herdsmen and replenished 
the Menalamba of Rabozaka with arms purchased in the region. T h e 
uprising he organized was the only Menalamba movement in which 
commercial considerations played a fundamental part: the aim was to take 
control of regional trade, of which the Indians and Creoles had a virtual 
monopoly, which is w h y they were attacked. In the nearby regions of the 
Imerina, the relations of the Menalamba leaders maintained with local kings 
and dignitaries were instrumental in the spread of some of their ideas. 
T h e Tanala Rainimangoro, for instance, declared that he had received 
orders from Antananarivo to drive out the French.19 
Elsewhere, such relations were non-existent. In the provinces that were 
most firmly controlled and hence most heavily exploited, the fall of 
Antananarivo in September 1895 was the signal for attacks on the 
Manamboninahitra, w h o were chiefly officer merchants, and on Merina 
immigrants and foreigners. In the eastern province, for example,20 the 
revolt of the 'Vorimo', a clan living on the lower Mangoro, triggered off 
a series of uprisings which created a climate of insecurity in the region 
throughout 1896. In the first instance, these revolts were directed 
exclusively against the Merina oligarchy. Until October 1895, when the 
governor-general of the province, Rainandriamampandry, was recalled to 
Antananarivo, members of the Betsimisaraka tended to destroy the soldiers' 
rice fields, refused to feed the royal army, or else merely deserted. F r o m 
December of the same year, they openly attacked military posts and took 
the initiative of mounting sorties or organized raids against Merina planta-
tions. T h e insurgents spared the lives of foreigners because they mistakenly 
thought that the French had come to save them from their oppressors. 
However, the very harsh measures which detachments of the army of 
occupation took to put down the revolts came as a surprise to the 
Betsimisaraka and later inclined them to believe that the French were not 
so m u c h their friends as the allies of the Merina. F r o m then on, the 
insurgents stepped up their offensive, and attacked the French as well as 
the Merina. T h e movement did not start to die d o w n until December 1896, 
but then disappeared altogether with the introduction of the measures taken 
19. S . Ellis, 1980(b), p. 212. 
20. M . Esoavelomandroso, 1979, pp. 346-52. 
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by General Galliéni to replace the representatives of the oligarchy by local 
chiefs. 
T h e population in the regions subject to the French conquests can 
accordingly be said to have expressed their opposition in a variety of ways. 
T h e resistance of the independent peoples 
At the outset, the French thought that by capturing Antananarivo they 
had gained control over the entire island. However, after putting d o w n 
the Menalamba movements and thereby having occupied Imerina, they 
discovered that they also had to conquer the independent regions. T h e 
peoples w h o had not been subject to the royal authority took up arms and 
repelled the French attempts at penetration. 
In the A m b o n g o - an example of a region whose principal feature was 
its political division into a host of small units - the French employed several 
stratagems to gain control. While seeking to reach an understanding with 
the main chiefs or kings both on the seaboard and in the interior, from 
1897 onwards they installed military posts in the large villages so as to 
keep order in the region.21 Early in 1899, however, disturbances stemming 
from the same determination to reject colonial domination and to uphold 
the region's independence broke out under the leadership of the main chiefs. 
O n e by one and in haphazard order, these groups of insurgents clashed 
with the locally recruited infantrymen led by the French, w h o never had 
to contend with two opponents at the same time. O n the contrary, they 
were free to strike whomever and wherever they wished. T h e bands of 
resisters were isolated from one another and were incapable of uniting in 
the face of the c o m m o n enemy. T h e chiefs were primarily responsible for 
this state of affairs and, through lack of foresight and selfishness, were 
unable to foster the growth of a popular struggle in defence of Sakalava 
independence. 
T h e conquest of M e n a b e , a large and well-organized kingdom, began 
in 1897, and was to be the practical illustration of the policy devised by 
Galliéni with the threefold aim of isolating and wearing d o w n the main 
enemy, the centralized Merina authority; of fostering the political autonomy 
of the main regions of the island against Imerina, in accordance with the 
'divide and rule' principle; and of taking advantage ofthat autonomy to 
bring about colonization at the least possible cost.22 King Toera and his 
principal chiefs, w h o were assembled at A m b i k y , were said to be making 
ready to lay d o w n their arms, but Major Gérard, w h o was in charge of 
the operation, preferred to invest the capital rather than accept their 
submission and to 'massacre all the Sakalava w h o could not escape, 
including King Toera'. This cruel and underhand act strengthened the 
resolve of the Sakalava, and a well-organized resistance movement, led by 
21. M . Esoavelomandroso, 1981. ' 
22. B . Schlemmer, 1980, p. 109. 
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Ingereza, the brother and successor of Toera, spread throughout the 
M e n a b e and lasted until 1902. T h e peoples of Antandroy and Mahafale 
in the south also opposed French attempts at penetration and only 
submitted in 1904. 
As a result of his policy of gradual annexation and after a long period 
of colonial penetration, Galliéni was able to claim in 1904 or thereabouts 
that the unification of the island was complete. There was not a single 
part of the island that escaped the authority of Antananarivo and all the 
regions acknowledged the power of the colonizers. However, that unity 
in c o m m o n submission to France created a n e w situation which accounts 
for the different forms of action taken by the Malagasy to improve their 
lot and indeed to recover their independence. 
A country united by its submission to France and its 
opposition to colonial domination 
Malagasy reactions to the conquest and colonial penetration which had 
come to an end in 1904 had all come to nothing. Officially, the military 
operations were over and the different administrative, economic and 
cultural cogs of colonization set in place by Galliéni were henceforward 
able to function and to allow France to establish its ascendancy once and 
for all. 
Yet, that same year of 1904 saw the beginning of a n e w period that 
was to be marked by the struggles of the Malagasy people against colonial 
oppression. 
F r o m colonization to the dawning of the national m o v e m e n t 
For the Malagasy people, the colonial situation meant that they had lost 
their freedom and dignity. While they sometimes still found a measure 
of continuity between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they felt the 
perpetual strain in their everyday lives of a foreign presence which, after 
having snatched power from them and turned them into a subject people, 
n o w exploited and oppressed them. France decided to 'civilize' the 
Malagasy people and 'assimilate' them, and hence to compel them to 
become something else or, in other words, to alienate them. This attempt 
to destroy the national personality and to change the way of life of the 
island's inhabitants sparked off a variety of reactions. 
F r o m the administrative standpoint, the colonial venture broke d o w n 
the long-established political framework. In Imerina, Galliéni abolished 
the monarchy on 28 February 1897 and the privileges of the aristocracy 
on 17 April. Elsewhere, however, he did not abolish the different dynasties, 
at least not de jure. O n the contrary, he started out by attempting, as the 
Minister had instructed him to do, to combat the Merina hegemony and 
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to embark on the 'politique des races' which had earlier been tried out in 
the Soudan (French West Africa) and Indochina. Former sovereigns or 
their sons were accordingly brought into the administration as 'native 
governors', while 'internal protectorates' were created a m o n g the extensive 
kingdoms in the west and south-west. This system did not prove satis-
factory, however, and from 1905 onwards the n u m b e r of Merina assistants 
was increased to a disproportionate degree, since the Merina were regarded 
as being more suitable material for 'progress and adaptation' than the other 
peoples. Finally, Galliéni introduced French settlers (colons) and Asian 
immigrant workers into the n e w colony which greatly alienated the 
indigenous people. Galliéni's 'Franco-Merina synthesis' was extended to 
cover the entire island, its key features being the fokonolona, the village 
communities, considered as having collective responsibility for their affairs, 
and the corvée or forced labour system, which was legally designated as 
the 'provision of services' in 1907 and was brought into general use between 
1908 and 1915.23 This entailed the defacto abandonment of the 'politique 
des races', the abolition in 1909 of the two regional schools on the coast, 
one at Analalava on the north-west coast and the other at M a h a n o r o on 
the east coast (the third was in Antananarivo) which had been set up by 
Galliéni as breeding-grounds for potential civil servants, and the phasing-
out of the 'internal protectorates'. T h e finishing touches were put to the 
territorial unification of Madagascar with three measures. T h e first was 
the standardization of the administration (between 1927 and 1932, three 
attempts were m a d e to define the boundaries of administrative districts). 
T h e second was the widespread introduction of administrative fokonolona 
as the m e d i u m for the exercise of authority. T h e third was the setting 
up of a restrictive body of law with the institution, in 1901, of the 'native 
code' (indigénat), forming the basis for dispensing administrative justice 
in which the judiciary and the executive were merged. While, in the case 
of the Merina, these measures descended in a direct line from the reforms 
introduced by Rainilaiarivony and pointed to a degree of continuity between 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in other regions they represented 
a complete break with the past and entailed far-reaching changes that were 
not always understood by the Malagasy and were consequently often 
resisted. 
For the Malagasy, colonization also meant the economic exploitation 
of the island by the expatriate minority. Very early on, this so-called 
'development' of the colony came up against the problem of m a n p o w e r 
resources. After Galliéni had reintroduced the Merina royal fanompoana 
and had decided to extend it to the whole of the island in 1896 and 1897, 
thereby compelling every able-bodied Malagasy male between the ages of 
16 and 60 to furnish fifty days of unpaid labour a year, the Office Central 
du Travail was established in 1900 and was charged with the task of 
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facilitating the recruitment of workers for private firms. F a c e d with the 
resistance of the Malagasy to any form of recruitment, the administration 
took over a n d , in 1926, established the Service d e la M a i n d ' O e u v r e p o u r 
les T r a v a u x d'Intérêt Général ( S M O T I G ) , w h i c h required conscripts not 
actually called u p for military service to w o r k for three years - subsequently 
reduced to t w o years - on the colony's construction sites. T h e S M O T I G , 
w h i c h w a s regarded by the Malagasy as being 'slavery in disguise', w a s 
deeply resented not only b y the people w h o w e r e c o m m a n d e e r e d but also 
b y 'voluntary' w a g e labourers w h o lost their jobs as a result. 
T h e colonial oppression w a s further aggravated b y the forcible takeover 
of land, w h i c h w a s then distributed to colon settlers. U n d e r a decree 
promulgated in 1926, the state w a s declared o w n e r of 'all vacant a n d 
ownerless land not developed, enclosed or granted b y w a y of a concession 
as of the date of promulgation of the decree'.2 4 Thenceforth, the good 
land w a s monopol ized by the administration a n d the settlers encroached 
o n the native reserves, while the Malagasy n o longer had any title to o w n e r -
ship over their ancestral lands. T h e areas m o s t affected b y this land take-
over, which w a s greatly resented b y the Malagasy , were the north-western 
a n d eastern seaboards. 
T h e s e e conomic changes a n d the political upheavals they engendered 
inevitably caused social a n d cultural transformations. T h e very w a y of life 
of the clan societies of the coastal regions w a s u n d e r m i n e d a n d they were 
threatened with progressive decay or structural b r e a k d o w n . Confiscation 
of the m o s t fertile land; the heavy tax b u r d e n which compelled whole 
populations — like the Atandroy in 1921 - to emigrate to the plantations 
of R é u n i o n a n d the north-west of the island; the forced redeployment of 
workers; the dissemination of formal schooling a n d Christianity; the 
departure of Malagasy soldiers to France to take part in the First W o r l d 
W a r ; the abolition of slavery; the humiliation of the noble faction - all 
these factors brought about drastic changes in the social structures, caused 
the break u p of a n u m b e r of clans, a n d debased ancestral values a n d 
practices. In Imerina, the vastly increased n u m b e r of schools a n d the w h o l e -
sale recruitment of junior civil servants gave rise to d i smay both in the 
ranks of the former oligarchy w h i c h h a d been deprived o f its p o w e r b y 
the conquest a n d a m o n g the n e w elite trained in the colonial schools, w h o 
gained the impression that they had been 'deliberately debarred from 
positions of responsibility b y the colonial system'. 2 5 
T h u s , colonial oppression affected all the different levels of Malagasy 
society, even though its forms differed in the different regions, and it 
provoked different reactions. 
24. L . Rabearimanana, 1980, p. 58. 
25. A . Spacensky, 1970, p. 24. 
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T h e first reactions in opposition to the colonial system 
In 1904, at a time w h e n effective occupation was regarded as being over, 
the colonizers were nevertheless aware of just h o w precarious the situation 
was. Their apprehensions were confirmed by the insurrection of 1904-5 
in the south-east of the island. T h e uprising which broke out in November 
1904 in the province of Farafangana spread very quickly westwards, as 
a result of the traditional contacts that had existed in historical times 
between the eastern peoples and the Bara (see Fig. 10.3). T h e solidarity 
of the clans in the face of the c o m m o n e n e m y accounted for the speed 
at which the movement spread, while the geographical setting, with its 
forests and escarpments, offered an explanation for the difficulties 
encountered by the forces sent to put d o w n the rebellion. T h e insurgents 
- led by chiefs belonging both to the Bara clans (such as Befanoha) and 
to the south-eastern clans (such as Mahavelo and the Masianaka group 
and Resohiry from the Vangaindrano region), or by dissident militiamen 
like Corporal Kotavy - attacked military posts at Amparihy, Begogo and 
Esira, and concessions, including the Emeraude, where they killed the 
owner, Lieutenant Conchon. Locally recruited infantrymen deserted their 
posts at Tsivory and Bekitro, or joined the rebellion, as in the case of 
Antanimora. 
Galliéni explained away the insurrection by claiming that it was due 
to the mentality of the local people 'with their warlike disposition' and 
'their attractive conception of disorder and plunder'. Victor Augagneur, 
his successor, saw the reasons as lying in the 'surfeit of administration' 
(increased taxation, abuses in tax collection, and the tyrannical attitude 
of heads of military posts or isolated settlers). These explanations were 
inadequate, since they overlooked an essential aspect of the insurrection 
(the struggle for the recovery of freedom) and the organizational ability 
of the insurgents, w h o attacked all those w h o personified the colonial 
administration, whether they were French occupying forces or Malagasy 
civil servants or schoolteachers. By way of conclusion to his study of the 
1904 rebellion, G . Jacob states that it undoubtedly had a twofold 
significance: 'it was a fight for independence and a struggle against colonial 
exploitation'.26 T h e suppression of this first revolt against the oppression 
of the administration forced the Malagasy to seek other forms of struggle. 
O n e of the most widespread forms of anti-colonial response was passive 
resistance: a refusal to comply with orders; the rejection of everything that 
was regarded as a sign of 'civilization' but was closely bound up with 
colonization and the foreign presence; keeping children away from school, 
which was looked upon in some circles as merely being a form of 'colonial 
forced labour'; and abandonment of the villages created along the roads 
in the south in an attempt to keep the population together. These refusals 
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fig. 10.3 Resistance, insurrection and nationalism in Madagascar, 1896-1935
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to co-operate did not seem dangerous to the colonizers, w h o believed that 
peace had finally been established in Madagascar in 1905. But then, 
suddenly, in 1915, the revolt of the Sadiavahe — the nickname given to 
the insurgents — broke out in the south-west, while in Antananarivo the 
police discovered the existence of a secret society known as Vy Vato 
Sakelika or V V S - 'strong and hard like stone and iron' (see Fig. 10.3). 
T h e Sadiavahe movement (1915-17) was an armed peasant uprising 
which first began on the left bank of the river Menarandra in early February 
1915 and spread very quickly to the districts of Ampanihy and Tsihombe. 2 7 
T h e Sadiavahe stole cattle, attacked villages, cut telegraph wires, and 
withdrew into hiding-places well away from the posts controlled by the 
administration. T h e y formed bands ranging in number from ten to forty 
m e m b e r s at most, were extremely mobile, and scoured wide areas of the 
south. A m o n g the reasons w h y entire villages gave open or clandestine 
support to the Sadiavahe were the virtually chronic poverty of the popula-
tion as a result of the very infrequent but violent rainfall, the imposition 
of a cattle tax, and the far-reaching effects of the First World W a r which 
had led to the mobilization of reservists, tax increases, food shortages and 
insufficient cash earnings to pay taxes. 
In Antananarivo, seven students from the capital's medical school, which 
was the only institution providing tuition for the highest degree then open 
to Malagasy nationals, created the V V S in July 1913, just after the publica-
tion of a series of articles written by the Protestant minister Ravelojaona 
under the title of 'Japan and the Japanese'.28 These articles called on the 
Malagasy to model themselves on Japan, where modernism and tradition 
had been so skilfully blended. T h e students were joined by clerks and office 
workers and primary-school teachers. T h e anticlericalism of Augagneur, 
the governor-general from 1905 to 1910, and the campaign conducted 
against the missions, gave a fresh lease of life to the Tranozozoro, whose 
ministers demanded a 'free church in a free country',29 both in their 
sermons and in their writings. A s they campaigned against 'French atheism' 
and the adoption of 'false French ways', the intelligentsia stressed the 
national tradition of the Protestant faith whose democratic structures could 
become a refuge for the resistance.30 They also drew attention to and 
fostered Malagasy cultural nationalism, through a literary renaissance, the 
restoration to prominence of certain periods in the country's past, and the 
revival of ancient rites for gaining admission into the secret society. 
Although the V V S was a clandestine organization, it expressed its opinions 
openly in the press by calling on the Malagasy to sacrifice themselves for 
their homeland, so that its people could advance and live in freedom and 
dignity. As the bearer of a national message, this secret society was an 
27. F . Esoavelomandroso, 1975, pp. 135-69. 
28. F . Esoavelomandroso, 1981, pp. 100-11. 
29. S. Ayache and C . Richard, 1978, p. 176. 
30. J. Fremigacci, 1980, p. u . 
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intolerable challenge to the administration, especially in wartime. T h e very 
harsh sentences meted out in the form of hard labour, deportation to the 
c a m p at Nosy Lava, banning of the newspaper whose editors were 
implicated in the affair, and dismissal from the civil service; the changes 
m a d e in school curricula in order to delete the teaching of history - a 
subject regarded as a vehicle for ideas about freedom and equality that 
offered too m u c h scope for speculation - the increased importance attached 
to the French language; the greater prominence given to local dialects in an 
attempt to belittle the Merina dialect, which had been imposed as a national 
language some years earlier - all these were measures which showed h o w 
conscious the colonizers had become of the nascent nationalism within the 
elite and h o w m u c h they feared its consequences. T h e outcome of these 
repressive measures was that the Malagasy were prompted to abandon their 
clandestine action and, from then onwards, to switch openly to channelling 
their political demands through press campaigns, the establishment of trade 
unions, and so on. 
Struggles to recover dignity 
T h e decade following the First World W a r was an important period because 
of the growing awareness displayed throughout the country in the prepara-
tion and consolidation of a national movement. T h e beginning of this 
decisive turning-point in Malagasy history can be dated from the return 
of the ex-servicemen to Madagascar. 
Basking in glory, these war veterans, w h o were convinced that they had 
served France in the same way as any Frenchman, demanded the same 
rights as those the French enjoyed, and they were supported in this by 
a large number of their compatriots. Faced with the attitude of the press 
and the chamber of commerce, which were opposed to wholesale naturaliza-
tion, they gradually drew a distinction between two images of France: the 
one far-off but generous and the other close at hand and unjust. Under 
the leadership of Ralaimongo, therefore, they embarked on a long-drawn-
out struggle to obtain French citizenship. 
Ralaimongo (1884-1942), w h o had been successively a Protestant 
primary-school teacher, a clerk, and a student in Paris, and w h o was an 
ex-serviceman, a socialist and a freemason, was the true founder of the 
national movement. T h e circles he had frequented in Paris, which had 
consisted of pacifists, socialists and radicals, and especially the members 
of the Ligue des Droits de l ' H o m m e , had a profound influence on him. 
W h e n he returned to Madagascar in 1922, he settled in Diego Suarez, 
which was an ideal environment for spreading propaganda because of the 
presence of the workers at the naval arsenal and the complexity of the 
land-tenure problems in the Mahavavy plain and the Antalaha region. Until 
M a y 1929, it was Diego Suarez rather than Antananarivo that was the 
focal point of the national movement which, besides agitating for equal 
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rights, denounced the intolerable abuses of the colonial system, such as 
the land expropriations in the north-west and around Lake Alaotra, the 
absence of liberties, the despotism and high-handedness of the administra-
tion, and the racial segregation displayed in the attempts to check the 
outbreak of plague at Tamatave and in the highlands in 1921. T h e 
originality of Ralaimongo's approach can be seen from the novel methods 
he used. T h e watchwords of the campaign set in motion against the colonial 
system were legality and legitimacy, on the grounds that Madagascar had 
been declared a French colony by the law of 6 August 1896 annexing the 
island, and that all French laws should accordingly be applied there. 
Successful representations were m a d e to the business community, which 
showed more drive than the members of the civil service w h o were afraid 
of administrative sanctions, and the movement was, in fact, financed by 
traders, especially those in the capital. 
T h e Ralaimongo group, which was strengthened by the support of 
Ravoahangy, a former m e m b e r of the V V S ; E m m a n u e l Razafindrakoto; 
A b r a h a m Razafy, secretary of the Antananarivo branch of the French S F I O 
trade union; and Jules Ranaivo, was joined by several left-wing Europeans, 
including Albertini, a lawyer, Dussac, Planque and Vittori. In an endeavour 
to present and defend their demands, from 1927 onwards they published 
two newspapers - L'Opinion in Diego Suarez, and L'Aurore Malgache in 
Antananarivo - which had to contend with all sorts of petty reprisals on 
the part of the administration. At the political level, the group demanded 
'the management of the overall interests of the country by a Council-
General with extended powers', the abolition of the Government-General 
and the representation of Madagascar in the French government.31 
In parallel with the action of the Ralaimongo group, religious agitation 
flared up again in the Tranzozoro cult. Renewed controversy between the 
Malagasy congregation and the European Protestant ministers only ended 
in 1929, with the judgement handed d o w n by the Conseil du Contentieux 
recognizing the Tranzozoro as an indigenous mission. F r o m then onwards, 
the sect agitated for self-government under cover of a movement preaching 
religious autonomy, whose leaders were followers of Ralaimongo and 
Dussac. 
Having organized, with Ralaimongo and Ravoahangy, the 'Pétition des 
Indigènes de Madagascar', demanding French citizenship, the abolition 
of the indigénat judicial regime and the application of the social and cultural 
benefits introduced under the Third Republic, Dussac arrived in 
Antananarivo in M a y 1929 to explain the petition's aims. A conference, 
which was planned for 19 M a y but which 'Malagasy subjects' were barred 
from attending, turned into a vast procession in the streets of the capital, 
in which thousands of demonstrators chanted rebellious slogans such as 
'Long live freedom and the right of assembly!' and ' D o w n with the 
31. A. Spacensky, 1970, p. 30. 
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indigénatV This first mass demonstration marked a decisive stage in the 
growth of the nationalist m o v e m e n t (see Fig. 10.3). T h e events of 19 M a y 
1929 represented both the culmination of the struggle for equality and 
the starting-point of the demands for independence. T h e y also marked 
the beginning of authentic political militancy, in the shape of propaganda 
campaigns, the creation of political cells and parties, and the emergence 
of a broad-based and varied press. Ralaimongo, w h o had been exiled to 
Port Berge, encouraged the peasants to engage in the type of resistance 
practised by Gandhi in India. In 1931, he openly mooted the idea of 
independence in response to a speech by Paul Reynaud, the Minister of 
the Colonies, which rejected the case for wholesale naturalization. In 
L'Opinion of 20 July 1934, Ravoahangy evoked 'the natural and inalienable 
right to form a free and independent nation'. F r o m 1935 onwards, other 
newspapers that were openly nationalistic in outlook began to appear. Both 
Ny Fierenena malagasy ( 'The Malagasy Nation') and Ny Rariny ('Justice') 
constantly urged that Madagascar must become free. T h e m o v e m e n t w a s 
losing m o m e n t u m , however. In fact, 'the business communi ty had been 
hard-hit by the economic crisis and withdrew its support . . . Civil servants 
were afraid of compromising themselves and of losing their jobs. T h e 
Protestant ministers were embarrassed at the political turn taken by 
developments and retreated into their churches. T h e Malagasy middle class 
was terribly prone to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and preferred the direct 
and personal benefits accruing from French citizenship.'32 It would take 
the Popular Front to give the m o v e m e n t fresh impetus. 
Conclusion 
T h e armed, but scattered and uncoordinated resistance of the people of 
Madagascar to the French conquest did not prevent the colonial system 
from being established. But the logic of colonialism and the traumatic shock 
suffered by the Malagasy, threatened as they were with the loss of their 
identity, prompted them to take u p several forms of combat in a bid to 
recover, their dignity. T h e struggles against colonial oppression fostered 
the birth and vigorous growth of the national m o v e m e n t , even though, 
in 1935 as in 1940, too m a n y regional, religious and social dissensions 
prevented a clear-cut awareness of all that colonialism implied and 
accounted for the apparently unshakeable position of the administration. 
32. F. Koerner, 1968, p. 18. 
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Liberia and Ethiopia, 
1880-1914: the survival of 
two African states 
M . B. A K P A N 
based on contributions from A . B . Jones 
and R . Pankhurst 
'Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands unto G o d ' . Blessed, glorious 
promise! O u r trust is not to be in chariots or horses . . . [but in] the 
Lord. A n d surely, in reviewing our [African] history as a people, 
whether w e consider our preservation in the lands of our exile or the 
preservation of our fatherland from invasion, w e are compelled to 
exclaim: Hitherto hath the Lord helped us.1 
(Edward W . Blyden, Liberian scholar, 1862). 
Ethiopia has need of no one; she stretches out her hands unto G o d . 2 
(Menelik II, Emperor of Ethiopia, 1893). 
W e have realized as never before that this is an era of a N e w 
Diplomacy, a diplomacy which is not bound by the cardinal principles 
of international law or even of natural justice or equity, where small 
nations are concerned . . . Great states meet and partition small states 
without any consultation of the latter; and they are helpless as they 
have no adequate army or navy to meet force with force.4 
(Arthur Barclay, President of Liberia, 1907). 
T h e quotations above show the bond, however tenuous, that bound Liberia 
and Ethiopia, and particularly the c o m m o n predicament that derived from 
aggression committed against both states by European powers engaged in 
the Scramble for the partition of Africa (1880-1914). This chapter is 
therefore a comparative study of historical developments in the two states 
particularly during the crucial period of the Scramble and partition when 
European powers imposed colonial rule on most of Africa. After introducing 
their territories, peoples, and governments, the chapter examines h o w 
Liberia and Ethiopia were challenged and affected by, or responded to, the 
strategies and processes whereby Europeans imposed their rule on Africa; 
1. E . W . Blyden, 1864, p. 358. 
2. R . Pankhurst, 1976. 
3. A . Barclay, F . E . R . Johnson and T . M . Stewart, 'Report of Liberian Commission 
to Europe in re Franco-Liberian Frontier', in Liberian National Archives (LNA) , file 
entitled Executive President: Presidential Commissions (EPPC). 
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w h y both states escaped European rule; and the major political, economic 
and social changes that occurred in them. 
Liberia and Ethiopia on the eve of the Scramble for Africa 
Liberia 
Liberia was technically a colony of the American Colonization Society 
( A C S ) which founded it in 1822 with the assistance of the United States 
government for settling 'free' Afro-Americans willing to flee the oppression 
of slavery and white racism, and recaptured Africans ('Recaptives') rescued 
on the Atlantic waters from slave ships by American naval vessels. 
Monrovia, established in 1822 by the pioneer Afro-American emigrants, 
formed Liberia's nucleus. Thereafter, up to about 1906, over 18000 N e w 
World Africans mostly aided by the A C S settled, annually, in Liberia in 
congeries of over thirty towns close to the Atlantic littoral on land obtained 
by the A C S or the Liberian government from the African chiefs of the 
region. Almost all of them were Afro-Americans, but at least 400 were 
Afro-West Indians from Barbados w h o emigrated in 1865 and settled 
together at Crozierville, 13 k m inland from Monrovia. Over 5000 
Recaptives - mostly from the Congo region - were also settled, particularly 
between 1844 and 1863, initially in the care of the Americo-Liberians -
as the N e w World African settlers and their descendants were collectively 
designated.4 
Needing land for farming, trade, and for building a great nation, and 
faced with some competition from the British and the French seeking land 
to build trading factories and military stations, the Americo-Liberians 
greatly expanded Liberia's territory from the few isolated points on the 
coast initially leased to them by African chiefs. B y December 1875, w h e n 
the expansion virtually ceased, Liberia allegedly stretched for 960 k m along 
the Atlantic coast and between 320 and 400 k m inland and hypothetically 
as far as the River Niger (see Fig. n . 1 ) . It embraced the Americo-Liberian 
and Recaptive settlements and peoples and the indigenous African ethnic 
groups and their territories. These groups included the Vai, Dei, Bassa, 
K r u and Grebo near the coast; and the Gola, Kissi, Bandi, Kpele, L o m a , 
and Mandingo further inland.5 
T h e Americo-Liberians practised an essentially western culture in their 
life style, political institutions, through the use of the English language, 
individual ownership and perpetual alienation of land, and their adherence 
to Christianity and m o n o g a m y . T h e indigenous Africans were Traditiona-
lists or Muslims, spoke their o w n languages, and held land communally. 
Their villages were governed by chiefs and elders assisted by age-grade 
or socio-political organizations like the poro (for m e n ) and sande (for 
4. M . B. Akpan, 1973(b), pp. 217-23. 
5. M . B. Akpan, 1976, pp. 72-5. 
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w o m e n ) . Although they appreciated western education brought by the 
Americo-Liberians and white missionaries, some of their elders opposed 
the propagation of Christianity and other interference with their laws and 
customs. 
Lacking effective military might, trained administrative personnel, and 
funds, the Liberian government could not implement its plans for effective 
occupation of Liberian territory by building roads, railways, military and 
administrative posts and Americo-Liberian settlements across its length 
and breadth, or by co-operating with interior chiefs by paying them regular 
stipends and inviting them to 'represent' their people in the Liberian 
legislature as 'referees'. Hence w h e n the Europeans commenced their 
Scramble in about 1880 (culminating in the Berlin Conference of 1884-5), 
Liberia seemed likely to lose to them vast stretches of the territory she 
already claimed.6 T h e Liberian government was therefore concerned 
during the Scramble primarily to preserve territory it had already acquired. 
O n the eve of the Scramble, the internal development of Liberia had 
not undergone m u c h change since it had gained its independence from 
the American Colonization Society in 1847. T h e Legislature, modelled after 
the American Congress, consisted of a House of Representatives and a 
Senate. T h e Executive comprised the President and Vice-President elected 
biennially by the people, and cabinet members appointed by the President 
with the consent of the Senate. T h e Executive was represented in the county 
- the unit of local administration - by a county superintendent w h o headed 
the county's administration. In spite of the President's theoretically vast 
powers, owing to inadequate means of enforcing executive authority outside 
Monrovia, considerable political power was wielded by certain Americo-
Liberian families at the county level, sometimes extending over several 
generations, during the Republican and True W h i g regimes. Such families, 
described sarcastically by a Liberian critic as 'the lords and noblemen' 
of Liberia, included the Hoffs, Shermans and Watsons of Cape M o u n t ; 
the Barclays, Colemans, Coopers, Dennises, Grimeses, Howards, Johnsons, 
Kings and Morrises of Montserrado; the Harmons and Horaces of Grand 
Bassa; the Birches, Greenes, Grigsbys, Rosses and Witherspoons of Sinoe; 
and the Brewers, Dossens, Gibsons, T u b m a n s and Yancys of Maryland. 
These families constituted the political (and invariably the economic) elite.7 
Serious social cleavages, however, undermined Liberia's national unity. 
For example, the Republic's two political parties formed around independ-
ence in 1847 (the Republican, dominated by the mulatto settlers; and the 
6. R . W . Shufeldt, World Cruise: Liberia and the Liberian Boundary Dispute (Naval 
Historical Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D C ) , Shufeldt to Coppinger, Fernando Po, 8 M a y 1879. 
7. L N A , Executive Department: Correspondence General i88j—t8gg, Ross to Cheeseman, 
Greenville, 12 July 1892 ( E D C G 1887-1899); Liberian Letters, 15, Dennis to Coppinger, 
Monrovia, 22 August 1871; Sierra Leone Weekly News, 3 June 1899; L N A , Liberian Legisla-
ture, Minutes of the Senate, 1848-1900. 
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True W h i g , dominated by the black settlers, the Congos and the educated 
indigenous Africans) lacked fundamental ideological or political differences 
and therefore tended to engage in sterile, acrimonious, biennial electioneer-
ing for political ascendancy to control the Republic's vast patronage system. 
T h e Republicans ruled Liberia from Independence to 1870, when they 
were overthrown by the True Whigs , but they regained power in 1871 
only to lose it again to the True Whigs in 1877. T h e True Whigs then 
ruled Liberia continuously until 1980 w h e n they were overthrown in a 
coup led by Master-Sergeant (now General) Samuel D o e . 
M o r e fundamental has been the cleavage between the Americo-Liberians 
and Liberia's indigenous Africans. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
Americo-Liberians' policy was to assimilate the indigenous Africans 
culturally and politically by 'civilizing' and Christianizing them, and giving 
them equal rights with the settlers. Although this was achieved to some 
extent with the Recaptives (who were m u c h less numerous than the settlers), 
the Americo-Liberians, mindful of their o w n privileged position, main-
tained tight political control over Liberia by restricting political participa-
tion of even those indigenous Africans w h o were educated. Only very few 
of them were given the franchise on an equal footing with the Americo-
Liberians (although these might themselves be illiterate and poor). T h e 
main indigenous African representation (mostly of the coastal Africans) 
in the Liberian Legislature as from 1875 consisted of African chiefs 
designated 'referees' (or 'delegates'), after their chiefdoms had paid an 
annual 'delegate fee' of $100 to the Liberian government. A s the delegates 
'spoke' through an interpreter solely on ethnic matters and could not vote, 
they had very little influence on government policy.8 Hence both the 
educated Africans and the chiefs resented their restricted representation. 
Furthermore the Liberian government sought to maximize its import 
and export duties and other levies on trade and shipping which constituted 
its main sources of revenue. T o facilitate collection and control of the 
external trade by Americo-Liberian merchants, from 1839 the government 
restricted foreign merchants to trade at only six Americo-Liberian ports-
of-entry. T h e restrictions and levies alienated both the foreign merchants 
w h o resented them, and the indigenous African chiefs w h o had formerly 
controlled the external trade and levied the dues. Often, the foreign 
merchants and chiefs combined to resist or defy the trade restrictions and 
levies, or to appeal to European states to intervene on their behalf. T h u s , 
at various times during the nineteenth century, the Vai, K r u and Grebo 
8. Only during the presidency of William V . S . T u b m a n (1944-71) were reforms 
introduced to give the Africans almost equal rights with Americo-Liberians and indigenous 
African elites assimilated to their way of life. T h e rights included extension in 1944 of 
the franchise to all adult indigenous African males w h o paid a hut tax of $2, which did 
away with the 'delegate' system; and the extension of the county system of the Americo-
Liberian communities to all parts of Liberia, which abolished the colonial-type system 
of 'indirect rule'. 
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of the Liberian coast put up an armed resistance to Liberian government 
impositions on their trade.9 
Ethiopia 
After over a hundred years of disunity, the ancient Ethiopian empire was 
revived by Emperor Tewodros II (1855-68). B y defeating the powerful, 
frequently warring feudal rulers (or rases) of Ethiopia's Tigre, Begemdir, 
Gojjam, Simien, Wello and Shoa provinces, over which the puppet emperor 
at Gondar had hardly any control, Tewodros reunited the empire during 
the early years of his reign under his strong rule (see Fig. 11.2).I0 These 
provinces, located mostly on the high Ethiopian plateau from Eritrea to 
the Awash valley, were peopled predominantly by the Agaws , Amharas and 
Tigreans. These peoples professed the dominant Amhara-Tigrean culture 
characterized partly by Monophysite Christianity of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church, the closely related Amharic and Tigrean languages, a 
socio-political structure comprising 'a hierarchy of superior-inferior 
relations held together by powerful authority figures', and an agriculture-
based economy that generated 'a strong attachment to land' and 'a 
corresponding network of land-based rights and services' usually associated 
with feudalism. ' ' 
Reunited under Tewodros, the Amhara-Tigre core formed, as did 
Monrovia and other Americo-Liberian settlements in Liberia, the spring-
board for Ethiopia's further expansion during the second half of the 
nineteenth century into the lands of the surrounding, mostly lowland 
populations over some of w h o m the imperial government had at various 
earlier times occasionally exercised a 'shifting and often uneasy' relationship 
or jurisdiction.12 T h e Amhara-Tigre core was, however, not monolithic 
but was divided politically by regional rivalries, and physically by ravines 
and highlands which hindered communication and transportation. 
Tewodros's subjugation of the rases with superior imported arms, and 
his o w n eventual defeat in April 1867 by a British punitive force dramatized 
to Ethiopian leaders the significance of modern weapons for controlling 
the empire and containing political rivals or external aggression. 
A s Tewodros's successor, Emperor Yohannes IV (1871-89), was, as will 
be seen below, preoccupied with repelling Egyptian and Sudanese Mahdist 
aggression. Further Ethiopian expansion - over Ethiopia's so-called 
'historic lands', to over twice Ethiopia's size - occurred mostly under 
Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) whose reign coincided with the European 
Scramble for Africa.13 
9. J. D . Hargreaves, 1963, p. 243. 
10. R . Greenfield, 1965, p. 70; P. Gilkes, 1975, pp. 9—10. 
11. C . Clapham in R . Lemarchand (ed.), 1977, pp. 36, 37. 
12. H . G . Marcus, 1975, p. 140. 
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B y the time of Menelik's reign, the political culture of Ethiopia had 
already crystallized. T h e Ethiopian imperial system was organized at three 
basic levels: district or seignorey, province, and nation; and on three separate 
axes: the economic, political and religious. T h e lord, governor and emperor, 
ruling respectively over the district, province and empire and related to one 
another in a 'hierarchy of superior-inferior relations' constituted the pillars 
of the system since each was 'at once governor, judge, military leader and 
courtier'. A s a rule the emperor appointed the provincial governors w h o in 
turn appointed the lords or sub-governors over the districts into which his 
province was divided. 
T h e lord possessed certain rights k n o w n as gulf, essentially the right 
to collect tribute in kind from each household in the district and to 
appropriate labour for work on his farms or on other projects he might 
designate. Part of the tribute was retained for his o w n use, and the 
remainder was transmitted to his overlord - the provincial governor. H e 
adjudicated cases and disputes in the district, mobilized and c o m m a n d e d 
the local militia, and organized public works to develop the district (besides 
ensuring that his 'parish', often coterminous with the district, discharged 
its obligations to the local Ethiopian Orthodox church).14 A s a rule, the 
obligations due to the lord or church from the district's population, based 
primarily on their attachment to land for livelihood, were comparatively 
light in the Amhara-Tigre core provinces. There, land was owned and 
controlled by the rist system, that is, mostly by individual lineages; it was 
practically inalienable and was therefore unavailable for distribution by 
the emperor or governor for patronage purposes. T h e obligations were 
heavy in the regions in the south and west conquered by Menelik, where 
the lords and naftanyas (literally 'gunbearers': settlers from the Abyssinian 
highlands) greatly exploited the people partly through gult rights and 
obligations.15 
T h e provincial governors performed functions similar to those of the 
lords but on a larger scale. Those in the Amhara-Tigre core were recruited 
mostly from the emperor's close relatives or from local noblemen presumed 
loyal to the emperor. Governors of the newly conquered regions in the 
south and west where alienable land was available, were predominantly 
A m h a r a , Shoan, Tigrean or other northern noble or military m e n w h o 
received gult rights (or rut-gult land in lieu of governorship) for their 
services to the emperor. T h u s continued loyalty to the governor or emperor 
greatly depended on the availability of gult for rewards, and of military 
power to enforce authority. ' 6 
T h e emperor was the most important single factor in the imperial system. 
H e performed institutionalized executive, legislative, and judicial functions 
14. D . N . Levine, 1974, pp. 114-20; P. Gilkes, 1975, pp. 13-14. 
15. ibid. 
16. C . Clapham in R . Lemarchand (ed.), 1977; P. Gilkes, 1975, pp. 28-9; D . N . Levine, 
19747 PP- 120-1. 
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which have been classified by Christopher Clapham as 'protective', 'extrac-
tive and distributive', 'regulative', and 'symbolic'. T h e emperor personally 
led his army, managed imperial affairs, and dispensed justice and patronage. 
M o r e importantly perhaps, the emperor symbolized national unity and 
independence by virtue of his alleged descent from the Biblical King 
Solomon and his coronation and anointment by the abuna, the Egyptian 
head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.17 
T h e imperial system inherited by Tewodros lacked a notable 'historic 
bureaucracy'.18 Excepting comparatively few offices with well-defined 
functions like the Tsahafe Tezaz (Imperial Secretary) and the Afa-Negus 
(Chief Justice), the imperial administration was largely personalized in the 
emperor and his regional representatives: the governors and lords.19 
Tewodros himself attempted to create a bureaucracy by often replacing 
existing governors of aristocratic stock by paid army generals of humble 
birth, loyal to, and dependent on him. But the new governors were 
overthrown and replaced by pre-existing dynasties during widespread 
revolts against his increasingly harsh rule.20 
T h e similarities between Liberia's and Ethiopia's political systems were 
too obvious from the analysis thus far to belabour. Besides possessing a 
core and periphery, and a central government, each had sub-political 
systems centred on local chiefdoms (or villages) like those of the Gola in 
Liberia or the O r o m o ('Galla') in Ethiopia not discussed in this chapter, 
with political cultures more or less different from the dominant political 
culture at the centre. Both systems were solidly based on privilege at the 
core, and extensively utilized patronage and assimilation techniques. 
Nevertheless, whereas Ethiopia's imperial system was largely 'African', 
lacking political parties or parliament - Tewodros, Yohannes and Menelik 
became Emperor by virtue of their superior military power over their rivals, 
and not through the ballot box - Liberia's central government was 
thoroughly western. At any rate, each system possessed or developed the 
mechanisms and instruments necessary for containing European aggression 
unleashed by the Scramble and partition. 
European aggression on Liberian and Ethiopian territory, 
1 8 8 0 - 1 9 1 4 
Both Liberia and Ethiopia had enjoyed more or less amicable relations 
with the European powers up to 1879. During the period of the Scramble 
from the 1880s onwards, these relations began to change and both of them 
were subjected to varying degrees of European imperialist pressures and 
aggression with contrasting results and consequences. 
17. C . Clapham in R . Lemarchand (ed.), 1977, pp. 44-5. 
18. D . Crummey, 1969, p. 465. 
19. R . Pankhurst, 1967, p. 12. 
20. C . Clapham in R . Lemarchand (ed.), 1977, P- 47-
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Liberia 
Neither invited to, nor represented at, the Berlin Conference, Liberia at 
first refused to be bound by its decisions such as the principle of 'effective 
occupation' on the ground. A s Liberia's Secretary of State, E d w i n J. Barclay 
stated in June 1887, the Liberian view was that the Berlin decisions 'refer 
to further acquisitions of African territory by European powers and not 
to the present possessions or future acquisition of an African state'.21 T h e 
Liberians insisted, correctly, that being an African government and 
country, Liberia required no 'effective occupation' since all the inhabitants 
were Liberians. 
In the end, to avoid losing Liberia's entire hinterland, the Liberian 
government commenced measures from the late 1890s for effective 
occupation. Liberia's President from 1904 to 1911, Arthur Barclay, aptly 
stated the issues at stake, arguing in December 1906 that: 
Liberia was a recognized state long before the Berlin Conference . . . 
and there might be ground on its part to question some of the dicta 
laid d o w n at that Conference. But it is a fact that the great powers 
really settle the principles of international law. Small states must 
conform. It results, therefore, that w e are compelled to occupy our 
frontiers with a frontier guard, suitable officials, and give to the 
frontier district an organized government on civilized lines.22 
European imperialism in Liberia during the Scramble and partition 
occurred in three main forms: (1) expropriation of Liberian territory by 
European powers; (2) gross interference in Liberia's internal affairs by them 
and; (3) control of Liberia's economy by European merchants, financiers, 
concessionaires and entrepreneurs w h o enjoyed the confidence and 
patronage of these powers. European imperialist activities in Liberia further 
weakened and destabilized her. 
Heeding invitations by the Vai of north-western Liberia, and Sierra 
Leonean and British merchants stationed on the Vai coast, and mindful 
of Sierra Leone's commerce and revenue, Britain intervened from i860 
allegedly to protect the Vai and the merchants from Liberian impositions. 
After fruitless, intermittent discussions between British, Liberian and Vai 
representatives, Britain annexed most of the Vai chiefdoms to Sierra Leone 
in M a r c h 1882, although the Vai chiefs never desired British rule (save 
British intervention) (see Fig. 11.3).23 Liberians, stunned by the British 
action, but helpless, issued an emotional, ineffective ' M e m o r a n d u m and 
Protest' against the action, copies of which were sent to all nations with 
21. Quoted in M . B . Akpan, 1973(b), p. 223. 
22. A . Barclay, Annual Message, 11 December 1906, in Liberia Bulletin, N o . 30, February 
1907, p. 69 (hereafter, Bulletin). 
23. Public Record Office, K e w ( P R O ) , F O 84/1699, Derby to Havelock, 2 March 1883; 
Granville to Lowell, 10 March 1883. 
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which Liberia had treaty relations. It implored these nations to aid Liberia 
and to mediate 'to arrest a course of events which threaten her destruction'. 
A m o n g the few governments to reply was that of the United States, to 
which Liberians particularly looked for intervention to secure 'a just 
arrangement' of the boundary question. But the United States government 
promptly advised Liberia to acquiesce at the British action, which d i m m e d 
the hopes of the Liberians entirely. Most of the other nations appealed 
to were European and were themselves intensifying existing expansionism 
or about to seek territorial aggrandizement in Africa. Hence Liberia's appeal 
fell mostly on deaf or unsympathetic ears.24 In November 1885 Liberia 
signed an agreement with Britain which fixed the boundary with Sierra 
Leone at the River M a n o to Liberia's disadvantage. 
Similarly, the French annexed south-eastern Liberia between the Cavalla 
and San Pedro rivers in M a y 1891, taking advantage of its inhabitants' 
discontent with Liberia's trade policies and Liberia's lack of effective 
occupation of the district25 (see Fig. 11.3). O n c e again, the Liberians issued 
an emotional appeal to the 'civilized Christian nations of the world' to 
intercede on their behalf, but in vain.26 Helpless and powerless, Liberia 
concluded an agreement with France in December 1892 which fixed 
Liberia's boundary with the Ivory Coast at the Cavalla river and thereby 
gave France the C a valla-San Pedro district and a large slice of Liberia's 
hitherto undefined hinterland, purportedly in return for France relinquish-
ing her vague claims to Garraway, Buchanan and Butaw on the Liberian 
coast.27 
T o prevent further encroachments on Liberia, the Liberian government 
sent envoys to Washington and London in 1890 and 1892 respectively to 
obtain their commitment to the preservation of Liberia's territorial 
integrity; but neither would be committed.28 
Liberia lost further territory to Britain and France between 1892 and 
1914 as those powers advanced competitively to occupy Africa's heartland 
and subsequently demarcated their territories' boundaries with Liberia. 
Britain, hitherto confined to the Sierra Leone coast, annexed its 
hinterland in 1896 and imposed a colonial or 'native administration' over 
24. G . W . Gibson and A . F. Russell, 1883. 
25. African Colonization Society, Seventy-Seventh Annual Report, January 1894, 
pp. 9-10; E . Hertslet, 1909, Vol. Ill, pp. 1132-3. 
26. Maryland County, 'France versus Liberia: a document adopted by citizens of 
Maryland County against the Franco-Liberian Treaty now before the Liberian Senate -
urging the Senate to reject it, and praying France to refrain; and affirming by reference 
to Liberian deeds Liberia's right to the San Pedro Region' (February 1893) in L N A , 
Executive, Department of State, Domestic Correspondence ( E D S D C ) , 1855-1898. Also 
see United States National Archives ( U S N A ) Despatches of United States Ministers at 
Monrovia ( D U S M ) 11/70, M c C o y to Gresham, Monrovia, 27 April 1893. 
27. Archives Nationales, Paris: Franco-Liberian Boundary Agreement, 1892, M . 1 2 . 
8972; U S N A , D U S M 11/52, M c C o y to Foster, Monrovia, 1 February 1893. 
28. H . R . Lynch, 1967, p. 185. 
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it. T h e territory annexed included Kanre-Lahun, the principal town of 
the L u a w a chiefdom, with whose chief, Kai L u n d u , T . J. Alldridge had 
concluded a treaty in 1890 on behalf of the British government. B y 
1902, following some civil commotion, a British force had occupied 
Kanre-Lahun. 
T o forestall the British in Kanre-Lahun district, the Liberian govern-
ment established a 'native administration' by posting administrative and 
customs officials and a military unit there in February 1907. But the British 
force would not withdraw, even though the Governor of Sierra Leone, 
G . B . Haddon-Smith, w h o visited Kanre-Lahun that month and was 
escorted into it by the Liberian military unit, recognized the district as 
Liberian territory held by Britain 'temporarily' for Liberia.29 Rather, in 
June 1907, Liberia's Consul-General in London, Henry H a y m a n , informed 
President Barclay that the French and British governments were 'contem-
plating very serious measures' which might almost 'impair the independ-
ence of Liberia' unless Liberia's boundary with France's Ivory Coast and 
Guinea was settled.30 
M o v e d by this threat, President Barclay visited London and Paris in 
September 1907 to seek guarantees for Liberia's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. However, not only did both governments refuse to give any 
guarantees but the French government rather drew up, almost unilaterally, 
a boundary 'agreement' which gave France a further slice of Liberian 
territory beyond the M a k o n a river, and committed Liberia to establish 
military posts on the Franco-Liberian frontier 'which the French authori-
ties would be allowed to occupy [temporarily] if the resources of the 
Liberian Government do not allow her at the time to keep up a garrison 
there herself'.31 Barclay, understandably, initially refused to sign the 
'agreement' but was compelled to do so after the United States government, 
to which he had strongly appealed to intervene, advised him to sign on 
the grounds that 'if w e rejected it, the French would likely make further 
encroachments and w e would eventually suffer material loss of territory'.32 
This one-sided treaty settled part of the Franco-Liberian boundary 
problem. T h e solution of the rest was started in July 1908 when a joint 
Franco-Liberian commission began boundary limitation work.3 3 However, 
29. A . Barclay, Annual Message, December 1908; U S Department of State, Report of 
the Commission of the United States of America to the Republic of Liberia (Washington D C , 
October 1909); P R O , F O 267/65, H . H . Johnston, ' M e m o respecting the Americo-Liberian 
Occupation of North-West Liberia', 19 April 1907; F O 267/75, Haddon-Smith to Elgin, 
Freetown, 28 March 1907. 
30. Barclay to Lyon, Monrovia, 9 August 1907 enclosed in U S N A , D U S M 326/202, Lyon 
to Secretary, Monrovia, 9 August 1907; E P C G 1905-1912, Barclay to Lyon, 9 August 1907. 
31. E . Hertslet, 1909, Vol. H I , pp. 1140-1; R . L . Buell, 1928, Vol. II, p. 790. 
32. A . Barclay, F . E . R . Johnson and T . M . Stewart, 'Report of Liberia Commission to 
Europe in Re Franco-Liberian Matters, September 1907', in L N A , E P C E P G ; U S N A , 
D U S M (NF), 326/345, Ellis to Secretary, Monrovia, 12 January 1910. 
33. Cabinet Minutes, for 6 August 1909. 
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up to the mid 1920s the French still occasionally threatened to seize 
Liberia's territory. 
Apparently envious of the French gain of Liberian territory in 1907, 
Britain also insisted on acquiring the Kanre-Lahun district and in 
September 1908, instructed Major L e Mesurier, the Briton commanding 
the British troops stationed at Kanre-Lahun, to forbid the Liberian 
commissioners in the Kanre-Lahun district to perform administrative 
functions other than the collection of customs duties. A month later, L e 
Mesurier ordered them to remove their customs posts and to leave Kanre-
L a h u n altogether, as according to him, the new Liberian frontier with Sierra 
Leone was to be marked by the natural boundaries of the M o a and Mafissa 
rivers.34 
Between November 1909 and early 1910, the Liberian government tried 
in vain to secure the Kanre-Lahun district from the British by persuasion.35 
T h e matter was finally settled in January 1911 by an Anglo-Liberian treaty, 
by which Britain retained the Kanre-Lahun district but ceded to Liberia 
the m u c h less desirable territory between the Morro and M a n o rivers and 
paid £4000 'compensation' to the Liberian government with which to 
develop the territory ceded (see Fig. 11.3). (Liberia also w o n the right 
to free navigation of the M a n o river.) T h e final delimitation of the new 
Liberian-Sierra Leone boundary occurred in 1915. T h u s Liberia survived 
the British aggression but was mutilated and anguished.36 
Ethiopia 
European imperial designs against Ethiopia's territory and independence 
were no less diabolical than those directed against Liberia (see Fig. 11.4). 
Their beginnings could be traced to 1869 w h e n an Italian Lazarist mis-
sionary, Giuseppe Sapeto, purchased the Red Sea port of Assab from a 
local sultan for 6000 Maria Theresa dollars. T h e port became the property 
of a private Italian shipping company, the Societa Rubattino, and in 1882 
was declared an Italian colony.37 
Emperor Yohannes, though a notable patriot and a staunch adherent 
of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, was less immediately concerned with 
the advent of Italy than with the departure of Egypt.38 T h e latter then 
ruled m u c h of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden coasts of Africa, and their 
34. U S N A , D U S M (NF) 326/-, Lemadine to Barclay, 30 September 1908; P R O , F O 
367/209; Cooper to L e Mesurier, Gbonibu, 25 November 1909. 
35. R . L . Buell, 1928, Vol. II, pp. 784-9; U S N A , D U S M (NF) , 326/339, Ellis to 
Secretary, Monrovia, 6 January 1910. 
36. P R O , F O 367/233, Baldwin, 'Annual Report', 30 September 1911; A . Barclay, Annual 
Message, 12 December 1911. 
37. Italy, Ministero dell'Affari Esteri, Trattati, convensioni, accordi protocolli ed altri 
document! relativi all Africa (Roma, 1906). 1-25-6. 
38. For a brief Ethiopian chronicle of the reign of Yohannes see M . Chaîne, 1913. 
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immediate hinterlands, including the port of Massa w a and the city of Harar. 
Egypt, which had come under British occupation in 1882, was faced with 
the rebellion of the Sudanese M a h d ï , M u h a m m a d A h m a d , which caused 
Britain to decide in 1883 that the Sudan would have to be evacuated of 
Egyptian and British troops. Egyptian rule thereupon collapsed in the whole 
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area bordering Ethiopia. Since several Sudanese 
towns with Egyptian garrisons and European inhabitants were besieged 
by the Mahdists, Britain decided on enlisting Yohannes's help in their 
evacuation. A British officer, Rear-Admiral Sir William Hewett, was 
dispatched to negotiate with Yohannes w h o agreed to assist, but he also 
stipulated that territories on the Sudanese frontier recently occupied by 
Egypt should be returned to him. H e also asked for control of Massawa. 
His first demand was accepted, but, as for the port, Britain merely promised 
free transit 'under British protection' for Ethiopian goods, including arms 
and ammunition.39 A treaty embodying these principles was signed on 3 
June 1884, after which the notable Ethiopian warrior Ras Alula relieved six 
garrisons in the Sudan. 4 0 
T h e value of the agreement was, however, short-lived, for on 3 February 
1885, the Italians seized Massawa. T h e y did so with the consent of the 
British w h o favoured Italian expansion in the hope of curbing that of 
France, their principal rival in the Scramble for Africa. T h e Italian officer 
in charge of the occupation, Rear-Admiral Caimi, proclaimed to the 
inhabitants that this action was taken in agreement with the British and 
Egyptians, and promised: ' N o obstacle shall be put by m e on your trade; 
on the contrary, all m y exertions shall aim at facilitating it.'41 This 
profession, however, rapidly proved worthless, for the Italians soon stopped 
the supply of arms to Yohannes, and penetrated inland as far as the villages 
of Sahati and Wia . Ras Alula protested against this infiltration, but the 
Italians replied by fortifying the disputed areas, and by sending more troops 
which were intercepted by Ras Alula at Dogali in January 1887. T h e 
invaders thereupon evacuated Sahati and W i a , but, complaining of 
a 'massacre' at Dogali, blockaded all shipping bringing supplies to 
Ethiopia.42 
W a r between the Italians and Yohannes seemed imminent, but the 
former, anxious to avoid a difficult mountainous campaign, persuaded 
Britain to mediate. A British diplomat, Sir Gerald Portal, was dispatched 
to the Emperor to ask him to agree to an Italian occupation of Sahati and 
Wia , and of the Senahit or Bogos area which the Egyptians had ceded 
in 1884. W h e n these proposals were read out, Yohannes bluntly answered 
'I can do nothing with all this. B y the Treaty m a d e by Admiral Hewett, 
39. A . B . Wylde, 1901, pp. 472-4. 
40. ibid., p. 35. 
41. E . Hertslet, 1909, Vol. I, p. 8. 
42. O n contemporary Italian attitudes to the battle of Dogali and other events in the 
history of Italian expansion see A . Dejaco, 1972. 
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all the country evacuated by the Egyptians on m y frontier was ceded to 
m e at the instigation of England, and n o w you come to ask m e to give 
it up again.' Angered that Britain had thus departed from the treaty, he 
wrote to Queen Victoria, protesting that if she wished to m a k e peace it 
should be w h e n the Italians were in their country and the Ethiopians in 
theirs.43 
Yohannes, faced with the growing threat from Italy, strengthened his 
defences by moving up a garrison stationed on the Sudan frontier. Finding 
the area unguarded, the Mahdists attacked there. T h e emperor hastened 
to M a t a m m a to resist them, but at the close of a victorious battle on 10 
March 1889, was mortally wounded by a stray bullet. N e w s of his death 
caused his army to disintegrate. There was great confusion throughout 
northern Ethiopia, the more so as the country was suffering from a serious 
cattle plague and famine followed by epidemics of smallpox and cholera.44 
During this period of difficulty the Italians advanced rapidly inland. B y 
the end of 1889 they had occupied a stretch of the northern plateau where 
they established their colony of Eritrea with its capital at Asmara. 4 5 
During m u c h of Emperor Yohannes's grim resistance against Egyptian 
and Italian aggression, Menelik, Shoa's ruler and nominally subordinated 
to the emperor, maintained cordial relations with Italy (see Plate 11.1). 
Contact with Italy was valuable to Menelik, for the Italian envoy, Count 
Antonelli, the only foreign diplomat more or less permanently at his court, 
provided convenient access to Europe and her technology; besides, the 
Italians supplied him with several physicians as well as numerous firearms. 
A s a consequence of this friendship with Italy, Menelik was able as King 
of Shoa (1865-89) to forcibly acquire the rich regions of Arussi, Harar, 
Kulo and Konta to the south and south-east, and Gurage and Wallaga 
to the south-west.46 Italy for its part regarded Menelik's co-operation as 
a useful, if in the long run dispensable, asset in its expansionist ambitions. 
This friendship culminated on 2 M a y 1889 - less than two months after 
the death of Emperor Yohannes — in a Treaty of Peace and Amity signed 
between Menelik and Italy at the Ethiopian village of Wuchale. 
T h e Wuchale (Italian: Uccialli) treaty, which was to constitute a turning-
point in the relations between the two countries, contained articles of benefit 
to both. In it Menelik recognized Italian sovereignty over the greater part 
of the Eritrean plateau, including Asmara, while Italy recognized him as 
emperor - the first such recognition he had been accorded - and promised 
that he could import arms and ammunition through Italian territory. T h e 
most important section of the treaty, however, was Article X V I I which 
was soon in dispute. T h e quarrel arose from the fact that the treaty had 
43. G . L . Portal, 1892, p. 158. 
44. R . Pankhurst, 1966. 
45. A . B . Wylde, 1901, p. 49. 
46. H . G . Marcus in L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1969, pp. 422-4; R . Greenfield, 
1965, pp. 98-9. 
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two texts, one in Amharic and the other in Italian. T h e sense of Article 
X V I I differed materially between the two versions. T h e Amharic version 
stated that Menelik could avail himself of the services of the Italian 
authorities for all communications he might wish to have with other powers; 
the Italian text made this obligatory.47 
T h o u g h the Italian text of this article was soon used by Italy to claim 
a protectorate over Ethiopia, relations between the two countries remained 
cordial for several months . 4 8 Menelik dispatched his cousin, Ras 
M a k o n n e n , the governor of Harar, to Italy in July 1889 to negotiate 
implementation of the agreement, while General Baldissera, the officer in 
charge of Italian expansion, advanced further into the Eritrean plateau in 
accordance with the Wuchale treaty. O n 2 August he issued a proclamation 
for the occupation of Asmara, while on 1 October Ras M a k o n n e n signed 
an additional convention to the Wuchale treaty in R o m e . In it Italy again 
recognized Menelik as emperor, while the latter recognized Italy's 
sovereignty over the Red Sea colony on the basis of the frontiers in existence 
at the time. Provision was also made for an Italian bank loan of 4000000 
lire.49 
Ideas of co-operation were, however, almost immediately dashed, for on 
11 October the Italian Foreign Minister Crispi announced that 'in 
conformity with article X X X I V of the perpetual treaty between Italy and 
Ethiopia . . . His Majesty the King of Ethiopia consents to avail himself 
of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy for the conduct of 
all matters which he m a y have with other Powers or Governments.'5 0 
Crispi's announcement, though phrased in a roundabout manner, thus 
constituted an unequivocal Italian claim to a protectorate over Ethiopia. 
Italy's claim was duly recognized by the European powers. Cartographers 
in Europe described the country on their m a p s as 'Italian Abyssinia', and 
when Menelik informed the powers of his coronation as emperor, scheduled 
for 3 N o v e m b e r 1889, they replied, to his chagrin, that since Ethiopia was 
a protectorate they could not deal with him directly but only through Italy. 
Britain later entered into three protocols with Italy, on 24 M a r c h and 14 
April 1891 and 5 M a y 1894, defining the frontiers between British colonial 
territory and the alleged protectorate.51 
T h e Italians in support of their claim meanwhile advanced from Eritrea 
into Tigre, in northern Ethiopia. Passing the limits earlier agreed to, they 
crossed the Mareb river and occupied the town of A d o w a in January 1890. 
They then informed Ras Mangasha, the son of Yohannes and the ruler 
47. C . Rossetti, 1910, pp. 41-4; E . Work , 1936, pp. 84-6; S. Rubenson, 1964; C . Giglio, 
1968. 
48. O n the history of Italo-Ethiopian relations between the treaty of Wuchale and the 
battle of Adowa , see C . C . Rossini, 1935; J. L . Niege, 1968. 
49. C . Rossetti, 1910, pp. 45^7. 
50. E . Hertslet, 1909, Vol. I, pp. 1, 17. 
51. E . W o r k , 1936, pp. 128-33, 138-9. 
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of Tigre province, that they would not withdraw until Menelik recognized 
their interpretation of the Wuchale treaty.52 
Menelik refused to accept this interpretation. O n 27 September 1890, 
he wrote to King Umberto I of Italy pointing out that he had discovered 
that the two texts of Article X V I I did not agree and declared: 
W h e n I m a d e that treaty of friendship with Italy, in order that our 
secrets be guarded and that our understanding should not be spoiled, 
I said that because of our friendship our affairs in Europe might be 
carried on with the aid of the Sovereign of Italy, but I have not m a d e 
any treaty which obliges m e to do so, and today, I a m not the m a n 
to accept it. That one independent power does not seek the aid of 
another to carry on its affairs your Majesty understands very well.53 
Determined not to become further dependent on the Italian loan, he began 
paying it back. Relations between Italy and Ethiopia reached a deadlock. 
During the resultant discussions the Italian envoy, Antonelli, informed 
Menelik that, 'Italy cannot notify the other Powers that she was mistaken 
in Article X V I I , because she must maintain her dignity'. Menelik's consort, 
Empress Taytu, replied, ' W e also have m a d e known to the Powers that 
the said Article, as it is written in our language, has another meaning. 
A s you, w e also ought to respect our dignity. Y o u wish Ethiopia to be 
represented before the other Powers as your protectorate, but this shall 
never be'.54 
After several years' delay, which Menelik turned to advantage by 
importing large quantities of firearms, especially from France and Russia, 
and by acquiring Kaffa, W o l a m o , Sidamo, Bale, parts of the Ogaden, Gofa, 
Beni, Shangul and the lands of the eastern and western Boran O r o m o 
('Galla') mostly through conquest, he finally denounced the Wuchale treaty 
on 12 February 1893. O n 27 February he informed the European powers, 
and, referring to Italy's claims, alluded to the biblical phrase, declaring 
that 'Ethiopia has need of no one; she stretches out her hands unto G o d ' . 
H e spoke from a position of strength, for he was by then in possession 
of 82000 rifles and twenty-eight cannon.55 
Fighting between the Italians and Ethiopians broke out in December 
1894 when Batha Hagos, an Eritrean chief, rebelled against the rule of 
Italy. Early in January 1895 the Italians attacked Ras Mangasha in Tigre 
and occupied m u c h of that province. Menelik thereupon ordered the 
mobilization of his army on 17 September, and marched north with a large 
force which w o n significant victories at A m b a Alagi on 7 December and 
Makalle at the end of the year. T h e Italians then fell back on A d o w a where, 
after a period of inaction, the final confrontation took place (see Plate 11.4). 
52. A . B . Wylde, 1901, p.'51. 
53. E . W o r k , 1936, p. 107. 
54. Quoted in ibid., p. 118. 
55. Quoted in ibid., pp. 134-5. 
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Menelik was in a relatively strong position. H e had the support of the 
local population, whose patriotism had been intensified by the fact that 
the Italians had been expropriating Eritrean land for the settlement of their 
colonists.56 T h e inhabitants were therefore willing to show his troops good 
paths and report on enemy movements. T h e Italians, on the other hand, 
had to face the enmity of the local people, and had no accurate maps; 
they therefore moved in confusion in an almost unknown country. 
Menelik's army, moreover, was m u c h larger. It was composed of over 
ioo ooo m e n with modern rifles, besides others with antique firearms and 
spears, whereas the invaders had only about 17000 m e n of w h o m 10596 
were Italian and the rest were Eritrean levies. T h e Italians had some 
superiority in cannon, but with fifty-six pieces as against Menelik's forty 
this was by no means decisive. 
T h e outcome of the day's fighting at A d o w a was a remarkable victory 
for Menelik, and a complete defeat for his enemies. During the battle, 
261 Italian officers, 2918 Italian non-commissioned officers and m e n , and 
about 2000 askaris or local troops, were killed; in addition 954 Italian 
soldiers were permanently missing; and 470 Italians and 958 askaris were 
wounded. Total Italian casualties amounted to over 40 per cent of the 
fighting force which was almost completely routed, and lost all its artillery, 
besides 11000 rifles.57 
A s a result of Menelik's victory, on 26 October the Italians agreed to 
the Peace Treaty of Addis Ababa which annulled the Treaty of Wuchale, 
and recognized the absolute independence of Ethiopia.58 Menelik, on the 
other hand, for reasons not divulged, did not demand an Italian withdrawal 
from Eritrea, though he had often expressed a desire for access to the sea. 
T h e southern frontier of the Italian colony was thus confirmed on the 
M a r e b river. 
T h e A d o w a campaign gave Menelik considerable international prestige. 
T h e French and British dispatched diplomatic missions to sign treaties 
with him, while other embassies arrived from the Sudanese Mahdists, the 
Sultan of the Ottoman empire and the Tsar of Russia.59 
T h e outcome of the battle, the greatest victory of an African over a 
European army since the time of Hannibal, was of major significance in 
the history of Europe's relations with Africa. T h e Ethiopians acquired 
prestige throughout the Red Sea area, as noted by the Polish traveller, 
Count Potocki, w h o remarked that the Somali displayed 'race-pride on 
the victory of their neighbours over a great European power'.6 0 
Increasing interest in Ethiopia, the last indigenous independent state 
56. R . Pankhurst, 1964, pp. 119-56. 
57. G . F . H . Berkeley, 1902, p. 345. 
58. C . Rossetti, 1910, pp. 181-3. 
59. O n the diplomatic missions to Menelik at this time see E . Gleichen, 1898; 
J. R . Rodd, 1923; H . P. M . d'Orléans, 1898; R . P. Skinner, 1906; F . Rosen, 1907. 
60. J. Potocki, 1900, p. 88. 
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in black Africa, was also evinced by black intellectuals in the N e w World. 
T h e Haitian, Benito Sylvain, one of the first apostles of pan-Africanism, 
travelled to Ethiopia four times between 1889 and 1906, carrying letters 
to and from President Alexis of Haiti,61 while William H . Ellis, a black 
American of C u b a n descent, visited the country twice in 1903 and 1904 
with various plans for economic development and the settlement of black 
Americans.62 
A n Ethiopian impact was also felt in South Africa where the biblical 
prophecy about Ethiopia stretching forth her hands unto G o d had aroused 
interest some years earlier. A n Ethiopian Church had been established in 
South Africa by 1900.6 3 Increasing awareness of Ethiopia was later mani -
fested by the appearance in 1911 of the Gold Coast intellectual J. E . Casely 
Hayford's book, Ethiopia Unbound, which was dedicated 'to the sons of 
Ethiopia the World W i d e Over'. 
Economic and social developments and European 
intervention in Liberia's and Ethiopia's internal affairs, 
1880-1914 
Liberia 
Side by side with European encroachments, Liberia faced serious internal 
economic and social problems. T h e Scramble and partition forced the 
Liberian government to advance into the Liberian hinterland to subjugate 
the indigenous ethnic groups and establish a colonial-type administration 
over them. 6 4 Each administrative unit or district was governed 'in-
directly' through its principal chiefs in collaboration with a government-
appointed district commissioner. U p to 1914 most of the commissioners 
were Americo-Liberian or educated indigenous Liberian military officers. 
T h e administration was largely oppressive and corrupt. Most of the district 
commissioners, their aides, and troops, being poorly and irregularly paid, 
and seldom supervised from Monrovia, lived off their districts by extorting 
food, labour for their private farms, and excessive fines and taxes (above 
the official one dollar poll-tax on adult males, and labour required for public 
buildings and roads).65 
61. A . Bervin, 1969. 
62. R . Pankhurst, 1972. 
63. G . Shepperson, 1968, pp. 251-3. 
64. At least two Liberian presidents have openly admitted that Americo-Liberian rule 
over the indigenous Liberians was colonial in nature; namely Arthur Barclay (1904-12), 
and William V . S. T u b m a n (1944-71) - the latter in his Annual Message to the Liberian 
Legislature in November i960. See The Liberian Age, 25 November i960, p. 9. 
65. Liberian Department of the Treasury, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury to 
the Senate and House of Representatives of the Republic of Liberia, December 1Ç21 (Monrovia, 
December 1921), pp. 13-14. 
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Not surprisingly, the indigenous Africans resisted not only their military 
subjugation to Liberian government authority - just as Africans elsewhere 
resisted subjugation to European rule - but also the excesses of the Liberian 
administration. Until subjugated by the Liberian militia, the Liberian 
Frontier Force and American naval ships, the K r u resisted intermittently, 
and particularly in 1915-16; the Grebo resisted in 1910; the Kissi in 1913; 
the Kpele and Bandi, 1911-14; the Gio and M a n o , 1913-18; the Gbolobo 
Grebo, 1916-18; the Gola and Bandi, 1918-19; the Joquelle Kpele, 
1916-20; and the Sikon in 1921. These protracted wars on different fronts 
and the cost and inefficiency of the 'native administration' encouraged 
foreign intervention and strained the government's h u m a n and material 
resources.66 
T h e government's revenues were never adequate. Foreign aid was 
meagre. Most Americo-Liberians preferred trade to agriculture and were 
seriously hurt by the worldwide depression of the late nineteenth century. 
B y 1890 resident German, British and Dutch merchants dominated 
Liberia's external trade. Coffee, Liberia's major export commodity since 
the 1860s, was produced mostly by Americo-Liberian planters and 
entrepreneurs using both Recaptive and indigenous African labour. Owing 
to the depression and adverse competition in the world market with better-
prepared Brazilian coffee, the price of Liberian coffee drastically fell from 
1898 onwards.67 T h e consequent cuts in Liberian coffee output and exports 
and the general contraction of the volume and value of Liberia's external 
trade drastically reduced government revenues which consisted mostly of 
customs dues and other levies on trade and shipping. Besides, the 
government lacked the means to collect effectively from reluctant Liberian 
and foreign merchants or to stop smuggling. 
T o avoid bankruptcy, the government borrowed frequently and heavily 
from Liberian and resident foreign merchants 'to carry out its most ordinary 
operations': $10000 in November 1896 at 9% interest from the G e r m a n 
trading firm, A . W o e r m a n n and C o m p a n y , 'to meet the current expenses 
of the Government';68 $15000 in February 1898 from the Dutch firm, 
Oost Afrikaansche Cie, to pay the expenses of the Liberian Legislature;69 
and an unspecified amount in June 1900 from the German firm, Wiechers 
and Helm, 'to meet quarterly payments of the civil list' - to mention 
a few examples.70 Furthermore, the Liberian government borrowed 
£100000 in 1871, £100000 in 1906 and $1700000 in 1912 from British 
and European financiers on harsh terms. For repayment it hypothecated 
its customs revenue. This was administered by British officers as from 
66. M . B. Akpan, forthcoming. 
67. M . B . Akpan, 1975, pp. 136--7. 
68. L N A , Cabinet Minutes, Meeting of 19 November 1896. 
69. L N A , Cabinet Minutes, Meeting of 11 February 1898. 
70. L N A , Cabinet Minutes, Meeting of 13 June 1900. 
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1906, and by an 'International Receivership' as from 1912, to ensure and 
facilitate repayment to creditors.71 
Left with meagre funds after debt payments, and lacking skilled m a n -
power, Liberia could not develop her h u m a n or natural resources to any 
extent or build an infrastructure. American missionary and philanthropic 
bodies bore the brunt of providing and funding most of Liberia's 
elementary and high schools, and Liberia's university established in 
Monrovia in 1862. They also sponsored most of the missionary work in 
Liberia, for which they employed mostly Liberian and white American 
missionaries and teachers. 
T h e decline of Liberian trade and agriculture and of foreign aid as from 
the late nineteenth century increased the Liberian government's exploita-
tion of the indigenous Liberians through the corvée, poll tax and other 
levies; and Liberians' dependence on their government for jobs. Competi-
tion to control these jobs or the social surplus increased between political 
parties and interest groups like the 'founding fathers' (or Americo-
Liberians w h o had settled in Liberia before Independence) and the 'sons 
of the soil' (or Americo-Liberians born in Liberia). 
S o m e social and economic developments did nevertheless occur. In 1900 
the Liberian government reopened the Liberia College (which it had closed 
d o w n in 1895 for lack of funds and progress) and thereafter more or less 
subsidized it to greater productivity. T h e following year, an Americo-
Liberian engineer, T . J. R . Faulkner, installed Liberia's first telephone 
linking Monrovia with several neighbouring Liberian towns.72 In 1900 
a cable station in Monrovia built by a G e r m a n firm was opened and linked 
Liberia with the outside world. During 1906-7 a British firm, the Liberia 
Development C o m p a n y , built several motor roads from Monrovia inland, 
using a part of the loan of 1906. Furthermore, several foreign firms obtained 
and exploited rubber, mineral and other concessions in Liberia from the 
Liberian government.73 
Ethiopia 
Like Liberia, Ethiopia underwent significant economic changes from the 
last decades of the nineteenth century on. 
Menelik was desirous of modernizing his age-old country, and displayed 
keen interest in innovations of all kinds. This interest caused de Castro, 
an Italian physician, to describe him as 'a progressive sovereign in the 
true sense of the word', and to add, with humour , that if an adventurer 
71. M . B . Akpan, 1975, p. 159. 
72. G . W . Gibson, Annual Message, 10 December 1901. 
73. A . Barclay, Annual Message, n December 1911; D . B . Howard, Annual Message, 
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proposed to erect an escalator to the m o o n the emperor would ask h i m 
to build it 'if only to see if it could be d o n e ' . 7 4 Menelik's reign witnessed 
n u m e r o u s innovations without precedent in Ethiopia's history. T h e first, 
and one of the most important, w a s the foundation in the m i d 1880s of 
the capital, Addis A b a b a , literally ' N e w Flower', which by 1910 had a 
population of s o m e 100000 inhabitants.75 T h e construction of the first 
m o d e r n bridges was also effected at this time, and improved the country's 
difficult communications. In 1892 the taxes were reorganized and a tithe 
instituted for the a r m y , thereby ostensibly ending the soldiers' traditional 
practice of looting from the peasants. In 1894, the first national currency 
w a s issued 'in order', a proclamation declared, 'that our country m a y 
increase in honour and our c o m m e r c e prosper'. A postal system w a s also 
being brought into existence in the 1890s. Postage stamps, ordered like 
the coins from France, were put o n sale in 1893, and a decree establishing 
post offices was issued in 1894. French advisers were used in developing 
the service, and entry into the International Postal U n i o n was effected 
in 1908. A concession for a railway from Addis A b a b a to the French Somali-
land port of Djibuti w a s granted in 1894, but technical, financial and 
political difficulties were so great that the line, largely constructed with 
French capital, did not reach the railway town of Dire D a w a until 1902 
and Akaki , 23 k m from Addis A b a b a , until 1915. T w o telegraph lines had, 
meanwhi le , been established at the turn of the century. O n e , constructed 
by the French engineers working o n the railway, followed its track, while 
the other, erected b y Italian technicians, linked the capital with Eritrea 
and the south and west. Early in the twentieth century, the first m o d e r n 
roads were constructed between Addis A b a b a and Addis A l e m , and between 
Harar and Dire D a w a , with the assistance of Italian and French engineers 
respectively, while the capital's w o o d supply w a s improved by the 
introduction, probably by a F r e n c h m a n , of eucalyptus trees from Australia. 
T h e later years of the reign saw the establishment of various m o d e r n 
institutions. T h e B a n k of Abyssinia w a s founded in 1905, as an affiliate 
of the British-owned National B a n k of Egypt. T h e first m o d e r n hotel in 
Addis A b a b a , the Etege, w a s established by E m p r e s s T a y t u in 1907. T h e 
Menel ik II School w a s set u p with the help of Coptic teachers from Egypt 
in 1908, Menelik having already s h o w n his interest in m o d e r n education 
by sending several students to Switzerland and Russia. T h e Menelik II 
Hospital, founded to replace an earlier Russian R e d Cross establishment 
set u p during the A d o w a w a r , w a s erected in 1910, while a state printing 
press c a m e into existence in 1 9 1 1 . 7 6 Failing health, and the increasing 
complexity of government , had meanwhi le caused Menel ik in 1907 to 
establish his country's first Cabinet, which, according to his chronicler 
74. L . de Castro, 1915, Vol. I, p. 162. 
75. ibid., pp. 189-246; E . Mérab, 1921-9, II, pp. 13-193; R . Pankhurst, 1962(a), 
pp. 33-61. 
76. G . Sellassie, 1930-2, Vol. II, pp. 527-8. 
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G a b r e Sellassie, s t e m m e d from a 'desire of implanting E u r o p e a n customs'. 
Ethiopia by the end of Menelik's reign had thus been placed on the road 
of modernization.77 
T h e outcome of the Scramble and partition for Liberia 
and Ethiopia 
T h e European Scramble for and partition of Africa did have s o m e interest-
ing but contrasting impacts o n Liberia and Ethiopia. F o r one thing, they 
were the only two states in the whole of the continent that survived the 
imperialist onslaught and retained their sovereignty and independence. B u t 
while, as indicated above, Ethiopia not merely survived but in fact greatly 
expanded her southern and eastern frontiers during that period, Liberia 
lost a great deal of her territory to both Britain and France. T h e last question 
to be considered is h o w these contrasting impacts o n Ethiopia and Liberia 
can be accounted for. In other words , w h y did both of t h e m survive while 
one lost and the other gained territory? 
Both Liberia and Ethiopia survived for three main c o m m o n reasons: 
the determination of the peoples of both states to remain independent, 
the diplomatic dexterity displayed by the leaders of both countries at the 
time, and finally, the rivalry a m o n g the imperial powers which prevented 
any one of t h e m from occupying either of these states. T o all this m u s t 
be added, in the case of Ethiopia, her military strength. O n the other hand, 
Ethiopia gained further territories while Liberia lost part of hers mainly 
because of the internal conditions - political, economic and military - in 
each of the states and of course the degree of the interference of the 
Europeans in these internal affairs. 
O n e of the m a i n reasons for the survival of both Liberia and Ethiopia 
w a s the very strong belief of the peoples of both countries that they were 
destined by the Almighty G o d to survive, a belief which very m u c h 
strengthened their determination to resist all European encroachments and 
aggression. G r o w i n g largely out of the experience of involuntary servitude 
in the N e w W o r l d , there w a s i m b e d d e d within the Liberian consciousness 
a firm faith in a Divine Being as controller of the destiny of the Nation. 
Several Liberian presidents were ministers of the gospel. Indeed, Liberians 
have always viewed each major event in their history as the result of divine 
intervention. It is this s a m e belief that underlies the m u c h - q u o t e d expres-
sion of E m p e r o r Menelik of Ethiopia in 1893 that 'Ethiopia has need of 
n o one; she stretches out her hands unto G o d ' , as well as the passage from 
his letter to Q u e e n Victoria in August 1891 and his proclamation of 
September 1895 on the eve of the battle of A d o w a quoted in the first chapter 
of this v o l u m e . 7 8 There is n o doubt that this firm belief on the part of the 
77. L . de Castro, 1915, Vol. I, p. 162. 
78. See p. 4 above. 
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peoples of these countries filled t h e m with a determination that should 
go s o m e w a y to explaining their successful opposition to all the European 
onslaughts. 
T h e second m a i n reason for the survival of Ethiopia and Liberia w a s 
diplomatic. O n the one hand, both were able to play one European p o w e r 
against the other and were able to resist by diplomacy the m o r e indirect 
pressures of the colonial powers. Menel ik certainly succeeded in playing 
Italy, France and Britain off against each other. H a v i n g relied on French 
a r m s to defend himself against the Italians in 1896, he m a d e use of the 
British in 1902 w h e n the French attempted to obtain excessive control 
over the Djibuti railway. Menelik's objective, de Castro states, w a s simply 
to m a k e use of the technological achievements of E u r o p e without s u c c u m b -
ing to it politically. 'If Europeans c a m e into our house to bring us civiliza-
tion', the E m p e r o r is said to have reasoned, ' w e thank t h e m very m u c h , 
but they m u s t bring it without us losing our sovereignty. W e k n o w h o w 
to profit from whatever aspects of their civilization are most helpful to 
us ' . 7 9 Liberia also constantly played off France against Britain, and Britain 
against G e r m a n y , while she did not hesitate, whenever the going w a s tough, 
to bring in the United States to m a k e the necessary threatening noises 
to w a r d off any of these powers. 
O n the other h a n d , there is n o doubt that the determination of the 
imperial powers to prevent any one of them gaining control of either of 
those states w a s a crucial factor in the survival of those states. F o r mainly 
economic reasons, G e r m a n y , France and Britain were not prepared to see 
any one of t h e m in sole control of Liberia since the traders of each of 
these countries were active there. F o r sentimental reasons, the United 
States was bent o n ensuring the survival of Liberia. T h u s , from October 
1862 w h e n a formal Treaty of C o m m e r c e and Navigation was signed and 
ratified by the United States Congress, United States military gunboats 
continued to appear periodically in Liberian waters to put an end to the 
resistance of the indigenous peoples to Liberian rule and at the s a m e time 
to moderate French and British ambitions to carve u p Liberia o n the pretext 
that Liberia w a s unable to police her borders.80 A t other times, the United 
States employed diplomatic m e a n s to w a r n Britain and France of the moral 
judgement of history should either of t h e m m a k e any attempt to end the 
independence of Liberia. T h u s in 1879 and 1898, the United States warned 
France and G e r m a n y not to annex or establish a protectorate over Liberia.8 ' 
In the s a m e w a y , for mainly strategic reasons, Britain, France and Italy 
were not prepared to see any one of t h e m in sole control of Ethiopia. It 
is significant that w h e n in 1906 the imperial powers of Britain, France 
and Italy felt that Menelik's failing health would be followed by the dis-
integration of his empire, all three of t h e m c a m e together to secretly sign 
79. C . Rossetti, 1910, pp. 319-25. 
80. C . H . Huberich, 1947, Vol. I, p. 213. 
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a tripartite Convention in which Ethiopia was divided a m o n g them, a m o v e 
which was exposed by Menelik even before his death.82 
H o w e v e r , in the case of Ethiopia, there is one unique and crucial factor 
that should be cited in explanation of her survival, and which also explains 
the fact that she w a s able to extend her territorial limits during the period 
under review, and that is her military strength. H a d Menelik lost the battle 
of A d o w a , Ethiopia would undoubtedly have b e c o m e an Italian colony in 
1896. But as s h o w n above, thanks to her military strength which was far 
superior to that of Italy in Africa, Ethiopia w o n that battle and thereby 
maintained her independence. E v e n after the battle of A d o w a , Menelik 
persisted in stockpiling arms, a fact confirmed by a British traveller, John 
Boyes, w h o noted, early in the twentieth century, that 'practically all the 
Abyssinians' were 'armed with rifles', and that 'the Abyssinians are the 
best armed native race in Africa' and 'could not easily be brought under 
subjection by any foreign P o w e r ' . 8 3 A t a military parade held in Addis 
A b a b a in 1902 to c o m m e m o r a t e Ethiopia's victory at A d o w a , an estimated 
600000 Ethiopian troops-about 100 000 short of the empire's total military 
strength - were present, 90000 of w h o m were m e n of the imperial standing 
a r m y . 8 4 All the troops were a r m e d with m o d e r n weapons , including rifles, 
machine guns, and cannon. M o s t of the artillery and rapid-fire weapons 
were stored at Addis A b a b a and significantly boosted the emperor's power 
vis-à-vis that of the provincial governors.85 A n d it was this a r m y that 
enabled Menelik to extend the frontiers of Ethiopia in the late 1880s and 
throughout the 1890s. 
But if Liberia and Ethiopia did survive, the former did so mutilated 
and emaciated, and this was the outcome of her military weakness and 
the hopeless internal conditions of the state. Liberia's navy in any year 
consisted of one or two gunboats (including those presented by Britain). 
H e r a r m y was the Americo-Liberian militia u p to 1908 w h e n the Liberian 
Frontier Force ( L F F ) was organized to complement it. T h e militia 
n u m b e r e d under 2000 m e n in any year u p to 1914 and was mostly poorly 
trained, paid and equipped.8 6 It was mustered mostly during wars with 
the indigenous Africans w h e n invariably it w a s assisted by 'auxiliary' 
indigenous Liberian 'warriors'. It lacked the m e a n s of quick transportation 
to the scene of war. B y 1880 it was divided into four regiments — one 
stationed in each county — each under an Americo-Liberian c o m m a n d e r 
subordinated to the Liberian president, the army's commander-in-chief.8 7 
T h e typical condition of the militia was portrayed in President Barclay's 
description of its Fifth Regiment in M a y 1906 as: 'unsatisfactory: Colonel 
82. C . Rossetti, 1910, p. 331. 
83. J. Boyes, n.d. p. 22. 
84. H . G . Marcus, 1975, pp. 217-18. 
85. ibid. 
86. A . Barclay, Inaugural Address, 4 January 1904. 
87. U S N A , D U S M 10/22, Enclosure, Barclay to Taylor, Monrovia, 27 August 1887. 
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Carter, its commander , being also a preacher and absent constantly; the 
Lieutenant Colonel being illiterate; the major being deaf; the Regiment 
is rapidly going d o w n and must be reconstructed'.88 T h e L F F , no less 
inefficient than the militia, comprised in December 1913 three American 
and seven Liberian officers and over 600 enlisted m e n stationed in over 
a dozen detachments in the Liberian hinterland. U p to 1914, the officer 
commanding each detachment performed both military and administrative 
duties in his district. Consequently he received instructions from, and 
reported to both the Department of W a r and the Department of Interior 
(neither of which co-ordinated with the other). Liberia's military weakness 
markedly contrasted with Ethiopia's military might and largely accounted 
for Liberia's inability to defend her territory from encroachment by 
Europeans during the Scramble. 
N o less hopeless was the internal situation. A s indicated above, and for 
reasons already given above, the Liberian government was perennially near-
bankrupt and owed huge debts to local and foreign creditors. B y January 
1908 Liberia's indebtedness to Britain comprised, according to the British 
Consul-General at Monrovia, £60000 a year 'for several years' while her 
indebtedness to G e r m a n merchants in Liberia amounted to $120000 by 
September 1905. This indebtedness enabled the imperial powers to 
constantly interfere in the internal affairs of Liberia during the period under 
review in a way that they never did in Ethiopia where they were never 
provided with the cause nor the excuse so to do. Throughout the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century, the imperial powers sent mission upon 
mission to Liberia to offer aid to her to pay her debts if she would come 
under their protection. France did this in 1879, Germany in 1887 and Spain 
in 1886, and each power offered to regulate Liberia's finances, organize 
her defence, and establish and control her Frontier Force. At the same 
time, their resident ambassadors and representatives treated the Liberians 
with contempt and frequently imposed on her by denouncing her trade, 
customs and citizenship laws or bullying her to redress their nationals' 
grievances as Britain did in September 1869, August 1870, April 1871, 
February and June 1882, November 1886 and finally January 1909.89 
Germany similarly brought in her gunboats to intimidate Liberia in 
February and October 1881, in August 1897, January and September 1898 
and December 1912. O n each occasion, the G e r m a n government demanded 
financial indemnity ranging between $3000 and $60000 from the Liberian 
government on mostly trivial grounds, particularly alleged 'insults' by 
Liberian officials to the G e r m a n consul or G e r m a n merchants in Liberia 
w h o invited the G e r m a n intervention. 
T h e three years 1907-9 witnessed an unprecedented escalation of this 
interference by Britain, France and G e r m a n y culminating in the famous 
88. L N A , Cabinet Minutes, of the Meeting of 3 M a y 1906. 
89. Liberian Letters, 15, Dennis to Coppinger, Monrovia, September 1870; Repository, 
LVIII, July 1882, pp. 90-1, 123-5; Bulletin, 10 February 1897, pp. 51-4. 
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'Cadell Incident' of n and 12 February 1909. T h e issues involved included 
the obvious deplorable economic, social and political conditions in Liberia, 
the rivalry among European powers for influence and territory in Liberia 
at Liberia's expense and Liberians' indebtedness to these powers or their 
nationals. 
Such European intervention in Liberia had far-reaching effects on 
Liberian politics and society. First, it divided the Liberians into pro-British 
and pro-American factions90 w h o staged massive anti-Barclay and pro-
Barclay demonstrations in Monrovia in January 1909.91 Moreover, the 
employment of Europeans at high salaries to implement the reforms 
demanded by the powers also greatly strained the Liberian government's 
already depleted revenues. But for the active intervention of the United 
States, thanks to the activities of the American Minister Resident in 
Monrovia, Ernest Lyon, an Afro-American thoroughly in sympathy with 
Liberia and her leaders' anxiety to obtain American support from 1909 
onwards, there is no doubt that Liberia would have fallen victim to the 
other imperial powers. 
Never at any time was Ethiopia subjected to such persistent intervention 
by the European imperial powers in her internal affairs. O n the contrary, 
thanks to the A d o w a victory, she was accorded every respect and accepted 
into the comity of nations more or less as an equal during the period that 
Liberia was virtually under the siege of the imperial powers. Granted the 
military weakness of Liberia, and, above all, her internal dislocation, due 
partly to her o w n economic weakness and the active interference of 
Europeans in her internal affairs, the surprising fact is not that Liberia 
survived anguished and emaciated, but that she survived at all. 
90. U S N A , D U S M 405/238, Lyon to Secretary, Monrovia, 14 August 1908; London. 
U S N A , Records of the Department of State relating to the internal affairs of Liberia 
( R D S L ) , 1909-1929. Reid to Secretary, London, 14 February 1909. 
91. P R O F O 369/596, Wallis to Grey, Monrovia, 11 March 1909. 
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M . C R O W D E R 
T h e First World W a r was essentially a quarrel between European powers 
which involved Africa, both directly and indirectly, because at the outbreak 
of hostilities the greater part of it was ruled by the European belligerents. 
Campaigns were fought on African soil which - though they only marginally 
affected the overall course of war - had significant implications for Africa. 
M o r e than a million African soldiers were involved in these campaigns 
or campaigns in Europe. Even more m e n , as well as w o m e n and children, 
were recruited, often forcibly, as carriers to support armies whose supplies 
could not be moved by conventional methods such as road, rail or pack-
animal. Over 150000 soldiers and carriers lost their lives during the war. 
M a n y more were wounded and disabled. B y the time the war ended, every 
country in Africa, with the exception of the small Spanish territories -
which remained neutral - had been formally committed to one side or 
the other. Belgian, British, French, Italian and Portuguese administrations 
were allied - more or less actively - against G e r m a n colonies (see Fig. 2.1). 
Even the last remaining independent states on the continent - Liberia, 
Ethiopia and Därfür - became involved. Liberia declared for the Allies 
on the entry of the United States into the war in 1917. T h e pro-Muslim 
boy-Emperor of Ethiopia, Lij Iyasu, proclaimed his country's allegiance 
to Turkey, thereby causing considerable concern among the Allies that 
he would inspire a djihäd among the Muslims of the Horn of Africa where 
Sayyid M u h a m m a d Abdule Hasan's forces were still giving trouble to 
the British. British, French and Italian troops moved to Berbera, Djibuti 
and Massawa, but the intervention proved unnecessary since shocked 
Christian nobles overthrew the Emperor in September 1916. Similarly, 
Sultan 'All Dinar of Därfür, nominally tributary to, but effectively 
independent of, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, responded to the Turkish call 
to djihäd and raided French Chad, threatened British Borno (Northern 
Nigeria) and tried to stir up revolt in Kordof an (Sudan). Not until February 
1916 was he defeated and killed in battle and Därfür fully incorporated 
into Sudan. 
Whether directly involved in the fighting or not, nearly every African 
territory was affected by the exclusion of the Germans from the African 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-igjs 
trade, the wartime shortages of imports caused by scarcity of shipping 
space, or, on the brighter side, sudden booms in demands for strategic 
resources. 
A great deal has been written about the European campaigns in Africa 
during the First World W a r , 1 and the consequent distribution of G e r m a n 
territory a m o n g the victorious Allied powers2 - the last chapter in the 
Scramble for Africa. M u c h less has been written about the impact of the 
war on Africans and on the administrative structures recently imposed 
on them by their European conquerors.3 H o w far did these fragile struc-
tures withstand the exodus of European administrative personnel, the 
spectacle of white conqueror fighting white conqueror, the exactions on 
recently subdued Africans in terms of m e n and material, and the widespread 
revolts that took place on the occasion, though not always directly, or even 
indirectly as a result of the war? W h a t were the social, political and economic 
consequences of involving Africans in the European war? It is with these 
broad questions that this chapter will be principally concerned. However 
a brief account of the military campaigns is essential if w e are fully to 
understand the implications of the war for Africa. 
The War on African soil 
T h e immediate consequence for Africa of the declaration of war in Europe 
was the invasion by the Allies of Germany's colonies. Neither side had 
prepared for war in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed there was short-lived hope 
that it might be isolated from the war. Governor Doering of Togo suggested 
to his neighbours in British Gold Coast (now Ghana) and French D a h o m e y 
(now Benin) that Togo should be neutralized so that the spectacle of 
Europeans fighting each other would not be witnessed by their African 
subjects.4 In G e r m a n East Africa (now Tanzania) the Governor, D r 
Schnee, was intent on avoiding hostilities so he could pursue his energetic 
programme of development, and when the British bombarded Dar es 
Salaam shortly after the declaration of war, he subscribed to a short-lived 
i. For the Togo and Cameroon campaigns, see F . J. Moberly (ed.), 1931; for the German 
South West Africa campaign see Union of South Africa, 1924; W . K . Hancock, 1962, 
pp. 394-400; for German East Africa, see R . C . Hordern, 1941, Vol. I, and, for the German 
point of view, P . E . von Lettow-Vorbeck, n.d. There is a good summary of the complexities 
of this campaign in L . Mosley, 1963. 
2. See in particular G . L . Beer, 1923; and W . R . Louis, 1963(a). 
3. There are a number of doctoral theses relating to the First World W a r in Africa 
which have as yet not been published, but see J. Osuntokun, 1978. Since writing this 
chapter in 1977, an issue of the Journal of African History, Volume X I X , 1978, has been 
devoted to 'World W a r I and Africa' and is primarily concerned with the impact of the 
war on Africans. It has been possible to take note of some of the points made in this 
important symposium. 
4. R . Cornevin, 1962, p. 208. 
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truce that would neutralize G e r m a n East Africa.5 There was even optimism 
in some quarters that the articles of the Berlin Act of 1885 covering the 
neutrality of the conventional basin of the Congo would avert war in east-
central Africa.6 
T h e forces in favour of involving Germany's African possessions in the 
war were, however, more pressing. F r o m the point of view of Britain, given 
her naval supremacy, the strategy as laid d o w n by the Committee for 
Imperial Defence was to carry war to her enemy's colonies. T o maintain this 
naval supremacy, Germany's African communications system and principal 
ports had to be put out of action. For the Allies, successful campaigns in 
Germany's colonial possessions might result in their being shared by the 
victors as spoils of war. This was certainly a major consideration in the 
decision of the Commandant-General of the South African forces, General 
Louis Botha, and the Minister of Defence, J. C . Smuts, in the face of 
real opposition from Afrikaner irreconcilables, to commit South African 
forces to the Allied side and invade G e r m a n South West Africa (now 
Namibia), and later participate in the East African campaign.7 Not only 
did Botha and Smuts covet South West Africa as a potential fifth province 
but they hoped that if they assisted a British victory in G e r m a n East Africa, 
parts of conquered German territory might be offered to the Portuguese 
in exchange for Delagoa Bay - the natural port for the Transvaal - going 
to South Africa.8 In Britain, it was considered that the involvement of 
South Africa and her loyalty would be ensured by the prospect of South 
West Africa becoming hers.9 For the French, invasion of Cameroon would 
retrieve the territory reluctantly ceded in 1911 to Germany in the aftermath 
of the Agadir crisis (see Fig. 12.1b). Even Belgium, which had immediately 
invoked the perpetual neutrality of the Congo (now Zaire) under Article 
X of the Berlin Act, eagerly joined in the invasion of G e r m a n African 
territory once her o w n neutrality had been violated by the Germans , in 
the hope that successful participation would give her a bargaining position 
in the eventual peace settlement.10 
Germany's colonies were not easily defensible given Allied naval 
supremacy and her m u c h smaller colonial forces. There was early optimism 
that the anticipated speedy G e r m a n victory in Europe would avoid direct 
colonial involvement while achieving Germany's ambition of a Mittelafrika 
linking Cameroon and G e r m a n East Africa and thwarting once and for 
5. P . E . von Lettow-Vorbeck, n.d., pp. 27-8. See also W . R . Louis, 1963(b), p. 209 
citing H . Schnee, 1919, p. 28. 
6. W . R . Louis, 1963(b) pp. 209-10 for a brief discussion of the implications of the 
neutrality of the Congo Basin for German and British East Africa. 
7. D . Denoon, 1972, p. 121. 
8. R . H y a m , 1972, p. 28. 
9. ibid., p. 26. 
10. W . R . Louis, 1963(b), Chapter X I X . 
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all Britain's longed-for Cape to Cairo route.! ' But once it was clear that 
quick victory would not be achieved, it was perceived that protracted 
campaigns in Africa would tie d o w n Allied colonial troops w h o might 
otherwise be sent to the European front. This strategy was brilliantly 
pursued by General P. E . von Lettow-Vorbeck, the G e r m a n commander 
in East Africa w h o engaged a combined Allied force - at one time over 
ten times greater than his o w n - for the duration of the war (see Fig. 
12.1e). 
T h e campaigns in Africa can be divided into two distinct phases. During 
the first, which lasted only a few weeks, the Allies were concerned to knock 
out Germany's offensive capability and ensure that her fleet could not 
use her African ports. T h u s L o m é in Togo, Duala in Cameroon, and 
S w a k o p m u n d and Lüderitz Bay in South West Africa were occupied soon 
after the outbreak of war. In G e r m a n East Africa, British cruisers 
bombarded Dar es Salaam and Tanga in August, and though neither port 
was taken until later in the war, they could not be used by G e r m a n warships. 
In Egypt, on the entry of Turkey into the war on Germany's side, the 
British defences of the Suez Canal were strengthened and a Turkish 
expedition repulsed in February 1915. Thereafter Egypt served as the major 
base for Britain's operations against Turkey and her Middle Eastern 
provinces, and became the fulcrum of British power in Africa and the 
Middle East for the next three decades. 
T h e campaigns of the first phase of the war in Africa were vital to its 
global strategy. T h e campaigns of the second phase, with the exception 
of those mounted from Egypt against the Turkish empire, were of marginal 
significance to the outcome of the world struggle. Nevertheless the Allies 
were determined to conquer the G e r m a n colonies both to prevent them 
being used as bases for the subversion of their often tenuous authority 
in their o w n colonies, and to share them among themselves in the event 
of an overall Allied victory. Thus once the South African government had 
put d o w n the Afrikaner rebellion which had received support from the 
Germans in South West Africa, it mounted an invasion of the territory 
which took six months to complete. T h e South West Africa campaign (see 
Fig. 12.id) was the only one in which African troops were not involved, 
since the Union generals were reluctant to arm their African population, 
while the Germans dared not, after having so brutally put d o w n the Herero 
and N a m a risings. 
T h e protracted Cameroon campaign (see Fig. 12.1b) was largely fought 
by African troops. Despite their superiority in numbers, the French, British 
and Belgian allies took over fifteen months to complete their conquest of 
the territory. 
In East Africa von Lettow-Vorbeck, appreciating that he could not hope 
to win the battle against forces which outnumbered his o w n by more than 
ii. For a discussion of the German plans for the establishment of a Mittelafrika in 
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ten to one, determined at least to tie them d o w n as long as possible by 
resorting to guerrilla tactics. ' 2 Right up to the end of hostilities he remained 
undefeated, leading his bedraggled column through Portuguese East Africa 
(now Mozambique ) and then on its last march into Northern Rhodesia 
(now Zambia) where he learnt of the armistice in Europe. At a conservative 
estimate, some 160000 Allied troops were engaged by von Lettow-
Vorbeck's force which never exceeded a strength of 15 000. A s in Cameroon, 
African troops proved vital to both sides, m a n y of them fighting with great 
bravery, and proving m u c h more effective fighters than the white South 
African troops w h o were decimated by disease. At times the ration for 
Nigerian foot soldiers was half-a-pound of rice a day with nothing to 
go with it.13 T h e carriers suffered particular hardships and it was estimated 
that at least 45 000 died from disease in the campaign. ' 4 
The European exodus 
T h e war saw a large-scale exodus of European administrative and c o m -
mercial personnel from the Allied colonies in Africa, as they left for the 
Western Front or enlisted in locally based regiments for campaigns else-
where in Africa. In some parts the European presence, already thinly 
spread, was diminished by more than half. In Northern Nigeria, m a n y 
political officers on secondment from the army were recalled to their 
regiments while others voluntarily enlisted, with the result that Northern 
Nigeria was denuded of administrators. ' 5 S o m e divisions in Northern 
Nigeria, like Borgu, were without any European administrator for m u c h 
of the war. ' 6 In Northern Rhodesia, as m u c h as 4 0 % of the adult European 
population was on active service. ' 7 In French Black Africa there was general 
mobilization of Europeans of military age, while in British East Africa, 
Europeans were registered for war work. In some parts, particularly the 
countryside, it was rumoured that the white m a n was leaving for ever.18 
In Morocco, where the Resident-General, Louis Lyautey, had to withdraw 
so m a n y of his troops for the European front, G e r m a n prisoners of war 
were used on public works to persuade the Moroccans that the French 
were winning the war . 1 9 
12. The British Official History comments that von Lettow-Vorbeck 'had successfully 
contained in Africa for over four years a force considerably larger than Lord Roberts' 
whole army in the South African War' . 
13. W . D . Downes, 1919, p. 90. 
14. L . Mosley, 1963, p. 234. 
15. A . M . Fika, 1978. 
16. See M . Crowder, 1973. 
17. L . H . Gann, 1964, p. 163. 
18. In Nigeria the British administration reported that the various 'petty risings were 
due to unrest caused by the war and rumours of the withdrawal of government', Nigeria 
Annual Report for IQIS, 1917, P- 23-
19. R . Bidwell, 1973, p. 23. 
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T h e result of this exodus was a slowdown, if not a complete stoppage, 
of m a n y essential services manned by Europeans. In certain instances 
Africans were specially trained, as in Senegal, to fill the vacancies thus 
created.20 In British West Africa, others jobs hitherto reserved for whites 
were filled by educated Africans which, as Richard Rathbone has pointed 
out, goes some way towards explaining the loyalty of the elites during the 
war. 2 1 In French West Africa, the governor-general complained that the 
British, w h o were not subjected to general mobilization in their colonies, 
were taking advantage of the fact that their French allies were, by filling 
the trading vacuum left by the departure of French commercial agents 
to the front.22 Only in Egypt was there a net increase in the European 
presence, since there was an enormous influx of British troops using Egypt 
as a base for the Allied offensive in the Middle East. 
F r o m the African point of view, perhaps even more remarkable than 
the apparent exodus of Europeans was the spectacle of white people fighting 
each other, a thing they had never done during the colonial occupation. 
W h a t is more they encouraged their subjects in uniform to kill the 'enemy' 
white m a n , w h o hitherto had belonged to a clan w h o , by virtue of trie 
colour of his skin, was held to be sacrosanct and desecration of whose 
person had hitherto been visited with the direst retribution.23 
The African involvement in the W a r 
Except in the G e r m a n South West African campaign, African troops were 
a major factor in the Allied successes in their African campaigns. African 
troops were called on during the war not only to fight on African soil, 
but also to reinforce European armies on the Western and Middle Eastern 
fronts. Further, they were instrumental in putting d o w n the various revolts 
against colonial authority, just as they had been instrumental in the 
European conquest of Africa. 
Over a million troops were actually recruited during the war to supple-
ment the generally small forces maintained by the colonial authorities. Only 
France had substantial armies on the ground in her various African colonies 
on the outbreak of war and though subsequently G e r m a n y was accused 
of militarizing her colonies, it was really France alone against w h o m this 
accusation could be levelled with accuracy. In addition to troops, carriers 
20. Gouvernement Général de l ' A O F , Textes relatifs à la formation et la réorganisation 
des cadres indigènes en A O F , 1916: 'Circulaire relative à la formation du personnel des 
cadres indigènes', Dakar, 1 October 1916, pp. 3-4 . Also 'Circulaire relative à la réorganisa-
tion des cadres des agents indigènes de l 'AOF' , Dakar, 1 October 1916, pp. 27-8. 
21. R . Rathbone, 1978, p. 6. 
22. Archives du Sénégal, Dakar, Série D , 4 D 7 3 , Recrutement indigène (1918). Rapport 
et Correspondance du Ministre des Colonies et du Ministre de Guerre. Reprise de recrute-
ment: Mission Diagne. 1917-18: 'Projet de Recrutement'. 
23. Letter from Sir Frederick Lugard to his wife dated 19 June 1918, cited in M . Perham, 
1960(b), p. 549. 
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were recruited on a massive scale — s o m e three carriers were necessary 
to keep each fighting soldier in the field. Further, N o r t h Africans were 
recruited to w o r k at factory benches vacated by F r e n c h m e n conscripted 
into the a r m y . T h e subsequent voluntary migration of Algerian labour 
to France has its origin in the First W o r l d W a r . All in all over 2.5 million 
Africans, or well over 1 % of the population of the continent, were involved 
in w a r w o r k of s o m e kind. 
Recruits for both fighting and carrier service were raised by three 
m e t h o d s . T h e first w a s o n a purely volunteer basis w h e r e Africans offered 
their services freely without any outside pressure. T h u s , in the early stages 
of the w a r on the Palestine and Syrian fronts, large n u m b e r s of i m -
poverished fallâhïn (peasants) in E g y p t offered their services in return 
for w h a t were comparatively attractive wages . T h e r e is n o doubt that in 
m o s t African countries there were volunteers for the a r m y w h o k n e w exactly 
w h a t enlistment entailed. T h e Senegalese citoyens of the F o u r C o m m u n e s 
of Senegal were quite prepared to accept the full obligations of compulsory 
military service exacted from Metropolitan F r e n c h m e n if it w o u l d 
guarantee their o w n status as citizens. A n d to this end their D e p u t y , Blaise 
Diagne , secured the passage of a L a w of 29 September 1916 which stated 
that 'the natives of the communes de plein exercice of Senegal are 
and remain French citizens as provided for by the law of 15 October 1915'. 
In M a d a g a s c a r all 45 000 recruits into the French a r m y were said to have 
been volunteers,24 but the great majority of African recruits w e n t into 
the various armies against their will, either as forced 'volunteers' or as 
conscripts. 
A great deal of recruitment w a s undertaken through chiefs w h o were 
expected to deliver u p the n u m b e r s required of t h e m b y the political officers. 
In s o m e areas they h a d n o difficulty in obtaining genuine volunteers; in 
others, m e n were impressed by the chiefs and presented to the political 
officers as volunteers. M u c h of the unpopularity of chiefs in Northern 
Rhodesia after the w a r can be attributed to their role in recruitment of 
soldiers and carriers.25 
L a r g e n u m b e r s of soldiers and carriers, however , were formally c o n -
scripted. In French Black Africa, a Decree of 1912 aimed at creating a 
p e r m a n e n t black a r m y m a d e military service for four years compulsory 
for all African males between the ages of 20 and 28. T h e a im w a s to replace 
garrison troops in Algeria with black African troops so that the former 
w o u l d be available for service in E u r o p e in the eventuality of war . If such 
a w a r were prolonged, General M a n g i n wrote, ' O u r African forces w o u l d 
constitute an almost indefinite reserve, the source of which is b e y o n d 
the reach of the adversary.' After the outbreak of w a r , with 14785 Afri-
can troops in W e s t Africa alone, it w a s decided to recruit 5 0 0 0 0 m o r e 
during the 1915-16 recruitment campaign . T h u s began in French 
24. H . Deschamps, 1962; G . S. Chapus, 1961. 
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Africa an exercise called by Governor Angoulvant a véritable chasse à 
l'homme26 and recently described by Jide Osuntokun as a new slave trade.27 
Chiefs were given quotas of m e n to fill, and rounded up strangers and 
former slaves to avoid enlisting their immediate dependants or kinsmen. 
Since births were not registered, many m e n above and below military age 
were recruited. But, as we shall see, the recruitment campaign provoked 
widespread revolts and the insurgent areas were impossible to recruit 
in. Desperate for more m e n and in the hope that an African of high standing 
might succeed where Frenchmen had not, the French Government resorted 
to the appointment in 1918 of Blaise Diagne as High Commissioner for 
the Recruitment of Black Troops. Set the target of recruiting 40000 m e n , 
his teams actually enlisted 63378, few of w h o m , however, saw the front 
since the war ended in November 1918. 
Compulsory recruitment was also used to raise troops and carriers in 
British East Africa, under the compulsory service order of 1915, which 
m a d e all males aged between 18 and 45 liable for military service. This 
was extended to the Uganda Protectorate in April 1917. Forced recruitment 
of porters in all districts in Northern Rhodesia meant that for a large part 
of the war over a third of the adult males of the territory were involved 
in carrier service.28 After 1917, the heavy demands of the Syrian front 
forced the British Protectorate government in Egypt to introduce conscrip-
tion and requisition of animals despite its earlier promise that it would 
bear the full burden of the war. Village 'umdas 'paid off old scores as they 
shepherded their enemies into the arms of the recruiting agents or swept 
animals into the insatiable Syrian caravan'.29 In Algeria, Tunisia and even 
Morocco, which was still being conquered, colonial subjects were pressed 
into the war. Over 483 000 colonial soldiers from all over Africa are 
estimated to have served in the French army during the war, most of them 
compulsorily recruited. T h e Belgians in the Congo impressed up to 260000 
porters during the East African campaign.30 T h e sheer numbers involved 
are mind-boggling, especially as this was so soon after the European 
conquest. T h e slave trade at its height never reached a tenth of the numbers 
involved in any one year. 
While the war directly took an enormous toll in dead and wounded 
in Africa, it further accounted for innumerable indirect deaths in the Africa-
wide influenza epidemic of 1918-19 whose spread was facilitated by the 
movement of troops and carriers returning h o m e . 
26. Archives du Senegal, Dakar, Série D , File 4 D 4 5 , Lt. Governor, Ivory Coast to 
Governor-General, French West Africa, 18 December 1915. 
27. J. Osuntokun, 1977. 
28. R . Hall, 1965, p. 102. 
29. T . Little, 1958, p. 128. 
30. C . Young, 1965, p. 219. 
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plate 12.3 Men of the Egyptian Labour Corps embarking for service overseas. The corps
served in Egypt, France, Mesopotamia and Salonika
PLATE 12.4 German East African campaign: wounded of the Nigerian Brigade ready to be
moved from Nyangao after the battle ofMahiwa, 15 October 1917
plate 12.5 German East African campaign: Belgian African troops at Ndanda, January
1918, en route to the coast after German forces had crossed the Rovuma river, January 1918
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T h e African challenge to European authority 
At a time when the Allied colonial regimes in Africa could least afford 
trouble in their o w n backyards, their authority - still only tenuously 
established in places like southern Ivory Coast, m u c h of Libya, or Karamoja 
in Uganda - was widely challenged by armed risings and other forms of 
protest by their subjects. As a result the Allied powers had to divert scarce 
military resources, needed for fighting the Germans in Africa as well as 
on the Western Front, to dealing with local revolts. So scarce were these 
resources, and so widespread the revolts in certain areas such as French 
West Africa and Libya that the reimposition of European control over 
the revolted areas had to be delayed until troops became available. Large 
areas of Haut-Sénégal-Niger and D a h o m e y remained out of French control 
for as long as a year for lack of troops. T h u s the French were initially 
unable to deal with the revolt of 1916 in D a h o m e y a n Borgu because 
neighbouring groups — the S o m b a of Atacora, the Pila Pila of Semere and 
the Ohori among others - were also in revolt. In Morocco Lyautey, its 
conquistador, feared that metropolitan instructions to return half his 70000 
troops to France and withdraw to the Atlantic coast might lead to revolt. 
T h o u g h he had to release the m e n , he did not withdraw and managed 
to avert challenge to his authority. A s it was, France had to keep the other 
35 000 troops in Morocco throughout the war. In Portuguese East Africa 
the G e r m a n invasion inspired Portuguese subjects to take the occasion to 
overthrow their hated overlords.31 
T h e causes of the widespread revolts and protest movements that took 
place during the war varied considerably and were not all directly connected 
with the war itself. In some cases what were described as revolts were, 
in effect, as in Libya, just the continuation of primary resistance to 
European occupation. In m a n y cases the motives for revolt or protest were 
mixed. There can be no doubt that the visual evidence of the apparent 
weakening of European authority as represented by the exodus of Euro-
peans encouraged those contemplating revolt just as the influx of 
Europeans, in particular British troops, discouraged it in Egypt. 
A number of themes run through the wartime risings: the desire to regairi 
a lost independence; resentment against wartime measures, in particular 
compulsory recruitment and forced labour; religious, and in particular 
pan-Islamic, opposition to the war; reaction to economic hardships 
occasioned by the war; and discontent with particular aspects of the colonial 
dispensation, full realization of the nature of which in m a n y areas coincided 
with the wartime years. There is a final theme, particularly significant 
in South Africa, that of pro-German sentiment among the subjects of 
the Allied powers. 
31. C . P. Fendall, 1921, p. 120. Also J. Duffy, 1959, p. 367. 
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T h e desire to return to a life independent of white rule, that is a return 
to the status quo ante, comes out clearly in the revolts of the Borgawa 
and Ohori-Ije in French D a h o m e y and of various Igbo groups in Owerri 
province of Nigeria.32 T o a greater or lesser extent the desire to get rid 
of the white overlord runs through the majority of revolts against French 
authority in West Africa. Certainly one of the exacerbating factors in the 
rising of the Egba in 1918 in Southern Nigeria was the very recent loss of 
their semi-independent status at the outbreak of the war. In Egypt, the 
W a f d riots which took place immediately after the war were largely inspired 
by a desire to shake off the recently imposed British protectorate, which, 
in its short wartime life of four years, had proved itself excessively ob-
noxious to nationalists and fallähtn alike. In Madagascar 500 Malagasy, 
mainly intellectuals, were arrested at the end of 1915 and accused of 
'forming a well-organised secret society with the aim of expelling the French 
and restoring a Malagasy government'.33 
A major concern of the Allied powers during the war was that Turkey's 
entry on the G e r m a n side might encourage dissidence among their Muslim 
subjects. While Turkey's call to djihäd evoked less response a m o n g the 
subject Muslim populations of Africa than the Allied colonial authorities 
feared, they were constantly on the alert in case of disaffection among 
their Muslim subjects and were at great pains to reassure Muslim chiefs 
and leaders that the Allies were not hostile to Islam. T h e imposition of 
martial law and the imprisonment of nationalists in Egypt was partly 
inspired by fear of a sympathetic response to the Turkish call for djihäd 
a m o n g the Egyptians. T h e British in Northern Nigeria, which was 
predominantly Musl im, were very sensitive to the possible impact of 
Islamic propaganda there, but the community of interest established 
between the Sultan and emirs of the Sokoto Caliphate and the British 
ensured the loyalty of the bulk of Northern Nigerian Muslims. 
There were some nervous moments for the British when the Sanûsï 
Sufi brotherhood in Libya, still resisting the Italian occupation of its 
country, responded to the Turkish call to djihäd and invaded western Egypt 
in November 1915. T h e Sanûsï force took the Egyptian port of al-Sallüm 
with three-quarters of the Egyptian garrison going over to its side, while 
the British escaped by sea. It then advanced on Sïdï Barraní and Marsä 
Matrüh. Thereafter the British seized the initiative and drove the Sanûsïs 
back into Libya.34 T h o u g h defeated in Egypt, members of the brotherhood 
as well as other Libyans inflicted a decisive defeat on the Italians at the 
battle of al-Karadäbiyya, the worst defeat suffered by the Italians since 
A d o w a in 1896. T h e y then drove the Italians, w h o had to divert the bulk 
of their troops to the Austrian front, to the coast, so that by 1917 Italy 
32. See J. Osuntokun, 1977. 
33. N . Heseltine, 1971, p. 158. 
34. E . E . Evans-Pritchard, 1949, pp. 127-8. 
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was on the verge of losing Libya altogether.35 These victories led to the 
establishment of the Tripolitanian Republic (al-Djumhüriyya al-
Taräbulusiyya) on 16 November 1918 in western Libya and the Emirate 
of Cyrenaica in eastern Libya. Italy recognized these states in 1919 and 
granted each one its o w n parliament. Further rights were granted by Italy 
under the Treaty of al-Radjma in 1920. In January 1922, these two states 
agreed to form a political union and elected Idrîs al-Sanusï, the leader 
of the Sanüsiyya, as the head of the union and set up a central committee 
with its headquarters at Gharyän. 
T h e Libyan risings found a sympathetic response in southern Tunisia, 
where 15000 French troops were needed to suppress the revolt,36 and 
among the Tawärik and other Muslims in French Niger and Chad, where 
Islamic abhorrence of infidel rule, the drought of 1914 and intensive recruit-
ment for the army had provoked considerable discontent. In December 
1916 Sanüs^s forces invaded Niger, where they gained the support of 
Kaossen, leader of the Tarkï Tawärik, Firhün, chief of the Oullimiden 
Tawärik, and the Sultan of Agades. They took Agades and a combined 
French and British force was needed to defeat them.3 7 
Not only Islamic risings threatened the Allied powers in their colonies. 
John Chilembwe's rising in Nyasaland (now Malawi) of January 1915 had 
strong Christian undertones, while the Kitawala Watchtower movement 
in the Rhodesias preached the imminence of the end of the world and 
disobedience to constituted authority. It capitalized on the disruption 
caused in Northern Rhodesia by von Lettow-Vorbeck's invasion at the 
end of the war. Similarly apocalyptic was the widespread movement in 
the Niger delta area of Nigeria, led by Garrick Braide, otherwise known 
as Elijah II, w h o preached the imminent demise of the British administra-
tion. In Ivory Coast, the Prophet Harris was deported in December 1914 
because 'the events in Europe demand more than ever the maintenance 
of tranquillity among the people of the Colony'.38 In Kenya, in Nyanza, 
the M u m b o cult which grew rapidly during the war years, rejected the 
Christian religion, and declared: 'All Europeans are your enemies, but the 
time is shortly coming when they will disappear from our country.'39 
Perhaps the most important cause of revolt was the forced recruitment 
of m e n for service as soldiers and carriers. Such was the hatred of forced 
recruitment that it was a major inspiration for nearly all the revolts that 
35. N . Barbour (ed.), 1959; al-Tillisi, 1973, pp. 25-6,46-7,274-5,4°5-i°; A . M . Barbar, 
1980. 
36. D . L . Ling, 1967. 
37. See A . Salifou, 1973; J. Osuntokun, 1975. 
38. Confidential M e m o r a n d u m from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Ivory Coast to 
Administratuers of the Cercles, 16 December 1914, quoted in G . M . Haliburton, 1971, 
P- 139-
39. Quoted by B . A . Ogot in B . A . Ogot (ed.), 1974, p. 264. For further details on 
the risings in this section, see Chapters 20, 26, 27 and 29. 
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took place in French Black Africa, and evoked some resistance in the other-
wise peaceful Gold Coast colony.40 
John Chilembwe's rising was precipitated by the enlistment of Nyasas 
and their large death toll in the first weeks of the war in battle with the 
Germans . In his memorable censored letter to the Nyasaland Times of 
26 N o v e m b e r 1914 he protested: ' W e understand that w e have been invited 
to shed our innocent blood in this world's war . . . w e are imposed upon 
more than any other nationality under the sun'.41 
Economic hardship caused by the war certainly underlay and even 
provoked resistance against the colonial authorities. T h e risings in the m i d -
west of Nigeria and the Niger delta during the early stages of the war 
cannot be understood except in the context of falling prices for palm 
products, and the drop in trade due to the exclusion of the producers' 
main customers, the G e r m a n s . 4 2 Indeed, pro-German sympathy a m o n g 
Allied subjects, where it was found, derived largely from the fact that 
Germans had in m a n y parts of Africa been the principal traders; and their 
exclusion by the Allies was associated with the economic depression that 
attended the first year of the war. 
In South Africa the Afrikaner revolt of late 1914 against the government's 
decision to support the Allies was due both to pro-German sympathy and 
hatred of Britain. T h e Germans themselves did their best to provoke dis-
affection among the African subjects of the Allies, being particularly active 
along the north-eastern border of Nigeria and in Libya. In Uganda, shortly 
after the commencement of hostilities, Nyindo, Paramount Chief of Kigezi, 
was persuaded by his half-brother, the M w a m i of Ruanda, to revolt against 
the British on behalf of the G e r m a n s . 4 3 
In m a n y cases, and notably Nigeria, wartime revolts were not directly 
attributable to specific wartime measures. Rather they were directed against 
obnoxious features of colonial rule such as taxation, which was introduced 
into Yorubaland for the first time in 1916 and together with the increased 
powers given to traditional rulers under the policy of 'indirect rule', 
provoked the Iseyin riots.44 In French West Africa the impositions of the 
indigénat (a discriminatory judicial code), the reorganization of administra-
tive boundaries, the suppression of chiefs or the exactions of chiefs without 
traditional authority were all major causes of the revolts that broke out 
in every colony of the federation. 
These revolts were, whatever their cause, put d o w n ruthlessly by the 
colonial authorities. 'Rebels' were impressed into the army, flogged or even 
hanged, chiefs exiled or imprisoned, and villages razed to the ground to 
serve as a warning. But not all protests were violent in character. M a n y 
40. See D . Killingray, 1978, p. 46; R . G . Thomas , 1975. 
41. Quoted in R . I. Rotberg, 1965, p. 82. 
42. J. Osuntokun, 1977. 
43. W . R . Louis, 1963(b), p. 213. 
44. J. A . Atanda, 1969. 
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people tried to avoid the source of their grievances by emigration or other 
forms of evasive action. T h u s large numbers of French subjects in Senegal, 
Guinea, Haut-Sénégal-Niger and Ivory Coast undertook what A . I. 
Asiwaju has termed 'protest migrations' to the neighbouring British 
territories.45 T o avoid recruitment teams, inhabitants of whole villages 
fled to the bush. Young m e n mutilated themselves rather than serve in 
the colonial army. T h e protest migrations were of such magnitude that 
it was estimated that French West Africa lost some 62000 subjects as a 
result of them.4 6 In Zanzibar, too, m e n hid all day and slept in trees at 
night to avoid being impressed as carriers.47 
The economic consequences of the War 
T h e declaration of war brought considerable economic disruption to Africa. 
Generally there followed a depression in the prices paid for Africa's primary 
products, while knowledge that henceforth imported goods would be in 
short supply led to a rise in their prices. In Uganda there was an overnight 
increase of 50% in the price of imports.48 T h e pattern of African trade 
with Europe was radically changed by the exclusion of the Germans from 
the Allied territories, where in certain cases, like Sierra Leone, they had 
accounted for 80% of the import-export trade. Germany's o w n colonies, 
even before they were occupied by the Allies, were cut off from trade 
with the métropole because of Allied dominion over the seas. G e r m a n y , 
from being tropical Africa's major overseas trading partner, was n o w almost 
entirely excluded from trading activities in the continent, for once the Allies 
completed their occupation of the G e r m a n colonies, all G e r m a n nationals 
were interned and their plantations, commercial houses and industries were 
taken over by the occupying powers. Even in the case of the French African 
territories, where the French groundnut-milling industry would normally 
have been able to absorb the oil-seeds hitherto imported by the Germans , 
it was unable to do so, as it was located in the German-occupied part 
of north-east France. T h u s where France had been the major importer 
of the Gambian groundnut crop, she was n o w replaced by Britain whose 
share of the crop rose from 4 % in 1912 to 48% in 191o.49 Indeed the 
dramatic substitution of British for G e r m a n traders would almost suggest 
that the war, as far as the African colonies were concerned, was seen by 
Britain, (like Germany, a free-trade nation) as an opportunity for economic 
aggrandizement. While generally the excluded G e r m a n traders were 
replaced by nationals of the governing power of the colonies in which they 
45. I. A . Asiwaju, 1976(b). 
46. See M . Crowder in J. F . A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974, p. 506. 
47. H . M . Smith, 1926, p. 191. 
48. K . Ingham, 1958, p . 191. 
49. P . H . S . Hatton, 1966. 
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had traded, in French West Africa, the British m a d e headway against the 
French because of the mobilization of French traders.50 
T h e depression that followed the outbreak of war soon gave way to 
a b o o m in those products needed to boost the Allied war effort. T h u s 
Egyptian cotton rose from £E$ a quintal in 1914 to £ E 8 in 1916-18.51 
But increased demand was not always reflected by increased prices, for 
often the colonial governments controlled the prices paid to the producers. 
Certain countries suffered badly throughout the war. T o take the example 
of the Gold Coast, its major export crop of cocoa was not nearly in such 
demand as, for instance, oil-seeds. Furthermore the buying capacity of 
the African-based import-export houses was severely hampered by the 
enlistment, voluntary or obligatory, of so m a n y of the European personnel; 
in French West Africa some 75% of the European traders had left for the 
war by 1917.52 
While prices of exports did not always reflect the increased demand 
for them, because of controlled prices, and while demand for labour, too, 
was not always reflected in increased wages, the prices of imports, where 
they were obtainable, rose throughout the war. While the vast majority 
of Africans in the subsistence sector were not affected by this inflation, 
those in the wage-earning or export crop-producing sectors were. T h u s 
the Egyptian peasant producing cotton found that the benefit he received 
from increased prices for his product did not offset the steep rise in the 
cost of fuel, clothing and cereals.53 
T h e war witnessed an increased level of state intervention in the 
economies of the African colonies, whether in the form of price control, 
requisition of food crops, compulsory cultivation of crops, recruitment of 
labour for essential projects or allocation of shipping space. Generally such 
intervention tended to favour the import-export houses of the colonial 
power controlling the colony concerned. T h u s in Nigeria, companies like 
John Holt and the United Africa C o m p a n y were used as buying agents 
and had both priority in shipping space and easier access to loans from 
the banks, with the result that smaller import-export companies, in 
particular Nigerian-controlled ones, suffered.54 
D e m a n d s for traditionally subsistence crops, including yams, manioc 
and beans, for the feeding of the Allies in Europe and for the armies in 
Africa or the Middle Eastern front, added to the hardship of those outside 
the subsistence sector. A n d where subsistence crops were requisitioned 
— as they widely were — or paid for at prices below the free-market price, 
the producers themselves suffered. T h u s by the end of the war the Egyptian 
50. M . Crowder in J. F. A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974, p. 506. 
51. G . Baer, 1962. 
52. M . Crowder in J. F. A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974, p. 506. 
53. M . Y . Zayid, 1965, p. 76. During the war overall production fell sharply, see 
P. O'Brien in P. M . Holt (ed.), 1968, pp. 188-90. 
54. J. Osuntokun, 1978. 
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fallâhïn were hard put to keep b o d y and soul together, what with inflation, 
and the requisition of their cereals and animals.5 5 In French W e s t Africa 
the d e m a n d s for m e n for the w a r conflicted with d e m a n d s for s o r g h u m , 
millet, maize, etc. which they w o u l d normally have produced. B y 1916 
France w a s in a desperate situation for food, for her crop in terms of wheat 
had suffered a shortfall of 30 million quintals, 60 million as against the 
9 0 million required. T h e following year, with a world shortfall in the wheat 
crop, her o w n crop w a s only 4 0 million quintals.56 T h u s in both these 
years wheat or substitutes had to be found overseas. N o r t h Africa, so close 
to France , w a s an obvious source of supply a n d even recently conquered 
M o r o c c o w a s enlisted in her ravitaillement. B u t d e m a n d s were m a d e even 
as far afield as Madagascar . In addition to such d e m a n d s , the subsistence 
farmer in territories in which campaigns were fought, particularly in East 
Africa, w a s subject to the exactions of armies which , because of supply 
problems, could not but live off the land. 
D e m a n d s for troops and carriers as well as for increased production 
of both export a n d subsistence crops resulted in shortages of labour in 
m a n y parts of the continent during the w a r . Recruitment of carriers in 
Northern Rhodesia for the East Africa campaign cut off Southern Rhodesia 
( n o w Z i m b a b w e ) a n d Katanga from their traditional source of labour57 
a n d the Belgian administration in the C o n g o h a d to conduct forced recruit-
m e n t of labour for the country's mines . T h e influenza epidemic at the 
end of the w a r in East and Central Africa particularly affected the returning 
carriers and created acute shortages of labour in K e n y a and the Rhodesias. 
Thi s shortage occurred a m o n g E u r o p e a n as well as African personnel; and 
in Southern Rhodesia, where white railway workers had hitherto been laid 
off at will by their employers because of the availability of replacements, 
they were n o w at such a p r e m i u m that they were able to form unions, 5 8 
previously resisted b y employers and G o v e r n m e n t . 
T h e shortage of imports m a y have led to a fall in production w h e r e 
agriculture, as in Egypt , w a s dependent o n imports of fertilizers, farm 
implements and irrigation machinery, but it also encouraged the develop-
m e n t of import substitution industries in s o m e countries, particularly South 
Africa where the potentialities of overseas markets for local products c a m e 
to b e realized at this t ime.5 9 In the Belgian C o n g o , cut off from the occupied 
metropolis, the w a r w a s a great stimulus to increased self-sufficiency, as 
it w a s in the early years of the w a r in G e r m a n East Africa. T h e influx 
of British troops into Egypt a n d the injection of s o m e £ 2 0 0 million into 
the e c o n o m y during the war period w a s an important stimulus to industrial 
growth. 
55. T . Little, 1958, p. 128. 
56. H . C . Cosnier, 1922. 
57. L . H . Gann, 1964, p. 164. 
58. ibid., p. 172. 
59. F. Wilson in M . Wilson and L . Thompson (eds), 1971, p. 135. 
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T h e war introduced the internal combustion engine and, with it, 
motorable roads to m a n y parts of Africa. In East Africa, the protracted 
campaign against the Germans and the problem of moving supplies led 
to the construction of a number of motorable roads, such as that from 
D o d o m a in G e r m a n East Africa to T u k u y u at the north end of Lake Nyasa, 
which reduced to two to three days a journey that hitherto had taken two 
to three weeks.60 In those areas where there was sustained military activity, 
or where transit facilities were required, ports developed rapidly. M o m b a s a , 
Bizerta, Port Harcourt and Dakar are cases in point. In Nigeria, the E n u g u 
coal mines were opened up during the war to provide the railways with 
a local source of fuel. 
Generally government revenues diminished during the war, since they 
were largely dependent on duties on imported goods. T h e colonies never-
theless bore a large part of the burden of the cost of local campaigns, 
apart from making grants to the metropolitan powers to help the war effort. 
Except where military exigencies necessitated them, public works came 
to a halt and development plans were shelved until after the war. 
T h e socio-political consequences of the W a r 
T h e social consequences of the war for Africa varied considerably from 
territory to territory and depended on the extent of their involvement, 
in particular the degree of recruitment or military activity in them. 
Unfortunately, until recently relatively little attention has been given to 
the social impact of the war. This is somewhat surprising, since for some 
areas like eastern Africa, the First World W a r , as Ranger has put it, was 
'the most awe-inspiring, destructive and capricious demonstration of 
European "absolute power" that eastern Africa ever experienced. T h e scale 
of the forces involved, the massiveness of the fire-power, the extent of 
devastation and disease, the number of African lives lost - all these dwarfed 
the original campaigns of colonial conquest, and even the suppression of 
the Majï Majï rising.'61 Writing in the 1930s D r H . R . A . Philip remarked 
that the 'experiences of the years from 1914 to 1918 were such as to 
effectively awaken the Kenya native from the sleep of the centuries'.62 
Compared with the research conducted on the political consequences of 
the war for Africa, comparatively little has been undertaken on its social 
consequences. Yet its impact on soldiers, carriers and labourers w h o were 
uprooted from the circumscribed worlds of their villages and sent thousands 
of miles away and their impact on their societies on their return63 forms 
a major theme in colonial history. 
60. P. Mitchell, 1954, p. 38. 
61. T . O . Ranger, 1975, p. 45. 
62. Quoted by B . A . Ogot in B . A . Ogot (ed.), 1974, p. 265. 
63. See for example M . J. Echenberg, 1975; Y . Person, i960, pp. 106-7 refers to the 
dominant role played by old soldiers in Kissi society after the First World W a r , particularly 
as agents for modernization. 
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There is no doubt that the war opened up new windows for m a n y 
Africans, particularly the educated elite groups. Margery Perham has 
written that it is 'difficult to overestimate the effect upon Africans, w h o 
had been largely enclosed within a bilateral relationship with their European 
rulers, of looking outside this enclosure and seeing themselves as part of 
a continent and of a world'.64 In m a n y parts of Africa the war gave a 
boost, if not always to nationalist activity, at least to the development of 
a more critical approach by the educated elites towards their colonial 
masters. Bethwell Ogot has suggested that the shared wartime experience 
of African and European soldiers had a similar effect for the less-educated: 
T h e African soldier soon discovered the weaknesses and the strength 
of the European, w h o up to that time had been regarded by the 
majority of Africans as a superman. In fact, the warrant and non-
commissioned African officers were instructing European volunteers 
in the technique of modern warfare. It was becoming evident that 
the European did not know everything. T h e returning porters and 
soldiers spread the n e w views of the white m a n ; and m u c h of the 
self-confidence and assertiveness that the Africans in Kenya displayed 
in the 1920s had a lot to do with this new knowledge.65 
H e also points out that, significantly, several African political leaders in 
Kenya had either fought or served in the East African campaign. In Guinea 
the return of the anciens combattants heralded strikes, riots in the de-
mobilization camps and attacks on the authority of chiefs.66 
If the war saw an end of attempts by Africans to regain the lost 
sovereignty of their pre-colonial polities, it also saw a rise in demands for 
participation in the process of government of the n e w polities imposed 
on them by the Europeans. These demands - inspired by President 
W o o d r o w Wilson's Fourteen Points which were m a d e in reaction to the 
Soviet proposals put forward in October 1917 for the immediate conclusion 
of peace without annexation or indemnity - even extended to the right 
to self-determination. In the case of the Arab countries of North Africa 
the joint announcement by Britain and France in November 1918 that 
the Allies were contemplating the enfranchisement of peoples oppressed 
by the Turks presented the spectacle of one group of Arabs being offered 
independence, while another, ruled by those very powers w h o were offering 
freedom to the Turkish provinces, was denied it. 
Sa'd ZaghlüTs W a f d Party in Egypt took its n a m e from the delegation 
{Wafd) he tried to send to the Versailles Peace Conference to negotiate 
Egypt's return to independence.67 Similarly in Tunisia, though the wartime 
Resident, Alapetite, had kept as firm a grip on the nationalists as the British 
64. M . Perham, 1961, p. 45. 
65. B . A . Ogot in B . A . Ogot (ed.), 1974, p. 265. 
66. A . Summers and R . W . Johnson, 1978. 
67. M . Zayid in P. M . Holt (ed.), 1968, pp. 341-2; for the activities of the Wafd Party, 
see Chapter 23. 
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had in Egypt, after the war their leaders sent a telegram to President Wilson 
of the United States to enlist his assistance in their demands for self-
determination.68 
While Wilson's Fourteen Points did not inspire demands for immediate 
independence in Africa south of the Sahara, his liberal sentiments 
encouraged West African nationalists to hope that they could influence 
the Versailles Peace Conference and also encouraged them to demand a 
greater say in their o w n affairs.69 A s the Sierra Leonean, F . W . D o v e , 
a delegate to the National Congress of British West Africa put it, the time 
had 'passed w h e n the African peoples should be coerced against their will 
to do things that are not in accordance with their best interests'.70 In 
the Sudan, Wilson's Fourteen Points, coupled with the inspiration of the 
Arab revolt of 1916, proved a turning-point in Sudanese nationalism, 
informing the attitudes of a n e w generation of politically conscious young 
m e n w h o had passed through government schools and had acquired some 
modern, western skills.71 
In m a n y territories where heavy contributions had been m a d e in terms 
of m e n and material to the war effort, there was hope that these would 
be rewarded at least by social and political reform. In some cases the colonial 
governments specifically promised reform in return for increased assistance 
from their subject populations. Blaise Diagne was promised a package of 
post-war reforms in French Black Africa if he could recruit the additional 
m e n France required for the European front. This he did, but the reforms 
were never put into effect.72 T h e Algerian contribution to the war effort 
was rewarded by economic and political improvements in the status of 
Algerians which were, however, opposed by the settlers and perceived as 
too limited by the Emir Khâlid, grandson of ' A b d al-Kädir, w h o strongly 
criticized the French administration and was deported in 1924. H e has 
justly been described as the founder of the Algerian nationalist m o v e -
ment . 7 3 In Tunisia a delegation of thirty m e n representative of the Arab 
community called on the Bey to initiate political reform, reminding him 
of the sacrifices Tunisia had m a d e in the war . 7 4 Certainly m u c h of the 
impetus behind the foundation of the Destiir or Constitution Party in 1920 
came from returned soldiers and labourers w h o were dissatisfied with their 
subordinate position in their o w n country.75 In British West Africa, the 
press, while generally extremely loyal to the British and critical of the 
68. N . A . Ziadeh, 1962, p. 60. 
69. J. A . Langley, 1973, p- 107 and passim. 
70. Memorandum of the National Congress of British West Africa, 1920, F . W . Dove, 
delegate of Sierra Leone. 
71. M . 'Abd Al-Rahim, 1969, p. 94. 
72. M . Crowder, 1977(d), in M . Crowder, 1977(a), p. 117. 
73. C . V . Confer, 1966, p. 113. 
74. N . A . Ziadeh, 1962, p. 88. 
75. ibid., p. 123. For the activities of the Destür, see Chapter 24. 
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G e r m a n s , believed that the reward for this loyalty would be a m o r e 
significant role for the educated elite in the colonial decision-making 
process.76 
T h e war acted not only as a stimulus to African nationalism but also 
to white nationalism, particularly in South Africa. T h e r e , though the 
Afrikaner rebellion w a s speedily put d o w n , the spirit which informed it 
w a s not. A s William H e n r y Vatcher has put it: 
T h e rebellion reconfirmed w h a t the Boer W a r had taught, that force 
w a s not the answer, that battle m u s t be pitched in the political arena. 
T h u s , in a real sense, m o d e r n Afrikaner nationalism, conceived in 
the Boer W a r , w a s born in the 1914 rebellion. If the first world war 
had not taken place, the Boers might have been better able to adjust 
to the conciliatory policy of Botha and S m u t s . T h e war forced on 
t h e m the decision to organize, first covertly in the form of the 
Afrikaner Broederbond, then in the form of the 'purified' National 
Party.77 
In K e n y a , the white settlers used the w a r to m a k e major political 
advances vis-à-vis the colonial government. T h e y secured the right of 
whites to elect representatives to the Legislative Council, where after 1918 
they formed a majority. This , coupled with the C r o w n L a n d s Ordinance, 
wh ich m a d e racial segregation in the W h i t e Highlands possible, the Native 
Registration Ordinance, which introduced a pseudo-pass law for Africans, 
and the Soldier Settlement S c h e m e which allocated large portions of the 
N a n d i reserve for settlement of white soldiers after the war , entrenched 
the white minority in a dominant position in K e n y a u p to the 1950s.7 8 
A major stimulus to K e n y a nationalism w a s the reaction against such 
privileges gained b y the white c o m m u n i t y , in particular with regard to 
land. T h u s the K i k u y u Association, consisting mainly of chiefs, was 
founded in 1920 to defend K i k u y u land interests while Harry T h u k u ' s 
Y o u n g K i k u y u Association, founded a year later, a imed at defence of both 
land and labour.79 
In South Africa, the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and Republican 
agitation during the war gave serious concern to African leaders in 
Swaziland and Basutoland ( n o w Lesotho). T h e y feared that their countries 
might be integrated into the U n i o n , which with its increasingly racist 
policies, exemplified by the provisions of the Native L a n d Act of 1913, 
might, under Afrikaner pressure, gain independence, and that thereafter 
there would be n o protection for their interests. A s S i m o n P h a m o t e of 
the Sotho National Council declared, his people feared 'the U n i o n because 
w e k n o w that . . . the Boers will one day get their independence from the 
76. F. O m u , 1968, pp. 44-9. 
77. W . H . Vatcher, 1965, p. 46. 
78. G . Bennett, 1963, pp. 35-45. 
79. ibid., p. 45. For further details, see Chapter 26. 
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British.'80 Within the Union, the South African Native National Congress 
(later to become the African National Congress) presented a m e m o r a n d u m 
after the war to King George V of Britain, citing the African contribution to 
the war in both the South West African and East African campaigns as 
well as in France, and recalling that the war had been fought to liberate 
oppressed peoples and to grant to every nation the right to determine its 
sovereign destiny.81 T h e Congress was informed by the British Colonial 
Office that Britain could not interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa 
and the Congress appeal was not presented to the Peace Conference. 
Conclusion 
T h e war saw a major change in the climate of international opinion with 
regard to colonialism. Prior to the war, the European colonial powers had 
been accountable only to themselves. After the war, at the Versailles Peace 
Conference, the colonial record of one of them, Germany , was examined 
and found wanting, according to newly conceived standards of morality 
concerning the governance of colonial peoples.82 Undoubtedly, most of 
the other colonial powers would have been found equally wanting if their 
o w n record had been similarly scrutinized.83 T h e idea of administering 
so-called backward peoples as a 'sacred trust', though evident in the 1890s 
in the prohibition, for example, of the sale of alcohol to Africans, was 
n o w enshrined in the Mandates where the victorious Allies took over the 
administration of Germany's colonies on behalf of the League of Nations 
- 'responsible for the . . . promotion to the utmost of the material and 
moral well-being and the social progress of [their] inhabitants'.84 Theoreti-
cally the principle of international accountability had been underlined, 
though, because of the weakness of the League of Nations, little could 
be done, for instance, about the deplorable conditions of the indigenous 
inhabitants of South West Africa administered under Mandate by the 
Union. 8 5 T h e right of self-determination, first enunciated at the Congress 
of the Socialist Second International held in London in 1896, had also 
been enunciated by the leader of a major world power, W o o d r o w Wilson, 
whilst the newly-emerged Soviet Union was to attack all forms of 
colonialism in Africa. 
Even if the lot of the subject peoples did not change m u c h for the better 
in the years following the war, w h e n even willing attempts at reform were 
80. R . H y a m , 1972, p. 80. 
81. L . Kuper in M . Wilson and L . M . Thompson (eds), 1971, p. 439. 
82. See for example German Colonization Handbooks prepared under the direction of 
the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, N o . 36, London, 1919 and C . Fidel, 1926. 
O n Germany's colonial record in Togo see M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 241-8. 
83. L . H . Gann and P. Duignan, 1967, p. 79. 
84. This is the standard wording for the African mandates. 
85. See R . Segal and R . First, 1967. 
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aborted by the depression,86 searching questions about the morality of 
colonialism had begun to be asked. A n d it was in this climate that the 
nationalist movement gestated that was eventually to obtain independence 
for m a n y African countries. For example, leaders of the National Congress 
of British West Africa like J. E . Casely Hayford and H . C . Bankole-Bright 
were able to gain an international hearing through the League of Nations 
Union, concerning themselves with the administration of Togoland and 
appealing to the Covenant of the League as a charter for 'just treatment 
towards our people'. A n d at long range, the idea of the Mandate evolved 
into the post-Second World W a r concept of Trusteeship, which incorpor-
ated the explicit goal of eventual independence for the Trust Territories 
which were to be visited by 'neutral' missions of inspection. 
T h e First World W a r , then, represented a turning-point in African 
history, not as dramatic as the Second World W a r , but nevertheless 
important in m a n y areas. O n e of its most important legacies was the re-
ordering of the m a p of Africa roughly as it is today (see Fig. 12.2). Germany 
was eliminated as a colonial power, and replaced by France and Britain 
in the Cameroon and Togo , by the Union of South Africa in South West 
Africa and by Britain and Belgium in G e r m a n East Africa, the latter gaining 
the small but densely populated provinces of Ruanda and Urundi (now 
R w a n d a and Burundi).87 
T h e intricate negotiations that took place at Versailles over the re-
allocation of these territories to the Allied victors belongs properly to the 
history of Europe, though the way in which Cameroon and Togo were 
divided, with little reference to historical and ethnic considerations, was 
to create considerable bitterness among certain sections of the population 
in these territories and their immediate neighbours, in particular the E w e 
of Togo and the Gold Coast. A s far as the African inhabitants of the former 
G e r m a n colonies were concerned, their lot was not noticeably improved 
by the change of masters. Indeed some Africans compared their former 
masters favourably with their new ones, and in Cameroon and Togo, a 
certain nostalgia for the earlier regime grew as the French introduced 
their forced labour and the British proved less energetic than their Teutonic 
cousins in developing their territories.88 Because France and Britain saw 
themselves as temporary stewards in the Mandate territories, the two T o g o -
lands remained less developed than say Ivory Coast and Gold Coast, and 
Tanganyika less developed than Kenya or Uganda. A n d if South West 
Africa developed spectacularly under South African 'stewardship', it was 
to the benefit of the fast-growing settler population; as far as the indigenous 
inhabitants were concerned, the brutal experience of G e r m a n rule was 
86. A n example is A . Sarraut, 1923. 
87. See W . R . Louis, 1963(b), for an account of the negotiations leading up to the decision 
of the Peace Conference to allocate Ruanda and Urundi to the Belgians. 
88. See C . E . Welch, 1966, p. 58. 
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fig. 12.2 The changed map of Africa after the First World War (after J. D. Page, 1978)
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exchanged for that of a government committed to racist policies and the 
settlement and exploitation of the country by and for whites. 
T h e First World W a r , though essentially a European war, involved 
Africa intimately. It marked both the end of the partition of Africa and 
of attempts by Africans to regain independence based on their pre-partition 
polities. T h o u g h it represented a period of immense social and economic 
upheaval for m a n y African countries, it ushered in a twenty-year period 
of tranquillity for the European administrations, except in places like the 
French and Spanish Rïf, French Mauritania and Italian Libya. 
However, ideas concerning the self-determination of peoples and the 
accountability of colonial powers had been sown during this war. These 
ideas were to influence profoundly the development of the incipient 
nationalist movements during the ensuing period of peace. But it was to take 
a second world war to provide the cataclysm which translated the requests 
of the nationalists for greater participation in the process of government, 
into demands for full control of it. 
3" 
Methods and institutions of 
European domination 
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'Native policy' 
Shortly after or concurrently with the military conquest and occupation 
of Africa by the imperial powers of Europe, Africa was overlaid with a 
colonial administrative grid which, while neither uniform nor simple, was 
welded out of a few commonly held ideas and beliefs. A s at no other time 
or in any other continent subjected to European domination, colonial policy 
came to be referred to as 'native policy'. Granted that the term supported 
a variety of definitions in the administration of'natives', the word generally 
employed in describing Africans, there was general agreement both in 
theory and in practice that colonial rule could only be effectively secured 
through the use of indigenous personnel and institutions in some 
complementary or supportive function. 
This realization was the result of the colonial situation already deter-
mined by those nineteenth-century Europeans w h o had been operating 
in Africa. With Algeria and Southern Africa listed as the notable excep-
tions, the vast land mass of the continent was considered climatically in-
hospitable to intensive white settlement, while the local populations 
appeared to be insufficiently concentrated geographically to allow for 
effective direct administration by European personnel. Essentially, Africa 
was deemed to be a congeries of tropical estates whose populations were 
to be both enlisted and directed by the Europeans for externally defined 
purposes. W h a t Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard would define as a 'dual 
mandate' in his famous book of that n a m e first published in 1922, was 
generally accepted as the theoretical justification for the European 
presence: social and economic development as m u c h for the sake of the 
rest of the world as for Africa. 
In contemporary imperialist ideology, therefore, the purpose of the 
European presence was defined in terms of a responsibility or trust. T h e 
British government's White Paper on K e n y a issued in 1923, which 
established the principle of 'native paramountcy', included the statement 
that 'His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust 
on behalf of the African populations . . . the object of which m a y be defined 
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as the protection and advancement of the native races . . . ' ' T h e French 
Minister of Colonies, Albert Sarraut, argued in his well-known study, La 
mise en valeur des colonies françaises, that the 'sole right which should be 
recognized is that of the strong to protect the weak'. France, he continued, 
was guaranteeing 'the economic growth and h u m a n development' of its 
colonies.2 
Both statements suggest that paternalistic attitude which had thoroughly 
permeated European thought about colonial Africa and which was both 
internationalized and institutionalized with the mandates system that 
emerged from the League of Nations after the First World W a r . In the 
language of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the colonial 
effort, particularly in Africa, was n o w proclaimed to be a responsibility 
undertaken in the n a m e of higher civilization, with 'the tutelage of such 
peoples [the colonial populations] . . . entrusted to advanced nations'.3 
Behind such rhetoric still stood an attitude of cultural and racial superiority, 
formed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and regularly given 
expression in descriptions of the African as childlike or 'non-adult'. T h e 
European domination which such an imagined social condition required 
was thought to be of long duration, which meant that the colonial hold 
on Africa would last into some unforeseeable future. 
A s for those few areas which already had large residential white 
minorities and were receiving still more such immigrants at this time, the 
anticipated future condition was one of permanency of settlement and of 
the continuance of European primacy in all matters relating to politics 
and property. Yet even in such territories - except South Africa where 
a policy of severely unequal segregation had already been imposed - notions 
of co-operative development were frequently expressed, and the African 
populations were at least officially enjoined to accept and follow European 
guidance. 
Beyond such considerations, colonial policy was without clear, final 
objectives. M o r e short-range process than well-defined system, it vaguely 
included notions of self-government in its British form, and of political 
integration in its French and Portuguese forms. Broadly poised between 
these policies of 'differentiation' and 'identity', colonial administration of 
the inter-war era was described by its practitioners as necessarily empirical, 
an exercise in cultural and political accommodation. 
Yet what seminal thought and experimentation that did occur were pre-
war in origin. Following upon the 'paper occupation' of Africa in the 1880s 
and 1890s, the process of military conquest and domination occurred, and 
1. Indians in Kenya, C m d 1922 (1923). 
2. A . Sarraut, 1923, p. 19. 
3. While becoming a member of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union did express 
reservations about certain articles of the League Covenant. In particular the Soviet Union 
disapproved of Article 22 and accordingly refused to assign a representative to the Mandates 
Commission. 
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this gave rise to many of the methods of administrative control to be 
employed even before the century ended. A s a result, the inter-war years 
were those in which m a n y of these earlier practices were structured into 
official policy and in which administrative expediency was elevated to the 
status of well-articulated theory. In retrospect, the period can clearly be 
seen as the one in which the bureaucratization of colonial administration 
occurred. 
Although there was initially no universally accepted approach to colonial 
administration in Africa, most lines of thought converged on what might be 
called conjunctive administration (usually termed indirect rule); that which 
joined African authorities, in traditionally-held or European-imposed 
political roles, to the colonial government, but in an obviously subordinate 
capacity. T h e reasons for general concurrence on this broad principle of 
rule are varied. First, the historical pattern of late nineteenth-century 
colonial acquisition was a formative factor, as size alone added a n e w 
dimension to the problem of colonial rule. Secondly the internal penetration 
of Africa rapidly outpaced the numbers of European personnel available 
to administer the newly possessed lands. Furthermore, since such 
penetration extended into m a n y regions yet untouched by European 
cultural contact, direct rule of any kind would have been an entirely n e w 
experience and therefore immediately unworkable. Primarily as a result 
of these conditions, previously noted by several critics,4 the direct rule 
characteristic of the smaller possessions on the coast gave way to the indirect 
rule of the larger possessions in the interior. Furthermore, at the turn of 
the century, the collapse of rule by chartered companies necessitated the 
establishment of national control over weakly held extensive territories. 
Yet this condition was in turn met (except in G e r m a n East Africa) with 
a type of informal rule similar to the loose methods employed previously 
by the companies, as was most evident in Italian Somaliland. 
There were also reasons which sprang from European cultural percep-
tions and announced political intentions. N o t only was there widespread 
acceptance of the principle of empire 'on the cheap', with little or no direct 
cost to the metropolitan state, but there was also general agreement that 
the least social dislocation would assure the most indigenous co-operation. 
Speaking of British policy in Africa, Lugard asserted that 'institutions and 
methods, in order to c o m m a n d success and promote the happiness and 
welfare of the people must be deep-rooted in their traditions and 
prejudices'.5 Likewise the French Minister of Colonies, Georges Léyguès, 
had stated in 1906: 'The fundamental principle of our colonial policy must 
be scrupulous respect for the beliefs, habits and traditions of the conquered 
or protected peoples'.6 
4. See M . Perham, 1960(b), pp. 140-1; J. D . Fage in P. Gifford and W . R . Louis 
(eds), 1967, p. 703. 
5. F. D . Lugard, 1929, p. 211. 
6. La Dépêche Coloniale, 12 July 1906, p. 1. 
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These explanations and arguments in respect of shortage of personnel 
and the need to reduce cost to the barest m i n i m u m are themselves directly 
related to a more fundamental problem which dictated the adoption of 
the conjunctive system of administration by all the colonial governments 
in the twentieth century. This was the failure of the assimilationist or direct 
administration policy which was the vogue in the nineteenth century. 
Whether in respect of the French in the Four C o m m u n e s of Senegal or 
of the British with regards to the C r o w n colonies of Sierra Leone, Gold 
Coast (now Ghana) and Lagos (in what is n o w Nigeria), assimilation had, 
by the end of the nineteenth century, been frustrated not only by the 
cultural resistance of the African peoples concerned. There was also a loss 
of enthusiasm on the part of the French and the British colonial officials 
themselves, due to the emergent trend of conflict and friction between 
the European colonial elite and the locally produced western-educated 
Africans. In both the French and British colonies, the end of the nineteenth 
century was marked by a systematic frustration of westernized Africans' 
expectations. A s A . E . Afigbo has correctly observed,7 the end of the nine-
teenth century in the colonies of British West Africa witnessed not just 
the systematic removal of educated Africans w h o had held positions of 
responsibility in the earlier decades: the same period also saw the systematic 
tightening of conditions under which Africans could become French 
citizens in Senegal and elsewhere. It was, indeed, this loss of fellowship 
between the European colonialist and the educated Africans at the end 
of the century, which created the artificial scarcity of administrative 
personnel, as the n e w regimes began to exercise restriction on the recruit-
ment of highly skilled Africans into the administrations. 
In the light of these considerations, no colonial power immediately 
sought to dispose completely of the socio-political structures already in place. 
However , policy ran a long gamut, from reluctant acceptance and forced 
adaptation of such structures as in Portuguese Angola and G e r m a n East 
Africa, to considered efforts at institutional preservation as in British 
Northern Nigeria or French Morocco. Nevertheless, the basic d e m a n d s 
of the colonial system everywhere had the effect of modifying the purposes, 
, hence of distorting the functions of and weakening basic African institu-
tions. T h e very fact that most African states were acquired by conquest 
and the exile or deposition of some ruling chiefs in itself brought the whole 
business of chieftaincy, for instance, into disrepute. T h e universal imposi-
tion of European-planned taxes was certainly another disruptive colonial 
measure, but even the modest efforts m a d e in the direction of what is 
today called modernization also remoulded local institutions. If the vast 
majority of the African population was not regularly affected by the 
European presence, basic political institutions were. 
7. A. E . Afigbo in J. F. A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974, p. 443. 
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Colonial rule and structure 
F r o m the palace of the Sultan of Morocco to the kraal of the East and 
Southern African chief, European colonial administrators sought and 
employed 'native authorities' as allies or agents through w h o m the demands 
of alien rule might effectively be m a d e on the African populations at large. 
T h e arrangement of such authority was asymmetrical, no matter h o w little 
existing institutions were modified or subsumed to European needs. At 
the pinnacle of the administrative system stood the governor or resident-
general w h o , while ultimately responsible to his national government, 
frequently enjoyed the powers of a sovereign. 
T h e institutional framework within which he acted varied considerably 
in size and complexity, but he was usually assisted in the inter-war period 
by some form of consultative council or commercial interests. T h e 
centralized nature of colonial administration in the French, Portuguese 
and Belgian systems assured the retention of legislative authority in the 
metropolis. In the British African possessions, however, colonial councils 
did emerge as proto-parliamentary bodies with appointed or elected 
membership, or both, and with functions varying from the advisory to 
the legislative, thus unintentionally but logically preparing the w a y for 
political devolution. While the Africans began to m a k e their appearance 
in the colonial conciliar system, and most particularly in the British version, 
their n u m b e r and the means by which they were appointed effectively 
guaranteed that they would have no noticeable impact on the m o d e of 
European domination in the inter-war period. 
T h e crucial institution of all colonial organization was the district or 
provincial unit, called a cercle in French West Africa. T h e continued use 
of this military term was a reminder of the nature of colonial acquisitions. 
Over the cercle, a European administrator exercised colonial authority and 
directed both the activities of his European subordinates and the African 
authorities enlisted in the colonial administration. 
T h e most important and most discussed African component was the 
local chief. Indeed, every colonial power in Black Africa depended on the 
chief, whether traditional or warrant in authority, as the basic element 
of the administrative structure. T h e French colonial administrator, Robert 
Delavignette, explained the nature of the system succinctly, and in a w a y 
applicable to more than the French West African situation, w h e n he wrote: 
'There is no colonization without native policy; no native policy without 
a territorial c o m m a n d ; and no territorial c o m m a n d without native chiefs 
w h o serve as links between the colonial authority and the population.'8 
Although no observer or critic has doubted that chiefly activities were 
integral to the colonial system throughout the continent, there has been 
a considerable academic debate about the uses to which the various 
8. R. Delavignette, 1946, p. 121. 
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European powers put these chiefs.9 T h e major question has centred on 
the difference between direct and indirect rule, between delegation of 
European authority to the African rulers and European mediation of 
traditional authority enjoyed by these rulers. While most scholarly interest 
has been directed to the distinction between the British and French modes 
of control in sub-Saharan Africa, where procedures, if not ultimate effects, 
were distinctive, the issue is perhaps best placed in historical perspective 
by a general review of continental policy, but with special attention still 
given to the activities of the British and French. 
T h e most famous explanation of the importance of the 'native authority' 
to the colonial order was that of Lugard, w h o encased in theory the most 
discussed and imitated method of domination: indirect rule. A s with so 
m a n y administrators in the colonial realm, he m a d e virtue of a widespread 
necessity, but few wrote so persuasively of that virtue. 
Confronted with the large territory of Northern Nigeria to administer 
after the transfer of the Royal Niger C o m p a n y ' s authority to the state, 
and then faced with a shortage of m e n and funds, Lugard realized that 
any suggestion of direct control was out of the question. But such a 
conclusion was also supported by his belief, which had already been formed 
during his earlier service in Uganda , that the use of existing indigenous 
institutions was the best method of colonial administration. In his service 
as high commissioner for Northern Nigeria between 1900 and 1907, Lugard 
therefore developed his general practice and offered a detailed explanation 
of it in his m a n y instructions to administrators, which were published as 
Political Memoranda. 
T h e best resume of his policy is found in a set of instructions he issued 
to his officers in 1906, in which he argues for 'a single Government in 
which the Native Chiefs have well-defined duties and an acknowledged 
status equally with the British officials'.10 T h e basis of what was to become 
the system of indirect rule was therefore one of co-operation, not sub-
ordination, with the British Resident acting primarily in an advisory, not 
an executive capacity, and with the African 'chief - in this instance, the 
Fulani emir - continuing in a traditional role which was n o w carefully 
guided, not rigidly fixed by the imposed colonial administration. In this 
attempt to integrate the emirs into the colonial system, Lugard wished 
to leave to them most of their old responsibilities, functions, and perquisites 
of office so that they would continue to appear in the eyes of the local 
populations as the legitimate rulers. 
If, then, the essential of Lugard's rule was the use of existing authorities 
in existing capacities, something more was intended. Modifications along 
9. See H . Deschamps, 1963; M . Crowder, 1964; M . Crowder and O . Ikime (eds), 1970; 
A . I. Asiwaju, 1976(a). 
10. F. D . Lugard, 1919, p. 298. 
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European lines were expected in matters such as justice and taxation.11 
' T h e great task of indirect rule,' wrote Lugard's biographer in an article 
defending his policy, 'is to hold the ring, to preserve a fair field within 
which Africans can strike their o w n balance between conservatism and 
adaptation.'12 That task depended in large measure on the knowledge that 
European administrators had of local customs and institutions - and, of 
course, on the willingness of the native authorities to m a k e such adjust-
ments towards modernization within the context of their o w n institutions. 
This broad sketch of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria can be aligned 
with another which, like Lugard's, met most success in regions overlaid 
with M u s l i m political institutions. Reaching beyond Africa in scope, this 
form of indirect administration was primarily given theoretical definition 
by the French. W h a t they labelled a politique d'association received 
considerable recognition at the turn of the century and was enthusiastically 
contrasted with the older ideal of political assimilation. T h e conservative 
colonial theorist, Jules H a r m a n d , offered one of the best explanations of 
this policy in a long section of his influential work, Domination et colonisa-
tion, published in 1910. Association, he therein stated, is 'indirect adminis-
tration, with the preservation but improved governance of the institutions 
of the conquered peoples, and with respect for their past'. ' 3 With the 
publication in 1923 of Sarraut's La mise en valeur des colonies françaises, 
the policy was given the aura of official sanctity. 
Originally suggested for Indochina and later extended as policy to Africa, 
'association' was none the less geographically limited as a colonial practice. 
Only in Morocco did the French seriously consider it, and there primarily 
because of the attention given to indigenous affairs by the Resident-
General, Louis-Hubert Lyautey, w h o , in the initial years of the protec-
torate, ruled with few restrictions from the metropolitan government. 
Throughout Morocco the forms of the Sherifian state were preserved, while 
at the local level administrative activities were strikingly similar to those 
proposed by Lugard. T h e French contrôleur civil was to perform in an 
advisory not a supervisory capacity with respect to the cadi, a Musl im 
official fulfilling magisterial functions in accordance with the shari'a. A 
comparable arrangement existed in the Spanish-dominated portion of 
Morocco where the cadi was guided in his role by the Inventare, the Spanish 
counterpart of the contrôleur civil. T h e cadi was also administratively 
retained as before in Italian Somaliland, but there he was joined in the 
responsibilities of local government by assigned warrant chiefs. 
In theory such indirect administration also applied to French colonial 
activities south of the Sahara, but in fact practice was at severe variance 
with it. In a statement frequently referred to as most descriptive of the 
11. In Nigeria, the modifications brought about by indirect rule in practice have been 
carefully documented in O . Ikime (ed.), 1980, Chapters 25, 26, 27. 
12. M . Perham, 1934, p. 331. 
13. J. Harmand, 1910, p. 163. 
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methods which the French actually pursued in this region between the 
wars, the Governor-General of French West Africa, Joost V a n Vollen-
hoven, remarked in 1917: T h e chiefs 'have no power of their o w n , for 
there are not two authorities in the cercle . . . ; there is only one! Only the 
commandant du cercle c o m m a n d s ; only he is responsible. T h e native chief 
is but an instrument, an auxiliary'.14 Despite official pronouncements, 
therefore, the French used indigenous authorities not indirectly, but 
directly and subordinately in their colonial administration. A n d in like 
manner so did the Portuguese. 
Lugard's form of indirect rule was initially successful in Northern 
Nigeria although discredited by some critics as unduly conservative15 and 
was then extended after the war throughout m u c h of British Africa, 
including the newly acquired G e r m a n possessions of Tanganyika and the 
Cameroon. It was even adapted by the Belgians for their use in the Congo 
after 1920. Although conditions were nowhere else so optimal or the results 
so successful as in the Hausa-Fulani region of Nigeria, the British did 
try to follow the contours of local custom so that even newly devised 
institutions, like local councils, were in consonance with indigenous forms 
of organization. T h e egregious exception, however, was South Africa where 
the concept of'native authority' was the means by which the white minority 
assured local administration of Africans n o w displaced by the policy of 
segregation to territorial reserves. 
Throughout sub-Saharan Africa during the inter-war period, the chief 
became an administrative agent and not a 'native authority' and his 
traditional roles and powers were greatly weakened or curtailed. This shift 
in position, even in regions submitted to indirect rule, is easily explained. 
Most obviously, traditional functions were distended by n e w demands, 
such as the collection of taxes, the taking of censuses, or the recruitment 
of labour and military conscripts. W h e r e there appeared to European eyes 
no satisfactory individuals in positions of traditional authority, other 
personnel, such as veterans, non-commissioned officers or clerks, were 
installed as chiefs. This was especially the case in French and Portuguese 
colonies where the local roles for the recruitment of personnel for chief-
taincy positions were more often than not violated. Then , chiefs were some-
times endowed with political significance which had not previously been 
inherent in their office; on other occasions they were installed in acephalous 
societies where they previously had no administrative purpose. Examples 
of these two developments are found a m o n g the Igbo of Nigeria, the Gikuyu 
of Kenya and the Langi of northern U g a n d a . ! 6 
With the establishment of European administration, chiefs were 
manipulated as if they were administrative personnel w h o might be reposted 
14. J. van Vollenhoven, 1920, p. 207. 
15. For a recent assessment see S. Abubakar in O . Ikime (ed.), 1980. 
16. O n this subject see particularly R . Tignor, 1971; J. Tosh, 1973; A . E . Afigbo, 1972; 
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or removed to satisfy colonial needs. Chieftaincies were abolished where 
considered superfluous and created where considered colonially useful. 
Perhaps the most striking example of this process occurred in the Belgian 
Congo (now Zaire) where, after 1918, the reforms proposed by the colonial 
minister, Louis Franck, led to a drastic revision in the colonial order of 
things. T h e number of chefferies was reduced from 6095 in 1917 to 1212 
in 1938. Furthermore, an entirely n e w administrative unit, called le secteur, 
was introduced for purposes of consolidation. Along similar lines the 
French in West Africa also created a n e w unit, a grouping of villages into 
a canton, which, in the words of one governor, 'is placed under the authority 
of an indigenous administrative agent w h o assumes the n a m e of canton 
chief.17 In Libya the population was subjected to n e w administrative 
organization by a royal decree of 31 August 1929 which notably allowed 
for the division of the nomadic peoples of the colony into 'tribes' and 
'subtribes' at the discretion of the governor and upon the advice of the 
regional commissioner. A n d even the British m a d e such alterations in the 
eastern district of Nigeria w h e n indirect rule was introduced there. Faced 
with an elaborate n u m b e r of local rulers whose range of authority they 
were then unable to discern, the British introduced the principle of the 
warrant chief whose authority extended over districts of m a n y thousands 
of people but derived directly from the warrant issued by the colonial 
government.18 
Operating as a disruptive agent in connection with these factors was 
the local administrator. Whatever his intentions, he invariably became a 
surrogate chief. A s Delavignette described the situation with satisfaction, 
the colonial administrator was not an administrator at all, but a commander 
and recognized as such by the African population under his control. His 
primary function, he asserted unequivocally, 'is to act as a chief.19 T h e 
reserved and unobtrusive role which Lugard had hoped the British Resident 
would generally play in Northern Nigeria was denied in their territories 
by the French and Portuguese administrators, both sets of w h o m were 
prominent in the exercise of local authority. While the administrators in 
Italian Somaliland came closest to the British in their relationship to the 
local chiefs, even a m o n g these two groups Lugard's dicta were necessarily 
modified by the exigencies of colonial rule and the personalities of the 
individuals exercising it. T h e truly subtle and empathetic rapport which 
Lugardian indirect rule actually required for success was seldom to be 
found a m o n g the colonial officers w h o served in Africa. M o r e significantly, 
the n e w set of social requirements imposed by colonialism was quite alien 
to African custom and hence was incorporated into indigenous institutions 
only by a distortive process. 
17. 'Programme d'action économique, politique et sociale', 1933, p. 185; quoted by 
J. Suret-Canale, 1971, p. 323. Italics in author's original. 
18. For further details, see A . E . Afigbo, 1972. 
19. R . Delavignette, 1946, p. 29. 
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Purposes and impositions of colonialism 
Beyond the official rhetoric, the m u n d a n e purposes of colonization turned 
out to be quite limited. In their starkest form, they were the maintenance 
of order, the avoidance of heavy financial expenditure, and the establish-
ment of a labour force, initially for porterage and later for the creation 
of roads and railways but also for commercial purposes. In general practice, 
these purposes were added to the functions of local rule and were fulfilled 
in three ways: redirection of systems of justice, use of forced labour, and 
the imposition of personal taxes. T h e latter two were the most disturbing 
of colonial institutions while the former was, perhaps, the most wisely 
reviewed of all by the Europeans. 
T h e introduction of European judicial institutions was usually done with 
some attention to African customary law and to Muslim law where it also 
existed, as for instance, in Italian Somaliland; but the effects were 
modificatory none the less. A s Lord Hailey has remarked, the basic concept 
of European law differed markedly from that of the African systems, for 
it was directed towards the punishment of the guilty and not the redress 
of the aggrieved.20 Frequently, there were colonial attempts at a dyarchical 
judicial arrangement wherein civil litigation involving Africans was settled 
according to pre-colonial legal modes, while criminal law and litigation 
involving Europeans fell directly under colonial jurisdiction. 
However, everywhere, with the noticeable exception of the Portuguese 
colonies, a court system was developed or reinforced according to African 
needs as perceived by the Europeans.21 In the first decade of the century, 
there were particular attempts by the Italians in Somaliland and the 
Germans in East Africa to extend the judicial function of African chiefs 
or magistrates. In the same period, the most elaborate and successful of 
such efforts occurred on the other coast: Lugard's implementation of'native 
courts'. Part of his tripodal 'native administration', the 'native court' 
was, in his mind, an instrument by which to 'inculcate a sense of 
responsibility, and evolve a m o n g a primitive community some sense of 
discipline and respect for authority'.22 Presided over by Africans, and 
directed primarily to domestic affairs, these courts were to adhere as closely 
as possible to African customary law, modified only where basic customs 
were not in accordance with fundamental English norms. T h e Lugardian 
model was introduced into m a n y British possessions and the mandated 
territories, and was also emulated by the Belgians in the Congo. 
In direct contrast to this method was the French which tended to erode 
African authority, finally making the administrator the responsible judicial 
official. However , the most peculiar and inequitable element in the French 
20. Lord Hailey, 1957, p. 591. 
21. For a fascinating case study of this process, see O . Adewoye, 1977. 
22. F . D . Lugard, 1929, p. 548. 
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system was the indigénat.23 First employed in Algeria in the 1870s, this 
device was imported into French West Africa in the 1880s and remained 
institutionally operative there as well as in Algeria until the end of the 
Second World W a r . Regularized by a decree of 1924, it allowed any French 
administrator to impose a punishment of up to fifteen days gaol sentence 
and a fine for a series of infractions ranging from failure to pay taxes on 
time to displaying discourtesy to French officials. 
M o r e pervasive in effect than the legal systems were the personal taxes 
which all African males eventually encountered. Primarily designed as one 
means by which to m a k e the colonial effort financially self-sustaining, they 
were also inspired by the notion that they would force the African into 
European economic enterprises and would extend the money economy. 
B y the early twentieth century, these taxes were regularized as was no 
other colonial institution, having undergone what appears to be a clear 
cycle of development.24 T h e 'hut' tax was an obvious form in the early 
years of domination and was also a source of considerable African con-
tention and protest.25 It was generally replaced by about the second decade 
of the twentieth century with a poll or capitation tax which remained the 
dominant form until the end of the colonial regime. Between the wars 
there were attempts to graduate this tax on a regional basis or on an assess-
ment of the potential yield of the land. Lastly, there was the income tax, 
introduced in the 1920s into several British territories and the Belgian 
Congo, but then primarily affecting non-Africans w h o generally were the 
only ones with sufficient income to be required to pay it. 
Within this general pattern there were m a n y regional distinctions, the 
most prominent being that connected with Lugard's idea of 'native 
authority'. As he wrote in his Dual Mandate, the 'tax . . . is, in a sense, 
the basis of the whole system, since it supplies the means to pay the Emir 
and all his officials'.26 T h e institution through which the process worked 
was the 'native treasury', an idea originating with Sir Charles Temple , 
in service under Lugard in Northern Nigeria. Each native authority was 
to be returned a percentage of the taxes collected in his district. This amount 
was to form part of a 'native treasury' further enriched by various licensing 
fees and fines collected in the courts. F r o m this s u m , the emir or chief 
was to draw his o w n revenue and supply the salary of his subordinates. 
T h e remaining funds were to be used for public services and improvements. 
T h e arrangement, originally employed in the emirates, spread with indirect 
rule, not only to British possessions on both coasts but also to the Belgian 
Congo. 
O f all the colonial devices, the tax system was the one which most 
obviously encouraged the bureaucratic development of colonial rule. It 
23. For a recent detailed study, see A . I. Asiwaju, 1979. 
24. Lord Hailey, 1957, p. 676. 
25. See Chapter 6 above. 
26. F . D . Lugard, 1929, p. 201. 
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assigned a c o m m o n function to the administrator and the African chief 
w h o in assessing and collecting the tax, often in conjunction with local 
councils of elders or notables, reminded everyone of the regulatory power 
of the new system.27 Furthermore after tax collectors as such, there soon 
appeared administrative agents w h o became part of the new colonial elite. 
T h e most striking and controversial a m o n g them were no doubt the akidas 
used by the Germans in East Africa. Swahili-speaking officials w h o served 
on the coast before European domination, they were used in redefined posi-
tions both to collect taxes and to recruit labour for the G e r m a n administra-
tion. In 1936, special African clerks were appointed to collect taxes in 
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), another indication of this bureaucratic 
trend. 
T h e introduction of money taxes was briefly accompanied by labour 
taxes, the most obvious expression of European attempts to enlist labour 
forcibly into the economic organization of the colonial effort. T h e impôt 
de cueillette, the tax by which wild rubber was harvested in the Congo 
Free State, was the most criticized of such taxes, but in duration the French 
prestation, a labour tax required of all males in French West and Equatorial 
Africa unless remitted by cash payment, was the longest; it was only 
abolished in 1944. Conversely, the Germans in the Cameroon allowed the 
capitation tax to be remitted by a labour 'payment'. A n d in parts of Uganda, 
the British continued the luwalo, a pre-colonial public-work tax of one 
month's labour, until 1938, w h e n it was replaced by a money tax. Yet such 
taxes were the exception to forced labour devices employed by all of the 
colonial powers. 
Consistently concerned with shortages of manpower for n e w projects and 
n e w employments which colonial rule supported, European administrators 
imposed their domination before the end of the century by a system of 
virtual impressment, frequently satisfying private as well as public 
purposes. It is true that such direct forced labour declined in the early 
twentieth century, because of the decreasing need for portage as well as 
the increasing concern with international opinion. But the uses, however 
modified, remained an integral part of colonial domination until the Second 
World W a r . At least this was the case with the French colonial governments 
which, as in West Africa still employed large numbers of Africans through 
prestation particularly on railway building until after the Second World 
W a r . Moreover, French colonial officials frequently sanctioned labour 
recruitment for commercial purposes, as on rubber plantations of 
Equatorial Africa or in the forests of the Ivory Coast.28 Abuses at this 
time were still sufficient in intensity to arouse expressions of public 
27. Lugard in particular extolled the virtues of personal taxation as marking 'the 
recognition of the principle that each individual in proportion to his means has an obligation 
to the State . . . ' ibid., p. 232. 
28. T h e case of the Ivory Coast has been covered by Z . Semi-Bi, 1973, and R . P . A n o u m a , 
I973-
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indignation, most well marked in the celebrated commentary of André 
Gide in his Voyage au Congo (1927). 
Yet the most oppressive forms of labour regulations were those found 
in G e r m a n South West Africa and in the Union of South Africa. Union 
policies were, of course, extended to South West Africa when it became 
a mandated territory after the war, but G e r m a n policy before then was 
strikingly similar in nature and severity to that devised in the Union. Pass 
laws were imposed, as were identity cards, both regulating the movement 
of Africans; Africans without labour contracts were subject to vagrancy 
laws; and labour contracts were designed to give the G e r m a n employer 
an enormous advantage. In the Union, there were also pass laws and Acts 
against vagrancy, the penalty for which was required, if minimally paid, 
labour. T h e Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and the Native Administra-
tion Act of 1927 reinforced previous pass laws, while other enactments, 
such as the Apprenticeship Act of 1922, effectively restricted the forms 
of employment an African might take. 
Means of control and administration 
Whatever the variety of theories and methods of colonial domination 
suggested and implemented in the period between the two world wars, 
an emergent pattern of bureaucratic rule is evident. B y then domination 
had shifted from military to civil institutional control while direct force 
tended to be replaced by administrative persuasion. This shift, however, 
in no way denied the fact that the ultima ratio of colonial authority was 
displayed by European arms. 
As its most ardent advocates were willing to remark, colonial rule was 
w o n by the sword and so maintained. With this dictum in mind, all the 
European powers utilized in their military establishments elements 
recruited from the indigenous population. Although organization and 
effectiveness varied both according to region and particular national 
purposes, such colonial troops primarily performed police functions in the 
inter-war era and were joined by newly created constabulary forces in this 
capacity. Yet because they were frequently m a d e to serve in geographical 
regions culturally and ethnically unfamiliar to them, African soldiers were 
thus alienated from their o w n society and were often received with hostility 
by the local populations they forcefully encountered. A s a result of this 
condition and, furthermore, of the European denial of c o m m a n d positions 
to Africans, the army never came to play the political role in the 
independence movements that its counterparts in Asia and the Near East 
did. In fact, the only colonial power which elaborated a significant military 
policy for the Africans under its domination was France which, from the 
first years of the twentieth century, considered sub-Saharan Africa a m a n -
power reservoir essential to the maintenance of the French military posture 
in the world. 
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However, even in the inter-war period, labelled by contemporaries as 
one of 'colonial peace', military activities still punctuated African affairs 
in a severe manner. T h e professed European desire to keep Africa as 
militarily neutralized as possible was in fact never realized. T h e French 
introduced a law of conscription in 1919 whereby an African contingent 
of 10000 was to be annually obtained; the British developed a Sudan 
Defence Force, uniquely staffed by Sudanese as well as by British officers, 
but primarily directed to imperial strategic needs in the Near East as well 
as in East Africa. T h e Force Publique of the Belgian Congo, exhibiting 
the qualities both of occupation army and police force, was frequently used 
during this era to quell resistance expressed in the form of syncretistic 
religious movements . 2 9 O n the scale of open warfare, events can be easily 
measured. T h e Italian campaign to subdue Libya in the 1920s and the 
Spanish and French effort to resolve the Rïf war in Morocco in the same 
period are obvious. But they are surpassed in scope by the rapacious war 
undertaken by Mussolini against the Ethiopians, an event with which the 
period here under consideration was tragically closed. 
This account of military developments in Africa in the inter-war period 
does not seriously impair the assertion that divergent intentions of 
European colonial method and practice are those which, in retrospect, 
seem the most significant. There is little doubt that colonial bureaucratiza-
tion did provide partial preparation for an unintended movement towards 
national independence. T h e configurations of a n e w political elite were 
slowly emerging, as lower-echelon clerks and appointed chiefs in various 
colonial services - but particularly the British - were learning to apply, 
if only modestly, Napoleon's imperative: 'careers open to talent'. Training 
schools, such as the Ecole William Ponty in Dakar, were undertaking the 
preparation of educators and administrators upon w h o m the colonial 
administration was more and more to depend. Principally in the urban 
regions, the 'wind of change' was slowly being generated. 
Yet this was not what the European colonial administrators actually 
intended. Even w h e n they emphasized 'native paramountcy', they did so 
with the thought that the welfare of the African populations could only 
be guaranteed and effectively structured socially and economically by them. 
G o o d government and independent government were, as Lord Cromer 
once remarked, opposing objectives in a colonial context. T h u s the colonial 
system existed as an authoritarian one, and it was in no meaningful way 
calculated to confer political power upon the Africans it supposedly served. 
Its most c o m m o n characteristic was paternalism, with shared responsibility 
at best only tolerated in areas of considerable white settlement. T h e history 
of the changing purposes and interpretation of 'native paramountcy' in 
Kenya is instructive in this matter. T h e White Paper of 1923 employed 
29. O f the several studies of the historical development of the military in modern Africa, 
the best brief introduction, and the one the comments in this text have generally recapitu-
lated, is J. S. Coleman and B . Belmont Jr in J. J. Johnson (ed.), 1962. 
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the concept as a device by which to stave off the demands of the Indian 
population for equitable representation in the affairs of the colony. 
Subsequent White Papers issued in 1927 and 1930 qualified the concept 
and contained concessions to the growing white residential population 
which was n o w allowed to join in the responsibilities of'trusteeship'. Native 
paramountcy therefore did not really imply dominance of African interests, 
but only respect for them. 
Even where parliamentary institutions were introduced to provide a 
degree of responsible colonial government, this arrangement was effected 
so that white preponderance was guaranteed. In Algeria, for instance, a two-
college electoral system, sanctioned by the Jonnart L a w of 1919, provided 
proportionately lower Arab participation than European in the Délégations 
financières, the incipient parliamentary body representing interest groups, 
not geographic areas. In South Africa, Africans enjoyed no role whatsoever 
in the parliamentary procedures that were developed there. T h e Repre-
sentation of Natives Act of 1936 effectively removed the Africans from 
the Cape Colony electoral rolls and limited their political status throughout 
the Union to the election of a limited n u m b e r of whites w h o were to 
represent 'native interests'. In these two major settler colonies, exactly as 
in all the other colonies in which residential Europeans were to be found, 
the demographic minority was in fact the political majority, thus precluding 
any resemblance to democratic government on the European model. 
If the general political effects of the various colonial methods were 
historically more similar than divergent, distinctions in method were 
important in the preparation for the timing of colonial devolution. In large 
measure, colonial rule ultimately collapsed in Africa because of the 
declining ability - a combined financial, military, and moral condition — 
of Europeans to continue it in the face of African nationalist pressure. 
Yet within the terminal decade of colonialism, the pre-established methods 
of control were influential in determining the process of change. T h e 
administrative matters of identity and differentiation and of centralization 
and local autonomy then became effective determinants. T h e smoothest 
transmission of power, as will be seen in the concluding volume of this 
History, was that accomplished through the English 'Westminster system', 
the outgrowth of the colonial legislative councils through which methods 
of political opposition were developed, as is most evident in the 
independence of the Gold Coast as Ghana . T h e most radical change was 
that which occurred in French Algeria and, more recently, in the Portuguese 
settler colonies of Angola and M o z a m b i q u e , where the assimilationist 
approach held that these areas were overseas extensions of the national 
state. 
Diversity of colonial method was not as important historically as was 
the similarity in assessment of the colonial situation. Despite the 
pronouncements enshrined in the documents of the League of Nations, 
and in defiance of their weakened global positions as a result of the World 
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W a r , the European powers in Africa did not entertain thoughts of political 
devolution in the inter-war period. Egypt excepted, Africa was seen as 
the one continent in which colonialism would be of very long duration, 
and colonial methods were all designed to accommodate European interests 
and intentions. Therefore, the essential political activity was one of African 
adjustment to European objectives, regardless of whether the particular 
colonial practice followed was indirect or not. 
Mos t important of all the historical developments of the inter-war period, 
the colonial system established the general administrative framework in 
which national government would be housed in the first decade of 
independence. This incipient regularization of political activity within a 
European arranged structure was the principal aspect of modernization 
that the Europeans introduced, but for their o w n purposes, to contemporary 
Africa at that time. 
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Conquest and new production relations, i88o-¿\ 1910 
F r o m the late fifteenth century onwards, Africa participated in the Europe-
oriented world economy as a peripheral and dependent sector. But, on 
the eve of the imposition of European colonial rule, there was no direct 
alien control of everyday economic activity on African soil. Such a situation 
came into being by a slow process after the loss of African sovereignty. 
T h e colonial economic system cannot be said to have reached its prime 
until the coming of the Second World W a r . T h e years 1880-1935, therefore, 
cover the laying of the foundations of production relations characteristic 
of. colonialism. African opposition and resistance held prospective 
colonizers at bay until the second decade of this century and occasionally 
longer. Africans responded aggressively to the attempted destruction of 
their economic independence, as illustrated by some of the more famous 
anti-colonial resistances already discussed, such as the H u t T a x war in 
Sierra Leone, the Bailundu revolt in Angola, the MajïMajï wars in G e r m a n 
East Africa and the Bambata rebellion in South Africa. 
Africans witnessed the first physical evidence of a n e w economy in the 
form of road, rail and telegraph construction. Transport and communica-
tion lines were a prelude to conquest and they were logistically necessary 
in occupied areas so that the latter could serve as the staging points for 
further aggression. African rulers were sometimes hostile towards the 
Europeans building a transport and communications infrastructure. Their 
followers were told to pull d o w n telegraph posts and tear up railway tracks, 
as in the Niger/Senegambia region when the French military presence was 
first manifest in the 1880s and 1890s.1 However, few roads or railways 
were of purely military interest; and the same railways which facilitated 
conquest were used for the extraction of groundnuts, cotton and so on. 
Coastal African economies were quickly reduced to dependent entities 
within the economies of the respective colonizing powers, while the interior 
peoples were usually the last to be brought into the network of produce 
1. G . Ganier, 1965; see also Chapter 6. 
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collection, cash-crop cultivation and paid labour. Considerable expenditure 
was needed to provide certain African ports with deep berths and viable 
off-loading capacity;2 but this was less onerous than the capital which had 
to be invested in arterial roads or railways penetrating the hinterland. 
Therefore, distance from the coast was one of the determinants of h o w 
early the colonial economy could be set in motion. 
T h e most decisive variable affecting the implanting of the colonial 
economy was the extent to which various parts of Africa had already been 
participating in the world economy. This was partly because Europeans 
preferred jurisdiction over areas with which they were already familiar, 
and partly because pre-colonial foreign trade orientation caused African 
communities to be more susceptible to colonial economic innovations, such 
as the cultivation of crops specifically for sale to Europeans. T h e slaving 
zones from Senegal to Sierra Leone, from the Gold Coast (now Ghana) 
to Nigeria and from the Congo river to Angola were the stretches of coast-
line first encroached upon by the European colonizers. In these localities, 
features of the colonial economy emerged before the formal advent of 
colonial rule, because of mutual African and European attempts to stimulate 
export commodities which served as 'legitimate' replacements to slaves. 
Rulers, professional traders and other sectors of the population in western 
Africa perceived advantages in maintaining the foreign trade nexus and 
access to imported goods. O f course, African propensity to trade with 
Europeans was not always restricted to the coast. Europeans knew that 
their trade with West Africa had its roots inland. Indeed, they overestimated 
the amount of wealth which could be readily m a d e if they penetrated to 
these sources. This accounts for the commercial attention paid to the 
countryside above the Niger/Benue confluence during the 1880s and 1890s. 
O n the eastern side of the continent, the Indian Ocean trade was not 
exclusively directed towards European countries, nor was the long-distance 
trade out of East Africa controlled by Europeans or Afro-Europeans. T h e 
colonizers had to supplant the Arab, Swahili and Indian merchants. 
Experiences in East Africa underscored the premise that colonial activities 
first centred around parts of Africa which had a prior involvement in inter-
continental exchange. T h e coastal area of greatest interest to Britain and 
G e r m a n y was that claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar (now Tanzania), w h o 
was the foremost comprador for the supply of ivory, slaves and slave-grown 
cloves to Europeans, Arabs, Indians and Americans. Setting out from the 
Swahili coastal towns, European colonizers followed the Arab lead and 
sought the termini of the caravan routes in the interlacustrine region. B y 
the mid 1880s, the Scramble was already taking place on Lake Victoria, 
on whose shores colonial enterprises were quickly grafted on to the already 
high level of African economic activity. W h e n the British completed their 
railway from M o m b a s a to the Lake in 1902 (see Fig. 16.3), it attracted 
2. R. G . Albion, 1959. 
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freight which had been part of the caravan traffic which previously had 
existed further south at Tanga and Bagamoyo. A s a result of British 
competition, the Germans too began a coast-hinterland railway in 1905, 
and this faithfully traversed the slave and ivory route to Lake Tanganyika. 
D e e p within Central Africa, it was also the Arab trading network which 
provided the European colonizers with their first economic base. 
North Africa combined some of the features of East and West Africa, 
and displayed these in a heightened form. North African economies were 
as m u c h part of a Mediterranean complex as they were part of the African 
trans-Saharan network. Prior experience with the European economy 
allowed segments of North African society to accommodate to the intensifi-
cation of production for Europe and to the spread of European commodities 
in local markets. But the well-defined and exploitative ruling class was 
determined to defend state frontiers, even if willing to enter closer economic 
relations with Europeans. Therefore, colonial rule often advanced while 
maintaining North Africans in nominal authority, and the colonial economy 
was institutionalized before the complete subjugation of the indigenous 
polities. 
T h e prelude to European colonization of Egypt goes back to the 
Napoleonic expedition of 1798. T h e European presence in the nineteenth 
century frustrated the economic innovations of M u h a m m a d 'AIL L o n g -
staple cotton, introduced as a basis for industrialization, was by the 1840s 
the basis for integrating Egypt as a primary agricultural producer within 
the global capitalist system. After contributing to the failure of Egyptian 
industrialization, Britain and France sought control of Egypt's trade and 
entered the internal market in land and mortgages.3 In Algeria, bitter 
resistance against the French was not yet over in the 1870s, but by then 
the country was already host to an entrenched settler agriculture, which 
was the principal feature of the Algerian colonial economy and which 
appeared in varying degrees in the rest of the Maghrib and in Libya. 
Tunisia entered the colonial epoch in 1881-2; while Morocco and Libya 
were partially annexed in 1912. T h e settler economy of the Maghrib was 
instituted at roughly thirty-year intervals - firstly in Algeria from i860, 
then in Tunisia from 1890, and finally in Morocco from 1920.4 Italian 
immigrants in Libya were fewer than their French counterparts in the 
Maghrib, and settler agriculture in Tripolitania had to await the complete 
defeat of the Libyan people by about 1931. 
In spite of the broad span of years covering the starting-points of the 
colonial economies of respective North African territories, the con-
ventionally assigned start of colonialism in the 1880s is still applicable. 
European powers reduced North African economies to colonial dependency 
mainly through the power of finance capital. North Africa entered the 
imperialist epoch w h e n large amounts of capital were invested in the Suez 
3. C . P. Issawi, 1963. 
4. S. Amin, 1970, p. 256. 
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Canal and w h e n loans were thrust upon the ruling class from Egypt to 
Morocco. This process was at its height by 1880, leading to the increasing 
subservience of the local regimes and ultimately to the assumption of 
sovereignty by one or other of the interested European nations. Therefore, 
while the colonial economy had a long and early period of genesis in North 
Africa, it cannot be said to have been definitively established until the 
1890s w h e n monopoly capital was to the fore in Europe. T h e same 
observations are applicable to Southern Africa. 
B y the time of imperialist partition, European settlement in South Africa 
involved tens of thousands of whites maintaining economic ties with 
Africans. African economic independence was undermined through the 
forcible alienation of land while African labour power was placed at the 
behest of the whites. During the nineteenth century, whites and blacks 
'engaged in the formation of n e w economic and social bonds'.5 These new 
bonds were at first colonial ones only in the sense that they bound together 
an alien minority and an indigenous majority in positions of super-
ordination/subordination, but they soon became the type of colonial 
relations determined by the intrusion of large-scale capital due to the 
discovery of diamonds and gold. 
T h e mining of diamonds and gold in South Africa could not have been 
carried on without modern technology and relatively heavy concentrations 
of capital. Neither the British government nor the mining monopolies which 
emerged from the 1870s had any intention of leaving mineral resources 
under the control of the Boers or of allowing priority to settler agricultural 
concerns with arable land, water, pasture and cattle, when the subsoil and 
African labour promised huge surpluses exportable to the metropolises. 
Boer social formations combined elements of the slave plantation, the feudal 
fief and the patriarchal community, in addition to capitalist commodity 
relations. After the Kimberley diamond finds (1870) and particularly after 
the Witwatersrand gold strike (1886), the bourgeoisie was determined to 
impose hegemony over all pre-capitalist social formations in South Africa, 
irrespective of race. T h e Anglo-Boer wars (1899-1902) were also anti-
imperialist resistances, albeit in a perverse sense, since at the same time 
they sought the further entrenchment of settler colonialism. T h e defeat 
of Boer attempts at settler autonomy and the crushing of the African peoples 
of the region discussed in Chapter 9 marked the formation of a South 
African colonial economy which was unquestionably geared towards the 
transfer of raw materials, profits and other inputs to the capitalist metro-
polises. 
Capital and coercion, c. 1900-f. 1920 
African resistance helped substantially to dictate a slow pace of economic 
colonization for at least the three decades between 1880 and 1910. Besides, 
5. C. W . de Kíewiet, 1965, p. 34. 
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immediate interest on the part of European monopoly capital was low. 
Africa c o m m a n d e d high priority during the mercantilist era of 
accumulation, but the relative obscurity of the nineteenth century 
persisted into the early years of colonialism, in spite of the increase in 
politico-economic control which followed upon partition and conquest. 
Viewed in terms of the global investment drive of monopoly capitalism 
up to the First World W a r , figures concerning the growth of the African 
colonial economy are unimpressive. T h e most relevant of these figures 
concerned imports and exports, since the import/export sector was the 
central feature of the colonial economy. T h e volume of goods imported 
into Africa rose sluggishly. With the exception of South Africa, import 
lists were not headed by machinery, plant or high-quality consumer items. 
Trade growth usually meant the extension of product lines characteristic 
of the mid nineteenth century, and those had not departed radically from 
the patterns of the slave trade era. Cotton piece-goods continued to 
dominate European exchanges with Africa, and in m a n y places the import 
of cotton cloth never lost its priority throughout the period in question, 
although other items of domestic consumption, such as kitchen utensils, 
radios, bicycles and sewing machines were later to gain in popularity. 
Production of export commodities within Africa advanced slowly and 
not always steadily. Natural rubber, for instance, enjoyed only a momentary 
prominence in West Africa during the 1880s. In East and Central Africa, 
the more substantial rubber industry fell into decay after an international 
crisis of prices in 1912-13; so that eventually only Liberia came to be 
identified with a product which was once highly touted by Europeans bent 
on the exploitation of Africa. T h e more usual performance graph of African 
staples in the colonial context comprised a first stage of insignificant 
quantities covering two decades of the present century, followed by a second 
stage of appreciable growth until 1930. Cotton, palm oil, coffee, groundnuts 
and cocoa illustrate such characteristics in the parts of the continent with 
which they are respectively associated. 
Only small amounts of foreign capital were invested in African industry 
and agriculture during the early colonial period. South Africa was again 
the obvious exception, while to a lesser extent Algeria also attracted settler 
and mining capital. However , the case about capital scarcity can be over-
stated,6 since capital was not the only means of mobilizing labour and 
hence surplus in the African colonial economy. O n the contrary, it was 
coercion which was principally responsible for bringing labour and cash 
crops to the market-place. In Europe, the decline of feudalism and the 
concomitant rise of capitalism witnessed the brutal destruction of peasant 
independence and the creation of a working class whose members had 
no alternative but to seek wage labour as a means of survival. In Africa, 
the autonomy of the indigenous village economy had to be destroyed even 
6. S. H . Frankel, 1938. 
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more violently, since there were no internal social mechanisms transforming 
labour into a commodity. Such European funds as were available for invest-
ment in Africa had of course to enter into a relationship with African labour. 
But this capital was inadequate to induce labour through good wages and 
high prices; and from the African viewpoint, there was the inherent difficulty 
of making the traumatic leap from independent non-capitalist formations 
to quasi-capitalist formations in subjugation to the economic centres of 
imperialism. Therefore, African labour had to be recruited by the massive 
intervention of force - either nakedly or clothed by the laws of the n e w 
colonial regimes. 
Undisguised forms of forced labour and barely disguised forms of slavery 
were prominent aspects of the entrenchment of the colonial economy in 
Africa. B y the early years of this century, Portuguese 'contract labour' 
in Sao T o m é and the horrors of King Leopold's Congo Free State (now 
Zaire) were sufficiently scandalous that some reforms, or at least 
camouflage, were necessary to calm liberal opinion in Western Europe. 
Occasionally, the European working class joined African resisters to remedy 
such situation. T h e imperial G e r m a n government succeeded in callously 
crushing African unrest in Cameroon, South West Africa (now Namibia) 
and G e r m a n East Africa (now Tanzania) between 1904 and 1907; but there-
after Social Democrats intervened to reform the colonial order through 
legislation in the Reichstag. W h e n the disposition of G e r m a n colonies 
became an issue after 1918, Britain took the lead in arguing that G e r m a n y 
should be permanently deprived of its colonies because G e r m a n colonialism 
was supposedly more coercive. Arguments were marshalled imputing the 
continuation of slavery and the generalized resort to flogging by G e r m a n 
authorities. G e r m a n response involved a defence against these charges and 
counter-allegations that the British (and the French) were guilty of such 
policies.7 T h e reality is that the colonial m o d e of production incorporated 
an unusual amount of coercion both to recruit African labour and to main-
tain it at the point of production. 
At the onset of colonial rule, private capital sometimes undertook policing 
and coercion on its o w n behalf. This was the case with the chartered and 
concession companies which were active in Southern and Central Africa 
and in Nigeria and G e r m a n East Africa. At first glance, these companies 
appeared to be unchecked in the process of accumulation. However, they 
bore the cost of the armed interventions necessary for destroying African 
political independence and for laying the groundwork of the colonial 
economies. They were indeed unrestrained in their brutality, especially 
where labour recruitment was m a d e more difficult by sparse population, 
as in French Congo (now Congo). But chartered companies could not cope 
with coercive state functions. European states had to assume direct 
responsibility for their colonial territories - usually during the 1890s -
7. H . Schnee, 1926. 
337 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-igjj 
and the locally established colonial state apparatus supervised the economy 
on behalf of private capitalists/The latter were usually compensated for 
relinquishing their political privileges, making it clear whose class interests 
were being advanced by the colonial regimes. Compensation was a means 
of financing these companies to place their enterprise on a more secure 
footing than had been the case w h e n they were virtually in a state of war 
with the African people. 
Metropolitan states and their colonial counterparts in Africa had to con-
tinue state coercion for economic exploitation, because the colonial 
economy had constantly to be h e w n out in the face of opposition from 
Africans. In m a n y places, African land had first to be seized before the 
settler-type socio-economic formations could flourish. T h e necessary infra-
structure of roads and railways could be laid d o w n only by government 
assistance, one aspect of which was the requisitioning of African labour. 
T h e use of taxation to build the m o n e y economy is a device which is too 
well known to require lengthy elaboration. Taxation undoubtedly provided 
the major constraint driving Africans initially into wage labour or cash-
crop production; and subsequent increases in taxation deepened African 
involvement. T a x defaulters were at times used by private capital, but 
more usually by the state for the building and maintenance of administrative 
centres, roads and bridges. 
Colonial states discriminated with regard to the types of force which 
they sanctioned in their colonies. Remnants of slavery were suppressed 
because they had become anachronistic. Whipping and physical abuse of 
Africans by European employers was frowned upon and usually legislated 
against by the second decade of the twentieth century. Colonial states, 
like any others, tried to retain a monopoly over legal forms of violence. 
At the same time, they sought to reassure European investors or settlers 
that the power of the state was unquestionably at their disposal. Thus , 
whipping under the orders of employers was merely replaced by judicial 
floggings, which were resorted to in far greater measure than was the case 
with workers in Europe. African labour codes remained backward through-
out the 1930s; breach of contract was almost invariably treated not as a 
civil but as a criminal offence; and the unilateral termination of contract 
on the part of African workers continued to be regarded as 'desertion', 
with all of the militaristic implications of this term. 
S o m e parts of Africa were m o r e predisposed than others to a foreign-
trade orientation, and some Africans had taken the initiative to establish 
colonial economic relations with Europeans. West Africans had been 
experimenting with new export lines since the early nineteenth century, 
while in contrast the population of G e r m a n East Africa and the eastern 
Belgian Congo had turned to cotton and other export crops only when 
driven under the lash. T h e East African caravan traders had not brought 
as large a number of Africans into contact with European markets and 
European goods as was the case with West African pre-colonial trade. 
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Consequently, the local population had no strong initial inducement to 
withdraw a proportion of its labour from meeting its o w n needs. Even 
in West Africa, however, the colonial states often had to bring pressure 
to bear on cultivators to ensure that they joined the colonial economy and 
that they did so on terms which European capital dictated. T h e fact that 
partition took place against a background of prolonged and recurrent crisis 
in the capitalist economy was of significance in this context. For instance, 
Europeans were desirous of an extension of groundnut production in 
Senegal from 1883 onwards w h e n falling prices obviously offered no 
inducement to Africans, and taxation had to provide the dynamic 
'impetus'.8 In areas where dependency was entrenched by pre-colonial 
trade, colonial economic relations spread more rapidly and the amount 
of force necessary for stimulating the colonial economy was reduced -
although never entirely dispensed with. 
T h e combination of European capital with coerced African labour 
registered a sizeable surplus in products destined for European consump-
tion and export. Crops and minerals were exported and the profits 
expatriated because of the non-resident nature of the capital in the mining 
and plantation companies and the import/export houses. However , some 
of the accumulation was reinvested. This allowed Southern African capital 
to grow to massive proportions; and it speeded up monopolization a m o n g 
the West African commercial firms, enabling them to support, and integrate 
with manufacturing and distributing enterprises in Europe. In Algeria and 
South Africa and to a lesser extent in Tunisia, Kenya , Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Z i m b a b w e ) and Nyasaland (now 
Malawi), the first flow of profits from the colonial economy also permitted 
higher living standards as well as greater economic viability for the white 
settlers. 
African participation in the colonial economy, 1920-30 
Coercion in economic relations was decisive in the formative years of the 
colonial economies in Africa; and it subsequently attained a prominence 
which it did not hold in the capitalist epicentres. At some point, each 
colonial economy became less dependent on external force and non-
economic sanctions as the principal propellants. This turning-point was 
generally reached first in the British and G e r m a n colonies, followed by 
the French and then the Belgian and Portuguese. Whenever it came, 
Africans contemplated the m o n e y economy as a fact of life - a n e w order 
which they could not reverse and which in m a n y instances they were 
prepared to welcome. T h e n e w phase involved a choice between alternatives 
presented for earning a living and participating in the imposed economy 
of commodity production. Colonial Africa produced a wide range of agri-
8. M . A. Klein (ed.), 1968, p. 285. 
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cultural and mineral exports; but, for any African community, only a single 
option might have been locally available - perhaps tending vines on a 
European farm or growing an acre of cotton or descending daily into a 
mine shaft. Genuine alternatives were circumscribed by the ecology, and 
the policy of the given colonial administration. Nevertheless, Africans 
influenced the terms on which they were involved. They began by 
expressing their feelings on wage rates and prices; and ultimately they were 
drawn into discussing the variety of social and political questions which 
derived from and affected the colonial economy. 
N o precise date marks the onset of the above phase for the continent 
as a whole. It overlaps with conquest and with the period of ascendancy 
of coercive economic relations. In French Equatorial Africa and in the 
Portuguese territories, primitive coercion continued into the 1930s. T h e 
transition must be evaluated with reference to each colony and to geographic 
regions within the same colony. In several places, the colonial economy 
had been stabilized by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. 
It was then interrupted by the First World W a r and restored thereafter 
at a higher level. 
Mining dominated the post-war economies of Southern Africa, and came 
close to transforming the whole region into a single colonial economy. 
Firstly, the process of monopolization and cartelization assured the 
hegemony of large-scale capital in the then Union of South Africa, South 
West Africa and the Rhodesias. Secondly, the economic power of the 
mining centres was such that they required and were provided with a vast 
pool of labour which extended to areas where mining was not the principal 
economic activity - notably, the High Commission territories (Basutoland, 
n o w Lesotho; Bechuanaland, n o w Botswana; and Swaziland), Nyasaland, 
Mozambique and Angola. Collusion between the Portuguese and the 
regime in South Africa continued to ensure a regular and heavy flow of 
workers from Mozambique and Angola. This was reminiscent of slavery, 
but the paradoxical truth is that the trip to the mines became a highly 
desirable objective on the part of m a n y Africans. Colonialism created 
great disparities within Southern Africa. Capital was introduced in heavy 
concentrations in a few spots, outside of which economic activity was at 
a low ebb. Wherever they resided, Africans fell under the obligation to 
meet taxes and they sought items of consumption which had to be 
purchased with cash. In this connection, the mines were often the only 
opportunity which presented itself. 
T h e pattern of the colonial economies in the plantation sector had a 
great deal in c o m m o n with that of the mining sector. Geographically the 
two overlapped in Southern Africa, and to some extent in the Belgian Congo 
and North Africa. Plantations combined large-scale capital with large 
quantities of labour. A powerful international firm controlled oil palm 
plantations in the Belgian Congo. Sisal plantations in G e r m a n East Africa 
were dominated by big G e r m a n firms backed by industrial and banking 
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capital; and even when the industry became relatively decentralized under 
the British, sisal cultivation had still to be pursued with large acreages 
and a factory requiring significant capital investment. T h e state never left 
the side of the plantation owners, and gave them invaluable aid in procuring 
supplies of labour at the depressed wage rates which allowed for super-
profits. Yet, w h e n no viable alternative form of earning cash income existed 
in given parts of East, South and Central Africa, the plantation acted as 
an attraction to labour from far afield. Tanganyika had an influx from 
Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, M o z a m b i q u e and Ruanda-Urundi (now 
R w a n d a and Burundi). T h e British administration avoided regularizing 
labour supplies from M o z a m b i q u e through treaty relations with the 
Portuguese government. Instead, they relied solely on the differential 
between Tanganyika and Mozambique , where the m o n e y economy was 
weak and where the persistence of blatant coercion for taxes and labour 
frightened Africans into crossing the frontier. 
Wage-earners of all categories remained a tiny minority of the adult 
African population. Undoubtedly, cash-crop farming embraced the largest 
proportion of Africans - providing the basis for what has been termed 
the économie de traite, an economic system in which imported manufactured 
goods were directly exchanged for cash crops which were unprocessed or 
minimally processed.9 Cash crops offered Africans slightly greater room 
for manoeuvre than wage labour. Occasionally, there was a choice between 
export crops. Food crops were grown for family consumption, sometimes 
for local cash sales and more rarely for export. African peasants used the 
limited flexibility in these circumstances to determine the nature and 
quantity of what they would plant or prepare for export. Prices were set 
by metropolitan agencies, but agricultural prices could be marginally 
affected where peasants switched from one crop to another or deployed 
stocks into a local market. In a few desperate instances, they turned to 
the technique of 'hold-up' of the sale of their produce, even though this 
meant serious loss to themselves. 
Wherever there was a clash between peasant farming and hired labour, 
the African choice was almost invariably in favour of his o w n cultivation. 
Virtually all agricultural staples produced by peasants in Africa were 
associated with plantations elsewhere — notably, coffee in Latin America 
and palm oil in the East Indies. T h e strength of the African communities 
was responsible for the widespread incidence of peasant farms. Central 
Africa, with its low population density, was the arena for concession 
companies, infamous for forced labour. Such settled agriculture as was 
developed in Central Africa, continued with coercion over a rural 
proletariat, as on the sugar, sisal and cotton plantations of Mozambique 
and Angola, or it became capital-intensive, as in the Belgian Congo. It 
was possible for Lever Brothers to set up oil palm plantations in the Belgian 
9. R. Dumont, 1966. 
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Congo from 1911. Their requests to have similar concessions in British 
West Africa were turned d o w n , because the colonial administration 
correctly perceived that such a venture would necessitate the violent 
subjugation of thousands of inhabitants. Besides, the colonialists had early 
proof in West Africa of the success and viability of the African peasantry 
in producing an exportable surplus and lucrative returns to the European 
trading community. French persistence with settler agriculture in West 
Africa demonstrated its inferiority vis-à-vis African small-scale production. 
In East Africa, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia, the settler economy 
had to be subsidized and protected from African competition by legislation, 
without which it could not have secured enough labour. W h e r e mining 
was merely a localized intrusion into an agricultural colonial economy, 
African choice was once more in favour of peasant production, giving rise, 
for example, to difficulties in the recruitment of local mine labour in Asante 
and the Western Province of the Gold Coast and Sukumaland (Tan-
ganyika). 
While it was still being forced on to some African communities, cash-
crop farming was actively pursued by other Africans in the face of official 
indifference or hostility. T h e y demanded the transport and marketing infra-
structure, seizing the opportunity as soon as a railway line was completed. 
In m a n y cases, they pioneered before the colonial governments had built 
bridges and feeder roads. Seed for n e w crops were taken from the colonial 
governments, from missionaries, from European farms and from Africans 
w h o were already engaged in cultivation. Cocoa and coffee are the two 
best k n o w n and most important of the cash crops whose extension relied 
mainly on African initiatives. Minor crops such as tea, tobacco and 
pyrethreum also bear out the same principle. Besides, Africans fought 
specifically for crops which were better money-earners than others. In 
the case of cocoa, this meant cultivating lands which were only marginally 
suitable. At other times, African preference precipitated a struggle against 
discriminatory colonial legislation. T h u s , the latter part of the 1920s and 
the early 1930s saw a determined effort on the part of Africans in several 
highland areas of Tanganyika to cultivate Arabica coffee rather than hire 
their labour out or grow the less profitable Robusta variety. T h e Africans 
w o n literally by planting coffee trees faster than the colonial administration 
could destroy them. 1 0 
W h e r e peasant cultivation established itself as the hegemonic form of 
the colonial economy, it functioned like mines and plantations in drawing 
labour resources from an area m u c h wider than the actual zone of 
production. Senegambian groundnut farming attracted seasonal labour 
from the hinterland of the Senegal and Niger rivers; cocoa in the Gold 
Coast and in the Ivory Coast drew upon Upper Volta; while Ugandan 
coffee-growers turned to Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika to expand 
10. W . Rodney, n.d. 
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output. Together, cash-crop farming and the wage labour of mines and agri-
culture accounted for the overwhelming majority of Africans w h o partici-
pated directly in the colonial economy. However, a host of other activities 
were generated or transformed by the n e w commodity relationships. It 
was rather late before the extensive forest reserves of the continent were 
seriously maximized, but an extractive timber industry arose early in G a b o n 
and in varying degrees some such enterprise was pursued wherever forest 
reserves existed. T h e transportation network was a factor of more general 
significance. Thousands of Africans found wage employment at the ports 
on the trains, and - as road networks developed - as lorry drivers, especially 
when head porterage declined after the First World W a r . 
As the colonial economy began to mature, hardly any sector of the African 
community could stand apart. In spite of their reputation for conservatism, 
all pastoral groups were drawn into the money economy by the 1920s, 
if not earlier. They sold meat for local consumption and occasionally for 
export along with hides. In the territories that were to become Somalia, 
this was the principal manifestation of the colonial economy. Fishing 
peoples were similarly affected. Trade in the traditional item of dried and 
smoked fish, like trade in meat and other foodstuffs, became dependent 
upon the cash of the main export earners, and sensitively reflected the 
seasonal buying power of peasants receiving their 'cocoa money' , 'cotton 
money' and the like. Africans naturally exerted themselves to earn in a 
manner which was remunerative and congenial. Colonial administrations, 
missionaries and private companies employed junior clerks, artisans and 
(in the case of the first two) schoolteachers. T h e drive to obtain education 
was related to these job opportunities, especially since they were closely 
connected with the growing popularity of urban living. T h e drop-outs from 
primary schools or those w h o for one reason or another could not arrive 
at more prestigious paid employment filled the interstices of the colonial 
economy as domestic servants or as members of the police or army or 
by reaching out for forms of urban 'hustling' such as prostitution. 
African reactions at the personal level remained fundamentally mere 
responses to they dynamic of the imposed colonial economy. T h e y ex-
tended and strengthened that economy and confirmed the patterns of 
exploitation. 
Wages were kept abysmally low. U p w a r d trends were resisted; purcha-
sing power was eroded partly because of the periodic inflations and partly 
because wages were depressed or allowed to lag behind commodity prices. 
Settlers and other resident Europeans and the managers of foreign 
enterprises combined to keep wages low and to keep labour semi-feudal 
through the issue of work-cards which severely limited the freedom to 
shift labour from one employer to another. Throughout the period in 
question, employers remained hostile to worker organizations which would 
have had an effect in raising the wage rate. T h e backward regime of task-
or piece-work was widely pursued, and workers received no benefits for 
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sickness, disability, unemployment and old age. Besides, the constant 
mobility of the largely migratory labour force, its low level of skill and 
the pervasiveness of racism all added to the disadvantages of the African 
worker in confronting the capitalists over wages and working conditions. 
African peasants were u p against the commercial system. T h e tendency 
of West African merchant firms to monopolize through 'pools' is well 
k n o w n , and trading companies throughout the continent guarded their 
interests by refusing to compete in such a w a y as to raise prices. Indeed, 
intermediaries such as the 'Asians' in East Africa and the Lebanese in 
West Africa also set prices and conditions a m o n g themselves so that the 
African peasant had little choice w h e n he went to m a k e his sales. T h e 
cash-crop farmer faced the prospect of being gypped at the weighing scales, 
in the processing stage (as with the cotton ginnery), in transportation, in 
the calculation of returns and in the repayment of loans or advances where 
applicable. African producers were also making retail purchases from the 
middlemen traders and the commercial firms. A fundamental inequality 
marked the exchange between the colonial economy and the metropolises. 
This unequal exchange was reflected in the disparity between the low 
remuneration Africans received and the relatively high cost of m a n u -
factured imports; and it also manifested itself in the low wage rate in the 
colonies as compared with the metropolises. O f course, unequal exchange 
was not a purely economic phenomenon. It derived from the asymmetry 
in political power and from the organizational and technological weaknesses 
of African producers.11 
Africans were exploited by the colonial system irrespective of whether 
or not they produced an export surplus. T a x collection grew more and 
m o r e far-reaching, and it was utilized not so m u c h for services to the people 
as for building the state and economic infrastructure. T h e migrant labour 
of the mines, farms and plantations was secured at the expense of the 
previously autonomous village and local economies. Thereby, capital 
avoided the cost of production of labour. A s in slavery, labour arrived 
fully formed from outside the capitalist system as such. Workers never 
received a living wage or any social benefits because they were part-time 
farmers, and throughout their working lives other m e m b e r s of their family 
remained self-supporting at the stagnant level which Europeans considered 
to be African subsistence. In the same way , cash crops which went into 
the local or export markets were generated as a surplus over and above 
peasant subsistence. For these reasons, it is misleading to conceptualize 
the colony as a 'dual economy' with distinct 'modern' and 'traditional' 
sectors.12 T h e supposedly dynamic modern enclave and the backward 
traditional forms were dialectically interrelated and interdependent. 
G r o w t h in the export sector was possible only because it could constantly 
ii. S. Amin, 1974; A. Emmanuel, 1972. 
12. A. Mafeje, 1972; C . Meillassoux, 1972. 
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alienate value from the African communities in the form of land, labour, 
agricultural tribute and capital. T h e stagnation within these communities 
was induced rather than inherent. T h e 'traditional' no longer existed as 
such, with its labour drawn off and its rationale destroyed. Its agricultural 
production either dropped or failed to keep up with the growth of the 
population. In this way, isolated areas which registered no growth in 
capitalist terms were nevertheless affected by the presence of capitalism 
on the continent. 
Dependence and repression, 1930-8 
Colonial production relations were built within Africa over a span of years, 
during which the numerous self-sufficient African economies were either 
destroyed or transformed and subordinated. Their connections one with 
the other were broken, as in the case of the trans-Saharan trade and the 
commerce of the interlacustrine zone of East and Central Africa. Links 
previously existing between Africa and the rest of the world were also 
adversely affected, notably with regard to India and Arabia. A large number 
of discrete colonial economies came into being. Economic partition was 
not exactly the same as political partition, since stronger capitalist powers 
mulcted the colonies of weaker nations. Even Britain had to accept the 
penetration of United States capital into South Africa after the formation 
of the Anglo American Corporation in 1917. Nevertheless, the arbitrary 
political boundaries were generally taken to be the limits of the economies, 
each of which was small scale, artificial and separately oriented towards 
Europe. They lacked continental, regional or internal linkages. These were 
preconditions for external dependence - manifest in terms of capital, 
markets, technology, services and the decision-making process. 
B y definition, the colonial economy was an extension of that of the 
colonizing power. African economies were integrated first into that of their 
respective colonizer and secondly into the economies of the leading nations 
of the capitalist world. O n e of the most obvious connections was that of 
shipping. Only a handful of nations had maritime capitalists capable of 
operating during the era of imperialism. Portugal was almost completely 
out of the reckoning, while the United States considerably expanded on 
its nineteenth-century involvement in African trade. Competitive and 
monopolistic tendencies were juxtaposed in the shipping world. B y sub-
sidies and special shipping laws, countries sought to ensure that colonial 
commerce increased the tonnage of national shipping. Yet, early in the 
present century 'Conference lines' emerged as agencies for resolving 
competition and establishing monopolies over freight rates. Weaker nations 
had little or no representation within the Conference lines, while the 
G e r m a n s were major participants even after the loss of their African 
colonies.13 
13. C . Leubuscher, 1963. 
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Banks were the pinnacle of early monopoly capitalism. They constituted 
the principal avenues for the export of African surplus, there being no 
obstacles to the free flow of capital funds out of the colonies. Private banks 
initially issued the specie in circulation in most colonies, until this became 
a central bank function with the establishment of statutory currency boards. 
T h e treasuries of the colonizing powers manipulated the currency reserves 
of the colonies in their o w n interests and ultimately in the interest of finance 
capital, since the investment of colonial reserves was m a d e on the 
metropolitan m o n e y market. B y underwriting marine insurance and by 
backing large capitalist ventures, banks retained hegemony over the colonial 
economy. They advanced credit notes to the white settlers and the non-
African retail traders while for capitalist and above all pseudo-scientific 
racist reasons, they denied them to Africans. Colonial credit restriction 
ordinances sometimes confirmed this. 
T h e workings of the colonial economy can be traced in large part through 
shipping companies and mining concerns. But for an understanding of 
w h y the exploitative institutions functioned as they did, one must analyse 
the economic structures of the colony as part of the global capitalist 
economy. Colonialism confined African colonies to the production of 
primary goods for export and in turn kept them dependent upon the 
developed capitalist countries for manufactures and technology. This rigid 
international division of labour could not be permanently maintained, and 
shifts towards processing and light manufacturing took place before the 
Second World W a r . Nevertheless, the period until 1935 came closer to 
illustrating the classic colonial international division of labour. Initiatives 
to crush oil seeds in Senegal were vigorously and for a long while 
successfully opposed by French manufacturers. In Tanganyika, a few sisal 
plantation capitalists were able to establish a rope-making factory in 1932, 
but as soon as the product reached the London market the outcry from 
British rope manufacturers was so great that the Colonial Office explicitly 
reasserted the principle that Africa must be confined to the production 
of export raw materials. With few exceptions, colonial production tended 
towards monoculture, with dependence on specialized markets in a few 
capitalist countries. 
T h e international division of labour presented itself within the colonial 
economies as an ever-widening divergence between production and con-
sumption. T h e bulk of the production within the growing money economy 
was never intended to meet local demand and consumption. Conversely, 
the variety of goods obtainable at the retail markets were increasingly of 
foreign origin. Local artisanship suffered heavily from European competi-
tion and manipulation, along lines already manifest in the pre-colonial 
period. A s the colonial economy became firmly rooted in the 1920s, Africans 
were producing that which they did not consume and consuming that which 
they did not produce. In effect, domestic demand did not stimulate the 
maximization of domestic resources. A s a further deleterious consequence, 
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the colonizers wasted some African resources and ignored others, because 
their yardstick was the utility of the given resource to Europe rather than 
Africa. N o n e of the major economic elements such as savings, investment, 
prices, incomes and output were correlated in response to domestic require-
ments. For these structural reasons, recent research by African economists 
and historians has challenged the old formulations of colonial development 
and has posited instead that colonialism produced economic dependence, 
lopsidedness and underdevelopment.14 
T h e most significant event in the evolution of African economies in 
the inter-war period was the great depression of 1929-33. W h e n this hit 
the interdependent capitalist economies, it necessarily struck at the 
dependent African colonial economies - boldly illumining their extent and 
character in the process. 
Cyclical crises in the world economy since the nineteenth century had 
the effect of slowing growth in Africa and imposing hardships on Africans 
already attached to the m o n e y nexus. It was the severity of these tendencies 
which was n e w in 1930 w h e n the repercussions were felt on the African 
continent. T h e depression entered via the most advanced sectors of 
capitalism in Africa - the mines, plantations and primary cash-crop areas. 
However, it spread through all the secondary and tertiary channels, causing 
hardships to Africans w h o sold food to workers or to other farmers and 
to pastoralists w h o found it uneconomical to part with their livestock at 
the prevailing prices. Africans specializing in trade were all quickly affected, 
even where the trade was in an indigenous product such as kola. T h e fact 
is that the supposedly traditional Hausa or Dyula traders were subjugated 
to the colonial economy. T h e y were successful to the extent that they could 
wrestle with the new order and transform themselves — for example, by 
becoming lorry-owners - but they were defenceless when a major external 
factor such as the depression caused a contraction of the currency m a d e 
available to their customers by cash-crop farming and wages. 
Each participant in the colonial economy took steps to counter the effects 
of the depression. T h e initiative lay with the capitalist firms. Banks and 
commercial houses cut back on their operations, so that in cash-crop areas 
they maintained a presence in key centres like Dakar, Lagos and Nairobi, 
while branches up-country and in lesser capitals were closed. Above all, 
the export houses achieved economy at the expense of the peasants by 
slashing producer prices w h e n the 1930 crop came to market. A s employers, 
they retrenched workers and cut wages drastically. Except in the gold 
industry, which was avidly pursued, retrenchment was the major response 
of all major employers in various spheres of production. W a g e labour had 
increased considerably after the First World W a r , but declined by 50% 
or more between 1931 and 1934. Meanwhile, although m a n y settlers and 
small businesses went bankrupt, the principal beneficiaries of the colonial 
system continued to make reduced but substantial profits. 
14. W . Rodney, 1972; J. Rweyemamu, 1974; E. A. Brett, 1973. 
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Africans reacted to the crisis by struggling against attempted European 
solutions. T o deal with lowered wages, workers resorted to the strike 
weapon with greater frequency and in larger numbers, in spite of the non-
existence or lack of development of trade unions. Relatively little has been 
written on the spontaneous struggle of the African working class before 
the coming of trade unions,15 but business cycles and wars appear to have 
sharpened conflict, judging from unrest during the depression of 1920-1, 
during the major depression of 1929-33, and once more during the 1938 
recession. Similarly, it could be no mere coincidence that farmers on the 
Gold Coast held up their cocoa and boycotted foreign stores in 1920-1 
and again in 1930 and 1938. Foreign firms were determined that 
accumulation should continue under all circumstances, while workers and 
peasants in entrenched cash-crop environments tried to counter im-
poverishment and defended any small gains which might have been m a d e 
in better years. 
Another line of defence on the part of Africans was withdrawal from 
the money economy. Areas which had been recently brought into the m o n e y 
economy or which were only lightly touched were the first to retreat. T h e 
same phenomenon had previously occurred at the end of the First World 
W a r , leaving colonial governments with the task of re-establishing the 
colonial economy in some regions. M a n y Tanganyikan peasants, w h o had 
a m u c h lower level of involvement in m o n e y exchanges than their brothers 
on the Gold Coast, simply sought to abandon cash-crop farming in the 
years after 1930. In this they were not very successful, because the 
power of the colonial state was brought in to tilt the scales against what 
was considered to be a reversion to barbarism. Campaigns to 'grow more 
crops' were instituted, and bureaucratic sanctions were thinly veiled forms 
of force for the expansion of acreages in the face of falling prices. This 
type of campaign was backed not merely by merchants but also by 
industrialists requiring raw material and by powerful metropolitan organi-
zations such as the Empire Cotton Growing Association, which continued 
to be active in the years after the slump. 
Most capital projects were suspended during the depression; and, where 
this was not so, the investment was associated with the expansion of cheap 
primary production and was undertaken with the use of forced labour, 
as with the French Office du Niger irrigation project. There was an overall 
revival of coercion in economic relations, indicating that the colonial 
economy had to be buttressed by non-economic means when in crisis. 
African labour and taxes kept the railways viable and maintained colonial 
revenues. Yet, the African masses suffered most from the cutback on already 
skimpy social services, such as medicine and education, and they had to 
pay more for these services. In the years of recovery after 1934, wages, 
prices and facilities for Africans remained retrenched in contrast to the 
return to high profit levels for private capital. 
15. H . Deutschland, 1970. 
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Colonial governments granted m i n i m u m relief to Africans suffering from 
the depression. They suspended tax collection, and they subsidised prices, 
as the French did for groundnuts. T h e y also tried to moderate the crudest 
forms of middleman exploitation. These measures arose out of necessity, 
since no m o n e y was circulating and since lower prices in one country forced 
desperate peasants to march long distances and smuggle their produce out 
through an area where there was some marginal advantage. As far as the 
middlemen were concerned, the governments needed to restrain them from 
cornering the reduced profit rather than let it be exported. However, in 
East Africa the 'Asian' merchants were essential for keeping the m o n e y 
economy intact and avoiding reversion to barter, just as their capital had 
been the original basis for the extension of specie and small-scale m o n e y 
exchanges throughout the region.16 In the final analysis, therefore, the 
British administration co-operated to protect the interests of these retailers 
and produce buyers. Africans emerged from the depression subject to more 
bureaucratic controls (designed to increase production) and still entirely 
vulnerable to manipulation by the import/export firms and their local 
compradors. 
T h e dependence illustrated by the great depression indicates the degree 
of change in the lives of Africans some fifty years after the coming of 
colonialism. T h e impact in the early years was often slight, but major trans-
formation was wrought by colonialism as it advanced. Investigation into 
the economy has been given low priority both during the colonial economy 
and during the nationalist phase w h e n there was greater commitment to 
the study of African history from an indigenous perspective. This short-
coming has inhibited discussion on the significance of the colonial 
experience, since m a n y changes were economic, while others of a political, 
social or cultural nature had their basis in economic activity. Consequent 
upon the growth of the m o n e y economy, African society became more 
differentiated and n e w classes were formed. There was limited proletarian-
ization in various parts of the continent, and there was widespread 
peasantization. T h e latter held within it the seeds of further differentiation. 
A s in all peasant communities within a capitalist orbit, big peasants arose 
at the expense of small peasants and landless labourers. All of the cash-crop 
areas witnessed during the 1920s the emergence of big peasants owning 
land privately, employing labour and occasionally capable of new tech-
niques. A second well-known stratum comprised the privileged few w h o 
received an education in the first years of colonialism, w h e n certain skills 
were being introduced to make the colonial economy function. Finally, 
it is to be noted that the distribution networks were m a n n e d at the lowest 
levels by Africans, w h o achieved prominence in West and North Africa. 
Successful cash-crop farmers, African traders and the educated elite 
together created the embryonic petty bourgeoisie. T h e y often had roots 
in the old possessor classes in quasi-feudal parts of Africa, and as such 
16. J. S. Mangat, 1969. 
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were often pampered by the Europeans. But the more portentous fact was 
that, irrespective of colonial policy, the operation of the economy favoured 
the advance of these strata, w h o were economically and culturally part 
of the dependent colonial order. 
35° 
T h e colonial economy of 
the former French, Belgian 
and Portuguese zones, 
1914-35 
C. C O Q U E R Y - V I D R O V I T C H 
Both in their general configuration and from the standpoint of colonial 
policy, the French, Belgian and Portuguese colonies were similar in a 
number of ways.* They were colonies or federations of enormous geo-
graphical area, though in terms of population generally smaller than the 
average for British Africa, especially French Equatorial Africa ( A E F ) and 
Angola (see Fig. 15.1).' Mozambique and Ruanda-Urundi (now R w a n d a 
and Burundi) served as reservoirs of labour for neighbouring Northern 
and Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe) and the Belgian 
Congo (now Zaire), in the same way that the Voltaic Zone (now Upper 
Volta) of French West Africa ( A O F ) supplied Mossi workers for the cocoa 
plantations of the Ivory Coast and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) . 2 
Indeed, exploitation of these territories based on high investment was 
relatively recent. Not m u c h capital had been risked there before the First 
World W a r , as Table 15.1 indicates. 
In the economic field, the period was decisive; its beginning and end 
were marked by two profound traumas. T h e first - the World W a r -
served to trigger off, despite the brief but acute crisis of 1921-2, an 
unprecedented colonial b o o m which in fact reflected the prosperity of the 
metropolitan countries during the 1920s. Although spectacular, this expan-
sion was relatively short-lived, ending with the long slump which followed 
the collapse ushered in by the 1930 crisis. All this led to great disruption 
in economic as well as in social and ideological terms. By the end of the 
period, the relations of Francophone and Lusophone Africa with the outside 
world were transformed. T h e colonies, which on the whole had not been 
very dependent on the metropolitan countries, began from this time to 
•Editor's note: this chapter was written in 1974 and revised in 1980. 
1. In 1936, the population density was 4.2 per sq k m in the Belgian Congo, 2.8 in 
French Black Africa, 2.4 in Angola, according to S. H . Frankel, 1938, pp. 170 and 202-3. 
2. Mozambique and Ruanda-Urundi had population densities of 5.1 and 6.8 per sq k m 
respectively in 1936. Account must also be taken in A O F of the difference between the 
semi-desert region of the Sahel and the more fertile coastal zone, where the high density 
of little Togo (14.4 per sq k m ) is a typical example, ibid. 
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T A B L E 15.i Investments in Black 
Area 
British Africa 
French Black Africa3 
including: 
A O F 
AEF 
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1. According to S. H . Frankel, 1938, pp. 149-59; G - Paish, 1909, 191c—11. 
2. Excluding German investments in South West Africa (£126.5mn) and in Tanganyika GC33-5mn), 
S. H . Frankel, 1938, pp. 202-3. 
3. Frankel's appraisal of the capital invested in French Black Africa is none the less clearly under-
valued (perhaps by one-third) because it takes into account only the companies quoted on the Stock 
Exchange. 
4. 1870-1936. 
5. Including approximately £is.8mn of earlier German investments. 
6. Including approximately £ i6mn of British capital. 
7. j£2omn of British capital. 
8. Less the German investments in Ruanda-Urundi (¿çmn). 
9. A E F and Cameroon. 
be an integral part of the western capitalist system in the framework of a 
coherent economic system of colonial exploitation. 
T h e dominant trait of the period was the emphasis on the import of 
capital equipment which was as profitable to the metropolitan countries 
as it was sorely trying for the colonies. But there was a contrast between 
the mining countries (particularly the Belgian Congo; to a minor extent 
Angola and - as the outlet for the R a n d — Mozambique) , in which the 
mining industry or the railway infrastructure entailed a higher level of 
investment, and the other territories, which still remained exclusively 
agricultural. Another factor of diversity lay in the m o d e of exploitation; 
A E F and the Congo long remained countries exploited by monopoly c o m -
panies, whereas A O F and little Ruanda-Urundi were subjected to the 
competitive system of the économie de traite, or the 'milking economy', that 
is, an economy based on the export of primary agricultural commodities 
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produced by traditional means and the import of consumer goods. T h e 
Portuguese colonies, relatively well endowed, suffered chiefly from depen-
dence on an 'underdeveloped' metropolis that was itself unable to finance 
their exploitation. 
The financing of capital equipment 
T h e accompanying graphs (see Fig. 15.2) reveal a remarkable similarity in 
foreign trade between the Belgian Congo and A O F amounting to approxi-
mately £20 million on the eve of the depression. O n the other hand, the 
figures for Angola and A E F were four to five times lower. In 1930 the 
foreign trade of Angola, at 475000 contos, represented something less than 
£5 million as against £4.3 million for A E F . B y comparison, the trade of 
little Ruanda-Urundi seems almost non-existent. In 1930, it stood at 
B.frs 70 million, or only £360000. 
But all the graphs reveal one constant for the decade 1920-30, even 
though inflation tends to exaggerate the value of imported goods in relation 
to their volume (cf. the Ruanda-Urundi curves - the conversion into 
sterling having the advantage of cancelling the effects of continental in-
flation on the other figures). In all the territories an adverse trade balance 
— appearing at the turning-point of the First World W a r and culminating 
during the years of m a x i m u m economic euphoria of 1925-30 - reflected 
the emphasis placed on capital-goods investment. It is superfluous to point 
out the importance during this period of the transport infrastructure sector, 
especially ports, railways and roads. This was a new phenomenon linked 
with the introduction of motor transport. In the Belgian Congo, 65% of 
the accumulated investments in 1932 were in mines, transport and real 
estate or secondary agricultural or commercial undertakings related to the 
expansion of railways or mines. For the years 1927-30, goods imported 
for public works accounted on average for 4 7 % of the special imports. In 
1929, capital goods such as coal and coke, mineral oils, metal products, 
machines, ships and vehicles constituted nearly half of all imports,3 as 
opposed to only a third in A O F . As a result, the cumulative capital invested 
in the Belgian Congo rose sharply from B.frs 1215 million before the war 
to more than 3000 million gold francs in 1935.4 Already increasing rapidly 
between 1920 and 1924, it more than doubled between 1924 and 1929, 
bordering on the m a x i m u m of the inter-war period, before the abrupt 
drop during the depression. T h e annual capital subscribed by Belgian 
companies fell from B.frs 1400 million in 1929 to B.frs 276 million in 
1932, that is, from about 30 million to 50 million gold francs. 
3. F. Passelecq, 1932, Vol. I, pp. 417-20. 
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TABLE 15.2 Evolution 
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Source: J. P. Peemans, 1968, p. 383. 
But the colonies were poor from the financial point of view. Despite 
the increase in customs revenue associated with the rise in foreign trade, 
and particularly the increase in head tax, they were in no position to take 
on the financing of expansion by themselves. Development of capital 
equipment went hand in hand with an intensive policy of borrowing from 
the metropolitan countries. 
Paradoxically, the main effort was undertaken just at the time of the 
great depression. Started in the Belgian Congo during the euphoria of the 
last years of the decade, the policy of borrowing reached a peak there 
between 1928 and 1932. F r o m 1931, A O F in turn began a serious effort 
at borrowing; the débâcle of the 1930s having convinced the government 
of the urgent need for a capital investment programme. 
Whereas the public debt of the Belgian Congo amounted in 1909 to 
less than B.frs 250 million, the colony borrowed, especially after 1928, 
approximately B.frs 3500 million or nearly 600 million Belgian gold francs.s 
Despite the fact that it had a larger area and a larger population, A O F 
had to make do with a quarter of this amount after 1920, or only a third 
of the s u m authorized by law. A n amount of B.frs 630 million or approxi-
mately 120 million French gold francs out of the B.frs 1750 million of 
the time authorized between the two wars was actually paid-up in 1935. 
This was still only half the figure for A E F which, both more poverty-
stricken and patterned more on the Belgian example, had begun a policy 
of borrowing for infrastructure projects earlier. T h e loans were spent 
almost entirely on the construction of the Congo-Océan railway, that is, 
approximately 300 million gold francs borrowed between 1920 and 1936, 
or virtually the whole of the amounts legally authorized. 
T h e result was an increase in the external debt which became all the 
more alarming for budgetary equilibrium as the payments became heavier 
in the midst of the depression, precisely when export prices fell sharply. 
In 1933, the annual instalment of the Congolese debt (estimated at B.frs 
298 million) represented nearly 88% of the budgetary receipts of the 
colony, or almost half its expenditure or nearly half the value of its exports. 
M u c h less heavy, the amounts payable by A O F (F.frs 40 million in 1933) 
amounted to more than a third of its general budget during the worst 
years of the depression but only 5 to 8 % of the whole of the revenue of 
A O F including all budgets, general and territorial. Those of A E F then 
exceeded 80% (81% of the global budget in 1934). T h e Portuguese terri-
5. During the period, parity oscillated around the rate 100 Belgian francs = 70 French 
francs. 
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tories, on which there is little precise information, were also overwhelmed 
by debt. In 1936, Angola owed a total of almost 1 million contos which 
is equal to £8.7 million or 220 million French gold francs. This is distinctly 
more than the debt of A O F but was supported by only a seventh of the 
latter's exports,6 but less than half of that of the Belgian Congo which 
had a similar colonial budget. 
In general, the increase in the burden of instalments during the depres-
sion years was distinctly more rapid than in the most debt-ridden of the 
British territories; as indicated in Table 15.3. 
T A B L E 15.3 Annual instalments on debts: comparative charges on various territories in 1928 




































Source: S. H . Frankel, 1938, p. 182, and C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, forthcoming. 
Although difficult to m a k e because of currency fluctuations, a compari-
son between the Belgian Congo and A O F shows the differences in the 
modes of exploitation. Considered more profitable, and in any case m u c h 
more avid for capital, the Belgian Congo nevertheless presented obvious 
economic weaknesses. H e r indebtedness was infinitely heavier than that 
of A O F while the volume of her export trade was somewhat less despite 
the importance of the mining industries. Above all, her budgetary revenues 
were substantially more limited owing to lower customs duties and a lighter 
taxation of the African population. T h e result was a more serious financial 
deficit at the time of the depression. 
T A B L E 15.4 Some colonial statistics (F.frs mri) 
Debt instalment 
Ordinary budget receipts 
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6. S . H . Frankel, 1938, p . 371; J. Duffy, 1962, pp. 139 et seq. 
357 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-IQJ5 
This apparent inconsistency is accounted for, in fact, by the distortion 
of the level of exploitation. T h e Congo was reaching the stage of exploitation 
by capital, whereas A O F was still more or less at the stage of the 'milking 
economy'. O n the eve of the depression, the commercial superiority of 
the French federation, more than half of which (52.7% in 1928) was still 
based on the export of Senegalese groundnuts, was proof of the profitability 
of a short-sighted commercial policy limited to the exploitation of the 
profit margins between imported goods sold at high prices to African 
producers, and the purchase at low prices of crops the production of which 
was left to the traditional sector (économie de traite). This colony was 
supposed to be self-sufficient, since the basis of colonization was a profit-
yield to the metropolitan state; so it lived off customs duties drawn from 
expanding trade, and also off heavy taxation. Despite the depression, which 
brought business to a standstill and at the same time wiped out African 
revenues, the metropolitan state refused any subsidy in aid. In the same 
way, the last subsidy paid out to the wretched A E F - which received in 
all, from 1910 to 1934, F.frs 375 million - occurred in 1928, the metro-
politan state resigning itself only to assuming the servicing of loans at the 
height of the depression to the value of F.frs 80 million in 1935.7 
But the head tax continued to increase throughout the depression, or 
at least it scarcely receded: for A O F it was F.frs 156 million in 1929, F.frs 
181 million in 1931, its lowest point being F.frs 153 million in 1935. 
T h o u g h France finally agreed to make efforts to invest in the African 
colonies, this was strictly a temporary measure which took the form of 
state-guaranteed loans payable after fifty years at a rate of 4-5.5%. In 
other words, the French colonies were still essentially required to pay for 
their o w n capital equipment. O f course A E F was so poverty-stricken that 
the metropolitan state finally took over its debt almost in its entirety. But 
in A O F the French share of expenses was reduced between 1931 and 1936 
to only 16% of the total, allowing for servicing of the debt. In other words, 
it was indeed the labour of the inhabitants that was first used to develop 
the territory. 
Since this archaic economy, that is, an economy that depended on 
taxation and plundering instead of production and investment, was fragile, 
the depression triggered off its bankruptcy. In 1934, the rapporteur of 
the colonial budget informed the French C h a m b e r of Deputies that the 
colonies were at the end of their tether, and recommended the financing 
of capital equipment by the state. In the same year, the Economic 
Conference of Metropolitan and Overseas France was held to make the 
first attempt at setting up a programme of support. But this programme 
was in fact only carried out after the Second World W a r . 8 
Although the depression was sudden and severe in the Belgian Congo, 
with the value of exports falling by almost two-thirds, from B.frs 1511 
7. A . Moeller, 1938, pp. 3-5. 
8. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch and H . Moniot, 1974, pp. 407-9. 
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million to B.frs 658 million between 1930 and 1933, it was less pronounced 
in relative value and was more quickly overcome. This is evident from 
the fact that exports rose again to B.frs 1203 million in 1935. T o 
be sure, the Belgian Congo still remained only moderately productive. 
Compared with the British colonies in Southern Africa, its mining yield 
was, to say the least, still very low. Although in 1935 this yield represented 
6 2 % of the total value of the Belgian Congo's exports, and, in the case 
of Angola 30%, these two territories together still exported a mere 6% of 
the total value of the mining products of black Africa. 
T A B L E 15.5 Relative importance of the foreign trade (total of imports and exports) of various 












T h e Belgian colony, where economic activity was already of the capital-
ist type, nevertheless had the advantage of its technological advance and 
its policy of long-term investments. T h e grave budgetary crisis of the 
1930s was due more to the reduction in the flow of investments than in 
the value of exports. T h e colony's o w n revenues, lower than in A O F , were 
compensated for by the great volume of private capital and the support 
of the state which, in addition to loans, m a d e up the deficit through heavy 
subsidies. These amounted to B.frs 687 million between 1933 and 1937; 
not including a colonial lottery, the profits from which (B.frs 271 million) 
served to cover part of the deficits of 1934 and 1935 (B.frs 673 million, 
or 4 7 % of regular expenditures). F r o m 1914 to 1935, the Congo 'cost' 
Belgium, exclusive of loans, a total of 112.5 million gold francs, or nearly 
half the total metropolitan expenditure between 1908 and 1950.9 
In short, even though, or rather because, it 'cost Belgium more' , the 
Congo , unlike the French federations, was able to 'take off as soon as 
industry recovered after the depression. Nevertheless, one must not exag-
gerate this phenomenon. T h e fact that, following the depression, exports 
everywhere again took the lead over imports, proved that the capital equip-
ment of the preceding phase had only helped develop to a further stage 
a policy still basically centred on exploitation from outside rather than on 
the development of the territories for their o w n benefit. 
The workers' burden 
This period - falling between two difficult phases marked by increasing 
exploitation of the workers, the First World W a r and the depression -
was hard on the Africans. At that time of colonial 'development', Africans 
9. A . Moeller, 1938; see also J. Stengers, 1957, p. 394. 
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interested the colonizers only to the extent that they represented a c o m -
modity or an instrument of production. It was, moreover, to ensure their 
efficiency that the first measures for the protection of labour were taken. 
But the precarious living standard was vulnerable to the slightest upset, 
and collapsed with the depression. A s a French administrator remarked, 
'I have always noticed that whenever the budget of a native family was 
properly and regularly kept, it never managed to make ends meet. T h e 
life of a native is, in fact, a miracle.'10 
L a b o u r 
Although forced labour was officially repudiated everywhere, the shortage 
of labour encouraged coercion, whether direct or imposed through the 
expedient of taxes that had to be paid. 
Compulsory service and provision of crops 
Everywhere, the use of unpaid labour was c o m m o n . T h e French federa-
tions, after the war, officially sanctioned unpaid labour for projects of 
local or colonial interest. Initially set at seven days per year, labour demands 
soon rose to twelve days in A O F or fifteen days in A E F . T h e Decree of 
6 October 1922, revised on 7 January 1925, provided for the possibility 
of individuals purchasing exemption at the rate of 50 centimes to two 
francs per day, according to the degree of penetration of the money 
economy. 
T h e obligation, limited in itself, was the more unpopular because of 
the fact that the feeding of the workers, previously not even considered, 
remained the w o m e n ' s responsibility if the work was within a day's walking 
distance from the village. This labour obligation was in addition to forced 
(but paid) recruitment for railway work. F r o m 1921 to 1932, 127250 m e n 
representing a total absence of 138125 years were recruited in A E F for 
building the Congo-Océan railway; probably some 20000 lives were lost 
before 1928. n In A O F such labour obligations were accompanied by 
the system k n o w n as 'the second portion of the contingent', under which 
workers could be drafted for 'social and utilitarian' purposes from the half 
of the quota not called up for military service. ' 2 Finally, on the eve of 
the depression, porterage, although decreasing in most places, was still 
wreaking havoc in Ruanda, where compulsory free labour nevertheless 
declined from twenty-nine to thirteen days per year.13 
T h e period was also characterized by the institution of compulsory 
10. M . Urvoy, 1940. 
11. G . Sautter, 1967. 
12. Decree of 31 October 1926. This system was also used in Madagascar. 
13. P. de Dekker, 1974. The annual number of days of labour required declined from 
fifteen in 1928 to thirteen in 1931. But in the Belgian Congo, compulsory free labour rose 
to 120 days a year during the Second World War. M . Merlier, 1962, p. 95. 
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cultivation of crops. T h e principle, which originated as early as the end 
of the nineteenth century in the Belgian C o n g o , w a s revived during the 
First W o r l d W a r , following a mission carried out in 1915 in U g a n d a and 
the Gold Coast with respect to cotton and cocoa respectively.14 T h e 
compulsory cultivation of rice w a s introduced in the Eastern Province, 
and that of cotton spread from the M a n i e m a and the Uele to the entire 
colony. In 1930, the 'state fields' covered m o r e than a million hectares; 
as a result the C o n g o produced 15000 tonnes of rice and 3 0 0 0 0 tonnes 
of cotton; s o m e ten companies controlled 111 ginning mills. T h e innovation 
w a s particularly unpopular but w a s none the less adopted in the French 
federations. It w a s initiated in 1916 in connection with the 'war effort'. 
T h a t it survived w a s due , from the start, to the artificial maintenance of 
prices by m e a n s of French subsidies. At the s a m e time, by contrast, the 
government of Nyasaland (now M a l a w i ) abandoned subsidies for cotton 
production, and they were also reduced in the Belgian C o n g o . In A E F at 
the instigation of the administrator Felix E b o u é (1927-8), four companies 
were given a purchasing m o n o p o l y over vast 'protected zones' in exchange 
for m i n i m u m capital equipment . 1 5 This s cheme followed the Belgian 
pattern of monopolies in the C o n g o which sprang from the decree of 
1 August 1921. 
T h e compulsory cultivation of cotton, started in the s a m e period in 
A O F , w a s also one of the major ideas of the Office d u Niger (1933). There 
again, specially developed village centres first established in 1937 were a 
lamentable failure, owing to the impossibility of solving the demographic 
problem and because of the low yields of an inferior cotton w h o s e selling 
price fell from 1.25 francs in 1928 to 90 centimes in 1929, 70 centimes in 
1931 and only 60 centimes from 1933 to 1936. 















Source: San Marco, 1940. 
Throughout the Portuguese colonies, the failure of the administrative 
authorities to ensure the distribution of seed or to provide technical instruc-
tion, explains the inefficiency of the system. It nevertheless prevailed in 
a particularly archaic form in the territory of the M o z a m b i q u e C o m p a n y , 
which w a s created in 1891 and enjoyed fifty-year sovereign rights over 
160000 sq k m . T h u s , it w a s the only c o m p a n y in the world that was still 
exercising sovereign powers by 1930, and it also accounted for 11.6% of 
the colony's total trade from 1918 to 1927, controlling 6 .5% of the territory 
and the labour of 4 % of the population.ï 6 
14. F. Passelecq, 1932, Vol. I, p. 281. 
15. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972, pp. 475-7. 
16. E . Böhm, 1938, p. 155. 
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Results were not always too disappointing. It was at the turning-point 
of the great depression that large-scale production, still using the system 
of compulsory planting, was launched for the production of cocoa, and 
especially coffee in the Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Ruanda-Urundi. In 
the latter territory, the 'coffee programme', launched on an experimental 
basis in 1925 (with an obligation on each chief or sub-chief to cultivate a 
half-hectare), was systematized as soon as the first effects of the depression 
were felt. 











Source: G . Molitor, 1937. 
T h e rapid take-off of speculative crop-raising can be explained first 
because the Africans were overwhelmed by their burdens and had no other 
remedy at the worst periods of the depression than to compensate for the 
drop in their income by increasing production, thereby offsetting the fall 
in m o n e y values. But at the end of the depression, the peasants, finally 
convinced of the profitability of their efforts, voluntarily took to producing 
the n e w crops. T h e spectacular nature of the take-off in A O F in 1936 is 
indicated in Table 15.8. 
T A B L E 15.8 AOF exports (tonnes) 
¡93S_ ¡93b_ 
Coffee 5300 43500 
Cocoa 6700 49700 
Source: 'L'évolution des exportations de l 'AOF de 1905 à 1957.' Institut d'Emission de TAOF et du 
Togo, no. 36, July 1958. 
This speculative crop-raising guaranteed the m i n i m u m of ready m o n e y 
required for the head tax and the satisfaction of primary consumption 
needs, both of which in turn led to the elimination of forced crop-
cultivation. 
In the circumstances, the role of institutions intended to aid producers, 
such as the Crédit Agricole (organized in 1931 in A O F , A E F and in the 
Cameroon) to guarantee short- and medium-term production operations 
while favouring the transformation to private property, was by no means 
negligible. Only farmers belonging to a legally recognized association 
(Société de Prévoyance, Association agricole, etc.) and owners of property 
registered in their o w n names (and not family inheritances) were eligible 
for aid.17 In the same way, the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance, whose 
17. Decree of 26 June 1931. M . Desanti, 1940. 
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numbers in A O F increased fivefold in four years (from twenty-two in 
1929 to 101 in 1933 and 104 in 1936), also played a role, though too often 
they interested the 'commandant de cercle' solely from the standpoint of the 
additional resources resulting from compulsory subscriptions. In Senegal 
in 1940, only two or three of them - in Sine-Saloum - were able to play 
a useful role. ' á U p to that time, compulsory labour, whether in the fields, 
the mines or on railway projects, remained the general rule. 
The labour system and legislation 
In French Africa, the administration controlled recruitment which in 
theory, after 1921 in A E F , could not exceed 'one-third of the able-bodied 
male population having reached adult age'. In Gabon, from 1926 onwards, 
with the increased exploitation of forests, the new owners were warned 
that they opened their logging sites 'at their o w n risk, in full awareness 
that they might not find the labour they needed on the spot'.19 
In the Belgian Congo, recruiting was limited to 25% of the 'able-bodied 
adult males'. T h e limit was reduced to 10% in the middle of the decade 
because of the drying-up of the labour pool; but in general the official 
quota was very considerably exceeded.20 In the Portuguese colonies, a 
subtle distinction was established between 'penal labour' reserved for 
convicts, and the labour - 'a moral and social obligation' — of m e n between 
14 and 60 years of age, for at least six months per year.21 T h e state was 
'to have no scruples about obliging and if necessary forcing the Negro 
savages of Africa to work, that is, to improve themselves through labour 
in order to improve their means of existence, to civilize themselves'.22 
T h e plague of recruiters was particularly prevalent in the Congo, where 
the state delegated its powers of recruiting to companies such as the Bourse 
du Travail du Katanga ( B T K ) a private agency recruiting for the mines 
in the rural zones. In 1926, to ease the labour shortage, the government 
awarded to the Union Minière du Haut Katanga ( U M H K ) the recruiting 
monopoly in Maniema (Eastern Province) and in Ruanda-Urundi . 2 3 
Finally, in the Portuguese colonies, scandals broke out periodically, such 
as the scandal of forced and slave labour on the cocoa plantations of Sào 
T o m é and Principe at the turn of the twentieth century. These took 
between 2000 and 4000 'voluntary recruits' each year. In accordance with 
its policy of neo-slavery, Portugal rejected, in 1930, the 'Recommendation 
18. M . Tupinier, 1940. 
19. G . G . Antonetti, 1926, 1927. 
20. M . Merlier, 1962, pp. 134-5. T h e notion of'adult' was loose, as it designated any 
individual having 'reached normal adult development'. H . Leonard, 1934, p. 382. 
21. Labour Code in 1911. Le régime et I'organisation du travail des indigènes dans les 
colonies tropicales, Brussels, 1929, pp. 224-315. 
22. Recommendation of the Commission, incorporated into the Labour Code of 
14 October 1914; cited by J. Duffy, 1962, p. 132. 
23. B . Fetter, 1976, p. 90. 
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concerning the indirect coercion of Labour' proposed by the Geneva 
International Conference. In 1947, there was the famous protest of 
Henrique Galvâo, the m e m b e r of parliament for Angola. W h e n he reported 
that 2 million Africans had been expatriated from the Portuguese colonies, 
he was arrested as a result in 1952.24 In 1903, recruitment in Mozambique 
of miners for the Transvaal was entrusted to the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association ( W N L A ) . In exchange for an agreement to reserve 
47-5% of South African traffic for the Laurenço Marques railway, the 
Convention of 1928 authorized some 250 recruiters to enrol as m a n y as 
80000 Africans a year. T h e average between 1913 and 1930 was 50000 
emigrants per year or a total of 900 000 of w h o m 35 000 died and only 740 000 
returned in satisfactory health. T h e hiring out of manpower thus consti-
tuted, with the transit of goods, the chief financial resource of the colony 
(two-thirds in I928).2S In addition to the sums received for emigration 
permits, which constituted 9.8% of budgetary receipts in 1928-9 and the 
28% for railway taxes, one should also take into account the return customs 
duties paid (25%), and as part of the revenue collected through the head 
tax, the funds sent to families or brought back into the country.26 
T o a lesser degree, Ruanda-Urundi played an equivalent role for the 
Katanga mines. In 1930, 7300 labourers out of a total population of 350000 
able-bodied adult males resided in the Congo, including more than 4000 
in Katanga.27 Also worthy of mention was the widespread phenomenon 
of voluntary emigration due to natural calamities. S o m e 25 000 Ruandese 
emigrated to Uganda during the great famile of 1928-9. There was also 
the flight from forced labour comparable to that resorted to by the Mossi 
of Upper Volta, w h o found refuge in the Gold Coast. 
All the colonial powers felt, at approximately the same time, the need 
for labour regulations. These had previously been purely formal, but their 
enforcement became essential as wage labour proliferated.28 T h e regula-
tions, which were similar everywhere, fixed the legal duration of the 
contract at three years m a x i m u m in the Congo and two years in the French 
and Portuguese colonies. However, the registration (subject to tax) of the 
contract in the labourer's 'livret' was not compulsory everywhere. Although 
from 1922 the administration of the French federations established an 
24. E . B ö h m , 1938, p. 124; J. Duffy, 1962, p. 185. 
25. E . B ö h m , 1938. 
26. See tables inj. Cardozo, 1931, p. 29. 
27. P. de Dekker, 1974. 
28. In the Belgian Congo, a Decree of 1910 concerning 'all native workers' of the Congo 
or neighbouring colonies, employed by a 'civilized master' or 'subject to personal taxation' 
other than the per capita tax was amended in 1922. In A E F , a Decree of 1902 was resumed 
from 1907 to 1911, and completely revised in 1922, although it was not until 1935 that 
the first general Decree specifying how it was to be implemented was promulgated. In 
A O F , the first general Decree regrouping the local measures was promulgated only in 1928. 
In the Portuguese colonies, a Labour code of 1911 was revised in 1926, and again in 1928 
(Salazar Code). H . Leonard, 1934. 
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authorized ' m i n i m u m wage', there was no inspection, and abuses flour-
ished. It was not unusual for an African believing he had signed up for 
a year to find himself expatriated for two years or more; his wages were 
paid in goods not money, and the ration was often not what was originally 
agreed upon. Finally, very heavy fines were imposed for the least dis-
obedience. Furthermore, in the n a m e of the proclaimed freedom of labour, 
the hiring of day-labourers whose employment was not subject to any form 
of control remained prevalent for a long time. 
T h e manpower crisis, particularly acute in the mines and on railway 
projects, caused a change of policy in the Belgian Congo. Until the 1920s, 
the pattern remained that of the South African mines, in which unskilled 
labour, recruited under short-term contracts of 6-9 months, was replaced 
as it was used up. Following an investigation in 1922, the U M H K under-
took its reforms. T h e rapid increase in production - which doubled in 
the following two years - entailed a parallel increase in African personnel 
from 7500 to 14000. This was the origin of the famous Belgian 'paternal-
ism'. T h e reorganization of the compounds was undertaken in 1926; within 
a year the cost of labour had increased by 40%, although wages no longer 
represented more than one fifth of the budget. In 1930, for the first time, 
the birth rate exceeded the death rate in the U M H K camps, which at the 
time offered the least unfavourable working conditions in Central Africa.29 
T h e success of the policy of stabilizing manpower in return for regularity 
of employment after 1928, and of providing leadership in all sectors of 
life (leisure activities, religion, schooling, etc.), was evident when, as a 
result of the depression, workers were retrenched from 16000 to only 5000 
between 1930 and 1932. This provoked successive revolts of the Northern 
Rhodesians against the repatriation policy, a series of riots by the labourers 
living outside the compounds, and the revolt of m e n from Ruanda-Urundi 
in 1932. 
Taxation 
Despite the progress achieved, the undeniable improvement in the economy 
had little effect on the living standards of Africans. T o be sure, wage-
earning became standard practice; the number of workers in the Congo 
increased tenfold within a decade, from 47000 in 1917 to 427000 in 1927, 
a figure only exceeded in 1937 after the great depression had waned. 3 0 
However, this represented only a moderate percentage of the population: 
less than 20% of the 'able-bodied adult males' in the Congo of w h o m 2 % 
in any case were Ruandese,31 and, as late as 1950, still only 2 % of the 
total population in French Africa.32 
29. B . Fetter, 1976, p. 113. 
30. Annual Reports on the administration of the Belgian Congo, 1919-1939. 
31. 7300 workers out of 350000 able-bodied adult males. P. de Dekker, 1974. 
32. T . Hodgkin, 1956, p. 118. 
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Despite the rising curve of employment, wages failed to keep pace. For, 
unlike the situation of Great Britain which remained faithful to its de-
flationary policy, the inflation of the 1920s was the dominant financial 
phenomenon in other European countries. B y 1926, the French franc had 
lost four-fifths of its pre-war value and the Belgian franc a little more 
(parity of B.frs 100 for F.frs 87.60 in 1926, stabilized the following year 
at about B.frs 100 F.frs 71), to say nothing of the galloping inflation of 
the Portuguese escudo. Because of the metropolitan inflation which was 
felt in Africa through the rising cost of imported goods at a time when 
no change occurred in the prices paid for export produce, African real 
wages tended to fall. 
T h e only effort that met with any success was the gradual substitution 
of payment in cash for payment in kind— imposed in the Belgian Congo 
from 1916 onwards and more slowly adopted in A E F . However, this led 
to cash payment of the tax, which was required of all able-bodied adults 
and which was from the beginning of the century considered to be the 
sign of the country's accession to a monetary economy and, by the same 
token, as the condition for its development. 
This problem of taxation weighed more and more heavily on the pur-
chasing power of Africans caught up in the cycle of colonial production. 
T h e completion of colonial penetration and the progress in administration, 
strengthened after the war, m a d e it increasingly difficult for the populations 
to retaliate by fleeing or rebelling. Once they became more regular, tax 
receipts finally began to perform their functions as the chief source of 
finance for expansion. This, in turn, led, between the two wars, to a more 
rapid increase in the rate of the head tax than in pay for the workers. 
T h e income of the peasants remained, in fact, ridiculously low, especially 
a m o n g those planting compulsory crops. Between 1928 and 1932, in the 
Belgian Congo, 700 000 cotton-planters each earned an average of B.frs 165 
a year; rice-growers did only a little better (B.frs 170).33 Results were 
even worse in A E F . By cultivating 20 acres of cotton a year (on the basis 
of the 200 days required by law), the Ubangi peasant earned in the same 
period only from F.frs 9.20 to F.frs 40, or hardly more than the amount 
of the tax.34 
Although less beggarly, the remuneration of wage-earners hardly kept 
pace with inflation, although it tended to progress more rapidly in the 
zones where a monetary economy prevailed. T h e average monthly wage 
fell in the Middle Congo from B.frs 25.45 m I Q I 2 _ admittedly a peak 
year (B.frs 19.30 in 1913) - to B.frs 19.35 in 1920, and rose to about 
B.frs 30 only in i929.3S It was higher in the Gabonese forestry zones 
33. M . Merlier, 1962, pp. 83-4. 
34. San Marco, 1940. 
35. Annual Reports, Moyen-Congo, Archives A E F , Aix-en-Provence, Dossier 4(2)D. 
Cf. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972, pp. 490-2. 
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(B.frs 40-50), where it was approximately equal to the average for the 
Belgian Congo (B.frs 60 per m o n t h ) . 3 6 
At best, in the most productive areas, there was a parallel rise in taxation, 
as for instance in G a b o n , where the amount of work needed to pay the 
tax even tended to decrease throughout the decade - from 23 days just 
after the war to 18 days on the eve of the depression. By and large, 
nevertheless, the tax burden grew heavier, especially for the peasants and 
above all during the depression with the dismissal of workers and the 
collapse of the prices for tropical goods. In general, the burden of direct 
taxation on the African was far higher than his wages, and led him into 
debt and destitution - all the more so since taxes rose just at the m o m e n t 
w h e n prices fell to their lowest level and dragged peasants' wages d o w n 
with them. Cases studied in Guinea or the Ivory Coast show that during 
these hard years, the peasant had to pay more than he received, at least 
in the framework of the money economy. Despite the concurrent increase 
in speculative crops, all the evidence shows that poverty was acute. Peasants 
dipped into their meagre resources, gave up the last bits of silver they 
had saved with immense difficulty, and sold even their scanty family 
possessions. 
Although comparisons between the territories with which w e are con-
cerned are difficult, certain similarities and certain differences in their 
evolution can be discerned. It was in the Portuguese colonies that the 
burden of the head tax remained consistently heaviest, since it corresponded 
officially to three months' labour, the tax being payable in labour. T h e 
corresponding daily wage was estimated as being 1 to 1.5% of its total. 
T h e head tax was also proportionately high in A O F . T h e average amount 
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— 144 27 
115 181 38 
109 168 37 
82 154 41 
91 153 
Source: Rapports annuels sur l'administration de la colonie du Congo belge, 1932 à 1938. Annuaires 
statistiques de F AOF, Vols. I, II, III, 1932-8, and of A E F , Vol. I, 1936-51. 
36. In 1927, for example: B.frs 227 million for 315000 workers, i.e. B.frs 720 a year 
or B.frs 60 a month (60 B.frs 1927 = 42.50 F.frs). In 1924, the U M H K paid between 
B.frs 30 and B.frs 45 for 30 days of effective work. B . Fetter, 1976. 
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FIG. 15.3 Approximate evaluation of African monetary possibilities in French Guinea, 
IQ28-38 (after M . Trentadue, 1976) 
of the direct tax collected in 1915 per inhabitant was F.frs 2 in A O F , 
F.frs 1.55 in A E F , and B.frs 1.35 in the Belgian Congo. T h e more the 
country was obliged to live off its o w n resources, the heavier was the tax. 
A s a general rule, the colonial budgets were all funded in the same way: 
25% from customs revenues and 25% from the head tax.37 T h e tragedy 
was that, with the depression, the authorities tried to have the head tax 
37. In A O F nearly half (43-45%) of the budget was funded, from 1928 to 1935, by the 
capitation tax plus customs duties. A third came from other taxation, especially indirect 
taxes (15-20%) — which also fell largely on the indigenous population (land tax; taxes on 
cattle; consumer and circulation taxes) and on the railways ( 13-16%) - the latter furthermore 
constantly showing a deficit. T h e remainder (only 21-24%, a percentage similar to that 
in the Belgian Congo) came from various public or private concerns (state property, 
licences, incomes, industrial plants). Annuaires Statistiques cited in source to Table 15.9. 
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make up the deficit in customs receipts, which everywhere had fallen to 
less than 20% in 1932. Nevertheless, once more, the Congolese taxes were 
the least oppressive; although, in 1931, the average tax per inhabitant was 
almost on a par with that levied by the French authorities (the average 
per inhabitant: F.frs 12.48 in A O F and F.frs 11 in A E F , as against B.frs 
11.50 in the Congo or F.frs 8.30), the decrease during the depression was 
greater. T h e total receipts from the head tax in the Belgian Congo fell by 
29%, as against 15% in A O F between 1931 and 1934, not to mention 
A E F , where it increased by 43% between 1929 and 1934. 
T h e fact is that in French Africa, despite the reductions sometimes 
dramatically requested by the local administrators during the depression, 
lack of support from France obliged them to 'start d o w n the path [of 
reductions] only with the greatest caution'.38 In the Congo, on the other 
hand, if the situation, on the whole, was worse by the end of the period, 
the tax still remained less than a month's wages. Moreover, the work-time 
required in addition to cover basic needs (expressed by the purchase of 
kitenge or printed cloth), which had risen in some cases (for example in 
Kasai) to nearly five months, had on the whole declined since 1920, if not 
since before the war. However, it later rose to barely one month and a half. 
T A B L E 15.10 Value of annual head tax in 3 rural regions, in relation to monthly wage (total 
monthly wage: 1Q12-33 = 100) 
Tax Tax + kitenge 
IÇI2 IQ20 IQ24 IÇ28 IÇ33 IÇI2 IQ20 1Ç24 IÇ28 IQ33 
Lower and 
Middle 
Congo 65 50 36 31 78 106 175 198 119 138 
Kasai 75 37 41 22 59 175 482 291 143 135 
Source: J. P. Peemans, 1968, p. 361. In A O F , on the other hand, the S C O A estimated that as late 
as 1940 taxes took half the yearly earning of the groundnut farmer. Report appended to the 
balance-sheet, Archives of the Company. 
Here w e find - although still in the embryonic stage - the effects of 
an earlier investment policy, which was to result in a more dynamic system 
of production, or one which, at least, tended to differ increasingly from 
the retarded type of exploitation in the French Sahel zone. For lack of 
any profitable produce, the Africans in this zone were still being squeezed 
in an attempt to avoid economic collapse. 
T h e crises and their repercussions 
T h e situation of the Africans, always precarious, became in 1930 as tragic 
as it had been at the beginning of the period. 
38. Circular N o . 68 from the Commission of the Republic in Cameroon, 19 September 
1932, Archives Yaounde, A P A - 1 0 8 9 5 / A . 
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Production 
Despite the global scale of the hostilities, the First World W a r brought 
about an occasionally spectacular rise in production. With a few exceptions 
(as in the case of Gabon's okoume timber trade, wholly dependent upon 
the G e r m a n market, which closed abruptly), the exports and profits of the 
expatriate firms showed an appreciable rise. T h e fact is that the 'war 
effort' was particularly severe in French-speaking Africa; a programme 
for 'intensifying production' was launched in 1915, and expanded in 1916-
17.39 W o r k camps were organized for the cultivation and harvesting of 
so-called strategic products (rubber, oil-yielding crops, timber, etc.). Most 
important of all, the French government temporarily guaranteed their 
purchase; it accordingly requisitioned 140000 tonnes of oilseeds in 1918, 
and almost 3 million tonnes in 1919. T h e production of certain commodities 
such as castor-oil and rubber, which then enjoyed a b o o m , collapsed once 
and for all w h e n the First World W a r ended and the state ceased to buy 
them. O n the whole, however, the war m a d e clear the need to organize 
production (this was the role played by the Colonial Economic Conference 
in 1917) and served to launch the first large-scale speculative enterprise 
- cotton in Oubangui-Chari (now Central African Republic), timber in 
G a b o n and Ivory Coast — in the early 1920s, after the violent but brief 
crisis of 1921-2. 
It was for quite opposite reasons that the 1930 crisis, which triggered 
off the collapse in prices, led to a radical rethinking of production objectives 
and techniques, at least in the territories under French authority whose 
economy had up to then been an économie de traite. 
T h e crisis was not one of overproduction. T h e extremely low yield 
meant that the products in question represented only a minimal proportion 
of international trade (for example, Senegal's groundnut exports repre-
sented 50% of the income of A O F , but only 5% of world production), 
and the protection of the colonial powers ensured rapid disposal thanks 
to a policy (albeit limited) of subsidies. These subsidies included export 
bonuses in A O F paid to expatriate firms to compensate for the fall in 
prices, and the underwriting of the national debt in A E F which had been 
driven to the verge of bankruptcy by the deficit in customs revenues. 
Burdened by taxes which they were no longer able to meet (a high rate 
of taxation being maintained despite the collapse in prices and wages), 
Africans reacted to the fall in their incomes by stepping up production. 
A s w e have seen, it was at the height of the crisis that tropical plantation 
crops (coffee, cocoa, bananas, cotton) enjoyed a b o o m due solely to the 
production of small-scale indigenous planters. Despite the extremely low 
prices, the overall drop in export tonnage, which had been substantial in 
1932, was rapidly reversed. T h e average of the inter-war years was exceeded 
for the first time in 1931, then again, definitively, from 1934. This was 
39. Cf. circular of 13 February 1915, A E F cited in C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972, p. 492. 
With regard to A O F , see M . Michel, 1982. 
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of course the consequence of the effort begun in the 1924-8 b o o m years, 
as well as of the policy of developing the transport infrastructure which 
had been vigorously pursued during the crisis from the loans provided to 
the French colonies in 1913. 
However, as the allocation of these funds coincided with the period of 
deepest depression, it served essentially not to promote the expansion of 
the programmes but rather to correct - albeit only very partially - domestic 
deficit, particularly in Cameroon (where the work camps were dis-
continued) and in A O F , where more than half the operations continued 
to be financed by the federation's o w n , extremely reduced, resources. 
Moreover, this massive loan policy led to a sharp rise in the internal debt 
at the very m o m e n t when, due to the shortfall in customs revenues, the 
receipts of colonial budgets collapsed. 
T h u s , the manifest economic transformation brought about during the 
period was achieved and paid for by the peasantry, since the increase in 
the tax burden upon the producer occurred at the very m o m e n t w h e n , as 
prices reached their lowest levels, the wages of rural workers declined 
correspondingly. Admittedly, the increase in tax receipts and the develop-
ment of the wage-earning sector of the farming population, which gradually 
replaced forced labour, must be related to the expansion in speculative 
crop-farming. However, such farming served essentially to trigger off an 
incipient process of social differentiation through the emergence of a class 
of indigenous 'new rich', small-scale landowners and commercial entre-
preneurs w h o m a d e their money by exploiting the destitution and indebted-
ness of the majority. For example, it is significant that, throughout the 
years of crisis, savings rose steadily in African countries, whether measured 
in terms of the number of savings accounts or the value of deposits. This 
growth in savings was undoubtedly brought about by the 'comprador' 
lower middle classes, w h o were quick to understand, thanks to relatively 
favourable terms of trade, that their status depended on their quickly 
adopting the rules of the capitalist game. 
O n the other hand, for the mass of the poor small peasants, poverty 
appeared to be at its worst. T h e Africans dug into their meagre reserves, 
mortgaged their land and became share-croppers on the two-thirds and 
three-quarters system (the abusa of the Ivory Coast cocoa plantation area). 
There was no longer even any need to constrain them by strict compulsory 
work legislation. F r o m 1931 onwards the shortage of money (whose use 
could no longer be avoided) became acute; and it was less and less possible 
for them to fall back on the traditional life of subsistence food cropping, 
which no longer even ensured survival. Strictly speaking, peasants no 
longer had the choice.40 
40. For French Equatorial Africa see G . G . Reste, Rapport économique au Min. des Col., 
Brazzaville, 24 June 1937, Archives Nationales, Section d'Outre-Mer, Paris ( A N S O M ) , 
Fonds Guerut, 827. For A O F , see Report by E . Giscard d'Estaing to the M i n . Col. on 
his mission to French West Africa, 1931-2, A N S O M , Affaires politiques, 539. Cf. 
C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1977 and (ed.) 1976. 
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Food shortage, famine and epidemic 
A feature of the whole of this period was the acuteness of the food supply 
crises. 
T h e war economy of the years 1915-18 had some very serious implica-
tions. T h e most harmful step was the requisitioning of foodstuffs for the 
h o m e country just when the troops (only 10 000 m e n in A E F , but a little 
over 160000 in A O F ) were draining the countryside. 
In Gabon, only a quarter of the compulsorily produced crops were left 
for local consumption. Even manioc (cassava) was exported from the 
Middle Congo and Oubangui-Chari: 210 tonnes in 1915 and 157 tonnes 
in 1917.41 In A O F as a consequence of the decision to export local staple 
crops, the authorities emptied the reserve granaries which were already 
suffering from the succession of two years of semi-drought (1911-12) and 
one year of total aridity (1913). This drought had spread over the entire 
Sudan area, from Senegal to Wadai and Chad. F r o m periodic shortages, 
the situation worsened to a devastating famine which claimed probably 
250000 to 300000 victims,42 alleviated only by the 4000 tonnes of cereals 
that the French Soudan (now Mali) had had neither the means nor the 
time to ship to France.43 
T A B L E 15.11 AOF: exports of requisitioned food products ('000 tonnes) 
Maize 
Millet 






















1. Including wood, cola and gonakié (variety of cola). 
2. Plus beans. 
Source: Annuaire du Gouvernement Général de l'AOF, 1917-21, Paris, 1921, p. 55. 
In A E F where forced sales continued into the following decade in order 
to provision the Congo-Océan railway projects, famine, which had begun 
in 1918, spread to the northern half of the country (Woleu-Ntem) between 
1922 and 1925; it probably reduced the Fang population by half, from 
140000 to 65000 in 1933.44 
T h e weakened populations then fell a prey to epidemics: renewed out-
breaks of smallpox and especially the spread of Spanish influenza imported 
from Europe, from which perhaps one-tenth of the population of A E F 
perished.45 
41. Cf. circular of 13 Feb. 1915, A E F ; C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972, p. 492. 
42. J. Suret-Canale, 1964, pp. 169-72. 
43. H . C . Cosnier, 1921, p. 253. 
44. G . Sautter, 1966, pp. 859, 864, 871. 
45. Huot, Marzin, Ricau, Grosfillez, David, 1921. 
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T h o u g h not always accompanied by such disastrous results, the famine 
problem resulting from food shortages caused by the colonial system was 
a recurrent feature of the period. It recurred, for example, in 1928-9 in 
Ruanda, the 'granary' of the Belgian Congo , following another drought,46 
and was indeed the sign of the fragility of countries exhausted by the 
économie de traite despite the rise in export figures. 
There were situations of severe famine such as that in Niger in 1930, 
of which Zerma-Sonrai still have memories, followed by an invasion of 
locusts. But the colonial system did a great deal to aggravate the famine 
as the reports of the time, which are full of self-criticism, indicate. Exorbi-
tant taxes (increasing in ten years from B.frs 1.25 to B.frs 7) encouraged 
the population to flee to the Gold Coast instead of raising crops. Forced 
labour was increased after 1927 by the installation of the administrative 
services at Niamey and by the extension of the railway. This completely 
disrupted the farm calendar though the precariousness of the rains m a d e 
farming times particularly important. T h e supplies of millet, non-
compulsory, depended entirely on the local chiefs. In 1931, the refusal of 
the administration to lower the head tax, and its insistence on collective 
payment, which forced the peasants to pay also for deserters and for 
deceased people, led to a situation in which, as one report put it, 'entire 
villages vanished . . . and an age group was completely decimated'47 with, 
in some areas, a mortality rate of over 50%. 
Taken all round, however, the catastrophe was less spectacular. T h e 
famines were checked thanks to progress in transport facilities and the 
epidemics were halted by the first health campaign. But the fall in prices 
and loss of employment were everywhere cruelly felt. 'It was in the price 
paid to the producer that the decline m a d e itself most heavily felt. T h e 
purchasing power of the natives was reduced to a greater extent than in 
any of the earlier crises.'48 
It is revealing that, in Francophone Africa, large-scale urban immigration 
began precisely when the great crisis occurred. Notwithstanding the overall 
stagnation in population growth (in A O F 14.4 million inhabitants in 1931, 
as compared with 14.6 million in 1936), the towns and cities began to be 
swollen by the massive influx of destitute peasants, in spite of the fact 
that the urban employment situation was also critical. In 1936, for example, 
there were still no more than 167000 wage-earners in A O F , which was 
hardly more than 1% of the population. Nevertheless, between 1931 and 
1936 the populations of Dakar and Abidjan increased by 71%, while that 
of Conakry doubled. Even more revealing is the case of an impoverished 
little town in the interior like Ouagadougou which, reversing its previous 
46. This famine did not prevent the subsequent rise in exports of manioc, an increase 
from 239 to 2515 tonnes being registered from 1930 to 1934. P. de Dekker, 1974. 
47. Quoted by F. Fuglestad, 1974, p. 25. 
48. Société du Haut-Ogoué, Report to the General Assembly of Stockholders, 1930; 
Archives of the Company. 
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trend, increased its population by one-third over the same period. 
T h e overall stagnation in population growth during this period is parti-
cularly indicative of the prevailing state of poverty. For social expenditure, 
was, by contrast, tending everywhere to rise: the parallel increase in ex-
penditure on health care, and in the n u m b e r of dispensaries and treatment 
facilities tended effectively to curb the traditional scourges (trypanoso-
miasis, venereal diseases, leprosy). B y contrast, populations proved to 
be particularly vulnerable during the taxing period 1931-6 to epidemics 
('sporadic illnesses': influenza, smallpox, etc.). It is extremely tempting 
to relate such increased morbidity to the state of profound distress and 
physical destitution in which a weakened and defenceless population found 
itself.49 
The economic balance sheet 
Because they were held under strict control by the administrative authori-
ties, and because of their very limited participation in social and economic 
changes, the populations, at the end of the period, were in a perilous 
situation, while the system itself was in the throes of change. 
T h e private sector 
T h e period was indeed marked by the rise of powerful firms which had 
only just been founded at the turn of the century. 
T h e Belgian Congo was at the forefront of this development. Just before 
the depression, the country numbered 278 industrial and commercial con-
cerns, and agencies for thirty-six foreign companies - not counting a 
scattering of privately owned local businesses. In all, the number of estab-
lishments had increased by more than a third in three years, rising from 
4500 in 1926 to 6000 in 1929. 
T A B L E 15.12 Belgian companies operating in the Congo, iQ2Q 
Commerce „ . 




Iransport Banking Mining • . . - , forestry, 
























Source: F. Passelecq, 1932, p. 362. 
49. Cf. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, forthcoming. 
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F r o m 1919 to 1930, the amount of capital invested had risen by 1000 
million gold francs, and included 1000 million due to colonial issues. T h e 
government portfolio (estimated at 16000 million gold francs in 1928, of 
which the market value had fallen to 5000 million by September 1930 and 
been brought down to one-third of the assets held by the private sector) was 
then estimated at half the value of the Congolese securities held by private 
individuals. 
But although the sectors covered were already diversified, the chief 
impetus was from mining and railway activities. Four principal companies 
(Société Générale, Empain , Cominière and Banque de Bruxelles), with 
more than 6000 million gold francs invested, accounted for nearly 75% of 
the capital.50 T h e leading company, the Société Générale, was itself 
responsible for half of this, controlling three railway companies, three 
general companies, two banks, twelve mining companies, six plantations, 
three finance companies, eleven industrial and commercial companies and 
one real estate company, that is to say, almost all the mining production 
(copper, diamonds, radium and a good share of the gold), the entire cement 
industry and the most important hydroelectric installations.51 
Its success was linked to the productive level of its mines, chief among 
which were the U M H K (copper), founded in 1906 by an agreement with 
the Comité Spécial du Katanga. T h e Comité itself had taken over from 
the Compagnie du Katanga (1891), which had been entrusted by the Congo 
Free State with the economic management of the area in 1900, and had 
begun operations with the arrival of the railway at Elisabethville (now 
Lubumbashi) in 1910, and Forminière (Kasai Diamonds) whose prospect-
ing operations had started in 1907 and exploitation in 1914. 
It contrasted with the relative inactivity of the other concessionaire 
companies, most of which had not assembled sufficient capital to exploit 
their excessively vast areas. 
This was particularly true52 of A E F , paralysed since 1900 by an un-
fortunate thirty-year concessionary scheme that had sold off the territory 
to some forty enormous monopoly companies, most of which had already 
collapsed by the eve of the First World W a r . S o m e of the few survivors 
had either been converted into strictly commercial companies such as the 
Société du Haut-Ogooué, in the eastern half of Gabon , the Compagnie 
Propriétaire du Kouilou Niara bought out by Lever Brothers in 1911; or 
into companies vaguely exploiting palm plantations that remained in a 
rudimentary state such as the Compagnie Française du Haut et du Bas-
Congo. Others served to prolong belatedly an absurd regime of coercion 
and poverty in products that were unprofitable or even already condemned 
such as the Compagnie Forestière Sangha-Oubangui, with a capital of 
50. S . H . Frankel, 1938, p. 292. 
51. In addition, it had a large share in seven other companies, and was represented on 
the board of directors of about fifteen more, ibid., p. 294. 
52. Cf. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972. 
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B.frs 12 million for a monopoly covering 17 million ha which had regrouped 
eleven former concessionaire companies of the Middle Congo and 
Oubangui-Chari, and imposed its monopoly over wild rubber harvesting 
until 1935. O n the other hand, the exploitation of Oubangui diamonds, 
discovered in 1913, was not begun until the 1930s. T h e only b o o m had been 
that in G a b o n of okoume wood, a raw material used in the plywood 
industry, which emerged during the First World W a r . 
O n the eve of the depression, the combined capital of 107 firms totalled 
a nominal B.frs 309 million which - in gold francs - had scarcely doubled 
since 1913, when private shareholder capital reached B.frs 70 million. 
T h e dominant role in capital investment was still played by the state -
the sign of a country considered to be poor, where the private sector had 
long abandoned to the public authorities the burden of the enormous 
outlays for equipment. 
It was a far cry from the success of a firm like Lever Brothers which, 
starting with the first palm oil purchased in the Belgian Congo (based on 
a concession of 750000 ha from the S E D E C - Société des Huileries 
du Congo Belge, 1911), soon extended its oil plantation empire to the 
whole of West Africa (Gabon/Middle Congo, Nigeria, Cameroon). Uni-
lever, finally founded in 1928 by the merging of the British firm with the 
German-Dutch margarine trust, developed, alongside the English empire 
of the United Africa C o m p a n y , a whole series of French subsidiaries 
(Niger Français, Nosoco in Senegal, Compagnie Française de Côte d'Ivoire, 
etc.) which grew bigger around the time of the Second World W a r . 5 3 
A O F remained, in effect, the domain of commercial firms founded on 
agriculture for export. Even in this field, the lag was enormous compared 
with the Belgian Congo. 
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Source: J. Dresch, 1952, pp. 232-41, based on the investigation carried out by the Ministry of Colonies 
in 1943, A N S O M , Affaires Economiques series, carton 52. 
In 1938, the French federations numbered only some fifty commercial 
firms whose registered capital barely exceeded F.frs 600 million.54 At the 
time, ten of them listed a capital of more than F.frs 20 million, among 
which only two accounted for a third of the whole: the Société Commerciale 
de l'Ouest-Africain ( S C O A ) founded in 1906 with a capital of F.frs 125 
million, and the Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale ( C F A O ) 
53. M . Sherril, 1973, p. 48. 
54. M . Tupinier, 1940. 
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founded since 1887, with F.frs 75 million.ss But their investments, 
negligible before the war, scarcely exceeded an average of 10-20 million 
gold francs during the best years, even though at the end of the period 
they represented 10% of the total investment in French Africa.56 
T h e reason was that trading, which consisted in collecting and routeing 
to the ports the products of the country, exported unprocessed or in a 
semi-refined state, and in distributing in exchange imported manufactured 
commodities consisting chiefly of consumer goods, required but little 
capital. Certainly the 1920s were the heyday of the économie de traite, and 
inflation was a source of major profit: from 1913 to 1920, the foreign trade 
of A O F rose from F.frs 277 to F.frs 1143 million. In five years the value of 
British cotton goods exported to Africa quadrupled and, taking into account 
the stability of the pound, increased by 800% in relation to French prices 
in 1914. Within a few years, S C O A and C F A O had spread over all of 
West Africa, and by 1924 they had more or less reached their final form 
( S C O A : 140 agencies, 145 in 1930, 250 in 1940; C F A O : 141 agencies, 191 
in 1930, 411 in 1939). But they also operated in the British territories, 
where commerce was more active: oil palm products and tin from Nigeria 
for C F A O , and cocoa from the Gold Coast for S C O A which was soon to 
account for a third of that company's turnover. 
T h e depression was felt severely, for the basis of prosperity was largely 
speculative and ill-equipped to resist the collapse of commodity prices 
since the diversification of activities had scarcely begun, industrialization 
was as yet virtually non-existent, and since the traditional trading economy 
still constituted the bulk of A O F activities. 
A s for the Portuguese colonies, they had as yet scarcely managed to 
choose between these various approaches. Mozambique found herself in 
a general state of mediocrity; she was still largely under the concessionaire 
regime in which, alongside the relatively efficient pillage by the M o z a m -
bique C o m p a n y , or the rather good lands held as a sub-concession by the 
Zambezi C o m p a n y , the Niassa C o m p a n y had lost its monopoly in 1929, 
owing to its disastrous record.57 Mozambique stood up to the depression 
very badly as is evident from the fact that the value of exports fell by half 
between 1929 and 1933. In Angola, the first attempt at mining operations 
was that of the Diamang group with Belgian and British capital. Since 
1920, it had figured as the chief financial support of the colony, despite 
its still relatively limited contribution of £600000 sterling in 1929, or a 
quarter of the value of Angolan exports. Exempted from taxes and customs 
duties, the company, which had labour and the market at its exclusive 
disposal, was already forging its monopolistic empire. 
55. In 1945, stock investments in the two firms represented 84% of the capital of the 
A O F commercial enterprises quoted on the French Stock Exchange, and 52% of that of 
all A O F enterprises. P. Valdant, 1946. 
56. O n the history of the two firms see C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1975. 
57. E . B ö h m , 1938, p. 155. 
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Capital equipment and production 
With respect to capital equipment and production, the economic balance 
sheet still remained poor at the end of the period. T h e main achievement 
had been the railways; everywhere the state had replaced or largely financed 
the former private companies. T h e Belgian Congo network had expanded 
considerably. T h e investments in this field rose from 480 million gold 
francs in 1920 to 535 million in 1935 and the length of permanent way 
from 1940 k m to 2410 k m . In all, by 1934, the government had guaranteed 
railway capital to the amount of 2271 million gold francs. T h e correspond-
ing charge amounted in 1934 to 103 million gold francs.58 T h e programme 
had consisted essentially in making comprehensive the network around the 
mines, by linking Katanga to the Rhodesian system in 1918, to the Lower 
Congo in 1928 and towards Benguela after 1930. But the financial balance 
remained catastrophic (with an average yearly revenue of around 1%), 
except in the case of the Katanga railway, 85% of whose tonnage was in 
copper. T h e fact was that the railway was looked upon as a good speculation 
rather than as a public service. T h e goal was less a rise in traffic than a rise in 
profits, through exploitation of the excessively high rates, which were 
protected by the prohibition of rail/road competition,59 which impeded 
production, particularly during the period w h e n prices slumped. This was 
obviously to the advantage of the Portuguese colonies which, with 2348 k m 
of railway in Angola and 1936 k m in Mozambique by 1930, drew the greater 
part of their resources from their transit function, amounting to 80% of the 
total foreign commerce of M o z a m b i q u e . 6 0 
In A E F the grandiose railway projects launched in 1913 including the 
Gabonese railway and the C o n g o - C h a d link-up61 finally resulted in the 
laborious construction, at great cost in m e n and money , of the C o n g o -
Océan line (less than 500 k m , 1922-34). T h e latter opened up the territory 
previously dependent on the Belgian Congo. O n the other hand, A O F , 
which suffered from the poverty of its mineral resources, carried out only 
a few extension projects on a haphazard network of older sections of railway 
perpendicular to the coast and indicative of the archaic, fragmentary and 
extraverted character of the colony's exploitation. These extensions 
amounted to 550 k m from 1921 to 1934, out of a total in operation of 
more than 3500 k m . 
58. S. H . Frankel, 1938, pp. 407, 414. 
59. Each of the sectors enjoyed a monopoly. Cf. Monopole des transports automobiles 
delimite entre 1Ç28 et 1934, Report N o . 108 to the Belgian Senate, 1935, quoted by H . S. 
Frankel, 1938, pp. 409-11. The policy was similar to that of the British territories in 
which, as for example in the Gold Coast, the government at the same period forbade 
planters to ship their cocoa by truck, in order to guarantee the profits of the railway. 
G . B . Kay (ed.), 1972, p. 431. 
60. According to the tables in S. H . Frankel, 1938, p. 369. 
61. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972, p. 286. 
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M o r e important as an innovation was the construction, in savanna 
country, of a road network which, by putting an end to the ravages of 
h u m a n porterage, transformed the conditions governing the collection and 
distribution of products. T h e beginning of the construction of the Oubangui 
network ( A E F ) dated from the war and, by 1926, 4200 k m had been 
completed. However, only a few vehicles were seen using it and most of 
them were exclusively commercial. There were less than 1000 vehicles in 
1930,1500 in 1931 and only 2850 in 1945, 600 of which were for tourism.62 
A O F , especially, made up for its railway deficiencies with roads. B y 
1937, 27000 k m were open to 17229 vehicles, including nearly 10 000 
trucks and light trucks. Between 1926 and 1934 highway projects and port 
improvements absorbed almost as m u c h capital as the railways, amounting 
to F.frs 475 million as against F.frs 520 million.63 
Nevertheless, the infrastructure provided hardly had time to affect the 
volume of exports before the onset of the depression. T o be sure, a certain 
number of territories offered a wide range of products: cotton, coffee, 
sugar cane, sisal and maize in Angola; coconuts, groundnuts and rice in 
Mozambique; wood in Gabon and the Ivory Coast; and bananas in Guinea. 
But exports continued to be based almost exclusively on minerals and 
oil-yielding plants. F e w territories were as favourably situated as the 
Belgian Congo, whose improvement was based, at best, on two or three 
groups of products which, at least, were already partially processed. These 
were vegetable oil whose production increased from 2500 tonnes in 1914 
to 9000 in 1921 and 65000 in 1930; and copper, which tripled between 
1922 and 1931, from 43000 to 120000 tonnes before falling again the 
following year to 54000 tonnes, as a result of a reduction in production 
decided upon by international agreements. 
T A B L E 15.14 Belgian Congo: value of exports (expressed as percentage) 
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Source: S. H . Frankel, 1938, pp. 289-301. 
Certainly, Angola seemed almost as well endowed potentially. However, 
Portuguese negligence left its haphazard agricultural production to the 
risks of the weather and of speculation, which led to its stagnation for ten 
years.64 
As for A E F , it was just emerging from the Gabonese forestry monopoly, 
62. ibid., p. 284. 
63. Annuaires statistiques de l'AOF, op. cit. in source to Table 15.9. 
64. S. H . Frankel, 1938, pp. 37i~3-
379 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880—igjs 
which accounted for a little more than 400000 tonnes of its exports in 
1930. Although the tonnage exported from Cameroon had tripled since 
1923 (from 48000 to 124000 tonnes), exploitation of the country was barely 
getting under way by 1934 with F.frs 73 million in exports, of which 
nearly 60% consisted of cocoa and oil palm products. Finally, A O F , despite 
the slow emergence of a few n e w products, still depended for more than 
half its exports on Senegalese groundnuts, almost all of them leaving the 
country unprocessed. 








































































Source: 'L'évolution des exportations de l 'AOF', op. cit. in source to Table 15.8. 
Conclusion 
In short, the economic balance sheet at the end of the inter-war period 
was a negative one, both from the colonizers' standpoint — with production 
slumping and insufficiently diversified - and from the African angle -
with the populations poverty-stricken and distraught. Nevertheless, despite 
appearances, the available infrastructure and production facilities had 
profoundly altered the structure of the economy. In this respect, the crisis 
of 1930 drew attention to the need for a concerted policy directed by the 
state. It heralded the emergence of colonial planning, in which the inter-
national division of labour served to justify the organization of specialized, 
intensified production zones. In short, state capitalism as conceived by 
the industrial colonial powers (particularly France) was aimed a integrating 
the colonial world, which till then had remained relatively on the periphery, 
into the global system of the production and distribution of goods. 
A further feature of the period was the reversal of the population trend. 
In the case of the French-speaking territories at least, it would appear 
that population decline was halted in the mid-i920s. T h e war had revealed 
both the reservoir of h u m a n resources that Africa represented and the 
dangers which threatened it, at the very time when the 'development' of 
the territories was generating an ever greater demand for labour. 
Admittedly, by the end of the 1930s the population explosion had not yet 
begun. T h e resumption of population growth none the less helped to speed 
up the process of recovery. Indeed, colonial exploitation soon resumed 
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with renewed vigour, with the populations, by then on the way to becoming 
integrated into the modern economy, preparing to act otherwise than as 
passive or rebellious instruments of colonial law. Certainly Portuguese 
colonies, where Great Britain or the Union of South Africa were taking 
over capitalist development, remained wretchedly poor. Belgian paternal-
ism was always ready to invest, but accompanied this with a systematic 
rejection of internal advancement for the Africans. France, for its part, 
had finally awoken to the need to contribute on a massive scale to investment 
in production, even if such investment did not bring immediate returns. 
As early as 1936, it fell to the Popular Front government to put forward 
a coherent colonial programme that was both modernist and reformist. 
Even though lack of funds prevented it from going very far in this direction, 
it introduced into the French federations the very first reforms that were 
finally to permit the formation of African trade unions and political parties. 
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B y the second decade of the present century the British had firmly estab-
lished themselves in m a n y parts of tropical Africa including Nigeria, Gold 
Coast (now Ghana) , T h e Gambia , Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanganyika (now 
Tanzania), Nyasaland (now Malawi), Uganda, Northern Rhodesia (now 
Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa (see Fig. 
2.1) and the colonial economies were clearly taking shape. This chapter 
seeks to examine the nature and major characteristic of these economies. 
T h e British, like other colonizers, did not develop a universal theory 
of colonialism which could embrace all aspects of life in all colonies. N o r 
did they develop anything near a universal practice of colonialism. Indeed 
this was impossible as colonialism was imposed on peoples with extremely 
diverse cultures and backgrounds, and living in widely differing environ-
ments. M u c h was left to the administrators to deal with situations depend-
ing on the local conditions. Even in the absence of a clear theory, however, 
a critical examination of colonial relations brings to light some fundamental 
assumptions which seem to have acted as guidelines for both the framers 
and implementers of colonial economic policies. First, the colonies were 
expected to provide raw materials (agricultural products and minerals) to 
feed the machines of the industrial imperial power. Second, the colonies 
had to import manufactured goods from the imperial power. These two 
assumptions divided the empire into two distinct economic camps - the 
colonies and the metropolis. Significantly there was very little reciprocity 
in the relationship. While in most cases the colonies had an obligation to 
export to Britain before they could consider any other buyer, even if such 
a buyer would pay higher prices, Britain had no obligation to import 
exclusively from any of her colonies. She operated through rational econo-
mic choices and bought from whoever sold at low prices. T h e colonized 
people were also at a disadvantage in the import trade. In some cases they 
had to buy expensive British manufactures as the colonial state apparatus, 
under pressure from Britain, raised customs duties for non-British goods. 
Third, the colonies had to be self-supporting. T h e colonized peoples had 
to raise revenue for the general administration and for whatever limited 
development projects that were undertaken. 
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All these guiding principles were m a d e clear, explicitly or implicitly, to 
the colonial administrators. But there was an equally important assumption 
which seems to have been confused by some colonial administrators and 
other apologists of colonialism and this is the fact that the British, like 
other colonizers, went out to the colonies primarily, if not exclusively, to 
enrich themselves and promote their o w n interests. T h e development of 
the colonized was none of their business. W h e r e there was 'development' 
in the colonies, it was by and large a by-product of activities intended to 
promote the interests of the colonizers. It would be meaningless to imagine 
the colonial state apparatus making important policy decisions without 
taking into account the interests of the unofficial representatives of 
imperialism. These unofficial agents operated especially through c o m -
mercial firms, mining firms and banks. They represented group interests 
in the colonial legislatures and different committees, or acted as pressure 
groups. In the absence of well-organized African representation, as was 
the case in most colonies, white settlers and representatives of expatriate 
companies were able to obtain m a n y concessions from the colonial govern-
ments at the expense of the local populations. Colonial policy and practice, 
in other words, were shaped by both political and economic determinants. 
A s a matter of fact, in m a n y cases, the unofficial elements affected the 
local population more directly than the administration did. They bought 
and collected agricultural products from the former and sold imported 
goods to them. T h e y also employed indigenous labour. In both cases, 
there was very little government interference. Evidently the prices of 
exports and imports and the level of wages affected the people's day-to-day 
life more than the district commissioner's annual tax-collecting visit to 
the rural areas. Such a state of affairs was in no way a peculiarity of a 
few colonies. It was the normal reality of colonial economic relations. A n d 
since such relations are predominantly economic, colonial practice was 
conditioned by economic laws.1 
Right from the early days of British effective occupation of Africa, the 
British government recognized the potential and importance of the econo-
mic forces of their n e w colonies in the promotion of British interests 
overseas. In 1895 the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, revealed this aware-
ness to Parliament quite clearly: 
It is our business in all these n e w countries to m a k e smooth the path for 
British commerce, British enterprise, the application of British capital, 
at a time w h e n other paths, other outlets for the commercial energies 
of our race are being gradually closed by the commercial principles 
which are gaining more and m o r e adhesion . . . 
In a few years it will be our people that will be masters, it will be our 
commerce that will prevail, it will be our capital that will rule . . . 
M y Lords, this is a tremendous power, but it requires one condition. 
1. J. S. Furnivall, 1948, p. 8. 
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Y o u must enable it to get to the country where its work is to be 
done. Y o u must open the path.2 
Indeed, the path was open, and each colonial state apparatus created 
and maintained effective conditions for the 'orderly' running of economic 
activities in the colony. These included the maintenance of'law and order' 
which facilitated effective exploitation of colonial resources, both h u m a n 
and material. 
Ownership of the means of production 
T h e basic and almost only means of production in the British dependencies 
in the period up to 1935 was land. British attitudes and policies towards 
land varied from region to region, and even, in each region, from colony 
to colony. It can be stated in general terms, however, that whereas Africans 
remained in practice in control of their lands in British West Africa, m a n y 
of them were deprived of theirs in British East and Central Africa. There 
were, however, some important variations from colony to colony in each 
region. 
In Uganda and to a lesser extent Tanganyika, most of the fertile land 
was owned by the indigenous population, the Africans. With a few ex-
ceptions, for example Buganda in Uganda, the Bukoba and Kilimanjaro 
areas in Tanganyika and Gikuyuland in Kenya, land did not acquire market 
value on a large scale, and it was held communally. Every m e m b e r of the 
community had the right to land. In most cases it was labour, and not 
land, which was the scarcer means of production. 
Foreigners, mostly British, secured and held concessions on land with 
mineral and timber resources, but such arrangements had little adverse 
effect on the local agricultural communities. In some cases, however, 
serious hardships were faced where mineral resources were located on rich 
arable land. With almost no exception, mineral wealth belonged to the 
British Crown or its agents and was disposed of in ways decided by the 
official and unofficial agents of imperialism. 
In Kenya and Central Africa, as was the case in Tanganyika under the 
Germans, Africans owned some land, but substantial portions of the most 
fertile arable land were alienated for European settlers. T h e process of 
land alienation and its political and economic repercussions in Kenya and 
Southern Rhodesia have been well documented by M . P . K . Sorrenson3 
and Giovanni Arrighi.4 It has been argued that British perception of 
economic activity in Kenya at the beginning of the twentieth century 
led them to look for economic agents from outside. Contrary to well-
developed peasant agriculture found in Uganda (especially in Buganda) 
2. Quoted by R . D . Wolff, 1974, pp. 134-5. 
3. M . P. K . Sorrenson, 1968. 
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under the control of centralized political institutions, the argument goes, 
the economies of most communities in Kenya were too backward to 
be relied upon as a springboard for economic growth. Consequently, 
the argument concludes, white settlers were chosen to form the base of 
economic life of the dependency.5 This line of thought offers only part, 
and the lesser part, of the explanation. There were m a n y parts of the 
British Empire where indigenous economies were miserably undeveloped. 
T h e coastal regions of Kenya are a case in point. T h e fact that these 
regions were spared from settler colonization clearly indicates that the 
Kenya Highlands had something special to offer for European settlement. 
Evidently it was the temperate climate above other factors, which attracted 
the white settlers. T h e land occupied by settlers was mostly over 1400 m 
above sea level. Such areas were a m o n g those with the highest and most 
reliable levels of precipitation. In short, the alienated land was situated 
in the most favourable agricultural zones. 
T h e beginning of land alienation in East Africa was discussed in Chapter 
7. It took a dramatic trend especially in Kenya after 1909 and was carried 
out at give-away prices. In 1903 only about 2000 ha had been alienated 
to Europeans in Kenya. By 1914 the area alienated had risen to about 
260000 ha and to about 2740000 ha in 1930.6 This was a very substantial 
chunk of the arable land, bearing in mind the fact that the Kenya Highlands 
(about 90000 sq k m ) comprised less than 15% of Kenya's area and yet 
supported over 75% of the total population of the country until the 1930s. 
T h e chief losers were the Gikuyu, but the Nandi, Maasai, Kipsigis and 
others also lost land. 
T h e availability of land, and the propaganda by the colonial authorities to 
popularize settler agriculture attracted m a n y Europeans, both adventurers 
and genuine settlers. In 1903 there were only 596 Europeans in Kenya, 
two years later the number had reached 954 of w h o m 700 were South 
Africans;7 by the end of March 1914 the number had risen to 5438 and 
by the end of December 1929 there were 16663 Europeans in Kenya. 8 
M a n y of the early settlers, especially until 1910, acquired land at little or 
no cost. A m o n g them was Lord Delamere w h o came to be one of the 
leading landowners, at one time owning more than 400000 ha.9 T h e land 
bought between 1902 and 1915 was held on ninety-nine-year leases. In 
the latter year the administration changed terms of land leases in favour 
of the settlers w h o were by then an effective political force. T h e C r o w n 
Lands Ordinance of 1915 extended the duration of the leases from 99 
years to 999 years. It also reduced the rents and the m i n i m u m value of 
the required improvements as stipulated in the 1902 ordinance. 
5. R . D . Wolff, 1974, pp. 47-67. 
6. ibid., pp. 57, 60. 
7. ibid., pp. 54, 103. 
8. ibid., p. 107. 
9. E . J. Huxley, 1935, p. 287; M . P. K . Sorrenson, 1968, pp. 86ff. 
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M u c h of the alienated land was not put to any productive use. While 
Africans, w h o needed it badly, were refused access and right to it, Euro-
peans m a d e spectacular gains with it through speculation. B y 1930 as 
m u c h as 64.8% of the land available to Europeans was not 'in any form 
of agriculturally productive activity'. ' ° Speculative profits were accom-
panied by the consolidation of holdings. B y 1912 only five owners together 
held 20% of all land alienated to Europeans. At one time over 50% of all 
alienated land in the most fertile parts of the Rift Valley was owned by 
two syndicates and four individuals. It was also in this area that speculation 
went out of proportion. Farms which sold for half a shilling per acre in 
1908 were resold for ten shillings per acre in 1912. T w o years later the 
same land changed hands on the market at twenty shillings per acre.11 
In Southern Rhodesia an even greater proportion of land was alienated 
to Europeans. Between 1890 and 1900 European entrepreneurs and adven-
turers poured into the country expecting to find a 'Second Rand' , which 
was nowhere to be found. Only small and scattered mineral deposits were 
discovered. M a n y of the Europeans bought land from the British South 
Africa C o m p a n y ( B S A C ) , which ruled by Charter on behalf of the British 
Crown, and settled in Mashonaland as farmers. T h e n in 1894 each m e m b e r 
of the Victoria and Salisbury columns recruited to crush the Ndebele was 
promised 6000 acres of farm land. Land alienation was extended to 
Matabeleland. Unlike the situation in Kenya, the European population 
increased very fast, and between 1900 and 1935 Southern Rhodesia had 
more Europeans than any other country in tropical Africa. B y 1901 their 
number had reached 11000. Within a decade the population had more 
than doubled to 23 000, and by 1926 there were more than 35 000 Europeans 
in Southern Rhodesia. O f this total, 29.9% were born in Rhodesia, 29.2% 
in the United Kingdom and 32.6% in South Africa. Until the 1930s the 
European population increased more through immigration than through 
births. 
T h e increase in European population led to more alienation of land. 
Throughout the period 1900-35 Europeans held a disproportionate amount 
of land. B y 1911 they had acquired about 7700000 ha; slightly less than 
the areas of the Native Reserves. Land alienation continued, and by 1925 
Europeans owned about 12500000 ha which included nearly all land over 
900 m within 40 k m of the railways12 where temperatures were mild and 
precipitation was adequate and reliable. In contrast, by 1925 Africans had 
purchased only some 18000 ha of land outside the Native Reserves. This 
figure vividly illustrates their inability to compete with Europeans under 
the then prevailing circumstances. But up to this time, landownership did 
not have a rigid legal seal in favour of the white minority. It was the Land 
Apportionment Act, enacted in 1930 and enforced in April 1931, which 
10. R. D . Wolff, 1974, p. 60. 
11. ibid. 
12. G . Kay, 1970, p. 50. 
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legally promoted the interests of the white minority at the expense of the 
black majority. T h e Act divided the country into four major categories. ' 3 
Native Reserves (22.4%) were the areas within which land was held accord-
ing to customary African laws; the Native Purchase Area was reserved for 
purchase as farms by individual Africans, and could be regarded as c o m -
pensation for loss of the right to buy land elsewhere in Southern Rhodesia; 
the European Area (50.8%) consisted of existing European-owned land 
and a further 7700 ha all of which henceforward could be owned or 
occupied by Europeans only. 'All urban areas lay within the European 
Area.'14 T h e Unassigned Area (18.4%) comprised 720000 ha of poor 
inhospitable land, and was held by the government to be distributed in 
future among any of the other categories. Evidently, the Land Apportion-
ment Act of 1930 introduced racial prejudice into the allocation of land, 
but did not reject the distribution of land between the races prior to 1925. 
Consequently it prevented the possibility of 'separate development' of the 
races within their respective area. T h e white minority were allocated such 
a large amount of land because by then Southern Rhodesia enjoyed internal 
self-government dominated by the whites. T o them land served a double 
function; it was a factor of production as well as an object of speculation. 
In Northern Rhodesia relatively less land was alienated to Europeans. 
T h e British South Africa C o m p a n y , which ruled the dependency until 
1924, had secured land rights over the entire territory except Barotseland, 
through treaties with local chiefs in the 1890s. ' 5 T h e company successfully 
encouraged white immigrants. Africans whose land was alienated were 
forced to m o v e , at times with some compensation. B y 1921, 714 out of a 
total European population of 3634 were engaged in agriculture.16 During 
the mid-i930s land in Northern Rhodesia was divided roughly into three 
categories. Areas reserved especially for Africans totalled 28740000 ha 
and comprised Barotseland (14970000 ha) and the Native Reserves 
(13760000 ha). Land already allocated to Europeans was more than 
3430000 ha, of which 2225000 ha were held by two companies and more 
than 1200000 ha in farms. T h e remaining 60700000 ha comprised forest 
and game reserves.17 
In British West Africa (see Fig. 16.2), the British attempted even earlier 
than in East Africa to establish direct control over land, to create forest 
reserves and to offer land as concessions to European planters and con-
cessionaires. A s early as 1894, and again in 1897 the British introduced a 
Lands Bill in the Gold Coast which was to establish direct British control 
over lands which were said to be vacant. T h e reaction of the people, as 
has been pointed out already in Chapter 6, was the formation of the 
13. ibid., p. 30. 
14. ibid. 
15. R . E . Baldwin, 1966, pp. 144-5. 
16. ibid., pp. 41, 146. 
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Aborigines' Rights Protection Society in C a p e Coast in 1897 b y the educated 
elite and the traditional rulers to resist this proposed legislation. T h e 
Society sent a delegation to L o n d o n in M a y 1898 w h i c h succeeded in 
persuading the Colonial Office to drop the Bill o n the grounds that there 
were n o vacant lands in the G o l d Coast a n d that every piece of land w a s 
o w n e d b y o n e extended family or another. A m o v e to introduce a similar 
Bill in L a g o s in Nigeria in the 1910s w a s also checkmated b y the Anti-
Slavery a n d Aborigines' Rights Protection Society founded b y the elite 
led b y Herbert M a c a u l a y a n d the traditional rulers. Th i s Society did this 
b y appealing to the Privy Council in L o n d o n which ruled that land w a s 
the 'undisputed right of the c o m m u n i t y ' . " A s a result of these victories 
b y the W e s t Africans, the British a b a n d o n e d the policy of direct control 
of land though in theory all lands in the conquered areas of British W e s t 
Africa such as Benin in Nigeria and Asante in the G o l d Coast or lands 
ceded to the British C r o w n such as L a g o s w e r e o w n e d b y the C r o w n while 
lands in the protectorates such as Northern Nigeria or the Northern Terri-
tories of the G o l d Coast w e r e held in trust b y the C r o w n for the people.19 
However, rigorous campaigns were mounted by Europeans like W . H . 
Lever, the Liverpool soap and margarine tycoon, and societies such as the 
British Cotton Growing Association between 1906 and 1925 for the estab-
lishment of plantations in British West Africa, and indeed a few plantations 
were established in the Gold Coast, Southern Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 
These campaigns, however, failed and by 1930 only a relatively small 
proportion of land in British West Africa had been alienated for the use 
of the colonial rulers and other Europeans and most of this was for mining 
purposes. 
It was neither a deliberate policy on the part of British colonial rulers 
which saved the land in British West Africa for the Africans during the 
inter-war period, nor was it because of the notorious reputation that West 
Africa had acquired as 'the White M a n ' s Grave' by the late nineteenth 
century. A s A . G . Hopkins has pointed out: 
T h e alleged unhealthiness of the tropics did not prevent the establish-
ment of European plantations in the Belgian Congo, French Equatorial 
Africa, or Malaya, and it did not discourage serious applicants in 
West Africa either. Furthermore, the control of malaria and other 
tropical diseases was becoming more effective by the start of the 
twentieth century, and the so-called White M a n ' s Grave was begin-
ning to lose some of its unsavoury reputation.20 
W h a t then did prevent the wholesale alienation of land in British West 
Africa? T h e first answer was what Hopkins has termed 'a fortuitous geo-
logical fact', that West Africa was found to be not profusely rich in mineral 
18. J. F . A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974, p. 576. 
19. T . O . Elias, 1971, pp. 1-33. 
20. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 212. 
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deposits. T h e second was the failure of the m o v e to establish plantations 
in West Africa. This failure was caused by a number of factors. T h e first 
was the vigorous opposition put u p by the other British firms operating 
in these areas, which could not go in for the plantation system themselves. 
T h e second was the failure of the few plantations that were established 
owing to lack of capital and 'a considerable ignorance of tropical condition', 
shortage of labour and the shifts in world supply. T h e third and most 
important factor was the success of the West Africans themselves in meeting 
the d e m a n d for export crops such as cocoa, groundnuts and oil palm using 
their o w n simple methods on their small farms, which obviated the necessity 
of the plantation system in these areas. Another factor was the opposition 
that any attempt to seize any large areas or introduce large-scale forced 
labour for plantations would have generated a m o n g West Africans.21 It 
was a combination of these factors that saved the people of British West 
Africa from the expropriation of their lands that was the fate of some of 
those in British East and Central Africa. 
Production 
T h e colonial economies under discussion were characterized by two major 
sectors - one producing mainly for the subsistence of the producers and 
for the h o m e market, and the other producing essentially primary products 
for export. Production for subsistence had been well-developed long before 
colonial rule, and it received only negligible attention from the colonial 
authorities. Plantains, yams, cassava, rice and maize were produced by 
West African peasants with the very simple technology which the British 
met at the end of the nineteenth century. Things were not different in 
the production of bananas, maize, cassava, millet, and a variety of other 
crops in East and Central Africa. In an average year most families produced 
enough for h o m e consumption and put a small amount into the exchange 
sector. But to both the official and unofficial agents of imperialism, the 
subsistence sector was of little interest as it did not directly promote the 
interests of international capital. Unlike the export sector, it did not earn 
the badly needed foreign currency with which to pay for imports, nor did 
it provide raw materials to feed the factories of the metropolis. N o wonder, 
therefore, that this sector was neglected by the colonial authorities. 
Cash crops 
T h e export sector was basically concerned with the production of primary 
products - agricultural products and minerals. With the few exceptions 
of the areas where European settlers owned m u c h land, the agricultural 
export sector in the former British dependencies of tropical Africa was 
2i. ibid., pp. 213-14. 
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almost wholly in the hands of millions of unspecialized small producers. 
T h e family was the basic unit of production. It was only in the southern 
Gold Coast, and to some extent in western Nigeria, where a substantial 
proportion of farmers successfully organized their cocoa farms upon a 
capitalist basis.22 T h e unspecialized producers could not take full advantage 
of market opportunities to maximize their profits during the b o o m years.23 
But since they were only partially integrated into the international capitalist 
system, they were neither fully exposed to adverse international economic 
conditions, which were far beyond their control, nor fully subjected to 
different forms of colonial exploitation. T h e main cash crops grown by 
small-scale farmers comprised cocoa from the Gold Coast and western 
Nigeria; palm oil and palm kernels from Nigeria, Sierra Leone and to a 
lesser extent, the Gold Coast; groundnuts from T h e G a m b i a and Northern 
Nigeria; cotton from Uganda, Nigeria and Tanganyika; and coffee from 
Uganda and Tanganyika (see Figs 16.1 and 16.2). T h e production of cloves 
in Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania), from where almost all British Empire 
requirements came, does not fit into this category. Clove plantations were 
worked by African labour but owned by Arabs. 
Participation in the production of cash crops under the colonial situation 
did not give African producers any undue emotional shock. First, it did 
not involve any fundamental technological innovation. Second, m a n y of 
these crops or similar ones had been grown and processed long before the 
colonial era. 
In the case of the palm oil industry, it had served West Africans for 
centuries, and required few changes either in production or processing. 
Three crops - cocoa, coffee and cotton (in Buganda) - were new to the 
producers, but they all fitted easily into customary working cycles. C o n -
sequently the export sector expanded fast.24 In the absence of any major 
technological innovation, this fast expansion can be attributed to increased 
inputs of land and labour.25 
Contrary to what colonial historians would want us believe, the peasant 
export sector in the countries under consideration was established with 
little government initiative. A s a matter of fact, in some cases advances 
were m a d e despite discouraging official policies and practices. Even the 
Gold Coast cocoa industry, of which the British were greatly proud, was 
essentially developed with local initiative. Allan M c P h e e , one of the en-
thusiastic admirers of imperialist expansion into Africa, erroneously gave 
credit to the colonial administration for the success of the cocoa industry 
in the Gold Coast. T o him 'there seems little doubt that the cocoa industry 
of the Gold Coast is a foster child of the Government' . 2 6 But recent 
22. P . Hill, 1963. 
23. H . Myint, 1968, pp. 50-2. 
24. S . H . Frankel, 1938, p. 193. 
25. See R . Szereszewski, 1965, passim. 
26. A . McPhee, 1926, p . 41. 
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scholarship27 has drawn attention to the limited nature of the government 
contribution to the formative stages of this industry. Indeed, on a number 
of occasions, agricultural experts, w h o were paid substantial salaries from 
the taxes of the agricultural producers, proved more ignorant than the 
producers, and their advice proved disastrous.28 Despite the misguided 
activities of the Agricultural Department, the industry expanded. Starting 
from almost nothing in the early 1890s, by 1903 the farmers had put over 
17000 ha under cocoa. B y 1928 there were 364000 ha of cocoa.29 Within 
two and a half decades cocoa replaced both rubber and palm oil to become 
the leading domestic export.30 In 1934 the Gold Coast produced 40% of 
world output. Yet until this time the industry had benefited little from 
scientific research carried out in the country. A s the West African C o m -
mission observed: 
It is . . . extraordinary that until 1937 there was no single agricultural 
station in the cocoa belt proper at which research could be carried 
out on the requirements of the crop. It is difficult to see h o w any 
officer of the Department could be expected to offer correct advice 
on cultural or other treatments, as he had no opportunity to acquire 
knowledge under the local conditions.31 
Real government contribution to peasant agriculture was limited to two 
related aspects: first, to the making and reinforcing of regulations governing 
the quality of produce, and, second, to introducing agricultural techniques 
to increase or preserve the productivity of both land and labour. In both 
cases there was only limited success, mainly due to the ignorance and 
presumptuous attitude of 'the experts'.32 
In Kenya and the Rhodesias the production of cash crops increasingly 
passed into settler hands as the twentieth century advanced. During the 
first decade of the century African peasant producers in Kenya and 
Southern Rhodesia competed with white settlers quite effectively in pro-
ducing most of the grain which fed the growing numbers of wage earners. 
Indeed until 1914 African farmers in Kenya contributed more to the cash 
and export sector than the settlers. This was the period w h e n the settlers 
were struggling without m u c h success to establish themselves. At this 
time, too, the impact of the political economy of colonialism was relatively 
small. Soon the settlers and planters discovered that they could participate 
effectively in the production of cash crops only if they acted through the 
27. S. H . Hymer , in G . Ranis (ed.), 1971, pp. 129-79; a ' s 0 G . B . Kay (ed.), 1972, 
pp. 12-35. 
28. G . B . Kay (ed.), 1972, pp. 13-15, 231. 
29. S. La Anyane, 1963, pp. 40, 100. 
30. In 1915 cocoa exceeded 50% of the value of domestic exports. 
31. The West African Commission, JÇ38~ç (London, Leverhulme Trust, 1943), para. 
185, cited in G . B . Kay (ed.), 1972, p. 231. 
32. For the West African experience see M . H . Y . Kaniki, 1972, pp. 63-7. 
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respective colonial administrations and systematically reduced the role of 
African producers to the m i n i m u m possible. But settler agriculture, in-
efficient as it was, required an ample supply of cheap labour. A s one 
Kenya administrator assessed the situation in 1905, 'native labour is as 
necessary in the development of the land as are rain and sunshine'.33 
Accordingly a number of steps - mostly imported from South Africa -
were taken to drive Africans to work for the white m a n . First, the land 
curtailment which had been going on was intensified. This step was aimed 
at denying the Africans alternative sources of cash income. 
T h e case of Northern Rhodesia, where African producers tried to take 
advantage of the market created by mining labour during the 1920s, is 
particularly striking. During the early 1920s they sold a negligible quantity 
of maize to traders, but by 1927 they sold as m u c h as 30000 200 lb bags. 
In 1930 they contributed up to 50% of the marketed cattle and by 1935 
they sold about 100000 bags of maize.34 These developments were not 
in the interest of the settlers w h o , by then, had formed an effective pressure 
group. They were not interested in lowering the price of agricultural 
products to the miners but rather in acquiring more land for expansion 
and gaining high prices for their products. In 1928-9, to promote settler 
interests the government established native reserves in the railway area 
and other places where Africans and Europeans were competing for the 
same land. Apart from lessening existing African market competition, this 
measure, more significantly, 'limited severely' potential African competi-
tion in commercial markets by reserving for European settlement a strip 
extending in most areas about 30 k m on each side of the railway.35 Such 
steps were taken quite deliberately. A European elected m e m b e r of the 
Legislative Council expressed the feelings of the time in 1930, noting that 
'the British Empire is primarily concerned with the furtherance of the 
interests of British subjects of British race and only thereafter with other 
British subjects, protected races, and the nationals of other countries, in 
that order.'35 
Indeed the colonial administration was committed to promoting settler 
interests at the expense of the local population as is evident from a number 
of measures that were taken. First, in 1936 the Maize Control Ordinance 
was enacted. It established the Maize Control Board which was empowered 
to purchase and sell all maize at fixed prices. T h e market was divided 
into an internal pool and an export pool, with higher prices in the former. 
European producers were allocated three-quarters of the internal pool and 
Africans only one-quarter.37 A year later African participation in the cattle 
33. M . F . Hill, 1956, p. 7. 
34. R . E . Baldwin, 1966, p. 150. European maize output for sale from 1930 to 1935 
increased from 168000 bags to 211000 bags. 
35. ibid. 
36. ibid., p. 147. Emphasis added. 
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trade was also restricted by the Cattle Marketing and Control Ordinance 
which established the Cattle Control Board with power to fix m i n i m u m 
prices below which livestock sales were illegal, and to regulate exports and 
imports of cattle. Undoubtedly the ordinance was to some extent aimed 
at improving the quality of beef, but its 'main purpose' was 'to prevent 
the destruction by competition of a significant part of the European cattle 
industry'.38 
Secondly, prices of agricultural products from peasants were badly 
deflated. In Southern Rhodesia this took place especially between 1908 and 
1911 with grains. But even after the introduction of these two devices, most 
Africans were not attracted by wage employment on settler farms and 
plantations, mainly because of the hostile surroundings and conditions of 
work and the low wages. This state of affairs was not a peculiarity of 
Kenya and the Rhodesias since the rest of tropical Africa experienced the 
problem until the 1920s.39 
Thirdly, taxation was introduced or increased, not only to raise revenue, 
but to drive Africans to serve the interests of international capitalism. T h e 
guiding principle here was stated vividly by the governor of Kenya in 1913: 
W e consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling 
the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work. Only 
in this way can the cost of living be increased for the native . . . it is 
on this that the supply of labour and the price of labour depend. T o 
raise the rate of wages would not increase, but would diminish the 
supply of labour.40 
Fourthly, in m a n y of the colonies forced labour was legalized. Africans 
were forced to provide work for a certain number of days in a year on 
public works and settler farms and plantations. This was done both during 
peace and war. T h e n , the notorious pass system, based on the South 
African experience, was introduced to regulate the supply of labour. It 
became effective in Kenya after July 1920. Every African adult male was 
required to carry a pass (kipande) on which the employer recorded, among 
other things, the kind of work performed, time worked and wages earned. 
Failure to carry, or loss of the kipande rendered Africans liable to a fine 
and/or imprisonment up to three months. T h e kipande greatly restricted 
the African's freedom of movement . A m a n could not leave his job of 
his o w n accord. T h e contractual relationship between employer and e m -
ployee became subject to the force of criminal law, and the former right 
of withholding labour became a criminal offence. T h e African's determina-
tion to free himself from such bondage is evidenced by the thousands of 
prosecutions of 'deserters'. 
Furthermore, Africans were forbidden to grow certain crops. In Kenya, 
38. ibid., pp. 153-4. 
39. E . J. Berg, 1965, pp. 394-412-
40. East African Standard, 8 February 1913. 
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for instance, Africans were forbidden to grow coffee, 'by far the most 
lucrative cash crop' in the country.41 It was not until the 1950s that this 
European monopo ly w a s shattered by M a u M a u . 
T h e main result of all these steps was the proletarianization of the 
African peasantry, which appears to have taken place on a larger scale in 
Southern Rhodesia than in the other countries under discussion.42 T h u s 
African labour employed by Europeans at starvation wages produced cash 
crops for both the h o m e market and for export. In K e n y a , b y 1927, 
between 83700 and 117 000 Africans, or m o r e than 5 0 % of total wage 
labour, worked in commercial agriculture. T h e leading crops were maize, 
coffee, wheat and sisal. Maize occupied only 325 ha in 1905; by 1920 it 
occupied nearly 12500 ha, and nine years later the area had risen to over 
9 0 0 0 0 h a . 4 3 B y the early 1920s the settlers had ousted African peasants 
from the production and trade of this important staple. T h e area under 
coffee also recorded a dramatic expansion, rising from 32 ha in 1905, 
reaching over 11250 ha in 1920, and shooting u p to nearly 3 9 0 0 0 ha ten 
years later.44 In 1913 coffee and maize exports earned the country £ 6 4 9 9 1 ; 
in 1920 export of these two crops and sisal earned £ 5 6 6 5 5 6 and their 
value reached £ 2 4 2 9 6 5 5 in 1930, with coffee accounting for m o r e than 
5 0 % . 4 S These developments led to significant structural changes. In 1913, 
the exclusive African sector contributed 2 4 % of the value of total domestic 
exports while the exclusive European sector contributed only 5%. 
Evidently by this time, African labour had m a d e little impact on commercial 
agriculture. B y 1932 the contribution of African areas had dropped to 9 % 
while that of European areas had risen to 7 6 % . 4 6 A dominant feature of 
the e c o n o m y in colonial K e n y a w a s established. 
Settler farmers in Southern Rhodesia began to experiment with a n u m b e r 
of crops like cotton, citrus fruit and tobacco, but only tobacco b e c a m e 
well established and w a s the leading agricultural export from the 1910s 
(see Fig. 16.1). In 1927, the value of unmanufactured tobacco exports 
reached £ 1 2 5 4 0 0 0 ; its highest point between 1909 and 1937. This contri-
bution was 19.9% of total domestic exports.47 But tobacco was only one 
of the country's crops. For a long time cash products for the h o m e market 
(especially maize and livestock products) were m o r e valuable than the 
production of tobacco for export. F o r example, with the exception of three 
years (1926-8), the value of maize between 1920 and 1929 was over 5 0 % 
of the total value of crops.48 T h e expansion of maize exports was hampered 
41. R . D . Wolff, 1974, p. 141. 
42. G . Arrighi, 1970. ' 
43. R . D . Wolff, 1974, p. 73. 
44. ibid. 
45. ibid., p. 54. 
46. ibid., p. 137. 
47. S. H . Frankel, 1938, pp. 231-2. 
48. ibid., p. 239. 
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by high transport costs, as maize is a bulky and low-value commodity. 
Settler agriculture in Southern Rhodesia, as was the case in Northern 
Rhodesia and Kenya, was established and developed with substantial 
government aid, which was given in the form of loans, research and 
technical advice. In 1938 the Director of Agriculture, himself a European, 
complained about the glaring lack of help to African producers, but he 
was ignored.49 
In Southern Rhodesia, more than anywhere else in tropical Africa, 
settlers formed a powerful rural bourgeoisie and adopted a national charac-
teristic through deep commitment to the economic advancement of the 
country.50 A s early as 1926 agriculture employed more Europeans (22.9% 
of the total employed) than any other sector.51 It is noteworthy that in 
1935 this sector employed 4305 Europeans, of w h o m 2733 were farm 
owners, while the number engaged in mining was 2899.52 
Minerals 
A number of the former British dependencies of tropical Africa were rich 
in a variety of mineral resources (see Figs. 16.2 and 16.3). Gold was 
mined in the Gold Coast, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Sierra 
Leone. Diamonds became an important industry in Sierra Leone and the 
Gold Coast. Copper mining was restricted to Northern Rhodesia, while 
iron-ore mining remained a speciality of Sierra Leone. Only Nigeria and 
Southern Rhodesia mined coal, an important source of power. Most terri-
tories had one or two minerals, only Southern Rhodesia and Sierra Leone 
had a variety. Starting with platinum and gold in 1929, by the mid-i930s 
Sierra Leone was mining, in addition, chrome ore, iron ore and diamonds. 
T h e discovery of mineral deposits in the countries under discussion 
was not a fortuitous affair of the colonial period. Either minerals had been 
known and worked long before the colonial era, or deposits were found 
by m e n w h o were specifically searching for minerals. Before the colonial 
era both Southern Rhodesia and the Gold Coast, where the local population 
had mined and worked gold for generations, were noted for their potential 
mineral wealth rather than their agricultural prospects. In Nigeria, too, 
the local population had mined and worked tin for generations before the 
white m e n penetrated the interior. T h u s in a number of cases prospecting 
during the colonial period started with locating areas where mining had 
been carried out by the local population. Expectations of growing rich 
overnight attracted m a n y Europeans and m u c h capital into Southern 
49. The Minutes of Proceedings at the First and Second Meetings of the Native Develop-
ment Board. Lusaka, 1938, pp. 12-17. I a m grateful to Miss M a u d M u n t e m b a for this 
reference. 
50. G . Arrighi, 1967, p. 20. 
Si. G . K a y , 1970, pp. 46-7. 
52. S. H . Frankel, 1938, p. 238. 
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FIG. 16.3 East Africa: economic development in the former British zones, minerals (after
R. Oliver and A. Atmore, 1972)
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Rhodesia from the 1890s, but a 'Second R a n d ' was not found, only small 
deposits being located. T h e small miners, together with the settler farmers, 
came to form the rural bourgeoisie which began to exhibit strongly national 
characteristics, rather than becoming involved with large-scale inter-
national capitalism. 
With the exception of a few cases, mineral resources were exploited 
with foreign capital. T w o main reasons accounted for this feature. First, 
there were cases where capital on a scale beyond the ability of Africans 
was required, for example in copper mining in Northern Rhodesia and 
iron-ore mining in Sierra Leone. Second, and this had a wider applicability, 
the colonial administrations deliberately and systematically excluded 
Africans from benefiting from the mineral resources of their country. Soon 
after mineral deposits were found a series of legislative measures was 
introduced to give monopolies to imperialist interests. Even where Africans 
had been working minerals for generations, it became illegal for the African 
to be found in possession of minerals without a licence. N o Africans were 
allowed to deal in diamond mining. T h e industry, both in Sierra Leone and 
the Gold Coast, was monopolized by the Consolidated African Selection 
Trust ( C A S T ) , a powerful multinational company engaged in mining a 
number of minerals. This monopoly was granted on the pretext that the 
diamonds market could not be controlled where a number of dealers were 
operating. Whatever the rationale, bowing to the pressure of international 
capital, the colonial administration viciously excluded the local population 
from this most lucrative industry of the day. T h e Sierra Leone Selection 
Trust ( S L S T ) was given exclusive rights to prospect for, mine and dispose 
of all diamonds for 99 years beginning in 1933." It was not until the 
1950s, w h e n it became impossible to police the extensive diamondiferous 
areas, that the government was forced to legalize African participation.54 
But even in the cases where Africans could take mining licences from 
the beginning, a number of regulations and technicalities minimized 
African participation. In the Nigerian tin-mining industry, for instance, 
it was a crime for the mine owner, in his absence, to leave the mine under 
the charge of an African, regardless of his qualifications.55 In Sierra Leone 
an African could not secure a mining licence unless he could read and 
understand the Mining Ordinance of 1927, which was written in English. 
T h u s inability to read English disqualified an individual outright from 
participating in mining.56 All the same, mining was established as a viable 
industry. 
T h e export sector of the countries under discussion, comprising mainly 
53. A copy of the Agreement is in Public Record Office, K e w (PRO) , C O 267/644/22008/ 
Part 1/1934. 
54. H . L . Van der Laan, 1965. 
55. E . G . Charle, 1964, p. 38. 
56. Africans sidestepped this discrimination by establishing partnerships with those w h o 
could read English. 
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agricultural products and minerals, expanded fast. By 1914 all countries 
had experienced a decade of appreciable growth. 
Minerals have been regarded as 'the touchstone of economic develop-
ment in most of Africa',S7 and colonial administrators struggled feverishly 
in the effort to strike 'a lucky spot'. But clearly the contribution of minerals 
to colonial economies has been greatly exaggerated. It is true, as Table 
16.1 shows, that minerals contributed substantially to the export sector of 
a few countries, especially the Rhodesias, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. 
In the Gold Coast minerals gained significance from the early years of 
this century. Between 1905 and 1909 minerals, mostly gold, contributed 
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n = not available 
Source: calculated from Annual Reports. 
over 40% of the total value of domestic exports, and during eight of the 
nine subsequent years the proportion was over 30%. T h e proportion 
dropped to below 20% during the 1920s, but in 1935 it stood at 4i%.58 
T h e case of Southern Rhodesia is even more striking. Between 1909 and 
1913 minerals (mostly gold) contributed over 90% of domestic exports. 
For most of the subsequent years to 1935 the proportion was over 70%. 
In Northern Rhodesia, copper was mined from 1910, but it was not until 
the late 1920s w h e n the mines came into full production that minerals 
m a d e an appreciable impression on the export sector. F r o m 1931 minerals 
contributed over 50% of the total value of domestic exports. T h e proportion 
increased considerably in subsequent years. In Sierra Leone mining started 
late, but by 1935 minerals contributed over 50% of domestic exports. In 
1936 mineral exports in British dependencies of tropical Africa stood in 
the following order of importance: Northern Rhodesia, £5094000; 
Southern Rhodesia, £4422000; Gold Coast, £2124213 and Sierra Leone, 
£1245000. It is interesting to note that though minerals in Nigeria were 
important in their own right, they were relatively unimportant as a 
proportion (only 14%) of total exports, while the smaller amount mined 
in Sierra Leone accounted for 56% of that colony's exports. 
T h e substantial contribution of minerals to the export sector could 
57. S. H . Frankel, 1938, p. 210. 
58. ibid., pp. 320-1. 
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mislead us into exaggerating their contribution to the general wealth. But 
the limited nature of African participation should guide our assessment. 
Mining was established with foreign capital, and profits accruing from 
the industry were repatriated to swell the pockets of shareholders abroad, 
or to develop economies outside Africa. For instance, w h e n the Charter 
of the Niger C o m p a n y was revoked in 1899, the company was compensated 
£150000 for its mining rights in the region where tin mining was later 
established. According to the same agreement, the company was to receive 
as m u c h as 50% of all royalties from mining for ninety-nine years.59 This 
was a very heavy price for the local population to pay, but the situation 
was even worse in the Rhodesias, where mining rights remained in the 
hands of the British South Africa C o m p a n y until 1933 w h e n they were 
purchased by the state for £2 000 000.60 But even after this change the 
local population was rarely regarded, and even more rarely treated, as the 
beneficiaries of mining operations. As late as 1942, a high-ranking official 
in the British Colonial Office shamelessly placed on record that 'there is 
particularly little reason for reserving the value of the mineral product to 
the local inhabitants when those inhabitants have done nothing to develop 
it'.61 But even where the colonial administrations nationalized minerals, 
as was the case in Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, little 
revenue, mainly from royalties and income tax, was realized. In Sierra 
Leone direct revenue from minerals in 1935 was £34100, which was only 
5% of total revenue.62 
W a g e s remained the only w a y by which the local population could have 
acquired a substantial portion of the proceeds from mining, but, as was 
the case in settler and plantation agriculture, they were kept so low that 
wage earners had to be subsidized by the peasant sector. Racial discrimina-
tion was an important guiding line in this issue.63 European employees 
were paid m a n y times the amount paid to African employees, even for 
similar tasks. Africans were rarely taught important skills which would 
increase their productivity and, subsequently, their incomes. In Southern 
Rhodesia where white skilled and semi-skilled workers dominated the 
labour market,64 African workers were not even allowed to form trade 
unions. But even in the territories free from settler domination, it was not 
until the late 1930s that trade unions, an important feature of collective 
bargaining, were given legal recognition. With the exception of Southern 
Rhodesia where mining has 'provided a basis for m u c h local industrial 
59. P. Bower in M . Perham (ed.), 1948, p. 5. 
60. ibid. 
61. D a w e , Minute, P R O , C O 54028/42 J. A . D a w e was Assistant Under-Secretary at 
the Colonial Office. 
62. M . H . Y . Kaniki, 1972, pp. 238, 239. 
63. R . E . Baldwin, 1966, pp. 42, 82-99; **• Bower in M . Perham (ed.), 1948, p. 23; 
G . Arrighi, 1967, pp. 25-Ó; G . K a y , 1970, pp. 57-8. 
64. G . Arrighi, 1967, pp. 20-1; G . Kay, 1970, pp. 57-8. 
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development' 6 5 and in contrast to the South African experience, w h e r e 
mining w a s the 'original creator and protector' of manufacturing,66 the 
sector had few spin-off effects. A n d the few benefits were not without 
their costs. D a m a g e was d o n e to farmland; bush and economic trees w e r e 
destroyed; the traditional w a y of life w a s interfered with and there w a s a 
general b r e a k d o w n of law and order. 
T h e export sectors of the countries under discussion had two major 
characteristics. First, exports, both agricultural products and minerals, left 
the countries unprocessed. T h u s , most exports were of relatively low value. 
Second, there w a s a tendency towards monocultures. This m a d e the econo-
mies of the countries which depended mostly o n agricultural exports highly 
vulnerable. O n l y Nigeria, with three or so crops (cocoa, p a l m oil products 
and groundnuts), and K e n y a developed s o m e w h a t diversified economies. 
T h e weakness of monoculture economics w a s vividly exposed during the 
great depression of 1929-34 by the panic and confusion displayed b y 
colonial administrators. 
Currency and banking 
Like the other colonial powers , the British also introduced m o d e r n curren-
cies into their colonies in place of the traditional system of barter, c o m -
modity currency, and currencies such as gold dust and cowries. This w a s 
mainly to encourage production and export of cash crops a n d the importa-
tion of European manufactures. Indeed, the colonial powers went out of 
their w a y to promote and encourage the adoption of m o d e r n m o n e y in 
three m a i n ways . These , according to H o p k i n s , were 'by demonetising 
traditional currencies; b y paying [the] expanding labour force in European 
coin; and b y insisting o n receiving taxes in cash rather than in kind'.6 7 
T h e s e m e t h o d s proved very successful and by 1910 European currencies 
were widespread in W e s t Africa. In the British colonies these consisted 
of a wide variety of English coins. In 1912, the W e s t African Currency 
Board w a s established to supply currencies to British W e s t Africa. In 
1913, the Board issued its first coins of the denominations of 2s, is, 6d 
and 3d and three years later its first currency notes. In British East Africa, 
the British at first introduced the currency system operating in British 
India. In 1920, however, one currency board w a s established to issue coins 
and notes for the three colonies. It should be noted that all these currencies 
were linked with sterling in L o n d o n . 
O n e important consequence of the increasing use of currencies w a s the 
introduction of banking institutions in British Africa. In W e s t Africa the 
first bank to start operations w a s the B a n k of British W e s t Africa in 1894, 
followed in 1926 by Barclays B a n k (Domin ion , Colonial and Overseas). 
65. G . Kay, 1970, p. 24. 
66. S. Patterson, 1957, p. 150. 
67. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 206. 
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These two banks completely dominated banking activities in British West 
Africa throughout the colonial period. In British East and Central Africa, the 
National Bank and the Grindlay's Bank also appeared and soon dominated 
the field. T h e operations of these banks impeded economic developments 
in the colonies in three main ways. First, the banks invested all their 
money in England, including the savings m a d e by the Africans themselves. 
This meant that they promoted capital formation and therefore economic 
development of the rich metropolitan country at the expense of the poor 
colonies. Secondly, and more seriously, recent research has shown that in 
their lending policies, all the banks discriminated against African entre-
preneurs and in favour of the British and Asian population.68 Thirdly, 
since banking became the exclusive preserve of Europeans, Africans were 
denied the opportunity of acquiring training and experience in this vital 
field. 
Marketing 
Marketing was greatly neglected by the colonial administrators. T h e policy 
of laissez-faire was applied to varying degrees in all the countries under 
discussion. Cyril Ehrlich's generalization that this policy, 'contrary to popu-
lar myth, is practically the only untried Utopia'69 could only be valid for 
the post-1940 period. Indeed, marketing boards are an affair of the late 
1940s and 1950s. Most of the regulations until the mid-i930s dealt with 
only two major issues: trading licences and the quality of certain agricultural 
exports. Marketing co-operatives were recognized by law in Tanganyika 
in 1932, but nothing was done for five years. Being the champion of free 
trade till this period, Britain did not even restrict the operations of non-
British commercial firms and individuals in her dependencies. Before the 
emergence of the United Africa C o m p a n y ( U A C ) in 1929, for instance, 
the two leading French firms - the Compagnie Française de l'Afrique 
Occidentale ( C F A O ) and the Société Commerciale de l'Ouest-Africain 
( S C O A ) - competed quite effectively with the British firms in the British 
dependencies of West Africa. During the mid-i920s each of these firms 
had more branches and 'factories' in Sierra Leone than any British firm.70 
Yet there were no safeguards to protect the local population. T h e main 
concern of the colonial administrations was to expand the export-import 
trade which could lead to increased revenue from customs duties. 
Certainly, until the early 1930s, the tendency was to encourage whoever 
was likely to contribute in this respect. T h u s Indian traders were not only 
allowed, but, to some extent, were also encouraged to patronize trade in 
East Africa, and to some extent in Central Africa. T h e Asian population 
in East Africa increased as follows: Uganda: 1910 - 2000; 1917 - 13026; 
68. ibid., p. 209. 
69. C . Ehrlich, 1973, p. 660. 
70. See M . H . Y . Kaniki, 1972, pp. 58-60. 
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Tanganyika: 1913 - 18784; 1931 - 23422; Kenya: 1921 - 22800; 1931 -
26759. T h e 'dislike and distrust of the Levantine communities' in West 
Africa, which Professor Bauer noticed to be 'marked in official circles',71 
was a relatively recent development. Real hostility towards the Levantines, 
mostly Lebanese, came not from official circles but from the various 
European agents of commercial firms, and such hostility was in response 
to effective trade rivalry presented by the Levantines.72 A n d where British 
firms appear to have been given preference, it was not because of their 
respectability, but because they could - with the blessing of the British 
government - act as effective pressure groups and influence colonial policy-
makers.7 3 
Still, Ehrlich's generalization that 'administrative attitudes, throughout 
British Africa, rarely encouraged indigenous commercial initiative'74 is 
quite valid. But other factors stifled local initiatives. First of all, general 
official policy, as would be expected in a colonial situation, was geared 
primarily towards the advancement of imperialist interests. Consequently, 
the local population was not protected from the devouring jaws of gigantic 
firms. If anything, they were exposed for easy destruction. B y the first 
decade of the twentieth century, following the construction of railways, 
European firms were squeezing African traders in two related ways. 
Through concentration of capital they undersold small, usually o n e - m a n , 
African firms. In this way the big indigenous West African merchants 
w h o emerged during the nineteenth century were pushed out of business. 
T h e n the big European firms extended their business from wholesale to 
retail sale. W h a t T . J. Alldridge said of Sierra Leone in 1908 is applicable 
to m a n y parts of the British empire: 
Formerly the large European firms were merchants pure and simple, 
in the old-fashioned sense of the term . . . their business then was 
strictly wholesale; they imported their goods; they bought native 
produce and shipped it, but they never broke bulk. They sold their 
imported goods in the original packages; they dealt only in large 
quantities, and left the retail business entirely in the hands of the 
Sierra Leone traders . . . All this is n o w changed. T h e middleman's 
occupation is no longer what it used to be, as the great firms of 
importers have gradually become their o w n middlemen, and, while 
continuing to be wholesale merchants, they have developed retail 
business on their o w n account.75 
Secondly, in most cases African businessmen could not secure bank 
71. P. T . Bauer, 1954, p. 148. 
72. Slater to Amery, Confidential Dispatch, C O 267/607, 11 January 1925, Ends . 3 
and 5. 
73. C . Ehrlich, 1973, p. 652. 
74. ibid. 
75. T . J. Alldridge, 1910, pp. 73-4. 
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loans because they had n o collateral. Furthermore , at times racial prejudice 
w a s also e m p l o y e d in this respect. 
T h e role of the E u r o p e a n commercial firms has been assessed b y m a n y 
scholars, m o s t of w h o m agree o n the significance of connecting Africa 
with markets in W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n d the Americas . T h e firm b o u g h t 
produce in and exported it from Africa. T h e y also imported and sold a 
variety of manufactured goods , mostly textiles. M c P h e e , Bauer a n d 
H o p k i n s have rightly emphasized the firms' role in expanding the traders' 
frontier a n d the cash sector as a whole , but they say very little about the 
exploitative tendencies o f these firms.76 Traders - E u r o p e a n s , Indians, 
Lebanese , a n d to a limited extent, Africans - appropriated the surplus 
generated b y peasant production, especially through unequal exchange. 
T h e y paid little for produce a n d charged relatively high prices for imported 
goods. T h e experience of Latin A m e r i c a n peasants is quite relevant here. 
A further obstacle to the commercia l deve lopment of the smallholders' 
e c o n o m y is the marketing m e c h a n i s m . O n account of the contractual 
inferiority of the peasant, and the usual concentration of three c o m -
mercial functions in the hands of single individuals (purchaser of 
produce , supplier of credit and vendor of consumpt ion goods), any 
surpluses developed b y the little e c o n o m y tend to be transferred to 
the m i d d l e m a n rather than remain available for reinvestment.77 
In settler-dominated areas, for e x a m p l e Southern Rhodesia, it ' b e c a m e 
customary for E u r o p e a n landowners to market their tenants' produce, a n d 
often that of neighbouring peasants as well',78 a practice which minimized 
African competition a n d assured the settler of a semi-monopolistic position. 
Occasionally African producers defended their interests collectively 
through hold-ups (refusals to deliver produce to market ) . T h e r e w e r e 
several such hold-ups in the G o l d Coast w h e r e cocoa farmers were substan-
tially exposed to international market forces. T h e m o s t serious cocoa hold-
u p , be tween October a n d D e c e m b e r 1930, has been described as 'an 
economic strike for higher prices' a n d w a s 'directed against the large 
expatriate buying firms a n d their m o n o p o l y control' over the G o l d Coast 
e c o n o m y . 7 9 In addition to withholding their cocoa, G o l d Coasters b o y -
cotted E u r o p e a n goods . Arrests were m a d e a n d fines imposed b y chiefs 
to maintain the ho ld-up . T h e effectiveness of the m o v e m e n t threatened 
the very foundation of colonial economic relations, as the colonial govern-
m e n t , like the expatriate firms, d e p e n d e d o n the cocoa trade for its revenue. 
Evidently the m o v e m e n t w a s against the interests of both sides. A c c o r d -
ingly, the colonial administration broke the m o v e m e n t b y force, fining 
76. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, pp. 188-209; A . McPhee , 1926, pp. 32-105; P. T . Bauer, 1954. 
77. S. Pearse in T . Shanin (ed.), 1971, p. 73. 
78. G . Arrighi, 1970, p. 209. 
79. S. Rhodie, 1968, p. 105. 
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and imprisoning chiefs w h o supported the hold-up.80 During the 1937/8 
cocoa season another big hold-up was staged against the most important 
cocoa exporting firms which had formed an agreement to buy cocoa at a 
fixed m a x i m u m price. This time, the hold-up was extended to Western 
Nigeria, and it ended only with the intervention of the British government. 
A commission of enquiry headed by Nowell81 revealed that the marketing 
system, which involved thousands of intermediaries, was both inefficient 
and wasteful, and was disadvantageous to both the producers in West 
Africa and the consumers in Western Europe. 
T h e United Africa C o m p a n y ( U A C ) , an amalgamation of m a n y former 
British firms, was the most prominent and most powerful firm in West 
African trade after 1920. It alone handled nearly half of West Africa's 
overseas trade during the 1930s, and dominated British West Africa,82 
especially Nigeria. T h e Company' s subsidiaries operated in East and 
Central Africa, but their role there was m u c h smaller. N o r was there an 
equivalent of U A C in East and Central Africa. 
Trade with Britain put African dependencies at a great disadvantage, as 
was the case during the great depression. In 1932 Imperial Preference was 
introduced in British dependencies. Imports from the British Empire had 
customs duties fixed at between 10 and 50% lower than the general level. 
But since trade between the dependencies was negligible, the intended 
beneficiary of the arrangement was obviously Britain. In September 1931 
the Colonial Office dispatched a circular to officers administering depen-
dencies asking them to help Britain and reminding them that: 
the interests of the United Kingdom and those of the Colonies and 
Dependencies are inseparably bound up with one another, that the 
perils which face the United Kingdom are perils which menace the 
whole Empire . . . that any general collapse of British credit and 
declir - in the exchange value of sterling must spell ruin for the 
colonies no less than for the United K i n g d o m . 8 3 
Despite the higher tariff on non-British goods, their importation, to the 
advantage of consumers in the dependencies, increased greatly. Canvas 
shoes and artificial silk and cotton clothing, all from Japan, featured promi-
nently, and their prices were far below those of British goods which enjoyed 
protection. In 1934 the district officer of Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, 
observed that 'practically every shop in the district'84 was stocked with 
80. ibid., pp. 109-15. 
81. Great Britain, Commission on Marketing West African Cocoa (London: H M S O , 
1938), p. 157 and passim. 
82. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 199. 
83. West African Mail and Trade Gazette, 24 October 1931, p. 4; Sierra Leone Royal 
Gazette, 15 October 1931. 
84. Dar es Salaam District Officer's Annual Report for 1934, p. 4, Tanzania National 
Archives, 54/4. 
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m a n y Japanese goods. T h e development was especially important during 
this period of economic distress. A s one colonial administrator in Tangan-
yika put it, probably with some exaggeration, 'the average African would 
n o w be reduced to wearing bark cloth if it were not for the fact that large 
quantities of cheap cotton goods from Japanese manufacture are exposed 
for sale in all the town and country shops'.85 But the British Government's 
concern was the success of the British industry and not the welfare of the 
poor people in the dependencies. In 1934 a further attack was m a d e on 
non-British goods by raising the tariff to 100%, as a general rule. In 
addition, a quota system was imposed on the importation of Japanese 
textiles. There were isolated protests against these measures but the colon-
ized people had to pay high prices, thereby promoting imperialist interests 
at their o w n expense. 
Infrastructure 
O n e of the most important aspects of marketing is infrastructure. T h e 
construction of railways, roads, telegraph lines and harbours received the 
attention of the colonial administrations quite early on. T h o u g h these 
facilities helped in the general administration, their main task was to 
evacuate exports. N o wonder therefore that the location and general direc-
tion of railways and roads took little account of the general welfare of the 
dependencies. Most railways ran directly from the coast to interior sources 
of cash crops or mineral deposits. Only a few lateral and inter-colonial 
links were established. Railways therefore served only limited areas, and, 
important as they have been, their role in 'opening up' the continent has 
certainly been exaggerated.86 Only in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa 
were there more sophisticated railway networks, mainly intended to connect 
and serve the widely-scattered mining areas and settler farming regions. 
T h e cocoa belt of the southern Gold Coast, too, was well served by railways, 
while the Northern Territories with no export crops, were completely 
ignored. (See Figs 16.2, 16.3.) 
Mos t of the railways were constructed, owned, and operated by govern-
ments or official agencies. Construction of the first railway in British West 
Africa took place in Sierra Leone during the 1890s. T h e first train started 
operating in the colony area in 1897, and by 1909 the main line, crossing 
the rich palm oil belt to P e n d e m b u , in the east (365 k m ) had been completed. 
A branch line from Bubuyan to Makeni in the north (132 k m ) was opened 
in 1915. Soon after the work started in Sierra Leone, other dependencies 
followed her example with even better results. All major lines were built 
by 1920. In Tanganyika the British inherited the two railways constructed 
by the Germans earlier during the twentieth century. 
Only in the Rhodesias and Sierra Leone did private capital contribute 
85. ibid., for 1933, pp. 3-4. 
86. A . McPhee, 1926, pp. 47-8, 108-15, 126-7. 
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to railway construction. T h e main railway running northwards through 
the Rhodesias was a continuation of the South African system and was 
constructed by the British South Africa C o m p a n y . T h e line reached Bula-
wayo in October 1897 and crossed the Zambezi at the Victoria Falls in 
1904. A number of branch lines were constructed by firms interested in 
promoting mining.87 T h e main line reached Livingstone (then capital of 
Northern Rhodesia) in 1905 and Broken Hill the following year. It was 
finally extended to the Congo border by a new firm, the Rhodesia-Katanga 
Junction Railway and Mineral C o m p a n y in 1909 (see Fig. 16.3). In Sierra 
Leone the Sierra Leone Development C o m p a n y , which had been mining 
iron ore at M a r a m p a since 1933, constructed an 83 k m line between 
M a r a m p a and their loading jetty at Pepel during the early 1930s. T h e line 
was exclusively for the company's use. Road construction was carried out 
by both the colonial administration and local authorities. African chiefs, 
where resources allowed, mobilized their people to integrate their econo-
mies with the wider world. But roads, as a rule, were meant to act as 
feeders, not as alternatives, to the railways which were official undertakings. 
T h u s the taxpayer had to maintain expensive and inefficient systems. 
T h e most important contribution of modern transport was the dramatic 
reduction of freight rates, which had two related results. First, h u m a n 
porterage was replaced by machinery, thereby releasing scarce h u m a n 
resources for other productive activities. Secondly, the decreased cost of 
transport increased the profit margins of producers and encouraged the 
expansion of the cash sector. Only rarely, however, did African producers 
benefit from this development. Commercial firms and others engaged in 
the export sector were too eager to benefit as well, and being more influen-
tial, they got the lion's share. In the settler regions, freight rates were 
manipulated in favour of Europeans, thereby forcing the African sector 
to subsidize settler agriculture. 
T h e impact of railways was dramatic in Uganda and Nigeria. Before 
1902, the year the Uganda Railway connected the landlocked territory 
with M o m b a s a through the Kenya highlands, transport costs added 150% 
to the price of most commodities from the coast. T h e arrival of the Lagos 
railway in K a n o in 1911 had similar effects. It greatly accelerated the 
expansion of the groundnut industry. Exports increased from a previous 
m a x i m u m of 2000 tons to 50000 in 1916 and 117 000 by 1929. In Northern 
Rhodesia, too, railways contributed substantially to the export sector, 
especially to the development of mining.88 In most other countries, railways 
contributed relatively little, and for most of the period under consideration 
they were liabilities.89 It should be emphasized that even though modern 
transportation was quite beneficial, it did not create an export economy 
out of nothing. 'Indeed . . . modern transport was attracted primarily to 
87. G . Kay, 1970, pp. 42, 44. 
88. R . E . Baldwin, 1966, pp. 17-18, 171-2. 
89. S. H . Frankel, 1938, passim. 
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regions which though still full of uncertainties, had already begun to 
demonstrate their economic potential'.90 
Another part of the infrastructure which had been in existence in pre-
colonial days but increased in efficiency and importance during the colonial 
period was shipping. In British West Africa, this field was by 1900 
dominated by one single British firm, the Elder Dempster Line and C o 
Ltd which was an amalgamation in 1890 of all the British shipping c o m -
panies operating on the west coast. In 1895, this line and the G e r m a n 
shipping firm, the W o e r m a n n line, agreed not to compete between them-
selves and were therefore able to fix rates to the disadvantage of their 
patrons. In East and Southern Africa, shipping was dominated by the 
Union Castle Line. 
South Africa, 1880-1935 
O f the British African colonies and dependencies, so unique and so pheno-
menal and yet so notorious in their impact were the economic changes 
that occurred in South Africa during the period under review that they 
merit separate treatment here, however briefly. 
By 1869, South Africa - consisting of the two British colonies of Cape 
Colony and Natal and the Boer or Afrikaner settler-colonies of Transvaal 
and Orange Free State - was economically as poor and as peripheral to 
the world capitalist economy as any of the other European colonies and 
settlements in Africa (see Fig. 27.1). This combined European population 
was only 260000, about 20% of w h o m lived in the Cape Colony.91 T h e 
Cape had the only town with a population of over 10 000 - Cape T o w n . 
There were only 3 k m of railway by i860 and no road for motor traffic. All 
transport was drawn by animals. Manufacturing was confined only to the 
making of wagons, furniture, shoes and the tanning of leather.92 T h e 
exports of South Africa in i860 consisted of primary products with wool 
as the leading one, followed by iron, hides and skins, all worth £2.5 million 
a year. As D . Hobart Houghton has concluded: 'The general character of 
the [Cape] Colony [by i860] was that of a sparsely populated country 
largely engaged in pastoral farming and self-subsistence agriculture, too 
poor to advance rapidly by domestic capital formation, and lacking any 
exploitable resources to attract foreign capital'.93 A n d the Cape Colony 
was economically the leading province of South Africa by then. Conditions 
in the other colonies, especially Transvaal and Orange Free State, were 
even worse. 
Not only the economy but the society of South Africa underwent a 
revolutionary change during the last three decades of the nineteenth cen-
90. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 198. 
91. P. Curtin, S. Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, p. 329. 
92. M . M . Cole, 1961, p. 396. 
93. D . H . Houghton in M . Wilson and L . Thompson (eds), 1971, p. 4. 
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tury. This was primarily because of one single event, the discovery of 
minerals, first of diamonds in Griqualand in 1867 and Kimberley in 1870, 
and then of gold in Transvaal in 1886. Within five years of the discovery 
in Griqualand, more than £1.6 million-worth of diamonds was being 
annually exported. This had increased to more than £5 million by 1880, 
that is more than the total value of all the other exports of South Africa.94 
B y 1899 D e Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd had emerged 'to reorganize 
mining as a highly capitalized and concentrated modern industry, employ-
ing the latest scientific techniques, and establishing a world monopoly of 
sales through the London Diamond Syndicates'95 and the value of 
diamonds exported continued to rise. B y 1905, it was about £10 million 
and by 1910 over £15 million. Even more rapid was the growth of the 
gold mining industry after its discovery in 1886. B y 1890 £10 million-worth 
of gold was being exported which m a d e gold the leading South African 
export; this had risen to £25 million by 1905 and to between £45 and 
£50 million by 1910. 
T h e effects of this mining b o o m in South Africa were truly phenomenal 
and all-embracing. Politically, the discovery of diamonds led first to the 
annexation of the Kimberley area, then Transvaal itself in 1877, and finally 
to the conquest of Zululand in 1879 after the humiliating defeat of the 
British at Isandhlwana. Both also contributed to the first Anglo-Boer war 
of 1881, which was w o n by the Boers. Similarly, the discovery of gold led 
to the annexation of all the African states south of the Limpopo river, 
the Jameson Raid of 1896, and finally the Second Boer W a r of 1899 which 
ultimately resulted in the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. 
S o m e aspects of these far-reaching political consequences and the reaction 
of Africans to them have been discussed in Chapter 9 above. 
Secondly, the discovery led to the pouring in of capital and technical 
personnel from Britain, Europe and the United States. Indeed, the bulk 
of the investments in colonial Africa between 1880 and 1939 went to 
Southern Africa alone. According to P . Curtin and others, on the eve of 
the Second World W a r , 'outside per capita investment was estimated at 
£$6 in South Africa, £38 in the two Rhodesias . . . and £13 in t n e Belgian 
Congo, but not more than £10 anywhere else in tropical Africa'.96 It was 
this investment that promoted not only the mining industry but, as w e 
shall see presently, the infrastructure of South Africa. That South Africa 
should have led here is not surprising for, as Houghton has pointed out, 
Griqualand from being 'a forgotten no-man's-land inhabited by a few 
hundred Griqua under their chief Waterboer', thanks to the discovery of 
diamonds, 'suddenly became a focus of world interest'.97 T h e discovery 
94. See Fig. 2: 'Exports of South African Produce 1861-1910' in ibid., p. 18. 
95. ibid., p. 13. 
96. P . Curtin, S. Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, p. 500. 
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of gold did the same thing for the Transvaal and the areas south of the 
Limpopo river. 
Equally revolutionary was the impact of the mining industry on the 
provision of infrastructure in South Africa. T h e huge distances between 
settlements and towns - Johannesburg is 1540 k m from Cape T o w n -
and the sparseness of the population had hitherto ruled out the construction 
of railways as a viable proposition. But the discovery of gold and diamonds 
m a d e railways and roads not only necessary but also practical. It is not 
surprising then that railway construction began in the 1870s from different 
points - Cape T o w n , Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban - all 
leading first to the diamond fields and then after 1886 into the Transvaal. 
T h e length of railway line rose from n o k m by 1869 to 1700 k m by 1889, 
3300 k m by 1899 and 4190 k m by 1905 (see Fig. 16.4).98 Side by side 
with railways went the construction of roads. By the end of the First 
World W a r , 75 000 k m of provincial roads and many more of farm roads 
had been constructed. 
T h e fourth important impact was in the field of labour and land, and 
with them came the growth of urban centres. T h e demand for labour 
created by the diamond- and gold-mining activities was virtually in-
exhaustible. It was partly to ensure the supply of labour and partly to 
safeguard even more the positions of the whites - especially the Afrikaners 
— that a whole series of pieces of legislation was passed, especially in the 
1910s and 1920s, to compel the Africans to leave their farms and places 
of birth for the mining and other industrial centres. These Acts included 
the Natives' Land Act of 1913,the Mines and Works Act of 1911 and its 
amendment in 1926, the Apprenticeship Act of 1922, the Natives (Urban 
Areas) Act of 1923, the Native Administration Act of 1927 and finally the 
Native Service Contract Act of 1932. T h e most notorious of these Acts 
was the Natives' Land Act under which 88% of the land in South Africa 
was reserved for the exclusive use of whites w h o constituted only 20% of 
its population." T h e remaining 12% was established as a series of'native 
reserves' for the Africans. This Act also abolished squatting and the system 
of farming-on-the-half by which Africans were allowed to farm part of 
the land of a white m a n in return for which the latter received half of the 
Africans' produce. Thirdly, the Act prevented Africans from buying land 
outside the reserves from persons other than Africans except in the Cape 
Province and, in Transvaal and Orange Free State, except by the special 
dispensation of the governor-general. T h e Act thus struck at the very basis 
of African society and caused the immediate displacement of thousands 
of independent African pastoral and agricultural farmers from their 
traditional homes and lands and from the white-owned farms. Indeed it 
98. ibid., p. 20. 
99. P . Curtin, S . Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, p. 505; D . K . Fieldhouse, 
1981, p. 75; F . Wilson, L . Kuper in M . Wilson and L . Thompson (eds), 1971, pp. 126-36, 
436,440. 
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FIG. 16.4 The growth of the railway network of South Africa, igoo-53 (after M . M . Cole, 
1961) 
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transformed them, in the words of Leo Kuper, into 'a landless and exploit-
able proletariat' — the worst form of economic dependence. T h e Act also 
introduced the principle of territorial segregation into South Africa. This 
Act remained unaltered until 1936, and by 1931 about 6 million Africans 
were occupying reserves totalling only 88000 sq k m while 1.8 million 
Europeans were occupying 1140000 sq k m . 1 0 0 
T h e Mines and Works Act of 1911 and its amendment of 1926, and 
the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 also excluded Africans from m a n y skilled 
occupations and laid down different scales of pay for skilled (largely white) 
labour and unskilled (largely African, Indian and Coloured) labour. In 
1935, the white miner was receiving on the average eleven times what an 
African was receiving.101 T h e Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, the 
Native Administration Act of 1927 and the Native Service Contract Act 
of 1932 all also jointly regulated the movement, residence and employment 
of Africans in the interest of white workers. T h e Natives (Urban Areas) 
Act of 1923, for instance, introduced compulsory residential segregation 
of Africans so as to stop 'undesirable mixing', while the Civilised Labour 
Policy adopted in 1924 intensified the industrial colour bar by stipulating 
that non-white workers were to be replaced with poor whites.102 Finally, 
the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 also made the breaking of 
contract by African labourers on mines and works a criminal offence. 
T h e total effect of all these measures was to drive Africans from their 
homes and farms into the new mining and industrial centres and to keep 
them on European farms as wage earners. T h e number of labourers on 
the mines rose by leaps and bounds during the period under review. By 
1906, the mines were employing 163000 people - 18000 whites, 94000 
Africans and 51000 Chinese; by 1918 this number had risen to 291000 
of w h o m 32000 were whites. B y 1936 there were as m a n y as 300000 African 
mine labourers, about 40% of w h o m were from the Transkei and Ciskei 
Native Reserves, 25% from Portuguese Mozambique and nearly 15% 
from Basutoland. It should be noted from these figures that in spite of 
those Acts, not enough labour was being obtained from within South Africa 
and therefore African labourers had to be recruited in Mozambique, 
Basutoland and even Nyasaland and the Rhodesias, while from 1899 
indentured Chinese had to be imported. I 0 3 It should also be emphasized 
that partly as a result of the legislation described, most of the Africans 
employed were not permanent, but rather migrant or seasonal labourers. 
They were therefore compelled to spend their lives shifting back and forth 
between work on the white portions and the 'native reserves'. 
Another important impact of the mining b o o m was on urbanization. 
Since the workers migrated into the new mining and industrial areas, 
100. D . K . Fieldhouse, 1981, p. 75. 
101. P. Curtin, S. Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, p. 502. 
102. D . Welsh in M . Wilson and L . Thompson (eds), 1971, pp. 183-4. 
103. D . H . Houghton in M . Wilson and L . Thompson (eds), 1971, pp. 15, 19-20. 
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completely new towns came into existence while some existing ones saw 
very rapid growth. Thus , Kimberley which was not in existence in 1866 
had become a town with a population of 18000 by 1877, while Johannesburg 
had grown from a small village into a large town with a population of 
166000 by 1900.104 Existing towns like Cape T o w n and Port Elizabeth 
also saw very rapid expansion during the same period. T h e percentages 
of whites living in towns rose from 35.8% in 1890-1 to 65.2% in 1936 
and that of Africans from 13% in 1904 to only 17.3% in 1936.105 
T w o other sectors of the South African economy also saw tremendous 
development, partly as a result of the mining boom. These were the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors. T h e great increase in the popula-
tion of South Africa and the new urban populations created new markets 
for both agricultural products and manufactured goods. These markets 
were further expanded by the acquisition of South West Africa by the 
Union of South Africa as a mandated territory after the First World W a r . 
T h e new infrastructure of roads and railways facilitated the transportation 
of these products and the farmers took advantage of these opportunities 
as well as of the Land Act of 1913. Between 1927 and 1937, the government 
also introduced a number of measures such as protective tariffs and the 
establishment of various marketing boards and extension of banking facili-
ties to assist the white farmers at the expense of black farmers. T h e result 
was that not only were the white farmers producing enough for h o m e 
consumption but they also began to export maize from 1907, meat and eggs 
after the First World W a r and sugar and dairy products from the late 
1920s onwards.1 0 6 But by n o w Africans had been virtually eliminated 
from commercialized farming and had become mere wage earners on these 
farms. T o worsen their plight, their wages remained either static or were 
increased only very slowly. Between 1914 and 1934, the married African 
farm labourer's average wage increased from 6s to 10s a month to only 
8s to 12s.107 Furthermore, the average monthly wage for a white farm 
employee in the Cape rose from £2 18s id in 1866 to £19 7s 7d in 1952, 
while that of the non-white farmer increased from 12s iod to only 
£2 7s iod.108 Thus , during the period under review, the economic gap 
between white and black widened and the living standard of the black in 
fact deteriorated. 
Even more revolutionary were the changes that occurred in the m a n u -
facturing sector and this is all the more interesting since this did not occur, 
as we have seen already, in most other parts of colonial Africa. As Monica 
Cole has pointed out, 'The changed political conditions after the Anglo-
Boer war encouraged industrial growth and the unification of the four 
104. F . Wilson in M . Wilson and L . T h o m p s o n (eds), 1971, pp. 113-14. 
105. D . Welsh in M . Wilson and L . T h o m p s o n (eds), 1971, p. 173. 
106. F . Wilson in M . Wilson and L . T h o m p s o n (eds), 1971, pp. 132-6. 
107. D . Welsh in M . Wilson and L . T h o m p s o n (eds), 1971, p. 158. 
108. ibid. 
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provinces in 1910 aroused a surge of national feeling which expressed itself 
in a desire for industrial development a n d greater self-sufficiency.'109 T h e 
whites therefore did begin to promote e c o n o m i c development a n d by 1912 
a n u m b e r of industries h a d been established. T h e s e included fruit pre-
serving, j a m m a k i n g , brewing, soap m a k i n g , candle m a k i n g a n d small-scale 
engineering industries m a k i n g windmills, p u m p s and water-boring drills, 
gates and fences; a n d boots, shoes and clothing.11 ° T h e growth of this 
sector w a s particularly encouraged during the First W o r l d W a r with a 
view to diversifying the e c o n o m y of the country and minimizing its d e p e n -
dence o n the mining industry a n d also providing e m p l o y m e n t for the 'poor 
whites'. T o p r o m o t e that sector further, the government not only intro-
duced protective tariffs in 1924 but also created the B o a r d of T r a d e a n d 
Industries in 1921, the Electricity Supply C o m m i s s i o n in 1923 and the 
South African Iron a n d Steel Corporation in 1928. T h a t these efforts 
proved successful is evident from the n u m b e r of people e m p l o y e d in this 
sector. B y 1918, there were 124000 workers of w h o m 4 4 0 0 0 were white; 
b y 1928 this h a d increased to 141000 . T h e manufacturing sector saw even 
m o r e rapid growth after the depression of the 1920s a n d early 1930s. B y 
1939 its output in food, drink, tobacco, textiles and clothing, leather a n d 
footwear, chemicals, metals a n d engineering w a s worth about £ 7 5 million, 
m a k i n g it the second leading contributor to national i n c o m e with mining 
in the lead.111 
It should b e obvious from the above that unlike that of m o s t colonies, 
the e c o n o m y of South Africa definitely experienced a revolutionary 
development during the period between 1880 a n d 1935. B y 1932, the gross 
national product w a s as high as £ 2 1 7 million a n d this rose to £ 3 2 0 million 
in 1937. It also b e c a m e highly diversified unlike the e c o n o m y of m o s t 
other African countries depending, as it did, o n mining, manufacturing 
and agriculture. B y 1932, as m a n y as 5 5 5 0 0 0 people were e m p l o y e d in 
the mining, manufacturing a n d construction a n d railway sectors, a majority 
of w h o m w e r e Coloured, Indian and African. ' '2 A n d all this w a s d u e 
primarily to the discovery of gold a n d d i a m o n d s a n d partly to the fact 
that the whites of South Africa were given virtually full control over their 
fate b y the British during the period under review. B u t all this p h e n o m e n a l 
development w a s achieved at the expense of the non-white peoples 
of Africa especially the Africans and the Coloureds. A s the Native E c o n o m i c 
C o m m i s s i o n appointed in 1932 reported, while the p h e n o m e n o n of the 
'poor white' h a d completely disappeared b y then, the condition of the n o n -
whites h a d radically deteriorated. In the reserved areas overpopulation a n d 
poverty w e r e widespread; this had caused m a s s migrations into the towns 
and mining centres w h e r e the Africans w e r e underpaid, discriminated 
109. M . M . Cole, 1961, p. 396. 
no. ibid. 
in. ibid., p. 399. 
112. D . H . Houghton in M . Wilson and L . Thompson (eds), 1971, p. 35. 
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against and packed into slums and ghettos. W h a t was even worse still, they 
were not allowed to settle permanently in these places with their families but 
most of them became temporary migrants moving between town and 
country, and thereby becoming ' m e n of two worlds', because, as Houghton 
puts it, 'they had close and inseparable ties both with their peasant society 
and with the modern industrial world'.113 Displaced, landless, underpaid 
and discriminated against, the Africans of South Africa suffered far more 
economically and socially than Africans in any other part of Africa during 
the period under review. 
Conclusion 
B y the mid-i930s British colonialism had been well entrenched by inte-
grating the economy of tropical Africa into the world capitalist economy. 
T h e dependencies remained important sources of primary products with 
hardly any industrial sectors. Through participation in the cash sector, 
African peasants and workers experienced with the rest of the ,vorld some 
of the most serious economic adversities between 1929 and 1935. Neither 
the worker nor the peasant was a beneficiary of colonial economic relations, 
but the former experienced worse exploitation. T h e appropriation of the 
surplus by international capital is revealed by the backwardness and general 
poverty of the dependencies during the mid-i930S. Colonial administrators 
attempted, often feverishly, to arrest the increasing deterioration of soil 
fertility, especially in the native reserves where population pressure 
threatened land productivity, by restricting African cultivation. But Euro-
pean exploitation of different resources was nowhere restricted. N o one 
suggested, for example, that minerals should not be mined because they 
could never be replaced.114 A n d mining, generally considered to be a 
modern sector, contributed only marginally to industrial life. A s a matter 
of fact, mining thrived on the peasant sector by paying workers starvation 
wages. T h e economic features which were established during the period 
under discussion have, in most cases, persisted to the post-independence 
era. 
113. ibid., p. 35. 
114. R . E . Baldwin, 1966, p. 160. 
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North Africa 
T h e economy of North Africa in the first quarter of the twentieth century 
did not develop at the same pace or pass through the same stages in 
all constituent countries (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt and 
Sudan), because they were not colonized at the same time (see Fig. 17. i). 
Part I: the economy of Tunisia, Algeria and 
MorOCCO, I919-35 A. KASSAB 
The economy from the end of the First World W a r to 
the economic crisis of 1929 
In 1919, Algeria had already been a French colony for eighty-nine years, 
Tunisia for thirty-eight and Morocco for only seven. But it is clear that 
on the morrow of the First World W a r the political, administrative, econo-
mic and financial institutions introduced by the French authorities were 
already well established, and that the process of dispossessing the fallähin 
(peasants; sing, fallah) and draining wealth away for the benefit of the 
metropolitan country (barely begun in Morocco) was already well under 
way in Algeria and Tunisia. T h e war had merely slowed the pace of this 
process: once hostilities ended it resumed at high speed. 
T h e disruption of rural society by agricultural colonization 
In Algeria the growth of settler estates stemmed mainly from a consistent 
policy of 'official colonization'. Land taken from the indigenous peoples 
was m a d e up into lots by the authorities and allocated to European settlers, 
w h o were given every facility for setting themselves up (loans, implements, 
housing, etc.). Settlers' centres were built for them at public expense to 
provide essential services (shops, schools, hospitals, etc.). 
n 
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After the war, official colonization ran out of steam (only 70000 ha of 
state land was allocated between 1921 and 1931), and private colonization 
took over. After a short slowing-down period (1918-20), the growth of 
colonization started again faster than ever, despite the increase in the price 
of land. This was due to land legislation of 4 August 1926, which simplified 
the inquiry procedure through which carsh (communal) land could be 
alienated by replacing piecemeal with overall inquiry. Thanks to this 
legislation, several thousand hectares of 'arsh land was acquired by settlers. 
In 1930 the 25795 settler estates in Algeria had a total area of 2334000 
ha.1 T h e y were mainly in the Tell, the best-watered area with the best 
land: i.e. the plains of Oran, Sïdï Abül-Abbäs, Mu'askar, the Mitidja, 
Skikda and Annäba and the plateaux of Constantine, SatTf, G u e l m a , etc. 
(see Fig. 17.2). 
These estates were already extensive before the great economic crisis. 
T h e average area was 90 ha. Large estates of over 100 ha, which m a d e 
up only 20.6% of the total number of European estates, accounted for 
73.4% of the total area of settler land. 'The striking feature of European 
agriculture in the years 1920-30 was thus the increase in large and especially 
in very large estates.'2 
In Tunisia the process of dispossessing the fallähin had started as soon 
as the Protectorate was established in 1881. 'Colonization by capital' (1881-
2), which had allowed big capitalist firms (Compagnie des Batignolles, 
Société Marseillaise de Crédit, Société Foncière de Tunisie, etc.) to gain 
control of nearly 430000 ha, had been followed by 'official colonization' 
systematically organized by the Protectorate authorities, w h o were appre-
hensive about the 'Italian peril'.3 T h e main aim of 'official colonization' 
was to increase the French population in Tunisia and promote 'colonization 
by Frenchmen'. Considerable sums of money were allocated to it. In 
addition to legislation tending to transfer Tunisian-occupied land into 
French hands - beylical decree of 13 November 1898 requiring the habús 
(pious foundations) administration to m a k e at least 2000 ha of land available 
to the state each year; beylical decree of 22 July 1903 taking the mountain 
areas into state ownership, etc. — the Protectorate authorities gave settlers 
major financial help. There were subsidies for European farm credit bodies, 
settler co-operatives and farming unions, and interest-free setting-up loans 
repayable in twenty annual instalments for recipients of settler estates. At 
the same time the authorities developed at public expense the roads and 
railways in areas with substantial settler populations, built settler villages 
and improved the water and sewerage provision in country areas where 
there were settlers. In 1931 settler estates in Tunisia amounted to some 
700000 ha, as in Algeria mainly in the best-watered and most fertile parts 
of the country. T h u s , in the Tell, there was nearly 400000 ha of settler 
1. C . R . Ageron, 1979. 
2. ibid., p. 484. 

























































































































































































































































Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935
FIG. 17.3 The extent ofagricultural colonization in Tunisia in 1921 (after J. Poncet, 1952)
land, while in the centre and south there were only 300000 ha. These
figures include both French estates and Italian ones (43 600 ha) (see Fig.
17-3)-
Italian estates were typically small (under 10 ha); settlers from Sicily
and Calabria were usually vine-growers, market gardeners and nurserymen
living in the Tunis-Bizerta area on the coast of the Cape Bon peninsula.
French settler estates, on the other hand, were on average very large: in
the Abu Sälim area in the middle Medjerda, for example, 80% of French
estates were over 500 ha in area.4
In Morocco agricultural colonization admittedly began later than in
Algeria or Tunisia, but it took advantage of Algerian and Tunisian experi¬
ence. Progress dated from 1918, and was very rapid from 1923 to 1930.
The Protectorate administration, which wanted to bring about heavy Euro¬
pean settlement throughout the Sherifian empire, likewise methodically
organized official colonization. It made available to the settlers - 60% of
whom came from Algeria - state land transferred in the form of settler
estates of varying sizes, and communal land. This land was not granted
free as in Algeria but sold at low prices, as in Tunisia, with the obligation
to develop it and live on it, generous payment terms, ample installation
and equipment loans, subsidies for land-clearing, mechanization, planting,
etc., exemption from customs duties on imports ofagricultural equipment,
advances to agricultural friendly societies, and so on.
4. A. Kassab, 1979.
424
The colonial economy: North Africa 
During the same period (1922-32), private colonization managed to take 
over more than 350000 ha.5 Most of the settler land belonged to French-
m e n ; a small part of it was farmed by Spaniards, Belgians, Swiss and 
Italians. This land was mostly in the plains of Atlantic Morocco (Shäwiya, 
Dukkâla and 'Abda), the Sa'ïs and eastern Morocco (plain of Trïffa). 
Estates of 100-500 ha represented 5 0 % of all European farms. 
The features of agricultural colonization 
Despite considerable efforts by the authorities to increase the French rural 
population, official colonization did not manage to establish m a n y French 
settlers in the countryside of North Africa. Apart from smallholders in 
vineyards and orchards (Italians in Tunisia, Spaniards in Morocco), Euro-
pean settlers did not constitute a real peasantry such as existed in France 
at that time. They were mainly large farmers owning enormous estates, a 
wide range of agricultural equipment and often impressive farm buildings. 
They had close links with the banks, the various agricultural credit bodies, 
the research institutes and the m a n y administrative departments directly 
or indirectly concerned with colonization. 
T h e agriculture they practised was essentially speculative and aimed at 
exporting their produce rather than selling it on the h o m e market. Most 
settlers specialized in a single crop, such as vines, cereals or olives (in 
Tunisia). In the Oran area (Algeria) settler agricultural economy was 
almost wholly centred on vines, while in the high plains of Constantine 
and the plains of the Tunisian Tell cereal monoculture was the rule. 
This specialization, applied to estates of several hundred hectares, m a d e 
possible some rationalization of agricultural work and the systematic use of 
modern agricultural equipment. It was after the First World W a r that trac-
tors, both tracked and wheeled, appeared in the North African countryside. 
They gradually became widespread, along with tractor-drawn equipment 
(ploughs with plough-shares, disc ploughs, multi-disc ploughs, culti-
vators, drills, etc.). After reaper-binders, combine harvesters also became 
widespread, bringing enormous savings in agricultural manpower. T h e 
new machinery also m a d e it possible to apply dry-farming techniques to 
cereal land on the semi-arid fringes of the Tell, and to expand the growing 
of wheat, particularly soft wheat. 
At the same time m u c h effort was put into agricultural economics 
research in the research institutes of Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, etc.; and this 
provided the settlers with n e w varieties of cereals, fruit trees, tobacco, etc. 
suited to the soils and climates of North Africa. 
This agriculture, with its sophisticated techniques, often reached a high 
level of productivity. Yields in all sectors increased continuously between 
1919 and 1929; wine production in Tunisia m a d e a great leap, rising from 
498 148 hectolitres (hi) to 918 853 hi between 1920 and 1925; and in Algeria 
5. In 1932 official colonization had alienated 202000 ha. 
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average annual wine production, 6853000 hi in the years 1916-20, rose to 
18 371000 hi in the years 1931-5.6 For wheat the increase in production was 
also spectacular. In particular soft wheat, an essentially European crop, 
increased remarkably not only in area cultivated but also in annual 
production. 
Settler production of soft wheat in Morocco rose from 68 285 quintals 
in 1920 to 1 884000 quintals in 1935. T h e Moroccan falldhin obtained only 
1316000 quintals from a larger area (222815 ha). 
Local markets could not absorb the increasing quantities of agricultural 
produce: in the case of wine (the overwhelming majority of the population 
being Musl im) almost the whole output had to be exported. Wheat pro-
duction was also superabundant, especially in wet years. 
This highly mechanized agriculture needed large investments, and was 
continually having to call on credit. Mos t settlers went heavily into debt 
between 1919 and 1930, not only to enlarge their holdings but also to 
equip themselves with farm machinery. 
The agricultural sector 
SOCIETY AFTER T H E FIRST W O R L D W A R 
O n the morrow of the First World W a r the majority (more than 80%) of 
the population of North Africa lived off the land in rural areas. T h e system 
of land tenure broadly comprised mulk land (private property), larsh or 
communal land and, in Tunisia and Morocco, habüs land (property in 
mortmain). T h e relative size of each category varied from one area to 
another: mulk land, for example, predominated in the settled areas around 
the towns and the well-watered plains of the Tell and the Sa'ïs in Morocco; 
while 'arsh land was mainly in the pastoral uplands, for instance among the 
Zä'er, w h o lived from seasonal grazing, and the semi-arid areas (the high 
plains of Algeria and Morocco and the high and low Tunisian steppe), 
where the way of life was based on the breeding of sheep, goats, camels 
and horses. 
In areas of mulk land there was a whole hierarchy of landowners, the 
top consisting of a minority of large landowners w h o concentrated in their 
hands a major part of the arable and pasture land. These large landowners 
were particularly c o m m o n in Morocco. In Algeria, too, despite the great 
growth of settler land, large Musl im holdings on the m o r r o w of the First 
World W a r covered a sizeable area; but nowhere near as m u c h as those 
of the large Moroccan landowners. 'Large estates were mainly in the 
arrondissements of Mustaghânim, M é d e a and Constantine. In the latter, 
there were 834 owners of more than 100 ha in 1914 and 1463 with an 
average of 185.4 ha in 1930. At that date the average was 263.7 ha in the 
arrondissement of Mustaghânim and 367.3 ha in that of M é d e a . Lastly, for 
6. C . R. Ageron, 1979, p. 487. 
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Algeria as a whole the 1930 statistics give 7035 proprietors, i.e. 1.1% 
holding 21% of the Muslim areas.'7 
In Tunisia also there was a landed aristocracy living in Tunis. Its land 
was mostly in the cereal-growing Tell (areas of Bedja, Mateur and the 
Këf). This land was farmed by fifth sharecropping, the khammäsät, prac-
tised throughout North Africa, which did not allow m u c h development 
of techniques or methods of cultivation. T h e category of 'middling' or 
'well-off landowners was not insignificant: it is said to have accounted 
for 22.6% of Algerian proprietors and held 34.8% of the total Muslim 
area in 1930.8 
Smallholdings were legion around the towns, in the fertile grain-growing 
plains such as those of the Sals in Morocco and the middle Medjerda in 
Tunisia, in the mountains where there were settled farmers (Kabylia, Rïf 
and the western High Atlas) and in the oases. 
Agricultural production and herd populations were liable to wide fluctu-
ations because of the irregular rainfall; famines, though on the decrease, 
were still frequent. In addition usury still wrought havoc in the countryside, 
and only large farmers had access to the credit institutions set up by 
Europeans. But early on in Tunisia (1907) and later in Morocco (1922) 
sociétés indigènes de prévoyance (indigenous provident societies) were set 
up, mainly to make seed loans9 to small fallähin. T h e colonial authorities' 
financial help for settlers was incomparably bigger. Thus , between 1917 
and 1929-30, for example, Moroccan fallähin10 obtained short-term loans 
through the sociétés indigènes de prévoyance amounting to 19 million M o r o c -
can francs; whereas long-term loans alone given to settlers (about 4000 in 
number) between 1925 and 1930 by the Caisse des Prêts Immobilier 
(Property Loan F u n d ) set up in 1920 reached 140 million francs.11 
C H A N G E S IN R U R A L SOCIETY U N D E R COLONIALISM 
Nevertheless North African rural society perceptibly developed on contact 
with the colonial occupation. O n the one hand, the big farmers took their 
cue from the settlers, and adopted with varying degrees of success their 
techniques and methods and even their crops (vines and soft wheat). O n 
the other, a great m a n y countryfolk working on settler farms or those of 
the big North African farmers became agricultural wage labourers, and 
were thus proletarianized: social inequalities became more entrenched after 
the First World W a r with the spread of agricultural mechanization. T h e 
7. ibid., p. 59. 
8. ibid. 
9. T h e very limited cash credit was subject to such strict conditions (binding commit-
ments, guarantees in the form of third-party sureties or liens on land, mortgages on title 
deeds, etc.) that only a minority of 'well-off' farmers could get it. 
10. T h e rural population in 1926 was estimated at 5450000 (87.9% of the total 
population. 
11. R . Hoffherr, 1932. 
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use of tractors and modern agricultural machinery gave the settlers and 
big indigenous farmers insatiable land hunger. T o m a k e their modern 
equipment profitable, whether they owned or hired it, they had continually 
to increase their output, and hence the size of their holdings; and this 
expansion was only possible, once the state land was used up , at the 
expense of the small and middling Muslim farmers, w h o were driven 
further and further back towards the mountainous areas or the foothills. 
In order to spread out also into the space used by the pastoral peoples of 
the steppes and take part of it for settlement, the colonial authorities set 
out by every possible means to sedentarize the peoples w h o lived in these 
areas and turn them into cereal-growing or orchard-farming peasants. In 
the Tunisian high steppes, for example, 'after the First World W a r , for 
every allocation of land to settlers there was a corresponding allocation 
intended to tie the local people to the land; and since 1922 m a n y small 
plots of uniform size have been distributed to the occupants of certain 
c o m m u n a l or habüs lands'.I2 
T h e consequence of this was the spread of settlement into areas where 
the indigenous peoples needed large areas of grazing for their cattle, and 
the start of a process of sedentarization that led to impoverishment and 
flight from the land. 
T h e colonial character of the n e w ways of organizing the 
infrastructure 
Mining 
European settlement in the three countries of North Africa meant not 
only the seizure by settlers of m u c h of the best land, but also the working 
of underground resources mainly for the benefit of foreign companies. 
These resources were prospected very early and exploited quickly. In 
Algeria the first mines were opened in 1845; in Tunisia the phosphate 
deposits at Kafsa were already discovered by 1885-6 (only four years after 
the establishment of the Protectorate) and exploited from 1889 on. 
In Morocco the first mining zahtr (decree) organizing mineral prospect-
ing and working dated from 1914: it laid d o w n the principle that 'the 
mine belongs to the first occupier', which led to abuses; the 1923 zahir, 
intended to put a stop to the manoeuvres of speculators by redrafting the 
mining regulations, only delayed the systematic working of the country's 
mineral resources. Apart from the Khüribka phosphates worked since 
1920, Morocco even in 1928 exported only some 8000 tonnes of ore. But 
prospectors and applicants for mining concessions fell on the country like 
a swarm of locusts: the number of search licences issued between 15 
September and 1 January 1939 reached 3500, while prospecting licences 
numbered 400. 
T h e discovery of the Djeräda coalfield in 1923 was to lead to another 
12. J. Despois, 1961. 
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redrafting of Moroccan mining legislation. In that year the Bureau de 
Recherches et de Participations Minières (Mining Research and Joint 
Stock Bureau) was set up, specializing in the search for solid and liquid 
fuels; while the zahïr of i November 1929 simplified earlier mining regula-
tions and protected the interests of the state. F r o m that time onwards the 
prospecting and working of mineral resources grew faster. T h e Djerâda 
coal basin, and also the Khenïfra iron ore deposits and the Iminï manganese 
deposits, were systematically explored and prospected; the AwlT lead mine 
on the upper Mulüja, one of the largest in North Africa, was brought 
into production and quickly equipped. T h e manganese deposits at A b u 
'Arafa, in south-eastern Morocco, were linked by rail to Wudjda in 1933, 
while the cobalt at A b u 'Azïz, the lead and zinc at Mibladen, the tin at 
Wulmïs and the molybdenum at Azzekür, in the High Atlas, were all 
brought into production. O n the eve of the economic crisis, Morocco was 
seemingly one of the North African countries richest in mineral resources. 
But it was phosphates above all that took pride of place, both in terms of 
tonnage produced and of quantities exported. Exports rose from 8232 
tonnes in 1921 to 1179000 tonnes in 1930. 
In Algeria and Tunisia deposits of phosphates (Kuwayf and Kafsa), 
iron ore (Benï Säf, Wenza and Djarïsa), lead, zinc, etc., had already been 
brought into production before the First World W a r , and nearly the whole 
output was exported to France and other West European countries. This 
mineral wealth was exploited entirely by foreign companies, which provided 
the capital, the technicians, the managers and so on. T h e Société des 
Mines d'Aouli et Mibladen, for example, was under the control of the 
Société Penarroya-Maroc, which was associated with the Banque de 
l'Union Parisienne-Mirabaud and also with the Banque de Paris et des 
Pays-Bas, Kuhlamann and the Bureau Minier de la France d'Outre-Mer. 
T h e zinc and lead mines at Tüwaysit were owned by the Belgian Compagnie 
Royale Asturienne des Mines; and the American Morgan group was one 
of the biggest shareholders in the Zellïdja mine. In Tunisia the Djarïsa 
iron ore mines were under the control of the Compagnie Algérienne de 
Crédit et de Banque, representing the Banque de l'Union Parisienne. In 
Algeria likewise all the mineral wealth was in the hands of foreign, particu-
larly French, capitalists. 
Communication and ports 
T o link the various mineral deposits to the export ports, railways were 
built very early in Algeria (from 1844) and in the early years of the 
Protectorate in Tunisia and Morocco. By 1919 the main lines of the 
Algerian and Tunisian railways were already set up: they linked the large 
towns (mostly near the coast) with each other and the mines with the 
main export ports (Oran, Algiers, Annäba, Tunis, Sfax and Sousse). In 
Morocco railway development was slower because of a clause in the Franco-
German treaty of 4 November 1913 prohibiting France from building any 
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railways before the construction of the Tangiers-Fez line (see Fig. 17.1). 
It was not until April 1923 that the first line, Casablanca-Rabat, was 
inaugurated. Unlike most of the Tunisian and Algerian lines, the Moroccan 
network consisted mainly of standard-gauge track (1.44 m ) . But like that 
of the other North African countries it was manifestly colonial in character, 
with the main lines linking the towns and ports with the Atlantic coast 
and the axial lines serving the mines and the large towns in the interior 
(Fez, Meknès and Marrakesh). It was built and run entirely by foreign 
companies. 
T h e road network was also planned to serve the big towns where most 
of the European population lived and those parts of the countryside where 
settler estates had been established. Most of the Algerian road network, 
for example, is in the northern Tell, where the European farms and the 
largest towns were concentrated. 
T h e same was true of the port infrastructure, which was planned and 
developed essentially in order to open up the countries of North Africa 
to French and foreign manufactured goods and to export minerals and 
agricultural produce. 
B y 1919, whereas the Algerian and Tunisian port infrastructure had 
already been built, Morocco's had hardly been begun. It was not until 
1917 that the fitting up of the port of Casablanca was completed. Traffic 
through this port grew rapidly and steadily, from 400000 tonnes in 1920 
to 2220000 tonnes (including 1198000 tonnes of phosphates) in 1927.13 
It handled over 80% of the total traffic through Moroccan ports. Traffic 
through Kenitra (formerly Port Lyautey), the second biggest port in 
Morocco, barely reached 191000 tonnes in 1927. 
T h e type of traffic through all the ports showed the colonial nature of 
the trade and the unequal relationships between the three countries of 
North Africa and France. 
T h e iniquity of the customs and fiscal system 
The customs system 
Algeria being a colony, Algerian and French merchandise was reciprocally 
admitted duty-free into the other country. Foreign goods imported into 
either France or Algeria were likewise liable to the same tariffs; and under 
the flag monopoly French shipping had the exclusive right to sail between 
Algeria and French ports. Thus there was a true customs union between 
France and Algeria, 'one of the most perfect met with in the world of 
economics'.14 But this union condemned Algeria to remain an exporter 
13. The ports, like the railways, were built by means of a series of public loans floated 
by the Moroccan administration and guaranteed by the French government (1916 loan 
and 1920 loan of 290 million francs). 
14. L . Bouis, 1946, Vol. II, p. 56. 
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of raw materials and agricultural produce and an importer of manufactured 
goods. 
T h e customs system in Tunisia on the morrow of the First World W a r 
was governed by the acts of 19 July 1890 and 2 M a y 1898. T h e latter 
gave a preferential position to French manufactured products, especially 
metal goods, machinery, textiles, etc. Similar foreign goods, however, were 
not liable to duty under the French tariff, so that the Tunisian market 
was flooded with manufactured products from France and foreign coun-
tries. A partial customs union was introduced in 1928: Tunisian agricultural 
produce admitted free of duty was no longer subject to quotas, but French 
goods were given either complete exemption from duty or protection 
against similar foreign goods. T h u s French goods could compete on the 
Tunisian market with those from other industrial countries, and sometimes 
even eliminate them, which had the effect of making imported goods 
dearer and paralysing Tunisian attempts at industrialization. 
Commercial and customs relations between Morocco and foreign coun-
tries were even more iniquitous and unequal. T h e Act of Algeciras (1906) 
laid d o w n the principle of strict economic equality between signatory 
countries on the Moroccan market. Wherever they came from and whatever 
bottoms they were carried in, goods entering Morocco were liable to a 
flat 10% ad valorem duty plus an additional 2.5% duty for the Caisse 
Spéciale des Travaux Publics (Special F u n d for Public Works) . This 'open 
door' system allowed the big exporting countries to flood Morocco with 
their manufactured goods and agricultural produce, with no quid pro quo 
except possibly the advantage of buying supplies at competitive prices 
during the fitting-out stage (1920-30). But with the beginning of the 
economic crisis Morocco felt the drawbacks of this system, which was 'a 
growing impediment to Moroccan prosperity as the country's activity 
began to m o v e towards a comprehensive economy in which infant industries 
would require the necessary protection'. ' s 
Morocco nevertheless had to have recourse to indirect protectionism 
restricting access for certain foreign foodstuffs. T h u s the zahtr of 22 
February 1921 m a d e the entry of wheats, barley and their derivatives 
subject to licence; that of 4 June 1929 virtually banned foreign wheats 
and flours; but manufactured goods continued to pour into Morocco on 
the same terms as in the past. 
T h e nature of North Africa's exports clearly demonstrated the nature 
of the North African economy and its customs system. Moroccan exports 
between 1920 and 1930, for example, consisted mainly of phosphates and 
cereals. T h e imbalance in the type of goods bought and sold by North 
Africa was responsible for the almost continual deficit on its balance 
of trade, imports by value being far higher than exports for all three 
countries (see Figs. 17.4, 17.5, 17.6). For example, the value of Tunisian 
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fig. 17.5 GlobalAlgerian trade, 1915-38 (after Encyclopédie de l'Empire Français,
1946)
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fig. 17.6 Trade with France as a percentage of global Algerian trade, 1920-38 (after
Encyclopédie de l'Empire Français, 1946)
imports reached 1984 million francs in 1929, whereas exports brought in
only 1408 million francs.
Finally, the customs system was largely responsible for the ruin of the
rural and urban craft industries.
The fiscal system
One of the first things the French authorities did when they took over
North Africa was to reorganize the financial and fiscal system. They set
up a Financial Administration whose first task was to draw up a budget
and check expenditure. Budgetary strictness and discipline enabled them
to balance receipts and expenditure, and this balance was frequently
achieved between 1919 and 1930. But as a result of the crisis expenditure
exceeded receipts; and in 1939 the Tunisian budget had a deficit of over
100 million French francs.
Revenue came mainly from customs duties and from taxes on land,
agricultural produce (tarttb in Morocco) and consumption goods (indirect
taxes), in short mainly from the indigenous population: 'spread over an
organic mass of native taxpayers, the [fiscal] burden on the natives often
became very heavy'.1*
In addition, in order to purchase equipment, the three North African
16. ibid., p. 292.
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countries had to borrow at frequent intervals. In 1930 Algeria owed France 
2000 million francs,17 while in 1932 Morocco's total indebtedness 
amounted to 1691 million francs.18 T h e equipment acquired by dint of 
these loans benefited first and foremost the modern sectors of the economy, 
which was dominated by European concerns; yet the bulk of these loans 
was redeemed out of Muslim m o n e y . In 1931 the servicing of Morocco's 
public debt absorbed more than a third of the country's budget. 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco during the great economic 
crisis (1930-5) 
T h e crisis and the major sectors of the e c o n o m y of North Africa 
T h e crisis hit North Africa a little late. Its full effects were felt from 1932 
onwards; but it came on earlier in Morocco than in Tunisia or Algeria,19 
the former being then right in the development phase of its economic 
potential. 
O n e of the first sectors of the economy affected by the crisis was settler 
agriculture, which, as w e have seen, was highly dependent on credit and 
foreign markets. O n c e prices collapsed and foreign outlets were shut off 
or became scarce, the mechanized but debt-ridden farmers could no longer 
honour their commitments to the various credit bodies to which they were 
indebted. Likewise with mining, which was totally dependent on foreign 
markets because mineral raw materials were hardly processed or used at 
all in the producer countries. 
T h e domestic economy was also hit by the crisis, its contribution to 
the export of agricultural produce being affected by the slump and the 
fall in prices. So were the craft industries, which played an important role 
in the economy of the big towns in Morocco (Fez, Meknès and Marrakesh) 
and in Tunisia (Tunis, Kayruwln and Sfax) and whose foreign outlets were 
practically cut off. 
The effects of the crisis on the settler economy 
AGRICULTURE 
T h e first European agricultural sector affected by the crisis was the one 
most dependent on foreign markets, especially the French market, namely 
the wine industry, whose exports (in Algeria, for example) represented 
66% by value of all exports in 1933. T h e average selling price of a hectolitre 
of wine, which in 1927 reached 168 francs, fell to 108 francs in 1931 and 
54 francs in 1934. T h e slump and superabundant harvests, especially the 
1935 one, led to the accumulation of enormous stocks of wine in Algerian 
and Tunisian cellars. N o w the wine industry, particularly in Algeria, was 
17. C . R. Ageron, 1979, p. 414. 
18. R . Hoffherr, 1932, p. 304. 
19. J. Berque, 1970. 
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one of the cornerstones of the settler economy. In Tunisia it provided 
a living for 1372 European proprietors: 'hence the bankruptcy of the wine 
industry could mean the bankruptcy of a large part of the French rural 
colony on whose settlement such care had been lavished'.20 
T h e crisis also affected the olive-oil industry, especially the Tunisian 
one, a third of whose annual output was exported, mainly to Italy but 
also to France. N o w Italy subsidized its olive-oil producers, to encourage 
them to export at low prices and to protect its olive-oil industry; and in 
1932 it imposed prohibitive duties on foreign oils. In 1935 it stopped its 
imports from France and the French empire in retaliation for the French 
embargo, adopted in pursuance of the League of Nations sanctions of 
5 October 1935 following the Italian aggression against Ethiopia. T h e drop 
in exports and prices21 admittedly hit Tunisian growers first; but it also 
hit the European planters in the Sfax area, w h o owned enormous estates 
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FIG. 17.7 Production and export of Tunisian olive oil, 1931-9 
(after Encyclopédie de l'Empire Français, 1946) 
20. J. Poncet, 1952, p. 300. 
21. T h e price of oil, which reached more than 1000 francs a quintal in the years 1925-8, 
fell to 700 francs in 1930 and 300 francs in 1933. 
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quintals in 1930, fell to under 200000 in 1936; 'this was another real 
disaster: it brought European planting to a halt, and marked the end of 
the expansion of French settlement in the Sfax area' (see Fig. 17.7).22 
T h e third agricultural venture, essential both to fallähin and settlers 
was cereal growing. Algerian settlers had over a million hectares of land 
under wheat in 1934; and in Morocco nearly 96% of the land farmed by 
Europeans was given over to cereal growing. But the settlers grew mostly 
soft wheat, intended for the French milling trade: in Tunisia, for example, 
nearly all the 160000 ha under soft wheat belonged to Europeans. In this 
sector too a drop in prices went hand in hand with a fall in exports; the 
value of European exports of Tunisian wheat, 291408000 francs in 1931, 
fell to 60845000 francs in 1934. 
T H E CRISIS IN T H E M I N E S 
T h e increase in mineral prices on the world market became unsteady in 
1927, and the downward trend in mineral exports emerged clearly in 1931. 
Shipments of Moroccan phosphate fell from 1779000 tonnes in 1930 to 
900731 tonnes in 1931; and Tunisian shipments from 3600000 tonnes 
bottomed out at 1623000 tonnes in 1932. While selling prices continued 
to fall, prime costs rose. In 1932 a tonne of Tunisian phosphate whose 
prime cost was 65.77 francs at the port of loading sold for 53.77 francs.23 
T h e same held good for other minerals (lead, zinc, iron, etc.). 
T h e crisis led to the closure of a great m a n y mines, especially those 
that were marginal or split up. 
The disruption of the Muslim economy by the crisis 
Given that the overwhelming majority of the population of North Africa 
m a d e its living out of agriculture, it was mainly in the agricultural sector 
that the effects of the crisis were most painfully felt. 
T h e main products disrupted by the crisis were cereals (particularly 
hard wheat and barley), wool and oil, especially in Tunisia. 
All categories of producers, both those that were part of the domestic 
and foreign agricultural marketing networks and also small fallähtn living 
on a subsistence economy, felt the painful effects of the crisis. For Tunisian 
hard wheat, for example, while the fall in prices between 1928 and 1931 
was only 20% of 1926 prices, it reached an average of 45% in 1932 and 
60% in 1935 (the bottom of the depression).24 For barley the fall in prices 
reached 75% of 1926 prices in 1935.2S Wool , produced and largely 
marketed by stock-breeders of all categories, fell in 1935 to 60% of the 
1926 price. T h e crisis likewise hit the craft industries, which were already 
22. J. Poncet, 1952, p. 302. 
23. Grand Council of Tunisia, Eleventh Session (November-December 1932). French 
Section, Report by Boissée, Director of the Chamber of Mining Interests, p. 29. 
24. A . Nouschi, 1970. 
25. H . el Annabi, 1975. 
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severely depressed by competition from imported manufactured goods. 
T h e Tunisian craft industries' share of Tunisian exports, for example, 
3 % in 1920-5, fell to 1.95% in 1930-5.26 
It is not surprising, in these circumstances, that in the three North 
African countries the overall value of external trade fell steadily between 
1931 and 1936. T h e value of Tunisian external trade fell in 1936 by nearly 
40% compared with 1927-8. In Morocco the total value of external trade 
fell from 3780606 francs in 1929 to 1750518 francs in 1935. Algerian 
external trade also fell off markedly, from 9983000 francs in 1930 to 
6702000 francs in 1936. 
Social effects of the crisis 
In the first place, the social effects were extremely serious. T h e debt-ridden 
settlers and North African farmers w h o could not honour their commit-
ments were faced with bankruptcy. A great m a n y of those w h o were not 
yet in debt had to take out loans and mortgage their possessions. T h e small 
and middling farmers, w h o did not have access to the banks or agricultural 
credit institutions, had to turn to moneylenders in the countryside or the 
towns in order to pay off their debts. 
T h e crisis considerably sharpened social divisions by enabling financiers 
(often also moneylenders), big business m e n and rich owners of blocks of 
plots in the town and the country to increase their wealth inordinately. 
Property and farming became increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
a minority of big property owners from the country (and often too from 
the towns). In Algeria 'this world crisis, marked by a catastrophic drop in 
cereal and sheep prices, made life difficult, on the other hand, for pro-
prietors of 50 to 100 ha, and aggravated the impoverishment of peasants 
on small parcels of land. Thus it is understandable that large areas were 
put up to auction and part of the land was bought up by the wealthiest 
people.'27 T h e formation of m a n y very large settler and Muslim estates 
dates from the time of the great crisis. With the farming crisis and natural 
calamities, drought and famine became commonplace in several parts of 
North Africa, particularly in the steppe areas. A considerable number of 
fallähm, ruined, starving or pursued by tax collectors, flocked to the towns. 
O n e of the consequences of the great crisis was intensification of the flight 
from the countryside and the establishment or growth of shanty-towns28 
on the outskirts of the towns. Henceforth no town of any size escaped 
this phenomenon, which took on enormous proportions during and after 
the Second World W a r . 
T h e economic depression led to the stoppage of building work and the 
closure of mines and workshops, and so brought about massive unemploy-
26. A . Kassab, 1976. 
27. C . R . Ageron, 1979, p. 509. 
28. For example, the shanty-towns of Ben Mslk at Casablanca, of Melâsïn and Djabal 
al-Ahmar at Tunis, and so on. 
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ment a m o n g townspeople, craftsmen and workers in all occupations. 'By 
1932 12% of workers in Algiers were unemployed . . . [in 1935], 77% of 
building workers were out of work in Algiers'.29 
Solutions to the crisis 
Government intervention 
A crisis of such proportions could not leave the authorities unconcerned; 
and the role of the state in the organization of the various sectors of the 
economy was considerably expanded as a result. T h e main measures taken 
by the colonial authorities and the government in France had to do with 
the agricultural sector; for most of the North African population m a d e 
their living out of it, and the future of European settlement depended on it. 
T h e steps taken to help the wine industry took the form for Tunisia 
in particular of increasing the quotas of wine admitted duty-free into the 
h o m e country. T h e extension of new vineyards was forbidden throughout 
North Africa, and the pulling up of vines was encouraged by the making 
of grants. 
A s regards cereal growing, several measures were taken by the govern-
ment to put it on its feet again. Stocks of hard wheat and soft wheat were 
built up, and stockpiling grants given; a m i n i m u m price was fixed for 
hard wheats and soft wheats, and the sale of stockpiled cereals was 
staggered; government-guaranteed warehouse warrants were issued, on 
which farmers could obtain bank loans of up to more than two-thirds of 
the value of the produce; and measures adopted in France to control, 
protect and regulate the cereals market were applied in the three North 
African countries. 
Semi-governmental agencies (Office des Céréales, Office de l'Huile, and 
Office du Vin) were set up to apply these measures in the respective sectors. 
T o end the foreclosures and prosecutions directed against insolvent 
settlers and farmers, the Caisse des Prêts de Consolidation (Consolidation 
Loan F u n d ) (1932) was set up in Algeria and the Caisse Foncière (Land 
Fund) (1932) and the Caisse Tunisienne de Crédit et de Consolidation 
(Tunisian Credit and Consolidation F u n d ) (1934) in Tunisia. Days of 
grace, debt reductions and mortgage loans could also be granted to debtors 
threatened with expropriation. 
T h e distress in the rural communities, and the resultant nationalist 
unrest, led the French authorities to investigate the lot of the North African 
fallähtn. F r o m 1933 to 1935 a peasant policy was introduced in the three 
countries of North Africa. 
The peasant policy 
In Algeria the Act of 9 July 1933 established a Fonds C o m m u n des Sociétés 
29. C . R. Ageron, 1979, p. 43. 
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Indigènes de Prévoyance (Pool of Indigenous Provident Societies), which 
enabled the Administration to give loans and grants to Musl ims alone 
through the Société Indigènes de Prévoyance. T h e Pool also helped, on 
the same basis as the Caisse des Prêts Agricoles (Agricultural Loans F u n d ) , 
to get fallähin out of debt by giving them consolidation loans. A 'social 
economy' department in the Directorate of Native Affairs instituted certain 
measures to modernize the production techniques of the fallähin; it gave 
long-term loans for tree-planting, and m a d e advances for the purchase of 
fertilizers, ploughs, etc. But all these measures, useful though they were, 
were nowhere near enough: the loans to farmers were frittered away ' a m o n g 
a myriad offallähin',30 and the steps taken to modernize M u s l i m agriculture 
and stiffen up the fallähin were not really persevered with. 
In Tunisia and M o r o c c o the state also set out to inject credit into the 
countryside, settle land-tenure problems and diversify the agricultural 
production systems of the fallähin. But the legislation enacted was not 
backed u p by large-scale campaigns to improve and expand the production 
methods of the herdsmen and fallähin or enlarge the holdings of the poorest 
ones. 
Nerv trends in agriculture; the persistently colonial nature of the economic 
system 
T h e economic crisis clearly showed the dangers of monoculture, the pre-
dominant system in particular a m o n g European farmers. T h e government 
promoted crop diversification by encouraging the extension of orchard 
farming and market gardening and developing irrigation. 
T h e interruption of Spanish and Italian fruit exports to France because 
of the Spanish Civil W a r , and the application of sanctions against Italy 
by the League of Nations, laid the French market wide open to North 
African fruit production and contributed to a very rapid development 
of fruit-tree cultivation, particularly citrus fruits. E n o r m o u s orchards of 
orange trees, clémentine trees and lemon trees were planted in the Mitidja 
in Algeria, on C a p e B o n in Tunisia and in the Casablanca, Khenïfra, 
M e k n è s , W u d j d a , etc. areas in M o r o c c o . Semi-governmental bodies such 
as the Office Tunisien de Standardisation were set u p to organize the 
packing, sale and export of the fruit. 
T h e growth of market gardening and early vegetable and fruit gardening 
in the coastal plains w a s linked to that of irrigation and to the tapping of 
underground water and streams. In M o r o c c o d a m s were built on the W â d ï 
Baht (1934), on the U m m al-Rabfa at Kasba-Zaydäniya, in the Tadla 
(1936) and on the W â d ï NafTs at Lalla Takerkust (1936). Irrigated areas 
were laid out in the Sïdï Sulajmân area, the plain of the Tadla, the plain 
of the Triffas, etc. 
In Tunisia large olive groves were planted in the grain-growing areas 
of the Tell, particularly on the big settler estates. 
30. ibid., p. 497. 
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Nevertheless the economy of North Africa remained essentially agri-
cultural. There were only a few processing industries using as raw material 
either local agricultural produce, namely flour-mills, oil mills, distilleries, 
pasta factories, breweries and canneries, or minerals; these latter were 
given either an initial processing (e.g. lead smelters) or a more complex 
preparation (e.g. hyperphosphate and superphosphate plants) before being 
exported. 
Firms, mostly small, were almost entirely in the hands of Europeans, 
and the number of workers in industry was not large: 40000 3 1 for the 
whole of Algeria in 1938. Despite the highly under-industrialized state 
of the country, the towns of North Africa were nevertheless growing 
very rapidly. T h e proportion of built-up area in Morocco, 7 % at the 
beginning of the century, rose to over 15% in 1936. T h e population of 
the big commercial centres (Casablanca, Algiers and Tunis) rose by leaps 
and bounds. Casablanca, which had only 20000 inhabitants in 1900, had 
257400 in 1936. With little industry, these towns with a superabundant 
tertiary sector acted as magnets for countryfolk in search of work. 
O n the eve of the Second World W a r the economy of North Africa 
was typically — as a colonial system - dualist and extraverted. T h e sectors 
of the economy in which North Africans predominated suffered from 
arrested development because of lack of finance, the survival of archaic 
practices, fragmentation of land holdings and the fact that they had been 
driven back to the marginal land. North Africans were in fact excluded 
from the modern sectors of the economy (banking, mining, processing 
industries and development project planning and implementation bodies). 
But these sectors themselves, dominated as they were by foreign capital, were 
closely dependent on outside decision-making centres and markets, whose 
options and fluctuations they could only more or less passively suffer. 
Part II: Libya, Egypt and the Sudan 
A . A . ABDUSSALAM and F. S. ABUSEDRA 
Libya 
During the colonial period, the economy of Tripoli evolved around two 
main activities, namely agriculture (including animal husbandry) and trade. 
Agriculture was carried out in the rural areas while trade was conducted 
in the cities. These two activities were the main occupation and source of 
income for most of the population. N o attempt was made by the Turkish 
31. C R . Ageron, 1979. 
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rulers to change this situation. T h e Italians, however, tried to introduce 
some drastic changes in the economy. T h e first part of this section deals 
with the late years of the Ottoman rule, while the second part describes 
the economy under the Italian occupation. 
T h e e c o n o m y of Libya during O t t o m a n domination (1880-1911) 
T h e economy was stagnant during the period of the Ottoman administra-
tion and economic activities were confined to agriculture, trade and small 
handicrafts. Agriculture remained traditional during the Ottoman rule. 
Animal-drawn wooden ploughs were used to till the soil. T h e main crops 
were wheat and barley. Other crops were dates, olive oil, citrus fruit and 
livestock. Agricultural production depended to a large extent on rainfall 
which varied from season to season. H u g e numbers of livestock were raised 
in the plains of Cyrenaica and Tripoli. S o m e of these animals were exported 
to neighbouring countries. It was estimated that the total export of sheep 
in 1906 was about 500000. Export of livestock from Cyrenaica alone in 
1908 was about 58000 head of cattle and 340000 head of sheep. 
In the field of trade, due to the lack of paved roads and the absence of 
modern means of transportation, caravans were used not only to carry 
merchandise between local cities, but also between the main cities in 
Tripoli and other neighbouring countries in Africa. There were five main 
caravan routes, three going to the south, one to the east and the other to 
the west (see Fig. 17.8). O n e caravan route went from Tripoli to K a n o (in 
Nigeria), passing through Ghadämes , Ghat, Air and Zinder. T h e second 
route went from Tripoli to Borno (in Nigeria) via M u r z u k , Tadjarhï, 
Bilma, Nuigni and K u k a w a . T h e third route went from Benghazi to Wadai 
(in Chad) by way of Awdjîla, Kufra and Tibesti. Other routes went from 
Benghazi to Sallüm (in Egypt) in the east and from Tripoli to Tunisia in 
the west.32 
T h e caravan trade carried glassware, dresses, silk, spices and paper to 
Borno and Wadai and brought back commodities such as leather, ivory 
and ostrich feathers. But from the end of the nineteenth century, the 
caravan trade started to decline. T h e colonization of other African countries 
brought about n e w and cheaper routes. Modern and more efficient methods 
of transportation replaced the old ones. Consequently, the importance of 
the caravan trade slowly diminished. O n the other hand, Tripoli and 
Benghazi, the main ports, did a brisk business with Europe and other 
neighbouring countries. T h e exports to these countries included cattle, 
sheep, wool, goat- and camel-hair, dates, barley, wheat and esparto grass. 
Imports included cotton and silk textiles, glass, firearms, rice, sugar, tea 
and coffee. T h e main trading partners were Italy, England, Malta, Egypt, 
Tunisia, France, Austria, Germany and Greece. 
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Industry was carried out on a small scale and was confined to a few 
handicrafts. These small industries included textiles, mat-making, tanning, 
soap and some gold and silver works. B y 1911, there were about 2000 
looms for weaving cotton, 550 looms for weaving wool and about 120 looms 
for weaving silk.33 These local industries produced national dress for both 
m e n and w o m e n . Tents and carpets were also h o m e - m a d e products. S o m e 
privately-owned small factories made fine ornaments, such as bracelets, 
rings and earrings. Other industries such as salt and tobacco were m o n o -
polized by the government. 
Although the second Ottoman reign in Tripoli lasted for more than 
seventy years (1835-1911), little effort was made to develop the Libyan 
economy. There was no conscious policy to improve the economic infra-
structure such as roads, ports and the educational system. F e w technical 
schools were operating in the country at the time. T h e neglect of the 
economy could be attributed partly to the fact that Turkey was preoccupied 
by her o w n problems. She was at war with some of her neighbours, while 
also trying desperately to hold on to her possessions in Europe and to 
save the empire from disintegrating. A s a result, little attempt was m a d e 
to foster the economy of Libya. All that the Turkish administration seemed 
to care about was to collect taxes. 
T h e tax system which was implemented in Tripoli during the Ottoman 
rule included a head tax on male adults, a tithe on agricultural products 
and an income tax. Other taxes included a real-estate tax, inheritance tax 
and a tax for exemption from military services which was levied on non-
Muslim male adults; a tax on stamping gold and silver and customs duties 
were imposed on exported and imported goods.34 Furthermore, the govern-
ment gained sizeable revenues from monopolizing salt and tobacco. Those 
taxes added to the burden of the economy and contributed to its sluggish 
growth. T h e y also precipitated several revolts which caused political in-
stability and weakened Turkish control of the country. 
T h e Libyan e c o n o m y during the Italian occupation (1911-42) 
T h e Italian interest in Libya began late in the nineteenth century. Like 
other European powers, Italy wanted to secure a foothold in North Africa. 
But it was not until early in the twentieth century that Italy embarked 
on her colonization policy. In the beginning, Italy wanted to accomplish 
this goal by peaceful means, and used the Banco di R o m a as her Trojan 
Horse. 
T h e Banco di R o m a was the first Italian financial institution to operate 
in Libya. It opened for business in Tripoli in 1907. Soon afterwards, it 
opened several branches in other cities and widened the scope of its 
operations. Its activities were not confined to financial matters but also 
33. ibid., p. 79. 
34. A . J. Cachia, 1975, pp. 72 ff. 
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included business ventures in industry, agriculture and transportation. 
T h e bank established plants for processing olive oil, flour mills in Tripoli 
and a sheep farm in Cyrenaica. In addition, it inaugurated shipping lines 
between the major Libyan cities and the neighbouring countries, and also 
bought land and sent survey teams to explore the country's mineral re-
sources. These activities and others aroused suspicion about its real role 
in Libya. Consequently, the bank's activities were restricted, if not frus-
trated, by the Turkish authorities.35 T h e hostile attitude towards the Banco 
di R o m a was one of the pretexts used by Italy to invade Libya in 1911 
(see Chapter 5). 
Economic policy during the period of Italian occupation 
W h e n Italy invaded Libya in 1911, she had a dream of making her n e w 
colony a source of raw materials for Italian industry, a market for Italian 
products and a means of solving Italy's population problem. T h e Italian 
intention was to make Libya an integral part of Italy and every effort was 
geared towards accomplishing this aim. T h e Italians invested heavily in 
agriculture, industry and infrastructure. 
AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS 
T h e Italian agricultural programme in Libya passed through two distinct 
stages, namely private settlement and colonial settlement. 
T o encourage colonial settlement of Libya in the early stages of the 
Italian occupation, the Italian government granted large estates to wealthy 
Italians in order to develop them for agricultural purposes. These lands 
were either government lands or lands which were expropriated from their 
original owners. B y 1929, about 58087 ha of land had been acquired. T h e 
estates were leased to Italian farmers for ninety years. At a later sta^e, 
these concessionaires were required to settle more Italian farmers with 
them, a matter which burdened both the original settlers and the govern-
ment. T h e government subsidies to the private settlers amounted to £ 6 2 
million, in addition to a loan of nearly £158 million from a savings fund.36 
Only about 2031 families were settled according to this plan, which was 
far below the Italian expectations.37 Therefore, the Italian government 
embarked on a n e w settlement scheme with the aim of speeding up the 
settlement process but was not able to carry out any major development 
programme until the national resistance ended in 1932. 
Shortly after the suppression of the national resistance (for details see 
Chapter 5 above), the Italian government set out to implement an ambitious 
development scheme encompassing certain parts of Libya, especially Al-
Djabal al-Akhdar (the Green Mountain). Its goal was to resettle about 
35. F . Malgeri, 1970, pp. 17 ff. 
36. M . M . Sharkasi, 1976, pp. 67^71. 
37. ibid., p. 71. 
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300000 Italians in a period of 25 years.38 This job was entrusted to private 
and semi-public institutions which pooled together whatever resources 
they could muster from both the private and public sectors and channelled 
them to finance the n e w development plan. These institutions were the 
E N T E per la colonizzione delle Libia ( E N T E ) , Instituto Nazionale della 
Providenza Sociale (INPS) and the Azienda Tabacci Italiani (ATI). T h e 
scheme included clearing land, providing water supply, erecting farm 
buildings and related facilities and providing stock and equipment to the 
settlers. T h e farmers, in turn, were to pay for the development expenses 
by handing over most of their produce to these institutions, the value of 
which was credited to their accounts.39 After a certain period of time, the 
settlers would be able to o w n their farms. U p to 1936 the settlement 
project had cost about £800 million and only 85000 Italians had been 
resettled.40 
INDUSTRY 
T h e Italians did not establish major industries in Libya but they did 
develop some of the small industries which already existed before the 
Italian invasion. A small tuna-processing plant was established in Tripoli 
and the capacity of the olive-oil processing plant was increased to 2200 
tonnes annually.41 T h e production of salt grew markedly, rising from about 
14000 tonnes annually in 1927 to an annual average of 50000 tonnes in 
1937.42 Moreover, a second and bigger tobacco factory was established in 
Tripoli in 1923. T w o shoe factories were also built, one in Tripoli in 1923 
and the other in Benghazi in 1929. Food-processing plants and textile 
factories continued to produce on a larger scale. Other industries which 
were operating at the time included building materials, asphalt, gunpowder, 
fats and soap. During the period under study, there were about 789 fac-
tories, most of them in Tripoli. T h e local handicrafts industry continued to 
exist during the Italian occupation because of its character and the smallness 
of the market. 
DEVELOPING T H E INFRASTRUCTURE 
Prior to the Italian occupation the infrastructure of Libya was grossly 
underdeveloped and the Italian government therefore had to invest 
massively in it. It built roads, railways, ports, a modern communication 
system, hydraulic works and public buildings. T h e investment expenditure 
in these areas amounted to 870 million lire for the period between 1913 
and 1936.43 T h e purpose of such massive investment in the infrastructure 
38. ibid., p. 72. 
39. J. Lindberg, 1952, p. 11. 
40. M . M . Sharkasi, 1976, p. 72. 
41. ibid., pp. 33-4. 
42. ibid. 
43. J. Lindberg, 1976, p. 46. 
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was to develop the economy to benefit Italy. T h e object was to provide 
jobs for the Italian population and to secure a potential market for Italian 
products. 
This huge investment, however, was not without its cost to the Libyans. 
T h e Libyan population had been reduced by the war. M a n y people died 
fighting the Italian occupation. Others perished in concentration camps. 
Moreover, large groups migrated to neighbouring countries. Those w h o 
survived the concentration camps were herded, in semi-slave conditions, 
to build the coastal road and n e w agricultural development projects. T h e 
Italian aim was to drive out the local population to the marginal land in 
the interior and to resettle the surplus Italian population in the most fertile 
lands of Libya. 
T h e Italians also reduced the number of livestock in Libya. For years 
the Libyan population in the interior had been dependent on sheep and 
camels for food, as a source of raw materials and as a means of transporta-
tion. H u g e numbers of livestock were either killed or confiscated by the 
Italians. W h a t remained of these animals was further reduced by starvation 
w h e n they were moved from the pastoral land to inhospitable areas near 
the concentration camps. Table 17.1 shows the drastic decline in the 
number of animals during the period of the Italian occupation. 























T h e Italians did not know the extent of the damage they had inflicted on 
the animal wealth of Libya until after the resistance ended in 1932. While 
they tried to encourage animal husbandry, it took years before the animal 
wealth could be restored to its original level. This was mainly because of 
the damage which had weakened the economic base and impoverished the 
population and reduced their ability to save. 
Finally, to m a k e things worse, the Italians did not train the Libyans in 
administration nor did they provide them with adequate education. A s K . 
Folayan has pointed out, 'while the Italians (about 10% of the total popula-
tion) had in 1939-40 eighty-one elementary schools for their children, the 
Libyans w h o constituted more than 85% of that population were given 
only ninety-seven schools'.45 There were also seven secondary schools for 
the Italians and only three for the Libyans. Even in the police and military 
services no Libyan national could be promoted beyond the rank of sergeant. 
Only a handful of Libyans were permitted to assume relatively important 
44. J. A . Allan, K . S. McLachland and E . T . Penrose (eds), 1973, p. 52. 
45. K . Folayan, 1974, p. 7. 
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administrative jobs after 1934. T h e lack of trained personnel impeded 
economic development in Libya for m a n y years to c o m e . 
Egypt 
M u h a m m a d 'All's military defeat in 1840 marked the end of an important 
phase of Egypt's modern economic history. His system called for the 
simultaneous development of both agriculture and industry under the 
control and ownership of the state, and his schemes started the country 
on the road leading to an export-oriented economy. 4 6 T h e trend he had 
initiated was reinforced during the period between 1850 and 1920. All 
economic activities were geared to the cultivation and the export of cotton, 
thus converting Egypt into a highly specialized monocrop economy. During 
the 1920s, Egypt witnessed a trend towards industrialization, mainly by 
import substitution. T h e period under consideration was characterized by 
two main trends. T h e first was towards concentration on agriculture, 
especially cotton, for export. T h e second was towards industrialization. 
Several structural changes occurred to accommodate these trends. This 
section will discuss the factors that led to each phase. 
Exported-oriented e c o n o m y 
The development of the infrastructure 
T h e period under study witnessed an impressive infrastructural develop-
ment of the country. This was, however, concentrated on activities related 
to cotton and its export. Major irrigation projects were undertaken. T h e 
Aswan d a m , the largest in the world at that time, was completed in 1902 
and m a d e higher in 1907-10; the Delta barrage was reinforced and put 
into service, and so also were the Zifta, Asyût and Esna barrages. About 
13 500 k m of canals were dug during Ismail's reign (1863-^79). T h u s the 
cultivated area rose from 4.76 million feddäns in 1881 to 5.66 million in 
1911. It was also possible after the extension of the perennial irrigation 
to grow more than one crop. Therefore, the crop area increased to 7.71 
million feddäns in 1911.47 T h e bulk of the increase was used u p by cotton 
not only because it was more profitable than other crops but also because 
of British encouragement since cotton was both a cash crop which enabled 
Egypt to pay her debts and a much-needed raw material for Lancashire. 
In other words, the British wanted and successfully kept Egypt as a source 
of cotton to supply their textile industry.48 T h e size of the cotton crop 
increased from 3.12 million kantärs in 1879 to 7.66 million in 1913, a 
140% increase during a period of twenty-four years.49 
46. C . Issawi, 1963, p. 24. 
47. C . Issawi, 1954, p. 34. Feddän = 0.56 ha. 
48. ibid., p. 35. 
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T h e need to m o v e the cotton crop required an expansion of the trans-
portation and the communication network, on which most effort was 
consequently concentrated (see Fig. 17.8). Railways connecting all major 
cities of the Delta, and from Cairo to U p p e r Egypt were completed. T h e 
first railway was opened in 1853 a n d by 1877 there were 1519 k m of 
standard-gauge railways. These railways were more than doubled during 
the British occupation reaching 3200 k m in 1909. In addition there were 
1600 k m of light railways. Harbour facilities at Alexandria were modernized 
and repeatedly enlarged and new ports at Suez and Port Said were built 
on the Suez Canal, which was opened for navigation in 1869. Such develop-
ments greatly facilitated the transformation of the agricultural sector from 
subsistence farming to the cultivation of cash crops on a large scale for 
export to international markets. 
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the main economic impact of the 
British administration was largely felt in these fields of irrigation and 
transportation. T h e reconstruction of several barrages and the construction 
of the A s w a n d a m ensured Egypt perennial irrigation and increased the 
total crop area. However, it must be remembered that the British were 
trying to develop alternative sources for their cotton requirements. Instead 
of relying solely on the United States for the supply of cotton to their 
textile industry as was the case before the American Civil W a r , other 
sources were sought. Egypt had comparative advantages over other possible 
suppliers like India and Brazil. In other words, the main concern of the 
British was to secure a stable source of raw material for their textile 
industry. Hence , it was not surprising that most of the government capital 
expenditure was directed towards the promotion of the export sector. It 
was argued that a considerable investment in the irrigation network, despite 
Egypt's difficult financial situation, was necessary to increase the revenues 
to repay Egypt's foreign debts. Cotton was the main beneficiary of invest-
ment in public works. Other sectors that benefited were those related to 
the needs of the export sector. 
Free-trade policy 
O n e of the fundamental changes that characterized the phase under study 
was the government's belief in a free-trade policy. This belief was in 
contrast to M u h a m m a d 'Alfs approach which defended government inter-
vention as a necessary step towards development. Lord Cromer , the British 
financial advisor and the senior British official in Egypt for twenty-four 
years, was a laissez-faire economist. H e opposed granting protection 
through import duties to any infant industry. His negative attitude towards 
Egypt's textile companies is a good example. H e argued that 'it would be 
detrimental to both English and Egyptian interests to afford any encourage-
ment to the growth of a protected cotton industry in Egypt'.5 0 
50. Quoted by C . Issawi, 1954, p. 37. 
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In any case, the Egyptian government w a s b o u n d b y international trade 
agreements that prevented it from protecting infant industries even if it 
had desired to d o so. According to the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1838, 
foreign traders could b u y and sell a n y w h e r e within the O t t o m a n empire 
at a uniform duty of 8 % ad valorem or less.51 This treaty opened the 
empire to free trade, a n d foreign goods began to flood the unprotected 
Egyptian market . It has been argued that the treaty 'inhibited for m o r e 
than a century any n e w attempt at industrialization by the state'.52 T h e s e 
agreements expired on 16 February 1930, a n d Egypt regained her fiscal 
a u t o n o m y . This , as w e shall see, enabled her to change the structure of 
customs duties in such a w a y as to protect the emerging domestic industry. 
This tariff reform brought about the import-substitution phase. 
Investment pattern 
T h e investment pattern that prevailed during this period favoured agri-
culture. Gross fixed-capital formation during the period 1880-1914 
a m o u n t e d to 1 5 % of the gross domestic product ( G D P ) . This is a high 
investment ratio w h e n c o m p a r e d with other countries. H o w e v e r , mos t of 
the investment went to agriculture and urban building whereas the share 
of industry did not exceed 2 . 3 % of all gross fixed-capital formation ( G F C F ) . 
M o s t writers explain this pattern of capital accumulation in terms of 
relative profitability, arguing that investment in agriculture w a s m o r e 
profitable a n d less risky than in industry. H o w e v e r , R . M a b r o and S . 
R a d w a n have argued that other factors, mainly government policy, give 
a better explanation.53 
Egyptian investors preferred land and property to investment in indus-
trial projects because social prestige w a s bestowed o n landowners. Being 
a m e m b e r of the 'agrarian bourgeoisie' also gave privileges since this class 
w a s at the top of the social hierarchy. H e n c e , there w a s a clear trend 
towards concentration of large holdings of agricultural land. T h e n u m b e r 
of large landowners (owning 50 feddäns or m o r e ) represented 1 5 % of all 
landowners in 1897 a n d held 4 4 % of total agricultural area. In 1913 the 
large landowners represented less than 1% of all owners , but held 4 4 . 2 % 
of the agricultural land. Therefore, the size of the average large holding 
increased from 183 to 193 feddäns during the s a m e period.54 Th i s develop-
m e n t w a s important since investments b y those owners w a s concentrated 
o n land and resulted in a biased investment pattern. M o r e o v e r , foreigners 
enjoyed a fiscal and judicial i m m u n i t y under the Capitulations which gave 
t h e m the edge over Egyptian competitors w h e n it c a m e to industrial invest-
m e n t . H o w e v e r , not m u c h interest w a s s h o w n in the unprotected Egyptian 
market, and industrialization w a s negligible until the 1930s. 
51. D . C . M e a d , 1967, p. 15. 
52. R . Mabro, and S. Radwan, 1976, p. 18. 
53. ibid., p. 21. 
54. ibid., p. 25. 
450 
The colonial economy: North Africa 
It w a s also argued b y the Egyptian administration that the encourage-
m e n t of cotton a n d its export w a s necessary to increase the country's 
revenues and to enable E g y p t to repay its debts. T h e accumulation of a 
h u g e public debt b e g u n in 1858 w a s to finance the infrastructural projects 
as well as the extravagances of s o m e of the m o n a r c h s . T h e law of liquidation 
of 1880 had fixed Egypt ' s public debt at £ 9 8 . 3 7 million and during the 
next twenty years a further £ 1 8 . 2 million w a s b o r r o w e d . Egypt's liabilities 
to foreigners h a d reached £E 8.5 million per a n n u m b y 1 9 1 4 . a 5 Establishing 
export surplus w a s vital to meet those liabilities. 
T h e A m e r i c a n Civil W a r stimulated the production a n d export of cotton 
in E g y p t . O u t p u t increased from a little over half a million kantärs in 
i860 to over 2.1 million in 1865, to 4.1 million in 1890 a n d to 7 .7 million 
in 1913. H o w e v e r , after the rapid increase in the price of cotton caused 
b y the A m e r i c a n Civil W a r , prices continued to fall until the end of the 
century and the rise in production w a s insufficient to offset the fall in 
prices. D u r i n g the first decade of this century, cotton prices m o r e than 
doubled, and the value of the crop rose to over three times w h a t it h a d 
been at the beginning of the occupation. In 1916 cotton prices rose to an 
average of U S $ 3 8 a n d again to U S $90 per kantär in 1919; exports 
j u m p e d to £E 8 8 million in 1920 a n d a large export surplus w a s built u p . 5 6 
T h e financial achievement of the British administration w a s to ensure 
the proper collection a n d administration of the increased revenues accruing 
to the government out of this surplus. Fiscal reform in the form of reducing 
expenditure, except those considered remunerative like irrigation w o r k s , 
w a s undertaken. Increasing revenues from exports repaid all loans c o n -
tracted during the occupation as well as reducing Ismail's debt b y s o m e 
£ 1 0 million b y 1913. 
T h e import-substitution phase 
T h e r e is n o doubt that the British administration carried out m a n y reforms 
that benefited the Egyptian e c o n o m y . T h e major achievements w e r e in 
the financial field, irrigation w o r k s , a n d in efficient administration. H o w -
ever, it is equally true that the British administration's attitude towards 
the industrialization of E g y p t w a s hostile while the free-trade policy re-
sulted in deepening Egypt's concentration o n cotton. B u t during the late 
1920s, several important changes w e r e introduced w h i c h m a r k the begin-
ning of a n e w era w h e n attention w a s directed towards industry. O n e of 
the important reasons for these changes w a s the great depression w h i c h 
resulted in a s l u m p of international d e m a n d for r a w materials, including 
cotton. This , in turn, w a s reflected in a severe deflation of all activities 
in the Egyptian e c o n o m y . Therefore, the g o v e r n m e n t policy of free trade 
c a m e under increasing pressure a n d calls for g o v e r n m e n t intervention g r e w 
55. C . Issawi, 1963, p. 27. 
56. ibid., p. 31. 
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stronger. In addition, Egypt's terms of trade deteriorated during the late 
1920s. This added more thrust to the pressure to move out of cotton -
which continued to form the bulk of the exports — into other items. This 
period also witnessed the emergence of a strong nationalist movement. 
T h e 1919 revolution marked the peak of the growth of the Egyptian 
nationalism which was reflected in the emergence of national entrepreneurs 
with new ideas regarding the future development of Egypt. Furthermore, 
while the increase in agricultural output during the final decades of the 
nineteenth century kept pace with population growth, this was not the 
case during the first part of the twentieth century; total output in agriculture 
grew by 30% while the growth of the population was close to 50%.57 
Egypt's population was outrunning the absorptive capacity of agriculture, 
and other sectors had therefore to be developed to find productive employ-
ment outlets and to raise the per capita income. Finally, owing to shortages 
of imports during the First World W a r , several n e w industries came into 
being and needed protection if they were to continue in the face of increas-
ing foreign competition. 
It was for all these reasons that, after the country had attained fiscal 
autonomy in 1930, the government imposed tariffs of 15 to 20% on a 
wide range of consumer goods likely to compete with domestic products. 
T h e following decades saw tariff protection extended to all competing 
foreign goods. A n e w phase of economic growth through import substitu-
tion had thus begun. Several indices showed the growth of industry. T h e 
first was the rise in industrial employment. In 1937, about 155000 persons 
worked in manufacturing establishments employing ten persons or more 
as compared with 30000 in 1916. Another index was the increase in 
industrial output. For example, sugar production increased from 79000 
tonnes in 1917 to 159000 tonnes in 1939; cement output rose from 24000 
tonnes to 353 000 tonnes over the same period; and the production of 
mechanically woven cotton cloth increased from 7.2 million sq m in 1917 
to 132.6 million sq m in 1939.S8 A third index was the high percentage 
of local requirements of certain industrial commodities which local produc-
tion could satisfy by 1939, as shown in Table 17.2. 
Another important development was the emergence of national enter-
prises during the 1920s. T h e first purely Egyptian-owned and -managed 
bank, Bank Misr, was founded in 1920. It pioneered the development of 
large-scale manufacturing firms. T h e bank managed to attract private 
capital away from the traditional investment channels; by 1940 the Misr 
group included twenty-one affiliated companies. It was estimated that the 
share of Bank Misr industrial companies amounted to 45% of the increase 
in the total paid-up capital of all joint-stock industrial companies during the 
1922-38 period. T h u s , Bank Misr gave a big push to the industrial develop-
ment of Egypt during the inter-war period. Investment during the period 
57. D . C . Mead, 1967, p. 16. 
58. C . Issawi, 1963, p. 44. 
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showed an increasing participation of local capital. T h e successive cotton 
crises, the high profits expected at some branches of industry as shown 
by the profit m a d e by foreigners engaged in local industry, and the estab-
lishment of national investment opportunities by Bank Misr and its c o m -
panies changed the investment behaviour towards industrial projects. 
In conclusion, the period under consideration witnessed several attempts 
at achieving economic development. After the failure of M u h a m m a d 'All's 
plan to carry on a forced programme of industrialization without having 
adequate infrastructure, the economy was led to specialization in one crop 
for export. This trend was reinforced under the British occupation which 
encouraged the expansion of cultivable land and cotton exports. There 
were three main arguments advanced to support this trend. O n e was that 
free trade and specialization according to comparative advantage would 
result in higher welfare. T h e second was that revenues were needed to 
pay for the accumulated public debt. T h e third was that international 
treaties limited Egypt's ability to provide protection to new industries. 
T h e result was an export-oriented economy. O n the other hand, the first 
three decades of the twentieth century were characterized by structural 
transformation of the economy towards industrialization. This was due to 
several factors, namely, the successive agricultural crises resulting in the 
deterioration of Egypt's terms of trade, the emergence of national enter-
prises, the reattainment of fiscal autonomy and the change in government 
policy or attitude towards industry. Industry, therefore, grew rapidly 
towards the end of the period under review. 
The Sudan 
In the last part of the nineteenth century, the Sudan, as it has been seen 
already, witnessed the rise of a religious movement which sparked a revolt 
against the Turco-Egyptian rule of the Sudan and culminated in the 
establishment of the Mahdist state from 1881 to 1898. At about the same 
59. M . M . el-Kammash, 1968, p. 41. 
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time, Egypt fell to the British, and, later on, the Sudan was reoccupied by 
Britain. T h e n , the Sudan came under Anglo-Egyptian rule. T h e first part 
of this section deals briefly with the situation under the Mahdist state, 
while the second part will highlight the major developments during the 
Anglo-Egyptian rule. 
The Mahdist state (1881-98) 
T h e Mahdist state set up its o w n type of administration as well as a judicial 
system. O n e of the outstanding achievements of the Mahdist administration 
was the establishment of a simple and practical tax system which was 
based on Islamic teachings. Zakät comprised the bulk of the revenue. It 
was levied at the rate of 2.5% on m o n e y and at the rate of 10% on livestock 
and grain. O w i n g to the simplicity of this tax system and its adaptability 
to social conditions, it continued even after the fall of the Mahdist regime. 
T h e Mahdist administration encouraged both agriculture and trade because 
these activities were geared to support the army and equip it with arms 
and ammunition. 
T h e Mahdist state was, however, short-lived. Several factors contributed 
to its downfall. First, the Mahdist movement suffered from internal strife 
due to power struggles after the M a h d f s death in 1885. Secondly, the 
process of consolidating the control over the whole country had strained 
the resources of the state. Moreover, the n e w state had to contend with 
several European colonial powers on its borders.60 T h e Mahdist state 
wanted to expand northward towards Egypt, a m o v e which proved to be 
disastrous because it prompted the British, w h o were in Egypt at that 
time, to occupy the Sudan. 
Anglo-Egyptian rule 
T h e Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan ended the brief period of 
national independence under the Mahdists. But fortunately, the colonial 
administration was not heavy-handed. British colonial policy in the Sudan 
was relatively mild and there was a conscious attempt to develop the 
country's economy. T h e main contribution of the British administration 
in the Sudan was the development of the infrastructure and the introduction 
of a modern agricultural system. 
The development of the infrastructure 
During the British colonial period in the Sudan, the British built railways, 
ports and d a m s , and advanced the educational system (see Fig. 17.8). T h e 
first railway was constructed during the period from 1896 to 1898 to be 
used for the military campaign. It was later extended to Atbara and was 
60. P. M . Holt, 1970, pp, 204 ff. 
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used for transportation between the northern part of the Sudan and the 
Mediterranean via Egypt. W h e n Port Sudan was built in 1906, a new 
railway was constructed to connect it with Atbara. T h e n in 1910 the main 
line was extended to Sennâr. Another line was laid in 1924 between the 
Djazïra and the Red Sea. Steamboat services were also used to link the 
south with the north of the country. These modern and efficient means 
of transportation helped to convey agricultural products and considerably 
reduced transportation costs. T h e British administration also assisted in 
developing the educational system. Furthermore, measures were taken to 
improve the utilization of soil and water resources. A few pumping stations 
were built and several canals were dug for irrigation purposes. 
Agricultural development 
F r o m the beginning the British realized the great agricultural potential 
of the Sudan. They started the experimental cultivation of cotton so that 
they could supplement the Egyptian production of this crop. W h e n the 
first experiment in Zaydab in 1905 showed promising results, it was 
extended to the Djazïra plain between the Blue Nile and the White Nile, 
which contained the most fertile soil in the Sudan. A n ambitious plan was 
drawn up for the Djazïra plain. T h e Sudan Plantation Syndicate, which 
was a private concern, was granted a concession to cultivate cotton in this 
area. T h e arrangement called for co-operation between the government, 
the syndicate and Sudanese tenants. T h e government rented the land from 
its owners and provided the basic capital expenditure for canalization and 
the pumping stations. T h e syndicate was responsible for minor expenditure 
and for managing the project. It also arranged for the transportation and 
marketing of the product. T h e tenants, on the other hand, were to undertake 
the cultivation. T h e proceeds of the sale were then to be divided between 
the three partners in the following manner: 40% to the tenants, 35% to the 
government and 25% to the syndicate. T h e shares of both the govern-
ment and the syndicate were later changed to 38% and 22% respectively.61 
T h e Djazïra plan envisaged the irrigation of about 200000 ha on which 
cotton, millet and fodder were to be cultivated. But the plan was delayed 
because of the First World W a r . It was, however, revised in 1919 and 
was highlighted by the completion of the Sennär D a m in 1925.62 T h e 
success of the Djazïra scheme stimulated the development of other related 
activities such as transportation, irrigation and ginning factories for cotton. 
T o finance these schemes, the existing tax system was supplemented 
by an agreement between Britain and Egypt by which the latter would 
provide the Sudan with financial aid and loans for development projects 
and budget purposes. T h e Egyptian contribution to the Sudanese budget 
amounted to £E 2.8 million for the period from 1899 to 1916, while the 
61. W . N . Allan and R . J. Smith in J. D . Tothill (ed.), 1948, pp. 608-9. See also 
A. Gaitskcll, 1959, p. 70. 
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Egyptian loans to S u d a n totalled about £E 5.4 million for the period 
from 1900 to 1 9 1 0 . 6 3 T h e Egyptian grants and loans were called for 
because taxes were light in the S u d a n . T h e land tax ranged between 10 
piastres and 100 piastres per feddän. T h e tithe remained part of the tax 
system in the S u d a n during the British occupation. Other taxes were levied 
on trade and different types of industry.64 
T o stimulate land use, a quarter of the cultivable land w a s taxed after 
t w o years. T h e n , the whole land w o u l d be taxed after eight to ten years. 
Other taxes included a herd tax which w a s levied on an ethnic group as 
a whole . A poll tax of between 25 piastres a n d 80 piastres per head w a s 
collected. In 1912 property tax w a s introduced. M o r e o v e r , a boat tax w a s 
assessed on boats according to their capacity. 
T h e impact o f British colonial e c o n o m i c activities o n the S u d a n 
C o m p a r e d with those of the F r e n c h and the Italians in the M a g h r i b and 
Tripoli respectively, British colonial economic activities in the S u d a n were 
laudable to s o m e extent. L a n d w a s not appropriated by foreigners nor w a s 
it concentrated in the hands of a few people as w a s the case in the other 
colonies. T h e Djazïra s c h e m e also proved quite beneficial both to the 
British and to those people of the S u d a n w h o were directly involved in 
it. T h e development of a m o d e r n transport system together with the 
construction of ports and irrigation facilities also helped the growth of a 
m o d e r n agricultural system in the S u d a n . H o w e v e r , there is a negative 
side to this story. First, the infrastructure that w a s provided w a s totally 
inadequate and w a s clearly m e a n t to promote the interests of Britain m o r e 
than those of the Sudanese. It is m o s t significant that not one single mile 
of motor road w a s constructed in the whole of the S u d a n during the period 
under review while the railway w a s constructed initially to facilitate British 
military campaigns and later to p r o m o t e their cotton and g u m projects in 
Djazïra and the western areas respectively. A s in most of the colonies, 
industrialization w a s completely neglected. H o w e v e r , the greatest indict-
m e n t against British colonialism in the S u d a n is its total neglect of the 
Southern S u d a n economically a n d socially. This neglect is undoubtedly 
one of the m o s t important contributory factors to the creation of the 
southern problem in the S u d a n , a problem which has still not been solved. 
63. ibid., p. 35. 
64. H . A . Tunley in J. D . Tothill (ed.), 1948. 
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T h e years from the early 1880s to the mid-iojos mark the demographic 
divide in Africa. At the beginning of the period the continent's population 
was still sparse, at least by the standards of the Old World. M o r e signifi-
cantly it probably was not growing rapidly and evidenced a vulnerability 
to the kind of pressures, both internal and external, which were being 
increasingly applied. B y about 1935, the population was undoubtedly grow-
ing because of increasing control over mortality, and the basis was laid 
for a doubling over the next third of a century which almost certainly 
hastened and consolidated independence. 
M a n y indices can be used to illustrate the changes between the two 
dates, and some help to explain the demographic transition. In 1880 a 
European presence inland from the coast was largely restricted to Algeria, 
where a third of a million migrants, mainly from France, Spain, Italy and 
Malta, had consolidated the victory of the French army, and South Africa, 
where a similar number of Europeans, predominantly of Dutch and English 
extraction, n o w had a vanguard as far north as the Limpopo river. (See 
Fig. i.i.) Elsewhere Europeans were beginning to exert control over Egypt 
and Tunisia, ruled some coastal populations in Senegal and the Gold Coast 
(now Ghana) and held such enclaves as T h e Gambia , Sierra Leone, Lagos, 
Libreville and parts of Angola and Mozambique. B y 1935 European admini-
stations controlled almost the entire continent (see Fig. 12.2). T h e half 
century saw European medical science progressing from an ignorance of 
the cause of most of Africa's major diseases to an ability to contain or 
cure most of them; indeed the period ends just as the sulpha drugs were 
ushering in an era of chemotherapy of great significance for the continent. 
It also spans almost the whole railway-building age and a transition from 
a time when nearly all land transport was by h u m a n porterage to one where 
lorries were beginning to multiply on a growing network of dusty or m u d d y 
roads. 
Population growth 
Demographers have published tables of African population change with 
The social repercussions of colonial rule: demographic aspects 
apparent assurance,1 but the truth is that our most certain knowledge of 
nineteenth-century h u m a n numbers is provided by a retrospective view 
from the vantage of the post-Second World W a r censuses. If these had 
claimed twice as m a n y people as they did, w e probably would have adjusted 
our estimate of populations before the present century upwards by almost 
as m u c h . 
T h e much-quoted estimates for the nineteenth century are those of 
W . F . Willcox and A . M . Carr-Saunders, and these have recently been 
joined by those of J. D . Durand. 2 T h e first two at least were based on 
practically no evidence at all and have gained acceptance almost entirely 
by repetition and by the authority apparently derived from being close to 
each other. 
In fact Willcox chose merely to repeat the estimate of a seventeenth-
century Italian writer, B . Riccioli,3 justifying the decision by saying that 
he was a 'learned Jesuit priest' w h o 'summarized the knowledge of his 
day', and assuming that there was no population growth between the 
seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries.4 In fact Riccioli had been more 
influenced by the mystical quality of numbers than by solid demographic 
evidence, and had constructed a global estimate of a iooo million people 
which he distributed between the continents in multiples of ioo million. 
In order to allow for the fact that Africa was demonstrably not uninhabited 
while permitting an estimate of a very large Asian population, there was 
little alternative but to allocate ioo million inhabitants to Africa. Willcox 
justified his use of these estimates by claiming that the population density 
of those parts of Africa not k n o w n to be growing fast in 1931 (that is 
excluding Egypt, Tunisia, northern Algeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, T h e 
Gambia , South Africa and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia)) was the same 
as Riccioli's figure for the whole continent.5 This procedure is, however, 
meaningless: Willcox retained the countries with the least known popula-
tions at the time: there is no evidence that their populations were still 
stationary; there is no reason w h y their past densities should have been 
the same as the countries excluded. Willcox, arguing that there was no 
evidence of growth in Africa's population until recent times, retained the 
100 million figure as his estimate of its population up to 1850. 
Carr-Saunders' estimates are not in fact a separate series, but merely a 
commentary on those of Willcox, concerned less with the central estimates 
than with trends of sub-regional figures that m a y have been overlooked. 
Therefore he accepted the proposition that Willcox was probably right 
with regard to his population estimate for 1650, a mere three hundred 
i. See United Nations, 1973, Table II. 4, p. 21. 
2. W . F . Willcox, 1931; A . M . Carr-Saunders, 1936, pp. 17-45; J- D - Durand, 1967, 
pp. 136-59. 
3. B . Riccioli, 1661, 1672, pp. 630-4. 
4. W . F . Willcox, 1931, p. 45. 
5. ibid., pp. 53-4. 
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years before his time and widespread census-taking on the continent, but 
argued that account had not been taken of the likelihood that the ravages 
of slavery had caused a diminution of numbers before 1800 but that this 
had been more than counterbalanced subsequently by relatively rapid 
population growth in North Africa.6 T h u s he concluded that a low of 90 
million must have been reached by 1800 with a subsequent rise in popula-
tion by one-third in the course of the nineteenth century.7 
T h e thesis of population decline during all or part of the nineteenth 
century is frequently encountered but less frequently justified. O n e 
observer believed that it could mostly be accounted for by two facts: the 
lack of familiarity of Europeans with sparse farming populations and hence 
the conclusion that they were encountering areas of depopulation; and the 
desire of philanthropists to believe that they had brought assistance after 
a period of devastating disorder largely caused by their o w n people.8 
Another argued that overestimates of the populations had been m a d e at 
the time of the major m o v e forward by European powers in order to 
encourage investment in European companies participating in that m o v e -
ment. 9 Certainly it was easy to calculate large populations from the accounts 
of such explorers as H . M . Stanley, partly because the explorers tended 
to choose the highest figures and partly because they tended to follow 
rivers or paths that inevitably passed through areas of abnormally high 
density. 
Durand's population series apparently represents a major change. For 
most of Africa's population, namely that found south of the Sahara, he 
m a d e retrospective estimates supposedly employing United Nations figures 
for 1920.10 But, as he then disregarded the 1920 figure w h e n constructing 
his m e d i u m estimate on the grounds that it suggested an improbably high 
population growth rate (1.5 per cent per a n n u m ) between then and the 
1950 United Nations figure which he accepted, the real basis for these 
reverse projections is the post-Second World W a r censuses. Even so, 
Durand gives no reason for rejecting the United Nations 1920-50 implied 
growth rate and the suspicion remains that the influence of Riccioli 
transmitted through Willcox and Carr-Saunders continued to be dominant. 
H e concludes, with the appearance of trying to justify his approach, by 
observing: ' W h e n the estimate for North Africa is added, this [the m e d i u m 
estimate] agrees approximately with Willcox's surmise that the population 
of all Africa was stationary at the level of about 100 million during this 
period [1750-1850]'.11 Durand's estimates for North Africa are based on 
studies of population growth in Egypt and Algeria during the second half 
6. A . M . Carr-Saunders, 1936, pp. 34-5. 
7. ibid., p. 42. 
8. R . R . Kuczynski, 1948-53, Vol. II, p. 120. 
9. J. Suret-Canale, 1971, p. 37. 
10. J. D . Durand, 1967, pp. 152-3. 
n . ibid., p. 153. 
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of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the present one,1 2 and 
his m e d i u m estimate is prepared to credit the area with an annual growth 
rate of 1.25 per cent between 1850 and 1920. 
M o r e revealing are Durand's low and high estimates, which for 1850 
he places at 81 and 145 million respectively, thus providing a margin of 
error of about 30 per cent either way . Similar estimates for Asia and Latin 
America are m a d e within margins of 10 per cent and for Europe within 
4 per cent. Part of the explanation for the uncertainty about sub-Saharan 
Africa lies in the scarcity of written records. T h e possibility of uncertainty 
is illustrated by such facts, at the time of writing, as the debate as to the 
population of Nigeria, with contending figures 20 million apart, and great 
uncertainty about the magnitude of such considerable populations as that 
of Ethiopia. 
Clearly no one k n o w s what the population of Africa, more particularly 
sub-Saharan Africa, was during the period covered by this chapter. N o 
one appears prepared to put it m u c h under 100 million or over 150 million 
in 1880; by 1900 lower and upper estimates are narrowing to perhaps 
between 115 and 155 million; while it is n o w becoming clearer that by 
1935 the 150 million m a r k had already been exceeded. Most of Africa had 
no real population counts during this period, and some of the censuses 
barely deserve that n a m e . T h e 1911 census of Northern Nigeria was 
forwarded to L o n d o n on a single sheet of paper. ' 3 R . R . Kuczynski devoted 
years to the writing of three large volumes1 4 totalling almost 2500 pages 
meticulously examining pre-Second World W a r population information 
on all the British colonies and her two mandates in Africa. T h e world has 
an antiquarian fascination for the demographer but it would be wrong to 
suggest that it established m u c h of significance about population levels or 
trends in the period covered here. 
However , it is possible, and almost certainly m o r e instructive, to say 
something from recent evidence about the nature of African population 
and then to look at the forces which must have shaped it in earlier times. 
A fragile population emerging from near stability 
Except in unusual periods, such as the present time w h e n a scientific and 
technological revolution is changing the world, population growth rates 
must be relatively low, and hence average death rates must approximate 
average birth rates. This follows from the nature of exponential growth 
which over any sustained period yields enormous numbers from apparently 
low rates of increase. A growth rate as low as 0.5 per cent per a n n u m 
(yielded by a birth rate only five points per thousand above the death 
rate) results in a fifteen-fold increase over a millennium. Even if Africa's 
12. Especially C . V . Kiser, 1944, pp. 383-408; L. Chevalier, 1947. 
13. C . K . Meek, 1925, p. 169. 
14. R . R. Kuczynski, 1948-53; 1939. 
461 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-IÇ35 
population were as high as 150 million in 1900, it is highly improbable 
that the continent would have contained no more than 10 million people 
a thousand years earlier. 
T h u s it is possible to think of pre-modern death rates as having been 
within five points of the birth rate. Cautions should be added. This is an 
average over a very long period. T h e whole continent m a y have seen 
population oscillations over the last millennium, and almost certainly m a n y 
individual societies have experienced disastrous population decline with 
subsequent recovery. It would, however, be surprising if recovery had 
ever been achieved by natural increase rates m u c h over 1 per cent per 
a n n u m in North Africa before the early nineteenth century or in sub-
Saharan Africa before the end of the century. These are average birth and 
death rates. T h e evidence - m u c h of it from pre-modern Europe - indicates 
that in most years births exceed deaths; mortality catches up during a 
relatively few years of horrendously high death rates resulting from such 
disasters as epidemics, famine and warfare. 
T h u s , if fertility levels have remained fairly constant in Africa, something 
can be learnt about both fertility and mortality in the past by studying 
recent fertility patterns. F r o m the mid-1950s large-scale demographic 
surveys were carried out in greater numbers in Africa than anywhere else 
in the world.IS T h e data were difficult to interpret, largely because the 
African populations had not been culturally attuned to regard the kind of 
information (particularly that about exact age) needed by demographers 
as important or quantifiable. However , the very difficulties produced new 
methods of analysis (to an extent that the challenge of African data has 
revolutionized methodology in demography) that have yielded m u c h 
information on sub-Saharan Africa. ' 6 
T h e pattern revealed is one of greater variety than theoretical considera-
tions of long-term population stability might have led one to anticipate 
(some of the variety m a y well be explained by defects in the data). Neverthe-
less, it is clear that in most sub-Saharan African populations w o m e n 
average 6.5-8 live births in a reproductive lifetime and the crude birth 
rate is close to 50 per thousand or even higher. T h e exception is a rectangle 
in middle Africa of over 5 million sq k m embracing G a b o n , Cameroon, 
the Congo Republic, Central African Republic and m u c h of northern 
Zaire. Here average births per w o m a n apparently do not rise above six 
and fall in some areas to below four, yielding a crude birth rate for the 
15. See, for instance, the African predominance in the lists of fertility surveys in 
W . G . Duncan, 1973. 
16. The methodology is described in W . Brass and A . J. Coale in W . Brass et al., 1968, 
pp. 108-42; A . J. Coale and P. Demeny, 1967. Successive findings and interpretations are 
given in A . J. Coale and F. Lorimer in W . Brass et al., 1968; and in A . J. Coale and 
E . van de Walle in W . Brass et al., 1968; H . J. Page and A . J. Coale in S. H . Ominde and 
C . N . Ejiogu (eds), 1972; and in H . J. Page in J. C . Caldwell (ed.), 1975. 
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whole area which was certainly below 40 per thousand when the children 
surveyed were born - the 1940s to the early 1960s. M u c h of the explanation 
of the figures, if not the cause, rests on the number of w o m e n w h o have 
no children at all, which reaches two-fifths in some areas. 
Confining our attention to the area outside the low fertility zone, w e 
can hazard some reasonably good guesses about pre-modern sub-Saharan 
populations by employing stable population methods of analysis. ' 7 But 
first two problematic issues should be noted. O n e is the birth rate, which 
is most unlikely ever to have been higher than its present level. It m a y 
have remained constant, as the evidence of the age structure recorded over 
fifty years by the censuses of the Gold Coast and Ghana suggest. ' 8 O n 
the other hand, improving health conditions m a y have reduced sterility 
and sub-fecundity, as has been suggested at least in the cases of Kenya 
and Mauritius.19 If this has been the case, it is improbable that pre-modern 
fertility was less than 90 per cent of that n o w found and most unlikely 
that it was under 80 per cent. T h e other is the possibility that the population 
has not been stationary, but has been averaging a rate of growth of up to 
0.5 per cent per a n n u m for several centuries (for reasons which will be 
discussed below). T h e full range of possibilities allows us to describe a 
society where w o m e n averaged 5.5-7 live births yielding a birth rate of 
42-50 per thousand, and where the expectation of life at birth was 20-30 
years yielding a death rate of 38-50 per thousand and an infant mortality 
rate of 250-375 deaths per thousand live births. A m e d i u m assumption 
might be a situation where w o m e n averaged little more than six live births, 
where population growth averaged 0.33 per cent, where the expectation of 
life at birth was about 22.5 years (about the level of R o m e at the end of 
the Republic)20 and where the crude birth rate was about 48 per thousand, 
the crude death rate 45 per thousand and the infant mortality rate 300-350 
per thousand. Tropical Africa's high birth rates, which are sustained by 
culture and religion, are undoubtedly a response to high death rates in 
what has long been one of the world's most disease-ridden regions. 
This picture is not in any w a y surprising. Health conditions of this order 
have lingered on almost into our o w n time in remoter parts of the continent. 
Surveys in Mali in the late 1950s and Upper Volta in the early 1960s have 
17. T h e tables used were the 'North' set in A . J. Coale and P. D e m e n y , 1966, pp. 220-435. 
18. J. C . Caldwell in W . Birmingham, I. W . Neustadt and E . N . O m a b o e (eds), 1967, 
p. 94. 
19. T h e birth rate in Mauritius, having averaged below 40 per thousand all the century, 
rose from 33 per thousand in 1943 to 50 per thousand in 1950, the greatest rise occurring 
during and immediately after the antimalarial campaign; William Brass believes that birth 
rates in Kenya rose during the 1950s (personal communication); and D . J. van de Kaa 
believes that contemporary birth rates are rising in N e w Guinea in conditions of health 
and social change similar to those found in parts of Africa (D. J. van de Kaa, 1971). 
20. L . I. Dublin, A . J. Lotka and M . Spiegelman, 1936, p. 42. 
463 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880—igjs 
yielded adjusted data suggesting crude death rates of close to 40 per 
thousand and infant mortality rates of close to and even exceeding 300 
per thousand.21 However , this situation is incompatible with stability in 
the Middle Africa low fertility zone if the birth rates n o w claimed for that 
area are supposed to have persisted at that level from the past. Given the 
mortality levels described above (which is a conservative assumption in 
view of the fact that the health conditions of the forests of the west coast 
equatorial area have probably long been worse than elsewhere), the conclu-
sion could be drawn that in the centuries past those areas averaging 5 
births per w o m a n had experienced population declines averaging over 0.5 
per cent per a n n u m , and those averaging 3.5 children declines of over 1.5 
per cent per a n n u m . This is inconceivable over any protracted period; the 
latter population would be halving every forty years, and both situations 
suggest m u c h larger populations during the earlier years of European 
contact than has ever been suggested. T h e conclusion is inescapable that 
fertility has fallen in the area within comparatively recent times and 
probably within the period being described in this chapter. 
T h e main aim here will be to examine those influences which m a y have 
caused long-term population change as well as those which m a y have had 
more dramatic short-term effects within the last century. It is c o m m o n l y 
assumed that the major constraint on population numbers in traditional 
societies has been the availability of food. However, E . Boserup has argued 
that critical population densities do not lead to a Malthusian situation but 
to changes in the methods of cultivation: 'the low rates of population 
growth found (until recently) in pre-industrial communities cannot be 
explained as the result of insufficient food supplies due to overpopulation, 
and w e must leave room for other factors in the explanation of demographic 
trends . . . medical, biological, political, etc.'22 T h e African past m a y well 
have been more complex than this and the ultimate bounds m a y have 
been those of food resources, even though infrequently brought into play. 
T h e land available for farming was that land not proscribed by other uses; 
for instance, the nearly deserted land between warring kingdoms had 
alternative employment as a no-man's land. In m u c h of the continent little 
land appeared to be in use at any one time, either because slash-and-burn 
or savanna shifting cultivation meant that most land at any given time 
was fallow or because hunters and food gatherers needed huge areas for 
their support. Only occasionally did extreme famine conditions strike, 
caused by drought or locusts or by the disorganization arising from war 
or epidemic. T h e crisis was usually too sudden to allow any substantial 
temporary invasion of the fallow,23 and in effect the limits of the carrying 
21. P. Cantrelle, inj. C . Caldwell (ed.), 1975, p. 102. 
22. E . Boserup, 1965, p. 14. 
23. A good deal of this argument is based on a first-hand study of the Sahelian and 
Ethiopian drought of the early 1970s which was reported on in J. C . Caldwell, forthcoming. 
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capacity of the land were reached with resulting huge mortality and a 
drop in population numbers for decades. T h e pressure on the capacity of 
the system to produce food was usually - but not always - too short and 
sudden to produce the successive changes in methods of land use that 
Boserup describes. Such changes are most likely w h e n population numbers 
push persistently against the food-producing capacity of the cultivation 
system either in a situation where the great peaks of mortality have been 
reduced by health measures or other actions or where luck or geographical 
conditions moderate those peaks. For decades subsequent to the crisis, 
populations remained well below the level at which they pressed on food 
supplies;24 they grew, but only at a modest rate, because they were still 
subject to the ravages of fearful diseases. T h e rate of growth m a y have 
risen somewhat w h e n the population was thinned out, because of the 
temporary reduction in the communicability of infectious disease,25 but 
this is far from certain as the disaster m a y have led to such disorganization 
in the community (as, for example, an increased level of orphanage) as to 
tend to raise mortality from other causes. 
The clashing forces of demographic change up to and 
beyond 1880 
T h e clearest assault on the demographic balance was the slave trade. 
Although this chapter is concerned with a period which begins just as the 
Atlantic slave trade had been all but extinguished, it is important to discuss 
the magnitude of the trade and its lasting effects. 
T h e story of h o w certain numbers became conventionally accepted as 
measuring the volume of tropical Africans shipped to the N e w World bears 
a remarkable resemblance to the origin of the population estimates with 
Riccioli. Curtin has demonstrated h o w nearly all modern historians have 
drawn indirectly on Kuczynski, w h o borrowed the estimates from W . E . B . 
D u Bois w h o took them from the unresearched surmises of Edward Dunbar, 
a mid-nineteenth-century American publicist for a Mexican political 
cause.26 Until some future researcher attempts an even more complete 
examination of the original sources, there is no alternative now to employing 
Curtin's o w n estimates which show a total of just over 9.5 million slaves 
reaching the N e w World with the following distribution by century: 
fifteenth century - 34000 (0.4 per cent of the total); sixteenth century -
241000 (2.5 per cent); seventeenth century - 1341000 (14.0 per cent); 
eighteenth century - 5652000 (59.1 per cent); and nineteenth century -
24. For a discussion of this type of pressure, see W . Allan, 1965. 
25. As was apparently the case among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century settlers in 
North America in contrast to the position in the societies from which they came. 
26. P . D . Curtin, 1969, pp. 3-8; the intermediate source of most of these estimates is 
R . R . Kuczynski, 1936, p. 12. 
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2298000 (24.0 per cent).27 This movement , supplemented by a very small 
free movement across the Atlantic in the nineteenth century,28 established 
in the Americas a population of at least partial African ancestry numbering 
by the time of writing m a n y times the volume of transported slaves and 
clearly establishing Africa as second only to Europe as a source of settler 
population outside the continent of origin. T h e full historical significance 
of this has yet to be played out. 
T h e export of slaves (calculated in the first place in terms of those 
landed in the Americas) can be worked out as an emigration rate, subject 
admittedly to the proviso that there is no real knowledge of the size of the 
base population from which they were drawn. For illustrative purposes 
here w e will employ Durand's m e d i u m and low estimates29 (the latter 
because it will be argued later that it m a y be closer to the truth than the 
n e w constant population estimates). Concentrating on four time periods, 
the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth 
centuries, and calculating annual average rates per thousand base popula-
tion, the m e d i u m estimate yields emigration rates rising to 0.5 in the 
eighteenth century and falling to 0.4 in the early nineteenth, while the 
low estimate for the same dates climbs to 0.9 only to fall to 0.6. For 
sub-Saharan Africa during these two periods, the m e d i u m estimate rates 
would be 0.6 and 0.4 and the low estimate rates 1.1 and 0.6. However, 
most slaves came from restricted parts of the Atlantic coast of Africa, 
mostly from Senegal to Angola, with the great majority originating from 
birthplaces within 500 k m of the coast. Assuming these areas to have had 
about one-third of the sub-Saharan African population, we can calculate 
rates for the whole four time periods of 0.1, 0.6, 2.5 and 1.8 according to 
the m e d i u m estimates and 0.2, 0.8, 3.1 and 1.9 according to the low 
estimates. T o these should be added extra deaths occasioned by slaving. 
T h e losses on the Atlantic voyage seem to have fallen from perhaps 
one-fifth in the earlier two centuries to about one-sixth and one-tenth in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively.30 There were 
certainly very substantial losses of life in Africa too during capture and 
the march to the coast. S o m e of this additional mortality would have 
27. Derived from tables on pp. 116, 119, 216 and 234 of P. D . Curtin, 1969. At the 
meeting of experts on the African Slave Trade held at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, under the 
auspices of U N E S C O from 31 January to 4 February 1978, no agreement was arrived at 
on the exact number of slaves transported to the N e w World. It was generally believed 
that Curtin's figures were too low and that the correct figure was somewhere between 15 
and 30 million. See Final Report of the meeting, Ref. C C - 7 8 / C O N F . 6 0 1 / 7 , U N E S C O , 
Paris, 17 July 1978, and J. E . Inikori, 'Slave Trade and the Atlantic Economies, 1451-1870.' 
Working paper presented to the meeting, C C - 7 6 / W S / 2 2 Paris, 1 October 1976. 
28. For instance the recruitment of 36100 Africans into the British West Indies between 
1841 and 1867. See G . W . Roberts, 1954, p. 235. 
29. Constructing sixteenth- and seventeenth-century estimates by employing Durand's 
methods. 
30. P . D . Curtin, 1969, pp. 275-86. 
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occurred in a n y case, because analyses of slave origins in W e s t Africa 
m a k e it clear that captives for sale b e c a m e m o s t plentiful w h e n such 
internal wars as the Fulani conquests in Nigeria produced large n u m b e r s 
of refugees a n d prisoners;31 but without doubt the existence of the market 
o n the coast increased capricious violence producing victims of extra 
lawlessness or of the harsher implementation of customary law. T h u s the 
rates calculated above probably should be increased b y m i n i m u m s of half 
for the sixteenth a n d seventeenth centuries, one-third for the eighteenth 
century a n d perhaps one-fifth for the nineteenth century. 
Th i s inflation of loss rates, even w h e n applied to the l o w population 
estimates, does not produce total African levels for the eighteenth a n d 
nineteenth centuries above 1.3 a n d 0 .7 respectively. T h i s w o u l d b e 
compensated b y an average difference of o n e point between the birth a n d 
death rates (that is, an annual rate of natural increase of 0.1 per cent). 
W h e n restricted to sub-Saharan Africa, the rates b e c o m e 1.4 and 0 .8 
respectively; while a further restriction to one-third of this population 
yields levels of 4 . 2 a n d 2 .9 . T h e s e latter rates might well produce population 
decline or halt a tendency towards growth , in the absence of other 
substantial changes tending to m o v e the balance of vital rates towards 
growth , for natural increase in p r e - m o d e r n societies rarely s e e m s to have 
averaged levels as high as 0 .4 per cent for long periods. T h e area of certain 
population decline w a s the coast f rom C a b i n d a to L u a n d a a n d the country 
behind it during the eighteenth a n d early nineteenth centuries. T h e coast 
a n d its hinterland, even if w e include m u c h of w h a t is n o w Angola and 
Zaire and even s o m e of Z a m b i a , could hardly have contained m o r e than 
4 million people and yet m a y have yielded well over a million slaves in 
the nineteenth century alone, suggesting loss rates (according to the 
formula e m p l o y e d above) of close to 1 per cent per a n n u m , resulting 
almost certainly in declining population a n d the depopulation of s o m e 
areas, especially in Angola . 
W h a t then were the lasting effects in 1880? External slavery w a s n o w 
minor: slaves from the southern S u d a n w o u l d filter d o w n the Nile a n d to 
Ethiopia, East Africa a n d perhaps the M i d d l e East for a few m o r e years; 
a n d defacto slavery w o u l d continue from Ango la to the plantations of S à o 
T o m é a n d Principe until 1913. T h e trade of Zanzibar ( n o w part of 
Tanzania) practically ceased after 1873 a n d h a d never been o n the massive 
scale of the Atlantic trade although it h a d probably resulted in a m o v e m e n t 
of people a w a y from the m a i n routes inland, especially that west through 
T a b o r a . W i t h i n the continent there w a s still domestic slavery, as w a s 
evidenced b y the 1904 report o n F r e n c h W e s t Africa which s h o w e d almost 
a quarter of the population in s o m e type of b o n d a g e , 3 2 but the d e m o g r a p h i c 
impact w a s probably slight. A l though b y 1880 the Atlantic trade w a s four 
centuries old, half the slaving h a d occurred since about 1770, first in 
31. ibid., p. 260. 
32. J. Suret-Canale, 1971, p. 66. 
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response to the American cotton b o o m and then to the growing demands 
from Brazil. 
During this period of just over a century those successfully transported 
across the Atlantic plus those w h o had died during capture or subsequent 
transportation probably numbered about 6 million, of w h o m about 4.5 mil-
lion m a y have been males and 1.5 million females.33 T h e fraction of these 
persons w h o would otherwise have probably lived until 1880 is small: a 
quarter of a million at the most in view of the decline in numbers 
transported after 1840. However, a greater loss arises from the transporta-
tion of females. Even at the net reproduction levels of a stationary 
population, 1.5 million females would be succeeded by 3 million surviving 
children (thus reproducing numbers equal to themselves and their 
partners), and a small level of natural increase (0.3 per cent per a n n u m ) 
could raise this to 3.25 million by 1880 given that the bulk of the slaves 
were taken in the earlier part of the period. T h u s a total deficit of 4 million 
persons would seem a reasonable estimate. This would be a small deficit 
for either Africa or sub-Saharan Africa taken as a whole: perhaps 4 or 5 
per cent respectively and equivalent at a rate of natural increase of 0.5 
per cent per a n n u m to eight or ten years' growth. However, the position 
would have been very different for the main source area of slaves, where, 
if w e employ the same assumption as used above (that is, that the area 
contained one-third of the sub-Saharan population) the deficit would have 
been 15 per cent or at least a generation's growth. 
There are two debatable assumptions embodied in these calculations. 
T h e first is that the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century populations 
were not bound by Malthusian limits, in that food supplies could be 
increased by extra cultivation or a change of food staples. If this were not 
so, then the population would normally have grown very little but would 
have expanded rapidly enough to fill the deficit left by slaving before 
slowing d o w n , thus implying that the trade had very little impact on total 
numbers. O n the other hand, some kind of Malthusian restraint has been 
assumed when considering the earlier half of all slaves transported, those 
taken in the three centuries before 1770. If such an assumption is not 
warranted (and if the sex ratios of slave cargoes remained m u c h the same 
over the centuries), then w e can assume a further deficit of 4 million 
persons if moderate natural increase had been confined to the period after 
1770, and 5 million if it had not. T h e second assumption, m u c h less 
debatable, is that the universality of female marriage in Africa, guaranteed 
even in areas of imbalance between the sexes by the practice of polygamy, 
means that the removal of large numbers of males had little effect on 
reproduction. It was in fact the African institutions of marriage which 
limited the wounds inflicted by the slave trade. 
A subtler change has also been affecting the areas of slave origin, and 
33. Employed sex ratios derived from P. D . Curtin, 1969, p. 41, fn. 37. 
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other areas beyond, for half a millennium and m a y well have had a greater 
demographic impact. That is changes in the sources of food brought about 
largely by external contact. 
S o m e of Africa's densest population is n o w found in the wet tropics 
which extend around the coast of West Africa to the Congo basin and 
farther still to the East African highlands. Most of the area was originally 
covered by thick forest and m u c h still is. It is n o w the h o m e of two-fifths 
of the continent's population, but this was not always so. T h e most 
extraordinary feature of this vast region is that a very large proportion of 
the food is of a type that was unknown there five hundred years ago. A 
careful assessment of the scientific dietary studies in sub-Saharan Africa,34 
and other supporting information, shows that cassava (manioc) is n o w the 
most commonly used staple on the coast from the Ivory Coast to Angola 
and inland as far as the western ramparts of the East African highlands. 
In this area the most frequently used additional crop is maize, which 
becomes the dominant staple in Angola and in a vast area of East Africa 
stretching from Kenya to Lesotho and Natal. In R w a n d a and Burundi 
the major staples are in order of importance beans, sweet potatoes, cassava 
and potatoes. 
T h e neolithic revolution, according to some authorities though disputed 
by others, came to Africa by way of Egypt over six thousand years ago 
and reached the West African savanna about three thousand years ago.3 s 
T h e change to crop cultivation was surprisingly successful, resulting in 
the domestication of wild crops in Ethiopia and West Africa and even 
high neolithic cultures such as that of N o k in northern Nigeria. T h e 
invasion of wetter, tropical Africa by cultivated crops was less successful, 
although the locally domesticated y a m was rain-tolerant and grew well 
enough on the forest margins as did the West African variety of rice. Early 
in the Christian era plants more suited to equatorial Africa, the banana 
(especially its large non-sweet variety, the plantain) and the Asian y a m 
reached East Africa and slowly spread westward.36 But the conquest of 
the forest was a long slow process and agriculture and population grew 
slowly within its confines, so slowly indeed that up to the fifteenth century 
the forested northerly part of the Congo basin seems to have been sparsely 
occupied by hunters and food-gatherers and considerable areas are still 
occupied by these people.37 
In terms of demographic history, the important point is that the forest 
34. M . P . Miracle in C . Gabel and N . R . Bennett (eds), 1967, pp. 201-25. Miracle 
convincingly demonstrated the inadequacy of the anthropological data employed by G . P . 
Murdock, i960, and the value of painstaking sample surveys taken around the year 
by governmental organizations. With reservations induced by Miracle's criticism, Murdock 
has been used here as a supplementary source. 
35. R . Oliver and J. D . Fage, 1962, p. 25; G . P . Murdock, i960. 
36. R . Hallett, 1970, pp. 16-17. See also C . O . Sauer, 1952, pp. 34-5. 
37. D . F . McCall, 1964, pp. 142-3; D . W . Phillipson, 1977, pp. 220-30. 
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was the h o m e of very few people five hundred years ago. T h e major 
exceptions were the fringes, the coast and the important inter-regional 
routes. For instance in Nigeria an example of the first is the lagoon area 
either side of Lagos, of the second is Old O y o , and of the third is both 
Ife and Benin on the route which crosses the Niger at the lowest point 
where it is easily accessible and crossable before reaching the delta. Since 
then the movement into the forest has continued at an accelerating rate 
and is by no means complete. T o take another Nigerian example, and a 
contemporary one, the opening up of the wet forest south of O n d o (and 
to the south-east of the massively crowded central Yorubaland) to intensive 
cultivation has largely been a product of the building of the road from 
Ijebu O d e to Benin in the early 1960s. 
Without doubt, the peopling of the forest was sustained almost entirely 
by natural increase and not immigration. It is equally clear that the process 
accelerated during the nineteenth century and was proceeding at an u n -
precedented speed in the period covered by this study. Maize reached 
some parts of the northern Congo basin only after 1830 becoming the 
most important Zande crop around 1900. Maize was k n o w n in Kenya in 
the 1880s but until the end of the century it was important only on the 
coast,38 while it became important in Uganda, R w a n d a and Burundi only 
during the first decades of this century.39 Cassava's great spurt was even 
later. In West Africa its spread was inhibited by inadequate knowledge 
of h o w to prepare it and remove all poisons until the Brazilians (Africans 
returning from Brazil whence they or their ancestors had been transported 
as slaves) came to the Guinea Coast in the nineteenth century and taught 
the preparation of gari (cassava meal), which 'seems to have spread from 
the Brazilian centers to most of the old yam-growing areas, but its expansion 
has been most rapid since about 1900.'40 Cassava has been grown on any 
scale in Senegal only since 1900 and in Nigeria north of the Niger and 
Benue not until the 1920s.41 All evidence points the same way. Asian 
rices have largely supplanted indigenous rice, especially in far West Africa, 
during the last century and the present one; while even the older varieties 
of cocoyam (taro) were supplemented during the nineteenth century by 
the introduction of new types from the Pacific.42 
T h e food historian would note the revolutionary change in diet which 
has occurred. T h e demographer, however, must stress that m u c h of sub-
Saharan Africa has been subject to changes over five hundred years which 
could hardly fail to induce population growth and that these changes were 
still accelerating at the end of the nineteenth century, making a particularly 
strong impact on precisely the areas from which slaves had been taken. 
38. M . P. Miracle, 1966, pp. 95-9. 
39. M . P. Miracle in C . Gabel and N . R . Bennett (eds), 1967, pp. 219-20. 
40. W . O . Jones, 1959, p. 79. 
41. ibid., pp. 80-4. 
42. B . F. Johnston, 1958, p. 26. 
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T h e s e were the major forces determining population change but there 
were undoubtedly others. C o m m e r c e w a s one, although whether such 
activities brought prosperity and the ability to buy food in times of need 
and perhaps s o m e health care in the few places where it existed to a greater 
degree than it brought disease arising from increased contact with strangers 
is debatable. B y 1880 cash crops included the cotton of Egypt , cloves in 
Zanzibar, sugar in Natal and an increasing area of groundnuts (peanuts) 
in Senegal, while in Algeria a European settler e c o n o m y largely based o n 
wheat and wine w a s being established. O n e aspect of trade almost certainly 
did have a deleterious effect on health, and that is the flow of strong 
alcoholic drink into the continent. There were two reasons for the trade: 
firstly that alcohol could be produced cheaply in E u r o p e and sold for 
i m m e n s e profits; secondly, in economies without widely accepted m e d i u m s 
of exchange, there were real problems about what goods would be accepted 
in return for the produce of Africa.43 M a r y Kingsley found the trade 
spirit pure and likely to d o less h a r m than cannabis,44 a view shared b y 
a committee that investigated the liquor trade in içoç.45 Spirits were 
distributed on a h u g e scale, frequently as wages. In 1894 half the total 
government revenue and 95 per cent of the customs duties of the Niger 
Coast Protectorate were derived from spirits; by 1894 the governmental 
income from this source totalled nearly £2 million.46 Although the Brussels 
Act of 1892 tried unsuccessfully to limit the trade in the C o n g o ( n o w 
Zaire), it w a s not successfully regulated in tropical Africa until the eve of 
the First W o r l d W a r . 
M u c h the s a m e doubts could be cast o n another of the trade goods, 
guns. It w a s firearms that m a d e it possible for a relatively small n u m b e r 
of people to control a greater n u m b e r of slaves, as A r a b and Ethiopian 
experience in East Africa demonstrated. In the longer run, those areas 
most advanced in commercialization first developed a commercial, admini -
strative and civil infrastructure: port facilities, roads, trading premises, 
cash cropping and eventually schools and health facilities and possibly 
declining mortality levels. In W e s t Africa there was a tendency for those 
areas m o s t involved in the slave trade to be ahead in such development; 
s o m e of the trading a c u m e n of the Igbo and the Asante almost certainly 
developed during the time of the trade. In N o r t h Africa drainage, refuse 
collection and other sanitary measures were demonstrably under w a y by 
mid-century in certain Egyptian and Algerian cities, motivated largely b y 
the desire to protect the n e w European populations but doubtless affecting 
the indigenous population as well. In the 1840s the impact of such measures 
in Algiers w a s particularly great as the French strove to control cholera.47 
43. See H . M . Stanley's remarks quoted in L . Middleton, 1936, p. 288. 
44. M . H . Kingsley, 1897, pp. 662-8. 
45. R . Schräm, 1971, p. 115. 
46. ibid., pp. 114-15. 
47. J. R . Morrell, 1854, p. 87. 
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T h e impact of colonialism 
O n e of the most c o m m o n justifications for the European forward movement 
which began in the 1880s was that the n e w stable administrations reduced 
the mortality toll from inter-ethnic warfare and slaving raids. Lugard laid 
m u c h stress on this, claiming that Nigeria's more deserted areas were 
evidence of periodic devastation.48 Certainly there was some insecurity in 
pre-colonial Africa, as is evidenced by the defensive location of m a n y 
villages from which 'downhill movements' of farmers to better agricultural 
locations occurred after their safety could be guaranteed.49 
T h e claim of greater security was true in the long run but highly 
questionable during the first decades. African instability had been 
exacerbated by the European contact. In any case it was almost certainly 
exaggerated by both European administrators and missionaries, each 
seeking to justify the kind of n e w order that they had brought. T h e object 
of m u c h of the raiding was not people but cattle and grain,50 although 
without question the owners of such property ran risks in protecting it. 
W h a t was less frequently emphasized by the new regimes was the heavy 
loss of life arising in parts of Africa from their intervention. T h e deaths 
were rarely a product of the original extension of administration, but rather 
of the suppression of subsequent revolts and of the ensuing punitive 
expeditions which apparently often inflicted most damage because of 
starvation resulting from the upsetting of the subsistence farming cycle. 
Examples include the thousands killed in Senegal in 1886 when opposing 
the building of a railway51 and in the Ndebele war in Southern Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe) in 1893, the long-drawn-out suppression of the Bátetela 
rebellion in the Congo Free State from 1895 to 1907, and a series of 
episodes in G e r m a n South West Africa (now Namibia) between 1901 and 
1906. Greater disasters racked Tanganyika (now Tanzania), where the 
Germans adopted a 'scorched earth' policy in the 1905-6 Majï Majï 
rebellion resulting perhaps in hundreds of thousands of deaths largely 
from starvation,52 and where fighting between British and G e r m a n forces 
throughout the First World W a r undoubtedly raised mortality levels again. 
M o r e complex, but certainly arising indirectly out of the presence of 
Europeans, was the devastation caused in areas surrounding the Zulu 
nation after 1800 and in the Zulu Wars from 1879 until the last rebellion 
in 1906. N o r did occupation settle all internal disputes. S o m e were 
embittered because administrators or missionaries sided with one ethnic 
48. F. D . Lugard, 1929, p. 66. 
49. R . M . Prothero, 1965, pp. 39-40; R . M . Prothero in J. C . Caldwell and J. Okonjo 
(eds), 1968, p. 252. 
50. W . M . Macmillan, 1938, pp. 47 ff. 
51. P. Gaffarel, 1905, pp. 80-4. 
52. See C . J. Martin, in K . M . Barbour and R . M . Prothero (eds), 1961, where estimates 
of up to half a million deaths are reported. 
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group. In parts of the continent the colonial peace allowed farming peoples 
to encroach upon the lands of nomads as occurred in the domains of both 
the Maasai and the Tuareg. 
Certainly in some areas stable administrations apparently resulted in 
increasing populations in the nineteenth century, such as apparently 
occurred in Egypt from early in the century as M u h a m m a d cAlî extended 
irrigation and sanitation53 and in Algeria after the French subjugated all 
opposition in 1879.54 T h e necessity for such stability, especially as civilian 
instead of military administration became the rule around the turn of the 
century, arose out of the metropolitan powers' demand that their colonial 
administrations in Africa should be financially self-supporting.55 Hence 
the increasing concentration on communications and export production. 
Perhaps the major demographic problem in the years up to the First 
World W a r centres on the so-called 'labour question' and on the conces-
sionaire schemes of Middle Africa. 
In the late nineteenth century it was the central belief of colonizers that 
colonies should be profitable. Whether this could be achieved or not 
depended entirely on African labour. Profits depended on moving goods 
and this meant h u m a n porterage in most of tropical Africa, for the tsetse 
fly often prevented the use of draught animals and the lack of roads or 
railways prevented powered and wheeled vehicles being used. In Middle 
Africa the most profitable produce was at first ivory which entailed huge 
quantities of labour for carrying tusks. With the development of the 
pneumatic bicycle tyre in the late 1880s and the pneumatic car tyre in 
the 1890s a huge d e m a n d for rubber was created, which could not be met 
for a generation by plantation rubber (the first Malayan plantation came 
into production in 1910). In the meantime tropical Africa and South 
America met the d e m a n d from wild rubber, found in Africa mostly in 
vines and also needing great quantities of labour for its collection and 
initial processing.. 
T h e difficulty was that subsistence farmers had few needs and often 
felt that regular employment savoured of slavery5 6 and that these tasks 
were w o m e n ' s work. 5 7 Europeans, frustrated by seeing large profits 
slipping away from them, had little sympathy with such attitudes: 'fear 
had to take the place of ambition or covetousness as the motive sentiment 
inducing them to labour'.58 T h e solutions were primitive and often brutal. 
For government purposes forced labour was used, with the chiefs designat-
ing those w h o were to work. Individual and hut taxes were imposed, with, 
in some areas and more frequently in the earlier years of the system, the 
53. C . V . Kiser, 1944, pp. 385 ff. 
54. R . Oliver and J. D . Fage, 1962, p. 150. 
55. ibid., pp. 204 ff. 
56. J. C . Mitchell in K . M . Barbour and R . M . Prothero (eds), 1961. 
57. R . Oliver and J. D . Fage, 1962, p. 202. 
58. W . G . B . de Montmorency, 1906, p. 149. 
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possibility of commuting payment to labour. T h e Mossi of Upper Volta, 
following the introduction of taxation after the French conquest in 1896, 
at first attempted to increase production and trading, but soon the young 
m e n began to seek paid seasonal employment in the Gold Coast, only to 
find the taxes trebled between 1906 and 191o.59 T h e system had a long 
history; it was being used as part of a n e w French approach to colonization 
in the 1920s when the Mossi were employed on the Ivory Coast railways 
and other projects designed to improve the infrastructure of French West 
Africa, although porterage petered out in the 1930s as lorries became more 
plentiful.60 In addition Africans were recruited and conscripted into armies 
and police forces. In some areas labour was recruited from overseas, such 
as the importation of Indians to build the M o m b a s a - U g a n d a railway at 
the beginning of the present century and to cultivate sugar in Natal from 
as early as i860. Everywhere there was movement of labour either to 
concentrate it in places where it was needed or because some African 
peoples were regarded as better or more willing workers either because 
of their longer contact with a commercial economy or because of age-old 
features of their specific cultures. 
M u c h of this labour movement in the third of a century after 1880 was 
accompanied by appallingly high mortality. T h e labourers were often 
shifted to areas which exposed them to new diseases; but in addition 
Africans apparently i m m u n e to malaria in their h o m e areas developed not 
only virulent malaria in distant areas but even blackwater fever.61 S o m e 
of the migrant labourers did not observe the careful sanitary arrangements 
which exist widely in Africa, especially defecation in areas outside the 
village and away from streams62 thereby polluting their water supplies 
and spreading dysentery and the newly introduced diseases of typhoid 
and paratyphoid fever. Certainly the conditions of the work camps 
encouraged the spread of venereal disease and diarrhoea. T h e workers, 
carrying within themselves the great load of worms and agents of diseases 
commonly found in tropical Africa, worked more strenuously at times 
than they had learnt was possible for them, and came d o w n with sickness. 
M a n y of the labourers were weakened by hunger, partly because they 
were offered diets astonishingly different from their usual ones, but partly 
because porters and others were underfed apparently because Europeans 
either did not care or, in some unanalysed way, believed Africans lived 
off the land.63 Little is k n o w n of the nineteenth-century death rates, but 
in 1915 the British Consul on Sao T o m é and Principe claimed a death 
59. E . P. Skinner in H . Kuper (ed.), 1965, pp. 60-3. 
60. M . L . Bates in V . Harlow and E . M . Chilver (eds), 1965, p. 625. 
61. H . B . Thomas and R . Scott, 1935, p. 309. 
62. R . H . Faulkingham, J. H . Belding, L . J. Faulkingham and P. F . Thorbahn, 1974, 
pp. 31-5; I. O . Orubuloye, n.d. p. 77. 
63. R . R . Kuczynski, 1939, pp. 50-1; J. Suret-Canale, 1971, pp. 26 ff; E . P. Skinner in 
H . Kuper (ed.), 1965, p. 65. 
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rate of ioo per thousand among the indentured labourers there,64 while 
a similar rate has been calculated for forced labour on the railway from 
Brazzaville to the sea in 1922.65 T h e latter rate contrasts with one of 150 
per thousand for the pre-First World W a r Cameroon railway.66 T h e Mossi 
made a proverb out of the situation w h e n they said that 'White M a n ' s 
work eats people', and the French administration of Upper Volta intervened 
to have rations and wages improved during the 1920s for construction 
workers on the Ivory Coast railway so as to attempt to reduce the toll in 
lives.67 Similarly bad conditions prevailed on those plantations which did 
exist, as is evidenced by the loss in 1902 of one-fifth of the workforce a 
year in Cameroon. 6 8 
T h e worst situation developed in Middle Africa, in the Congo Free 
State (later Belgian C o n g o and then Zaire), French Congo (later French 
Equatorial Africa) and G e r m a n Cameroon, in almost exactly the area of 
the low fertility belt. F r o m about 1890 concessionaires were given the 
whole produce of the land in vast areas of the Free State, while the system 
was supplemented by the creation of Leopold's Domaine Privé from 1892. 
Within a decade the system had spread to the other two areas and remained 
intact until almost the First World W a r . Indeed André Gide found 
substantial remnants in the late 1920s.69 
Great similarities existed in each of the systems. T h e Africans discovered 
that they no longer owned even their accumulated ivory and that they had 
to kill elephants for more ivory and scour the forest for rubber. S o m e of 
the most callous riffraff of Europe drifted in to become agents for the 
concessionaires, and to an extraordinary degree they were permitted to 
utilize the apparatus of the colonial administration including its army, 
police and courts. Taxation and compulsory labour, although in theory 
limited, were reinterpreted by the agents to mean such continuous work 
that crop planting and, consequently, diet suffered very considerably. T h e 
population grew reluctant to toil collecting, and to hand over what had 
always been communally theirs. Imprisonment was an unsatisfactory 
punishment as it reduced the available labour. Instead, floggings, mutila-
tion, the taking as hostages of w o m e n and children, the burning of villages 
and a considerable amount of killing were employed. Undoubtedly disease 
and famine followed the break-up of the village organization of labour and 
the flight of whole villages.70 N o one kept adequate population records 
64. E . D . Morel, 1920, pp. 157-8. 
65. R . R . Kuczynski, 1939, p. 162. 
66. ibid., p. 61. 
67. E . P . Skinner in H . Kuper (ed.), 1965, p. 65. 
68. R . R . Kuczynski, 1939, p. 58. 
69. A . Gide, 1930, passim. 
70. Widely documented largely as a result of the debate in Europe during the period. 
See J. Suret-Canale, 1971; E . D . Morel, 1906; 1920; L . Middleton, 1936, and even 
Information and Public Relations Office, Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Belgian 
Congo, Vol. I, Brussels, 1959. 
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but enormous declines in population were widely agreed upon. Probably 
the evidence for such declines was based upon exaggerated estimates of 
pre-partition populations, and from the evidence of vanished populations 
along the tracks and river banks from which the people had fled. But it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that population probably did decline in 
the region between 1890 and 1910 or even later (the theory that millions 
went to the nearest British territories receives little support from reports 
and censuses of those areas). It is more difficult, but perhaps not impossible, 
to imagine that the level of disease (venereal disease and other infections) 
generated during this period still resulted in a high level of female sterility 
half a century or more afterwards. It is also difficult to feel that the 
situation in this region is adequately covered by a recent United Nations' 
publication writing of'cultural shock' and 'the processes of adjustment'.71 
Eventually the colonial penetration was to lead to a great increase in 
population. This was partly due to the establishment of an economic base 
which is evidenced by m a n y developments discussed in several of the 
chapters above. S o m e of the more spectacular of them were the develop-
ment of palm-oil exports from the Niger delta, the discovery of diamonds 
and then gold in Southern Africa in the years from 1870 to 1900, the 
development of an indigenous cocoa-growing industry in the Gold Coast 
in the 1890s and the discovery of huge deposits of copper between the 
Congo and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) in the early years of the 
century. 
However, the development which probably had the earliest impact on 
the mortality level was the penetration of the roads and railways. B y the 
end of the 1920s most of the railway system had been built and roads 
were improving; by the late 1930s lorries in limited numbers were reaching 
almost every part of the continent. This system m a d e it possible for food 
to be sent by governments or traders to famine areas. T h e very existence 
of a transport network together with a currency acceptable over great 
distances encouraged the production of a surplus of food for the market. 
F r o m about 1920 famine deaths, relative to the size of the rainfall deficit, 
fell consistently, and the great mortality peaks, which kept up the average 
level of mortality, began to be under major attack. Until that time, even 
countries like Uganda could experience over a hundred thousand famine 
deaths in a single year, as it apparently did in 1918-19.72 
Missionaries probably had a small but real impact on mortality, quite 
apart from the setting up of hospitals. O n e authority argues that 'their 
pupils imbibed . . . at least some sense of mastery over the n e w conditions 
of life created by the colonial system'.73 
Finally, what effect did western medicine have on Africa? T h e short 
answer is that, apart from emergency measures against certain epidemics, 
71. United Nations, 1973, p. 31. 
72. D . A . L o w in V . Harlow and E . M . Chilver (eds), 1965, p. n o . 
73. R . Oliver and J. D . Fage, 1962, p. 204. 
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the meagre services that did exist were concentrated mainly on saving 
Europeans until the First World W a r ; thereafter services became progres-
sively available for African labourers w h o were still justifiably regarded 
as the chief source of wealth in Africa, while mass medicine was hardly 
attempted before the middle of the present century. That little m o r e could 
be attempted by the medical services is shown by the fact that as late as 
1939 they were awarded an annual budget of only two shillings per head 
in the Gold Coast and five pence in Nigeria.74 
T h e diseases to which the population were subject were awesome. A s 
late as the 1930s, it was reported of conditions in Kampala that: 'Every 
patient attending for treatment is a latent or active subject of malaria, and 
harbours one or more varieties of helminths. F r o m 50 to 80 per cent have 
or have had syphilis or yaws or both, and the same is true of gonorrhoea, 
while leprosy, spirillum fever and dysentery, a m o n g other diseases, are 
far from rare.'75 T h e helminths included h o o k w o r m , Ascaris infections, 
schistosomiasis, filariasis and Guinea w o r m . T o these must be added such 
epidemic diseases as yellow fever, smallpox and sleeping sickness (try-
panosomiasis) and the n e w imports like tuberculosis and cholera. Until 
near the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans were far m o r e likely 
to succumb to indigenous diseases, as is evidenced by the death rates early 
in the century a m o n g British West African forces which were nine times 
as great a m o n g the European as a m o n g the African soldiers.76 
Europe was not medically well equipped for its African ventures. At 
the beginning of the nineteenth century Britain's expectation of life at 
birth was less than 40 years; while, by the end, those of Britain, France 
and G e r m a n y had reached about 47 years with death rates close to 20 per 
thousand and infant mortality rates near to 200.7 7 Furthermore, the medical 
revolution was late in turning its attention to tropical disease. Although 
smallpox vaccination had been k n o w n since the eighteenth century (largely 
because the disease was not a specifically tropical one), even the methods 
of transmission of elephantiasis, malaria, and yellow fever were established 
only in 1877,1897 and 1900 respectively. Apart from quinine, and a limited 
use of arsenical compounds against syphilis and yaws, the development 
of drugs and vaccines to combat tropical diseases really dates only from 
the 1920s. Nevertheless, tropical medical schools were established in 
Europe as early as 1897 in Liverpool and L o n d o n , 1900 in H a m b u r g , 
1901 in Brussels, followed later by Paris, Bordeaux and Marseilles, and 
in Africa by 1912 in Cape T o w n and 1918 in Dakar. 
In tropical Africa governmental medicine was long a military concern 
74. R . R . Kuczynski, 1948-53, Vol. I, p. 10. 
75. H . B . Thomas and R . Scott, 1935, pp. 303-4. 
76. Calculated from data in R . R . Kuczynski, 1948-53, Vol. I, p. 16, which yield crude 
death rates for European soldiers of 427 per thousand and for Africans of 46 per thousand. 
77. N . Keyfitz and W . Flieger, 1959, pp. 32-6; L . I. Dublin, A . J. Lotka and M . 
Spiegelman, 1936, p. 61. 
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although small civilian hospitals began to appear in the 1890s. F r o m 1840, 
w h e n the first mission doctor arrived in Sierra Leone, there were across 
West Africa a scattering of medical missionaries including some Africans 
(mostly Sierra Leoneans). These services were concentrated very largely 
on saving the soldiers, administrators and missionaries, although some care 
was also extended to African troops, government workers and mission 
personnel. Real success was achieved only at the beginning of the present 
century, as is shown by the crude death rates for European officials in 
the Gold Coast which fell from a level of 76 per thousand in the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century to' 31, 22 and 13 respectively in 1902, 
1903 and 1904, and even taking age composition into account, compared 
favourably with levels in Britain from about 1912.78 T h e explanation was 
held to be sanitary measures against malaria and yellow fever, improved 
methods of treating tropical diseases, and segregated living quarters. T h e 
sanitary measures must have had some impact on the relatively small 
number of Africans living in the chief administrative centres, especially 
in Lagos after the measures taken in the first years of the present century 
by Governor William M c G r e g o r and D r Ronald Ross (who had identified 
the mechanism of malarial spread). T h e use of European methods to 
improve African health was relatively insignificant, partly because Europe 
offered more temptations after the First World W a r and partly because 
colonial powers cut back on health expenditures with the onset of the 
depression of the 1930s. In 1924 Nigeria had a theoretical medical 
establishment of one doctor for every 200000 persons, but in fact only a 
quarter of these posts were filled. Indeed, by 1939 there was a lower ratio 
of doctors to population in the country than there had been in I9i4.79 
Even these figures exaggerate the chance of an African receiving health 
care, for in the 1930s twelve hospitals met the needs of 4000 Europeans, 
while fifty-two hospitals catered for 40 million Africans.80 
In the absence of m a n y doctors, extensive treatment services really 
depended on whether rural clinics could be established providing adequate 
care with the services of medical auxiliaries and whether local self-help 
projects could be organized. In Nigeria, a dispensary was opened in Ibadan 
in 1904 and others followed in Yoruba towns in succeeding years.81 By 
191 o the Sierra Leonean government was awarding prizes to the chiefs of 
the two villages in each district which had shown the greatest improvement 
in sanitation.82 B y 1934 Uganda had hospitals in all major centres and 
eighty-eight sub-dispensaries in rural areas which recorded 1378 545 
78. R . R . Kuczynski, 1948-53, Vol. I, pp. 17-18. 
79. ibid., pp. 9-10. 
80. W . Rodney, 1972, p. 225. 
81. R . Schräm, 1971, p. 125. 
82. Anon., 1910(a). 
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attendances during the year.83 O n e should not exaggerate the significance 
of these changes: in m a n y dispensaries drugs were few and attendants 
uncertain about what to do, as has remained the position in m u c h of rural 
Africa until the time of writing. André Gide, visiting health facilities at 
Bétou on the Oubangui river in the late 1920s, commented scathingly that 
the only supplies received to combat the diseases of Middle Africa were 
iodine, boracic acid, and Glauber's salts.84 
T h e major reduction in African mortality (certainly in the period covered 
by this chapter) has probably been achieved by attacking the periodic 
peaks in mortality caused by famine and epidemic disease. S o m e of this 
reduction m a y have merely been a compensation for an upturn in certain 
diseases caused by the European presence. Nearly all authorities before 
the First World W a r believed that the sleeping sickness epidemics found 
across tropical Africa at that time had largely been caused by European 
activities and often assumed that the new communications and disturbance 
of the bush had spread tsetse flies or brought them close to the villages.85 
Similarly the so-called syphilis epidemic in Uganda in the early years of 
the century was said to be a n e w phenomenon and was taken so seriously 
that the campaign against it resulted in the foundation of the Uganda 
Medical Service. In Cameroon it was said to be u n k n o w n in 1895 and 
widespread in 1905. T h e truth about African syphilis is probably more 
complex than this: the microbe causing it is so similar to yaws that it is 
difficult to imagine some form of syphilis not having a long history in the 
continent;86 while there is clear evidence that virulent forms of syphilis 
spread from Southern Africa's mining areas, it appears that milder endemic 
syphilis m a y have long been widespread and m a y have been communicated 
by a form of vaccination in U g a n d a . 8 7 
With gathering m o m e n t u m from the early years of the century, the 
campaigns against epidemic disease apparently gained some success. T h e 
British attacked sleeping sickness by keeping the tsetse fly away from 
people: preventing game from using waterholes in inhabited areas, clearing 
bush, and, more spectacularly, moving populations, as occurred from the 
foreshores of Lake Victoria. T h e French treated huge numbers of individual 
83. H . B . T h o m a s and R . Scott, 1935, pp. 304-5. 
84. A . Gide, 1930, p. 33. 
85. Recent analyses have supported the original beliefs although differing slightly as to 
the reasons. In A . J. Duggan, 1962, it is argued that sleeping sickness was transmitted by 
the freer movement of peoples and their animas allowed by colonial administrations; while 
in J. Ford, 1971, this argument is taken further by suggesting that a whole range of new 
types of movements of people, domesticated animals and wild animals was made possible 
which fundamentally altered the ecological balance allowing, for a considerable period, 
major outbreaks of the disease. 
86. F . Cartwright and M . D . Biddiss, 1972. 
87. J. N . P . Davies, 1956, pp. 1041-55. 
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cases, especially noteworthy being the work of D r E . Jamot using the 
arsenical compound, atoxy. O n e area of 124000 people in the Cameroon, 
which was treated this way, was recorded in 1924 as having a crude death 
rate of 81 per thousand of which 36 points could be attributed to sleeping 
sickness; by 1930 the epidemic there was being beaten. In Uganda, where 
sleeping sickness was first identified in 1901, it was held to have caused 
over 200000 deaths by 1906 when the large population transfers began; 
but by 1918 there was sufficient confidence that the disease was being 
contained to allow some people to move back to their old areas.88 Outbreaks 
of bubonic plague were far from rare in the first third of the present 
century: in the first decade Egypt reported 6000 cases of w h o m half died;89 
almost 60000 deaths had been recorded in Uganda up to 1932;90 and 
there were outbreaks in Accra in 1908, Lagos in 1924 and more generally 
in Yoruba areas of Nigeria in 1925.91 Control measures in British West 
Africa indicated that the disease could be contained; during the Accra out-
break the town had been sealed off and 35 000 doses of Haffkine's vaccine 
were administered. Yellow fever epidemics have occurred from Senegal 
to Sudan at unpredictable intervals. B y 1927 a vaccine had been developed 
in the Rockefeller laboratories in Yaba on the outskirts of Lagos, but, as 
it was not used on a large scale until the Second World W a r , any success 
against the disease up until 1935 was due to the suppression of mosquitoes 
in urban areas and the use of mosquito netting. It is doubtful whether 
leprosy declined in this period; alepol oil was used in Nigeria from the 
early 1920s but by 1938 it was estimated that one per cent of the population 
still had the disease92 (see Plate 18.1). Smallpox vaccination was on such 
a small scale that by the late 1930s a significant reduction of the disease 
had probably taken place only in the Gold Coast and southern Nigeria.93 
In contrast, contact with Europeans and participation in the First World 
W a r ensured that the influenza epidemic of 1918-19 swept through Africa 
probably resulting in the highest annual death rate this century, although 
the rise in death rates was probably not as great as in Asia, for m a n y 
African populations were still protected by comparative isolation. Death 
rates were still enormous in the mines of Southern Africa in the early 
years of the present century; a 1907 commission reporting on the situation 
in Transvaal drew attention to death rates in the mines at the time of 71 
per thousand for tropical Africans compared with 28 for Africans from 
the temperate south and 19 for whites, the rates having declined from 
130, 35 and 20 respectively two years earlier.94 In most of the continent 
88. D . A . L o w in V . Harlow and E . M . Chilver (eds), 1965, p. i n . 
89. Anon., 1910(b). 
90. H . B . Thomas and R . Scott, 1935, p. 309. 
91. R . Schräm, 1971, pp. 121-2, 196. 
92. ibid., p. 231. 
93. R . R . Kuczynski, 1948-53, Vol. I, pp. 11-12. 
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little progress had been m a d e against the greatest scourge of all, malaria, 
which weakened when it did not kill and explained m a n y deaths attributed 
to other causes. 
Demographic movements up to 1935 
T h e attempt at this m u c h more detailed analysis of probable countervailing 
demographic forces in Africa than underlay previous attempts at estimating 
change in overall population numbers, does not lead to any real conviction 
about trends. T h e key to change has undoubtedly been the levels and 
trends of mortality. W e have no evidence that fertility changes have had 
m u c h impact on the continent as a whole. Fertility m a y well have declined 
for a period in the low fertility zone of Middle Africa; the Princeton 
project believed that an analysis of fertility by age indicated that this had 
occurred during the period under examination here in parts of the northern 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, G a b o n , Niger, Sudan and Zaire.95 
There m a y have been some increase in fertility in places because of 
improving female health, but such improvements, as w e have seen, were 
not substantial before 1935; in any case the evidence w e do possess from 
age structure data indicates surprising stability.96 There m a y have been 
changes in the patterns of polygyny, but, although it has been widely 
believed that the institution depressed fertility, the evidence from tropical 
Africa suggests that there m a y have been little effect of this kind: w o m e n 
in polygynous unions m a y average fewer births than those in monogamous 
ones because of a greater tendency to add wives to subfertile marriages 
and because levirate marriage is the source of some wives in polygynous 
unions.97 
There is unequivocal evidence of population growth during the first 
decades of the present century in those areas with adequate statistics, such 
as in Egypt where population m a y well have doubled between 1882 and 
1937,98 the Gold Coast, where the apparent growth of over one-third 
between the 1921 and 1931 censuses could not have been entirely an 
artefact of better census-taking,99 and South Africa where both total and 
94. Anon. , 1911. However, see also Anon. , 1913, where it was reported that questions 
in the South African Parliament had forced the Minister for Native Affairs to admit that 
the death rates of mine labourers had been systematically understated by excluding deaths 
in the residential compounds where as late as 1913 monthly deaths suggested annual rates 
of 200 per thousand or more. 
95. W . Brass et al., 1968, passim. 
96. That is for Ghana between 1921 and i960; J. C . Caldwell in W . Birmingham, I. W . 
Neustadt and E . N . O m a b o e (eds), 1967, p.94; and for Northern Nigeria between the 1921 
and 1952-3 censuses, C . K . M e e k , 1925, p. 180, and E . van de Walle in Brass et al., 1968. 
97. See H . V . M u s h a m , 1951, pp. 354-63; P. O . Ohadike, 1968; pp. 264-8. 
98. C . V . Kiser, 1944, pp. 385 fF. 
99. J. C . Caldwell in W . Birmingham, W . I. Neustadt and E . N . Omaboe (eds), 1967, 
pp. 20-3. 
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African numbers came close to doubling between the 1904 and 1936 
censuses. But these were areas of unusual prosperity or administrative 
action, as is partly evidenced by the existence of censuses, and must be 
assumed to have had populations growing more rapidly than the continent 
as a whole. 
Given all these disclaimers, and repeating that no one will ever k n o w 
the population of Africa prior to the present century, the following trends 
appear to be more plausible than those suggested to date. Largely because 
of the invasion of the tropical forest by agriculturists, a growth rate of 
0.25 per cent per a n n u m for the whole continent (and probably 0.5 per 
cent in the forest) seems a reasonable guess for the period from 1500 to 
1840, assuming that an accelerated rate of diet change in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries counterbalanced the ravages of the slave 
trade. With the decline of that trade, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
rate rose to a peak of 0.5 per cent around 1880 only to decline with the 
impact of the European partition and occupation of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although population growth probably continued to falter in some areas 
until the First World W a r , increasing populations in parts of North and 
Southern Africa, and possibly the Gold Coast, m a y well have more than 
compensated for the onslaught on the Congo Free State and the French 
Congo by 1900, so that w e can assume that continental population growth 
reached a low of about 0.25 per cent about the beginning of the century 
and thereafter continued to rise so that growth averaged 0.5 per cent up 
to 1920 and 1 per cent between that date and 1935. Projecting backwards 
from an assumed figure of 165 million in 1935,10° w e reach the following 
population estimates for various dates: 1500 - 47 million; 1840 - 104 
million; 1880 - 120 million; 1900 - 129 million; 1920 - 142 million; 1935 
- 1 6 5 million. 
T h e essence of the projection is that it argues that the neolithic revolution 
has been slowly moving through sub-Saharan Africa for three thousand 
years bringing with it more intensive land use and denser settlement. In 
its suggestion of sustained population growth, it can be compared only 
with Durand's low estimates, and the two sets would probably come close 
to agreement about the population size around 1500. But it implies lower 
rates of growth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and during this 
period is m u c h closer to his medium estimates. T h e projection suggests 
that Africa had a population of about 120 million when our period begins 
and that this grew by 37.5 per cent during the next fifty-five years to 165 
million in 1935. 
Population redistribution and urbanization 
These fifty-five years witnessed a flow of population that was to do m u c h 
100. Derived from the United Nations estimates somewhat adjusted to accord with the 
new knowledge of population derived from the post-Second World W a r censuses. 
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to determine the nature of the new Africa. A n addition of 45 million meant 
that everyone could not be fitted into exactly the same space as was 
occupied by their ancestors and the movement of people to unoccupied 
land speeded up. M o r e significantly, from the 1890s in West Africa — 
earlier in Southern Africa and somewhat later in East Africa - labour 
migrants began to m o v e great distances looking for paid employment. At 
first they were impelled by the need to pay taxes, but later the desire to 
purchase goods and to go to distant places became stronger; at first they 
were nearly all seasonal migrants but longer-term migration steadily 
assumed significance. B y the late 1920s, almost 200000 migrants a year 
were pouring from the savanna into the Gold Coast and Nigeria.101 
Governments put few restrictions on w h o moved , except in South Africa 
and Southern and Northern Rhodesia where the movement was restricted 
to temporary, adult males because of fears of settlement and pressures 
from white trade unions.102 
Ultimately, a larger proportion of these migration streams flowed not 
to the plantations and mines but into the towns, thus eventually ensuring 
centres in most regions large enough to support national administrations 
and secondary industries. Africa had, of course, ancient cities in the lower 
Nile valley, and more recent ones in the Maghrib, savanna West Africa 
and Nigeria's Yorubaland and the central Gold Coast. Nevertheless, by 
1880 only about one person in three hundred lived in centres with 
populations of over 100 000, compared with perhaps one in fifty in Asia 
and one in fifteen in Europe. 1 0 3 
T h e real change occurred in our period, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In tropical Africa, if w e exclude Nigeria, and list sixteen towns which 
were to be of major significance in the twentieth century, w e can estimate 
a combined population in 1880 of about 80000; by 1930 this had multiplied 
fivefold to over half a million (thus establishing a base for a multiplication 
of over ten times in the next forty years). B y 1931 Dakar's population 
had grown to 54000; Freetown had reached 44000 but this was only a 
doubling of the population of half a century before; Accra was 60000; 
Addis Ababa 65 000; Nairobi 48 000; and Dar es Salaam 25 000. In Nigeria 
the scale was different: Ibadan had a population of 400 000 but probably had 
150000 inhabitants at the beginning of the period; Lagos had perhaps 
doubled to 126000; ten other Yoruba towns had a total population of 
almost half a million which m a y have been little more than they had had 
half a century earlier; while, in the north, K a n o had probably doubled in 
the fifty years from 1880 to 89000 and eleven other towns had in total 
increased from perhaps 150000 to 200 000.1 0 4 In the Sahel, the population 
101. J. Suret-Canale, 1971, p. 246. 
102. R . Oliver and J. D . Fage, 1962, pp. 219-20. 
103. Calculated from P. M . Häuser in P. M . Hauser (ed.), 1957, pp. 53-95. 
104. Most figures for Nigerian towns are from W . Bascom, 1959, pp. 29-43. 
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of the historic cities was undoubtedly declining partly because they had not 
become the main French administrative centres; by 1931, Timbuktu, G a o 
and Mopti had a combined population of only about 15000. In North 
Africa, m a n y of the historic towns had retained their importance; in our 
period Cairo, Alexandria and Algiers had all trebled their populations to 
over a million, about 600 000 and a quarter of a million respectively; by 1931 
fourteen other old towns of the Maghrib had attained a total approaching 
one and a half million which represented at least a doubling in half a 
century and in Sudan, K h a r t o u m - O m d u r m a n had 159 000 people. B y 1931 
the fourteen largest towns of Southern Africa (South Africa, Rhodesia, 
Angola and M o z a m b i q u e ) had a total population of well over a million, 
perhaps a tenfold increase in the previous half century, and Johannesburg 
was approaching 400000. In sub-Saharan Africa, people were pouring 
into the n e w ports, mining towns and administrative cities which took 
over the whole region and were doubling in size about every twenty years; 
in North Africa there were some n e w towns, but growth was mostly on 
older foundations and a doubling was taking place about every thirty-five 
years. In the half century these large towns had grown by about four 
million, and the regional balance had changed so that, of all people found 
in such centres, North Africa's proportion had fallen from three-quarters 
to less than three-fifths, Southern Africa had risen from one-fifteenth to 
a sixth, and tropical Africa from one-fifth to a quarter (while within 
tropical Africa, the fraction outside Nigeria had climbed from a quarter 
to a third). 
A basis for the future 
B y 1935 Africa had successfully withstood the demographic shock of 
European colonization. Its births n o w far exceeded its deaths, and in m a n y 
parts of the continent, especially in the growing towns, life was no longer 
very precarious. Admittedly its death rates were still very high - in the 
continent as a whole the death rate was probably still well over 30 per 
thousand and the expectation of life at birth barely more than 30 years -
but it was the diseases of tropical Africa, more than any other factor, 
which had held the invader largely at bay and prevented Africa from 
becoming another Latin America. Even as it was, the white population of 
the continent had increased thirty times from 25000 in 1800, found mostly 
in the Cape, to three-quarters of a million in 1880, of w h o m five-sixths 
were in South Africa, Algeria and Egypt. B y 1935 it had multiplied again 
by five to 3.75 million, of w h o m half were in South Africa, a quarter in 
Algeria and a further fifth in the rest of North Africa. During the same 
period, Asians (almost entirely Indians except for a few small Chinese 
communities of which the largest was on the R a n d ) increased from about 
50000 to over a third of a million of w h o m over two-thirds were in South 
Africa. Change was coming but few perceived it clearly as is evident from 
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a serious European appraisal of the racial numbers in Algeria in the 1920s: 
' M o s t F r e n c h m e n in Africa had little to fear of there ever being another 
serious effort to overthrow authority; for, as they point out, there are over 
eight hundred thousand Europeans to five and a half million natives w h o 
have little cohesion and could not d o m u c h m o r e than indulge in sporadic 
outbreaks."05 
In 1935 Africa stood at the brink of rapid population growth, which 
would take its n u m b e r s - which had already grown according to our 
estimates from 120 million in 1880 to 165 million - to 200 million by the 
late 1940s, 300 million by the mid-1960s and inevitably to 400 million in 
the mid-1970s. O f the latter n u m b e r , 50 million would be in cities with 
m o r e than 100 000 inhabitants, a far cry from the Africa of the partition 
of the 1880s with its debate about creating a labour force. 
Finally, it is pertinent to ask whether these massive changes were largely 
or even entirely the result of the colonial penetration. Without doubt the 
upsetting of stable populations, leading in the C o n g o Free State and 
elsewhere in Middle Africa to an upsurge in the death rate, the slow 
reduction in mortality in other parts of the continent during the nineteenth 
century and generally in this century, and the accelerating nucleation of 
population in towns and on mining fields o w e d nearly everything to the 
industrial revolution and to increasing contact with people from industrial 
societies. M u c h of this process would have occurred even without colonial 
rule: the traders would have provoked trading centres into growth; 
European medical schools would have become interested in the problem 
of protecting the traders and others from tropical disease; missionaries 
would have laid the foundations of a hospital system. 
Nevertheless, direct colonial rule certainly speeded up all these processes. 
Eventually, and certainly towards the end of our period, it helped to reduce 
the great peaks of mortality by increasingly and effectively importing and 
utilizing epidemic control technology and creating a m o d e r n transport 
system which could distribute food in areas of famine. T h e need for 
administrative centres provided a nucleus for n e w towns, and colonial 
administrations' guarantees of personal safety and investment security to 
the nationals of their metropolitan countries hastened the growth of c o m -
mercial settlements, mining c a m p s and plantations. Without colonial 
administrations European entrepreneurs might well have been even m o r e 
rapacious and murderous than they were. Europeans usually justified the 
colonial penetration by pointing to these achievements. Yet the history of 
Latin America and China shows that in time most of these gains would 
have been achieved in any case; the growth of industrialization was 
irreversible and a modus vivendi with Africa and other developing areas, 
from which needed raw materials were secured, was essential. 
105. G . Casserley, 1923, p. 50. 
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A. E. AFIGBO 
Change and continuity 
In the rival mythologies of European imperialism and colonial nationalism, 
change was an innovation introduced by European rule into so-called 
traditional societies. T o imperial apologists change, as applied to colonial 
peoples, suggests progress, a dramatic and beneficial linear transition from 
a static and barely productive traditional culture to a dynamic and limitless 
modernism. But to colonial nationalists the word primarily connotes 
'disruption', the process by which unsympathetic and uncomprehending 
imperialists shattered the idyllic world of colonial peoples leaving in its 
place turmoil, instability and uncertainty. 
These differing attitudes notwithstanding, the two rival mythologies 
would appear to subscribe to a number of c o m m o n assumptions regarding 
change and traditional societies in the colonial situation. These include 
the belief that traditional societies were basically static, and therefore 
antithetical to modern values as a result of which the natural relationship 
between them was one of conflict; that n e w values, attitudes and structures 
necessarily displaced their traditional counterparts once they came into 
contact; and that in any given colony or even geographic region, traditional 
societies responded uniformly to the impact of European culture. 
Recently, however, scholars have shown that for Africa the above 
assumptions are unfounded since the societies on which European rule 
was imposed were far from static. O n the contrary they were the products 
of generations, or even centuries and millennia, of change. O n e can, in 
fact, assert that 'modernization in Africa has been a continuous process 
from earliest times'. Such ingredients as occupational specialization, urban-
ization, social mobility or even labour migration, usually associated with 
change and modernization, were operative in pre-colonial Africa. 
N o r is the 'traditional-modern' polar model, with all its attendant 
implications of conflict and incompatibility, applicable to the entire 
spectrum of African experience of change under colonialism. There were 
manifold variations in the reaction of African cultures to western innova-
tions. Not only were certain customs and beliefs discarded or modified, 
Africa under Colonial Domination i88o-igjj 
but some were retained at one level of society at the same time as n e w 
alternatives were being accepted at another level. T h u s while h u m a n 
sacrifice, the slave trade and the killing of twins were discarded in societies 
where such practices had existed, and old and new ideas were amalgamated 
in the sphere of religion, the European ideal of m o n o g a m o u s marriage, 
accepted as part of an expected public image by sections of the westernized 
elite, exists side by side under the law with the institution of polygamy 
a m o n g the urban and rural masses. Today w e have existing side by side 
in Africa indigenous and European architectural traditions; local ethnicity 
and nationalism; local and regional-locked economies and a notional m o n e y 
economy; rural and urban life; western bureaucratic institutions and 
traditional local authorities; Ku'ranic and Western schools. 
T h u s with ease m a n y indigenous African institutions and ideas survived 
the impact of, or even blended with, alien European values. There is, for 
instance, the case of the Igbo w h o are often regarded as having massively 
embraced western ways. According to Sylvia Leith-Ross, an Igbo in the 
1930s would — with disengaging facility — patronize holy communion and 
traditional magic and medicine, and plant 'side by side in the garden round 
his n e w cement and pan-roofed house the hibiscus of "civilization" and 
the ogirisi tree of pagan family rites'.1 Margaret Read has shown h o w the 
Nguni integrated the Christian Church and western education into their 
society, using both as instruments for further ensuring the survival of 
their culture in the modern world. T h e y see no contradiction, and have 
no difficulty, in combining Christian and traditional Nguni rites in marriage 
and funeral ceremonies.2 Professor Fallers has also described some 
Ugandan groups as 'enthusiastically and successfully' accepting m a n y 
elements of modernization — confining their influence, and adapting them 
to traditional culture and social structure. T h e point is that colonial Africans 
were probably not unaware of the elementary fact that accepting ' n e w 
forms [would] increase the range of alternatives'3 available to them. 
A n y easy generalization on the response of African societies to the 
European impact is thus bound to be misleading. O n e must always bear 
in mind the territorial vastness of the continent, the rich diversity and 
variegation of African cultures, differences in individual and group 
temperaments and psychologies - and thus the fact that response to even 
similar stimuli was likely to vary not only from individual to individual 
or from society to society, but also from time to time within the same 
society and by the same individual. In Nigeria attention has usually been 
drawn to the differing responses of the Igbo, the Yoruba and the 'Hausa-
Fulani' to indirect rule. In Kenya , the Gikuyu accepted western innova-
tions, modifying these to suit themselves while m a n y of their neighbours 
tended to adopt the opposite stance. 
1. S. Leith-Ross, 1939, p. 293. 
2. M . Read in V.Turner (ed.), 1971, p. 362. 
3. J. R . Gusfield in J. L . Finkle and R . W . Gable (eds), 1971, p. 19. 
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O n e can, therefore, subscribe to the view that change as such was not 
n e w to colonial Africa and that there is no African society which was not 
affected to an appreciable extent by European contact or which simply 
withered before it. O n e must also concede that with colonial rule the 
ideology of change c a m e to be consciously embraced by the rulers of Africa 
and their would-be friends. E v e n those colonial officials w h o were 
strongly committed to the policy and practice of indirect rule, with its 
emphasis on the preservation of traditional institutions and values, still 
recognized the need for change. Indeed under indirect rule indigenous 
institutions and rulers were expected to serve as media for introducing 
reform in measured doses and in ways acceptable to the colonial authority. 
Every colonial administration saw change as the only w a y of modernizing 
Africa and fitting her into the orbit of the W e s t to the latter's advantage. 
T h e indigenous elites have patronized change as a w a y of getting Africa 
on to her feet and making her states equal m e m b e r s of the community of 
nations. 
The main forces of change 
T h e forces which played the leading part in changing the social structure 
and character of colonial Africa are easily catalogued. T h e y were the very 
fact of colonial conquest with its attendant political settlement, western 
education, western Christianity, western economic forces and increased 
urbanization. Details of h o w most of these forces - especially those of 
military conquest, political conquest, consolidation and economic exploita-
tion - penetrated Africa and gained a firm grip on her society have been 
given in other chapters of this volume. It remains to do the same briefly 
for urbanization and western education before passing on to an analysis 
of the social effects which all the forces working jointly produced. 
In dealing with urbanization it is necessary to emphasize that this 
important force of change was not introduced into Africa by European 
rule. O n the contrary it had been operating there - with all the opportunities 
it offered for occupational specialization, population aggregation, social 
mobility and so on - for centuries before the imposition of European 
colonialism. T h e coasts of North, East, Wes t and Southern Africa, as well, 
for example, as inland areas such as the Sudanic belt and Yorubaland 
were all centres of ancient and continuing urban aggregation thanks to 
the catalytic impact of political consolidation and international trade. But 
it is undeniable that European rule gave urbanization in Africa a n e w 
impetus by strengthening those political and economic forces already 
working in that direction. T h e result was the rise of n e w urban centres 
in places, such as Igbo and Ibibio lands of Nigeria, which had not previously 
experienced urbanization, as well as the expansion of the old centres. This 
it did largely by creating improved means of communication, n e w political 
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and agricultural exploitation. In this regard it is noteworthy that between 
1850 and 1950, for the continent the critical century of European contact 
and foreign rule, the annual growth rate of urban population of Africa 
was 3.9 per cent compared to the world average of 2.6 per cent. This 
throws m u c h light on the growth rate of urbanization generally in colonial 
Africa. T h e n e w outburst of urban development and expansion invariably 
meant an increase in its catalytic role in social change. 
Unlike urbanization, western education was brought to Africa by Europe, 
though not spread by her agencies alone. It is correct to say that the 
educational revolution in Africa was the work of three interest groups -
Christian missions, colonial governments and local African initiative, in 
that order of importance. For the Christian missions the school was a key 
institution, being the most reliable means for membership recruitment, 
and for creating self-perpetuating congregations whose m e m b e r s would 
ensure the survival of Christianity in the event of withdrawal by the white 
missionaries. Education and evangelization were so closely linked that for 
m a n y parts of Africa the pitching of the missionary tent was synonymous 
with the establishment of a school. A m o n g the N g u n i the opening of a 
school is said to have preceded the opening of a church in all cases.4 
T h e colonial administrations, on their part, hoped through the school 
to raise the low-grade personnel they needed for staffing the bottom 
echelons of the colonial bureaucracy, to create such conditions - political, 
economic, social and moral - as would enable Europe to exploit as fully 
as possible what were regarded as the hitherto insufficiently tapped 
resources of Africa. T o this end not only did colonial administrations erect 
and run essentially lay schools, they also supported the educational efforts 
of the missions by means of subventions. Furthermore, the political settle-
ments they effected enabled the missions to penetrate the heart of the 
continent without fearing for the safety of their agents. T h e government 
lay schools were particularly important for the spread of western education 
in m a n y Islamized parts of Africa where it was feared that unrestrained 
missionary activity would provoke violent reaction from Muslims. 
With regard to local initiative, it is noteworthy that even before the 
onset of colonial rule, the rulers of Egypt and of the states of the Maghrib 
had introduced western education into their countries as part of an effort 
to bridge the technological gap between their societies and Europe. In 
black Africa local initiative also played s o m e part in spreading education. 
F r o m the 1920s Gikuyu cultural nationalists established and ran their o w n 
schools which, unlike mission schools, were sympathetic to Gikuyu culture. 
In U g a n d a and Southern Nigeria local rulers and elders joined with either 
the colonial administration or the missions to establish schools. In these 
places, too, some of the n e w elite established and ran schools, especially 
at the secondary level where the felt need for self-reliance at times led to 
4. M . Read in V. Turner (ed.), 1971, p. 359. 
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the building of technical rather than g r a m m a r schools, independent of the 
colonial administration and the missions. 
While it is easy to enumerate the forces making for social change in 
colonial Africa, it is less easy to catalogue the changes which each force 
brought about. In fact so pervasive was the influence of each of these 
forces that it would be pointless attempting to specify in all cases which 
force induced what change. 
Military conquest and the establishment of the colonial administration, 
for instance, did not only challenge and defeat the old political and military 
lords, but also the monopolists of traditional religious and magical powers 
w h o were equally involved in the m o v e m e n t of resistance. T h u s the loss 
of the war of resistance against the colonial powers could quite easily lead 
to a loss of faith in the old priests and gods and to a decision to embrace 
the supposedly superior faith of the conquerors. T h e success of the 
conquerors had other side effects as well. T h e old military classes, where 
they existed, could not continue, under the n e w dispensation, to live on 
militarism. N o r could the old political elite w h o had lived by ruling 
continue to do so unless they were recruited into the political service of 
the colony whether as 'native authorities' under indirect rule or as tax 
collectors and intelligence agents under the so-called direct rule. In other 
words, m a n y of the old political, military, economic and religious elites 
had to embrace new professions either in place of or in addition to the 
old ones. T h u s not all w h o seized the n e w economic opportunities offered 
by alien rule did so simply in response to the attractions of the n e w 
economic regime. S o m e w h o migrated to the new urban centres did so 
not just because of the lure of urbanism, but because the military conquest 
and the consequent political settlement m a d e their positions in the rural 
areas obsolescent and untenable. T h e triumph of military and political 
force thus struck in m a n y places at the roots of society and called on the 
different classes for appropriate adjustment. 
So did the introduction of Christianity which sought to abolish tradi-
tional gods and beliefs. Wherever Christianity took root, for instance, 
m a n y traditional priests and other manipulators of the supernatural had 
to take to other professions. Slaves obtained their freedom, thus forcing 
those w h o formerly depended on slave labour to do their o w n work for 
themselves or shift to dependence on wage labour. Lands hitherto reserved 
for gods and goblins were released either for arable use or for the siting 
of social institutions like the school, hospital and so on. T h e younger 
generations went to school where they learned n e w techniques which 
equipped them for employment in government, commercial firms or 
missions. A n d since these jobs were available for the most part in urban 
areas, it means that conversion to Christianity could also imply a predisposi-
tion to live in urban areas. O r to take another example, a m a n could go 
to the urban area in search of economic advancement while being still 
staunchly loyal to the traditional religion. In time, however, his physical 
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separation from the shrines and religious rites of his h o m e gods, as well 
as the economic, social and psychological pressures of the n e w environment 
could turn him into a Christian of sorts. These examples of h o w one social 
force usually produced a variegated impact could be multiplied m a n y times. 
T h e n e w social structures 
A m o n g the social effects of foreign rule on African society, the most 
immediately noticeable was the political one. Pre-existing African states, 
except for Liberia and, u p to 1935, Ethiopia, lost most of their sovereignty 
and with it the right to participate in the affairs of the world community 
except indirectly through their n e w masters. Even their right to interact 
with their African neighbours, except at the most rudimentary and u n -
official level, was severely limited if such neighbours n o w found themselves 
on the opposite sides of the line marking the boundary of a colony. For 
example, the Efik of Nigeria were severed from their traditional markets 
in the Cameroons, the Yoruba were prevented from taking a direct and 
open part in events in those parts of D a h o m e y (now Benin) which formerly 
formed part of their most celebrated empire, while the Bakongo of Angola 
could not interact to any significant extent with their kith and kin in either 
G a b o n or the French Congo . 
Furthermore, foreign rule transformed and simplified the political m a p 
of Africa. W h e r e formerly there were countless rival sovereign states and 
communities with shifting and at times vague frontiers, w e n o w had a few 
dozen colonies with fixed and clearly marked boundaries. Attempts were 
m a d e in international boundary conventions and treaties to take into 
account the pre-existing political and economic zones. However , such other 
considerations as the claims of the rival powers, the lure of natural frontiers 
(hills, rivers, etc.) and of lines of longitude and latitude tended to carry 
more weight than African claims. A s a result, closely related and sometimes 
previously politically united peoples at times found themselves on opposite 
sides of the agreed boundary lines. 
If the m o r e abiding claims of ethnic integrity were not always respected, 
neither were the m o r e ephemeral claims of conquest states and empires 
to territorial integrity. T h e Sokoto caliphate and the Borno empire lost 
large tracts of territory by the time the boundaries of the Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria emerged. In the case of the 'peripatetic empires' 
of Samori Turé and Rabi ibn Fadlallah, these were simply parcelled out 
between adjoining colonies. T h e secondary empires of Msiri and T i p p u 
Tib in Central Africa were similarly shared out a m o n g the Belgians, the 
Portuguese and the British. T h e imposed boundaries of the colonies 
fossilized under the dead hand of colonialism and international law to 
become the international boundaries of independent African states to which 
the liberties and rights of whole peoples are at times sacrificed. It is n o w 
impossible to contemplate a significant change in any one of these boundary 
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lines without a major upheaval. Events in the H o r n of Africa are beginning 
to suggest that these imaginary lines on the m a p of Africa are eternal. 
Another aspect of the n e w political structure deserving mention was 
the imposition of an alien European bureaucratic administrative structure 
on the pre-existing African political systems. Between the European and 
African structures there existed a wide range of patterns of relationship. 
Taking our examples from the policies of the two leading colonial powers 
of the period (Britain and France) w e discover there were even variations 
within each system. T h e French were less concerned than the British with 
maintaining intact the empires, kingdoms and chiefdoms they conquered 
and using their political systems in local administration. Therefore they 
tended to break up the old paramountcies, pensioning off their rulers, 
while the British m a d e an effort to hitch the local rulers and their political 
systems to their wagon of imperial administration. This was the general 
pattern. But in Morocco the French m a d e an effort to preserve the king 
and his political system and to use them in administration, while for nearly 
three decades in Asante in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) , and for nearly 
two in Benin in Nigeria, the British sought to break the indigenous 
administrative systems of these two empires.3 
However, w e find that even in the Musl im emirates of Northern Nigeria 
where it would appear there was a harmony of interests between the colonial 
power and the emirs, the union between the European and indigenous 
administrative systems was never organic. T h e result was that in some 
aspects of the life of a colony such as the purely secular the two systems 
could work hand in hand, while in some others they would work 
independently and, sometimes, at cross purposes. 
O n e other social impact of foreign rule which was noticeable quite early 
in the colonial period was the general depression of the status of Africans. 
Colonialism superimposed on the pre-existing class structure of the 
continent at least an extra layer of leaders and pacesetters. In East Africa 
where it encouraged Asian immigration, colonialism in fact superimposed 
two classes. In each colony Europeans had the monopoly of political, 
economic and educational power, except in East Africa where a fraction 
of the economic power fell into the hands of Asians. In this situation the 
Africans became the underprivileged and looked up to the Europeans, 
and at times to the Asians, for leadership and example. 
This structure of social relationship was shored up with a bogus racial 
theory which sought to arrange the different branches of the h u m a n family 
in a hierarchical order of civilization with the Africans (the Negroes) 
occupying the bottom of the ladder while the Europeans (whites) occupied 
the top. In Southern Africa, in particular, where white settlers found 
themselves locked in conflict with numerically superior Bantu peoples, 
the racial theory was especially stringent, with the authority of the Holy 
5. A. E. Afigbo in J. F. A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974. 
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Bible being wrongly used to reinforce the presumed social implications of 
pseudo-Darwinism. For the Negroes in particular the theory postulated 
a degree of cultural barrenness which m a d e it necessary and possible to 
explain their history and social evolution in terms of the Hamitic impact. 
In practical life the ascendancy of this racist theory led to a policy of 
denying Africans, no matter h o w well educated, equal rights and oppor-
tunities with the whites in the colonial service. In W e s t Africa this meant 
a retreat from the liberal policies of the middle years of the nineteenth 
century which had m a d e it possible for Africans to hold the same posts 
as the Europeans. T h e theory also led to a policy of segregating Africans 
from the Europeans in the urban areas. Not only were there European 
housing reserves, there were also European hospitals, European clubs and 
so on, distinct from those established specifically for the use of Africans. 
O n e effect of all this was to induce in the African a feeling of inferiority, 
a tendency to lose confidence in himself and his future - in short a state 
of m i n d which at times encouraged an uncritical imitation of European 
powers. Luckily, however, some African path-finders were nettled by it 
all into questioning the whole social and ideological façade of colonialism 
using facts from history and Christianity. B y so doing they helped to 
prepare the w a y for post-Second W o r l d W a r radical nationalist thinking. 
At the macro-level, then, colonial rule in Africa tended to transform 
racial distinctions into class divisions. A closer analysis, however, reveals 
that in no colony did all the Africans form one class. At first the pre-colonial 
class structure persisted, but in time the n e w forces of change occasioned 
a rearrangement of the structure, and the emergence of n e w classes. 
T h o u g h pre-colonial Africa provided m a n y avenues for people of ability 
to rise in social status through personal achievements, its class structure 
tended to give an undue weight to birth. This was so to the extent that 
not only political offices but also certain honoured professions like priest-
hood and smithing ran in families. Foreign rule was to bring about far-
reaching changes in African social structure by simply laying emphasis on 
individual talent and achievement rather than birth, and by providing 
m a n y openings for advancement which lay beyond the control of the 
traditional manipulators of African social structure and institutions. 
Furthermore, its desecration of m a n y African institutions and systems 
tended to undermine the authority and respect of the old nobility and to 
erode the awe in which they were held. 
Colonial legal and moral codes, by abolishing slavery and proclaiming 
the equality of all before secular and divine law offered even the most 
underprivileged in traditional society the opportunity to rise in status, 
each person according to his ability and destiny. 
T h e anonymity of the urban centres reinforced the effects of the legal 
and moral revolution by providing for the ex-slaves and their like an arena 
of action where they could operate unencumbered by history. Similarly, 
the urban centres held out and still hold out an irresistible attraction to 
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other classes of people in the rural areas. While some people went there 
to seek a fortune on their o w n volition, others did so in response to the 
tax and land policies of the colonial powers in the rural areas, especially 
in the settler colonies. Those immigrants w h o were well educated or highly 
skilled rose fast to become m e m b e r s of the n e w elite, or to hover on the 
fringe of that class as sub-elites. T h e less fortunate immigrants w h o had 
little or no education and w h o in addition were barely skilled or unskilled, 
sank to the bottom of the urban society to become the urban mass, also 
called the urban proletariat by some scholars. M a n y of these found them-
selves at the mercy of the employers of labour, while others learned some 
trade and established independent businesses of varying viability. They 
differed from their rural counterparts, the peasants, in that they did not 
derive their livelihood from the land, had a closer brush with modernizing 
influences and lived in slums. 
Both the n e w elite and the urban proletariat were important as agents 
making for change in rural colonial society, but the former were indis-
putably the more important in the political, economic and social history 
of colonial Africa. Their greatest advantage over the traditional elite and 
the urban and rural masses lay in their literacy. T h e fact was that for the 
non-Muslim areas of Africa probably the most important single innovation 
of foreign rule was literacy. Even for the Islamized areas, the coming of 
literacy in the R o m a n script gave a new impetus to Muslim education. 
Literacy was for m a n y African peoples a new magic, and was sought after 
as such and at all costs since it appeared to open the treasure house of 
the modern world. T o know the amount of power, authority and influence 
which the first generation of African clerks, interpreters and teachers 
exercised is to have some idea of the spell which literacy cast over m a n y 
African peoples. Literacy gave the elite access to the scientific and social 
thought of the western world, equipped them to enter into dialogue with 
the colonial powers over the destiny of Africa, and familiarized them with 
the social fashions of Europe which m a d e their life style an example to 
be emulated by their less fortunate countrymen. 
But not all those classified as belonging to the new elite in colonial 
Africa owed their membership of that class to education, nor did all those 
w h o owed it to education attain a uniform standard. A s Professor Lucy 
Mair and a number of other scholars have shown, some gained entry into 
that class because they had m a d e m o n e y from either large-scale farming 
or business and could help to finance the political agitation of their better 
educated but poorer brethren.6 S o m e cotton and coffee farmers of Uganda, 
cocoa farmers of western Nigeria and the Gold Coast, coffee farmers of 
Ivory Coast and groundnut farmers of Senegal and T h e G a m b i a were 
able to gain membership of the n e w elite class on grounds of their success 
in that profession. Similarly, in West Africa especially, where m a n y 
6. L . Mair in V . Turner (ed.), 1971; P. C . Lloyd (ed.), 1966; M . Kilson in L . H . Gann 
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indifferently educated Africans were able to interpose themselves as 
middlemen between the primary producers and the big European 
commercial companies, commercial success also provided a ready passport 
to the n e w elite status. There were, however, others w h o qualified for 
consideration as m e m b e r s of the elite because they controlled mass 
organizations like labour unions and could give the better-educated elite 
the kind of mass support which they needed to convince the colonial 
powers that they spoke for the people. O n the contrary, in East and Central 
Africa relatively few Africans gained admission into the elite group as a 
result of the deliberate policies pursued by the colonial rulers and the 
activities of the Indians and Portuguese and Greek petty traders. In fact, 
in m a n y of these areas, the old central elite virtually disappeared. 
It is largely this wide variation in their qualifications and background 
that makes it so difficult to define precisely in those terms w h o were the 
n e w elite of colonial Africa. O n e can thus justifiably argue that the issue 
of the rise of a new elite a m o n g any African people in the colonial era 
was largely a question of what amount and kind of educational and economic 
opportunities were available to the people and h o w far they put those 
opportunities to effective use. All the studies so far carried out on this 
aspect of the matter suggest that regions or colonies which witnessed the 
most intensive efforts in the propagation of western education and which 
offered Africans more opportunities for meaningful participation in trade 
and commercial agriculture produced the largest number of people of elite 
status. 
In parts of Africa, especially a m o n g such chiefless peoples as the Igbo, 
Ibibio, Ogoja, Tiv, Idoma, Birom, Angas and Gwari of Nigeria where it 
was difficult to identify the traditional rulers and associate them with the 
work of the colonial government, m a n y m e m b e r s of the n e w elite came 
from a m o n g those w h o in pre-colonial times would have been classified 
as commoners . S o m e were even of the servile class or were as yet 
unassimilated immigrants. This was because in such places it was m e m b e r s 
of these classes w h o first embraced western education, tried their hands 
at the n e w professions and moved to the urban centres while the traditional 
elite tended to stand back. But as soon as the benefits of western education 
and the n e w professions were demonstrated, members of the traditional 
elite also joined in. S o m e colonial powers, especially France and Britain, 
deliberately set out with varying results to encourage this belatedly 
awakened traditional elite group, for instance by establishing special schools 
for them. With the wealth they derived from their estates and/or their 
salaries as local authorities they were usually able to train their sons not 
only locally but also in higher institutions in Europe and America. 
In some other parts of Africa, however, the traditional elite responded 
early to the call of western education and modern commercial ventures. 
In Egypt it was this class which took the lead in establishing western-type 
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of western education and commercial farming. In Ethiopia they reacted 
in a similar manner to western education, sending their children to Europe 
and America to be educated. In this way they were able to retain the 
leadership of their countries. 
T h u s the fact that the ranks of the n e w elite contained people from 
different strata of society makes it risky to talk in easy terms of conflict 
between the n e w elite and the traditional rulers. In Sierra Leone and 
Liberia where for m u c h of the period the n e w elites were m a d e up of 
people w h o were not indigenous to these territories, there was an under-
standable tendency for the elite communities of the coast to be in conflict 
and competition with the traditional societies of the interior. T h e y were 
inclined to be contemptuous of the traditional leaders w h o in turn 
harboured an abiding suspicion of them. In the nineteenth-century Gold 
Coast and in Yorubaland (Nigeria), m a n y of the founding m e m b e r s of the 
n e w elite group were - or at least believed they were - related by blood 
to the peoples of the interior. 
Elsewhere in Africa where the first generation of n e w elites did not 
include repatriates such as slaves freed from slave-ships or returnees from 
the Americas, the ethnic and cultural tie was even closer. T h e result was 
that throughout the nineteenth century, and even during the early part 
of this century, the n e w and old elites built u p a tradition of co-operation 
- the new elite being regarded as those w h o mediated between their 
indigenous societies and western culture. After all they had been enabled 
to learn the new techniques in order to help their people meet the problems 
posed by European presence. In the Gold Coast and in Egbaland (Nigeria) 
they had worked closely with the traditional elite in an effort to build a 
n e w society and ward off European rule. But these efforts had failed. 
However, as colonial rule took deeper root, strains and stresses appeared 
in the relationship of the two groups. T h e n e w elites had wrongly hoped 
that Europe was out to modernize Africa and would use m e m b e r s of their 
group as the instruments for achieving that goal. But under colonial rule 
it was European bureaucrats w h o assumed the role which the n e w elites 
had cut out for themselves. A n d instead of taking the n e w elites into 
partnership, the administration tended to prefer the traditional rulers 
w h o m they relegated to the area of local government. This was particularly 
so in British-ruled Africa where a determined effort was m a d e to preserve 
the old ruling families and to some extent in Belgian-ruled Africa after 
1906. Even in the French territories where most of the great paramountcies 
were destroyed, the old ruling families at times survived in attenuated 
forms to be used at the village and district levels. A n d where people w h o 
had no traditional status were used in local government, they were often 
labelled 'chiefs' and assigned the same kind of functions as members of 
the traditional ruling families. 
Because of their exclusion, the n e w elites went into open opposition 
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could not join them. Their continued survival depended on the colonial 
power and this tied their hands. Also for the most part the traditional 
rulers were not sufficiently educated to participate meaningfully in the 
highfaluting debates of the new elites. In any case if they accepted the 
arguments of the n e w elites, they would be consigning themselves to 
second or even third place. Because they did not side with the new elites, 
the latter regarded them as the lackeys of imperialism. They in turn 
regarded the n e w elites as revolutionaries w h o wanted to destroy i m -
memorial custom and turn the world upside d o w n . 
T o m a k e matters worse the two were driven by imperialist propaganda 
into engaging in a struggle over w h o spoke for the people. T h e n e w elites 
said they did. This the traditional rulers denied, claiming the honour for 
themselves. T h e colonial administration agreed with them. T h e kind of 
acrimony which this disagreement at times generated could be seen in the 
dispute between the chief of A k y e m - A b u a k w a in the Gold Coast, N a n a 
Sir Ofori Atta and the leaders of the National Congress of British West 
Africa in the 1920s. It could also be seen in the same period in the quarrel 
between Harry Thuku's Y o u n g Kikuyu Association on the one hand, and 
the Kikuyu Association dominated by the traditional rulers on the other.7 
Yet one cannot conclude from the foregoing that in the period 1880 to 
1935 the normal relationship between the n e w elites and the traditional 
rulers was invariably one of conflict. T h e nature of the relationship varied 
both in place and time. In the French territories neither the n e w elites nor 
the traditional rulers flourished under alien rule. A n d w h e n after the 
Second World W a r the stranglehold of colonial autocracy came to be 
progressively relaxed, those w h o emerged as the leaders of French African 
nationalism included traditional rulers and their descendants. 
In the Gold Coast the leading political party until the ascendancy of 
D r K w a m e N k r u m a h — the United Gold Coast Convention - represented 
some kind of rapprochement between the new and traditional elites. In 
places like Ethiopia, Egypt and Buganda where the traditional rulers had 
responded positively to western influences, no logical conflict developed 
between them and the n e w elites. It was the same in societies like that of 
the Igbo where the traditional elites had not the kind of stature that 
survived far into the colonial period. In any case the n e w elites were not 
all the 'uprooted natives' of imperialist mythology, nor were all the 
traditional rulers the obscurantist opponents of change of latter-day 
nationalist demagogy. Both groups had more in c o m m o n than was often 
admitted in the evanescent heat of occasional debate. 
T h e rise of new organizations 
Apart from giving rise to the new structures discussed above, colonial rule 
7. D . Kimble, 1963, pp. 389-96; K . J. King, 1971(b). 
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introduced other changes into the structure of African society. Here w e 
have in mind the rise of n e w organizations which helped to mediate the 
adjustment of m a n y individuals and their rural h o m e s to the n e w demands 
and norms of colonial society. These n e w organizations have generally 
been described as 'voluntary' by social scientists. T h e y are 'voluntary' in 
the sense that people are not born into them as they are born into lineages, 
villages or ethnic groups. But closer analysis would show that for s o m e 
of them, especially the ethnic-based welfare or improvement associations, 
membership is not that voluntary since the practical alternative to m e m b e r -
ship is generally ostracism of a kind. 
Africanists are agreed on the social conditions which brought these 
organizations into being. It has been found that they generally originated 
in the urban centres, although some of them - like the ethnic-based ones 
- in time established h o m e branches. T h e fact was that, as Professor 
Wallerstein has aptly put it, migration from 'the traditional rural to the 
m o d e r n urban area' led to 'dislocation and disorientation for the indivi-
dual'.8 Since neither the traditional society nor the colonial administration 
had the means to step in and meet the n e w needs of such migrants, they 
had to evolve their o w n institutions, systems and norms for achieving 
meaningful existence in the strange and heady social world of the town. 
T h e studies of Godfrey Wilson in East Africa have shown that there 
was a clear correlation between the pressure of colonial society and the 
formation of these organizations. T h u s K e n y a n Africans, whose traditional 
culture c a m e under unusually severe pressure from colonial rule and settler 
aggressiveness, had stronger and m u c h m o r e numerous ethnic associations 
than Africans in neighbouring territories like Tanganyika and U g a n d a . 
There was thus an element of individual self-protection and self-
stabilization in the formation of the associations. Furthermore, urban 
conditions of existence created opportunities that m a d e it relatively easy 
to form such organizations since, as T h o m a s Hodgkin has put it, it provided 
'physical centres . . . where m e n and w o m e n , with particular interests in 
c o m m o n , can collide with one another'.9 
T h o u g h it has been correctly pointed out that it is difficult to group 
the different organizations into clear-cut categories, especially owing to 
their functional versatility, w e shall here distinguish between three kinds. 
In the first group are those organizations which could be described as 
purely 'social', that is devoted to promoting conviviality and relaxation. 
These were m a d e necessary by the absence from the towns of the traditional 
forms of amusement , relaxation and citizenship training - such as the 
masquerades, age-grade associations and traditional festivities. There was 
also the attraction of forms of m o d e r n European social life as advertised 
in the life of the European community in each colony. In this category 
8. I. Wallerstein in J. S. Coleman and C . G . Rosberg (eds), 1970, p. 319. 
9. T . Hodgkin, 1956, p. 84. 
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were the football clubs, Scout and Girl Guide movements, debating 
societies and alumni associations. 
In the second group are the ethnic unions. These were an extension of 
rural ethnicity to the urban areas. There were different hierarchies of 
them - village, clan and ethnic unions. These had two main functions. O n e 
was to help the individual w h o had migrated newly to the town to adjust 
as smoothly as possible to the conditions of urban life. T h u s when a 
migrant first reached the town, he usually m a d e his first contacts with 
members of his village or clan union w h o would help to find him 
accommodation, to introduce him to employers of labour or master 
craftsmen to teach him modern skills. They also taught him h o w to comport 
himself in the city. Through such associations members got help w h e n in 
difficulty. They could get loans to continue their business if they sustained 
crippling losses. Funeral, marriage and other expenses approved by the 
association could also be met with loans or donations from the group as 
the case m a y be. ' ° 
T h e other function of the ethnic unions was 'to provide a channel for 
progressive public opinion at h o m e ' , especially through maintaining an 
organized link between the sons at h o m e and the sons abroad. T o do this 
they had to take an interest in the political and social development of their 
homes. At first this w o n the associations the opposition and obstruction 
of suspicious colonial officials. In south-eastern Nigeria, for instance, where 
by the 1930s the colonial power was still toiling to entrench the idea of 
native authorities, the formation of these unions caused uneasiness in 
official circles. Their activities became, on occasions, the object of secret 
intelligence inquiries. 
In the third group were the trade unions which came into being largely 
for economic bargaining. For the most part modern urban centres grew 
up at vital commercial, mining and communication points which had 
openings for the employment of skilled and unskilled workers. In these 
towns, therefore, there soon came to be concentrations of people w h o 
earned their living mainly by means of salaried or wage employment. 
These m e n , especially those of them at the lowest rungs of the labour 
ladder, have at times been referred to rather inappropriately in Marxist-
oriented analysis as proletarians. Apart from those w h o were bound by 
the wage nexus to the big employers of labour - the colonial government, 
the commercial and the mining firms, the missions, etc. - there were also 
the self-employed artisans w h o supplied certain of the needs of the urban 
population. 
T h e life of these urban dwellers was tied to the vagaries of the world 
economy and market whose structure and behaviour they did not under-
stand. T o protect themselves in this unfamiliar economic world, those in 
waged or salaried employment formed trade unions for the purpose of 
10. For a good analysis of the rise and function of a voluntary association of the 
ethnic-based type see M . Banton in I. Wallerstein (ed.), 1966, pp. 402-19. 
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effective negotiation with their employers for higher pay and better 
conditions of work. T h e self-employed craftsmen also formed craft guilds 
which helped to fix prices, standards, conditions of apprenticeship and so 
on. T h e trade unions and craft guilds also functioned at times as friendly 
societies, helping members in difficulty with m o n e y and advice, providing 
fitting funerals, educational facilities, scholarships and occasional feasts. 
T h e years 1880-1935 saw something of the beginnings of these new 
organizations. Professor Kilson has shown that by 1937 there were all 
kinds of tradesmen's and workers' organizations in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Kenya and elsewhere. But his study and others like those of Professor 
Kimble on G h a n a , Professor Yesufu and M r Ananaba on Nigeria, V . 
T h o m p s o n and R . Adloff on French Equatorial Africa and R . H . Bates 
on Zambia clearly show that the golden age of these organizations did not 
arrive until after the Second World W a r . 1 1 
T h e reasons for this were m a n y . These associations depended to some 
extent on the spread of education, and the impact of this as of urbanism 
took time to manifest itself. Outside the coastal areas of West Africa, the 
Maghrib, Egypt and Kenya, this generally took more than three decades. 
While in South Africa where the conditions should have been ideal owing 
to an early industrial and communications revolution, the growing harsh-
ness of Boer nationalism and the opposition of other whites stifled African 
initiative. T h e rise of these associations also depended to some extent on 
the development of a capitalist economy, but colonial Africa is said to 
have only 'a rudimentary capitalist economy' which depended substantially 
on migrant workers - a species of labour which is said to be very resistant 
to trade union organization. A n d even after the Second World W a r there 
were very few wage earners in colonial Africa. In the 1950s their number 
was estimated at between 4 and 5 million. A n d finally there were the m a n y 
prohibitions associated with the autocratic and exploitative colonial regimes 
which for the most part did not accord legal recognition to trade unions 
until the late 1930s or early 1940s. 
As already mentioned, the social effects of foreign rule were far from 
uniform throughout the continent. With respect to the spread of education, 
the triumph of the new economic forces, the expansion of urbanization 
and therefore the rise of the n e w elites, West Africa would appear to have 
witnessed the greatest advances, followed by Egypt and the Maghrib, 
South Africa, East Africa and Central Africa. If, on the other hand, in 
this matter w e compared the colonial blocks rather than geographical 
regions, w e discover that greater changes took place in the British territories, 
followed by Belgian- and French-ruled Africa with Portuguese Africa 
limping far behind. A n d even a m o n g the British territories, there was also 
a differential impact. T h e British colonies where substantial transforma-
11. See, for example, M . Kilson in L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1970; D . Kimble, 
1963; T . M . Yesufu, 1962; W . Ananaba, 1969; V . Thompson and R. Adloff, i960; R . H . 
Bates, 1971. 
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tions were registered included Egypt, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Uganda and 
Sierra Leone, with Kenya and the Rhodesias (now Zambia and Zimbabwe) 
coming after. A n d if w e take individual colonies w e discover that more 
changes took place in the southern than in the northern parts of Gold 
Coast and Nigeria. In Francophone Africa, on the other hand, the West 
African colonies would come first, followed by the North African colonies 
and then French Equatorial Africa. Within French West Africa, Senegal 
and D a h o m e y (now Benin) led the way with the other colonies lagging 
rather far behind. 
T h e fact was that the spread and impact of the forces of change were 
controlled by more factors than any colonial government or African group 
was in a position to master completely. First there was the question of 
the length and extent of contact which the particular territory or geographic 
region had enjoyed with Europe by the time colonial rule was imposed. 
West and Southern Africa had maintained fairly regular contact with 
Europe from the sixteenth century. B y the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, therefore, quasi-urban conditions of life had come into existence 
at several points along the coast - at St Louis, Banjul, Accra, Lagos, the 
Oil River's ports, Luanda, and at the Cape. These provided good stepping 
stones for the forces of western education, western Christianity and western 
commerce to penetrate the interior. T h e east coast of the continent, on 
the other hand, came under sustained European contact only from about 
the 1870s. 
This difference in time factor is important in any attempt to account 
for the differential impact of the forces of change on the different regions 
and countries of Africa. That part of the nineteenth century which preceded 
the onset of European rule was the most liberal phase of Europe's relation-
ship with Africa. Between the abolition of the slave trade and the imposition 
of colonial rule, Europe was by and large prepared to encourage the 
emergence of a group of Africans equipped to co-operate with her in the 
business of 'civilizing' the continent. This meant encouraging African 
initiative in education and commerce. A s a result West Africa gained 
immensely through the application of this policy. 
But with the imposition of colonial rule with its concomitant illiberal 
racial policies, all kinds of obstacles were placed in the way of free African 
participation in education and commerce. A s a result those regions where 
the earlier liberal policies had not taken firm root before the dawn of alien 
rule, found themselves greatly handicapped. T h e colonial powers were by 
and large suspicious of the new African elites and sought to restrict their 
growth by slowing up the expansion of schools, while those w h o succeeded 
in graduating from the schools were frustrated through being denied fitting 
jobs in the colonial service. Also their scope for participation in the new 
commercial ventures was narrowed d o w n to a m i n i m u m . 
Equally important in helping to explain the differential impact of these 
forces was the presence or absence of white settlers. There were very few 
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European settlers in Wes t Africa and this to some extent explains the 
relatively rapid progress of the West Africans in educational and economic 
matters. But settlers were present in force in Algeria, K e n y a , the Rhodesias, 
South Africa and the Portuguese territories. In the Belgian Congo where 
there were fewer settlers, company rule was as illiberal and debilitating 
as settler influence. T h e interests of these settlers clashed with those of 
the Africans and they used their influence with the colonial administration 
to obstruct or stultify African development. 
Finally, there was the question of differing African responses to foreign 
influences. In Nigeria the Igbo embraced Westernism m u c h m o r e 
enthusiastically than the Fulani did. In K e n y a , the Gikuyu saw the 
advantages of western education long before their neighbours. Islamic 
cultural conservatism and resistance, especially in the Western Sudan, 
tended to hinder the spread of western influence, especially western 
education. In North Africa and Egypt, o n the other hand, sections of the 
ruling elite sought to ensure the survival of Islamic culture through the 
introduction of western science and c o m m e r c e . Their stand led to a fruitful 
marriage between Islamic culture and western scientific thought. Because 
the Western Sudanese Mus l ims failed to show comparable initiative in 
this matter, they found themselves unprepared to meet the challenges 
posed by colonial rule. A s a result it was possible for the British and the 
French to determine what types of western influences to admit into the 
region and in what doses. 
Religion in Africa during 
the colonial era 
K. ASARE O P O K U 
T h e imposition of European colonial rule on Africa was not merely the 
forceful establishment of European political, economic and social power 
on colonial possessions. It was also a cultural imposition and it used culture 
to buttress the political, economic and social superstructure which colonial-
ism represented. It is the religious aspect of this cultural imposition of 
colonialism and the African response to it that this chapter deals with. 
T h e state of African religious life on the eve of colonial rule 
Traditional African religion in the pre-colonial period 
Traditional African religion was, and still is, inextricably bound up with 
African culture. It was a pervasive force, and as E m m a n u e l Obiechina 
aptly puts it: 
There is hardly any important area of h u m a n experience which is 
not linked to the supernatural and the people's sense of religion and 
religious piety . . . these . . . are part and parcel of the ideological 
structure of traditional society, and so essential to a proper interpreta-
tion of experience in the traditional social context.1 
This pervasiveness of religion through the total way of life of African 
peoples gave traditional religion a remarkable wholeness within the context 
of the culture out of which it originated. 
It was based on a particular world view, which included not only the 
people's view of the supernatural but also their understanding of the nature 
of the universe, the nature of h u m a n beings and their place in the world, 
and the nature of G o d , w h o was known by various local names. Essentially 
a spirit, G o d had no images or physical representations and was 
acknowledged as the Creator and Sustainer of the world. Power, justice, 
beneficence and eternity were attributed to H i m , and as the Source of all 
Power, G o d had power over life and death. H e rewarded m e n but also 
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punished them w h e n they went wrong and was in m a n y ways likened to 
the Overlord of Society and was the Final Authority in all matters. O n 
the whole, G o d was unlike h u m a n beings and was completely above His 
creation, but at the same time, H e was involved in the affairs of m e n , 
sustaining creation and upholding the moral order. H u m a n beings 
depended upon H i m as a Power superior to them. G o d was therefore 
transcendent as well as immanent. 
There was a hierarchy of spirits. Below G o d were the ancestral spirits, 
which were always treated with reverence and with awe, and then there 
were also the deities or gods w h o were believed to have the power of 
rewarding h u m a n beings or punishing them with misfortune, disease or 
even death. T h e divinities had their cults, priests and shrines and there 
were some a m o n g them which were associated with various features of 
the environment: but these palpable objects were the abodes of the gods 
and not the gods themselves. 
In addition to these supernatural entities, there were other spirits or 
mystical powers which were recognized and reckoned with for their ability 
to aid or harm h u m a n beings. Included in these were agents of witchcraft, 
magic and sorcery. Finally, there were charms, amulets and talismans which 
were used for protective as well as offensive purposes. 
T h e general conception of m a n was that he was a compound of 
immaterial and material substance. T h e immaterial part of m a n (the soul) 
survived him after death, while the material part (the body) disintegrated 
after death. Death therefore did not end life; it was an extension of life. 
T h e dead remained members of society and there was believed to be a 
community of the dead alongside the community of the living, and there 
was a symbiotic relationship between the two communities. H u m a n society 
was an unbroken family m a d e u p of the dead, the living and the yet unborn. 
With regard to m a n ' s relation to society, being h u m a n meant belonging 
to a community and that involved participating in the beliefs, ceremonies, 
rituals and festivals ofthat community 2 and membership of the community 
was emphasized m o r e than a member ' s individuality. For society was 
based more on obligation than on individual rights and an individual 
assumed his rights in the exercise of his obligations, which m a d e society 
a chain of interrelationships. Furthermore, h u m a n life was viewed and 
understood as a cycle of birth, puberty, marriage and procreation, death 
and the afterlife. A n individual did not stay in one stage of existence for 
ever; he necessarily moved on to the next, and in order to m a k e the 
transition smooth, special rites were performed to ensure that no breaks 
occurred, and m o v e m e n t and regeneration continued perpetually.3 
African traditional religion was not only pervasive, it also bound m e n 
to the unseen powers and helped them to form correct relations with the 
n o n - h u m a n powers; it also bound m e n to their fellow h u m a n beings. 
2. J. S. Mbiti, 1969, p. 2. 
3. K . A. Opoku, 1978, pp. 10-11. 
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Religion acted as the cement which held societies together, providing them 
with support and stability. Furthermore, traditional religion helped m e n 
to understand and control events, to relieve doubt, anxiety and guilt. 
But the situation was not static, for from generation to generation, 
changes occurred and each generation added to the religious and cultural 
heritage on the basis of its experience. There were no jealous gods that 
forbade the acceptance or addition of n e w gods or beliefs, and new cults 
and shrines appeared whilst others declined. G o d s w h o proved powerful 
had their shrines spread far and wide, and it was not u n c o m m o n for 
defeated ethnic groups to adopt the gods of their conquerors. A n d since 
movement characterized life, changes which occurred were accepted as 
normal so long as they did not do violence to African values. 
Islam in the pre-colonial period 
In addition to traditional religion two guest religions - Islam and Chris-
tianity — were introduced, in pre-colonial times. T h e rise and spread 
of Islam in Africa has been dealt with in the earlier volumes. T h e greatest 
expansion of Islam in pre-colonial times took place in the nineteenth 
century, in part w h e n Islamic militants w h o were dissatisfied with the 
intolerable accommodations Islam had m a d e with traditional African 
religion declared holy wars aimed at firmly restoring the Islamic faith to 
its original purity. These djihäds led to the formation of theocratic states 
in which Islamic religion and law were imposed on the people, and this 
led to widespread conversions. These theocratic states extended across the 
Sudanic zone of West Africa from Senegal to what is n o w northern Nigeria, 
and included Futa Jallon, Futa Toro, the Sokoto caliphate and the Borno 
empire.4 
In East Africa, Islam moved from the coast into the interior, but unlike 
their counterparts in West Africa, Muslims in East Africa appear to have 
been more interested in trade than in converting people to their faith. 
They concentrated on maintaining their trade links with the interior and 
perpetuating their economic spheres of influence. S o m e parts of East 
Africa had, however, adopted Islam over the centuries; and along the 
coast, a new culture developed, and it was out of the mixture of Bantu 
with Muslim culture that the Swahili culture was born. T h e Swahili 
language is today the lingua franca of most of East Africa. 
Islam had m a d e considerable advances before the arrival of the colonial 
powers. A m o n g them m a y be mentioned the replacement in m a n y parts 
of Africa of the traditional cycle of festivals with the Islamic calendar and 
the adoption of m a n y Arabic loan words and concepts into African 
languages such as Hausa, Fula and Mandinka leading to their enrichment. 
Pilgrims returning from pilgrimages had adopted new fashions in dress 
4. M . Last in J. F. A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974. 
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and together with the example of visiting and resident Musl im scholars 
and holy m e n in m a n y parts of Africa, Arabic culture had begun to m a k e 
a considerable impact on Africans. This impact also included Musl im 
architecture, titles, music and other aspects of Arabic culture, especially 
a m o n g the wealthier segments of the African population, notably in the 
Sudanic zone. 
In spite of the advances Islam had m a d e before the arrival of the colonial 
powers, the last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the destruction 
of some of the theocratic states in West Africa and the weakening of Islamic 
trade and economic influence in East Africa. Nevertheless, colonial rule 
was to provide Islam with the opportunity for unprecedented expansion. 
Christianity in pre-colonial Africa 
Before the onset of colonial rule, Christianity - as has been shown in 
the earlier volumes - had been through three phases in its history on the 
African continent. Its first phase ended in the seventh century with the 
rise of Islam, leaving scattered Christian colonies in the deserts and parts 
of North Africa. Ethiopia remained firmly Christian from the fourth 
century onwards. T h e period of Portuguese explorations in the fifteenth 
century began the second phase; and this, too, was ended by the slave trade 
which followed on the heels of the explorations and lasted for nearly three 
centuries. T h e third phase, 1800-85, w a s sparked off by the rise of a 
tremendous missionary awakening in Europe towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, and the period from the 1840s marked a missionary 
thrust from the coast into the interior of Africa, whereas the period before 
that was marked by a concentration along the coast of Africa, largely in 
the European coastal enclaves and in Ethiopia and South Africa. T h e push 
into the hinterland was m a d e possible by the geographical explorations 
which greatly increased European knowledge of the interior of Africa. 
Besides, great inspiration was derived by m a n y missionaries from the 
exploration and ideas of David Livingstone, w h o m a d e the results of his 
expeditions k n o w n through his prolific writings. His view that missionaries 
should establish centres of Christianity and civilization which would not 
only promote religion but also commerce and agriculture, came to be 
widely shared by m a n y enthusiastic missionaries w h o penetrated far into 
the interior of Africa, following the old trade routes. Mention must also 
be m a d e of the advances that were m a d e in medical science in the nineteenth 
century which led to the control of m a n y tropical diseases and thus m a d e 
it easier for missionaries to settle in m a n y parts of Africa. 
T h e opportunity to live in the hinterland m a d e missionaries more and 
more knowledgeable about Africa and this was to become a crucial factor 
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century when the Scramble for 
Africa began. A s European nations increasingly became interested in the 
acquisition of African territories, the missionaries paved the way in some 
512 
Religion in Africa during the colonial era 
areas of Africa and served, quite consciously, as agents for European 
colonialism. Mos t missionaries were of the firm persuasion that if there 
was to be European intervention, then it should come from their o w n 
countries. A s Roland Oliver wrote, 'They wished to ensure that the 
intervention would be carried out by their o w n countrymen or by the 
power most likely to offer the best opportunity for the work of their 
denominations.'5 
Moreover, colonial government in Africa, most missionaries argued, 
would not only provide the m u c h desired security and protection which 
would assist them in redressing the evils of the slave trade, but would 
also stimulate and guarantee the development of n e w economic 
opportunities for the Africans. Missionaries therefore enthusiastically 
encouraged European intervention as a morally justified undertaking, 
especially from the 1870s onwards. 
African traditional religion and colonial rule 
T h e establishment of colonial rule in Africa from 1885 onwards led to the 
spread of European influence far into the interior where formerly European 
influence had been concentrated along the coast. T h e entire European 
intervention during the colonial period was based on the assumption that 
to bring about development, African culture had to be modified if not 
destroyed altogether. Since African culture was so intricately intertwined 
with religion, it is easy to see h o w even a European colonial policy could 
clash violently with some of the tenets in African traditional religion which 
underpinned African society. A n d right from the very beginning, African 
traditional religion was faced with the challenge of survival and the need 
to strengthen itself. 
Before the onset of colonial rule, the missionaries were the torch-bearers 
of western culture until about the beginning of the 1890s, and from the 
very beginning they expressed an uncompromising attitude towards African 
religion. T h e y were bent not only on converting Africans to Christianity 
but also to western culture, which was believed to be thoroughly infused 
with, and profoundly informed by, Christianity. In fact, in the minds of 
most enthusiastic missionaries, there was no distinction between the two. 
But while making no distinction between their religion and culture, the 
missionaries endeavoured relentlessly to convert Africans to a way of life 
in which religion was separated from other aspects of life. T h e missionaries 
taught their converts that life could be separated into spiritual and secular 
spheres, a teaching which ran counter to the fundamental basis of African 
culture, namely the unity of religion and life. Missionary teaching thus 
attempted to attack the cement which held African societies together. T h e 
danger signals were picked up early by m a n y perceptive African rulers, 
5. R . Oliver and G . Mathew (eds), 1971, p. 69. 
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w h o initially resisted missionary penetration into their societies, seeing in 
it a challenge and a threat to traditional patterns of authority. Missionaries, 
and colonial administrators alike, preached against belief in spirits, super-
natural forces and gods, witchcraft, sorcery, sacrifices and rituals, taboos 
and veneration of ancestors, and thus weakened the influence of African 
traditional and ritual leaders such as priests, priestesses, magicians, rain-
makers and divine monarchs. T h e introduction of western medicine by 
the colonial administrators and their attack on 'pagan' customs also led 
to a weakening of the role of the traditional doctors and herbalists. T h e 
old order was thus severely threatened and attempts to defend and protect 
it came from m a n y sectors of African society. 
Even though the colonial administrators could be said to have been 
primarily interested in political, economic and social control of their 
colonies, matters pertaining to religion could not be isolated from their 
central concerns. W h a t the missionaries taught was also shared by the 
colonial powers, and generally the colonial rulers adopted a hostile attitude 
towards certain religious practices and tried to abolish them while at the 
same time suppressing some cults. T h e colonial administrations sought to 
eradicate belief in witchcraft, and practices such as poison ordeals, meant 
to detect persons believed to be guilty or innocent of crimes whose detection 
was difficult, and 'carrying' the corpse to find out the person or persons 
believed to have caused the death by witchcraft or sorcery. 
Africans responded to these attacks in m a n y ways. In the first place, 
those w h o remained unconverted opposed colonial rule and defied 
missionary condemnation of their traditional ways by simply continuing 
to hold on to traditional beliefs and practising essential rites either openly 
or in secret. But for those w h o converted to Christianity and whose beliefs 
and attitudes were strongly influenced by the n e w dispensation, resistance 
was expressed by taking some of the traditional beliefs along with them 
into the n e w faith, and this resulted in a blending of ideas. 
Africans used their religion as a weapon to resist colonial rule and its 
threat to their values, and often relied on magic and the intervention of 
their ancestors and gods in their fight against colonial oppression. In the 
first two decades of this century, the Igbo warriors of south-eastern Nigeria 
resorted to such means to defend themselves from alien invaders. T h e 
Esza people of Abakaliki Division, the Uzuakoli and the Aro m a y be cited 
as examples.6 S o m e cults were clearly a focus for resistance to colonial 
rule, such as the M w a r i in Southern Rhodesia (now Z i m b a b w e ) , or secret 
associations like the Poro in Sierra Leone and other parts of West Africa. 
W a r - c h a r m movements also occurred in Madagascar and the Congo basin. 
In East Africa, especially Kenya , African prophets arose to provide spiritual 
reinvigoration7 to resist colonialism, such as occurred in the Machakos 
6. A . E . Afigbo, 1973. 
7. The founding of independent churches alongside mission-founded churches under 
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District among the people of Kilungu in the early months of 1922 (see 
Chapter 26). O n e of the best-known movements which used both religion 
and magic to resist colonial rule and oppression was the Majï Majï 
movement in G e r m a n East Africa during the first decade of the twen-
tieth century.8 (See Fig. 7.1.) Even though the movement failed, it 
served as a demonstration of the fact that unity could be achieved in 
African traditional religion in the face of European pressure and that 
African traditional religion was not a fragmentary force confined to limited 
localities. Besides, the movement provided the seed for African nationalism 
which was later to germinate and blossom into the struggle for independ-
ence and its final achievement in the 1960s. 
Another cult similar to Majï Majï was the Nyabingi cult, which also 
covered a wide area and cut across ethnic and regional boundaries and 
was found in Ruanda (now R w a n d a ) , north-western Tanganyika (now 
Tanzania) and Uganda. Like the followers of Majï Majï its adherents 
believed that the power of its medicines could neutralize the effect of 
European bullets, as well as believing in possession by the spirits of 
legendary ancestors. It began during the late nineteenth century and 
gathered m o m e n t u m until it finally broke out in 1928 in revolt against 
European occupation in the Kigezi region of Uganda. (See Fig. 7.1.) As 
E . Hopkins put it, 'the movement succeeded in immobilizing the admini-
strative efforts of three colonial powers for nearly two decades until its 
final suppression in 1928'.9 T h e Germans, and the Belgians w h o took over 
Ruanda from them after the First World W a r , failed to suppress it, and 
even after the suppression of the 1928 uprising, the cult lingered on until 
it was finally suppressed in 1934. 
Other cults gathered force against the European pressure by reviving 
aspects of traditional religion and combining them with ideas borrowed 
from Christianity. Such, for example, was the M u m b o cult which was 
used by the Gusii people, near Lake Victoria in Kenya, as the buttress 
of their revolt against British colonialism which began in 1900.10 (See 
Fig. 7.1.) 
In the Gold Coast (now Ghana) , the British colonial, administration 
adopted a hostile attitude towards certain religious practices, abolished 
some and endeavoured to suppress certain deities and cults. T h u s the cult 
of Katawere, the tutelary deity of Ak im Kotoku, was prohibited by the 
government in 1907. ' ' Prior to this the G e r m a n government had destroyed 
the shrines of the cult of Denteh of Kete-Krachi in the 1880s and the 
priest of Denteh had been imprisoned and executed by the government. 
T h e Krobo people were forced to abandon their settlements on the Krobo 
mountain by the British colonial administration which destroyed their 
8. For details, see Chapter 7. 
9. E . Hopkins in R . I. Rotberg and A . A . Mazrui (eds), 1970. 
10. For details, see Chapter 7 above and Chapter 26 below. 
11. H . Debrunner, 1967, p. 255. 
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settlements and suppressed the cult of their tutelary shrines of Kotoklo 
and N a d u . 
Colonial administration attacked the belief in witchcraft, and sought to 
eradicate it through the passage of witchcraft ordinances, and the adoption 
of measures to stop African witchcraft eradication movements. In spite of 
the opposition to witchcraft by both missionaries and colonial admini-
strators, the belief persisted among converts and non-converts alike, and 
Africans continued to resort to their o w n ways of dealing with it. 
S o m e of the new cults which arose to protect people from witchcraft 
in West Africa m a y be mentioned, for example, Aberewa (Old W o m a n ) 
cult in the Gold Coast which was suppressed by the administration in 
1908. T h e most widespread of the witchcraft eradication movements was 
the Bamucapi cult of south-eastern and Central Africa which spread widely 
over M o z a m b i q u e , Nyasaland (now Malawi), the Rhodesias (now Z i m -
babwe and Zambia), southern Tanganyika (now Tanzania), and Belgian 
Congo (now Zaire). (See Fig. 8.1.) M e m b e r s of the cult drank a medicine 
which was believed to have the capacity to rid them of witchcraft or protect 
them from its effect.12 T h e cult thrived in the early 1930s and borrowed 
ideas from both African traditional religion and Christianity. 
A s some Africans continued to use traditional methods of eradicating 
witchcraft, the colonial administration enacted witchcraft ordinances. In 
Uganda, for example, a Witchcraft Ordinance was passed in 1912; in 1921 
it was revised, the punishment being m a d e severer by increasing terms of 
imprisonment from one to five years and also making the possession of 
witchcraft articles in which the power of witchcraft is believed to reside 
a punishable offence.13 But all these ordinances of the colonial governments 
and condemnation by missionaries and African converts proved to be 
limited deterrents to the belief in witchcraft. 
Another attack on African traditional religion took the form of measures 
against initiation rites of boys and girls into adulthood. For the Africans, 
the initiation rituals were aimed at preparing the young boys and girls 
not only for adulthood but also for community and social life, and 
constituted a central and vital component of social, cultural and religious 
life. 
In m a n y parts of Africa, the initiation rites involved circumcision for 
boys and clitoridectomy for the girls, and this was the source of the greatest 
controversy. T h e missionaries found the rituals unacceptable to their taste 
and theology and often sought the assistance of the colonial administrations 
in their fight against them. T h e attack on these rituals amounted to an 
assault on the central significance in the conception of m a n and the 
organization of religious life, and the reaction of Africans to this attack 
was equally strong. It was especially in East Africa that the question of 
circumcision, especially clitoridectomy, provoked the sharpest reaction. 
12. T . O . Ranger in D . B . Barrett (ed.), 1971, p. 132. 
13. E . Hopkins in R . I. Rotberg and A . A . Mazrui (eds), 1970, p. 311. 
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T h e missionaries found clitoridectomy abhorrent and sought its total 
elimination from the life of their converts, but as far as circumcision was 
concerned, they were prepared to go along with it provided it was pruned 
of its 'pagan', 'demonic' and 'satanic' aspects. 
In the diocese of Masasi in southern Tanganyika and in the Central 
Province of Kenya , w e find examples of the most serious confrontation 
between Christian missions and African peoples on the matter of circum-
cision. (See Fig. 7.1.) In the former, a policy of adaptation was pursued, 
and it resulted in attempts to modify the jando (male circumcision) and 
the malango (female circumcision) by performing them under Christian 
auspices and eliminating whatever elements were thought or judged to be 
'un-Christian'. This policy avoided a head-on collision between traditional 
initiation and Christian missions and practice, even though the Church 
omitted an essential element in the girls' initiation, namely, the elongation 
of the clitoris, and thus failed to give malango the type of respectability 
that traditional initiation otherwise c o m m a n d e d . T h e Church, however, 
recognised the need for its' members to be at once Christians and fully 
initiated m e m b e r s of their communities, and this objective was achieved 
within the Church rather than in revolt against it.14 
But in the case of the Central Province of Kenya, the missionary policy 
towards initiation resulted in a head-on collision. T h e Africans had already 
begun to feel pressure and to harbour resentment against the British 
colonial administration for setting vast stretches of their land aside for 
European settlers. This m o v e also coincided with the activities of a n u m b e r 
of missions, for example the Scottish Mission (in Ukambani in 1891 and 
Kikuyu in 1898), Bavaria Evangelical Lutheran Mission (in Ukambani , 
1893), African Inland Mission (in Ukambani , 1896), Gospel Missionary 
Society (in Nairobi, 1897) and Church Missionary Society and African 
Inland Mission (in Nairobi, both in 1901), which began to speak against 
the cherished traditions of the A k a m b a , M e r u , Tharaka, Maasai and other 
peoples, especially that of initiation using circumcision of both boys and 
girls. T h e European presence thus spelt a double pressure on their land 
and traditions. 
W h a t missionaries found particularly abhorrent was female initiation, 
and they vehemently spoke against it, and the Church of Scotland Mission, 
African Inland Church, and Gospel Missionary Society prohibited it in 
their churches in 1920 and 1921. Boys' circumcision among Christians 
was not as severely interfered with, but the missions required that it should 
be done in hospitals or private homes. A s the pressure against clitori-
dectomy began to mount, the British colonial administration came to 
recognize it as a 'harmful' practice which 'education' would gradually 
bring to an end. But the Africans felt that both male and female initiation 
served a profoundly meaningful purpose in their communal life and that 
14. T . O . Ranger in T . O . Ranger and I. Kimambo, 1972. 
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any sudden abolition or prohibition would greatly disrupt their psycho-
logical, social and religious security. 
T h e African opposition to the negative attitude towards female circum-
cision came into the open in the early 1920s, beginning in 1923. For 
example, independent schools were established among the Gikuyu whose 
aim was to restore the practice and to provide education for those children 
w h o could not get admission into mission schools on account of the female 
circumcision issue. In 1929 a dance song, called muthirigu, which ridiculed 
missions and Christians w h o were opposed to female initiation, spread 
quickly a m o n g the Gikuyu but was banned by the British colonial 
administration the following year. Furthermore African opposition ex-
pressed itself in the secession of many m e m b e r s from the Protestant and 
Anglican churches among the Gikuyu, E m b u and M e r u peoples. A n 
independent Church, the African Orthodox Church, arose in 1928, while 
in 1930 a prophetic movement sprang up a m o n g the Gikuyu, preaching 
God's impending judgement upon Europeans and missions, but was 
quickly banned by the colonial administration. 
African protest continued to express itself in many forms, including 
disturbances, attacks on mission schools, attempts to prevent preachers 
from conducting services, and even the murder of a missionary at Kijabe. 
Combined with the African protest against the missionary attitude to 
female circumcision was also a growing nationalism which eventually 
resulted in political resistance against foreign rule. ' s A m o n g the A k a m b a , 
E m b u and M e r u peoples, however, the issue of female initiation did not 
create the same degree of tension as it did a m o n g the Gikuyu, but out of 
this came independent schools and independent churches. 
All these attacks against African traditional religion and African reactions 
to them on the whole greatly reinvigorated African traditional religion by 
the 1930s. 
Islam and colonial rule 
It would appear that Islam fared far better than traditional religion during 
the period of colonial rule. In the areas where Muslim rule was established 
before the arrival of the colonial power, Islamic law had provided territorial 
rather than ethnic uniformity and it c o m m a n d e d obedience to authority. ' 6 
This was good for efficient administration and commerce and Muslims 
were also able to proselytize and make more converts. 
T h e development of communications m a d e it possible for Muslim agents 
to penetrate into areas which had not been open to them before, and with 
the trading routes being redirected from the desert to the coast in West 
Africa, the number of Muslims, which had been scanty along the coast 
in the early days of colonial rule, n o w began to increase. T h e steady 
15. For further discussion, see F. B . Welbourn, 1961, pp. 135-43. 
16. D . L . Wiedner, 1964, pp. 245-6. 
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increase in the number of Muslims in Sierra Leone from 1891 to 1931 is 
illustrative of this fact. T h u s , whereas in 1891 Muslims formed 10 per 
cent of the population, they formed 12, 14, 19.5 and 26.2 per cent 
respectively in 1901, 1911, 1921 and 1931.17 
T h e Muslim presence along the West African coast was also further 
increased by the Ahmadiyya Muslims w h o came as missionaries using the 
coastal sea routes. Although considered heretical by some, they were 
important in fostering an interest in western education a m o n g Muslims. 
T h e attitude of colonial administrations towards Islam was mixed. While 
some felt that Islam was a more enlightened form of religion than traditional 
African religion, others regarded Muslim institutions as advanced social 
institutions and used them in the interest of the colonial administrations. 
Islamic law courts were therefore allowed to be set up , Muslim rulers 
were given greater authority in some areas,18 and Muslims were employed 
by the colonial administrators in subordinate positions as guides, agents 
and clerks. This brought Muslims into close contact with African peoples, 
and as Trimingham observed, this familiarized the traditionalists, 'with 
the outward characteristic of Islam, enhanced the prestige of adherence 
to the favoured religion, and provided the Islamic agents with facilities 
for the exercise of propaganda and various forms of pressure'.19 
Not all colonial administrations looked favourably upon Islam. T h e 
administration in the Belgian Congo was especially hostile to Islam and 
saw in it a threat to its 'Christianizing' and 'civilizing' mission. Only a few 
mosques were allowed to be built and there was a total ban on Musl im 
schools in the colony.20 
Other Europeans, especially the French, attempted to impose European 
culture on their subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, believing that 
they had an obligation to raise the standard of their colonial subjects by 
imparting to them the 'benefits' of French culture. Unlike the British 
whose policy towards the Muslim states was based on the belief that they 
could secure the co-operation of Muslim rulers, the French thought other-
wise. They initially tried to limit the areas under Musl im control in their 
bid to conquer the bulk of the Western Sudan. They endeavoured to avoid 
the use of Arabic in official correspondence, and even openly helped those 
w h o did not accept Musl im proselytization such as the Bambara. Further-
more, the French took care to ensure that Muslim rulers would not be 
appointed to rule over non-Muslim peoples. T o effectively oppose the 
spread of Islam and Islamic jurisprudence, they also tried to build u p 
traditional religion and codify African customary law as a counterforce.21 
17. J. S. Trimingham, 1962, p. 226. 
18. In Northern Nigeria, for example, where the policy of indirect rule was first tried, 
the British government upheld the power of the Muslim rulers and colonial power was 
placed behind Islam as the official religion of Northern Nigeria. 
19. J. S. Trimingham, 1962. 
20. See N . S . Booth in N . S . Booth (ed.), 1977, p. 325. 
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But the French were more familiar with Islam than traditional African 
religion in spite of their fear and hostility to the former and w h e n they 
did not succeed in their intentions they settled d o w n to try to cope with 
Islam and established institutes to study and document Muslim life, beliefs, 
practices and institutions.22 
Colonial powers were determined to break up large Muslim states and 
religious organizations and to foster rivalry and competition a m o n g them. 
T h u s the British abolished the Sokoto caliphate in Northern Nigeria while 
the French openly encouraged the ethnic and dynastic rivalries which led 
to the disintegration of the Tukulor empire (see Fig. 6.2) and the 
proliferation of Sufi orders, and refused to recognize one Khalifa for all 
Musl im members of the Tijaniyya order in West Africa. 
Both colonial powers in West Africa, Britain and France, were willing 
and anxious to guarantee freedom of worship to Muslims under certain 
conditions. They were anxious to see a West African Islam shorn of its 
international connections and universal aspects. W h a t the colonial powers 
were particularly anxious to prevent was a pan-Islamic movement which 
constituted a threat to their power, and this fear became real when Turkey 
entered the First World W a r on the side of G e r m a n y and the Ottoman 
Sultan, as the Caliph of all Muslims, reportedly ordered a general revolt 
against the European unbelievers. 
T h e colonial powers later came to encourage Islam and not merely to 
tolerate it as before. For they came to prefer to deal with Islamized Africans 
rather than with their Christianized counterparts. A French official is 
reported to have said in 1912 that 'Islamized Negroes are on the whole 
gentle people w h o are grateful for the security which our arms have brought 
them; they only think of living in peace in the shade of our power.'2 3 
T h e modernizing influence of Islam was also appreciated by colonial 
powers w h o were said to have regarded it as a 'bridge between the narrow 
particularism of traditional society and the wider impulses and require-
ments of modern life and economic interests'.24 Submissive Muslim leaders 
were therefore greatly encouraged and frequently received official favours 
such as national honours and awards. Mosques and Ku'ranic schools were 
built for them, and they were also helped to go on pilgrimages and study 
tours. But at the same time those Muslims w h o did not toe the colonial 
line and showed defiance were disciplined and often harassed. 
But Muslims also opposed colonial rule on both religious and political 
grounds, and although colonial administrations, such as the French, 
succeeded in gaining a measure of Musl im support in their West African 
territories, there were large numbers of Muslims w h o were bent on 
preserving the purity of Islam and w h o could therefore not tolerate 
submission to a Christian infidel administration, and they sought to rid 
22. ibid.; see also M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 359-61. 
23. Quoted in J. F . A . Ajayi, n.d., p. 22. 
24. ibid. 
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their countries of French colonialism. Such a desire led to the resurgence 
of M a h d i s m which was to end the rule of the unbeliever. T h e M a h d ï , the 
equivalent of the Christian Messiah, was believed to be the one w h o would 
c o m e into the world to establish a just government in accordance with 
Islamic d o g m a and finally rid society of the rule of unbelievers. M a h d i s m 
reared its head in m a n y parts of the Sudanic zone of West Africa as an 
expression of anti-French sentiment in U p p e r Guinea, Mauritania and 
Senegal, especially from 1906 to the First World W a r . 
Other Islamic movements which expressed an anti-French or anti-
colonial posture were the Hamalliyya m o v e m e n t , founded by Shaykh 
Hamallah, which was active in Senegal, French Soudan, Mauritania and 
Niger and the Sanüsiyya brotherhood, founded by M u h a m m a d b. 'All 
al-Sanûsï in Libya which became the force which led the Libyans against 
Italian colonialism. Between i860 and 1901 the Sanüsiyya spread to 
Tunisia, Egypt, the central Sahara, central Sudan and Senegal. 
T h e Sanüsiyya order had a tradition of opposition to foreign domination 
in Libya and developed not only as a religious order but also a political 
m o v e m e n t . It opposed Turkish rule even though it regarded the Sultan 
of Turkey as the Caliph of all M u s l i m lands. T h e only reason w h y the 
order did not take u p arms against Turkey was the fact that their c o m m o n 
religion of Islam held them together. But in the case of the Italians, there 
was no such c o m m o n bond and the order resisted the Italian invasion 
with firmness, and led the Libyan resistance from 1911 to 1932. After the 
withdrawal of Turkish sovereignty from Libya in 1912, the Sanüsiyya 
order assumed full leadership and responsibility for Libyan liberation, and 
orders and proclamations for the direction of the resistance were issued 
in the n a m e of ' a l -Hakuma al-Sanüsiyya', the Sanüsiyya government. In 
the course of time, m e m b e r s of the order c a m e to be recognized in other 
M u s l i m lands not only as liberators of Libya but also as 'Fighters of the 
Faith', 'Mujahidin'. K . Folayan has written that: 
T h e role of the Sanusiya Order in providing effective leadership for 
Libya's resistance m o v e m e n t makes it politically significant as a good 
example of a religious m o v e m e n t becoming the backbone of resistance 
to Western imperialism, and the Order actually had the longest record 
of such a resistance in Africa. In fact, the role of the Sanusiya did 
not end with the collapse of their military strength and the Italian 
occupation of Libya in 1932. Rather, right u p to the year of Libya's 
political independence (1951) the Sanusiya continued to stand for 
Libya as the effendiya class has stood for Egyptian or Maghribi 
nationalism.25 
S o m e of the most vigorous opponents of the French invasion of U p p e r 
25. K . Folayan, 1973, p. 56. 
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Volta in the late nineteenth century were Muslims, most of w h o m were 
reported to have told local Mossi people that the whites would leave their 
country as soon as the blacks became Musl ims. 2 6 Furthermore, the 
conquests of Samori in West Africa and Rabih in the Chad area in the 
last part of the nineteenth century brought them into conflict with 
Europeans and helped to identify Islam with opposition to colonial rule. 
But Islam prospered under colonial rule as a result of the m a n y 
advantages it had over Christianity imposed by missionaries, as well as 
from the disruption of traditional life which colonialism gave rise to. Islam 
was seen by m a n y as an indigenous religion, spread by Africans, whose 
adherents did not separate themselves from the community but instead 
mixed with them. By contrast the Christians tended to create their o w n 
separate communities and followed an essentially European way of life. 
It is thus no mere accident that the T e m n e (Sierra Leone) word for both 
Christian and European is poto.27 Besides, unlike mission-imposed 
Christianity, Islam was able to accommodate more African traditional social 
and religious institutions, such as magic, divination, polygamy, and 
communalism. Becoming Musl im did not therefore require the radical 
break with tradition which Christian missionaries insisted upon. 'It [Islam] 
placed more emphasis than Christianity on cohesion and less on competition 
and individual achievement.'28 A further asset in favour of Islam was that 
with all the disruptions which colonial rule had brought in its wake, there 
was the need for a new basis for social integration, and Islam provided 
this basis since it possesses significant resources for those w h o had lost 
their traditional roots. 
Commenting on the reasons for the 'explosion' of Islam during the 
period, N . S . Booth has written that: 
In some areas this m a y have been because Islam was seen as a way of 
resisting Western political and cultural domination while in others it 
was because colonial policies unintentionally favoured it. Perhaps in 
a complex way both the European hostility toward Islam and the 
European use of Muslims and Muslim institutions for their o w n 
purposes contributed to Islamic growth. Being Muslim could be a 
way of gaining advantages under the colonial system and at the same 
time expressing a certain distance from Western culture. It was a way 
of being part of a worldwide community which received grudging 
respect from Europeans while providing an alternative centre of 
loyalty and a basis for an independent dignity. T h e pressure of a n e w 
alien culture and religion tended to strengthen the sense of identity 
with a culture and religion that, although also originally alien, had 
become an accepted part of the local scene.29 
26. N . S. Booth in N . S . Booth (ed.), 1977, p. 323. 
27. J. Karefa-Smart and A . Karefa-Smart, 1959, p. 19. 
28. R . W . Hull, 1980, p. 146. 
29. N . S. Booth in N . S. Booth (ed.), 1977, p. 320. 
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But this acceptance has not resulted in the abandonment of the traditional 
world view altogether; in fact Islam, as well as Christianity, has come to 
supplement traditional beliefs and practices rather than supplant them. 
This is because the 'guest religions' have tended to be understood largely 
in terms of the fundamental notions which undergirded African traditional 
religion. T h u s Islam means to most African Muslims one of the m a n y 
ways of being religious, Islam complementing traditional religion and the 
latter making up for some of the deficiencies of Islam. 
There are, however, some basic changes from the traditional outlook 
a m o n g African Muslims. T h e Islamic article of faith concerning the final 
Judgement and the separation of believers from non-believers in the future 
life differs sharply from traditional notions, where the emphasis is on 
community with one's dead forebears. Islam is seen as possessing a n e w 
source of power which is tapped for the achievement of wholeness of life, 
healing, and the improvement of life in the community. 
Christianity in the colonial era 
T h e imposition of colonial rule was to aid considerably the work of the 
Christian missionaries. In the first place, both colonial administrators and 
missionaries shared the same world view and sprang from the same culture. 
Secondly, the colonial administration was favourably disposed to the work 
of the missionaries and often subsidized mission schools. Thirdly, the 
imposition of colonial control over each territory ensured peace and order 
within which the missionaries assured themselves of the protection of 
colonial administrations. Fourthly, the introduction of efficient means of 
communications, and the establishment of a m o n e y economy gave impetus 
to trade and commerce and helped usher in a n e w way of life which was 
to prevail all over Africa and which was characterized by a breakdown of 
communalism in favour of individualism. O n the whole, it m a y be said 
that Christian missions in Africa were the ally and adjunct of European 
imperialism and the activity of missionaries was part and parcel of the 
advance or penetration of the West into the non-Western world. 
Christianity as the religion of the conqueror was regarded as containing 
the secret of the source of power of the white m a n . At least it provided 
access to education, employment, power and influence in the white man' s 
world. T h e main thrust of missionary preaching was the particularity of 
Christianity, especially as it was understood and interpreted by European 
missionaries. Using the spoken word, or direct evangelization, schools and 
medical work, missionaries m a d e m a n y converts, and the late nineteenth 
century was marked by a phenomenal success of Christian missions. A s 
a result of this, m a n y Christian communities sprang up where before there 
had been none and m a n y converts also took up the further evangelization 
of their peoples. T h e reduction of m a n y African languages to writing as 
well as the teaching of European languages in schools, introduced literacy 
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into m a n y parts of Africa. With the reduction of African languages to 
writing, written literature in m a n y African languages came into being. 
T h e close association of Christianity and education cannot be over-
emphasized, for it was through the innumerable schools established by 
missionaries that m a n y Africans came into contact with Christianity, and 
in fact school was the church in m a n y parts of Africa. T h e importance of 
schools for the missionary enterprise was expressed by Elias Shrenk as 
follows: 
If w e had a nation with formal education, able to read and write, 
m y plans for mission work would be different. But n o w I a m 
convinced that the opening of schools is our main task. I have a low 
opinion of Christians w h o are not able to read their Bible. T h e smallest 
schoolchild is a missionary and establishes a relationship with the 
grown-ups, which would not exist without a school.30 
T h e missionaries played quite an important role in the introduction of 
a m o n e y economy in Africa. Mission stations developed plantations in 
m a n y parts of Africa and in addition to growing local foodstuffs and 
introducing n e w crops, they helped in the diffusion of commercial crops 
like cocoa, coffee, tobacco, cotton and sugar cane. 
Above all, Christianity infused m a n y n e w ideas. T h e ideas were not 
entirely new, and there were points of convergence between what the 
missionaries preached and what the Africans believed, such as the belief 
in G o d and obedience to His will as the final Judge and Creator of m e n . 
T h e missionaries, however, had a negative attitude towards African 
religion and culture and were determined right from the start to stamp 
them out. T h e missionaries preached that the only G o d was the one whose 
nature and character had been revealed in the Bible, and that all other 
gods were mere illusions; that the Son of G o d , Jesus Christ, was the final 
revelation and the only Saviour of mankind, and that the Church was the 
sole dispenser of divine grace and that there was no salvation outside the 
Church. T h e European missionaries therefore felt it a divine duty to bring 
all peoples into the arena of salvation and grace. 
A r m e d with the conviction of possessing the only truth, missionaries 
condemned all that was 'pagan'. T h e y preached against all kinds of 
traditional practices - the pouring of libation, holding state offices, 
drumming and dancing, traditional ceremonies of the rites of passage, 
such as outdooring, girls' puberty rites and customs associated with deaths 
and burials. T h e y also denied the existence of gods and witches and other 
supernatural powers which Africans believed in. O n the whole, becoming 
a Christian meant, to a large extent, ceasing to be an African and using 
European culture as a point of reference. T h u s Christianity had a dis-
integrating effect on African culture. 
T h e African response to the missionary endeavour expressed itself in 
30. Quoted by H . Debrunner, 1967, p. 145. 
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three distinct ways: acceptance, rejection and adaptation. There is no doubt 
that m a n y Africans readily accepted the n e w faith and that Christianity 
gained far more ground in Africa during the period under review than it 
had done in the previous two or three centuries. T h e first group of Africans 
to embrace Christianity would appear to be those w h o were regarded by 
the Africans as social outcasts, and the downtrodden such as lepers and 
others w h o suffered various forms of social disabilities in traditional African 
societies. Included in this category were those w h o had broken certain 
traditional taboos and were fleeing from persecution, and mothers w h o 
gave birth to twins in societies where there was a taboo against twin births. 
Such mothers found refuge for themselves and their children in mission 
stations. T h e social outcasts had nothing to lose by embracing Christianity: 
on the contrary, they gained hope, confidence and inspiration from the 
missionary teaching of equality and brotherhood, and also 'from the idea 
that one must not fatalistically accept his or her station in life as beyond 
h u m a n control'.31 
T h e spread of Christianity during colonial times was not due exclusively 
to missionary initiative. African converts, catechists and ministers zealously 
spread Christianity, while some of the traditional rulers such as Lewanika 
and Lobengula, as w e have seen already, gave every assistance to mission-
aries. T h e expansion of Christianity in Africa was largely due to the zeal 
of African converts, especially in the period after 1914. There were 
innumerable instances of African evangelists going outside their o w n ethnic 
groups to work as missionaries. For example, evangelists from Buganda 
took Christianity to other peoples like the Banyakare, Bakiga, Batoro, 
Bagisu and Langi, and Baganda evangelists went as far as Ruanda and 
the Belgian C o n g o (see Fig. 7.1). Famous a m o n g them was Canon Apolo 
Kivebulaya (1866-1933), w h o worked a m o n g the Pygmies as a missionary 
in the Belgian Congo (1896-9 and again 1915-33).32 In West Africa, the 
Yoruba bishop, Samuel Ajayi Crowther, worked in the Niger valley. T h e 
itinerant Liberian prophet, William W a d e Harris, travelled through the 
Ivory Coast and the Apolonia District of the Gold Coast between 1910 
and 1915 and converted some 100 000 people. W h e n expelled from the 
Ivory Coast, he withdrew to the Gold Coast, and his activities in both 
places resulted in the establishment of the Eglise Harriste in the Ivory 
Coast and the Twelve Apostles Church in the Gold Coast.33 
There were also those Africans already dealt with above w h o rejected 
the message of Christianity altogether and stuck to the religious and cultural 
traditions of their forefathers, seeing in them more meaning and significance 
than what the missionaries preached. S o m e of these participated in the 
persecution and ostracism of those w h o had become Christians but others 
also carried on the sacrifices and observances that were intended to keep 
31. R . W . Hull, 1980, p. 143. 
32. See A . Luck, 1963. 
33. For details, see G . M . Haliburton, 1971. 
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h u m a n beings in harmony with the spiritual forces. Out of their ranks 
came the religious and cultural leaders as well as herbalists and it is they 
w h o have been largely responsible for upholding African values and for 
providing knowledge about traditional African cultures. 
Separatist churches 
Finally, there were those w h o chose to adapt the n e w religion by founding 
what has c o m e to be known as separatist or independent churches, and 
this development represents the fourth stage in the history of Christianity 
in Africa. These churches were of two main types, namely, those which 
broke away from already existing independent churches and those which 
sprang up independently of any existing religious groups. In most instances, 
these churches sought to incorporate a larger measure of African beliefs 
and practices into Christian life than was permitted in churches under 
missionary control. They were an expression of the desire of Africans to 
find 'a place to feel at h o m e ' , and include African ideas of worship in 
their Christian liturgies. A n important causative factor was the translation 
of the Bible into m a n y African languages and the Africans' reading and 
interpretation of the Christian Scripture. O n the basis of their o w n under-
standing of Holy Scripture, Africans formed or founded their o w n 
churches, thus doing away with the monopoly over scriptural interpretation 
which had been in missionary hands for so long. 
T h e breakaway churches, in part, represented the African reaction or 
adaptation to colonialism and were emancipatory in character. Especially 
in areas of European settlement, where political repression was intense, 
such churches proliferated and attracted African nationalists. T h e 
Ethiopian churches in South Africa, which emphasize African self-
improvement and political rights, are a case in point. Nehemiah Tile broke 
away from the Methodist Mission Church in 1882 and two years later 
founded the T e m b u Church, 3 4 one of the first independent churches ever 
to be formed in Africa. T h e second, which was the first to be called 
'Ethiopian', was founded by a Wesleyan minister, M a n g e n a M . M o k o n e , 
in 1892, again in South Africa. T h e 'Ethiopian' movement spread to other 
parts of Southern and East Africa. 
In other areas of colonial Africa, breakaway churches often expressed 
open hostility to the colonial administration. John Chilembwe, for example, 
founded his Province Industrial Mission in Nyasaland, vehemently 
attacked the British colonial practice of taxation and military recruitment 
and eventually led an abortive armed resistance to the British colonial 
administration in 1915 before being captured and executed. Around this 
time, the Watchtower M o v e m e n t began to grow and spread from Nyasaland 
to Southern Rhodesia a m o n g the Shona, becoming a religious movement 
with strong political overtones. T h e African Watchtower M o v e m e n t which 
34. See B. G . M . Sundkler, 1961, pp. 38-9. 
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spread in Central Africa and the Congo was a distinct body and traced 
its origins to the separatist Church movement in the area founded by Elliot 
K a m w a n a in northern Nyasaland in 1908. It became known as the Kitawala 
(Kingdom) or the Church of the Watch Tower , and in Northern Rhodesia 
its millennial preachers predicted the total collapse of colonialism and the 
end of the world.35 
Similar developments took place in other parts of Africa, especially 
between the early years of the First World W a r . T h e example of William 
W a d e Harris in West Africa has already been discussed. Simon Kimbangu 
founded his Eglise de Jésus-Christ sur la Terre par le Prophète Simon 
Kimbangu ( E J C S K ) in 1921 in the Belgian Congo. His followers refused 
to pay taxes to the Belgian colonial administration and declared their 
intention to withhold their labour in the face of the forced labour which 
the administration had introduced. These acts constituted a veritable threat 
to the administration and in order to avert a general uprising in the country, 
Simon Kimbangu was arrested and kept in prison until his death in 1951. 
But Kimbanguism continued to spread from its original base in the Lower 
Congo River.36 T h e neo-Kimbanguist Mission des Noirs, founded by 
Simon-Pierre Mpadi, which became known as the 'Khakists', spread from 
the Lower Congo to the French Congo and Oubangui-Chari (now Central 
African Republic). 
Similar in orientation to the movements founded by Kimbangu and 
Mpadi were those founded in Uganda by an ex-serviceman in the King's 
African Rifles, Ruben Spartas Mukasa, w h o dedicated his life to work for 
the redemption of all Africa at whatever personal cost. His African 
Progressive Association and the Christian A r m y for the Salvation of Africa, 
as well as a branch of the African Orthodox Church which he started, 
expressed the political and social purpose of all these movements. In 
Nyasaland, Jordan N g u m a ' s Last Church of G o d and His Christ was of 
the same stamp as Mukasa's in Uganda. 
Other churches, in the spirit of the Reformation, emphasised certain 
aspects of Christian theology which the mission-founded churches had 
neglected. T h e Zionist churches of South Africa emphasized possession 
by the Holy Spirit, healing and prophecy and spread widely in Southern 
and East Africa. T h e Dini ya Roho (Holy Ghost Church),3 7 which grew 
up among the Abaluyia of Kenya and was founded by Jakobo Buluku and 
Daniel Sande in 1927, regarded baptism by the Holy Spirit, speaking in 
tongues, and the free confession of sins as a necessary prerequisite for full 
membership of the church. This same emphasis on the Holy Spirit also 
led Alfayo Odongo to found his Joroho (Holy Ghost) Church among the 
L u o of Kenya in 1932. Various African and Aladura churches in West 
Africa also emphasized possession by the Holy Spirit. 
35. For further details, see Chapter 27 below. 
36. ibid. 
37. O . Odinga, 1067, p. 69. 
531 
plate 20.6 Prophet Simon Kimbangu (c. 1890-1951), founder ofthe Eglise de Jésus-Christ
sur la Terre in the Belgian Congo
532
Religion in Africa during the colonial era 
S o m e churches had a narrower scope. In 1910, as w e have seen already, 
the Nomiya L u o Mission was founded by John Owalo, a m o n g the L u o 
of Western Kenya , and the Church adopted circumcision and m a d e it a 
condition for salvation. Even though the L u o did not have a tradition of 
circumcision, the Church adopted it in keeping with biblical precedent.38 
Other churches were set up specifically to accommodate those w h o had not 
been able to comply with the missionary churches' insistence on m o n o g a m y 
and had been expelled, as well as those w h o could not join the Church 
because they were already polygamous. A n example of such a Church was 
the African National Church 3 9 which thrived in the R u n g w e District of 
Tanganyika in the 1930s. 
Indigenous Christianity 
Besides these churches, another set arose which were not the product of 
anxiety alleviation or stress in society but rather derived their inspiration 
from a more positive ideology. F r o m the earliest days of the process of 
presenting Christianity to Africans, some converts had accepted the new 
faith lock, stock, and barrel. Others, on the other hand, accepted it on 
the basis of what they already knew, and understood Christianity in terms 
of the basic underlying concepts of African traditional religion, relating 
the message of the Church to their enduring religious needs. 
T h u s Christianity did not c o m e merely to supplant traditional religious 
beliefs and practices, rather it came to supplement them. In other words, 
some African Christians used certain aspects of Christianity to strengthen 
aspects of traditional beliefs that needed strengthening, and at the same 
time used traditional beliefs to strengthen aspects of Christianity where 
they were found wanting. T h u s they came out with what they sincerely 
believed to be a meaningful religion, and their Christianity can be seen 
as an expression of the African way of being religious. This is w h y w e have 
termed it indigenous Christianity. 
Underlying indigenous Christianity is an expression of religious crea-
tivity and cultural integrity, and not a mere reaction, response or adaptation 
to outside stimuli, as some scholars are wont to assert. Usually, and with 
a few exceptions, the explanation for the emergence and proliferation of 
movements of indigenous Christianity has been derived from factors 
outside these movements themselves which has given them a functional 
reasonableness or a dysfunctional aberrant quality. Such interpretations 
m a y not be devoid of validity but they tend to overstress the role of outside 
factors in the emergence of these movements. T h u s when they are called 
'independent' churches, the underlying suggestion is that there is some 
more important reference point outside these churches. 
Having taken the bold step of grafting Christianity on to the African 
38. E . S. Atieno-Odhiambo, 1974, pp. 10-11. 
39. T . O . Ranger, n.d., pp. 16-20. 
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tradition, the indigenous churches satisfy the spiritual hunger of their 
followers by portraying the Gospel in ways which are compatible with the 
traditional African world view, and are also comprehensible within the 
African view of things. 
Forms of worship have been provided to satisfy the spiritual and 
emotional needs of members , thereby enabling Christianity, like traditional 
religion, to cover every area of h u m a n life and fulfil all h u m a n needs. 
Included in these is the concern for healing, whose centrality in both 
traditional religion and indigenous Christianity cannot be over-emphasized. 
Healing contributes to h u m a n wholeness and religion is essential in this 
respect. A n d in addition to healing, the religious needs of divining, 
prophesying and visioning are also fulfilled, for there is the firm belief 
that G o d reveals the future and the causes of misfortune through visions. 
While mission-founded churches deny the existence of evil forces such as 
witchcraft and sorcery, the indigenous churches recognize their existence 
and provide a Christian source of protection against these evil powers, 
firmly believing that Jesus Christ can effectively protect and heal. 
T h e recognition of the reality of evil forces, such as witchcraft and 
sorcery, is an acceptance of the African world view and is reminiscent of 
the biblical world view which recognized demons, evil spirits, principalities 
and powers and the rulers of darkness in this world. T o deny such powers, 
as the missionaries did, was to be western and not necessarily biblical, for 
the Bible recognizes these powers, but proclaims the power of G o d over 
them. 
T h e emergence of these churches has provided the opportunity for the 
exercise of African leadership and ability in Christianity, and in these 
churches a truly African Christianity has been expressed. A n d with this 
development has come the beginning of an African Christian theology. 
These churches have cut across ethnic, and even international boundaries 
and have united m a n y peoples in c o m m o n faith and practice. At a time 
of tremendously radical and great changes in African life, these churches 
have provided religious or cultural shelter for m a n y . 
Examples of indigenous Christian churches that emerged in the colonial 
period and are still very m u c h alive are the Apostolowa Fe Dedefia H a b o b o 
(Apostolic Revelation Society) in the Gold Coast; the Negro Church of 
Christ (Nigeria); l'Eglise des Banzie in Gabon; Dini ya N s a m b w a (The 
Church of the Ancestors) in Kenya; as well as Calici ca Makolo (Church of 
the Ancestors) in Nyasaland; the original Church of the White Bird a m o n g 
the Zazuru of Southern Rhodesia; Church of Christ for the Union of the 
Bantu and Protection of Bantu Customs in South Africa; Eglise des Noirs 
in the Congo; and the Herero Church of South West Africa (now 
Namibia).4 0 T o these m a y be added those churches which stress the 
40. For further details, see J. B . Webster, 1964; H . W . Turner, 1965 and 1967; R . L . 
Wishlade, 1965; V . E . W . Hayward (ed.), 1963; C . G . Baeta, 1962. 
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indigenous nature of their Christianity by either including the name of 
the dominant ethnic group or the adjective African in their titles. But for 
a detailed illustration, the example of the M u s a m a Disco Christo Church 
of Ghana will be given. 
The example of the Musama Disco Christo Church 
In the light of the above consideration, the M u s a m a Disco Christo (Army 
of the Cross of Christ) Church of the Gold Coast (Ghana)41 merits 
consideration as an indigenous Christian Church. For, relative to the 
traditional Akan pattern of social organization, the founder of the church, 
Prophet Jemisimiham Jehu-Appiah, successfully adapted Christianity by 
reorganizing it on the Akan pattern and portrayed Christianity in terms 
which are comprehensible in the Akan view of things. T h e church began 
as a prayer group, the Faith Society, within the Methodist Church at 
G o m o a Oguan, in the Central Region of the Gold Coast in 1919. But 
when its leader, Catechist William Egyanka Appiah, and his followers 
were expelled from the Church, it was established as a full-blown Church 
in 1922. 
T h e founder did not only found a Church and become its General 
Spiritual Head, but he also established a dynasty and became its progenitor 
with the title of Akaboha (King) I, and his son, the Akasibeena (Prince), 
and became, according to the constitution of the Church, 'entitled to hold 
this line of succession as a divine right, as ordered by the Holy Spirit'.42 
T h e wife of the founder, the Prophetess Natholomoa Jehu-Appiah, became 
the Akatitibi (Queenmother) of the Church; and the King and Queen 
therefore became the supreme authorities in the M u s a m a Disco Christo 
Church. As a prophet and leader of a spiritual movement, Jemisimiham 
Jehu-Appiah laid d o w n the foundation of his Church as an 'indigenous 
Christian church, founded to serve as our humble present - a "Myrrh" 
from Africa to Christ, which is our divine and precious gift, not caring 
whether others are offering Gold or Frankinsence'.43 
T h e Church is organized on the traditional Akan state (Oman) structure 
based on military formation. At the head of the Oman is Nana Akaboha, 
w h o combines both spiritual and temporal power. T h e Akaboha has his 
wing and divisional chiefs, and the importance of the Akan state structure 
arises from the fact that it is tied up with the history and development 
of the Church, and the Church's sense of mission and destiny are reflected 
in the divisions. 
T h e headquarters of the church, Mozano , functions as an ahenkro, 
capital town of an Akan traditional state. Here the Akaboha resides and 
41. For further reading see K . A . O p o k u in E . Fasholé-Luke, R . Gray, A . Hastings 
and G . Tasie (eds), 1978. 
42. Constitution of the M u s a m a Disco Christo Church, Mozano , 1959, p. 11. 
43. ibid., p. ii. 
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all major decisions affecting the church emanate, and it is here that the 
annual festival, Asomdwee Afe (Peace Festival), is held. At an ahenkro, 
there are shrines and holy places where the faithful pray and receive healing. 
M e m b e r s of the Church are identified from others by their use of copper 
rings and copper crosses which serve as 'tribal marks'. T h e heavenly names 
which each m e m b e r receives and which are peculiar to the Church also 
serve as 'tribal names'. T h e Church has its o w n language, osor kasa 
(heavenly language), which is used in salutations, greetings and entry into 
houses; and the names used in the Church are also from this language. 
Although it is not an extensive language it is enough to add distinction 
to the Church as an ornan with its o w n language. Membership of the 
Church cuts across ethnic and status boundaries, and is largely determined 
by the needs of people w h o come to the Church to seek solutions to the 
problem of life. Like traditional religion: 
. . . the Christianity practised in the oman of M u s a m a is a religion of 
being and doing, and represents a rejection of missionary Christianity 
which was largely a religion of mental culture. It [the Christianity 
of the M u s a m a Disco Christo Church] is a religion which is meant 
for day to day living and which provides satisfying answers to the 
problems of contemporary life. Unlike missionary Christianity which 
denied the existence of demons, witches and evil spirits, the M u s a m a 
church recognizes the existence of such spirits but demonstrates the 
power of G o d over them. 4 4 
T h e Church draws heavily on Akan religion and culture in its search for 
satisfactory answers to the problems of contemporary life and combines 
elements of Methodism with a strong African polity. It represents a further 
extension of Christianity in Africa based, as it is, on the conviction that 
a Christian society can be built on the foundations of African culture. 
Conclusion 
T h e period of colonial rule in Africa from 1880 to 1935 saw not the 
destruction but rather the confirmation of religious pluralism in Africa. 
Orthodox Christianity and Islam also gained wide grounds during the 
period thanks to some of the activities of the colonial administrators. 
Traditional religion, as the host religion, formed the foundation upon 
which the new religions were based, although in the end m a n y changes 
were m a d e in its total outlook. Its institutional expression was greatly 
affected by the n e w colonial order but its world view has persisted even 
a m o n g professed Muslims and Christians. T h e fact of religious pluralism 
created rivalries, competition and even conflict in m a n y parts of Africa, 
but at the same time the opportunity for inter-religious dialogue was 
created. 
44. K . A . Opoku in E . Fasholé-Luke, R . Gray, A . Hastings and G . Tasie (eds), 1978, 
p. 121. 
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T h e weakening of traditional religion also meant a corresponding 
weakening of m a n y of the traditional social and political institutions which 
depended on it for their vitality and sanction. T h u s morality, the network 
of family relationships, c o m m u n a l cohesiveness and the institution of 
chieftaincy were considerably enfeebled though not completely over-
thrown. ' 
This period saw the birth in Africa of indigenous churches, sometimes 
referred to as independent, separatist, breakaway, or Ethiopian churches. 
T h e causative factors were m a n y but the colonial presence and the spread 
of literacy were crucial. However , whatever the reasons might be, this 
development marks the fourth stage in the history of Christianity in Africa, 
a period in which, under African leadership, a n e w brand of Christianity 
which is compatible with the African view of reality has c o m e into being 
and has drawn thousands into its fold. These churches have provided an 
alternative resource to the time-honoured services of traditional herbalists 
and diviners for their m e m b e r s , although people in need m a y turn to them 
(traditional medical practitioners). 
O n the whole, the coming into existence of several religions side by 
side, instead of the erstwhile single, traditional religion, has brought about 
a ferment of ideas which has enriched religious life. All three religions 
have borrowed from one another in order to maintain their relevance to 
their African practitioners. 
But traditional religion still continues to be relevant in the face of the 
mounting individualism, secularism, rootlessness, excessive exploitation of 
nature and even atheism, which have accompanied the impact of the West 
on Africa. T h e traditional religion offers an alternative perspective on 
universal h u m a n concerns, and is not detached from everyday life nor 
from nature. Its world view provides a refreshing counterpoint to the 
aridity which has engulfed m u c h of the spiritual dimension of modern life. 
S3« 
T h e arts in Africa during 
the period of colonial rule 
W O L E SOYINKA 
In February 1976, at a police checkpoint between Ibadan and Lagos, 
Nigeria, a m a n was arrested for being in possession of antiquities, believed 
stolen. H e had two sackfuls of bronze and wooden sculptures, all of which, 
he insisted, were his o w n property. T h e police later discovered that he 
was telling the truth. This m a n , a recent convert to Islam, lived and worked 
in Ibadan in a communal compound. T h e Yoruba deities whose carved 
figures were found on him were typically brought into the city by labour 
migrants where, in their temporary homes, they ministered to the spiritual 
needs of the displaced artisans, petty traders, city clerks and other workers. 
Later, however, the head of this compound was converted to Islam and 
he in turn began to convert his neighbours. After the suspect's o w n conver-
sion, he was m a d e to understand that his former religious symbols had 
to give way if the compound was to become a fitting habitation for the 
spirit of Allah. Unable to bear the thought of their physical destruction, 
he resolved to take them back to their original h o m e , his village, where 
they are n o w reinstalled. 
A c o m m o n pattern of the movement of cultural forms and their concrete 
manifestations, the incident provides an apt model of survival, even renewal 
of cultural values in the face of religious and other more socially intensive 
forms of domination. W h a t was true in 1976 can be seen as having been 
even more commonplace in that more dramatic period of external domina-
tion in Africa, when an entire people, its social organizations, and its 
economic and artistic patterns became subjugated to strategies for 
m a x i m u m exploitation by outside interests. T h e slave trade had intensified 
internecine warfare for over two centuries, leading to cultural devastation 
on an unprecedented scale. Punitive raids by colonial forces, missionary 
intolerance and lack of understanding - all these had thoroughly derailed 
the accustomed cultural directions of the continent. Different methods of 
foreign control or interaction with the African populace naturally evoked 
or created different cultural responses from the displaced African. Belgian 
and Portuguese colonialism, as well as British settler colonialism in East 
Africa, are easily recognized as the most ruthless on the continent. They 
created conditions for the truly displaced African in the most literal sense 
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of the word. T h e Arabic dimension was unique in its o w n right, an 
ambivalent face of expansionism which none the less left strong cultural 
impressions on the landscape. Yet the reality that w e extract from that 
period is the resilience and even increased vitality of the forms and values 
of the authentic cultures of the peoples. 
African art 
It is difficult to gauge the qualitative impact of imperial commerce on 
artistic productivity. Certain media remained obviously unaffected; for 
instance, the 'bead-paint' technique of the Cameroon artists or the art of 
religious sculpture a m o n g the Yoruba, the Baule, the Bakota, etc. Yet subtle 
transformations had begun to take place in other art media, both in form 
and content. While retaining m u c h of its chromatic sensibilities, the Mbari 
mural art of the Igbo (Nigeria) had began to undergo 'pop' crudities at 
the hands of urban returnees, the result of sudden access to paints in all 
tints and textures. Formerly such mural art was controlled by the very 
nature and sparse range of dyes of local manufacture. 
A feature of the annual festival of the K o u m i n a canton in the B o b o -
Dioulasso-Koumina department of French-administered Upper Vol ta was, 
significantly, arguments which raged between the 'traditionalists' and the 
'modernists' on this very question of dyes. T h e former group of m a s k -
makers preferred the old technique of natural dyes not merely for their 
visual and textural satisfaction, but from the feeling for an organic relation-
ship which should exist between the materials of artistic production. T h e 
latter group found the use of imported dyes not merely convenient, but 
filled with a greater potential for variety. This harvest festival, incidentally, 
one which brought together the blacksmiths, weavers, dyers, carvers, 
dancers and griots of all the neighbouring cantons, especially the famous 
musician of Diagaso, the Kare, provides yet another example of the 
persistence of collective creativity even within the community-fragmenting 
grid system adopted by the colonial administrators for their workers. Just 
that once every year, at least on such an assertively massed scale, the scat-
tered families poured into town with an artistic affirmation of their 
authentic world-view. 
Local genius was hardly a match for factory productivity which began 
to flood African markets even at the early stages of the colonial venture. 
T h e loss of the integrative role of art of normal community development 
m a y be seen in a decline in the art of the forowa and the kuduo, finely 
worked containers of the Asante (Gold Coast - n o w Ghana) whose 
decorative motifs were, as is m u c h the case in Africa, ideograms for tradi-
tional lessons, proverbs, moral counsels and vignettes of history. Like the 
gold weights which could be rightly said to have commenced a reduction 
in commercial utility, the forowa was still commonly used as a container 
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by factories in Britain, which additionally could experiment with a variety 
of metals. T h u s , Doran H . Ross1 records a silver forowa stamped 
'Birmingham, 1926'. By contrast, there is no indication that canoe 
ornamentation underwent, during this same period, a similar attenuation 
in the aesthetic wedding of image and sentiment; together with motorized 
vehicles, which had begun to m a k e their appearance by the second decade, 
and in woven cloth they continued to perpetuate that strategy of communal 
education which m a y be described as 'lessons in motion'. 
African architecture 
A more than cursory look at the layout, exterior and interior of some of 
the truly harmonious of traditional living-spaces would reveal the existence 
of an effective, sophisticated expression of the architectural genius of the 
indigene, one which contrasted vividly with the regimenting 'grid' planning 
into which Africans were being forced at this time, by Belgian and French 
(especially) forms of plantation slavery. A n extensive description is 
deservedly provided by André Gide in his Voyage au Congo (1927): 
T h e Massas' hut, it is true, resembles no other; but it is not only 
strange; it is beautiful; and it is not its strangeness so m u c h as its 
beauty that moves m e . A beauty so perfect, so accomplished, that 
it seems natural. N o ornament, no superfluity. T h e pure curve of 
its line, which is uninterrupted from base to summit, seems to have 
been arrived at mathematically by an ineluctable necessity; one 
instinctively realizes h o w exactly the resistance of the materials must 
have been calculated. A little farther north or south and the clay would 
be too m u c h mixed with sand to allow of this easy spring, terminating 
in the circular opening that alone gives light to the inside of the hut, 
in the manner of Agrippa's Pantheon. O n the outside a number of 
regular flutings give life and accent to these geometrical forms and 
afford a foothold by which the summit of the hut (often twenty to 
twenty-five feet high) can be reached; they enabled it to be built 
without the aid of scaffolding; this hut is m a d e by hand like a vase; 
it is the work, not of a mason, but of a potter . . . 
Inside the hut the coolness of the air seems delicious, w h e n one 
comes in from the scorching outside. Above the door, like some huge 
keyhole, is a kind of columbarium shelf, where vases and household 
objects are arranged. T h e walls are smooth, polished, varnished. 
Opposite to the entrance is a kind of high d r u m made of earth, very 
prettily decorated with geometrical patterns in relief, painted white, 
red and black. These drums are the rice bins. Their earthen lids are 
luted with clay, and are so smooth that they resemble the skin of 
a drum. Fishing tackle, cords, and tools hang from pegs; sometimes 
too a sheaf of assagais or a shield of plaited rush. Here, in the dim 
1. D . H . Ross, 1974, p. 45. 
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twilight of an Etruscan tomb, the family spend the hottest hours of 
the day; at night the cattle c o m e in to join them - oxen, goats, and 
hens . . . everything is in its proper place; everything is clean, exact, 
ordered. There is no communication with the outside as soon as the 
door is shut. One's h o m e is one's castle.2 
It would be futile to claim that all African housing of this period was capable 
of arousing such flights of lyricism in the traveller, yet one can only regret 
that little of the urban architecture of the time found it rewarding to borrow 
from the structural lessons of such traditional architecture. 
T h e cities continued to be developed either as replicas or adaptations 
of European urban planning, or, as already stated, in rigid 'grid' forms 
which aided the depersonalization of the African, and his alienation from 
his communal sensibility. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that pockets 
of traditional housing were successfully inserted in the heart of the alien 
structures which rose all over the landscape. Tucked neatly away in the 
'high-rising' centres of even the capital cities of the Belgian Congo (now 
Zaire), Senegal, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria, Angola, etc., are 
traditional compounds, overshadowed by the concrete edifices, which date 
back to the nineteenth century. T h e y are usually centred on a c o m m u n a l 
well. A circular or rectangular veranda opens into the courtyard and a 
series of family residences are linked to a c o m m o n roof and drainage systems 
which unite and flow into the open gutters on the main streets. Even where 
the houses consist of more than one floor, the spatiality and interplay of 
planes reveal the same liberating quality. T h e contribution of the Brazilian 
returnees to the continent was, in this respect, quite immense. Even in 
the minor cities of the African hinterland, isolated instances of an arrested 
development of traditional architecture from this period continue to create 
a sense of aesthetic loss in this most immediate of man's creative and 
utilitarian productions. T h e modern urban city in Africa constantly 
reminds one that the environment was never transformed on its o w n terms, 
but in the image of the colonizers, with all its alienating consequences, 
even in the urban-influenced production of other forms of art - the mural, 
sculpture, music, etc. 
African music 
T h e real music of the people of Africa continues to remind us that it 
remained undisplaced as the regenerative source of the continent's cultural 
will. T h e 'salons' played their dubious role in this; with few exceptions 
the fate of music on the West African coast was duplicated in those areas 
of Southern Africa with which the European world came increasingly in 
contact in the last quarter of the century. T h e pattern was the same: 
responsibility for the education of the 'natives' was left to the missionaries 
2. A Gide, 1930, pp. 217-18. 
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w h o established schools and, with a mixture of cajolery, threats (backed 
by the fleeting presence of expeditionary forces), commercial lures, in 
addition to a variety of unassailable demonstrations of the superior advance-
ment of the culture of the proselytizers, succeeded in filling their schools 
with eager to reluctant schoolchildren. T h e nature of missionary education 
which was provided for this harvest of children requires no reiteration 
but it must not be imagined that the process of cultural reorientation was 
applied to captive pupils alone. F r o m the Cape to T h e Gambia the routine 
differed only in details: 
two Natal musicians, M r . Ganney and M r . A . E . Rollands, formed 
a Zulu choir of about 14 members w h o were trained to sing, instead 
of their o w n native songs, English glees, part-songs and ballads. They 
were considered good enough for a concert tour of South Africa and 
later a tour of England, where at least 5 of the members became 
detached from the choir and subsequently fell into disrepute by 
accepting the more attractive wages offered in the music-halls of 
London . Nothing further is k n o w n about the Zulu Choir of 1892, 
but it was the forerunner of m a n y African choirs which in more recent 
years have given excellent renderings of European choral works.3 
This event probably owed something to the fact that two years before, 
Durban's exotic musical appetite had been whetted by the invasion of a 
troupe of black singers from the United States w h o had delighted the 
audiences with their 'unaccompanied renderings of the old favourites, " M y 
Old Kentucky H o m e " , "Old black Joe", "Jingle bells" . . . and the richness 
especially of genuine negro voices after so m a n y poor imitations . . .'4 
T h e author was obviously unaware of the irony of this undertaking, for 
earlier, he had written the following on the musical career of yet another 
Durbanite: 
William Swift's musical activities extended to musical research, which 
took him in his spare time to Zulu kraals where he listened to native 
songs, afterwards playing them himself on a violin which he always 
took with him on his wanderings. S o m e of the twenty-four songs he 
had collected in this way he sang at concerts where they were crudely 
described as 'kaffir songs'.5 
T h e 'kaffir songs' which M r Swift rendered to elegant European gather-
ings in the salons of Durban were of course contemporaneously rendered 
in environments of the most profoundly contrasting physical, spiritual, 
economic and social significance. For the K u y u people (Central Africa), 
similar songs would be an invocation of the life-force of the community, 
such as the rituals of planting and harvesting, death and fertility. (It m a y 
of course be safely assumed that few Europeans ever succeeded in collecting 
3. G . S. Jackson, 1970, p. 117. 
4. ibid. 
5. ibid., p. 50. 
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the truly sacred songs of such peoples.) But the role and social function 
of music is what is of fundamental interest here, for it is through music, 
more than any form of art, that the lived cultural reality of the peoples 
is most readily grasped.6 W h e n the K u y u , for example, performed their 
dusk-to-dawn sequence of song, dance and symbolic m i m e in the funeral 
ceremonies for a famed w o m a n farmer, w h o was regarded as being 
exceptionally proficient in the cultivation of manioc (cassava), w e are 
brought into a process of affirmation of life continuity, and even the 
practical evocation of economic survival for the living. T h e m i m e and lyric 
are consciously directed to transmitting her magical touch with plants to 
the living; an explosion of voice and motion simultaneously induced a 
catharsis for the entire community, purged them of their grief and 
strengthened them for the continuing struggle for survival. Such music 
went beyond mere 'song'. 
But music did not minister only to the mysterious and the profound. 
Oratory, her twin-sister, has always, in any community, constituted a 
favourite m e d i u m of formal, social exchanges, including political arrange-
ments and the administration of justice. Its role in warfare hardly requires 
emphasis. T h e combination of music and oratory in formal judicial 
structures m a y , however, be regarded as being yet another property of 
cultures in which music is not simply an isolated activity of society, but 
an integral one. T h e Idoma of north-eastern Nigeria employed a tradition 
of judicial processes which utilized a semi-choric pattern within a 
predominantly theatrical setting. Against a background of choric responses 
the contestants presented their cases like formal actors, moving out of the 
h u m a n , semicircular backcloth and merging into the mass again. Gestures 
were deliberately theatrical, fully measured even for incongruous effects. 
T h e process would last two days to a week. A litigation a m o n g the Watutsi 
involved similar theatricalities. A scene from the Bambala people described 
by A . P . Merriam provides a typical glimpse of the attitude of the people 
towards the colonial hovering presence, one which increasingly gathered 
all reins of social control in its hands. This reality of contemporary life 
was formalized in a variety of ways in the cultural repertory, but never 
allowed to dominate the actual operations of the idiom: 
FIRST P A R T Y : I was in m y house and would have liked to stay. But 
he has come and wants to discuss the matter in public. So I have 
left m y house and that is w h y you see m e here, (sings) 'I a m like 
a cricket. I would like to sing, but the wall of earth that surrounds 
m e prevents m e . Someone has forced m e to come out of m y hole, 
so I will sing.' Let us debate the things, but slowly, slowly, otherwise 
w e will have to go before the tribunal of the white people. Y o u have 
forced m e to come. W h e n the sun has set, w e shall still be here 
debating, (sings) 'I a m like the dog that stays before the door until 
he gets a bone.' 
6. J. H . Nketia, 1975, pp. 21-4. 
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O P P O N E N T : Nobody goes both ways at the same time. Y o u have told 
this and that. O n e of the two must be wrong. That is why I a m attack-
ing you. (sings) ' A thief speaks with another thief. It is because you 
are bad that I attack you.'7 
In spite of tendencies towards romanticization, racial extravagance and 
other forms of sentiment and bias, it is impossible to deny the larger truth 
of claims on behalf of music in the lives of the African peoples. According 
to a contemporary Shona musician: 
M u c h of African history has been handed d o w n . . . in song. [As you 
play mbira and sing] you can see the panoramic scenes of those bygone 
days and the vague dreamy figures of the past come into . . . focus 
in the modern time . . . Y o u can almost see your ancestors limping 
towards the living world again . . .8 
W h a t has been written about the griot in Malian, Senegalese, Gambian 
and Guiñean societies, not merely as the leaven of social occasions, but as 
recorder, historian, cultural formalist of society, is more than applicable 
also to the Shona musician, whose instruments, the mbira, inspired the 
comments quoted above. T h e griot has been amply celebrated in the epic 
of a slave's descendant w h o returned from the United States in the last 
decade to trace his Gambian ancestry.9 T o m o v e from the griot's h o m e 
in the Western Sudan southwards to Central and Southern Africa is to 
encounter his counterpart and the epic of his survival in a phase of even 
greater violence and instability. Even for Southern Africa with its history 
of epic empire-building and its attendant warfare and violent subjugations, 
the five decades across the turn of the century were singularly insecure 
for the inhabitants and recorded numerous violent dispersals. 
T h e mbira survived this culture-fragmenting process; indeed it suc-
ceeded in creating an identity of culture among its practitioners, with all 
its social structures of the religious and the secular. Part of the consequences 
of the violent movements of the Shona peoples between the Cape and 
Central Africa is that it is n o w difficult to say h o w m u c h of their musical 
instrumentation — and indeed the social functions of their music - were 
carried into or came from the neighbouring countries of Mozambique , 
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Tanganyika (now Tanzania), the 
Congos (now Zaire and Congo), and Uganda where the practice was 
widespread, into Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) where the majority 
of the Shona gradually became concentrated at the turn of the century. 
(See Fig. 8.1.) W h a t is beyond dispute, however, is that the mbira culture 
became a unifying bond among the scattered peoples and survived their 
constant and intensive fragmentation. 
Mbira music was considered by the Shona a gift of their great c o m m o n 
7. Collected by A . P. Merriam, quoted in R . Brandel, 1961, pp. 39-40. 
8. E . Majuru, quoted by P. Berliner, 1978, p. 133. 
9. A . Haley, 1976. 
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ancestral spirit Chaminuka w h o appears to have been a living person, a 
king in the early part of the nineteenth century. T h e music entered wholly 
into social life, penetrating it so thoroughly that it became indispensable 
to the various activities of healing, weddings, funerals, field labour, birth, 
initiations and a host of other social undertakings. T h e mbira instrument 
itself was held 'capable of projecting its sound to heaven and linking up 
with the world of spirits' and therefore, in effect, linked the activities and 
the thoughts of the living with the presence of their ancestors. 
T h e performers were both settled and itinerant; they did not always 
wait upon invitations, although notable mbira players have been hired from 
distances of hundreds of miles either for their sheer artistic reputation, 
or because their style of playing was considered best suited to a desired 
end - usually the successful possession of a m e d i u m . It can be observed 
that a culturally cohesive community was maintained in this way, across 
geographical boundaries. T h e night-long bira ceremonies which moved 
early into the possession of the m e d i u m , thereafter into the purely social 
pleasures of dancing, singing, poetic (including comic) recitals and mimicry, 
have been aptly described as 'a long, communal journey through the night'. 
T h e possessed m e d i u m would also, on regaining normality, pronounce 
judgments on disputes, advise on matters of c o m m o n interest - planting, 
harvesting, even politics. 
A footnote to the internal evolution of musical cultures in Africa is 
happily provided by the ubiquitous mbira. T h e instrument itself, a plucked 
board which was set in its classic form within a gourd, has, naturally, a 
hundred variants. T h e principal form was the mbira hum dzadzima which 
was considered the 'mbira of all ancestors', being the instrument of the 
great ancestor himself, Chaminuka. It was this form which the Shona 
brought into the Transvaal during the southward drive of the Ndebele 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, shortly before they again fled 
northwards as the Europeans commenced their o w n push into the interior. 
T h e same version was employed by the Venda and L e m b a in South Africa, 
and the Karanga of the southern parts of Northern Rhodesia during the 
same period. Altogether, the dzadzima had enjoyed a prominence of at 
least half a century since it was first described and appeared in the drawing 
published by Charles and David Livingstone in 1865. 
However, a rival cult, the mashawe, was introduced into Shonaland early 
in the twentieth century, using the njira version of the mbira. Within a 
decade this version had begun to gain ascendancy. With its frequent 
accompaniment of drums, even flutes, the njira began to attract preference 
especially for social occasions such as weddings, births, etc. Adherents of 
both schools even took their names from their instruments - the vaMbira 
for the dzadzima, the Njanja for the adherents of njira. This ethnic division 
became marked also in a geographical dispersal, affecting social usages in 
subtle variations but without breaking up the overall unity of the Mbira 
culture. 
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T h e diaries of missionaries and adventurers alike confirm also the 
emotional quality experienced by the mbira society. Such reports liken the 
sound of its playing to that of the zither, the harpsichord and the spinet.1 ° 
T h e singing, from similar accounts, suggests something of the emotional 
ambiance of the Portuguese fado which, significantly, was the music of the 
homesick Portuguese colonists in South America; the experience of dis-
placement would appear to produce recognizable musical correspondences 
in any language. 
Unlike a n u m b e r of other forms of African social music, mbira was no 
court art but a true music of the people, of the entire scattered communities. 
That its practitioners were so highly respected within the community and 
their work so valued is explained by the fact that they were regarded as the 
people's artistic m e d i u m with the other world. Moreover, they were acces-
sible, professional and became a symbol of ethnic cohesion during a period 
of violent upheavals. A n d such was the mastery of the artists over their 
forms that in spite of the predictable early hostility, even the missions were 
eventually w o n over. In the 1920s, mbira instruments had begun to trickle 
into church orchestration in Southern Rhodesia. Experimental composi-
tions, based on mbira melodies, had crept into the missions' seasonal 
festivals, and schoolchildren no longer faced certain expulsion for plucking 
the 'devil's instrument' at playtime. 
In or out of the mission compound , however, the socially integrating role 
of music remained the strongest feature of cultural life on the continent. A s 
spiritual m e d i u m or as social entertainer, as historian or even as court 
retainer ministering to a privileged class, the musician was a vital feature of 
the cultural devices. 
T h e theatrical arts 
T h e theatrical arts were, in most instances, an extension or elaboration of 
the musical; some of the examples already given above demonstrate quite 
effectively h o w difficult it is to draw the dividing line. However , as the 
theatrical arts evolved in the nineteenth century through contact with 
outside influences, they do offer, more specifically than in music, evidence 
of the processes of transposition from traditional to adaptive modes . T h e 
West African coast truly dramatizes the situation, shifting forms and local-
ization under the double assault of Islamic structures and Christian 
evangelizing, the latter being in turn supported by the influence of returnee 
slaves in Sierra Leone and Liberia, w h o brought with them the entertain-
ment forms of their countries of exile, their manners, values, costumes, and 
idioms.11 
10. P. Berliner, 1978, p. 41. 
11. J. H . Kopytoff, 1965, pp. 86-133; J. F. A . Ajayi, 1965, pp. 25-52; R . W . July, 1968, 
PP- 177-95-
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Throughout the nineteenth century, theatrical professionalism was a way 
of life in the old O y o empire in Nigeria, representing the evolution of secular 
theatre from masked representation during the funeral rites of a king. T h e 
disintegration of the empire under the assaults of the Fulani from the north, 
and the ravages of civil war with rebellious dependencies to the south, led 
simultaneously to the spread of the professional troupes to the south and 
across the borders to D a h o m e y (now Benin), and to its demise in its place 
of origin. T h e victorious Muslims banned most forms of theatrical per-
formances, and most definitely the genre represented in festivals of the 
ancestors whose representation of h u m a n figures was anathema in the 
Musl im religion. 
T h e disruption of political life in O y o , where the troupes had enjoyed the 
protection of a stable monarchy, did not long enhance the further dis-
semination (and secularization) of theatre. For by then, the missionaries had 
begun their o w n northward drive from the first footholds on the coast, 
usually only a few steps ahead of arms-backed commercial companies. ' 2 
T h e y completed the task which Islam had begun by forbidding their 
adherents membership of any cult. These theatre companies were run like 
family guilds, with the familiar practice of trade secrets and initiatory rites; 
their material was also firmly rooted in the traditional - all of which 
qualified them for definition as devilish, sinister cults. T h e Christian 
missionaries, like the Muslims, did not content themselves with banning 
only the performances. Like the mbira in Southern Africa, instruments 
which were associated with such theatre arts were banished with equal 
vigour. A vacuum was thus created into which the returnee slaves' culture 
neatly stepped. T h e slave trade had been instrumental to the process of 
religious conversion on the west coast even as it proved detrimental to 
cultural life, as manifested, in the affected societies. T h e missionary c o m -
pounds and spheres of influence, just as in Southern Africa, guaranteed 
some measure of safety, so did submission to the Mus l im overlords: the 
price of safety was inevitable renunciation of authentic art. N o w the cycle 
of cultural substitution began to close: having broken up the cultural life of 
the people, the slave era, n o w in its dying phase, brought back the sons of 
the land with a n e w culture in place of the old. ' 3 
Victory was not so simple, however. 'Pagan' theatre withstood the 
onslaught, not only preserving its forms but turning itself consciously into 
a base of resistance against Christian culture. So durable had it proved that 
it was to participate, in various forms, in experimentations which the 
colonial elite n o w embarked upon for a meaningful theatre. For n o w , as the 
century entered its last three decades, the west coast came under the 
creative influence of these returnee Christians, confident in the superiority 
of their acquired arts, eager to prove to the white colonials w h o n o w 
12. E. A . Ayandele, 1966, pp. 29-70, 117-23. 
13. J. F. A . Ajayi, 1965, pp. 126-65. 
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controlled their existence that the black m a n was capable not only of 
receiving, but of practising the refined arts of the European. There was only 
one fortunate complication: despite this conscious drive which m a d e them 
cut themselves off culturally from the indigenous peoples of the hinterland, 
the latter remained 'comfortably and firmly attached to their o w n customs 
and institutions'.14 
T h e direction of n e w (Euro-American) forms of theatrical activity 
followed an eastward pattern, initiated largely by expatriate life in Liberia, 
Senegal, and Sierra Leone. A s it m o v e d eastward, however, it received 
ever-increasing blood transfusions. T h e bastardized vaudeville of the 
'Nova Scotians', a self-appellation of the returnees of Sierra Leone, did 
enjoy a long run along the coast. However , its arrival in the more easterly 
countries of the Gold Coast, D a h o m e y , and Nigeria, brought about its 
transformation both in form and content. It is not an exaggeration to claim 
that, by the first decade of the twentieth century, a completely new form of 
theatre had achieved distinct form in West Africa: the 'concert party'. Its 
progenitor was a 'genteel' breed which catered for the middle-class popula-
tion of the capital cities along the west coast:15 the robust, even bawdy 
slapstick with its generous lardings of stevedore songs which had been 
refined for concerts at which the colonial aristocracy of the administrative 
centres might be present. 
'Academies' were formed for the performance of concerts which were 
modelled on the Victorian music hall or the American vaudeville. T h e 
Christian churches organized their o w n concerts, schools were drawn into 
the concert rage - prize-giving days, visit of the district officer, Queen 
Victoria's birthday, etc. T h e black missionaries refused to be outdone - the 
Reverend Samuel Ajayi Crowther was a famous example; a black prelate 
prominent in the patronage and encouragement of this form of the arts, 
while the Reverend James Johnson turned the famous Breadfruit Church 
in Lagos into a springboard for theatrical performances.16 T h e Brazilian 
returnees added an exotic yet familiar flavour, their music finding a ready 
echo in the traditional melodies of the west coast and the Congo whose 
urban suppression had not occurred long enough for such melodies to be 
totally forgotten. Christmas and N e w Year at the turn of the century, and 
in the first decades of the twentieth, witnessed the streets of the capital cities 
of Freetown and Lagos transformed by mini-pageants reminiscent of Latin 
fiestas, of which the caretla, a kind of satyr masquerade, ' 7 appears to have 
been the most durable. 
Cultural nationalism was, however, constantly at work countering a total 
14. R . W . July, 1968. 
15. B . Traoré, 1972, C h . II; O . Ogunba and A . Irele (eds), 1978. 
16. J. F . A . Ajayi, 1965, pp. 206-38; R . W . J u l y , 1968, pp. 196-207; E . A . Ayandele, 1966, 
pp. 175-238. 
17. The possibility also exists that the caretta was the Hispanicized form of the 'Gelede' 
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usurpation by imported forms.18 Once again religion and its institutions 
provided the base. Unable to accept the excesses of the Christian cultural 
imperialism such as the embargo on African instruments and tunes in a 
'universal' Church, the breakaway movements began. F r o m 1882 to the 
early 1930s a proliferation of secessionist movements took place mostly 
inspired by a need to worship G o d in the cultural m o d e of their fore-
fathers. 19 A n d n o w commenced also a unique 'operatic' tradition in West 
Africa, but especially Lagos, beginning with church cantatas and moving to 
the dramatization of biblical stories until it asserted its independence in 
secular stories and the development of professional touring troupes. T h e 
process is identical with the evolution of the Agbegijo Theatre - then 
temporarily effaced - from the sacred funeral rites of the Alafin of O y o to 
court entertainment and, thereafter, independent existence and geographi-
cal expansion. F r o m the general concerts of classical music and English folk 
songs by the 'Academy' of the 1880s to the historical play King Elejigbo of 
the Egbe Ife Church Dramatic Society in 1902, a transformation of thought 
and sensibility had recognizably taken place even a m o n g the Westernized 
elite of Southern Nigeria. T h e Church did not take kindly to it. It closed 
its churchyards and schools to the evolving art. Alas, it only succeeded in 
accelerating the defiant erection of theatre halls, specifically designed for 
the performing arts. It was in reality a tussle between groups of colonial 
elites, fairly balanced in the matter of resources. B y 1912 the secularization 
of theatrical entertainment was sufficiently complete for the colonial ad-
ministration of Lagos to gazette a 'Theatre and Public Performance 
Regulations Ordinance' which required that performing groups obtain a 
licence before going before the public. In the climate of cultural nationalism 
which obtained in Lagos at that time, it is doubtful whether this ruse at 
political censorship would have worked; it is significant that the ordinance 
was never enacted. 
T h e 'vaudeville' troupes prospered. N a m e s of groups such as w e 
encounter in ' T w o Bobs and their Carolina Girl' of the Gold Coast tell us 
something of the inspiration of m u c h of these. Teacher Yalley, a school-
master, is credited with having begun the tradition of the 'vaudeville' variety 
act in the Gold Coast.20 His pupil B o b Johnson and his 'Axim Trio' soon 
surpassed the master and became a familiar figure on the Gold Coast 
cultural landscape, and indeed along the west coast.21 M o r e important 
still, B o b Johnson's innovation must be credited with having given 
birth to the tradition of the 'concert party' of the Gold Coast, groups 
which specialize in variety routine - songs, jokes, dances, impersonations, 
comic scenes. But the most notable achievement in the sense of cultural 
18. O n cultural nationalism, with particular reference to Nigeria, see J. Hatch, 1971, 
C h . XII; F . A . O . Schwarz Jnr, 1965, Chs I, II, IV. 
19. B . C . Ray, 1976, C h . V I ; see also Chapter 20 above. 
20. J. C . de Graft, 1976. 
21. E . Sutherland, 1970. 
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continuity was their thrusting on to the forestage of contemporary repertoire 
a stock character from traditional lore - the wily trickster Ananse (the 
spider). This dramatic form quickly developed into a vehicle for social and 
political commentary, apart from its prolificity for pure comic situations. 
B y the mid-io/jos, Bob Johnson had become sufficiently established 
to take his brand of vaudeville to other West African cities. West Africa in 
this decade could boast of a repertoire of shows displaying the most bizarre 
products of eclectic art in the history of theatre. Even cinema, an infant art, 
had by then left its mark on West African theatre — some of B o b Johnson's 
acts were adaptations of Charlie Chaplin's escapades, not omitting his 
costume and celebrated shuffle. A n d the thought of Empire D a y celebration 
concerts at which songs like 'Mini the Moodier' formed part of the evening 
musical recitals, side by side with 'God's Gospel in our Heritage' and 
vignettes from the life of a Liberian stevedore, stretches the contemporary 
imagination, divorced today from the historical realities of colonial West 
Africa. 
Again, another irony of colonial intentions. While B o b Johnson was 
preparing his first West African tour and Hubert O g u n d e , later to become 
Nigeria's foremost 'concert party' leader was undergoing his aesthetic 
formation from the vying forces of a clergyman father and a grandmother 
priestess of the osugbo cult,22 in Senegal, a European educationist, Charles 
Beart, was beginning to reverse the policy of European acculturation in a 
leading secondary school in Senegal. T h e extent of this development -
including also an appreciation of the slow pace of such an evolution - will 
be better grasped by recalling the educational character of assimilationism, 
spelt in diverse ways by the publications of such dedicated African 
Francophiles as the A b b é Boilat, Paul Holle, etc. Boilat, in spite of proofs 
of extensive sociological research,23 the result of his examination of the 
culture, philosophy, social structure, languages, etc., of the Bambara, 
Sarakole, Wolof, Serer, Tukulor and Moorish groups in Senegal, found no 
lessons to be drawn from African society for a modern cultural develop-
ment, no future but to witness 'the fall of all those gross, if not dishonorable, 
ways known as the custom of the country'. If his addresses to the metropolitan 
centre of the French world did not become the cornerstone of French 
assimilationist policies, they undoubtedly played a key role in their formu-
lation. 
It was against this background, and ensuing decades of such con-
servatism, that the Ecole William Ponty was born and enjoyed a prolonged 
existence.24 A famous teachers' college, it served Francophone Africa in the 
same way as did Achimota College in Anglophone West, and Makerere 
College in East Africa. They were all designed to provide a basic European 
education for would-be teachers and low-echelon civil servants. Such 
22. See M . A . Fadipe, 1970, Chapter VII. 
23. A . Boilat, 1853. 
24. B . I. Obichere in J. L . Balans, C . Coulon and A . Ricard (eds), 1972, pp. 7-18. 
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cultural education as came into the curriculum of Ecole William Ponty was 
of necessity French - French plays, poetry, music, art, history, sociology. 
Beart, however, during his principalship embarked on a new orientation of 
the students' cultural instructions. F r o m 1930 onwards the students 
received encouragement to return to their o w n societies for cultural 
directions. Assignments were given which resulted in the students' explora-
tion of both the form and substance of indigeous art. Groups from every 
colonial territory represented at William Ponty were then expected to return 
from vacation, armed with a theatrical presentation based on their 
researches, the entire direction being left in the hands of the students 
themselves. Since the new theatrical sociology did not confine itself to the 
usual audiences of European officials and 'educated' Africans nor to Senegal 
alone, its influence spread widely through different social strata of Franco-
phone Africa. W a s it, however, an authentic development of the culture 
from which it derived? 
T h e answer must be in the negative, though the experiment was not 
without its instructive value. It would be too m u c h to expect that, at that 
period, the 'classic' model of French theatre could yield completely to the 
expression of traditional forms. T h e 'community' represented by William 
Ponty was an artificial one. It was distanced from the society whose cultural 
hoards it rifled both in qualitative thought and in cultural ends. T h e 
situation was of course not peculiar to William Ponty but was c o m m o n to 
the other schools and institutions set up by the colonizer for the fulfilment 
of his o w n mission in Africa. T h u s the theatre of William Ponty served the 
needs of exotic satisfaction for the community of French colonials. Even 
w h e n it 'went to the people', and with their o w n material, it remained a 
curiosity that left the social life and authentic cultural awareness of the 
people untouched. 
T h e literary renaissance in Egypt25 
In the sphere of literary culture, Egypt and the Western Sudan provide 
instances in the first case of literary renaissance and in the second of both 
direct and indirect mutual assistance in the cultural penetration of Africa 
during the colonial period by basically contending interests. 
Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation of Egypt, M u h a m m a d 'Alfs reforms in 
the military, social and economic fields, his sending of educational missions 
to Europe, especially France, and the establishment of a printing press in 
Bulaq in 1822 paved the way for the beginning of a n e w relationship 
between two worlds - the West and the Islamic East — and ushered in a new 
age in Egypt. This preparatory stage in Egypt's literary renaissance was 
accelerated during the reign of Khedive IsmaTl (1863-79) and reached the 
25. This section on the literary renaissance in Egypt (pp. 555^7) was contributed by 
Professor Y . A . Talib of the Department of Malay Studies, University of Singapore, 
Singapore (Ed.)-
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high road of decisive development from the latter half of the nineteenth 
century onwards. 
T h e creation of a necessary environment for the flowering of a modern 
Arabic culture was brought about by several factors. T h e first was the 
continued migration from the 1870s onwards of largely Christian Libano-
Syrian intellectuals26 into Egypt escaping the autocratic rule of the 
Ottomans and imbued with ideas on politics, science and literature adopted 
from the West. Within Egypt itself, a m o n g the Muslims, a new elite group 
emerged, filled with the Islamic modernist views of Al-Afghani and ' A b d u h . 
literary and intellectual renaissance'.27 However, local literary output was 
Europe exposed to a programme of studies with a humanistic bias, providing 
several crops of writers with varied viewpoints and interests. 
T h e economic development and transformation of the country as well as 
the establishment and founding of academies, learned societies, a national 
library in 1870, the secular universities, the reforming of existing religious 
ones (e.g. Al-Azhar) and the creation of a modern system of education 'gave 
birth to a public endowed with leisure, education and interest to form an 
audience. T h e result measured against the situation preceding it was a truly 
literary and intellectual renaissance.'27 However, local literary output was 
still heavily reliant on the translation of European works, undertaken before 
the establishment of the British Protectorate over Egypt and continuing to 
flourish under it. In time, this gave way to adaptations and imitations and 
finally creative works of originality. 
This cultural awakening coupled with the changing political climate of 
Egypt towards the end of the nineteenth century was reflected in the very 
extensive development of the press. B y 1898, there were already 169 papers 
and journals in existence with their numbers increasing to 282 in 1913.28 
Under the influence of the eminent Musl im reformer Al-Afghani,29 the 
periodical press was widely acclaimed as an educating or politicizing instru-
26. A m o n g these émigrés, three personalities were largely responsible for acquainting 
their reading public with the main currents of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French 
and British liberal and scientific thought - Farah Antun (1874-1922), founder of the review 
Al-Jamiah; Yagub Sarruf (1852-1927), editor of the widely read review Al-Muqtataf which 
served as an instrument for the popularization of Darwinian and Spencerian theories of 
evolution; and Jurji Zaidan, a prolific writer on a variety of subjects, and w h o especially 
through his review — Al-Hilâl - educated entire generations, not only in Egypt but equally 
in the Arab East. 
O f the Muslim authors, Fathi Zaghlül was the most prominent, w h o introduced western 
political thought and sociology through his translations of such works as Bentham's Principles 
of Legislation, Rousseau's Social Contract and E d m o n d Demolin's A quoi tient la supériorité 
des Anglo-Saxons, into Arabie. H e had a worthy successor in the person of Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 
editor of the daily Al-Jaridah and 'Apostle of Liberalism and Utilitarianism in Egypt'. For 
details see J. M . A h m e d , i960; A . Hourani, 1962. 
27. N . Safran, 1961, p. 57. 
28. M . Zwemer in J. R . Matt (ed.), 1914, p. 129. 
29. See A . A . Kudsi-Zadeh, 1980, pp. 47-55. 
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ment. It became increasingly the preferred media of expression for a whole 
generation of literary personalities as well as intellectual leaders after the 
First World W a r . T h u s , newspapers equally became vehicles for experi-
mentation with new literary forms such as the short story, the drama, etc. 
T h e need to express and interpret the newly acquired foreign ideas led to 
the evolution of a 'neo-classical Arabic'. 
But the controversy produced - whether to reform classical Arabic or to 
evolve a modern Arabic appropriate for contemporary Egyptian literature -
became a bone of contention between two groups, the classicists and the 
modernists. T h e former were in favour of a 'recondite style, studded with 
obscurities and graced with literary allusion and erudite wit typical of 
courtly culture'. T h e latter whose m e m b e r s were primarily of Syrian-
Lebanese migrant stock, adherents of the Christian faith, with a Western-
educational background, opted for a 'simple direct language, accommodat-
ing colloquial and Arabised foreign words'. 
Looming large in the ensuing cultural conflict way the question of values 
-Western ideals and norms versus traditional Islamic concepts. In its initial 
phase, this struggle of ideas was essentially given to an arduous acquisition 
of ideas from the West or merely being indifferent to it. Confrontations of 
opposing attitudes were in the form of cultural skirmishes and lacked 
'coherent centres of gravitation'. However, in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the external cultural challenge as presented by the n e w conditions 
of life was keenly felt in all aspects of the traditional value system. T h e first 
and vital response to this challenge was concentrated on the issue of power -
between a militant reformist Islam and a rational liberal m o v e m e n t . 3 0 
Egypt's cultural and national identity were given various interpretations — 
the Pharaonic-Mediterranean by such literary figures as Tewfik al-Hakim, 
M a h m u h T a y m u r and T a h a Husayn in their various social, literary and 
historical writings,31 the Arabism of al-Kawakibi32 as well as the under-
playing of Egypt's African cultural dimensions by most members of the 
literati until the emergence of Nasserism. 
This transformation of culture in Egypt under foreign rule during this 
period led to a greater political awareness that later found expression in the 
nascent nationalist movement . 
Literary culture in the Western Sudan 
It would appear that basically contending interests penetrated the Western 
Sudan zone of West Africa during the colonial period, the colonial or 
30. Especially the violent controversies aroused by polemical works written by the 
western-oriented authors, e.g. Taha Husayn, Fi'l-shi'r al-Jahili, Cairo, 1926 (on pre-Islamic 
poetry), which questioned the foundations of the Islamic faith. 
31. See notably, Taha Husayn, The Future of Culture in Egypt, Cairo, 1938 (English 
translation 1954). 
32. As expressed in his work, Umm al-gura, Port Said, 1899. 
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European and the Musl im represented by the Dyula. T h e conditions for 
this resided in the social structure of the people of the Western Sudan. T h e 
traditional caste system of the Western Sudanese, which recognized the 
authority of skilled craft groups over the related materials and geographical 
territory of their craft and its practice, accorded to the iman or alim (Islamic 
intructor) a monopoly of authority over the province of literacy, writing 
and communication, and also indirectly over commercial relations that 
developed with European colonialism. 
Historically, the alim was himself the agent of a unique community. This 
was a distinct, often dominant cultural unit scattered a m o n g the non-
Muslim peoples of Western Sudan and was characterized by its religion 
and efficient commercial organization. They were called the Dyula. 
T h e Dyula's penetration into the countries of the Western Sudan had 
commerce for its basic end; their immigration into towns such as B o b o -
Dioulasso, K o n g , Bonduku, and so on, followed the trade patterns from 
gold sources in the Gold Coast, Upper Volta and other mines in the tropical 
belt, ending along the caravan trails of the Sahara.33 Not only did they 
establish towns, they also created urban outposts which formed links from 
the major centres to the Sahara trails. T h e Dyula (a n a m e which itself 
described their main occupation, trade) were, however, equally concerned 
with the preservation and promotion of their Islamic culture and served as 
the link for further Moorish and Arabic penetration into the rain-belts of 
the west coast. Records exist still of the 'sabbaticals' of the Dyula learned 
m a n , the karamoko — a higher state of achievement than the more c o m m o n 
alim — w h o visited centres of learning in Cairo and left learned legal 
judgments in their courts (a returned compliment of the same order as that 
of William A m o , the Ghanaian ex-slave w h o delivered philosophical 
treatises at the universities of Wittenberg and Jena in G e r m a n y in the 
eighteenth century).34 
A n d while admittedly the literary culture of Islam which penetrated 
areas of West Africa was largely conservative, rhetorical and stereotyped, 
its methodology consisting of learning by rote rather than by recognition, 
its content restricted essentially to Islamic exegesis and the L a w (hadith 
and fiqh), the continuing movement of scholars between the west coast 
and North Africa and the Middle East right into the twentieth century, 
the valuable trade in manuscripts which flourished side by side with the 
more m u n d a n e material of Dyula commerce, testify to the more inquiring 
nature of Arabic scholarship among its African adherents. Historical 
writings owe as m u c h to the Arabic scholars as to their counterparts of the 
Europeanized coastal towns or emigre products of Western literacy. For 
instance, a survey of the libraries of mallams of the west coast, largely 
around the Ivory Coast in 1920, revealed manuscripts which covered history, 
33. For details about the Dyula see Y . Person, 1968-75, Volume I, pp. 95-122; Y . Person 
in M . Crowder (ed.), 1971, pp. 113-26. 
34. For details, see W . Abraham (ed.), 1964; N . Lochner, 1958. 
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language (Arabic grammar) , poetry, mathematics, logic, jurisprudence, 
etc.35 
T h e existence of a literary culture, even of a tiny educated elite at the 
pyramidal tip of a non-literary mass has enormous consequences not merely 
for the majority group but for the alien culture from whose canons the 
literary equipment of that cone is derived. A n d most especially w h e n that 
literary advantage is fostered in the proselytizing service of the alien culture. 
T h e experience of Islam was therefore different only in quality, not in 
results from the Euro-Christian incursion into the culture of the indigenous 
peoples. T h e event of two literacies from historically opposing cultures 
meeting on a 'passive' terrain provokes intensified devices from both groups, 
and more especially from the first arrival which sees its carefully nurtured 
field invested, literally on the eve of harvest. Both factions of course ignore, 
or are prepared to deny, the previous existence of authentic values of the 
contested ground, conveniently presuming it a cultural vacuum. T h e 
syncretic tolerance of African cultural systems naturally lent credence to 
this presumption and, ironically, of the two contestants, it was the culture 
which itself displayed some of this syncretic possibility - the Islamic — 
which lost the great element of its o w n orthodoxy - including the 
'orthodoxies' of later schisms - in the seemingly accommodative passivity 
of the indigenous people. 
W e have already commented on some devices employed by the 'autoch-
thones' against the mechanisms of cultural negation employed by European 
colonialism; the Islamic culture, in the proselytizing polity of the Dyula, 
was to encounter the same resistance. In some cases, the Dyula community 
became thoroughly assimilated into the local community. Such instances of 
total assimilation were rare, but I. Wilks, in his informative study,36 points 
to one example - the Tagara of Jirapa in north-western Ghana . T h e process 
was insidious enough. A s already discussed in the case of the funeral rites 
of the K o u m i n a canton, the Africans retained their custodianship of land, 
both physically and ritualistically, so that while, in the towns, contacts with 
the French and Islamic 'civilizing' missions, demonstrated undeniable 
advantage for the converts, the seasonal 'commuting' between land and city 
itself displaced 'unsecured' groups and individuals. Such was the fate of the 
Dyula. 
It should be recalled additionally that, as colonialism became an 
organized fact and industries mushroomed in the cities, migrants from the 
Islamic far north (Mali, Mauritania) joined the labour force of the southern 
city centres. This movement attracted the ministration of the €ulamdy or 
karamoko w h o soon became established within the city community. In 
keeping with the strategy of Islamic renewal or reinvigoration, the Dyula 
tried to maintain constant contact between the Musl im communities by 
dispatching the 'ultima* to communities which had began to show evidence 
35. I. Wilks in J. Goody (ed.), 1968. 
36. ibid., p. 165. 
559 
Africa under Colonial Domination i88o~igjs 
of backsliding. This demand on their services overstretched the available 
custodians of the true way. Moreover, they were often unwilling to leave 
the ease of the cities with the built-up prestige — which came from recogni-
tion as 'leaders of thought' through their role as intermediaries between the 
migrant labour and the toubab (white m a n ) as rudimentary accountants for 
the new middlemen of produce companies. T o go and minister to some rural 
community of the Dyula became an imposition. Often it was not even the 
Dyula on behalf of w h o m the appeal was m a d e . T h e value of literacy held 
a tremendous appeal to the non-Muslims and, frequently, the rural village, 
or perhaps a local chief or farmer would m a k e an appeal to the local Dyula 
for an instructor. T h e local bright hope sometimes became a peripatetic 
scholar, moving from 'ulatna to 'ulamä'. T h e prestige of the educated elite -
largely Islamic - in these areas in the nineteenth century, was coveted by 
many . A good pupil could go up in grades, graduating to the karamoko, in 
possession of his o w n isnad or chain of learning, linking him backwards 
through illustrious, legendary scholars possibly to the Prophet himself. 
Cheik H a m i d o u Kane in his beautiful work, Ambiguous Adventure,31 
captures this atmosphere of the conquest of a 'pagan' type by the aesthetics 
of Islamic teaching in a locality of the Western Sudan. 
Not all the West African Westernized authors at the time were prepared 
to see the Musl im cultural challenge as necessarily opposed to the true 
genius of the African or indeed as incompatible with the Christian values 
then feverishly expanding through missionary stations set up by black 
converts along the Niger, the Volta and the Senegal. For sociologists and 
educationists like the A b b é Boillat (or his gallant compatriot, the scholar-
soldier Paul Holle), Arabic language and Islamic culture deserved study 
preferably in higher institutions in France where they would leave no 
contaminating influence on impressionable Africans. Bishop Samuel Ajayi 
Crowther of Nigeria went further and was prepared to have them studied 
and taught.38 It might even lead, through the translation of the Bible and 
catechism into Arabic, to an amelioration of the 'grosser aspects' of 
Islamic beliefs and society. 
T h e St Thomas-born West Indian, Edward Wilmot Blyden, w h o 
migrated and settled in Liberia, however, was of the firm conviction that 
Islamic culture was, of all the major civilizations of the world, best suited 
to the temperament and cultural realities of the African. Islam was for him 
only a component - albeit a major one - in the reformulation of an African 
culture for the African, with its o w n guaranteeing structures and institu-
tions.39 This forerunner of négritude believed in nothing less than a 
complete reorientation of African education from its Eurocentric bias to a 
more African-attuned direction. Muslim-Arabic civilization, which had 
impressed him with its 'literary cultivation and intellectual activity' was to 
37. C . H . Kane, 1972. 
38. R . W . July, 1968, pp. 188-9. 
39. ibid., pp. 46-^7, 218-19. 
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play a major role in this. Tracing the history of the black m a n backwards 
into antiquity, Blyden published his findings on the prior existence of a 
black civilization in Egypt, established Herodotus as a more worthwhile 
commentator than later European annotators w h o , apart from being 'not 
contemporary' to the events described, had prostituted their scholarship by 
racist preconceptions.40 
But it was not merely history in antiquity which formed the main 
material of Blyden's fight for the African's cultural reorientation. Recent 
events in the history of the African, the extension of his culture and genius 
even into a disadvantaged environment in the ' N e w World' prompted Blyden 
to examine the history books and declare that the history of European 
figures such as Admiral Nelson be discarded for the history of black heroes 
such as Toussaint L'Ouverture. This was revolutionary, even dangerous 
talk; it meant the commencement of a new school of analysis of m u c h in 
Africa's recent experience and went d o w n even worse than his championing 
of the study of Arabic language and culture in West African systems of 
education, especially in Blyden's proposed university. Not surprisingly, 
such a university never became a reality in his lifetime, but the evidence 
w e have today is that this West African 'returnee', versed thoroughly as he 
was in Western traditions, was the direct catalyst of the break-up of the 
Christian missionary monolith on the West African coast. For, on 2 January 
1891, he gave a speech to a crowded audience in the assembly hall of the 
Breadfruit Church in Lagos, stressing the incompatibility of European 
ecclesiasticism with the society and traditions of the African. A few months 
later, again in Lagos, the first schism occurred in the 'orthodox' Breadfruit 
Church, giving birth to the United Native African Church, with con-
sequences - as already described - for the cultural life of the African as the 
movement spread westwards and northwards of West Africa.41 
Literature in European languages 
Literary culture in European languages in West and Central Africa m a y 
be said to have constituted the highest force of colonial confrontation. Oral 
literature retained its place as a satirical outlet, so did m i m e , dance and 
innovations in masquerade forms to take note of and make commentaries 
on the colonial phenomenon. But it was the colonial language literatures in 
journalistic form and in poetry, drama and the novel, which mobilized the 
literary imagination in the service of anti-colonialism.42 T h e West African 
coast, from Liberia to Lagos, nourished the pamphlet industry on a scale 
that is comparable to eighteenth-century England. So did Kenya although, 
in the East African case, this appeared to have been largely in the hands of 
the Asian community, as were most of the journals. T h e brief tract, cheaply 
40. E . W . Blyden, 1887. 
41. J. F. A . Ajayi, 1965, pp. 254-5; E . A . Ayandele, 1966, pp. 201-3. 
42. See C . H . Kane, 1972; M . Beti, 1971; A . K . Armah, 1973; W . E . G . Sekyi, 1915. 
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printed and easily disseminated, launched tirades against foreign domina-
tion and exploitation, against acts of deceit by the colonial administration 
and the ever-increasing encroachments on the life style and social dignity 
of the peoples. Portuguese Luanda for its part obtained its first printing 
press in 1841 and with it the commencement of active journalism in the 
championing of the Africans' cause. It was a period remarked for its stylistic 
consciousness - no matter in which colonial language. Racist accusations 
against French colonialism from A h m a d o u D u g a y Cledor of Senegal reveal 
meticulous prose in flights of indignation. Petitions to the British Colonial 
Office became an art, a study in diplomatic prose. 
T h e early 'parliamentarians' — the nominees, the assimilés of French 
administration, the spokesmen of the masses approved by the British system 
as members of the so-called legislative councils — utilized the tongue of the 
alien ruler to destroy his illusions over what he had presumed were captive 
colonial executives. Thus , despite his genuine gratitude, even obsequious 
conduct towards British audiences and potential philanthropists, a William 
Grant of the West African Reporter could write (or permit to appear) the 
following searing indictment in his journal in 1882: 
It continues to be a standing blot upon the intercourse of Europeans 
with Africa, that every steamer that comes to the coast . . . brings 
in large quantities of that which is comparatively worthless to be 
exchanged for that which is valuable and useful... If the articles given 
were simply worthless but harmless gew-gaws in exchange for articles 
of value, the morality of the transaction would even be reprehensible, 
but h o w m u c h more w h e n the articles are not only of trifling value . . . 
but often positively destructive. They take h o m e that which builds 
them up in wealth, often leaving to the African that which im-
poverishes and destroys him. It is a sad reflection that, in m a n y cases, 
European commerce has left its African customer as naked as it found 
him . . . they will never secure a footing in Africa for their ideas of 
civilization, until the commercial relations between the high-toned, 
enlightened European and the 'savage' African, are placed upon a more 
equitable basis. But so long as demijohn follows demijohn of r u m . . . 
no reinforcements of missionaries and no homilies from professional 
philanthropists, on the blessing of European civilization will avail 
anything.43 
A n ardent campaigner for Africa-oriented educational reforms, Grant, 
deeply influenced by Blyden, sought an educational system which had the 
university at its apex but only as an institution which was designed to 
provide research and teaching in fields related to Africa, as opposed to the 
'conventional literary education which emphasized European culture and 
values'. Y o u must, he wrote, 'educate him [the African] by himself. T h e 
43. Quoted by R . W . July, 1968, p. 142. 
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annals of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society of the Gold Coast in the 
1910s and 1920s, notably the speeches of J. E . Casely Hayford, are filled 
with masterpieces of Victorian prose, spiced with devastating wit of classical 
precision. M o r e than a few district officers touring their pacified territories 
underwent the startling experience of being welcomed to a ioyal speech' 
and departing in fury at the 'smooth insolence' of practised black orators in 
English. 
In 1911 Casely Hayford also published his Ethiopia Unbound,** one of 
Africa's earliest novels, an attempt in a mixture of styles, ranging from 
caustic sarcasm to passionate indictment of the greed and racial arrogance 
that went into the partitioning and colonization of Africa. Casely Hayford's 
writings throughout his life kept permanent vigil on the fate of the black 
continent, a refusal to the last to accept the act of colonization or accord it 
authority in his o w n thinking. Ethiopia Unbound curiously did not give birth 
to k n o w n imitators during this period and remained in an exclusive class of 
its o w n . B y contrast, however, Africa did produce scholars and literate 
public figures of a differing school of thought, such as Bishop Samuel Ajayi 
Crowther of Nigeria and Bakary Dialo of Senegal. Like the A b b é Boillat, 
they defended European colonialism as a positive and laudable experience 
for Africa. For Crowther, a Protestant theologian weighed d o w n by the 
horrors of his pagan origin and society, Christianity (of which colonialism 
was a mere agent or enforcer) represented, in the most primitive sense, a 
divine instrument for the salvation of a heathen continent. Bakary Dialo 
was, for his part, simply overwhelmed by the virtue of French culture. 
T h e dilemma of the product of the colonial policy of culture substitution 
resided principally in this alienation, and it created a wrench in the creative 
personality of educated Africans. Even for the most radical anti-colonials, 
a manifest fascination with and preference for European culture as ex-
perienced in their society, and as encountered in the expanded intellectual 
horizons of the individual, was often discernible in their writings. T h e 
tragedy of the gifted poet from Madagascar, Jean-Joseph Rabéarivelo 
(??-i937) w h o committed suicide through his - it was believed - failure to 
resolve this internal wrench in his colonial psyche, was a dramatic example. 
This gave a discernible ambiguous quality to the writings of m a n y articulate 
Africans in the early period of colonial affirmation. It facilitated the policy 
of cultural assimilation, especially in the French, Portuguese and Spanish 
territories, resulting in the deliberate withdrawal from, even denial of the 
authentic sources of African creative genius by the n e w elite. 'Primitivism', 
either in inspiration or in images or idiom conversion, became evidence of 
backsliding; it delayed the total act of re-baptism which alone guaranteed 
acceptance into the magical society of the European colonial officials abroad. 
Exceptions, especially notable in the settler situation that turned the 
policy of assimilado into political art were poets like Silverio Ferriera, 
44. J. E . C . Hayford, 1911. 
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Antonio José de Nascimento and Francisco Castelbranco, whose poetry 
from the turn of the century denounced the racial bigotry of the settlers. But 
simultaneously, both in Angola as in other Portuguese territories (as indeed 
in all colonial territories), an escapist form of response to the daily reality 
of humiliation did evolve. A n example is found in the poetry of Caetano 
da Costa Alegre (Sao T o m é ) whose sentimental love lyrics, glorifying the 
beauty of the black w o m a n , were published after his death45 and m a y be 
regarded as forerunner to the literary school of black self-reclamation that 
b e c a m e celebrated in the m o v e m e n t called négritude. 
T h e principal midwives of négritude were A i m é Césaire (Martinique), 
Leopold Senghor (Senegal) and L e o n D a m a s (French Guiana); the cradle 
w a s France. Négritude produced a flowering of poetry,46 not all of it 
'propaganda' poetry in the m a n n e r of da Costa Alegre, but one which 
nevertheless o w e d its existence to the renewed consciousness of an African 
reality, a recovery of which was turned into a concrete p r o g r a m m e by the 
group's persuasive prise de conscience. It was a revolt, to summarize it quite 
simply, a revolt against the successful assimilative strategy of French and 
Portuguese colonialism, products of which the initiators of the m o v e m e n t 
realized they were. But the genesis of the m o v e m e n t can be attributed with 
justification to the 'manifesto' in one issue of the journal Légitime Défense, 
published by three students from Martinique. In this manifesto, they 
rejected the 'bourgeois conventions' of European culture, rejected a 
n u m b e r of European literary models and the false personality which they 
imposed on the black m a n . A s substitutes, however — and the fact best 
defines the cyclic trap of the colonial artist-intellectual - they adopted 
M a r x , Freud, R i m b a u d , Breton and other European mentors. 
Négritude, which rounds off the period under study, held undisputed sway 
in the formulation of creative sensibilities for the next two decades, and not 
merely a m o n g the Francophone colonial writers and intellectuals but the 
L u s o p h o n e , and even Anglophone. A m o n g the m o s t uncompromising 
opponents of négritude today - convinced Marxists w h o hold a view of 
history irreconcilable with the tenets oî négritude — are s o m e African leaders 
w h o gave négritude a n e w lease of life in their o w n struggle against Portugal's 
assimilado policies in the early 1950s. T h u s , it is accurate to say that 
négritude was a historical p h e n o m e n o n which w a s called into being 
by a particular set of circumstances and has since lost its affective hold as 
those circumstances disappeared, and as society b e c a m e subjected to m o r e 
comprehensive forms of analysis and radical prescriptions. 
45. C . da C . Alegre, 1916. 
46. L . Kesteloot, 1974; A . Irele, 1964, pp. 9-11; D . S. Blair, 1976. 
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B. O. OLORUNTIMEHIN 
W e need a clear understanding of the nature of nationalism in Africa for a 
proper appreciation of the events that will be discussed in this chapter. A 
preliminary point to m a k e is the distinction between the expression of 
nationalism in Europe from the nineteenth century and that in colonized 
Africa in the period between the two world wars. Nationalism in Europe 
has been the expression of the desire of communities which accepted the 
fact of c o m m o n cultural identities, coupled with a c o m m o n historical past, 
for an independent, sovereign existence in political organizations (states) of 
their o w n . T h e struggle was to ensure a coincidence between the cultural 
nation and the organization of its political life as a state. A s the Greek, 
Italian and G e r m a n examples illustrate, what emerged from the nationalist 
movements were, by and large, nation-states. 
In Africa, the aspirations of the states and groups which fought against 
European empire builders and tried to prevent the establishment of the 
colonial system up to the outbreak of the First World W a r were in essence 
the same as those which imbued the nationalist movements in Europe. 
However, one feature of the war was that it ended with the imperial lords 
consolidating their positions vis-à-vis the defenders of African independ-
ence and sovereignty. In spite of the ferment of ideas which contributed to 
undermining imperialism as a system, colonial rule became a de facto 
situation to the extent that some authors have referred to the inter-war 
period as the 'golden age' of colonialism in Africa. 
Most of the colonies that had been created were m a d e up of several 
culturally and historically diverse nationality groups for w h o m , for the most 
part, the fact of subjection to a c o m m o n alien ruler was the main base for 
unity. T h e colonial situation represented for all a new setting in which they 
had to forge new identities of alien rule. In such situations colonial 
boundaries which in nearly all cases incorporated m a n y cultural nations 
under a c o m m o n imperial administration were taken as given. T h e forging 
of n e w identities began with the acceptance of the essential African-ness of 
the various cultural nations. T h e units of the colonial administrations 
represented, in practically all cases, the territorial definitions of what the 
2 
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Africans began to see as proto-states around which they sought to develop 
in their peoples a sense of c o m m o n belonging. 
Political and social developments in the colonial situation were a product 
of the interactions between the colonizer on the one hand, and the colonized 
on the other. In a sense, the orientations of African leadership elites were 
shaped partly by the form of colonial administration. W h e r e the administra-
tions were regional in structure and/or policy, as in the French colonial 
federations, the African leaders tended to adopt a regional outlook. Hence, 
champions of African nationalism in the inter-war period (wanasiasa as they 
are k n o w n in Swahili) have been referred to as being primarily pan-
Africanists rather than nationalists in the European sense. T h e point was 
that nationalism was taking a reverse course to the expression of the same 
phenomenon in Europe. Contrary to what happened in Europe, the state 
was created before the cultural nations that would m a k e it a meaningful 
political community were welded together. It is in this sense that one should 
take James Coleman's observation that: 
. . . the drive behind African nationalism in m a n y instances is not the 
consciousness of belonging to a distinct politico-cultural unit which 
is seeking to protect or assert itself, but rather it is the movement of 
racially-conscious modernists seeking to create n e w political and 
cultural nationalities out of the heterogenous people within the 
artificial boundaries imposed by the European master . . . ' 
W e must recognize that colonialism, as a system of relations, rests upon 
some kind of racialism, and that since development in a colonial situation 
is a product of interactions between the colonizer and the colonized, racial 
consciousness is basic to the growth of nationalism as a search for 
sovereignty and independence. 
That African nationalists are regarded as 'modernists' is a reflection of 
the fact that they were operating within an externally defined setting which 
imposed alien systems of values, norms, and definitions of political and 
social developments to which they had to subscribe as a condition for 
success. That nationalism in Africa is a dynamic, ongoing phenomenon is 
clear from the extensive literature on themes like nation-building and 
irredentism. Probably an accurate word for this phenomenon in Africa - as 
E . S . Atieno-Odhiambo shows in Chapter 26 - is the Swahili word siasa. 
In general, colonialism requires a social base for its survival. This is 
usually provided through a diffusion of the culture of the colonizer through 
education. Attainments within the educational system established for this 
purpose provide the yardsticks for raising a n e w group of elites a m o n g the 
colonized society. However , the diffusion of the imported culture of the 
colonizer almost invariably involves not only harmonious culture contacts, 
but also culture conflicts, which could find expression in violent reactions 
1. J. S. Coleman in P. J. M . McEwan and R. B. Sutcliffe (eds), 1965, p. 177. 
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from the subject people. Apart from this, there is always the problem of 
conflict of interests as between the colonizer and the colonized, the former 
working to perpetuate control, the latter struggling for self-fulfilment either 
through accommodation within the colonial system or through the recovery 
of independence and sovereignty. 
A s M . Crowder has shown above (Chapter 12), the First World W a r 
raised the hopes of the emergent educated elites all over Africa for greater 
opportunities for their being identified with the processes of development 
in their respective communities. T h e y expected to be absorbed and accepted 
as colleagues by the colonial rulers; but as the colonial situation became 
more and more of a reality they found their expectations checkmated or 
frustrated. Even where mass recruitment of European personnel during the 
war had led to job opportunities opening up for educated Africans, the 
realities of the post-war period soon caused disillusionment and discontent. 
Educated Africans not only found themselves placed in inferior positions 
vis-à-vis the European personnel of comparable training and experience 
with w h o m they served in the same colonial administrations, they were also 
kept in the background socially. Having been educated away from their 
indigenous milieu with the encouragement that the education they were 
getting would lift them into the European world, they were m e n w h o were 
largely alienated from the masses of their people in terms of orientation, life 
style, ambition and expectations of rewards in material and social terms.2 
T h e barriers which the illiberalism inherent in colonialism erected against 
them were, therefore, a source of resentment, bitterness and agitation 
against the colonial regimes. 
T h e colonial regimes were no exception to the truism that every ad-
ministration makes use of intermediary structures, largely for reasons of 
economy and effectiveness. T h e colonial governments m a d e varied use, as 
R . F . Betts has shown above (Chapter 13) of traditional institutions and 
leadership elites to facilitate their control of the subject peoples. Indeed, in 
the search for such authority structures and personnel, the colonial officials 
often created new ones which they could understand and use. Such were 
the 'warrant chiefs' of South-eastern Nigeria, the native authorities a m o n g 
the Maasai in Tanganyika (now Tanzania), and in parts of Uganda outside 
Buganda, and most of the so-called chiefs (chefs de paille) under the French, 
Belgians and the Portuguese. But even then, the elites so recruited to sustain 
colonial rule were hardly any better treated than the Africans w h o were 
raised through education in the colonial system. Like the new educated 
elites, the 'traditional' rulers fell between two stools. Having lost the 
traditionality of their positions and roles in the eyes of their people, they 
were treated in most cases like mere instruments of control by the colonial 
masters and not as real partners. T h e loss of real power and social status 
and prestige was a source of discontent for m a n y of them. 
2. See Jean-Paul Sartre's preface to F . Fanon, 1967. 
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Only few of the colonial administrators seemed to have understood h o w 
to manage the uneasy relationship which existed between the 'traditional' 
and the n e w African elites on the one hand, and between these two sets 
of elites and the colonial regimes on the other. T h e few exceptions included, 
notably, General (later Marshal) Lyautey in Morocco, Sir Frederick (later 
Lord) Lugard in Northern Nigeria and Sir Gordon Guggisberg in the 
Gold Coast (now Ghana) . Even for these, the general strategy consisted 
in dampening the aspirations of the n ew educated elite w h o were usually 
portrayed as ambitious upstarts. It was generally convenient to cultivate 
a conflict situation in relations between the two sets of African leadership 
elites, with the imperial master acting as the protector of 'traditional' 
leadership and systems of government. In such a situation neither set of 
elites was satisfied with the colonial regimes. In 1917, Governor-General 
Joost V a n Vollenhoven highlighted the potentially explosive nature of the 
problem, especially in relation to the future of colonialism, in the following 
perceptive piece: 
T h e indigenous chiefs, those of yesterday w h o m w e have preserved, 
or those of today w h o m w e have created, complain of being humiliated. 
T h e 'interpreters', the various types of auxiliaries of the administration 
and of commerce, complain that they are 'instruments' and do not 
have the rank due to them as collaborators. There is a m o n g the whole 
of this badly payed and very wretched elite - as remote from 
indigenous society, from which it has been driven out, as it is from 
European society into which it is not admitted — a feeling of 
disillusionment, discontent and bitterness which it would prove 
dangerous to be unaware of.3 
H e offered the following prescription that could not have found favour 
then a m o n g colonial rulers; 'it is necessary that this elite should be 
recognized and given a better welcome by us. T h e reform which should 
be brought about is less in the letter of the law than in actual practice.'4 
T h e adoption of the attitude being recommended would have been 
contrary to the ethos of imperialism, hence it went unheeded at the time. 
Instead, colonial authorities concentrated on consolidating their control 
and exploiting the h u m a n and material resources of their colonies. T h e 
absorbing problem was the solution to Europe's post-war problems of 
rehabilitation of the economy and the services. However, the international 
environment, with its streaks of liberalism being expressed on colonialism 
and colonial affairs,5 m a d e a change of attitude inevitable in the long run. 
But colonialism did not affect only the educated elite and the traditional 
3. Archives du Senegal, Fonds Afrique Occidentale Française (ASAOF) 17G61/2,1917, 
p. 10. 
4. A S A O F , 17G61/2, 1917, p. 20. 
5. See A . Sarraut, 1923; F. D . Lugard, 1929. 
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rulers. T o see African nationalism in the inter-war period only as an elitist 
and urban p h e n o m e n o n alone as has hitherto been done is wrong. Recent 
research is showing more and m o r e that a great deal of discontent and 
anti-colonial feelings were aroused in the rural areas mainly as a result of 
the n e w economic and financial measures, the n e w system of administering 
justice and, above all, the economic depression of the 1930s. T h e protest 
migrations from, say, the U p p e r Vol ta and Ivory Coast into the Gold 
Coast in the 1920s, the waves of deposition by their subjects of chiefs, 
the symbol of colonialism in m a n y parts of Africa, and of course the 
well-known and well-documented cocoa hold-ups in West Africa,6 all this 
shows that resistance to colonialism in the inter-war period was not confined 
to the urban centres and the elites only but also found echoes in the rural 
areas and a m o n g the illiterate farmers and workers. Admittedly, research 
in this area of the extent of rural anti-colonial sentiments and activities, 
and above all, of the linkage, if any, between the elitist/urban and illiterate/ 
rural activities in the inter-war period is very m u c h in the embryonic 
stage, and any synthesis therefore cannot be attempted in this chapter. 
T h e attention of future historians is very m u c h drawn to this n e w but 
fascinating theme. 
Another p h e n o m e n o n of African nationalism and politics in the inter-war 
period was the concern with cultural revivalism. This was an inevitable 
reaction to the stark reality that colonialism was a negation of the culture 
of the colonized. Cultural revivalism was part of the struggle for the 
reassertion and preservation of self-identity, first as Africans and, secondly, 
as m e m b e r s of particular cultural nations. Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism 
were perhaps the most striking examples; but the so-called 'nativistic' and 
religious movements , as well as 'Ethiopianism' belonged to the same genre 
of activities. 
Furthermore, colonialism is total in scope, affecting or representing a 
potential threat to all aspects of life; therefore the movements against it 
as a system were necessarily all-embracing. A s a security-oriented system, 
colonialism is normally threatened by all claims to fairness and equality 
in relations between the colonizer and the colonized, whether such claims 
were m a d e by groups of workers, in Church organizations, within the 
colonial bureaucracy or through agitations for the provision of social 
amenities like schools or health facilities. T h e essential point is that 
colonialism embodies inequality based on racial discrimination and any 
call for equality in any area of h u m a n relations is tantamount to demanding 
the end of colonialism. 
Intensity of variations in European influences in the form of ideas and 
institutions also influenced African reactions. T h e Africans in the areas 
which had experienced European dominance longest tended to be the most 
receptive to European political culture, and had the greatest expectations 
6. P. Jenkins (ed.), 1975; B. O . Oloruntimehin, 1973(a). 
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that progress would be m a d e towards the achievement of self-determination 
through such channels. A s they had been the most exposed to European 
education, they were well equipped and willing to adopt the European 
model of political and social development. They tended, therefore, to be 
constitutional in their agitations for desired change. T h e existence of a 
forum for doing this in the colonial legislatures was an incentive. 
In places like Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Algeria (especially 
the three departments of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran), the French 
Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, and the coastal areas of British and 
French West Africa, African activities were characterized by constitu-
tionalism, and the employment of techniques of exerting political pressures 
that were appropriate to Western European political processes. O n e reason 
for this was that the African nationalists were addressing themselves both 
to the immediate colonial authorities and to liberal political groups and 
opinions in the imperial metropolis. 
T h e constitutional approach found an ever-widening social base as the 
groups of educated Africans expanded and as n e w economic and social 
groups emerged as part of the dynamics of the colonial economy and 
measures, especially educational institutions, which were adopted to ensure 
African manpower for the economic and social activities. T h e emergent 
labour force gradually became unionized in m a n y colonies and added 
m o m e n t u m to the expression of African nationalism through anti-colonial 
politics. A s labour in the colonies exhibited all the malaise of a colonial 
situation, especially harsh exploitation based on racial discrimination and 
social injustice, labour relations automatically became political relations 
which were antagonistic as between the citizens of the colonizing country 
and the colonized Africans. T h e role of labour in the politics of African 
nationalism was to become very important from the Second World W a r 
onwards.7 
T h e role of the different official ideologies enunciated by the colonial 
powers was another determinant. A s John Peel says ' A n ideology, like the 
ideals of the great religions, is a factor shaping behaviour even w h e n 
uncompletely realised . . . ' and 'Development does not occur apart from 
men' s interpretation of their situation and ideas for their future.'8 T h e 
differences in the orientation and style of African nationalists derived in 
part from the fact that the various groups had different ideologies to guide 
their expectations and by which to assess their achievements. Hence, 
a m o n g African nationalists under French control in Algeria and Senegal, 
where the possibility of ending colonialism through the policy of'assimila-
tion' - by the attainment of French citizenship for individuals with full 
rights and responsibilities - had been demonstrated, the tendency was to 
continue to press for the extension, in scope and territorially, of the 
implementation of the policy. O n the other hand, those in British territories, 
7. G . Balandier and B. Dadie (eds), n.d., pp. 202-406; I. Davies, 1966. 
8. J. D . Y . Peel, 1968. 
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with the hope of eventual independence as separate sovereign countries, 
though as m e m b e r s of the British C o m m o n w e a l t h , were understandably 
more explicitly concerned during the period under consideration with 
reforms and participation which would prepare them ultimately for 
independence. T h e difference was not as to the objective of freedom, which 
they all wanted, but rather as to method. T h e latter was dictated by the 
context of action as set by the dialectic relations between ideologies and 
actual colonial practices.9 
Related to ideology as a factor is the settler factor. T h e settler factor 
showed in the relative intensity of colonization as a process, the frustration 
of the expectations of the colonized or lack of responsiveness to African 
claims. This factor explains the differences in tone and intensity in the 
expression of African nationalism as between settler-ridden Algeria on the 
one hand and, on the other, French territories which did not have Algeria's 
settler problem. T h e same happened as between settler-dominated Kenya , 
Southern Rhodesia (now Z i m b a b w e ) and South Africa on the one hand, 
and other British colonies. T h e declaration of the paramountcy of African 
interests (otherwise k n o w n as the Devonshire declaration) of 1923 in respect 
of Africans in Kenya was, in essence, an expression of the same ideology 
as informed British colonial administration in other regions. T h e different 
experiences of these territories resulted from the settlers' firm determina-
tion to perpetuate the subjugation of the indigenous population by 
practising what has been described as 'ultracolonialism'. ' ° 
African nationalism and international developments 
T h e situations which African nationalists found themselves in the inter-war 
years were essentially the same: deprivation of political and social liberties; 
exploitation of h u m a n and material resources to the benefit of the alien 
rulers; denial of facilities and services which could contribute to the political 
and social upliftment of the colonized societies or, w h e n it became clear 
that changes could not be prevented, the pursuit of actions aimed at limiting 
and reorientating the course of development with the main objective of 
perpetuating colonial dominance. 
A s counter-currents to these situations created by the colonialists were 
the aspirations of the nationalists for the recovery of lost sovereignty and 
independence albeit within the context of the n e w colonial territorial 
structures in the northern parts of the continent and, in the rest, for the 
improvement in the economic and social status of their communities with 
a view to making the enjoyment of civil liberties meaningful. In the pursuit 
of their aspirations, African nationalists were aided by developments on 
the international scene. Such were, for example, the impact of the First 
9. B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1971, pp. 33-50. 
10. J.Duffy, 1962; W . Minter, 1972. Also see B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1972(b), pp. 289-312. 
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World W a r already referred to and discussed in Chapter 12 above, and 
the League of Nations' expression of the desirability of regarding the 
development of the colonized as a major objective of colonialism, and as a 
yardstick against which the performance of imperial masters, especially in 
the mandated territories, would be judged. T h e introduction of the idea 
of accountability to the international community in respect of the mandated 
territories served as a source of encouragement to some of the nationalists. 
O n the political plane, international ideological movements like the Leninist 
anti-imperialist Communist International (Comintern) and other socialist 
movements, as well as the march towards independence in other continents 
of the world were also an incentive to African nationalists. So also was 
anti-imperialist pan-Africanism inspired by Sylvester Williams, Marcus 
Garvey, William D u Bois and other black American and Caribbean 
influences, which will be discussed later. ' ' 
A n international congress which was convened under the auspices of 
the Comintern at Brussels in February 1927 resulted in the formation of 
the League against Imperialism and for National Independence (known 
simply as the League Against Imperialism). T h e Congress was attended 
by about 180 delegates from Western Europe, North, Central and South 
America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa. T h e Congress brought together 
Communists, left-wing socialist groups like the Independent Labour Party, 
represented by its general secretary, Fenner Brockway (later Lord 
Brockway); radical socialist intellectuals and representatives of national 
movements in colonial territories. Participants from Africa included 
Messali Hadj and Hadjali Abdel-Kader (Maghrib); M o h a m e d Hafiz Bey 
R a m a d a n and Ibrahim Youssef (Egypt); Lamine Senghor (French West 
Africa); J o m o Kenyatta (Kenya); as well as J. T . G u m e d e and I. A . L a 
G u m a (South Africa). Also represented were members of the Inter-Colonial 
Union like M a x Bloncoux, while Carlos Deambrosis Martins came from 
Haiti.12 
There were also movements concerned with protecting the rights of 
m a n and citizenship and anti-slavery bodies which operated both in Europe 
and in several colonies in Africa. Movements which originated from 
America like Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association 
first launched in 1917 exerted influence in several colonies in Africa. 
As a counter-current to all these forces which were working for the 
upliftment of the social and political status of colonized or oppressed 
groups, there was the spread and influence of illiberal and retrogressively 
racialist political doctrines which became institutionalized in fascist and 
Nazi regimes in Europe and in repressive autocracies in the colonies, 
especially the Italian ones. Even in European countries, like France, where 
liberal political doctrines prevailed, fascism and Nazism found adherents 
and this fact reflected on the thinking over the situation in the colonies. 
11. See Chapter 29 below. 
12. See I. Geiss, 1974; G . Padmore, 1956. 
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In general, industrial and commercial capitalists in Europe continued to 
see colonies as estates to be preserved at all costs. 
T h e expression of African nationalism and politics 
M u c h as the colonial and the general international environment were 
broadly the same, the actual expression of African nationalism and politics, 
phenomena neatly s u m m e d up by the Swahili word siasa, varied from place 
to place, even in territories under the same imperial master. T h e explanation 
for this lies partly in the fact that colonial territories were acquired in 
different ways, at different points in time, and therefore had different 
experiences of colonialism, lasting for varied lengths of time. Factors which 
conditioned the form and intensity of action by nationalists (wanasiasa) 
in the colonies included the type of leadership, the variations in the spread 
and intensity of European influences in the form of ideas and institutions; 
the n u m b e r and significance of the settler (white) population; and, lastly, 
the colonial ideologies and practices. 
In nearly all cases, the nationalist movements and the attendant colonial 
politics were led and dominated by the n e w western-educated elites w h o 
were the best equipped to understand the European political culture and 
therefore to react effectively to the colonial regimes on the terms enunciated 
by the latter. Sometimes, they co-operated actively with m e m b e r s of the 
'traditional' leadership elites, even if there were tensions in their relations. 
Such co-operation features in territories like the Gold Coast with the 
Aborigines Rights Protection Society, in Southern Nigeria, Morocco, and 
a m o n g the Gikuyu of Kenya. In some cases, leadership remained within 
the ranks of the 'traditional' elites as in Libya and Morocco. In most 
cases, however, since those w h o represented or were recruited to represent 
traditional leadership elites were preferred by colonial regimes as instru-
ments of control, the tendency was for the expression of nationalism to 
involve treating the traditional elites as accomplices and for them to be 
attacked as such. 
Serving as channels for the expression of the aspirations and claims of 
African nationalism, and of specific grievances, were political parties and 
youth organizations. Political parties were meaningful in the few places 
where there were colonial legislatures. In Egypt, the bestowing of a 
parliament by the British w h o had unilaterally declared a sham independ-
ence in 1922, provided a purpose for the organization and operation of 
political parties. T h e constitutional situation m a d e it possible for Sa'd 
ZaghlüPs W a f d Party and the Nationalist Party to play a very important 
role in the struggle for the restoration of full independence and sovereignty 
to Egypt.1 3 T h e introduction of constitutional changes, though of less 
importance, in Nigeria and the Gold Coast in British West Africa, paved 
13. See Chapter 23 below. 
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the way for the appearance and meaningful operation of political parties. 
Before such constitutional changes, the National Congress of British West 
Africa had been easily checkmated in its endeavours.14 Thereafter the 
National Democratic Party of Nigeria was, for instance, able to m a k e a m o r e 
sustained impact on both the colonial authorities and the indigenous 
population. S o also did political parties play important roles in Senegal 
where the General Council which, after 1920, became the Colonial Council, 
provided the forum. 
Youth organizations, ethnic associations, old boys' associations and other 
movements dedicated to the achievement of civil liberties and the rights 
of m a n fulfilled an invaluable role in all the colonies irrespective of their 
constitutional situations. T h e y were an unavoidable political and social 
force especially in areas where overt political activities were m a d e impossible 
by the repressive nature of colonial rule. Youth organizations which acted 
as catalysts in the nationalist, anti-colonial politics and whose activities will 
be discussed in Chapter 25 below, included the Gold Coast Youth 
Conference which was founded in 1929; the Lagos (later Nigeria) Youth 
M o v e m e n t , Y o u n g Egypt, Harry T h u k u ' s Y o u n g Kikuyu Association 
founded in K e n y a in 1921, the Sudan Graduates' Congress, the Y o u n g 
Gabonese (Jeune Gabonais), and Y o u n g Tunisians. S o m e of the m o v e -
ments were inter-regional while others were trans-territorial. T h e former 
included the North African Star under the leadership of Messali Hadj , 
the National Congress of British West Africa, the South Africa Congress 
and the West African Students' Union led by the Nigerian, Ladipo Solanke, 
which drew its membership from all of British West Africa. 
Social organizations which contributed to the expression of African 
nationalism and anti-colonial politics included the several branches in 
Africa of M a r c u s Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association 
which had been founded in America in 1917. Such was the Nigerian 
Improvement Association (1920). W e also have bodies like the League for 
the Rights of M a n and Citizenship in G a b o n (Ligue des Droits de l ' H o m m e 
et du Citoyen); the Liga Africana at L u a n d a and Lorenço Marques in 
Portuguese Angola and M o z a m b i q u e ; André Matswa's Société Amicale 
des Originaires de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française with membership from 
Libreville, Bangui and Brazzaville; and L a Ligue Universelle pour la 
Défense de la Race Nègre (1925), led by Tovalou Q u e n u m ( D a h o m e y , 
n o w Benin), L e Comité, then L a Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre, led 
by Kouyaté Garang (French Soudan, n o w Mali) and L a m i n e Senghor 
(Senegal). ' 5 There was also, at the international level, the Comité mondial 
contre la guerre et le fascisme and the various Pan-Africanist congresses 
organized by Sylvester Williams and William D u Bois. Trade unions and 
other working-class movements also became important agents in the fight 
14. See Chapter 25 below. 
15. I. Geiss, 1974; J. A. Langley, 1973. 
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against the colonial system though they became even more so after the 
Second World W a r . 
Multifarious were the weapons that were fashioned during the inter-war 
period for the attack on the colonial system. Revolts and rebellions which 
were so c o m m o n in the previous period were reduced to a m i n i m u m . 
Instead, newspapers, books, pamphlets, petitions, protest migrations, 
strikes, boycotts, the ballot box, the pulpit and the mosques became the 
stock-in-trade of the nationalists. T h e newspapers became a particularly 
vital organ for the dissemination of the views for these political and social 
organizations: T h e slowly expanding intelligentsia provided the audience 
and market which sustained an increasing number of newspapers and 
periodicals in the period. Apart from those published within Africa, a fair 
number also came from outside the continent serving as vehicles for 
transmission of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist propaganda of inter-
national movements. T h e appearance of these papers varied from daily, 
weekly, fortnightly to monthly. Others were published only when it was 
possible. A number of the newspapers and periodicals had been in existence 
before the First World W a r . Such were al-Liwa, an Arabic newspaper 
founded in 1900 to popularize Egyptian nationalist ideas, La Démocratie 
du Sénégal, and The Lagos Weekly Record founded in 1891. T h e majority 
were, however, founded in the inter-war period. Such were the Times of 
Nigeria (1921-30), Daily Times (from 1926), Lagos Daily News (1925-38), 
Le Périscope Africain (Dakar, 1929), L'Ouest-Africain Français (Journal 
Républicain-Socialiste), Le Courrier de l'Ouest-Africain (Dakar), the African 
Morning Post, The Gold Coast Times (Accra), L'Action Tunisienne (1932) 
and La Presse Porto-Novienne with sub-titles and a section in Yoruba. 
Newspapers in African languages, other than the Egyptian al-Liwa, 
included the Yoruba language paper, Akede Eko (Lagos, 1932 onwards) 
and La Voix du Dahomey. F r o m outside Africa came communist-inspired 
and pan-African periodicals like the Race Nègre, Negro World, La Voix 
des Nègres, and Vox Populi, as well as New Times and Ethiopia News, the 
Cri des Nègres, African Times and Orient Review, The Crusader, and New 
York Age and Coloured American. Besides newspapers, plays, pamphlets, 
tracts and m a n y books were written by some of the nationalist leaders in 
which the colonial system was subjected to sharp criticism and ridicule. 
T h e newspapers served as media for diffusing nationalist and anti-
colonial activities across frontiers. T o that extent, they were a constant 
source of worry for colonial administrators as the various sedition laws of 
the mid-i93os and the attempts to establish iron curtains by legislation 
against certain publications show. T h e spread of the radio later m a d e the 
repressive measures which colonial rulers adopted to screen away their 
colonies from external influences more difficult and less effective. 
A s has been emphasized, constitutionalism, and the use of newspapers 
and radio as media of expression, were dependent on the availability of 
legislative institutions in the colonies or the hope of having them, as well 
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as the existence of a significant number of western-educated Africans w h o 
could make appropriate use of such institutions and organs of expression. 
Also, the approach of the western-educated African nationalists pre-
supposed the acceptance of Western European models of political develop-
ment such as nationalists without their experience could not appreciate. 
Uneven spread of education was, therefore, an important variable in the 
expression of African nationalism and anti-colonial politics. A s European 
powers concentrated on making colonies pay for their administration and 
services, relatively little was done to spread western education and provide 
infrastructure for political and social development. In several areas of 
colonized Africa between the two world wars, primary schools were still 
few and far between and secondary education was a rarity. In British 
Central Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Soudan and Portuguese Angola, 
Mozambique and Guinea, there was practically no access to secondary 
education before the Second World W a r . In such areas, nationalists could 
hardly be expected to adopt a constitutional approach to the expression 
of their anti-colonialism. 
It is in this context that one should seek to understand the role of 
traditionalist or 'nativistic' socio-religious movements in our period. O f 
particular relevance as w e have seen already in some of the earlier chapters 
were the messianic movements which expressed indigenous ideologies as 
well as those which reflected Islamic and Christian ones. T h e y were 
movements which were emancipatory in character, expressing what is 
essentially a universal phenomenon in situations in which communities 
had to express their dissatisfaction with their living conditions and a desire 
for regeneration. They represented an ideology competing against colonial-
ism in so far as the latter represented a negation of indigenous culture 
and economic, social and psychological depression of the colonized. In 
the words of Lanternari, 'They reflect the anxieties and hopes of the 
groups that participate in them for a sudden and total transformation of 
their physical, social and psychological environment.'16 
Prominent examples of such movements in our period, some of whose 
activities have been discussed in Chapter 20 above, were Ethiopianism in 
South and East Africa, and the movement spearheaded by millenarian 
preachers in Southern and Central Africa, notably the Kitawala (African 
and Congo Watch Tower) with large following in the Rhodesias, spreading 
to the Congo (now Zaire) and Nyasaland (now Malawi); the Kimbanguist 
movement (founded in the Belgian Congo by Simon Kimbangu) with 
following in Belgian and French Congo and the neo-Kimbanguist Mission 
des Noirs founded in the Lower Congo by Simon-Pierre Mpadi . Otherwise 
k n o w n as the Khakists, the movement had influence among the population 
of French Congo and Oubangui-Chari (now Central African Republic). 
S o m e of these movements were inspired by their acceptance of Christianity 
16. V . Lanternari, 1974, p. 483. 
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but were disenchanted with the expression of the religion in the organized 
Church of the colonial societies. African nationalists w h o were anxious to 
preserve Africans against colonial oppression found the Church at best 
indifferent. T h e y therefore broke away very m u c h in the spirit of the 
Reformation which has been characteristic of the growth and spread of 
Christianity in m a n y societies. Like the reformation movements in Europe 
and elsewhere, the churches and movements founded by African National-
ists aimed at applying Christian ideologies like the ideas of the brotherhood 
of m a n and the essential oneness of believers, without distinction as to 
race or colour, to end discrimination and oppression. 
That the spiritual was closely linked with the social and material situation 
was evident in the methods they adopted. While religion necessarily 
remained the med ium of expression of African aspirations, the concrete 
actions taken included labour unrest and refusal to pay taxes. Like the 
movements founded by K i m b a n g u and M p a d i , Ruben Spartas Mukasa 
in Uganda founded the African Progressive Association, and the Christian 
A r m y for the Salvation of Africa. A n ex-serviceman in the King's African 
Rifles, Mukasa gave expression to the unifying purpose of all these 
movements w h e n he promised to work for the redemption of Africa at 
whatever personal risks. W h e n he started a branch of the African Orthodox 
Church in Uganda, the political and social purpose was clear in his 
declaration that the Church was ' . . . for all right-thinking Africans, m e n 
w h o wish to be free in their o w n house, not always being thought of as 
boys'. Mukasa's church spread to Kenya. O f the same stamp was Jordan 
M s u m a ' s Last Church of G o d and His Christ in Nyasaland as were the 
various African and Aladura churches in West Africa. 
Islam represented a counterpoise to colonial ideology as well as a forum 
for the expression of messianism. T h e M a h d ï is for the Musl im as the 
Messiah is for the Christian. M a h d i s m haunted colonial authorities in 
North and West Africa, in the Sudan and Somaliland. T h e Sanüsiyya in 
Italian-dominated Libya, as w e have seen already, presented perhaps the 
clearest example of the expression of African nationalism and anti-
colonialism through Islam. Pan-Islamism, the religious side of the culture-
bound pan-Arabism and the idea of the Salafiya, also played a prominent 
role in the nationalist and colonial politics in Egypt, the Maghrib and 
northern Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. T h e Sanüsiyya influence as an anti-
colonial force spread to parts of West Africa. T h e colonial authorities 
found Islamic movements like the Hamalliyya, the Tijaniyya, and 
Mouridiyya a constant threat to the security of the colonial system. 
These Islamic movements provided a strong link among adherents w h o 
found themselves under different colonial regimes. F r o m the First World 
W a r on, as Crowder has shown above,17 pan-Islamic ideology being 
disseminated from Turkey was a worrying issue to colonial authorities in 
17. Chapter 12 above. 
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m a n y parts of Africa. It was a problem colonial rulers sought to tackle 
through the exchange of information and inter-colonial co-operation. 
Regardless of the degree of exposure to western influences experienced 
by the colonized African, a c o m m o n base for the expression of African 
nationalism were the different forms of cultural movements . T h e point 
has been m a d e about the resilience and continuing relevance of African 
cultures and institutions throughout Africa for the colonized. Even the 
most westernized of African educated elites were faced with the reality 
that they were essentially Africans whatever their degree of acculturation. 
Most of the youth movements already referred to, and as will be seen later, 
showed an awareness of the crucial importance of their culture to the 
preservation of their self-identity in spite of the inroads of Europe by way 
of the school system. T h e various Gikuyu associations were a good example. 
So also were the pan-African movements and the rather fluid concept of 
négritude which, as has been shown in Chapter 21 above, found expression 
from the early 1930s, as well as the so-called 'nativistic' and 'religious' 
movements already referred to. 
All these expressions of African nationalism and anti-colonial politics 
constituted the antithesis in the dialectical relationship between the 
European colonizers and the colonized Africans. T h e general reactions of 
the colonial regimes in seeking to tighten control by the use of physical 
force and the imposition of legal disabilities were understandable in view 
of the fact that the period witnessed the expansion of autocracies and 
illiberal tendencies in Europe itself. But it was not just the opposition of 
the Africans which was making the colonial regimes insecure. T h e spread 
of European ideas and institutions proved a sore point for the colonizers. 
T h e general attempt to limit the quality and scope of education was 
predicated upon the fear that European education and political and social 
ideas were destructive of colonialism as a system of relations. It was the 
desire to avert the danger that was looming that explained the general 
denunciation of education in the humanities at all levels, and the preference 
for rural schools, vocational schools, and technically-orientated post-
secondary institutions which were concerned with intermediate m a n p o w e r , 
but not universities. T h e idea was to avoid the example of India where 
the spread of liberal education had been a major lever for the expansion 
of anti-colonial and nationalistic politics. This is the explanation for the 
orientation and scope of such colleges as the Ecole William Ponty in French 
West Africa, and the Yaba Higher College (Nigeria), Achimota College 
(Gold Coast), Gordon's College, Khartoum, and Makerere College in 
British East Africa.18 
But the attempt to regulate the measure and type of social change that 
could take place in the colonies was itself another source of anti-colonial 
grievances that fuelled the nationalist movements. T h e world economic 
18. B. O . Oloruntimehin, 1974; pp. 337-57; D . B. Abernethy, 1969, pp. 79-88. 
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crisis worsened the situation in two ways. It limited the resources available 
to the colonial regimes to be viable without any subvention from the 
metropolis. T h e general tendency was to keep the colonial regimes going 
by cutting d o w n on expenditures on amenities and infrastructures that 
could benefit the colonized by the freezing of job opportunities regardless 
of the disruptive impact of unemployment on the societies. At the same 
time, the pauperizing exactions m a d e against the colonized became greater 
with higher taxes, frequent use of cheap and forced labour, in a situation 
in which farmers were receiving diminishing returns for their raw materials 
while paying higher prices for imported European manufactures. 
Finally one can point to the Italo-Abyssinian war which began in 1935, 
and the eventual Italian occupation of Ethiopia, as a major international 
event which furthered the feeling of alienation on the part of the colonized, 
especially the educated, against the colonial regimes. T h e tones of the 
Italian invasion, and of fascism and Nazism in general, emphasized the 
racialist nature of European colonialism in Africa. Those w h o had nursed 
hope in the League of Nations were sadly disappointed. T h e desire to 
protect the wounded pride of the African explains the resurgence of 
pan-African ideas and ideologies like négritude at this time. Equally 
important were international organizations in defence of the independence 
of Ethiopia, a country which symbolized the hope of the educated African 
for eventual independence. 
T h e newspapers and periodicals, both local and foreign, naturally served 
as vehicles for the transmission of anti-colonial, anti-European nationalism. 
It was to checkmate this development that various repressive administrative 
and legislative measures were taken against the mass media, including the 
slowly-expanding radio services. Efforts were m a d e to prevent or limit 
the circulation of literature, newspapers and periodicals, and radio sets 
even w h e n these emanated from the h o m e countries of the colonial 
administrators. T h e local press was in nearly all cases rigidly controlled 
through censorship and sedition laws. All these measures were taken to 
facilitate the operations of the colonial administrations, which became 
characterized by greater intolerance of nationalist aspirations, and depriva-
tion of civil, personal liberties and rights. 
In the inter-war period, colonialism and African nationalism existed in 
a dialectical relationship. African nationalism and anti-colonial activities 
did not achieve m u c h success in the inter-war period but they did cause 
some concern among the colonial officials. All the repressive anti-colonial 
measures taken during the period reflect this concern. Their responses to 
the challenges posed by African nationalism amounted to wanting to screen 
off Africa from general currents of development in the world. Not only 
was this unrealistic and self-contradictory, the attempt acted as a catalyst 
that snowballed African nationalism and anti-colonialism to deeper and 
wider forms which, with the impact of the Second World W a r , soon led 
to the movement for the overthrow of the colonial system. 
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Introduction 
T w o forms of nationalism competed for supremacy in North-East Africa 
in the inter-war years - secular nationalism on the one side and religiously-
inspired patriotism on the other. T h e continuing legacy of the M a h d ï in 
the Sudan and of Sayyid M u h a m m a d in Somalia managed to fuse religion 
and patriotic sentiment the most directly. O n the other hand, Egyptian 
nationalism in the inter-war years was getting more secular (see Fig. 4.1). 
But even in Egypt, Islamic modernism and nationalism interacted in the 
theatre of politics. After all, Sa'd Zaghlül, the nationalist w h o dominated 
Egyptian politics for the first decade following the First World W a r , was 
influenced by Djamäl al-Dïn al-Afghânï, the stormy revolutionary pan-
Islamist w h o had had a part in 'bringing about the first stirrings of national 
consciousness and discontent under IsmäTT. 1 However, it would still be 
true to say that the movement which Zaghlül led was basically a secular 
patriotic movement . T h e protests in southern Sudan were also basically 
secular: it was in northern Sudan and Somalia during those inter-war 
years that the religious factor was the more difficult to disentangle from 
the political. 
In addition to the dialectic between religion and secularism in politics 
during these years, there was the dialectic between nationalism and 
economic problems. This period included some of the worst years of 
economic depression in the history of the modern world. B y the end of 
the 1920s the imperial powers themselves were experiencing the pressures 
of a deepening recession, culminating in the Great Depression. T h e colonies 
of North-East Africa had been feeling the economic squeeze a decade or 
two before the Great Depression hit the industrialized world. 
For North-East Africa yet another characteristic of the inter-war years 
was that they witnessed both a further expansion of imperialism, on one 
side, and a n e w militancy against imperialism on the other. T h e years 
between the two world wars were the years of Europe's last frontier - as 
new territory was annexed and colonial control was consolidated. This 
1. A. Hourani, 1962, pp. 108-9; s e e als0 N . R . Keddie, 1968. 
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was imperialism's last territorial push in Africa. But the same years also 
witnessed the rise of anti-colonial militancy among the colonized peoples 
and the beginnings of effective political organization in pursuit of freedom 
and equality. In North-East Africa this was particularly marked in Egypt 
- but by no means exclusively there. 
T h e First World W a r itself played a part in creating these contradictions. 
O f all the countries of this part of Africa, Egypt was perhaps the most 
directly affected by the war. After all, w h e n Turkey entered the war on 
Germany's side, Britain had regarded it as a pretext not only for ending 
the Ottoman empire's residual suzerainty over Egypt but also for declaring 
Egypt a British protectorate, and for installing an alternative monarch of 
Britain's choosing. This declaration of a protectorate and the nature of 
the n e w monarchy together worked as a major catalyst for Egyptian 
nationalist resentment. This new militancy was deepened by the militariza-
tion of Suez, as half a million troops under British c o m m a n d were brought 
in to guard the canal. 
Britain's role in the Sudan was also consolidated - generating in turn 
n e w forms of nationalist sentiment. European imperialism was indeed 
pushing for its last territorial frontier in Africa - but in that very process 
it was also stirring a n e w patriotic awakening among the indigenous peoples. 
However, it is worth bearing in mind that during these years Egyptian 
nationalism was still tainted by a form of expansionism of its o w n . T h e 
leaders of the new nationalist movement in Egypt still regarded the Sudan 
as an Egyptian dependency and sought to recover effective Egyptian 
sovereignty over it. 
These, then, are the basic contextual contradictions of the inter-war 
years in North-East Africa - the dialectic between economic and political 
forces, the dialectic between religion and nationalism, the dialectic between 
the last frontier of imperialism and the n e w frontier of anti-colonialism, 
and the dialectic between local patriotism and local expansionism, especially 
in Egypto-Sudanese relations. 
Let us n o w look at these developments in greater detail, country by 
country, bearing in mind that some of the economic problems unleashed 
on North-East Africa in this period played a major role in creating a 
responsive atmosphere for nationalist agitation and resentment a m o n g the 
people. 
Egypt 
T h e 1919 Revolution 
Because of Britain's declaration of the protectorate in 1914, Egyptian 
nationalists felt the urgent necessity to form a united body to represent 
the nation in its forthcoming conflict with Britain. Consequently, in 
N o v e m b e r 1918, Sa'd Zaghlül, the distinguished Egyptian leader, and two 
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T h e W a f d was militant in its approach to change. Its ultimate objectives 
were to win complete independence for Egypt, ensure Egyptian sovereignty 
over the Sudan and abolish the Capitulations which granted special 
privileges to foreigners resident in Egypt. T h o u g h the Wafd's constitution 
did not openly mention the last two objectives, this was apparently a 
tactical m o v e to achieve freedom first and then turn to the two other issues.2 
Zaghlül and his colleagues represented not only the new Egyptian elite 
of modern administrators, lawyers and other secular professionals, but also 
a n e w group of landowners. Socially, they 'belonged to a native and 
relatively recent land-owning and professional class from the provinces'.3 
Their emergence was a signal that the older alien Turco-Egyptian and 
Albanian aristocracy had to hand over leadership to the long-suppressed 
professional elite. 
T h e W a f d reverted to militant tactics to strengthen its leadership. It 
distributed leaflets, organized public meetings, and collected 'formal signed 
dispositions from all representative organisations in the country to the 
effect that the W a f d was the official representative of the Egyptian nation 
solely responsible and authorized to negotiate its future'.4 Moreover, the 
W a f d mobilized a country-wide support for its position through effective 
articulation of the people's grievances and demands. 
T h e unacceptable and humiliating unilateral British declaration of a 
protectorate over Egypt in December 1914 was thus forcefully dismissed 
by the W a f d as illegal and a war measure only. It advocated its immediate 
abolition in fulfilment of President W o o d r o w Wilson's doctrines and the 
Allies' promises of freedom for small nations. 
Meanwhile, economic hardships were helping the nationalist cause. T h e 
m a n y social and economic problems that beset the Egyptian society during 
the First World W a r created a widely-felt sense of deprivation a m o n g the 
masses. T h o u g h the British government had promised to undertake all 
the responsibilities for the W a r , the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was 
employed in defending the Suez Canal, and in Syria and Palestine. T h e 
peasants were forcefully recruited in large numbers to serve in the Allied 
labour and camel corps. Their grain and animals were requisitioned without 
adequate compensation. T h e sharp rise in the cost of living was particularly 
harmful to government employees and unskilled labourers because it was 
not accompanied by a proportionate increase in their wages. Landowners 
were unable to profit substantially from the rise in the price of cotton 
because Britain limited its acreage to allow for the increase of the cultivation 
of essential foodcrops, fixed its prices, and restricted its export. T h e W a f d 
repeatedly stressed Britain's responsibility for this injustice and persuaded 
the Egyptians to rally behind it to redress it. This energetic campaign led 
to the gradual alienation of all classes from Britain. B y 1919 an inflammable 
2. A . M . Ramadan, 1968, pp. 431-2. 
3. P. J. Vatikiotis, 1969, p. 252. 
4. ibid., p. 255. 
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state of discontent prevailed throughout the country.5 Economic depriva-
tion was setting the stage for a political response on a mass scale. 
T h e failure of the British government to appreciate the strength and 
dimensions of the sweeping n e w nationalist spirit, and its arrogant 
insistence on the permanent status of the protectorate were serious errors 
of judgement. Its subsequent stubborn refusal to allow Husayn Rushdï, 
the wartime prime minister, and Zaghlül to present Egypt's case in the 
Paris Peace Conference added fuel to an already explosive situation. But 
the most dangerous of all British blunders was the arrest on 8 M a r c h 1919 
of Zaghlül and two of his colleagues, and their deportation to Malta. This 
was the spark that led to the 1919 Revolution. 
T h e immediate result of the Wafd's mobilization was a series of violent 
demonstrations and massive strikes by transport workers, judges and 
lawyers. Students from the al-Azhar university and secondary and 
professional schools actively participated in the nationalist struggle. Soon 
the provinces joined in the general protest, and attempted more daring 
attacks upon railway and telephone communications. Frequent attacks 
were also m a d e on British military personnel, culminating in the murder 
of eight British officers and m e n on a train from A s w a n to Cairo at Deyrut 
on 18 March . In short, the country was brought to a standstill and Britain's 
position in Egypt was seriously threatened. T h e W a f d n o w emerged as 
the sole representative of the nation and Zaghlül dominated the national 
political scene until his death in 1927. 
T h e 1919 Revolution is indeed a significant event in the history of 
modern Egypt. For it mobilized, for the first time, all Egyptian classes 
(peasants, workers, students, landowners and intellectuals) and religious 
groups (both Copts and Muslims) against British colonialism. Leaders of 
the Coptic community were, in fact, equally involved in the nationalist 
bid for independence, and a few were selected as m e m b e r s of the Wafd's 
central committee. This was one measure of the n e w secularism, as was 
a n e w development, the participation of w o m e n in public demonstrations 
against Britain. 
This national upheaval forced Britain to inaugurate a policy of concilia-
tion with the nationalists. Lord Allenby, w h o was appointed a Special 
High Commissioner, released Zaghlül and his colleagues and allowed them 
to go to Paris. T h e British government appointed a special mission, under 
the chairmanship of Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
to report on the causes of the 'disturbances', and the most suitable constitu-
tion for Egypt under the Protectorate. T h o u g h the W a f d had organized 
a nation-wide effective boycott of the Milner Mission, its conclusion that 
the unsatisfactory protectorate should be replaced by a treaty of alliance 
negotiated with the nationalists was a triumph for the W a f d . 
Britain was also forced to recognize the W a f d as the official spokesman 
5. P. G . Elgood, 1928, p. 227. 
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of the nation. Milner went even further than this by inviting Zaghlül for 
unofficial negotiations in London . T h e result was the Milner-Zaghlül 
m e m o r a n d u m in 1920 which provided for an offensive and defensive 
alliance between the two countries, and, subject to the approval of the 
Capitulatory powers, the transfer of their rights in Egypt to Britain. T h e 
m e m o r a n d u m was, however, silent about the Sudan since, in Milner's 
view, her status was clearly defined by the Condominium Agreement.6 
T h o u g h these negotiations collapsed over the Wafd's insistence on complete 
independence and Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, this m e m o r a n d u m 
formed the starting-point for all subsequent negotiations. 
T h e Declaration of Independence of 28 February 1922 was the most 
significant result of the 1919 Revolution. Under the pressure of the 
nationalists, Britain unilaterally abolished the protectorate and recognized 
Egypt's independence on condition that the status quo would be maintained 
in the following matters (usually called the Reserved Points) until the 
conclusion of an agreement with Egypt: the security of imperial c o m -
munications, the defence of Egypt, the protection of minorities and foreign 
interests, and the Sudan.7 Egypt's independence was formally declared 
on 15 M a r c h 1922, and Sultan Fu'ad assumed the title of Fu'ad I, King 
of Egypt. But was this a genuine case of decolonization? O r was Britain 
still guarding the new imperial frontier? 
T h e Declaration of Independence gave the Egyptian government a freer 
hand in conducting its internal and external affairs. It restored the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs abolished in 1914, and allowed Egypt to have diplomatic 
and consular representation. Moreover, the Declaration provided for 
constitutional rule in Egypt, a goal for which the nationalists had been 
struggling since 1883.a O n its basis, the 1923 Constitution was enacted. 
But this is only one side of the story. W h e n compared with its militant 
ideology, the 1919 Revolution achieved only a limited success in both the 
political and constitutional fields. T h e independence granted by the 
Declaration was diluted by the Reserved Points, particularly by the 
reservation which provided for the continued British military occupation 
of Egypt. Moreover, foreigners continued to enjoy their extra-territorial 
privileges, while the Condominium Agreement dictated by Britain re-
mained to provide the constitutional framework for the administration in 
the Sudan. Similarly, the 1923 Constitution did not establish a solid and 
secure foundation for constitutional rule in Egypt since it gave extensive 
powers to the monarchy, such as the right to select and appoint the prime 
minister, dismiss the cabinet, and dissolve parliament or postpone its 
sessions. This undermined parliamentary democracy in Egypt before it 
started. 
This inability to achieve all the nation's aspirations was, in the main, 
6. Milner, 1921, pp. 24-34. 
7. J. Marlowe, 1965. 
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the outcome of the progressive break-up of the national unity achieved in 
1919. O w i n g to personal jealousies over the leadership of the Wafd and 
differences in outlook about the question of national independence, a 
serious split in the national front occurred in 1920 between the moderates 
led by 'Adlï Yakan, and the militants led by Zaghlül. T h e former felt that 
the failure of the Egyptians to gain international support for their cause 
and their inability to continue the struggle by themselves m a d e compromise 
with Britain inevitable. T h e militants, on the other hand, were so frustrated 
by Britain's stubbornness and impressed by the 19199 people's awakening 
that they advocated the continuation of the struggle until Britain yielded 
to all the nation's demands. T h e outcome of this controversy was the 
tragic division of the W a f d and the country at large into two rival groups: 
the Zaghlülists and the 'Adlists. T h e W a f d therefore became a party 
representing the majority of the Egyptians rather than the united body 
that was speaking for the whole nation. 
Britain's colonial diplomacy of 'divide and rule' m a d e extensive use of 
this cleavage in the Wafd's ranks. Through manipulation and deception, 
colonial administrators encouraged the alienation of the 'Adlists from the 
Zaghlülists. While suppressing the latter, Allenby accommodated the 
moderates and negotiated the Declaration of Independence with them. 
Though Zaghlül described it as a 'national disaster',10 and though the W a f d 
organized a violent campaign of protest against it, the Declaration continued 
to function as a transitional imperial frontier. 
T h e era of negotiations, 1924-35 
In the post-Declaration period, the nationalist struggle was predominantly 
focused on liberation from the crippling Reserved Points through a 
negotiated settlement with Britain. Four negotiations took place between 
1924 and 1935. These were: the MacDonald-Zaghlül negotiations in 1924, 
the Tharwät-Chamberlain in 1927, the M a h m ü d - H e n d e r s o n in 1929, and 
the Nahhäs-Henderson in 1930 . n But they all failed because Britain 
refused to m a k e any concessions that might relax its occupation of Egypt 
or change the status quo in the Sudan. This intransigence was closely 
related to the British-inspired, if not created, rise of the Palace as a powerful 
anti-Wafdist centre of power. 
Britain brought Fu'äd to power in 1922 to act as a buffer between her 
and the 'extremist' W a f d and to enforce her wishes. T h o u g h the ambitious 
and autocratic Fu'äd had supported the Wafd-led independence movement 
in 1919, he hoped to control it and use it 'for his o w n ends, a means of 
9. The Paris Peace Conference recognized the British Protectorate over Egypt in M a y 
1919. 
10. A . al-Râfl, 1969, Vol. I, p. 135. 
n . H . A . Ibrâhïm, 1976, pp. 15-16. 
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increasing his stature and power' .1 2 But he soon realized that Zaghlül was 
following an independent path and suspected that he was planning to 
overthrow the monarchy and declare Egypt a republic. This led to the 
bitter enmity between the monarch and the W a f d that characterized 
Egyptian politics until 1952. Britain encouraged this hostility and exploited 
it for her o w n imperial interests. 
T o prevent the Wafd's accession to power, Fu'ad suspended the 1923 
Constitution three times in less than seven years - in 1924, 1928 and 1930 
- and in each case appointed his o w n prime minister. B y trie 1930 constitu-
tional coup d'état, the Palace Premier, I s m ä H SidkT, replaced the 1923 
Constitution by a less democratic one. T h e main objective of the n e w 
electoral law was to keep the W a f d out of power.1 3 During the greater 
part of the succeeding five years, Egypt, in fact, lived under anti-Wafdist 
governments. This frequent interference in the country's constitutional 
machinery prevented parliamentary government and its institutions from 
taking root in the political life of Egypt. 
T h e various Palace governments that ruled Egypt before 1935, particu-
larly that of SidkT (1930-3), took repressive measures against the W a f d . 
Its leaders were imprisoned, newspapers were banned and supporters were 
dismissed from their posts in the government and civil service. Besides 
their endorsement of these extreme measures, the colonial administrators 
occasionally took direct measures to humiliate the W a f d . For instance, 
Zaghlül was not allowed on two occasions, in 1924 and 1926, to become 
prime minister, though his party had a majority in parliament. 
This Palace—Residency suppressive campaign led to a gradual decline 
in the Wafd's popularity and erosion of its unity. Dissatisfied with what 
they called the 'uninspired leadership'14 of Nahhäs, ZaghlüPs successor, 
a group of W a f d leaders deserted the party in 1932. Being less able and 
willing to confront colonialism, the majority of the W a f d leaders therefore 
decided in the mid-i93os to strengthen themselves against the Palace by 
a deal with Britain. ' s T o achieve this, they were bound to compromise on 
the nation's demands. T h e upshot of this weakness was the conclusion of 
the 1936 treaty that legalized British occupation of Egypt and maintained 
the British-dominated administration in the Sudan. 
The Sudan 
Sudanese resistance to British colonial rule expressed itself in the aftermath 
of the First World W a r in various activities and sentiments. T h e educated 
elite and the Mahdists, the religious nationalists, organized this opposition 
12. E . Kedourie (ed.), 1970, pp. 90-1. 
13. O . Tweedy, 1931, p. 198. 
14. A. L . A . Marsot, 1977, p. 139. 
15. H . A. Ibrahim, 1976, pp. 24-5. 
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in the northern Sudan while the protest movements in the southern Sudan 
were predominantly local in nature. 
Y o u n g protest m o v e m e n t s 
T h e recently emergent educated elite played a distinctive role in the 
development of Sudanese politics during the period 1919-25. This group 
of m e n was mainly composed of students and 'graduates' of Gordon 
Memorial College and Khartoum Military College. They formed their 
own associations through which they conducted an active political campaign 
against colonialism. T h e earliest of these 'young' associations was the 
Graduates' Club of O m d u r m a n formed in 1918. But in the immediate 
post-war years two clandestine associations of a more political nature were 
formed, namely, the League of Sudanese Union ( L S U ) in 1919, and, 
more importantly, the White Flag League ( W F L ) , founded in M a y 1924 
by 'AIT c A b d al-Latïf, the most prominent nationalist leader at the time. 
T h e Sudanese nationalist movement of the early 1920s has been 
dismissed by m a n y British writers as unrepresentative and its proponents 
as mere agents and pawns of Egypt. But recent studies by Sudanese 
scholars have demonstrated that though tactically, culturally and ideologic-
ally closely connected with Egypt, this movement was indigenous and 
mainly concerned with the repudiation of British colonial rule. T h e 
programmes of both the L S U and W F L stressed and gave precedence to 
liberation from 'the slavery of the colonial master'. T h e originality of this 
movement is better seen in a telegram that 'Alï 'Abd al-Latïf and three of 
his colleagues sent to the governor-general on 15 M a y 1924. This important 
document spoke explicitly of a Sudanese nation and a right to self-
determination, brushing aside British and Egyptian claims to decide, alone, 
the future of the Sudan. ' 6 
T h e call for unity with Egypt that the nationalists advocated was 
apparently m o r e of a political slogan than a tenet of nationalist faith. It 
was largely an expedient calculated to gain the sympathy and support of 
Egypt, which was undergoing a national struggle herself. Moreover , this 
slogan of unity seems to have been forced on the nationalists by the refusal 
of Britain to concede the right of self-determination, and her policy of 
using local and religious leaders to perpetuate her rule. F r o m this point, 
'the idea of unity w a s the most, if not the only, leeway and counter-strategy 
for the nationalists'.17 O n c e Britain, the c o m m o n e n e m y , was expelled 
from the S u d a n , the nationalists expected that Egypt could be persuaded 
to leave. T h e motto of ' T h e S u d a n for the Sudanese' raised by the 
traditional and conservative leadership was dismissed by the educated as 
a British-inspired plot to exclude Egypt and dominate the S u d a n . 
Inspired by the example of the W a f d , Sudanese nationalists concept-
16. For the official translation of this telegram see H . Abdin, 1970, pp. 48-9. 
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ualized and articulated local grievances into an ideology of opposition to 
alien rule. They did not, however, formulate their opposition in religious 
terms, but dwelled upon the economic and political grievances, always 
emphasizing the greed and foreignness of the colonizer. T h e ' D e m a n d s 
of the Nation' which 'Abd-al-Latïf wrote for al-Hadära in 1922 was devoted 
entirely to criticism of the government. 
T h e main technique used by the nationalists for the dissemination of 
their ideas and propaganda on a mass level was at first hand-outs. Leaflets 
were mailed to different addresses in the country. In November 1920 a 
'Faithful Advisor' sent to hundreds of addresses copies of a famous circular 
letter in which he attacked British policy of 'divide and rule' in Egypt 
and the Sudan, and called upon the two nations to unite against British 
colonialism.18 Leaflets were sometimes posted in public places and 
scattered on the streets. Moreover, the nationalists occasionally smuggled 
some material for publication in the sympathetic Egyptian press and 
organized plays and literary festivals. 
B y 1923, however, the nationalists had abandoned these ineffective 
clandestine methods of propaganda for more revolutionary tactics. T h e y 
felt that open confrontation with the British colonial regime was the best 
way to broaden the nationalist base and mobilize popular support for its 
ideals. In this militancy, the nationalists were apparently consciously 
emulating the example of the W a f d in Egypt. ' 9 Like their counterparts 
in India, they also appealed over the heads of colonial officials in Khartoum 
to liberal opinion in Britain to support the Sudan's claim to self-
determination. 
This change in political orientation and tactics produced in 1924 violent 
political agitation in Khartoum and some provincial capitals and towns. 
T h e W F L organized a series of demonstrations and riots in Atbara, Port 
Sudan, El Obeid and Shendï (see Fig. 4.1), particularly after the arrest 
of its president, c A b d al-LatTf, and two of his colleagues in July. T h e 
secular side of Sudanese nationalism was more pronounced in these riots. 
T h e Sudanese military were particularly susceptible to the ideas and 
propaganda of the W F L . T h e cadets were incited to demonstrate in some 
northern and southern towns. Those of the Military School in Khartoum 
paraded in the streets of the town, with arms and ammunition. 
T h e Sudanese officers, m a n y of w h o m were of Dinka origin, resorted 
to arms against British colonialism. They planned and executed the 
important military revolt of N o v e m b e r 1924 in Khartoum. T h e main 
political motive of this revolt was a gesture of solidarity and comradeship 
with the departing Egyptian battalions.20 Sudanese troops marched from 
18. M . Abd al-Rahim, 1969, pp. 102-3. 
19. H . Abdin, 1970, p. 64. 
20. Britain used the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General, in Cairo as 
a pretext to demand, inter alia, the immediate withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the 
Sudan. 
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their barracks to join the Egyptian units in K h a r t o u m North . T h e 
possibility that they planned to act in concert with their Egyptian colleagues 
to bring off a coup d'état cannot be overlooked. 
B u t the British troops fired o n t h e m en route. T h e result w a s a fierce 
battle that continued throughout the evening a n d night of 2 7 - 8 N o v e m b e r , 
and claimed the life of m o r e than a dozen Sudanese troops. A subsequent 
court martial executed three others and sentenced the rest of the 
participants to long terms of imprisonment. 
T h e total collapse of this revolt m a r k e d the beginning of a decade during 
which the intelligentsia 'laid low nursing the w o u n d s of the previous years 
and rethinking their plans and methods for the future'. Politically it was 
a decade of disillusionment and futility. T h e hostility of the colonial regime 
and its determination to suppress open political action forced the educated 
class to fall back o n literary, religious and social activities 'as an alternative 
outlet and a m e a n s of regroupment' . 2 1 T h e y formed small study groups 
in various towns and pioneered several newspapers and magazines. These 
short-lived but lively journals 'testify to the vigour and earnestness of that 
generation'.22 T h e folklore of this period, particularly poetry, expressed 
resentment and bitterness towards the arrogance and authoritarianism of 
British officials. 
T h e first nationalist m o v e m e n t of the early 1920s was thus not successful 
and the m a i n reason for its failure was that it lacked popular support. 
This was mainly because it neither sought nor wished to ally itself with 
local and religious forces, the t w o reservoirs of mass following in the 
country. Nevertheless, it is significant because it emerged earlier than 
nationalist m o v e m e n t s in other tropical African dependencies. M o r e o v e r , 
its ideological components survived the decade of political apathy. For its 
mos t important political slogan — the Unity of the Nile Valley — w a s picked 
u p b y the Ashika and other Unionist parties in the 1940s. 
M a h d i s t resistance to colonial rule 
M a h d i s m w a s one of the early weapons that the Sudanese used in their 
struggle against colonialism outside the metropolitan province around 
K h a r t o u m . Both the militants and the neo-Mahdists had, in their o w n 
w a y s , opposed colonial rule during this period. 
Mahdist risings 
Hardly a year passed during the first generation of C o n d o m i n i u m rule 
(1899-1955) without a Mahdis t rising against colonialism. T h o u g h this 
w a v e of millenarian m o v e m e n t s had subsequently gradually died d o w n in 
the sedentary parts of the S u d a n , the Mahdists remained active in Därfür 
(see Fig. 4.1). M a n y assumed for themselves messianic prophecy and 
21. H . Abdin, 1970, p. 98. 
22. Abd al-Rahim, 1969, p. 113. 
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declared a djihäd against the 'infidel' British rule. T h e most important of 
them was fakt 'Abdullah al-Sihaynï, the leader of the Nyäla revolt of 1921. 
Like its predecessors, the Nyäla revolt aimed at the repudiation of the 
'infidel' colonial rule and the restoration of the 'glorious' Mahdiyya in the 
Sudan. Beside this fundamental religious drive, the imposition of a 
centralized colonial administration, increase in the herd tax, and the over-
estimation of the lushúr, were all other factors that provoked the people in 
Därfür to join the revolt.23 
L e d by al-Sihaynï, a force of about five thousand warriors attacked 
Nyäla fort and the market on 26 September 1921. They gained control 
of the fort and set fire to a nearby building. Al-Sihaynï launched a second 
attack that could have driven the enemy into confusion had he not been 
seriously wounded. T h e colonial casualties in this round were forty-three 
killed and twenty-one wounded, while at least six hundred Sudanese died 
in action. 
T h o u g h al-Sihaynï was publicly hanged on 4 October, his adherents 
continued the struggle. They concentrated a force of about five thousand 
m e n some 80 k m from Nyäla. Faced with these dangerous developments, 
colonial officials sent a strong punitive force that toured southern Därfür. 
It arrested m a n y people, burned their houses, seized their cattle and 
confiscated their property. B y M a y 1922, this period of resistance in Dar 
Masalït had ended. 
T h e Nyäla revolt was certainly the most important revolt against 
colonialism in the Sudan before 1924. Unlike previous Mahdist movements, 
it 'nearly succeeded in its apparent immediate objective', and fully revived 
'the old fear of a large-scale religiously-inspired revolt'.24 T h o u g h the 
rising failed to destroy colonial rule, its limited success was taken as a 
warning. 
Neo-Mahdism 
Since 1914, Sayyid ' A b d al -Rahmän, the posthumous son of the M a h d ï , 
had felt that fanaticism would no longer work and that the interests of 
both the Sudanese nation and the Mahdist sect would best be served by 
co-operating with the British on the motto of the Sudan for the Sudanese. 
This constitutionalism did not really ring true, but was, in fact, dictated 
by political realities. For al-Sayyid clearly realized that an armed rising 
could only lead to total destruction. 
Similarly al-Sayyid was shrewd enough to realize that political and 
religious agitation required financial backing. Consequently, he enlarged 
his agricultural and commercial enterprises until he had become a large 
landowner and a wealthy capitalist by 1935. Rather than giving a non-
political outlet to his ambitions as the colonial officials had naively expected, 
' A b d al-Rahmän used this wealth to strengthen the Ansär organization. 
23. H . A . Ibrahim, 1979, pp. 459-60. 
24. M . D . Daly, 1977, p. 144. 
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Through adroit manoeuvres and obstinate contest, he shrewdly by-passed 
colonial restrictions, consolidated his influence in traditional Mahdist 
centres in the west, and attracted fresh adherents and founded n e w spheres 
of influence. Seeing that political nationalism was beginning to supersede 
religion as the principal motive power in the east, al-Sayyid m a d e special 
efforts in the 1930s to gain the support of the educated class.25 
B y 1935 neo-Mahdism had thus become an important anti-colonial 
political force. T h e potential unity that it achieved between a sizeable 
section of the intelligentsia and the traditional and religious elements 
became the nucleus for the Independence Front that had an overwhelming 
nationalist appeal in the 1950s. This Front played an important and unique 
role in achieving the independence of the nation in 1956. 
Local protest m o v e m e n t s in the southern S u d a n 
T h e African peoples of the southern Sudan continued their risings against 
British colonial rule during this period. This resistance was marked by 
three notable features. It was not always, or even usually, a response to 
obvious administrative oppression. Instead, its fundamental objective was 
to end British colonialism in this African region. Moreover, it n o w extended 
to groups whose earlier attitudes, though aloof and suspicious, had not 
been systematically hostile to colonial rule. Above all, it represented 
an enormous increase in the scale of activity in which the Dinka and 
Nuer, the two largest ethnic groups in this region, were particularly active. 
They ignored their usual local distinctions and concentrated their resistance 
under emergency leaders, some of w h o m were religious leaders - often 
charismatic 'prophets'. O f this major wave of resistance two risings deserve 
particular attention: the Aliab Dinka uprising (1919-20) and the Dinka 
revolt (1927-8). African traditional religion affected the nature of these 
revolts. But, in addition, neglect as m u c h as oppression had stung the Aliab 
Dinka into open revolt in 1919. 
T h e immediate cause of the first uprising was the malpractices of the 
Aliab's immediate colonial administrator, the ma'tnür, particularly his 
extortion of cattle and w o m e n . This uprising seemed to have been part 
of a master plan in which other southern Sudanese peoples were involved.26 
While the Bor Dinka were only with difficulty restrained from rising in 
support of the Aliab, the Mandari, a completely separate non-Dinka people, 
actually joined them in this uprising.27 
T h e Aliab Dinka uprising began on 30 October 1919, when a force of 
about three thousand warriors attacked the police station at M i n k a m m a n 
south of Sobat river. T h e station itself was overwhelmed by the Aliab, 
though the ma'tnür managed to escape. T w o days later, a group of Mandari 
25. H . A . Ibrahim, 1977. 
26. L . L . M a w u t , 1978, p. 80. 
27. G . N . Sanderson, 1980, pp. 4-5. 
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entered a telegraph linesmen's zariba at Mulla, killed three of its m e n and 
carried off their guns. O n 2 N o v e m b e r the Aliab struck again, attacking a 
resthouse and killing two policemen.28 Although this Dinka assault was 
eventually repelled, the campaign proved very costly for the colonial rulers. 
S o m e colonial officials and m a n y policemen died on the battlefield. 
In this crisis of Dinka history, a very large part of the Dinka peoples 
found their charismatic leader in one Bul Yol, better k n o w n by his ' G o d -
given' n a m e of Ariendit. With his great skill in creating political organiza-
tion, Prophet Ariendit had by 1921 mobilized the Dinka peoples against 
colonialism. His programme was simple and radical: an end to colonialism 
- in effect Dinka independence.29 His militant supporters m a d e various 
attacks on colonial positions, but they were dispersed in February-March 
1922. 
T h e Nuer peoples offered another formidable challenge to colonialism 
in the southern region. In spite of the successive punitive patrols of the 
British forces, they did not accept defeat. In their eyes they had lost a 
number of battles but had not lost the war. Their resistance, however, 
reached its climax in their revolt in 1927-8. 
Led by the powerful and influential Prophet Garluark, the western 
Nuer refused to obey the orders of the administration. W h e n Fergusson, 
the district commissioner of western Nuerland, arrived in December 1927 
at Lake Jorr on an inspection tour, a crowd of several thousand Nuer 
warriors attacked his party. They killed him with eighteen of his people 
while the rest of the visiting party rushed away panic-stricken and escaped. 
Simultaneously, the Nuer people in L o u country south of the Sobat 
river rose against colonialism. Their influential leader, Prophet G w e k 
Ngundeng , refused to see colonial officials including the Governor-General 
himself. H e sent emissaries to all parts of the L o u country and neighbouring 
groups of Nuer with the message to prepare for war against the 'Turks' .3 0 
Knowing that Ngundeng could strike at any time, colonial officials took 
strong measures to suppress his movement . 
T h e extreme and indiscriminate violence used against these risings led 
to huge death and destruction. Nevertheless, the gallant resistance of the 
Dinka and the Nuer impressed the British colonialists that violence alone 
would not work. It forced them to inaugurate by the early 1930s a n e w 
conciliatory and 'caring' policy towards the peoples of the southern Sudan. 
Somaliland 
T h e Somali people had for long had a deeply-rooted c o m m o n sentiment 
of Somali nationality, accentuated by a virtually uniform national culture, 
28. R . O . Collins, 1967, p. 77. 
29. G . N . Sanderson, 1980, p. 22. 
30. O . Digernes, 1978, p. 88. 
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and reinforced by a strong adherence to Islam.31 Like both their predeces-
sors and successors, the inter-war Somali nationalists appealed to this 
national identity in their struggle against Italian, British and French 
imperialism in the respective Somaliland territories (see Fig. 4.1). 
Besides this underlying factor, there were other forces at work too. T h e y 
related to the social innovations that colonialism had introduced into the 
Somali social fabric. Colonial forces had, in fact, destroyed the traditional 
social and political institutions and imposed their o w n . T h e y introduced 
in all parts of Somalia a centralized system of administration that vested 
all effective powers in the hands of colonial administrators, and gave no 
Somali any position of c o m m a n d except at the very lowest level. Colonial 
appointed chiefs, k n o w n as akils in the British Protectorate and capos in 
Italian-ruled Somalia, operated in an advisory capacity only, and as vehicles 
for colonial directives to the people. This was indeed a wide departure 
from the traditional free local institutions and the nomadic way of life to 
which the Somali people were overwhelmingly dedicated. With their fierce 
sense of independence and traditional disdain for all foreign elements, 
especially white Christians, the Somali people were bound to resist this 
radical innovation. 
Before the colonial era, the Somali were not subject to government 
imposts other than qadi fees and import and export duties. But the colonial 
powers campaigned to mobilize and exploit all Somali resources - h u m a n 
and material - using their newly-appointed chiefs w h o had no regard for 
traditional authority. Direct taxes were instituted for the first time in 
Somaliland. While in Italian Somalia this took the form of an annual hut 
tax, in the Protectorate the British imposed taxes on lifestock. Moreover 
Somali labour was forcibly recruited for colonial enterprises. T h e French 
recruited 2000 Somali to work for them as manual labourers during the 
First World W a r . O f these, 400 were killed and another 1200 were 
w o u n d e d . 3 2 Italian administrators sent out frequent expeditions to provide 
the required labour for their plantations in Somalia. These Somali recruits 
were grouped according to their ethnic origins and forced to live in colonial 
villages on the consortiums. All this hardship and exploitation produced 
a widely-felt sense of resentment to colonialism. 
Somali resistance to colonial rule during the period 1919-35 was thus 
a direct response to these social changes. It expressed itself in two types 
of protest movements: local and elitist. 
Local protest m o v e m e n t s 
B y and large, Somali resistance in the inter-war period in the European 
colonies and in the Ethiopian-occupied Ogaden was local in nature and 
at no time involved all Somali people. This was mainly due to the fact 
31. I. M . Lewis, 1963, p. 147. 
32. V . Thompson and R . Adloff, 1968, p. 10. 
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that the Somali did not constitute a single autonomous political unit. 
Instead they were divided into a number of large and often mutually 
hostile clans, themselves 'further split into a wide array of subsidiary 
kingship groups', each usually composed of a few thousand m e n only.33 
These local risings are too m a n y and too diverse to be enumerated here. 
But what they stood for could be seen from studying some of them. 
T h e directive of the colonial administrators to all Somali chiefs and 
elders to surrender firearms and ammunition was rejected outright by 
Hädji Hasan of the Galjal Haya. H e defiantly replied to the regional 
commissioner: 
I do not accept your order. W e will not come to you at any cost because 
you have broken our pact T h e government has its law and w e have 
ours. W e accept no order other than our own. O u r law is that of G o d 
and the Prophet If you come into our land to make war w e will 
fight you in every way G o d has said: T h e few can defeat the 
m a n y . T h e world is near its end; only 58 years remain W e do 
not want to stay in this world, it is better to die following Muslim 
law. All Moslems are one.34 
T h o u g h Hadji Hasan was captured, the spirit of resistance could not 
be killed. For the Bantu Eile people waged another rising near Bur Acuba. 
Meanwhile, imperialism was pushing for a new frontier. T h e resistance 
to the Italian attempt to incorporate in their colony the two provinces of 
Obbia and Majerteyn (see Fig. 4.1), was another example of the deter-
mination of the Somali people to maintain the traditional and free social 
fabric of their society. Yüsuf 'AIT Kenadid, Sultan of Obbia, approached 
his counterpart in the Sultanate of Majerteyn for a united front against 
the invaders. But local differences prevented this. 
Though Obbia was annexed in 1925 and the Italians pensioned Yüsuf 
off to Mogadishu,35 a daring rising occurred at El Bur. It was led by ' U m a r 
Samatar, a Majerteyn clansman appointed by the Italians as chief of the 
local population. Samatar seized El Bur's fort and entrenched his forces 
in its central building. T h e Italian forces that besieged him were in turn 
besieged by the surrounding population led by Herzi Gushan, Sultan 'All 
Yüsuf 's district military commander. O n 15 November the colonial forces 
retreated to B u d B u d , leaving behind thirty-eight dead among w h o m 
was the Italian Resident himself. O n 30 November the Italians suffered 
another defeat in an ambush at Bot.36 Samatar and some of his followers 
crossed the border to Ethiopia where they campaigned against Italian 
infiltration in the Ogaden and attacked border posts. 
33. I. M . Lewis, 1963, p . 147. 
34. Quoted by R . L . Hess, 1966, p. 151. 
35. G . O . 'Tsa, 1965, p. 172. 
36. R . L . Hess, 1966, p . 154. 
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T h e Italians faced an even m o r e serious resistance in the Midjurtayn 
Sultanate. Its reputable Sultan, ' U t h m ä n M a h m u d , refused the inferior 
status assigned by the colonialists to himself and his people. In spite of 
colonial repression, his m o v e m e n t continued to thrive, and he held out 
against the invaders for almost two years. H e was , however, arrested 
towards the end of 1927 to be treated in the s a m e m a n n e r as his kinsman 
Yüsuf . 3 7 But the struggle continued under the leadership of his son and 
heir apparent, Herzi Bogor. 
Supported by the traditional chiefs w h o urged an outright war , Herzi 
attacked the Italian bases at R a s H a f u n , and early in D e c e m b e r 1925 drove 
an Italian garrison out of Hordio . A second large attack six weeks later 
threatened Italian installations at C a p e Guardafui. Herzi m a d e another 
daring assault on Eil at the m o u t h of the N o g a l . 3 8 Again the colonialists 
reacted in their predictable m a n n e r : making arrests and deporting leaders. 
A s for Herzi he went to Ethiopia, but returned after several years to 
M o g a d i s h u where he died of smallpox. 
Meanwhi le the ever-present m e m o r y of Sayyid M u h a m m a d ' s revolt 
entrenched the spirit of resistance in the hearts of m a n y Somalis in the 
Protectorate. T h e y remained active and alert to harass the colonial regime 
whenever they felt it to be weak . S o m e of the Sayyid M u h a m m a d ' s 
supporters, like Farah ' U m a r and Hâdjdj Bashïr Yüsuf, continued the 
struggle.39 Moreover , local risings, particularly in the west and along the 
eastern borders, were often w a g e d against the British. T h e innovation of 
western education in the Protectorate was interpreted by religious leaders 
as an instrument for Christian missionary activities and consequently a 
threat to Islam. T h e attempts to foster such education in 1920 and 1935 
aroused fierce resentment that culminated in two riots: at B u r a o in 1922 
and Baro in 1936. O n the latter occasion the newly-appointed British 
director of education was greeted with a shower of stones.40 
Equally significant were the local risings against French colonialism. 
Both the Afar, and the Isa Somalis, the two m a i n ethnic groups in French 
Somaliland, displayed a hostile attitude towards colonial administration. 
T h e Afar Sultanates of Tadjüra and G o b a a d were particularly active in 
this respect. T h e French had in fact summarily deported the Sultan of 
G o b a a d to Madagascar in 1931 . 4 1 
T h e Sultan of A w s a , w h o had for long opposed French penetration in 
the area, had his o w n grievances during the inter-war period. French 
control of the region between the coast and the Ethiopian frontier deprived 
h i m of the revenues he had formerly derived from the local people and 
the caravan trade. H e n c e Sultan Y a y ü a m b u s h e d and arrested L i p p m a n n , 
37. I. M . Lewis, 1965, p. 99. 
38. R . L . Hess, 1966, p. 155. 
39. G . O . 'Tsa, 1965, p. 130. 
40. I. M . Lewis, 1965, pp. 103-4. 
41. V . Thompson and R . Adloff, 1968, p. 11. 
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the newly appointed French governor at Dikhil. His successor, Albert 
Bernard, and sixteen of his Somali troops were murdered at Morheito in 
1935. T h e activism of the Sultan of A w s a further increased after the Italian 
conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 and R o m e ' s backing of A w s a ' s territorial 
claims at the expense of France. 4 2 
T h e arbitrary colonial partition of Somali frontiers was done without 
consulting the clansmen concerned and with little or no account of clan 
distribution or grazing needs. T h e Gadabursi and Isa clans, for example, 
were divided between Britain and Ethiopia, and, in the case of the Isa, 
France also. Boundaries sometimes cut across m a n y ethnic groups, and 
in several cases lands belonging to one group were allocated to n e w owners 
with no traditional claims to them. T h e outcome was agitation to get back 
lost lands or to be allowed to rejoin kinsmen in a different location. T h e 
Somali people had often resisted this colonial demarcation of the frontiers 
by force. T h e joint Anglo-Ethiopian commission that was sent in 1932 to 
fix the Protectorate's boundary, for example, encountered violent opposi-
tion from the clansmen in the area, and its officer in charge w a s killed.43 
These local risings against colonial rule in Somaliland were limited in 
scope and nature. Since they were undertaken within the traditional frame-
w o r k of the Somali segmentary system, widespread co-operation was 
extremely difficult. T h e inherent rivalry between different clans, and their 
internal fights for water and grazing grounds were crippling disadvantages 
to Somali resistance.44 Colonial administrators took advantage of this 
situation to play off one ethnic group against another, and to find for 
themselves agents and allies. T h e tough policy that they used against these 
risings was a further reason for their limitation. Nevertheless they provided 
an element of continuity with the former era and laid the foundation for 
further popular resistance to colonialism in Somaliland. 
Elitist protest m o v e m e n t s 
W o r k i n g in opposition to the government-appointed chiefs, w h o were 
becoming increasingly unpopular, the educated elite and the politically 
conscious Somali inside and outside the peninsula organized their o w n 
'young' associations. T h r o u g h these organizations the m o d e r n Somali 
nationalists - government officials, merchants, seamen and so on -
conducted their political campaign. 
Hâdjdjï Farah ' U m a r , a former colonial official and a pioneer m o d e r n 
politician, b e c a m e an active nationalist in 1920 in the Protectorate. H e 
protested against the excesses of colonial administration, and campaigned 
for the improvement of economic facilities and the expansion of education. 
Significantly, he did not limit his activities to matters concerning British 
42. ibid. 
43. I. M . Lewis, 1965, pp. 106-7. 
44. E . R . Turton, 1972, p. 124. 
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Somaliland alone but also took a wide interest in Somali affairs in general. 
T h e British exiled h i m to A d e n , but, with the co-operation of the Somali 
c o m m u n i t y there, he founded the Somali Islamic Association. T h o u g h 
not a political organization as such, this association promoted Somali 
interests. Hâdjdjî Farah brought Somali national aspirations to the notice 
of the British public through articles in A d e n newspapers, and petitions 
and letters addressed to the British government, press and m e m b e r s of 
parliament. 
Significant a m o n g these 'young' activities were the clandestine meetings 
organized by junior colonial officials and the political clubs established by 
merchants in the m a i n towns of the Protectorate in the mid-iojos. These , 
however, did not attempt a large-scale organization, but were limited to 
select m e m b e r s h i p . 4 5 Nevertheless, they played a role in articulating 
people's grievances, and in promoting political consciousness in towns and 
urban centres. In French Somaliland, too, s o m e interest in politics was 
displayed by the S e a m e n ' s U n i o n established in DJibuti in 1931. This 
organization's range of interest was not limited strictly to sailors' affairs, 
but included national matters such as 'the Somali representation in govern-
m e n t and their share in the territory's e c o n o m y ' . 4 6 
F r o m these tentative beginnings the Somali National League ( S N L ) , 
the most important 'young' association in the inter-war years, emerged in 
1935. F r o m its inception the S N L had been a 'Pan-Somali organization 
striving to break d o w n all traditional resistance to a national patriotism'.47 
T h e S N L continued to exist under various titles, and in 1951 it emerged 
as a fully-fledged political party in the British Protectorate.48 
These elitist associations have, however, played a limited role in mass 
mobilization against colonialism. W e should r e m e m b e r that the intelligent-
sia, the only people capable of organizing and sustaining a m o d e r n political 
m o v e m e n t , were very limited in n u m b e r since Western education during 
the inter-war period was virtually ignored in all parts of Somaliland. 
Furthermore, colonial authorities took prompt steps to penalize the activists 
a m o n g the educated elite, for instance dismissal from government service 
and posting to remote areas. Nevertheless the limited awareness founded 
by these associations developed into a stronger political consciousness in 
the years after the Second W o r l d W a r . 
In this connection one has to mention the invention in about 1920 of 
an indigenous alphabet for the Somali language, the 'Osmania Alphabet', 
so n a m e d after its inventor ' U t h m ä n Y ü s u f Kenadid. Both the conservative 
religious leaders, w h o favoured Arabic as a m e d i u m for writing Somali, 
45. S. Touval, 1963, p. 65. 
46. ibid., p. 70. 
47. I. M . Lewis, 1961, p. 286. 
48. I. M . Lewis, 1963, pp. 148-9. For the programme of this party which stressed 
Somali nationhood, see ibid., p. 149. 
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and the Italian colonialists opposed its use.49 Nevertheless, it gained 
restricted currency and was later heralded by the nationalists 'as a symbol 
of Somali achievement'.50 
Conclusion 
W e have narrated the basic facts about political change in North-East 
Africa in the years between 1919 and 1935. But it is important to place 
those basic events within the wider dialectical contexts w e mentioned 
earlier. 
In parts of North-East Africa, there was an interplay between religion 
and nationalism. In Egypt during these inter-war years, the trend was 
discernibly in the direction of secular nationalism, but in Somalia and 
northern Sudan the trend was less clear since religion was more politicized 
there. In southern Sudan, nationalism was still at the level of basic localized 
protest but conditioned sometimes by indigenous religious symbols. 
W e should also note that the inter-war years witnessed severe economic 
problems in this region even before the Great Depression began in the 
industrialized world. T h e tensions generated by regional and global 
economic dislocations helped to m a k e the political climate in North-East 
Africa, especially in Egypt, more responsive to the trumpet call of 
patriotism. O n e of the few benefits of economic hardship can sometimes 
be the activation of a sense of patriotic duty and commitment. Egypt's 
economic suffering and exploitation helped to arouse nationalist sentiment. 
Thirdly, these inter-war years witnessed both n e w imperial expansion 
and new anti-colonial militancy. As w e indicated, European imperialism 
was pushing for its last territorial frontier, while African nationalism 
entered a n e w phase of articulation. Egypt had become a protectorate from 
1914, and even after formal 'independence' in 1922, it remained an u n -
willing British vassal. O n the other hand, the astonishing (if short-lived) 
unity Egypt achieved in 1919 did extract significant concessions from 
imperial Britain. 
W h a t should not be tactfully overlooked in this period was Egypt's o w n 
role in relation to the Sudan. Egyptian nationalism under Sa'd ZaghlOl 
and subsequent W a f d leaders included a romanticized notion of Egyptian 
sovereignty over the Sudan, which was thought of as going back a 
millennium. 
A n d yet even Egypt's expansionist role had liberating functions. Pro-
Egyptian sentiment in the Sudan was often simultaneously anti-British. 
It also provided the basis of solidarity a m o n g Egyptian and Sudanese 
nationalists - helping them to create their o w n myth of 'the Unity of the 
Nile Valley' in order to combat Lord Salisbury's earlier imperial myth of 
the conquest of the Nile. 
49. R . al-Barâwï, 1973, p. 77. 
50. I. M . Lewis, 1965, p. 115. 
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In Somalia and the Sudan the nationalist struggle was not yet strong 
enough to achieve substantial results. But the Egyptian struggle had a 
demonstrable impact on its neighbours. T h e seeds of liberation were indeed 
being sown in the Nile Valley and the H o r n of Africa in these inter-war 
years. 
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After the First World W a r : an upsurge of nationalism 
and colonialist reaction 
T h e political historian on the look-out for signs of what is somewhat 
inaccurately called 'nationalism'1 at first finds explicit evidence of it only 
in Tunisa. In Algeria he notes a growing malaise, but is puzzled by its 
ambiguity. In Morocco the birth of a nationalist party dated only from 
some ten years after the end of the First World W a r , and even then had a 
formidable traditional past to contend with. In Libya, the people were still 
preoccupied with the problem of maintaining their sovereignty and 
independence in the face of the aggressive imperialism of Italy, and 
as it was seen in Chapter 5, this struggle continued until the 1930s. Libya is 
therefore not dealt with in this chapter. 
O p e n w a r and passive resistance 
T h e 'dissidence' or stba of the Berbers, then practically general in Morocco, 
was clearly a continuation of a pre-colonial phenomenon. But it was no 
longer the same as it had been under Muläy Hasan,2 when it could easily 
accommodate itself to the official fiction which saw it as a fairly harmless 
game akin to refusal to pay taxes. T h e penetration of the French into the 
Middle Atlas region, at the time of which w e are speaking, encountered 
more difficulty than that of the sultans,3 despite the fact that it was still 
effected in the n a m e of the 'legal government' or Makhzen. But the 
Makhzen was from n o w onwards that of the Christians - the Makhzen 
al-Nasära — and aroused more dangerous reactions than the old ethnic 
unrest. T h e defence of the nation took the form of xenophobia and holy 
war, and resistance spread over all the High and Middle Atlas. Towards 
1. At this point it would be more appropriate to speak of 'patriotism'; cf. M . Lacheraf, 
1963, p. 69. A n d as Anouar Abdel Malek has suggested, 'nationalitaire' ('nationalitarian' 
- pro-nationality) would be more correct in this context than 'nationaliste' (pro-nation). 
2. Cf. AI-Nâsirï, 1907, pp. 277 ff (trans. Eugène Fumey) . 
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the south and south-west, it encountered a strong continental substratum.4 
North of the Taza corridor, the greater part of the coastal region ceded 
to Spain remained unsubdued. Far to the east, on the other side of the 
Algerian Sahara,5 independent organizations functioned in Tripolitania, 
and the SanGsT were able to consolidate their position in the oases.6 T o 
consider such a widespread phenomenon as mere unruly conservatism is 
certainly to underrate it. In m y opinion the main impetus behind it was 
a tradition of communa l liberty. 
Parallel to this war-like continuity, there prevailed over the rest of the 
Maghrib the exact opposite, in the form of growing stability and the 
establishment of civilian government. It is very likely that the behaviour 
of m a n y people concealed different kinds of opposition. This took various 
forms, including loyalist protest and passive resistance. But, as one u n -
usually perspicacious governor wrote, 'one cannot speak of passiveness 
a m o n g the natives'.7 H e had observed that 'certain grievances, everywhere 
the same, c o m m a n d e d such unanimity that on these particular subjects a 
public opinion could be said to exist'. A s soon as the occasion presented 
itself, this public opinion took the form of opposition. Its swift trans-
formation into political action alarmed the rulers during the brief electoral 
career of the Emir Khâlid.8 A former captain in the French army, grandson 
of the great ' A b d al-Kädir, Khâlid enjoyed a short period of popularity. In 
the n a m e of his 'Muslim personality' he extolled the honour of Algeria 
and emphasized her claims to France's gratitude for all the soldiers she 
had supplied. Khälid's party, which defeated the moderates in the Algiers 
town council election, seemed to the authorities so dangerous that they 
annulled the election. T h e emir then w o n a second and a third election, 
but was finally obliged to leave Algeria (1923). In metropolitan France, 
he remained active for a while, though his objectives might no longer have 
been restricted to France and the Maghrib.9 
T h e constitutional quarrel in Tunisia 
During the second part of the nineteenth century, Tunisia had experienced 
a reformist upsurge which was in some respects in advance of similar 
4. T h e areas later known as the Algero-Moroccan Marches, the north of present-day 
Mauritania and the western part of the Sahara, known as the Rio de Oro, were still the 
scene of communal raids or rezzous, while at the same time attempts at organization were 
being made by the successors of the great religious reformer, M I ' al-'Aynayn. 
5. Where, until his accidental death, General Laperrine worked energetically to rally 
the Tawârik, who during the First World W a r had been roused by Sanüsl propaganda 
and various independent movements. 
6. T h e Italians did not succeed in reducing the 'Misurata Republic' until 1923, when 
they had to resume the fight in Cyrenaica against the Sanûsî and their supporters. 
7. M . Violette, 1931, p. 396. 
8. M . Kaddache, 1970, pp. 65 ff. 
9. A . K . Sa'dallah, 1969, pp. 420 ff. 
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movements in Egypt and Turkey. ' ° T h e failure of these attempts had not 
lessened their appeal for the enlightened bourgeoisie, which was inclined 
to look to the East rather than to the West for its models. Ottoman nostalgia 
was n o w replaced by hope in the principles enunciated by W o o d r o w 
Wilson, and nationalism, as in the case of the Egyptian W a f d Party, 
changed its tune. Shaykh ' A b d al-'Azïz al-Tha'âlibï (Taalbi) and his friends 
decided to plead their cause before public opinion in metropolitan France, 
especially the socialist sector. Their pamphlet, La Tunisie martyre (The 
Martyrdom of Tunisia) (1920), presented a vigorous analysis of colonial 
deterioration. B y founding the 'constitutionalist' or Destürian party (Feb-
ruary 1920) they intended to restore Tunisia to her independent existence. 
Their argument was not without logic. T h e Protectorate had interrupted 
the renewal of an Arabo-Mediterranean nation. But strangely enough, as 
against the opinion of eminent French jurists,11 the only response was 
the invocation of the power of the Bey three-quarters of a century after 
it had itself begun to fix its o w n constitutional limits. True, there had 
been indigenous representation on the Consultative Conference in Tunis 
since 1907. It was made up of nominated members , and like the French 
section had only fiscal powers. At the end of 1920, reform was requested 
by the majority of the French and by almost half the indigenous members; 
elective representation and an extension of powers were demanded. But 
the DestGr, going back on its original radical proposals (June 1920), 
published a reformist manifesto which 'played into the Protectorate's 
hands' (December 1921). Bey Nâsir's quasi-ultimatum of 3 April 1922 
was countered by intimidation. ' 2 But in the following year, various beylical 
decrees and Resident-General's orders (June 1922)I3 set up caïdal, regional 
and central representation by election at various levels.14 A Ministry of 
Justice, entrusted to the son of the reformer Khayruddïn, had already been 
created. These were scanty results for a campaign which had managed 
to win over both local sovereigns and the French Chamber. Shaykh al-
Tha'âlibïhad served several months in prison. His release did not contribute 
to the unity of his party: it broke up into two groups, not equally active. 
In a colonial context, as Maître Guellati's experience showed, moderation 
is always suspect. But the radicalism of Shaykh al-Tha'âlibï and Maître 
Al-Säfi (Essafi), for lack of even minor successes, was in danger of becoming 
perilously isolated, moribund and divorced from the course of events. 
' N o w that the first excitement was over, the Destour tended to bury itself 
10. See J. Karoui, 1973. 
11. C ' A . Julien, 1972, p. 67; R . Le Tourneau, 1962, pp. 65 ff. These two books provide 
a sustained account of the events which the present chapter tries to interpret, and references 
to them could be multiplied. 
12. C A . Julien, 1972, p. 69. 
13. O n the context of these measures see R . Balek, 1922, pp. 240 ff. 
14. The Italians, by setting up an 'Arab Parliament' in Cyrenaica (30 April 1921), had 
taken an initiative intended to go beyond what was demanded, but which failed to have 
the hoped-for pacifying effect. 
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in the subconscious, and to take on the purely theoretical colour of the 
djihàd that slumbers there . . . " s 
Popular communities 
T h e rural Maghrib consisted for the most part of an aggregate of traditional 
communities. T h e administration of Morocco openly depended on them, 
and institutionalized the chieftaincies. But beneath this official network, 
less docile traditional institutions with an even more turbulent potential 
could be discerned. French policy had long exploited particularism and 
local loyalties. T h e Senatus Consultum of 1863 had proposed the splitting 
up of the Algerian people into duwarï, or territorial divisions. T h e 
application of the law of 1884 had even given these divisions a communal 
significance similar to that existing in France.16 In 1919, both the energy 
of the Berber resistance on the one hand, and, on the other, a development 
of public opinion that was already evident everywhere else, in their different 
ways emerged from popular democracy: this upthrust was archaic and 
defensive in the case of the Berbers, and frustrated and apparently repressed 
in the case of the rest, but for both the essential organ of expression was 
the djemá'a.17 For the French to take this rising social force into account 
and make it the principle and objective of an ultimate rapprochement 
was by no means absurd, and might in the long run have led to the 
emancipation of rural Algeria and its penetration by the metropolitan 
political system. 
This was no doubt the ultimate aim of the law of 4 February 1919, 
k n o w n as the Jonnart L a w , and of the two decrees putting it into effect. 
It gave Algerians w h o possessed certain qualifications (such as having 
served in the army, being able to read and write French, owning some 
land in the rural areas, etc.) the right to take part in electing the communal 
assembly of the duwâr-commune, and some municipal offices, including 
that of the mayor. ' 8 Nearly half a million Muslims made up this primary 
electorate; a m o n g them were about a hundred thousand with the right to 
vote for departmental and central assemblies. But this did not end 
inequality. In the town councils, for example, the Muslims' representatives 
found themselves limited to a minority of a third of the membership. 
Although this prevented the Algerian masses from carrying the day,19 the 
enlarging of the electoral college at the lowest level, and the fact that 
Algerian representatives were n o w able to take part in the choice of a 
15. R . Balek, 1922, p. 286. 
16. J. Berque, 1970, pp. 137 ff. 
17. The heads of families of a community, and the 'collective' which ran it. 
18. C . R . Ageron, 1966. 
19. Even if, through naturalization, they managed to elect the mayor. This happened 
at Mekla, in Kabylia, where, flying in the face of all good faith, the administrative tribunal 
annulled the election. 
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mayor, struck the conservatives as subversive, though the timidity of these 
measures fell far below what had been asked for.20 
T h e first responses of the workers 
T h e heavy concentration of wage labourers in Tunisia, such as that in the 
Metlawï mines, for example, showed for a long time little sign of protest. 
As in Algeria, industrialization was not advanced enough, and the social 
context was too authoritarian, for the energy of the proletarian masses to 
manifest itself to begin with other than through a small avant-garde group 
educated in the ways of European trade unionism. 
But in tunisia, the early action of M u h a m m a d 'All2 ' and the analysis 
offered by Tahär al-Haddäd22 had some effect on class organization. T h e 
adventurous life of the former had brought him into contact with G e r m a n 
socialism and made him a friend of Enver Pasha, probably the m a n with 
the clearest sense at that time of the ways in which the leading ideas of 
the West might combine with the nationalist upsurge of the Islamic peoples. 
Al-Haddäd supplemented the foreign experience of M u h a m m a d 'All with 
an examination of the domestic problem. H e discussed both the subject of 
the workers and that of w o m e n , showing a clear grasp of the nature of 
each question. T h e dockers, first of Tunis and then of Bizerta, the cement-
workers of H a m m a m Lïf, and others gave a practical response to Haddäd's 
dual drive. 
At Bizerta, on 12 October 1924, nine regional unions became affiliated: 
they had the support of the French Communist Party (PCF), but were 
strongly criticized by the French section of the Workers' International 
(the S F I O ) , which was worried by the n e w group's nationalist affinities. 
T h e Destür dissociated itself from what it considered to be a compromising 
collusion. But it joined, on a reformist basis, a coalition which in February 
1925 brought together, in addition to the Destür, the indigenous section 
of the Grand Conseil, the socialist party, and the French General 
Confederation of Labour ( C G T ) . T h e complexity of these alliances and 
controversies, with their quarrels and reconciliations and changes of 
position, tend to obscure the spontaneity equally characteristic of such 
movements. At the same time, sectarian and ideological rivalries fore-
shadowed a conflict of options. French socialism, at the Tours Conference, 
had split over both party policy and the unions. T h e semi-colonial 
proletariat seeking its o w n aims was thus exposed to a variety of conflicting 
influences. A number of different options took shape, which were to have 
different outcomes - for example, those of the Algerians, ' A m a r Uzagän 
and Ben 'AlïBûkurt, and that of the Tunisian Mokhtär 'Ayärl. W h a t place, 
20. But C . A . Julien, 1972, p. 377, is probably right in thinking that the effect of this 
legislation on Algerian public opinion was probably not negligible. 
21. P. M a m e t , 1964; A . B . Hermasi, 1966. 
22. T . al-Haddäd, 1927. 
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for example, would forthcoming trends of events accord to national identity, 
up till then defined in terms of Islam? Would national identity be swallowed 
up in the general aspirations of the proletariat? 
T h e North African scene was not yet ready to provide clear-cut 
answers.23 It was rather in Paris, among the emigres from the Maghrib, 
that the Etoile nord-africaine was founded in 1924. A m o n g its founders 
was an active m e m b e r of the French Communist Party (PCF) , ' A b d al-Kädir 
Hâdj 'AIL T h e n e w organization was set up in a revolutionary and anti-
colonialist spirit rather than with any preoccupation with the problems of 
the working class as such. At first it enjoyed the patronage of the Emir 
Khllid. 
T h e prevailing system and mounting opposition 
T h e 1920s saw expanding communications in the Maghrib. T o w n s began 
to grow because of the influx of newcomers from the country. A n e w 
generation came of age, which had not known what life was like before 
the war. 2 4 Everything called out for change. T h e authority of colonialism 
and the authority of tradition, in varying combinations, called each other 
into question. These developments worried the colonial rulers, w h o tried 
to neutralize them by cunning or coercion. Yet more often, however, it 
was inertia that governed colonial practice, though one section of opinion 
in metropolitan France denounced abuse and inefficiency, and saw them 
as a source of danger. 
It was true that the acceleration of events observable immediately after 
the First World W a r had slackened off both in Algeria and in Tunisia. 
T h e simultaneous departure in 1923 of al-Tha'âlibï and Khälid, the two 
principal leaders, seemed to have weakened the opposition. But in Morocco 
the authorities had to face other kinds of difficulty which were considered 
more pressing. 
A n anticipation of future events: the Rïf Republic 
T o describe as a 'revolt' the national struggle which the Rïf leader 
M u h a m m a d ben ' A b d al-Khattâbï ('Abdel Karîm) brought to a resounding 
climax in 1925-6, and to treat it as a mere episode, is to underrate the 
23. Repression was always on the alert. In Tunisia, for example, the experiment of the 
Confederation Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens ( C G T T ) seems to have failed because 
of the arrest of its organizers and the banishment of their leader, M u h a m m a d 'All. It was 
not until some years later (in 1937) that Tunisian trade unionism, recognized as legal on 
16 September 1932, resumed independent activity in the context of the events of the 
Popular Front. But after the second C G T T with Belkâsim al-Kanâwî, it succumbed for 
the second time to political repression (1938). 
24. For Tunisia see F . b. 'Ashür, 1956. For Algeria, T . al-Madanï, 1963, pp. 92 ff., 
353 ff. See also, A . Berque, 1947, pp. 123 ff. 
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significance of facts which w e n o w recognize as the forerunners of m u c h 
later developments.25 
T h e Rïf had never given up the struggle. 'Abdel Karîm's military talent 
had inflicted on Spain (at Anwal , July 1921) one of the most famous 
disasters of the colonial wars.2 6 T h e Spaniards suffered an equally 
murderous defeat in November 1924, w h e n they had to evacuate 
Shafshâwïn in order to consolidate their front. 
'Abdel Karïm, the son of a kadi (judge) of the Spanish Protectorate, and 
thus born and brought up in a situation of compromise, had studied for 
a time at the religious university of Karâwiyyïn at Fez, where he probably 
first came into contact with Islamic modernism.2 7 It was no less as a 
Muslim reformer than as a political leader that he established a position 
for himself a m o n g his contemporaries. As well as possessing military skill, 
he had an open-mindedness and political dexterity which enabled him to 
play a more influential part internationally than the Libyans w h o m a y to 
a certain extent be regarded as his counterparts - Sulajman al-Bârûnï, 
R a m d â n Shatïwï, and especially ' U m a r al-Mukhtlr.28 T h e metamorphosis 
he brought about in his o w n clan, the Benï Warighîl, and in the 
neighbouring communities, was a lasting one. H e led these groups, ridden 
by clan vendettas, back to Islamic law, banning collective oaths and 
membership of brotherhoods, and forbidding married w o m e n to dance. 
T h e ichbrawn — little watchtowers in every village which from time 
immemorial had been the symbol of the aggressiveness of relations between 
neighbouring communities — were destroyed.29 Even before the victory 
at Anwäl, a meeting at a l -Käma between Benï Warighîl, T e m s a m â n , Benï 
Tûzïn and Rukkûya produced a 'crystallization of the Rïfian state 
structure'.30 T h e 'Rïfian Republican Nation', proclaimed according to 
some on 18 January 1923 and according to others on 1 February, was 
thus an attempt to reform the traditional state without destroying its 
positive aspects, such as certain practices facilitating group consultation 
and co-operation. 
This reforming impulse should be related to other attempts of a similar 
kind which were then being m a d e all over the Islamic-Mediterranean area: 
25. For all w e know, all the possibilities have not yet been realized although on the 
military plane 'Abdel Karîm's activity undoubtedly foreshadowed what happened after 1954. 
26. This disaster was rightly described as 'the battle of O m d u r m a n in reverse', the 
reference being to the battle in 1898 in which Kitchener crushed the Mahdist state. See 
A . Youssoufi, n.d., p. 113. 
27. It is to be noted, however, that he later violently attacked Shaykh Bûsha Tb-al-
DukkalT, w h o was chiefly responsible for introducing modernism into Morocco. 
28. A . al-Misurâtï, 1964, gives a lively account of the events of this period from the 
point of view of a Libyan patriot. 
29. Unpublished communication by D . Hart, at the Conference on the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the Rïf Republic in Paris in 1973. 
30. A . Youssoufi, n.d., and in a communication to the Conference mentioned in note 29. 
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in Tripolitania; the Egyptian Delta; Mesopotamia, at Rakka on the 
Euphrates, and so on. 3 1 Specialist studies will be needed to determine 
whether or not these were symptoms of nationalism. F r o m the point of 
view of the colonial powers, their simultaneous occurrence was all the 
more dangerous in view of the fact that cAbdel Karîm had established 
relations with the P C F , which actually called a strike in his support.32 
During this strike which occurred on 12 October 1925, m a n y French 
workers demonstrated against the colonial war in Morocco. There was 
also a strong campaign of the masses at the national level against 
the war, organized by the P C F , the Young Communists, the C G T U 
(the C G T Unifié), A R A C (Association Républicaine des Anciens C o m -
battants), etc. F r o m the spring of 1926 onwards, the Third Republic 
resorted to disproportionate force to bring 'Abdel Karïm to heel.33 But 
the rest of Morocco did not react.34 Nevertheless, the military solution, 
which enabled Spain to establish itself effectively in its o w n zone, did not 
wipe out the significance of the 'Abdel Karîm experiment. 
Contemporary accounts of the situation 
In 1901 Algeria had been granted a regime known as the Délégations 
financières, a kind of internal political autonomy that was dominated almost 
until the end of colonial rule by the representatives of the white settlers. 
W h e n this little agrarian parliament refused in 1927 to sanction the 
governor-general's wretched estimates for social welfare and school meals, 
it was to all intents and purposes signing its o w n death warrant. Maurice 
Violette pointed this out in a book prophetically entitled L'Algérie vivra-
t-elle? (Will Algeria survive?); the solution he proposed was of course 
extremely orthodox, not to say Jacobin.35 But the book represents an 
appreciable step forward, in that it suggests extending the representational 
reform of 1919.36 Later, Violette went further to advocate that a minority 
of educated Algerians should be given the right to elect deputies to the 
French Parliament, without losing their other voting rights, based on their 
'personal status'. 
This status, which the French settlers used to emphasize their o w n 
different position, provided successive French governments with a useful 
excuse for not granting full French citizenship to Algerians. Reference to 
this status was probably, on both sides, no more than a pretext - a pretext 
31. J. Berque, communication to Conference mentioned in note 29. 
32. R . Gallisot, communication to Conference mentioned in note 29. 
33. 'Abdel Karïm surrendered to the French authorities on 26 M a y 1926. 
34. Despite a few individual gestures, people's hopes and sympathies remained stifled. 
A few youths in Fez forged a tract supposed to be by the Rïf leader thanking the notables 
of the country for their solidarity. 
35. M . Violette took care to proclaim himself opposed to the extreme Left. 
36. M . Violette, 1931, pp. 474 ff. 
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for one side to refuse, and a pretext for the other side to reject. But the 
proclaimed desire of most Algerians, w h o took the notion of assimilation 
literally, to become part of the French commonwealth, is striking. It cannot 
be dismissed out of hand as a deceit, but it should be interpreted at 
different levels, of which the most fundamental was probably the desire 
for emancipation. This semantic complexity is evident in the articles 
published by Ferhät 'Abbas between 1922 and 1927, which he brought 
out in 1931 under the title Le Jeune Algérien (The Y o u n g Algerian).37 
These articles have certainly dated. But w e must not forget that his 
arguments, his compassion for suffering, and the generosity of his hope, 
though they m a y not have constituted a political ultimatum, nevertheless 
provided a moral and conceptual framework for a possible political goal. 
Colonization was denounced as 'power without thought, brain without 
soul'. Islam's right to respect emerged as self-evident, though this had 
long been obscured. T h e preface to the articles, written long afterwards 
in 1930, m a d e a careful distinction between the two aspects of the problem: 
the French and the Algerian. For the French, 'colonization is simply a 
military and economic venture defended thereafter by the appropriate 
administrative regime'. For the Algerians, by contrast, it is: 
a veritable revolution, overthrowing a whole ancient world of beliefs 
and ideas and an immemorial way of life. It confronts a whole people 
with sudden change. A n entire nation, without any preparation, finds 
itself forced to adapt or perish. This situation is bound to lead to 
a moral and physical disequilibrium, the barrenness of which is not 
far from total disintegration.38 
O n e would look in vain in the scientific writings of the period - in the 
works of L . Milliot, Augustin Bernard, R . Maunier, or even E . F . Gautier 
- for such a good definition of social change. Even the impressive historical 
synthesis of C . A . Julien, which was published at the time and played a 
recognized role in arousing North African awareness, could not improve 
on this inside view. 
This view also gave rise to the 'Book of Algeria', the Kitäb al-Djazä'ir 
(1931), by Tawfik al-Madanï. Its first page, illustrated by the miniaturist 
Räsim, bears the triple device of the 'Ulama' , and the book as a whole, 
while describing the troubles of the Algerians and claiming their right 
to be an Arab nation, avoids polemics and aims at objectivity. It is still an 
indispensable contemporary document. T h e chapter on Algerian music39 
brings out essential values, and this part of the book also has pertinent 
remarks about the obstacles in the way of the Arabic press40 and the signs 
37. Ferhät 'Abbäs took up the same themes retrospectively; see F . Abbäs, 1962, pp. 
113 ff. 
38. F. Abbäs, 1931, p. 9. 
39. T . al-Madanï, 1963, pp. 339 fl". 
40. ibid., pp. 343 ff. 
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of a literary renaissance.41 T h e list of writers and poets provides a useful 
inventory for further studies, though it should be noted that it omits the 
'Young Algerians', w h o were anxious to be regarded as French; and a m o n g 
these was Ferhät 'Abbas. 
Islamic reformism 
As has been said, the book has the device of the 'Ulama' on the flyleaf. 
Nowadays, emphasis is rightly put on the national aims of this association 
as well as on its religious objectives. T h e programme of Shaykh ' A b d 
al-Hamïd ben Bâdïs,42 though it is aimed at being free of circumstantial 
implications, was perhaps really more political than the other projects then 
in the forefront, compromised as these were by administrative manoeuvres 
at the bottom and by political intrigue at the top. T h e most spectacular 
attempts were far from being the most effective: for example, D r BendjellüPs 
venture at Constantine, or the egalitarian claims of the 'Elus'.43 T h e 
Shaykh, while taking care not to defy French sovereignty, insisted on an 
'intellectual and moral reform', and in so doing raised the question of 
identity, touched on the impulses of the majority, and echoed similar 
movements in the Middle East. H e thus appealed to a model which 
compared well with that of western democracy. Above all he addressed 
himself to clearly existing signs of social dispersion and moral deterioration. 
Claiming Algeria as his homeland or watan (but not openly as a 'state' or 
dawla), Islam as his religion, and Arabic as his language, he combined 
tactical subtlety with foreknowledge of the role that culture could play in 
decolonization. 
Another, less well-known aspect is the geographical one. As the nasabs 
(lines of descent) show, the leadership of the movement included several 
provincial names: not only those of the Constantine aristocracy, like Ben 
Bâdïs, but also Tébessa, Mïla and Sïdï ' O k b a . 4 4 Not content with having 
established the 'Circle for Progress' over the central plateau, especially 
Algiers and other urban areas, the movement also aimed at covering 'the 
unknown country'. Shaykh Bashïr al-Ibrâhïmï stirred Tlemcen to its 
depths, and attempts of this kind grew more and more numerous, in the 
form of sermons, and the activities of friendly societies and mutual benefit 
associations. 
T h e resulting proliferation of centres of the movement is often recorded 
41. ibid., pp. 353 ff. 
42. A . al-M. Murtäd, 1971, pp. 54 ff., 115 ff., 179 ff. See also A . Merad, 1967. 
43. A term used at the time for the members of a Federation formed on 11 September 
1927 by various Muslim notables elected to the different Algerian assemblies. Mostefa 
Lacheraf distinguished carefully between the actions of these politicians and those of the 
'Ulamâ', though he is critical of the latter. See M . Lacheraf, 1965, pp. 188 ff. 
44. Shaykhs al-Arabï al-Tebessï, Mubarak al-Mïlï and Tayyib al-'Okbï (a celebrated 
orator), were among the most famous members of the Ulemas' Association, founded in 1931. 
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only in terms of theological controversies which are almost incompre-
hensible to outsiders. But all these stirrings, whether under the aegis of 
the Ulemas or of some rival such as Shaykh B e n 'Alïwa at Mostagänem, 4 5 
or arising out of ineradicable differences, as at L e M z â b , 4 6 represented 
the first contact with a worldwide problem for communities which up till 
then had been quite cut off, and which the administration had been unable 
to arouse except perhaps against themselves. Shaykh B e n Bâdïs and his 
friends set an example by giving North African Islam a doctrinal shake-up 
which had not been attempted for centuries: their commentaries on the 
Ku'ran, for example, were a cultural exploit if ever there was one.47 T h e y 
were even so bold as to distinguish between transcendental invariables 
and circumstantial variables in religion.48 Detailed monographs are needed 
to study the relationships between the most important tendencies and the 
various social factors involved, and to distinguish the roles played by 
different social and age groups, economic strata, individuals, and moral 
attitudes. Such studies would without doubt reveal that the period was a 
turning-point in the social history of Algeria. 
T h r e e challenges to imperialism, and the reactions 
Strange as it m a y seem today, the celebration of the centenary of the 
French landing in Algeria49 did not call forth the open rebuke that w e in 
this age of decolonization tend to attribute retrospectively to the 
colonized.50 T o the m a n y Algerians w h o were then concerned with the 
claim for justice and equality, the festivities, which seemed likely to attract 
the interest of democratic elements in metropolitan France, brought first 
a renewal of hope, though this was swiftly followed by disillusion. T h e 
Musl im dignitaries of the regime - elected m e m b e r s , caïds and bachagas 
- vied shamelessly with one another in flattering the French,51 thus 
discrediting what remained of the authority of the traditional aristocracy 
45. A . Berque, 1936. There is no doubt that the ferment of Algerian Islam went far 
beyond the activities of the 'Ulamä'. 
46. W e m a y refer here to scholars such as Shaykhs Bayad' and At'fiyech. See M . A . 
Dabbür, 1971. 
47. Shaykhs Ben Bâdïs and Ben 'Ashür were probably the first modern North Africans 
after Shaykh A b ü Ras of Mascara (end of eighteenth century) to apply themselves to this 
formidable task, though a Moroccan scholar as famous as Shaykh Ibn al-Khayyät advised 
against it. See the latter's lithographed pamphlet on the subject, published in Fez. 
48. According to a rather extraordinary passage in a funeral address given by Shaykh 
Ibrâhïmï by the grave of Professor M o h a m m e d Ben Sheben, Shihdb, M a y 1928. 
49. There is a whole contemporary literature on the subject, most of it exasperatingly 
official in tone; but fortunately some scientific accounts stand out from the rest. 
50. S o m e adverse propaganda was organized in certain towns in collaboration with the 
P C F . See A . Ouzegane, 1962, pp. 171 ff. and passim. T h e teachers' union, and Benhâdj, 
a socialist militant, also had the courage to protest. See M . Kaddache, 1970, p. 193. 
Si. See M . Kaddache, 1970, p. 192, for some rather painful examples. 
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and of the inveterate profiteers of the policy of compromise. T h e paean of 
praise that arose to the glory of the settlers, n o w raised to the power of 
myth , set the seal on a policy from which France would rarely be able to 
free itself except by fits and starts. M o r e serious still, the regime simply 
passed over its o w n weaknesses. This was all very well as far as the 
hypothesis of sovereignty was concerned, since the balance of forces was 
so staggeringly unequal that almost no one challenged the theory openly. 
But that very responsibility which should have been its corollary was 
exercised by officials with little generosity and even less lucidity. Is this 
painting too sombre a picture? Let us admit that there were brighter 
patches. T h e intention was that everything should be done with as little 
coercion as possible. There was undoubtedly to be exploitation but it was 
to be legal, softened with cultural prestige, enveloped in a republican aura, 
sparing of violence, and even permitting itself to invoke the liberties of 
bourgeois democracy. By a paradox which is difficult for us to understand 
n o w , this apogee of imperialism was also the apogee of liberalism in 
manners. It is for this reason that French North Africa presents historians 
with a m u c h less tormented situation than that, for example, of British 
Egypt at the same point. 
But this apparent good h u m o u r , and its corollary, acceptance, were not 
put to good use. This can be seen in the provocatively triumphant tone 
of the celebrations in Algiers, and, more characteristically still, in the 
Eucharistie Congress held at Carthage from 7 to 11 M a y 1930, which was 
seen by the young people of Tunisia as a crusade against Islam in North 
Africa.52 However that might be, such a gathering was not in tune with 
the ideas towards which m a n y people in the Maghrib still looked for hope 
and understanding: the great principles of the Revolution, the Jaurès 
tradition, the myth of progress. 
In Morocco the Berber zaktr (royal proclamation) of 16 M a y 193o,53 
which incorporated Berber customary law into the French colonial judicial 
system, provided middle-class youth with an opportunity to appraise the 
position and with a first springboard for mass action. It was regarded as 
an attack on Islam and an attempt to divide the country, carried out in 
contempt of the undertakings of 1912. T h o u g h intended as a local and 
localizing measure, it had repercussions throughout the Musl im world, 
while on the spot it brought out into the open an opposition hitherto 
limited to small clandestine groups in two or three large towns. 
In the three months 5 4 from 20 June to 30 September 1930, there were 
more than a hundred and twenty incidents. Most of them occurred in 
mosques, the dogmatic setting for the latif, the Muslim prayer in distress. 
52. J. Berque, 1970, pp. 253 ff. 
53. ibid., pp. 250 ff. 
54. Special number, May-June 1933, of the review Maghreb, which appeared under 
the patronage of such varied celebrities as Bergery, Renaudel, and the Spanish philosopher 
Ortega y Gasset. 
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These imprecations were considered such a threat to public order that the 
authorities met it with summonses, imprisonment, and beatings. A 
delegation from the town of Fez went to the capital, and on 31 August 
three of its members were imprisoned, among them 'Allai al-Flsï, 'a young 
scholar from Karâwiyyïn',ss and Bel Hasan al-Wazzânï, 'graduate of the 
School of Social and Political Sciences in Paris'. T h e pair represented an 
almost symbolic combination of the two driving forces of resistance — 
orthodox tradition and modernity - and, appropriately enough, repression 
played the role of catalyst. T h e number of arrests rose to 150. M a n y shops 
closed, as before, in protest. Despite the official ban, the /aii/rang out 
again from the mosques. There were clashes in the streets. T h e spell of 
the Protectorate was well and truly broken, if one interprets it as the sort 
of hypnosis through which technical superiority and the prestige of Lyautey 
had so long held the country in their grip. 
In Paris, three years later, the review Maghreb devoted a special number 
to these incidents. Jean Longuet and other well-known Frenchmen, and 
particularly several young Moroccans, put forward a set of coherent 
arguments. T h e French sympathizers, though they rightly saw the 'Berber 
zahlr' of 1930 as a classic colonialist propaganda trick, had some difficulty, 
in view of their o w n anti-clericalism, in explaining the apparently religious 
aspect of m a n y of the Berber reactions. 'Everyone must be aware that in 
the East and in all Muslim countries, religion and nationality intermingle', 
said the French leader writer. Less complacently, one of the Moroccan 
contributors to the review wrote: 'In our country w e are ready to grant 
the Berbers what is generally refused to the Bretons in France. But w e 
want it to be in the context of Islam, which for us is not only a religion 
but above all a civilization.' H e thus brought out the cultural factor in 
the debate, an element modestly passed over by m a n y , both friends and 
adversaries. 
Towards confrontation 
Out of the twenty years between the two world wars, half thus went by 
without any progress in the relations between France and the Maghrib. 
O f course, the economic situation was scarcely favourable. Hardly was the 
immediate post-war depression over than the world slump loomed ahead. 
It reached the Maghrib in 1932, accentuating the generally depressed state 
of the economy that had reappeared in 1925 and was to last for a whole 
decade. This embittered relations between capital and labour, that is 
between the French settlers and the Algerians. Progress in mechanization, 
55. A member of an old family, already well known as a poet and scholar, he now 
discovered he had gifts as a speaker and organizer. H e produced an impressive amount 
of work, among which the most directly related to the present subject are al-Harakät 
al-htiklâliyya fi'l-Maghreb, Cairo, 1948, and Al-Nakd al-dhäti, Cairo, 1956. O n him, see 
A . Gaudio, 1972, and El Alamï, 1972. 
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planning, co-operatives, and even the unionization of public servants, 
enabled the French element to strengthen its stranglehold on the colony. 
T h e regime showed itself incapable of moderating the damaging effect of 
this stranglehold upon those it ruled. T h e connection between economic 
deterioration, which aggravated inequality, and political demands, is plain, 
but needs working out in more detail.56 It seems to m e that social change 
and the desire for a restored collective identity were even stronger factors 
than inequality in the awakening of North Africa. At all events, various 
motives combined to produce an aspiration which largely overrode party 
groupings. T h e Wataniyyïn or Moroccan 'Patriots' were then for the most 
part m e m b e r s of the bourgeois intelligentsia. T h e Etoile nord-Africaine 
had scarcely established itself in Algeria. T h e Destür was still imprisoned 
in unreality. T h e P C F did not back up its radical theories with enough 
support on the spot.57 Mos t drives for action remained implicit. Political 
expression was to be found in clubs, committees, groups without a n a m e , 
or even just in the spreading of attitudes, rather than in political parties 
as such. 
T h e administration, though unable to understand these nuances of 
expression, was very good at exploiting personal interests and rivalries. But 
it played d o w n political protest. It had superiority of means on its side, 
as well as continuity, and even an apparent consensus. But it was oblivious 
of the forces which were gathering beneath the seemingly normal surface. 
If there happened to be an outburst, the government blamed 'trouble-
makers', local or abroad, or the 'Reds', an attitude which excused both 
ultra-conservatism and repression. 
N e w tactics, and obstructions to action 
It was not all or nothing - far from it - but a deliberately temporal or 
even secular foothold on the political scene that Bourguiba58 and his friends 
Bahrï Kîka Tahär Safar and D r M a t a n , a m o n g others, aimed at. They 
defended the conformist president of the Tunisian Co-operative, because 
by so doing they were able to rally public opinion. They went so far as 
to support a measure prescribed by the Resident, but which seemed to 
them to serve their cause 'objectively', as w e might say (the proposal was 
that the budget provision for French officials should be reduced).59 A s 
56. Attempts have already been made , without any great success. See J. Berque, 1970, 
pp. 101 ff. See also A . Nouschi, 1962, pp. 31 ff. A s far as I know, this analysis, which is 
of great importance especially for its appraisal of the role played by social change during 
the period, has not yet been pressed far enough. 
57. Apart from the positions it took up over the Rïf war, the P C F generally confined 
itself to anti-colonialism pure and simple, in Algeria itself and right up till the Popular 
Front. Thereafter the idea of a 'nation in the making' seemed to prevail. 
58. See especially A . Bourguiba, 1954, passim. 
59. ibid., pp. 10, 35 ff. 
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regards the Great M o s q u e and the Tunis bourgeoisie, which provided m a n y 
recruits for the Destür, they did not conceal their criticism or their sarcasm. 
It was already apparent that the whole movement would be coloured by 
the fact that the m e n of the Sähel had become militant, and politicizing 
the country districts60 was to be one of the aims of the Neo-Destür. It 
was not by chance that the split which brought it into being took place 
at a vividly rural congress held at Kasr Hiläl (12 and 13 M a y 1933).61 
Meanwhile clashes with the Residency became more and more violent, 
for example at Monastïr and M o k n ï n . Obnoxious decrees were introduced 
to legalize repression, and Bourguiba, w h o applied that adjective to them, 
was imprisoned with his friends in the south (3 September 1934).62 But 
even though he was 'down' he still went on pleading the cause. 
In Algeria the administration tried to limit the spreading influence of 
the 'Ulama', mustering against them both the religious brotherhoods and 
the official clergy, the latter of extremely low standard.63 T h e authorities, 
seeing the people flock to hear the new preachers, w h o m they instinctively 
recognized as presenting a necessary updating of Islam, decided to forbid 
them to preach in the mosques. O n 16 February 1933 the 'Michel Circular' 
— named after the official w h o drew it up - and three supporting decrees, 
set up an official monopoly to this effect.64 Not only believers but also 
trade unionists and militants of the extreme Left took part in the 
demonstration that followed - a coalition which might have proved 
effective. Admittedly there occurred at that point a kind of 'divorce' 
between the Communis t and nationalist tendencies,65 which was far from 
healed by the reunification of the C G T and the C G T U in 1935. After 
several years of clandestine activity, the Etoile nord-africaine resumed 
open activity in Algeria itself in June 1933.66 Mesalï Hâdj , its president, 
had been using the word independence since 1927. A n d n o w , amidst the 
growing uneasiness, there was an anti-Jewish riot at Constantine in August 
1934.67 Whether this was a plot, a mere explosion, a diversion, or the result 
of provocation was not clear. But, whatever it was, it was a street outbreak 
which frightened all the politicians by its violence. Yet at the next elections, 
in January 1935, the opposition list of D r Bendjellûl carried the day in 
Constantine: this showed in which direction the sympathies of the majority 
were tending. Although the victor was a convinced assimilationist,68 he 
60. Or 'restoring' them vis-à-vis the city. The same morphological effect has been noted, 
mutatis mutandis, in the action of the 'Ulaml' in Algeria. 
61. J. Berque, 1970, pp. 289 ff., partly based on recollections by M . Bourguiba. 
62. A . Bourguiba, 1954, pp. 70 ff. 
63. A . Berque, 1951. 
64. Complete text in A . Nouschi, 1962, p. 69. 
65. A n Algerian Communist Party was formed in July 1938. 
66. A . Ouzegane, 1962, pp. 84 ff. 
67. A . Nouschi, 1962, pp. 74 ff. 
68. See his preface to A . Kessous, 1935. 
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aroused the prevailing powers to a fury of preventive measures. Clearly, 
what mattered in this vague radicalization of public life in Algeria was 
not the theory expressed but what it suggested or actually provoked. 
In Morocco, the settlers, embittered by the slump and irritated by such 
few limits as the administration imposed upon them, issued an ultimatum. 
This development, full of symbolic significance, occurred on the same day 
as the disorders in Paris on 6 February 1934. T h e same period saw in 
Morocco the rise of a nationalist press. T h e Moroccan Action Committee, 
in which 'Allai al-Fâsï was beginning to stand out as a leading figure, put 
forward a 'Reform Plan' on 1 December 1934, which if adopted would 
have developed its real significance and object in the course of the 
Protectorate.69 In the Spanish zone, opposition was already being expressed 
more openly through Torres and Nâsirï;70 it established contacts up 
country,71 and almost compromised the future M o h a m m e d V in a 
demonstration in Fez on 10 M a y 1934. 
T h e introduction of the Plan coincided with the wiping out of the last 
centre of dissidence in the south.72 Henceforth, history was to take quite 
a different-course from the archaic, almost legendary one that had been 
prolonged beyond its natural span by Lyauteyism and the Ministry for 
Native Affairs. T h e coincidence had a bearing outside Morocco itself. T h e 
cessation of the barüd was also potentially the end of the 'Arab bureaux'.73 
In Algeria and Tunisia, too, social change, which weakened old solidarities, 
also created n e w ones. T h e streets of the large towns and even village 
market places became the scene of mass action which class and party 
ideology were able to organize across traditional groupings. In all three 
countries of French North Africa, and especially in Algeria, where Régnier, 
the Minister, carried out a showy inquiry, the government's only answer 
to these material and intellectual developments was to manipulate elec-
tions74 and bring its repressive arsenal up to date.75 
This refusal of the administration to act cannot be explained entirely 
69. For a detailed analysis see R . L e Tourneau, 1962, pp. 189 ff. 
70. R . Rêzette, 1955, pp. 83 ff. 
71. By using the distribution networks of retailers in Fez. These contacts reached as 
far as the mountains and the Süs, where militants as well known as Mukhtär al-Süsi 
were recruited. 
72. Merebbi Rebbo was reduced by a combined operation on the part of French troops 
from Algeria and Morocco. Tindüf was finally occupied in 1934. 
73. Barüd meaning 'powder' and thence 'fight', came to be used by the army in Africa 
to mean the warlike and even desperate resistance engaged in by peoples whose honour 
had been slighted by 'pacification'. T h e 'Arab bureaux' created a century earlier by 
Lamoricière, had been the French administration's characteristic method for ruling the 
different traditional groupings. N o parallel existed in the towns, and even in rural districts 
of the Maghrib this method became out of date as things progressed. 
74. J. Menaut, 1935. 
75. As well as the 'décrets superscélérats' in Tunisia, there was the Decree of 30 March 
1935 in Algeria, and the dahir of 29 June 1935 in Morocco. 
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by the mounting dangers beyond the Rhine and the arguments this lent 
to the conservatives in France. T h e attitudes which the three parties 
concerned — metropolitan France, the colonialists, and the nationalist 
movement - had taken up , enjoined the first two to defend a status quo 
which the third was not yet in a position to challenge seriously. In return 
for the slavish allegiance which forbade Europeans in North Africa any 
originality, metropolitan France gave them her unconditional support. 
Those in Algeria, for example, w h o called themselves 'Algerians', carried 
particularism far enough to get super-profits out of it, but not far enough 
to risk finding themselves alone, face to face, as a 'dominion' or under 
some other arrangement, with the Musl im majority. Algeria was France, 
as they said, but France without democracy. T h e situation was to all 
intents and purposes the same in Tunisia and Morocco. 
Provisional conclusions 
Not everything has emerged into the daylight about the period w e have 
just been examining. Every so often, narrative history comes up against 
the stumbling-block of secret history. Future studies will shed more light 
on people, circumstances and decisions which at present are still enigmatic. 
But w e are also obliged to reserve for the future certain judgements 
concerning social history. Is there a close connection between the fluctua-
tions of the economy and those of political tension? It would seem that 
ethnic, or rather cultural dualism, is better able to explain the attitudes 
involved than class stratification. A n d since the conflict concerns a far 
wider area than the Maghrib, events in North Africa are probably affected 
more deeply, though more indirectly, by relevant events in the East than 
by French policy, which nevertheless seems to occupy the foreground. 
Perhaps one day w e shall be able to bring all these variables together in 
one general diagram, or at least give each of them its appropriate weight 
in relation to the others. 
Science, ideology and action, in the period w e are concerned with, 
tended to subscribe to a Eurocentric view of things: this applies both to 
the French Left and to most North African theories of that time. This 
only brings out more clearly those movements which, despite the difficulties 
this entailed, were able to avoid this distortion. Events after the Second 
World W a r were largely to justify them. 
But it is only too easy for the historian to set up as the prophet of what 
actually happens. Nowadays w e k n o w the aftermath, or, if you like, the 
consequences, of the situations described in this chapter. Could those 
consequences Jiave been different? In particular, might the reformism 
expressed by respectable m e n in all three countries of French North Africa 
have proceeded to its logical conclusion - the establishment, in an up-to-
date form, of solidarity between those three countries and France? It is 
easy n o w to answer no, but w e should avoid such an easy solution. 
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W h e n w e raise one of the possibilities unrealized by the actual course 
of events, w e do not merely reproach the authorities at the time with 
errors and abuses which probably helped to prevent things from taking 
their course. At the same time w e challenge ourselves as to the true 
significance of words and deeds at the time. W e hope to have suggested 
that the situation in the Maghrib at the period w e have been concerned 
with is, more than m a n y others, to be interpreted in terms of a kind of 
underground movement , where what was implicit - and even what was 
hidden - was more important than what was explicit. 
A n approach to bourgeois democracy; international socialism; the 
reaffirmation of a separate identity - w e k n o w n o w that of these three 
alternatives it was the third which prevailed. Yet at the time it was not 
unequivocal, but left the alternative open between two rival camps - Islamic 
and secular; westernizing and pan-Arab; moderate and revolutionary. In 
1935 no one could have said which of the two tendencies would prevail, 
nor even if either would prevail over the colonial set-up. W h a t w e m a y 
conclude is that history probably left in suspense other possibilities which 
might have c o m e - perhaps m a y still come - to govern in other forms 
other phases of the future. 
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A. A D U B O A H E N 
A s indicated in Chapters 6 and 12, resistance to colonialism in most parts 
of West Africa died d o w n during the First World W a r . Indeed, as M . 
Crowder has shown,1 except in parts of the Ivory Coast, Niger, the Gold 
Coast (now Ghana) and the eastern parts of Nigeria, most West Africans 
showed loyalty to their colonial rulers during the war and some of the 
traditional rulers even voluntarily contributed m e n and resources in the 
form of money to the imperial war effort. However, after the war, African 
reactions to colonialism were resumed with even greater vigour and 
determination. Indeed, if the period from 1919 to 1935 has been described 
as the high noon of colonialism in West Africa, it was also the period 
that saw African resistance to colonialism and nationalist activities in West 
Africa at its peak. 
African nationalism and political activities in West Africa during this 
period were shaped by a number of factors. These were the impact of 
the First World W a r , the colonial situation itself, an increase in the number 
of the educated and professional elite as well as the working class, especially 
in the urban centres, the general economic conditions of the 1920s and 
1930s, the socio-economic changes in the rural areas caused by the spread 
of the cultivation of cash crops, and finally, the diffusion of pan-Africanism 
and pan-Africanist activities into West Africa. Crowder (Chapter 12) has 
discussed in detail the impact of the First World W a r on Africa and on 
nationalist activities. Suffice it to state here first and foremost that the 
forced conscription of m a n y Africans aroused a great deal of anger especially 
in the former French African areas. Secondly, the war proved to the African 
that the white m a n was after all not a superman and could therefore be 
resisted. Thirdly, after the war, 'loyalist' West Africans were expecting 
rewards for their loyalty in the form of more concessions and more 
participation in the running of their o w n affairs, a feeling which was very 
m u c h strengthened by the principles of liberal democracy and self-
determination enunciated by President W o o d r o w Wilson of the United 
2 
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States and Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain. All these 
factors undoubtedly m a d e a good number of West Africans more ready 
than before to participate in the anti-colonial and resistance movements. 
T h e colonial system itself also became consolidated during the period, 
and the authoritarianism and racialism of the system became even more 
evident. It was during this period that the alliance between the African 
traditional rulers and the colonial masters was strengthened and various 
ordinances were introduced which greatly increased the powers of these 
rulers and virtually eliminated the new educated elite and professional 
groups from participation in the administration of their o w n countries. 
W h a t m a d e this factor all the more explosive was the fact that the period 
saw a substantial increase in the size of this educated elite and the 
professional group, following the spread of western education locally and 
the education of more and more people overseas. In the rural areas also, 
the spread of the cultivation of cash crops such as cocoa and groundnuts 
led to the emergence of an increasing n u m b e r of young m e n and w o m e n 
w h o became even richer than the traditional rulers and therefore resented 
not only the non-traditional and authoritarian powers conferred on their 
chiefs but their elimination from the ne w state councils of the so-called 
native authorities. All these social changes definitely shaped nationalism 
and political activities in West Africa. 
But even more important as a factor were the economic conditions of 
the inter-war period. Indeed, the first thing to note in connection with 
nationalist politics in English-speaking West Africa during the inter-war 
period is the w a y in which the commercial crises and changes in the colonial 
economy affected the initiatives and reactions of the colonial elite of lawyers 
and merchants, the sub-elite of teachers and civil servants, and the workers. 
For the 'economic revolution' in West Africa not only introduced a m o n e -
tary economy and expanded commerce, it also introduced certain social 
and economic values a m o n g African enterpreneurs and social classes, 
notably the lawyer-merchant class. Although the position of these classes, 
particularly the small traders, had begun to change with the development 
of the colonial economy in the 1890s, it was in reality the First World 
W a r and its attendant economic crises which had a more immediate and 
significant impact on their status. It had been already apparent during 
the stagnation of the 1880s and the 1890s that the growing sophistication 
of commerce, expansion of markets, and competition from extra-territorial 
firms meant that the African businessmen would either have to be more 
efficient, or play a secondary role in the colonial economy. T h e First World 
W a r , with its economic controls, discriminatory export duties, currency 
shortages and loss of shipping, created a growing awareness a m o n g educated 
Africans in business and in the professions, that the cosmopolitan days 
of harmony were over and that the era of the combine and of monopoly 
capitalism had arrived. 
In Sierra Leone, the frustration of the educated classes and the African 
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traders, and the unemployed in the big towns was given open expression 
in the riots of 1919 in which protests against the price of rice took the 
form of attacks on Syrian and Lebanese traders, and in the workers' strike 
that same year. T h o u g h directed against the Levantines (who were accused 
of creating scarcity by hoarding essential commodities, and of elbowing 
out local middlemen), these riots were in fact a violent and uncoordinated 
protest against what were believed to be injustices arising from the manage-
ment of the colonial economy. T h e looting and the riots spread from Free-
town to M o y a m b a , Kangahun (25-26 July 1919), M a n o , Boia, M a k u m p , 
B o , Bonthe, M a n g e and Port Lokko. T h e situation was so serious that 
troops had to be brought in from the Gold Coast. In addition to the riots, 
the technical staff and labourers on the railway and in the public works 
department went on strike, demanding the same war bonus paid to the 
government clerical staff, and complaining of low wages and rising food 
prices.2 In T h e Gambia , too, rising prices had their social and political 
effects, leading to sporadic outbursts of looting and petty theft, as well 
as a seamen's strike for better wages, and to the formation of unions, notably 
the Gambia Native Defensive Union. 
T h e 1921 slump also led to more agitation from West African merchants, 
a few of w h o m were financially ruined. T h e issue of paper currency and 
shortage of silver did not improve matters either, and the European 
merchants were accused of hoarding the currency notes and charging high 
prices. According to one Gold Coast newspaper, 'The kings, chiefs, and 
all classes will soon be paupers' unless West Africans got together to protect 
themselves against the wily manoeuvres of combine magnates. In general, 
then, all these economic hardships led the West African press to advocate 
the formation of the National Congress of British West Africa ( N C B W A ) , 
and the abolition of the Crown Colony system of administration to enable 
Africans to have more say in the running of the economy and more 
representation in the administrative and legislative bodies. 
T h e final background factor was the launching of the pan-Africanist 
movement, and, in particular, the activities of D r W . E . B . D u Bois and 
Marcus Garvey especially in the 1920s. These themes are discussed in 
great detail in Chapter 29. But it should be mentioned here that the various 
Pan-African Congresses organized by D u Bois - in Paris in 1919, in 
London, Brussels and Paris in 1921, in London and Lisbon in 1922 and 
in N e w York in 1927 which were attended by participants from West Africa 
- not only internationalized nationalist activities and struggle against 
colonialism in Africa in general and in West Africa in particular, but also 
very m u c h strengthened the consciousness of blacks throughout the world 
of their c o m m o n plight as a downtrodden and oppressed race and w o n 
more converts to the nationalist cause in West Africa. 
Against this background, let us examine the organizations and m o v e -
2. Public Record Office, K e w , C O 267/582/45278; also Sierra Leone Weekly News, 19 
July 1919, p. 8. 
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ments that were formed during the inter-war period for the articulation 
of nationalist grievances and demands first in British West Africa and then 
in Francophone West Africa. 
Politics and nationalism in British W e s t Africa 
Youth Leagues and M o v e m e n t s 
T h e most c o m m o n of these organizations were ethnic unions and youth 
movements or associations. T h e inter-war period certainly saw the forma-
tion of an increasing number, indeed a host, of ethnic, welfare, literary, 
old boys', voluntary and youth associations, clubs, societies and m o v e -
ments in m a n y countries in West Africa. Numerous Igbo unions were 
formed in the cities of Nigeria such as Ibadan, Abeokuta and Lagos. In 
the Colony and Asante regions of the Gold Coast alone, there were as 
m a n y as fifty such clubs and associations by 1930, most of them 
formed between 1925 and 1930.3 Examples of these clubs were the 
Achimota Discussion Group , the Literary and Social Club and the Eureka 
Club of Cape Coast, the O p t i m u m Club and the Literary and Social Clubs 
of Sekondi, the Y o u n g Peoples' Club, the C o s m o s Club and Rodger Club 
of Accra, the A n u m Improvement Society, the E w e League, the Asante 
Kotoko Society of Kumas i and the Bekwai Kotoko Union. It was some 
of these clubs and associations that J. B . D a n q u a h organized into the Youth 
Conference M o v e m e n t which held its first meeting in Accra in 1929. In 
the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone, I. T . A . Wallace Johnson founded 
his Youth League and the West African Youth League, while in 1934 the 
Nigerian Youth M o v e m e n t was formed which, as a recent Nigerian scholar 
has shown, 'embraced almost all the young intellectuals of the period -
H . O . Davies, N n a m d i Azikiwe, D r Vaughan, D r Kofo Abayomi , Obafemi 
A w o l o w o ' . 4 
All these clubs and associations were led either by the missionary 
educated elite or the young lawyers, doctors and businessmen. T h o u g h 
the aim of these leaders was to wrest political leadership from the old 
conservative nationalist leaders of the Congress stamp to be discussed 
below, none of them - with the sole exception of the West African Youth 
League - m a d e any radical demands in spite of the deteriorating economic 
conditions of the 1920s and 1930s. Their demands were confined to more 
educational facilities and of a higher quality, university education, higher 
wages and salaries, equitable representation on the legislative and executive 
councils, abolition of racial discrimination, admission into the higher grades 
of the civil service, the provision of economic opportunities for Africans 
and better relations between the colonial administration and the Africans. 
3. K . O . Hagan, 1968. 
4. G . O . Olusanya in O . Ikime (ed.), 1980, p. 558. 
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Such certainly were the demands m a d e by the Gold Coast Youth C o n -
ference at its first meeting in Accra organized by Danquah in 1929. 
T h e demands m a d e by the Nigerian Youth M o v e m e n t ( N Y M ) were 
similar. It advocated an African majority in the legislative council, and 
called for the progressive representation of all Nigerians in it. T h e N Y M 
Charter also demanded universal suffrage, criticized both the practice of 
Indirect Rule and the representation of European commercial and economic 
interests in the legislative council, and pressed for the gradual Nigerianiza-
tion of the civil service. In the economic sphere, like the Gold Coast Youth 
Conference, it called for equal African participation in the economy. It 
even provided the outline of a five-year development plan, in which priority 
would be given to manufacturing, banking, textiles and transport. It also 
proposed to set up co-operative societies which would help Nigerians buy 
up some industries; agricultural banks were also to be established to help 
modernize agriculture and improve the standard of living of the peasantry. 
It condemned the monopoly of extra-territorial firms, and urged the 
introduction of social welfare programmes for the benefit of Nigerian 
workers. O n the socio-cultural side, the N Y M Charter called for a state-
financed mass education and primary school education programme; health 
and adult education programmes were also recommended as responsibilities 
of local and central government authorities. 
T h e West African Youth League, the only radical one among these m o v e -
ments, was led by I. T . A . Wallace Johnson, a Sierra Leonean trade unionist 
w h o had studied in M o s c o w in 1931-2 (see Plate 25.1). H e returned to 
West Africa with the aim of creating a new political force based on wage 
labourers and the unemployed in the urban areas for the overthrow of 
the colonial system. H e founded the Youth League in the Gold Coast by 
organizing the workers and arousing them against the colonial system by 
his near-seditious and violent articles and by his skilful manipulation of 
local grievances, especially the unemployment situation, rising food prices 
and the frustration caused by reduced value of cocoa exports since 1929. 
Because of his efforts to mobilize these elements and use them in 
radicalizing local politics, the colonial administration came to see him as 
a dangerous radical paid by the communists to organize the colonial youth, 
and therefore deported him to Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, he established 
branches of the Youth League in Freetown and B o , and started a news-
paper, The Sentinel, which agitated against bad labour conditions and the 
Education Ordinance. 
Apart from newspaper campaigns and petitions, these youth movements 
took part in local elections and also resorted to strike actions. Thus , they 
were involved in the demonstrations, riots and strike in Freetown in Sierra 
Leone (1926-31), and in Bathurst (now Banjul) in T h e Gambia (1929). 
In Accra, the Youth M o v e m e n t led by Kojo T h o m p s o n , an Accra barrister 
and the Nigerian newspaper editor, N n a m d i Azikiwe, participated in the 
Accra municipal elections under the umbrella of the Mambi i Party against 
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the older and more conservative nationalists like D r F . V . Nanka-Bruce, 
while the Youth League took part in the Cape Coast local elections. T h e 
Nigerian Youth M o v e m e n t backed by Azikiwe's West African Pilot also 
mounted a vigorous and successful campaign against Herbert Macaulay's 
conservative Nigerian National Democratic Party which had dominated 
Lagos politics since its foundation in 1923. 
However, the youth movements did not achieve m u c h . Their electoral 
successes of the 1930s failed to dislodge the conservative leadership nor 
did their detailed economic programmes prove capable of implementation 
under a semi-Crown Colony system of administration. However, though 
m u c h of the activity of the youth movements apart from some electoral 
successes in the urban areas did not yield any substantial political gains, 
the political style of the post-1945 nationalist movement in British West 
Africa owed m u c h to the experience some of the leaders had gained in 
the youth movements. 
Political parties 
In addition to these youth movements, a number of political parties were 
formed to agitate for reforms. T h e best known of these was the Nigeria 
National Democratic Party formed in Nigeria by Herbert Macaulay in 
1923. T h e aims of the party were stated to be: 
T o secure the safety or welfare of the people of the Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria as an integral part of the British Imperial 
Commonweal th and to carry the banner of 'Right, Truth, Liberty 
and Justice' to the empyrean heights of Democracy until the realiza-
tion of its ambitious goal of ' A Government of the People, by the 
People, for the People' . . . and, at the same time, to maintain an 
attitude of unswerving loyalty to the Throne and Person of His 
Majesty the King Emperor, by being strictly constitutional in the 
adoption of its methods and general procedure.5 
A m o n g its programme were the nomination and election of the Lagos 
members of the Legislative Council, achievement of municipal status and 
complete local self-government for Lagos, the development of higher 
education and the introduction of compulsory education throughout 
Nigeria, Africanization of the civil service, free and fair trade in Nigeria 
and equal treatment for traders and producers of Nigeria, and, finally, 
the economic development of the natural resources of Nigeria under con-
trolled private enterprise. T h e Party employed the usual methods to achieve 
its aims — participating in elections in Lagos which it w o n in 1923, 1928 
and 1933, holding mass meetings and sending deputations to the governor 
as it did in 1930 'to discuss such national matters as the trade depression 
5. Quoted by J. S. Coleman, 1958, p. 198. 
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and the appointment and deposition of chiefs'.6 This party dominated the 
politics of Lagos until its defeat by the Nigerian Youth Movement in the 
Lagos elections of 1938. 
Trade unions 
Another vehicle for the articulation of anti-colonial sentiments and 
nationalist grievances was the trade union movement. While m a n y trade 
unions were formed in Southern and Central Africa beginning with the 
first of them, the Industrial Workers and Commercial Union formed by 
Clements Kadalie in 1919 in South Africa, and its branch formed in 
Southern Rhodesia in 1927, it would appear that the French government 
did not allow trade union activities in West Africa until 1937 while the 
British did not officially tolerate them until 1932 in T h e Gambia, 1939 
in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, and 1941 in the Gold Coast.7 But even though 
trade union activities were not allowed or encouraged officially during this 
period, a number of them did emerge mainly as a result of the high cost 
of living. They included the Railway Workers Union of Sierra Leone, the 
Nigerian Mechanics Union formed in 1919 and the Gambia Native Defence 
Union. T h e typical weapons of these unions were strikes, boycotts and 
hold-ups. T h e first series of strikes occurred among the railway and mine 
workers. Thus a railway strike occurred in Sierra Leone in 1919 and again 
in 1926. T h e workers of the Ashanti Goldfields went on strike at Obuasi 
in the Gold Coast in 1924 while the Enugu coal mine strike occurred in 
1925 and the Dakar-St Louis Railway strike in 1925.8 All these strikes 
were for higher wages and better conditions of service. 
Inter-territorial m o v e m e n t s and international movements : the 
National Congress of British W e s t Africa 
T h e associations, parties and movements that w e have been discussing 
so far were local or territorial in organization and outlook. But what 
differentiates the political movements of the inter-war period from those 
immediately before and after the period were the formation of an inter-
territorial movement in British West Africa and of international movements 
in the metropolitan capitals of the colonia' ruler. T h e first was the National 
Congress of British West Africa in West Africa and the second was the 
West African Students Union formed in London. 
Undoubtedly, the National Congress of British West Africa ( N C B W A ) 
was the most interesting of the nationalist movements that emerged in 
West Africa in the inter-war period.9 It was founded through the efforts 
6. ibid., p. 199. 
7. M . Crowder, 1968, pp. 351-2. 
8. ibid., p. 352. 
9. For details, see J. A . Langley, 1973. 
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of J. E . Casely Hayford, a Gold Coast lawyer and intellectual and D r 
Akiwande Savage of Nigeria, and, throughout, its leadership was dominated 
not by the traditional rulers but by professional m e n such as lawyers, 
doctors and businessmen. T h e leading spirit of the movement was 
undoubtedly Casely Hayford whose idealism, political vision and faith in 
the unity of African peoples enabled the N C B W A to survive from 1920 
to 1930, and injected a flavour of pan-Africanism into West African politics 
matched only by K w a m e N k r u m a h ' s efforts twenty-five years later. 
A s I have shown elsewhere in m y analysis of the social and occupational 
background of the N C B W A leaders,I ° this leadership had inherited the 
acquisitive individualism of Western liberal democracy, particularly some 
of its Victorian tenets such as laissez-faire, the idea that knowledge meant 
power, belief in progress and the natural harmony of interests as well as 
the belief that 'ordered liberty' and property went hand in hand. Moreover, 
for most of the leaders, 'British West Africa' existed as a more important 
entity than the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, or Nigeria. This identification 
of the parts with the whole was to continue till the depression of 1929 
and the 1930s when a narrower conception of nationality became 
dominant.11 T h e educated West African urban 'middle class', from the 
Sierra Leonean diaspora of the nineteenth century to the late 1930s, had 
more in c o m m o n , and communicated more easily with their counterparts 
along the coastal towns, than with their brethren in their o w n hinterland. 
Having been told that they had no history worth taking seriously, and 
conscious of the fact that their o w n socio-economic group had limited 
opportunities in the colonial system, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
nationalist intelligentsia came to prefer a visionary 'West African national-
ity' to a political system in which they had no voice and which, in any 
case, was alien and therefore, in their view, oppressive. Gold Coast news-
papers never tired of denouncing alien rule. A s one of the editorials 
observed: ' T h e introduction of the British system of government in place 
of the one existing before was an encroachment which no self-respecting 
nation would allow'. 
In spite of all the objection to 'alien rule', however, there was never 
any mention of severing relations with the colonial power; alien rule was 
bad but there were good reasons for consenting to it; it was better to demand 
more opportunities for a particular social group and m a k e moderate 
demands than to do away with alien rule completely; and one could still 
10. ibid., Chapter IV. 
11. For example, the Gold Coast Leader 26 September 1928 asserted: 'The idea of a 
Gold Coast Nation is a fundamental one'. Sierra Leone Weekly News, 27 October 1928 
also declared, 'whatever may be said to the contrary, Sierra Leone is our country . . . ' 
It is interesting to learn, however, that between 1918 and 1929 no really considerable body 
of evidence is to be discovered in the newspapers to suggest that the press did not consistently 
view matters from a wider West African point of view rather than from the point of view 
of individual colonies. W . D . E d m u n d , 1951, p. 113. 
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be 'free', 'under the Union Jack'. Even Herbert Macaulay, regarded by 
the administration as the gadfly of Lagos politics, could speak sincerely 
about the 'manifold blessings of Pax-Britannica'. T h e National Congress 
of British West Africa also declared: 
That the policy of the Congress shall be to maintain strictly and in-
violate the connection of the British West African Dependencies with 
the British Empire, and to maintain unreservedly all and every right 
of free citizenship of the Empire and the fundamental principle that 
taxation goes with effective representation . . . to aid in the develop-
ment of the political institutions of British West Africa under the 
Union Jack . . . and, in time, to ensure within her borders the Govern-
ment of the people by the people for the people; to ensure equal 
opportunity for all, to preserve the lands of the people for the people. ' 2 
Finally, the leaders also saw themselves as the only class of people w h o , 
by virtue of their social and occupational status, were qualified to control 
by constitutional means what hysterical American racists like Lothrop 
Stoddard and Madison Grant called 'the rising tide of colour against white 
supremacy'. 
It is important to clarify the attitudes of the leaders of this movement 
in order to emphasize the fact that, in spite of all the race rhetoric, they 
were essentially co-operationists with exceedingly limited political objec-
tives, a sub-elite whose interests generally coincided with, and were in 
fact protected by, the foreign rulers they were agitating against. Although 
they claimed to speak in the n a m e of 'the people', the interests of the 
nationalist petit-bourgeoisie were not identical with those of the people; 
in fact, it was the contradictions within the colonial system itself that they 
sought to harmonize in order to protect and expand their o w n interests 
without upsetting the system; hence their constitutionalism and their 
recognition of the benefits of British colonial rule. Their pan-Africanism 
apart, their main objective was the acquisition of representative institutions 
to protect their socio-economic interests and to enhance their opportunities 
in colonial society.13 
T h e N C B W A held its first conference at Accra from 11 to 29 M a r c h 
1920. Attended by delegates from Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone 
and T h e Gambia , it attracted wide attention in Africa, London and as 
far afield as the West Indies.14 T h e ' H u m b l e Petition' in which the 
Conference embedded its resolutions declared its members ' 'unfeigned 
loyalty and devotion to the throne and person of His Majesty the King-
Emperor' . Their recommendations presupposed not the destruction but 
the modification of the existing structures of government. Constitutional 
12. The constitution of the National Congress of British West Africa. Also the 
Resolutions of the Conference of Africans of British West Africa, Accra, 1920, p. 9. 
13. See E . J. Hobsbawm, 1964; pp. 176-^ 7 and the useful essay by M . Kilson, 1958. 
14. Gold Coast Times, 15 September 1931, p. 11; West African Nationhood, 9 April 1931. 
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changes advocated included the reconstitution of the West African legis-
lative councils so that half of the members be nominated by the C r o w n , 
and the other half be elected by the people, with the addition of part-elected 
assemblies to control taxation. They condemned the rigid colonial policy 
of appointing only Europeans to senior official posts. T h e y asked for 
municipal institutions, and for the establishment of a West African 
university along the lines proposed in 1872 by E . W . Blyden with the 
support of the Governor of Sierra Leone, John Pope-Hennessy. 
They complained of the post-war fiscal and economic controls and the 
growing power of extra-territorial firms. It is interesting to note that in 
their desperation, the conference, influenced by the merchants, and by 
the approaches of Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association 
( U N I A ) through the Reverend Patriarch J. G . Campbell, resolved: 
That this Conference, being of the opinion that trade competition 
in the British West African dependencies should be free from restric-
tion, views with great dissatisfaction the passing of the Palm Kernels 
Export Duty Ordinance . . . That, in view of the difficulties hereto 
experienced in the matter of space on British bottoms by legitimate 
African traders and shippers, this Conference welcomes competition 
in the shipping line with particular reference to the 'Black Star Line'. 
Legal reforms were proposed, especially the establishment of a West 
African Court of Appeal. T h e conference also resolved to set up a West 
African Press Union in recognition of 'the important part the Press plays 
in National Development'; a committee of experienced journalists was to 
look into the problem of better co-ordination of the press policy of the 
English-speaking West African press. It was also proposed to start an 
official organ of the N C B W A , under the editorship of Casely Hayford, 
and financed by the Congress Inaugural Fund , to be called the British 
West African National Review. 
Sanitary and medical reforms were also thoroughly dealt with and highly 
technical papers were read by D r H . C . Bankole-Bright of Sierra Leone; 
delegates also dealt with residential segregation of races and the position 
of African doctors in government service. T h e eternal and important land 
question was also discussed, with the conference tartly declaring: 'That 
in the opinion of this Conference the principle of Trusteeship with respect 
to the lands of the people of British West Africa has been overdone, and 
that it is proper to declare that the average British West African is quite 
capable of controlling and looking after his o w n interests in the land.' 
They condemned the right assumed by the European powers of 
exchanging or partitioning countries between them without reference to, 
or regard for, the wishes of the people, which they declared to be tanta-
mount to a species of slavery. Specifically, they denounced the partitioning 
of Togoland between the English and the French governments and the 
handing over of the Cameroons to the French government without con-
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suiting or regarding the wishes of the peoples in the matter, and respectfully 
desired an assurance from His Majesty's Government that under no 
circumstances whatsoever would it be a consenting party to the integrity 
of any of the four British West African colonies being disturbed. Finally, 
the Conference resolved itself into a National Congress of British West 
Africa, and determined to represent its views to London. 
A delegation in which T h e Gambia , Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and 
Nigeria were represented, went to London in 1920 to petition His Majesty's 
Government to grant elective representation to the four colonies (see Plate 
25.2). Casely Hayford of the Gold Coast led the delegation. T h e delegation 
also petitioned various parliamentary groups and humanitarian organiza-
tions. It also had the support and understanding of the Liverpool Chamber 
of C o m m e r c e , Albert Cartwright, the editor of West Africa, and some 
influential public personalities. However, because of the opposition of Sir 
H u g h Clifford, Governor-General of Nigeria, Gordon Guggisberg 
(Governor of the Gold Coast), as well as the opposition of some of the 
Gold Coast chiefs led by Nana Sir Ofori Atta and, above all, because of 
the negative attitude of the Colonial Office during Viscount Milner's tenure 
of office as Secretary of State, the N C B W A petition was rejected, 
principally on the grounds that the N C B W A leadership did not represent 
the majority of the people in the four West African territories. 
T h e Congress met again in Freetown (January-February 1923), Bathurst 
(December 1925-January 1926) and Lagos (1930) though most of the 
agitational politics of the movement was conducted by the individual 
territorial committees set up in T h e Gambia , Sierra Leone, Gold Coast 
and Nigeria. T h e Freetown session, fully supported by the Freetown social 
elite, ratified the constitution of the movement , and laid d o w n the functions 
of the president, general secretary, executive council, financial secretary 
and the central executive committee. T h e Freetown session also recom-
mended the creation of a journal for the movement, to be called the British 
West African Review, which would report on all the activities of the various 
territorial branches. T h e general secretary, w h o was based at Sekondi (Gold 
Coast) would receive quarterly reports from the secretary of each territorial 
committee. Significantly, the N C B W A constitution ratified in Freetown, 
also dealt with inter-West African economic co-operation, urging the 
N C B W A branches to educate public opinion, especially African business-
m e n and entrepreneurs, as to the ways and means of developing West 
Africa economically. 
T h e Bathurst session, which was held from 24 December 1925 to 10 
January 1926, recalling the rejection of the local committee's petitions for 
elective representation since 1920, resolved that 'constitution is best that 
makes provision for the effective and efficient expression of public opinion', 
that the time had arrived for the elective system of representation to be 
fully applied to the Colony of T h e Gambia , and finally that the various 
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West African Federation with a Governor-General and in due course 
representations made to His Majesty's Government to take it into deep 
and sympathetic consideration. 
T h e Bathurst session also advocated the establishment of national 
schools, compulsory education in all urban areas, industrial and agricultural 
education for the rural areas, the establishment of agricultural banks and 
co-operatives, and called for the 'commercial and economic independence' 
of West Africa, as well as the creation of a West African Appelate Court 
and the appointment of Africans to higher posts in the judiciary. It is 
noteworthy that the Gambia W o m e n ' s Auxiliary Committee of the Gambia 
section of the N C B W A movement participated in the deliberations of the 
Bathurst session. With the support of Herbert Macaulay's Nigerian 
National Democratic Party and the efforts of energetic members of the 
Lagos branch such as J. C . Zizer, Reverend W . B . Euba and E . M . E . 
Agbebi, the Fourth Session was finally held in Lagos in 1930. 
W h a t did the N C B W A achieve? T h o u g h it continued its activities 
throughout the 1920s, its main achievement was the introduction of new 
Constitutions in Nigeria in 1923, Sierra Leone in 1924 and the Gold Coast 
in 1925 in which the principle of elective representation was conceded. 
It used to be thought that this change was introduced on the initiative 
of Sir H u g h Clifford, the then Governor of Nigeria. ' 5 It has, however, 
n o w been established beyond doubt by the present author that this con-
cession was granted as a result of the persistent pressure exerted on their 
respective administrations by the various branches of the N C B W A . 1 6 T h e 
N C B W A also succeeded in developing a feeling of unity and c o m m o n 
political destiny among the British West African political leadership. Apart 
from these, it did not succeed in achieving economic independence nor 
the unification of the four British colonies nor any other amelioration or 
weakening of the colonial system. O n the contrary, by the 1930s, colonialism 
was even more firmly entrenched than it was in the 1920s. 
Rural politics or rural m a s s nationalism in the inter-war period 
In the youth movements, N C B W A and trade unions, w e have been dealing 
with nationalism and politics as seen in the urban centres in former British 
West Africa and led by the educated and professional elite. But as recent 
research has been revealing — and future research in other countries in 
West Africa will confirm or reject or modify these conclusions - African 
nationalist activities were not confined to the urban centres only but were 
evident in the rural areas; in the various paramountcies, states and c o m -
munities, and here the principal actors were the commoners and farmers, 
both literate and illiterate on the one hand, and the traditional rulers on 
the other. T h e latter were seen at times acting in co-operation with their 
15. See J. A . Langley, 1973, Chapter IV. 
16. ibid., pp. 243-5. 
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subjects against the colonial system and at times being attacked by their 
subjects as agents of the same system. Another aspect of this theme which 
is still very m u c h in the dark is the linkage there was, if any, between 
rural and urban politics and h o w or whether one influenced the other. 
Let m e illustrate this theme from the results of the limited research 
that has been conducted so far in G h a n a . 1 7 T h e inter-war period was 
characterized in the Gold Coast, as in the other British colonies in West 
Africa, by the establishment and consolidation of the system of indirect 
rule in the rural areas through the introduction of a number of ordinances 
and acts - the Native Jurisdiction A m e n d m e n t Ordinance of 1910, the 
Guggisberg Constitution of 1925, the Native Administration Ordinance 
of 1927 and the Native Administration Revenue Bill of 1931. All these 
measures which gave the traditional rulers powers to collect revenue and 
to impose court fines as were unknown before, were, according to Stone, 
'an attempt to make the chiefs a living part of the machinery of (colonial) 
government'. Economically, the era saw the alternation of periods of b o o m 
with those of recession and inflation - the latter in 1915-17, 1929-30 and 
the second half of the 1930s. It also saw the spread of the cocoa industry 
into the rural areas especially of A k u a p e m and A k y e m Abuakwa which 
led to the emergence of an increasing number of rich young farmers and 
long-distance traders. Socially, the period also saw the spread of elementary 
education into the rural areas and while some of the products of these 
schools drifted into the urban centres, others stayed behind and took to 
either farming or petty trading. With all these changes in their socio-
economic status, these rural people began to demand a corresponding 
change in their political status and especially representation on the state 
and provincial councils, a demand which the ordinances mentioned above 
m a d e steadily impossible. T h e principal objectives of the rural folk, then, 
were to acquire representation on these councils and, above all, to curb 
the increasing powers of their traditional rulers and the district commis-
sioners and abolition or reduction of some of the fines and taxes being 
imposed by them. 
A s recent research in Ghana has shown, two main instruments were 
fashioned in these areas for the attainment of these ends, namely the 
traditional instrument of the asafo companies, i.e. permanent organizations 
in Akan-speaking societies of commoners for military and social purposes 
outside the control of the traditional rulers or political elite, and new 
associations such as the Cocoa Farmers Association and the Gold Coast 
Federation of Cocoa Farmers formed in 1910 and 1928 respectively. T h e 
methods that these bodies employed were petitions and cocoa hold-ups. 
T h e most interesting of the asafo companies that emerged in the rural 
areas was the K w a h u asafo company. ' 8 
In 1915, the K w a h u asafo, m a d e up of commoners from all parts of 
17. See R . Addo-Fening, 1975; J. Simensen, 1975(a) and R . L . Stone, 1975. 
18. J. Simensen, 1974 and 1975(b). 
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K w a h u assembled at Abetifi, s u m m o n e d the O m a n h e n e of K w a h u to the 
meeting and forced him to sign a document which they had already 
prepared consisting of rules 'regulating political and economic affairs in 
the state'. In 1917, this document was formally ratified by the K w a h u 
State Council and became k n o w n later as the M a g n a Carta. 
In this document, fees and fines being imposed by the traditional rulers 
were reduced and regulations for their imposition were laid d o w n ; the 
O k w a h u m a n Council was also to be m a d e a truly representative body of 
chiefs and commoners and failure to attend was to be m a d e punishable 
by fine. Even more interesting and comprehensive were the regulations 
about socio-economic activities. Trade in foodstuffs was to be centralized 
in certain towns, a detailed list of market prices and trade fees was to 
be drawn up, the export of fish and game from K w a h u was prohibited 
and rules governing marriages, family responsibilities in debt cases, 
funerals, adultery by chiefs, etc., were laid d o w n . As J. Simensen has 
concluded, 'this Charter is probably the most detailed documentation that 
w e have from the early period of colonial rule in the Gold Coast of an 
attempt by commoners to curtail the authority of the traditional elite and 
assert their o w n influence more effectively in the fields of jurisdiction and 
legislation.'19 
T h e second method adopted by the commoners of the rural areas was 
the destoolment (deposition) of their traditional rulers, and this became 
quite a c o m m o n feature of rural politics in the Gold Coast in the inter-war 
period. Between 1910 and 1944, there were at least thirty-three depositions 
of divisional chiefs in A k y e m Abuakwa alone. T h e charges usually ranged 
from abuse of power, improper sale of land, extortionate fines, enforcement 
of levies to compulsory labour imposed by the colonial administration. 
T h e most interesting and most significant of these depositions were those 
that occurred in 1932, w h e n all the asafo companies in A k y e m Abuakwa 
combined to depose all the main divisional chiefs of the state and went 
on to prefer deposition charges against the O m a n h e n e himself, Nana Sir 
Ofori Atta. It is interesting to note that the action of the asafo was precipi-
tated by the decision of the A k y e m Abuakwa State Council to approve 
the Native Administration Revenue measure proposed by the Colonial 
administration which was to give the council power to impose a levy on 
its subjects. A s Simensen has shown, the list of charges preferred against 
the O m a n h e n e show 'an increased awareness of the commoners that m a n y 
of their troubles arose from the fact that the chiefs were being integrated 
into the administrative structure of the Colonial Government, and thereby 
removed from popular control'.20 Thus the action of the asafo was directed 
as m u c h against the colonial administration as it was against the traditional 
rulers. It is significant that it was only the timely intervention of the colonial 
rulers that saved Ofori Atta himself, though he conceded some of the 
19. J. Simensen, 1975(a), pp. 37-8. 
20. J. Simensen, 1974. 
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demands by, for instance, admitting three members of the A k y e m Abuakwa 
Scholars Union to the State Council in 1933. 
T h e other method that the rural folk adopted was the use of cocoa hold-
ups. Thus in 1921-2, 1930-1 and again in 1937-8, the cocoa farmers, 
led by John K w a m e A y e w and Winifried Tete-Ansa, both educated m e n , 
refused to sell their cocoa until better prices were paid.21 T h e 1937-8 
hold-up, which had the support of some of the traditional rulers including 
the paramount chief of A k y e m Abuakwa, Nana Sir Ofori Atta, was 
particularly widespread, and has been described by Hopkins as 'the last 
and most significant demonstration of rural discontent before World W a r 
II'. There were similar rural activities in such areas as A k y e m Abuakwa, 
Akuapem and A k y e m Swedru. 
From research done so far, it would appear that there was no formal 
linkage between the urban and rural movements though there were contacts 
on an individual basis, for example, between J. B . Danquah and the c o m -
moners in A k y e m Abuakwa, and between Kobina Sekyi, a Cape Coast 
lawyer and nationalist, and the commoners in Denkyira and Anyan 
Abaasa.22 
It seems evident from the Gold Coast case then, that politics and 
nationalist activities in the inter-war period were not confined to the urban 
areas alone but were in evidence in the rural areas which involved the 
commoners and farmers. There is no doubt that research in other countries 
will confirm the conclusion so far arrived at in Ghana. 
T h e outcome of nationalist activities in British W e s t Africa 
T h e question then is w h y did the nationalist movement in British West 
Africa have so limited an impact on the people and the colonial govern-
ments? T h e first and most important answer is that neither the N C B W A 
nor the youth movements ever commanded a mass following nor did any 
significant linkage occur between urban and rural politics. T h e leaders 
could therefore be written off by the colonial rulers as being unrepresenta-
tive of the people, a strategy which, in fact, both Sir H u g h Clifford and 
the Colonial Office pursued. Clifford described the N C B W A leadership 
as a 'self-appointed congregation of African gentlemen, vainly and 
erroneously hankering after constitutions and modes of government which 
were unsuitable and unworkable in Africa'. 
Secondly, in spite of all the rhetoric, neither the leaders of the N C B W A 
nor those of the youth movements were prepared to use any radical methods 
to achieve their objectives. It used to be thought that an entirely new style 
of radical politics developed in West Africa during the inter-war period. 
But it is quite clear from both the objectives and methods of the nationalist 
21. A . G . Hopkins, 1966(b). 
22. R . Stone, 1975. 
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groups and associations, that despite the economic depressions, no such 
revolutionary development in anti-colonial politics took place. As has been 
shown, the nationalist politics of the inter-war period should be seen as 
a transitional period during which both chiefs and intelligentsia participated 
in agitational politics, and as the formative period for some of the leaders 
of the nationalist movements after 1945. There were certainly elements 
of radicalism in the mid-iojos but in general, these movements were 
moderate nationalist movements, conducting their politics within the 
colonial framework. Political independence was decidedly not on their 
programme. 
Thirdly, there was a great deal of conflict a m o n g the leaders of the 
movements which greatly impeded their activities. In all the colonies, 
conflicts occurred between the conservatives and the moderates, and 
between both of them and the old traditional elite of kings. Such, indeed, 
was the conflict between the leaders of the N C B W A and those of the 
Aborigines Rights' Protection Society, and between the leaders of both 
on the one hand and the traditional rulers led by N a n a Sir Ofori Atta 
in the Gold Coast on the other. These conflicts greatly weakened the 
nationalist movement in that country. Similarly, it was largely because 
of the internal dissensions and personality conflicts in the Lagos branch 
of the N C B W A and the opposition of Sir Kitoyi Ajasa's Nigerian Pioneer 
and the Lagos conservatives that the fourth session of the N C B W A could 
not take place in Lagos until 1930. Fourthly, it would appear that the 
limited elective representation granted between 1923 and 1925 had the 
effect of politically anaesthetizing the nationalist movements. Finally, and 
undoubtedly, the death of Casely Hayford in 1930 constituted the final 
coup de grâce for nationalist activities in British West Africa in general 
and in the Gold Coast in particular in the inter-war years. 
For all these reasons, then, by the end of the period under review, 
politics and nationalism in British West Africa were at their lowest ebb, 
and it needed two events to ginger them up again, the Ethiopian crisis 
of 1935 and the Second World W a r of 1939-45, discussion of both 
of which belongs to the last volume of this work. 
Political activities in Francophone West Africa, 1919-35 
There are still some gaps in our knowledge of African political activities 
in the French West African colonies during the inter-war period. However, 
from the rather limited evidence available n o w , it would appear that there 
was a relative lack of political activity which would seem to stem from 
France's more restrictive attitude towards African political activities and 
organizations, and to the absence of a vigorous African press in French 
West Africa, comparable to the African newspapers in Sierra Leone, the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria. However, like the activities in British West Africa, 
those in French West Africa had their local as well as their international 
642 
Politics and nationalism in West Africa, ¡919-35 
aspects. Indeed, as I have shown elsewhere,23 a good deal of Francophone 
African political activity took place in Paris between 1924 and 1936. H o w -
ever, as most of these political groups were radical and aligned to radical 
French political parties and trade unions, the impact of their anti-colonial 
agitation on the French authorities was limited. A m o n g these groups were 
the Ligue Universelle pour la défense de la Race Noire, founded in Paris 
by a D a h o m e a n lawyer and nationalist, Prince Kojo Tovalou Houénou, 
in 1924. This movement agitated against conditions in D a h o m e y (now 
Benin) and the French colonies in general and had strong connections with 
Garvey's U N I A in the United States. Another group was the Comité 
de la défense de la Race Nègre, which succeeded Houénou's Ligue and 
was led by a Senegalese Communist, Lamine Senghor, until his death in 
1927 when the Comité was renamed the Ligue de la défense de la Race 
Nègre under the leadership of another Francophone West African Marxist, 
Tiémoho Garan-Kouyaté of Soudan. Interesting as these movements were, 
however, they did not operate in West Africa, although as will be seen 
later, some of their anti-colonial publications as well as those of their left-
wing allies in France, did find their way into some of the French West 
African colonies. Similarly, French humanitarian organizations such as the 
Ligue des Droits de l ' H o m m e (similar to the British Anti-Slavery Society) 
had branches in some of the French colonies, and as there was little or 
no organized African political activity, these branches were used by the 
Africans as instruments of protest against the colonial administration. 
Politics and nationalism in Senegal 
Perhaps the two most interesting French West African colonies where there 
was some African political activity in the inter-war period are Senegal and 
D a h o m e y . In Senegal the four communes had been electing deputies to 
the French Chamber of Deputies since the nineteenth century. Although 
the Africans in the urban areas were regarded as citoyens by virtue of 
the decree of 1833, they were represented by métis or Creole delegates 
until Blaise Diagne became Senegal's first black African Deputy in 1914. 
Diagne represented Senegal in the Chamber of Deputies from 1914 to 
1934, was High Commissioner of African Troops during the First World 
W a r , President of the Commission of Colonies in the Chamber of Deputies, 
and was instrumental in convening the 1919 Pan-African Congress in Paris, 
although he later fell out with the black American leaders of the m o v e -
ment . 2 4 
Diagne was also the first Senegalese politician to form a political 
organization. This was the Republican Socialist Party, which he founded 
23. For a more detailed treatment of this subject, see J. A . Langley, 1973, pp. 286-325. 
24. For a general background to the interaction of French and Senegalese politics between 
1919 and 1940, and for the details about the career of Blaise Diagne, see G . W . Johnson, 
1966; T . Hodgkin, 1954; M . Crowder, 1962; M . Boulegue, 1965. 
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in 1914 to unite the various ethnic groups in Dakar and St-Louis. Diagne, 
after almost twenty years' absence from Senegal, offered himself as a 
candidate in 1914, at a time when more Senegalese were coming into the 
urban areas and the groundnut economy was developing. This was also 
a time w h e n , with the political demise of the traditional chiefs, the marabouts 
(leaders of Islamic orders) were becoming a n e w political and social force 
in the rural areas. Young Senegalese clerks and school teachers in the urban 
areas were also becoming restive. T h e latter group had its origins in the 
Jeunes Sénégalais, which discussed politics and culture, demanded more 
jobs and better salaries and educational opportunities. It was later renamed 
the Parti des Jeunes Sénégalais, with a journal, La Démocratie. It partici-
pated in the 1914 elections, although it could not field a candidate. 
Blaise Diagne was able in 1914 to gain the support of the grands marabouts 
in the urban areas, as well as the political sponsorship of the Jeunes 
Sénégalais and some liberal-minded Frenchmen. Although a Serer, he was 
able to appeal to the other ethnic groups in Dakar and St-Louis such as 
the Lebou and the Wollof. In fact, the Wollof language was extensively 
used during his electoral campaign. Instead of appealing to race, Diagne 
spoke of the political representation of Senegalese Africans, the political 
awakening of the Africans, and of'rational evolution, not brutal revolution' 
in the colonies.25 Throughout the campaign, Diagne emphasized the 
importance of maintaining the right of citizenship and the right to vote 
by the African in the four communes, while his European and métis 
opponents (who had dominated the politics of the communes since 1900 
and had c o m e to regard the electoral seats as their personal or family fiefs) 
largely ignored this issue and dismissed Diagne as a candidate of no 
consequence. In fact, even some of the Africans, especially the Lebou, 
opposed Diagne in the beginning. 
Diagne, however, not only campaigned for the electoral rights of the 
Africans, he also advocated official recognition of Ku'ranic law and custom. 
H e also called for more commercial concessions to the Africans, the creation 
of a Colonial Council to manage the finances of the French colonies, the 
establishment of a medical school in Dakar, the right to organize trade 
unions, and compensation to the Lebou for lands taken from them through 
French military conquest. Largely through his energetic campaign, the 
secret ballot and the political support of the Muslim groups in the rural 
areas, Diagne emerged victorious in the 1914 elections, and became the 
first African deputy to the French C h a m b e r of Deputies in July 1914. 
His electoral victory was in itself a revolution in the participation and 
organization of the Africans in Senegalese politics. T h e African voters had 
become a significant political factor and not electoral fodder of the colons 
and métis. 
Blaise Diagne did not seek independence from France; he advocated 
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equality and dignity, and control of the administration and municipal 
institutions by the Senegalese Africans. H e remained faithful to this 
programme of evolution ('diagnisme') until his death in 1934. M'Galandou 
Diouf w h o succeeded him did not deviate from this policy either, although 
the radical intellectuals mentioned earlier came to regard the Blaise Diagne 
of the 1920s and 1930s as conservative and even anti-African. Nevertheless, 
his political awakening of Senegal did lay the foundation for the Senegalese 
politicians and nationalists of the 1940s and 1950s. 
Politics and nationalism in D a h o m e y 
In D a h o m e y , apart from the usual African protest through the local branch 
of the Ligue des Droits de l ' H o m m e , which was perhaps the only 
permissible forum of 'political' activity, 'politics' was largely a question 
of conflicts within the religious groups and the interaction of these conflicts 
with chieftaincy and succession disputes. This was, in fact, part of the 
origin of the 1923 Porto N o v o incidents. Because of their education and 
socialization, however, the African intelligentsia did not necessarily 
participate in chieftaincy politics or divide along ethnic lines. T h e most 
significant D a h o m e a n political activist during this period, w h o combined 
participation in chieftaincy politics (he supported the Sognigbe faction of 
the Porto N o v o Muslim community against the Jose Paraiso group of 
Yoruba Muslims) with anti-colonial agitation was Louis Hunkanrin.26 
Hunkanrin was educated in Senegal, worked for some time in D a h o m e y 
and returned to Senegal in 1913. H e wrote critical articles against colonial 
maladministration in D a h o m e y in French and Senegalese newspapers, and 
assisted Blaise Diagne during the latter's election campaign in 1914. 
Through Blaise Diagne, Hunkanrin was given a job in Paris, but got 
involved with radical political groups there and was sent back to D a h o m e y 
in 1921. While in Paris he started a newspaper called Le Messager Dahoméen 
which condemned colonial abuses in D a h o m e y and was later taken over 
by the Union Inter-Coloniale whose radical pro-communist journal Le 
Paris was at one time edited by the Vietnamese revolutionary H o Chi M i n h . 
Through these radical groups, Tovalou Houénou's Ligue Le Paria and 
Garvey's Negro World began to reach D a h o m e y . 
Back in D a h o m e y , Hunkanrin revived the local branch of the Ligue 
des Droits de l ' H o m m e as well as a branch of the Comité Franco-
Musu lman . Through colleagues in these local branches, radical and c o m -
munist newspapers from France and the United States reached Dahomean 
intellectuals, and petitions and grievances against the local administrations 
were sent to Paris. In Gabon, too, a similar body had existed since 1919. 
Laurent Antchouey, a young Gabonese w h o had studied in Senegal, revived 
a branch of the Ligue in Libreville in 1925, after returning from France 
26. M . Crowder, G . W . Johnson in J. F. A. Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974, 
pp. 511; 565-7. 
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where he had edited two journals L'Echo Gabonais and La Voix Africaine. 
In February-March 1923, partly because of increased taxes and lower 
price for palm kernel following the depressions of 1919 and 1920-1, and 
the subsequent price inflation and shortage of metal coins, workers in 
private firms went on strike and public meetings were organized by 
Hunkanrin's friends in the Comité F r a n c o - M u s u l m a n and in the Ligue.2 7 
T h e army had to be called out to break u p meetings, and the Africans 
reacted by mounting a passive resistance m o v e m e n t which lasted from 13 
February to early M a r c h . There were also strikes in W h y d a h . S o m e of 
the chiefs even requested fellow chiefs to resist the n e w taxes. T h e colonial 
administration countered by arresting the leaders of the resistance, calling 
for more troops from T o g o and Ivory Coast, and declaring a state of 
emergency which lasted until June 1923. W i t h the arrest and exile of nearly 
all the leaders of the protest m o v e m e n t , including Hunkanrin, nationalist 
agitation in D a h o m e y c a m e to an end, and a period of political quiescence 
as in the other French W e s t African territories followed. 
T h e major difference between conservative and radical French West 
African nationalists (and the conservatives were certainly in the majority 
during this period) was that the conservatives, led by Blaise Diagne, were 
satisfied with the 'symbolic representation' and gradual evolution of 
France's colonial subjects, with selected évolués representing the African 
population, whereas Kouyaté, Senghor, H o u é n o u and the few radical 
African intellectuals w h o expected greater changes in the colonies after 
the First W o r l d W a r , stood for significantly increased African representa-
tion through radical and ideologically articulate political groups which could 
operate either in France or in the colonies. This latter group also advocated 
the right to form trade unions in the colonies, as well as the possibility 
of some form of autonomy within the French empire. It was only w h e n 
the radicals were frustrated beyond measure by Blaise Diagne and the 
French authorities that their radicalism c a m e to assume autonomy and 
political independence from France as a goal. This was clearly not 
characteristic of the general political evolution of the French W e s t African 
territories, and it is, therefore, not surprising that this radicalism was short-
lived, and that the pattern of colonial politics in French W e s t Africa 
followed the style and concept of Blaise Diagne and M ' G a l a n d o u Diouf 
u p to the constitutional changes of the post-1945 period. 
Apart from the demonstrations and riots in Porto N o v o in 1923, which 
s t e m m e d from rivalry between M u s l i m and government-supported factions 
a m o n g the traditional groups, imposition of taxes, and deterioration in the 
palm kernel trade, and which was exploited by a group of nationalist 
intellectuals, nationalist m o v e m e n t s organized along the lines of the 
N C B W A or Macaulay's Nigerian National Democratic Party scarcely 
figured in French West Africa during this period. 
27. J. A . Ballard, 1965; R. Buell, 1928, Vol. II, pp. 16-17. 
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E. S. A T I E N O - O D H I A M B O 
T h e Kiswahili word siasa provides a useful umbrella for the two key words 
in the title of this chapter. Siasa includes opposition, complaint, agitation, 
activism. It embraces actions by organized groups as well as the spontaneous 
actions of spirited individuals. T h e practitioners of siasa are referred to 
as wanasiasa (singular: mwanasiasa). T h e British colonial authorities h o w -
ever referred to siasa as 'agitation', and to the wanasiasa as 'agitators'. But 
beyond this apparent British simplicity lay significant diversity at the levels 
of organizational scale, and with regard to areas of concern. Recent scholar-
ship1 has usefully drawn attention to the various levels of concern, and 
therefore the various arenas of activity, that the wanasiasa indulged in. 
This categorization is an improvement on John Lonsdale's earlier historio-
graphical designation2 of East African politics in the inter-war years as 
being essentially activism with a local focus. For, granted that the grounds 
for political activity lay in the local grievances of the masses and of certain 
individuals a m o n g the masses, the arenas for their articulation varied: from 
the chiefs' baraza in the location to the files of the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies in London; also from the licensed political rally to the defiant 
mass meetings on hilltops and armed rehearsals for war in the forests. 
T h u s one local issue could be presented at two or more levels at the same 
time, the initiative for action depending on the perception of the articulators 
as to what level would be most responsive to the given pressure at the 
given time. Siasa, then, represents a collective consciousness about colonial 
wrongs at a specific location in a given time. T h e term simultaneously 
captures the consciousness of clans, of nationalities, of social classes. T h e 
political activities that are the concern of this chapter, then, were the 
activities arising from concrete group consciousness. T h e y were mass 
activities. Each m o v e m e n t required a leadership, but the masses were the 
movement while the leadership was the vanguard. T h e assumption in 
the rest of this chapter is therefore that behind each movement and each 
leader, there lined up the masses.3 A n d depending on the levels and arenas 
1. D . A . L o w and J. M . Lonsdale in D . A . L o w and A . Smith (eds), 1976, pp. 40-8. 
2. J. M . Lonsdale, 1968(a). 
3. ibid. 
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of articulation, some of these activities have qualified in latter days for 
description as acts of nationalism. 
Religious protest movements 
O n e of the weapons that East Africans used from early on in their struggle 
against colonialism was religion. Resistance called for mobilization, and 
in m a n y regions religious leadership arose to fulfil this role. T h e era of 
primary resistance was also the era of the prophets. While the Africans 
lost the actual wars in the battlefield, the m o o d of resistance remained 
entrenched in the hearts of the m a n y . T h e followers of the Orkoiyot in 
Nandi remained active and watchful and the Nandi were repeatedly 
mobilized by this prophetic leadership to resist the abuses of colonialism 
over the years.4 Similarly colonial archives from Kenya are full of references 
to witch doctors and laibons creating trouble in Marakwet, Kericho and 
Samburu. In western U g a n d a the followers of the Nyabingi cult in Kigezi 
were being watched all through these years. T h u s these traditional religious 
resistance movements provided an element of continuity with the former 
era. But as the first decade wore on into the second, colonialism appeared 
to be gaining in strength; to m a n y , indeed, it appeared as if the worst of 
the evils had come to earth. T h e colonial forces dug in, restructured or 
destroyed the known social and political institutions, and imposed their 
o w n structures over the various communities. It appeared that colonized 
Africans needed a new spiritual reinvigoration in order to stand up against 
colonialism in its m a n y forms. This spiritual need was filled in two ways: 
first by the emergence of a new generation of African prophets, and 
secondly by the founding of African independent churches alongside the 
European Christian churches, with a view to providing 'a place to feel 
at h o m e ' for the m a n y Africans w h o had accepted Christianity but found 
it intolerable to live under missionary patronage.5 
Although not sufficiently covered in the existing historical writing, 
substantial initiative was displayed by those African prophets w h o arose 
and offered relief from the stresses which colonialism had introduced into 
the social fabric. These religious innovations were protest movements. 
Starting from the second decade, these activities were to continue through-
out the 1920s and 1930s, and were to be joined by m a n y more after the 
Second World W a r . W h a t they stood for can be seen by two studies from 
the K a m b a and the Abagusii of Kenya. 
T h e K a m b a had been in contact with the colonizing forces from the 
early 1800s w h e n K a m b a traders were plying to the coast.6 In their wake 
came the missionaries in the 1840s, and later on the more determined efforts 
at Christianization by the end of the nineteenth century and into the 
4. P. K . arap Magut in B . G . Mcintosh (ed.), 1969. 
5. F. B . Welbourn and B . A . Ogot, 1966. 
6. J. F. Munro, 1975. 
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twentieth century. But Christianity, like Islam, m a d e little impression on 
the mass of the K a m b a . W h a t m a d e visible inroads into K a m b a society 
was colonialism as a political and an economic force. During the first two 
decades of this century, the colonial situation produced a widely-felt sense 
of deprivation and frustration a m o n g the K a m b a masses as the colonial 
authorities campaigned to appropriate K a m b a resources in the form of 
taxes, land and labour, using their newly appointed chiefs w h o had very 
little regard for traditional authority. T h e pre-capitalist social institutions 
for conflict resolution were rendered irrelevant for the purposes of 
restraining these chiefs and their policemen. As the masses got more and 
more disillusioned they resorted to religious movements for succour and 
as vehicles for protest. These movements manifested themselves in 
prophets and spanned the period between 1910 and 1922. A widespread 
cult, Kathambi or Ngai, had emerged in Machakos district between 1901 
and 1911, promising an imminent millennium. For a time the cult's leader-
ship frightened the British authorities, w h o responded by instituting 
reforms in the political system. But these were not considered enough, 
and although the main wave of millenarianism cooled d o w n , there were 
still elements in K a m b a society that were not reconciled to the colonial 
situation. Compulsory recruitment into the Carrier Corps in the First 
World W a r years, plus the widespread inability of the colonial authorities 
to deal with the m a n y social and economic problems that beset the K a m b a 
masses after the war, served to increase the numbers of those w h o would 
answer to the clarion-call for a millenarian resolution to the tensions in 
society. 
Such a call came with the emergence of Ndonye w a Kauti, w h o began 
to preach a prophetic message to the people of Kilungu in Machakos district 
in the early months of 1922. Ndonye's movement grew in response to the 
local expressions of the worldwide economic crisis of the 1920-1 period. 
As a result of this crisis, m a n y K a m b a found it more and more difficult 
to acquire enough m o n e y to pay their taxes. In addition, the prices of 
their surpluses were declining while at the same time the burden of taxation 
rose up from three to eight rupees per head in 1920. T h e currency reforms 
of 1921-2, converting the rupee first to the paper florin and then to the 
shilling coin, led to losses in cash sales. T o crown it all, a drought decimated 
K a m b a production during these years, and yet there were not enough 
employment opportunities to absorb the surplus male labour. It was in 
these impecunious circumstances that Ndonye w a Kauti offered a millen-
arian and messianic solution to the cash shortage. H e claimed to be a 
prophet, asserting his ability to foretell the coming of rain, and invited 
w o m e n to dance a religious step (Kilumi) at his h o m e . H e also stated that 
G o d , Ngai, appeared to him in a dream and announced that he, Ndonye , 
had been selected to lead the people in a N e w Age about to come on this 
earth. At the onset of this new era, Europeans would be driven out, 
following which the earth would be as good as it was before colonialism, 
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with plentiful water, and no taxes. W h e n Ndonye had built a sanctuary 
as instructed by G o d , H e would send him books, clothes, rifles and a tele-
graph line. 'The telegraph line', Ndonye prophesied, 'will provide a means 
of communication between us. As soon as all these articles have been sent 
to m e by G o d , I shall take complete charge of the whole country.' But 
take charge he would not, for the district commissioner arrested him before 
the sanctuary was completed, and deported him to Siyu along the Kenya 
coast. Ndonye was never to return again, for like m a n y activists before 
and after him, he died in exile. A n d with his departure the movement 
collapsed, an indication that in this as in other movements, the role of 
the mobilizer was crucial. 
Not so easy to suppress was the M u m b o cult, a movement contempor-
aneous with Ndonye wa Kauti's prophetism which outlasted Ndonye. This 
movement was rooted in the resentment of colonial authority which the 
L u o and the Abagusii shared. This resentment dated back to the wars 
of occupation the British had inflicted on the Abagusii in 1904 and 1908, 
and on the L u o of Alego in 1908-1 o.7 But it was further ingrained because 
of the British coercion of these people to yield compulsory labour for road 
construction and for the settler farms. There was, in addition, the hated 
hut tax which weighed particularly heavily on those w h o were polygamous. 
T h e paternalism of the missionaries further fuelled this m o o d of resent-
ment. As in Ukambani, the Abagusii began to look for n e w categories of 
thought that would hold forth promise for a better world view. They found 
this in the L u o M u m b o cult, a traditional lake spirit cult which was at 
the height of its influence in the nineteenth century. This cult found 
revitalization into a political movement for resistance to the white man's 
presence in the second decade of this century. In an epiphany in 1913 
this M u m b o spirit addressed one Onyango D u n d e of the Seje clan in Alego 
as follows: 
I have chosen you to be m y mouth-piece. G o out and tell all Africans 
- and more especially the people of Alego that from henceforth I 
a m their G o d . Those w h o m I choose personally and also w h o 
acknowledge m e will be forever in plenty. Their crops will grow of 
themselves, and there will be no more need to work. I will cause 
cattle, sheep and goats to come out of the lake in great numbers to 
those w h o believe in m e , but all unbelievers and their families and 
cattle will die out. 
T h e Christian religion is rotten and so is its practice of making 
its believers wear clothes. M y followers must let their hair grow and 
never wash. All Europeans are your enemies but the time is shortly 
coming when they will disappear from our country. 
As in Ukambani , the message was one of denunciation of the European 
7. J. M . Lonsdale, 1977. 
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and a repudiation of his way of life. Because the message was succinct, 
but more particularly, because it was such a harmonious blend of a restate-
ment of the validity of a traditional religious cult together with a conscious-
ness of the more recent political happenings, the movement spread very 
quickly from Alego in Siaya District to South Nyanza, making its début 
in Gusii in 1914 through the agency of another L u o prophet, Mosi wuod 
A u m a , w h o was reportedly 'promising cures of all evils' and predicting 
'the early departure from Kisii of all white m e n after which the native 
would possess their land in peace'. 
T h e message about the imminent departure of the white m e n assumed 
a fortuitous reality when in 1914 the Germans attacked the British stockade 
at Kisii township. T h e Africans saw the prophecy as fulfilling itself, and 
joined in the rampage by plundering colonial and missionary centres in 
the district. W h e n reprisal came it was brutal, about 150 Abagusii being 
killed in the British effort at the suppression of the revolt. But it did not 
deter the adherents, w h o continued with their activities in the inter-war 
years, in spite of frequent arrests and the predictable deportations of the 
leaders. A n d in the process of entrenching itself further, the M u m b o cult 
intermeshed in Gusiiland with the more indigenous cult of Sakawa. Sakawa 
was a nineteenth-century Gusii prophet whose return was fixed by the 
Abagusii foretellers for some time in the middle of 1921. A prophetess, 
Bonairiri, began marshalling up an organization to prepare people for the 
return of Sakawa. T h e colonial administration's response was to break up 
this movement using the Abuse of Opiate Ordinance. This did not deter 
the followers, w h o continued through 1921 and 1922 to preach both 
Sakawaism and M u m b o i s m . Repressed by the colonial administration, 
these movements continued to thrive in Gusiiland throughout our period. 
Persecuted, deported, forbidden in the district, the Mumboites continued 
to preach and sing their recalcitrant refrain: 
Sabaye Laesi, Sabaye 
Wuriande you are going 
George you are going 
Sabaye Laesi, Sabaye.8 
But as is well k n o w n , 'George' (the white m a n ) did not go, and the kingdom 
of M u m b o did not come. Yet the spirit of resistance could not be killed. 
It simply went underground, surfacing later in the 1950s to gall the British 
administration in Gusii yet again. 
Equally significant, and the second strand of religious resistance, was 
the emergence of Christian independent churches. As w e have seen in 
Chapters 12 and 20, some of these churches played the role of protest 
movements against European patronage in the missionary churches; all 
of them had the aim of going beyond the missionary churches and offering 
8. B. A. Ogot and W . R . Ochieng in B . A . Ogot (ed.), 1972(a), p. 173. 
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solutions which they believed to be positively good for the communities 
they served. Yet having stated this c o m m o n purpose of the independent 
churches, it is important also to identify the m a n y varieties that emerged 
in East Africa in this period. S o m e were 'Ethiopian' churches in that they 
emphasized, as K . Asare Opoku has pointed out already, African self-
improvement and political rights. Yet others belonged to the 'Zionist' 
school, with their emphasis upon possession by the Holy Spirit, upon 
healing, and upon prophecy. M o r e than this there were differences between 
the independent churches with regard to doctrine, ritual, organization and 
aspirations. These differences are best identified as the narrative on 
independency flows. 
T h e earliest independent African Church in this region, the Nomiya 
L u o Church, founded in 1910 by John Owalo, a former Church 
Missionary Society adherent w h o had been converted in turn first to Islam 
and then to R o m a n Catholicism, has already been dealt with in Chapter 7 
of this volume.9 It m a y be recalled that he had a vision in which he 
was taken to Heaven, and of this place it has been written that: 
It is a beautiful place; and all the nations of the earth wanted to enter 
in but the Angels closed the gate. W h e n all the Nations of the earth 
had gathered at the gate of heaven, the Angels let the Jews in first, 
then secondly the Arabs. After them went in John Owalo, the Angel 
Gabriel and the Angel Rafael, all three entering together. T h e White 
races attempted to enter in after them, but the Angels closed the gate 
on their face and chased the White m e n away, kicking them. 
Owalo's heavenly vision, apart from its pointedly anti-white testimony, 
was in part a synthesis of his diverse religious experience and background. 
This synthesis was further carried into the practices of his new Church, 
whose ever-increasing adherents were enjoined to practise circumcision 
and to observe the T e n C o m m a n d m e n t s ; and w h o were also enjoined not 
to smoke, drink beer or dance. In essence then, as Ogot has observed,10 
Owalo was not rejecting alien religions: he merely wanted the Africans 
to accept them on their o w n terms. 
Equally exciting was the message the Watchtower Church delivered to 
the Africans in Central Africa and southern Tanganyika (now Tanzania) 
in the years during and after the First World W a r : the world was in 
its last age; the great empires and nations of Europe were the instruments 
of Satan; so too were the historic churches. All these were to be overthrown 
in one last great struggle. T h e world would then become the inheritance 
of the true believers. This message was to be easily received in Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia), where Hanoc Sindano preached, from 1917 
onwards, against the authority of the colonial chiefs, colonial administra-
9. See Chapter 7 above and also O . Odinga, 1967, pp. 68-9; B. A. Ogot, 1974(b), 
pp. 262-3. 
10. B. A. Ogot, 1974(b), pp. 262-3. 
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tors, and missionaries. B y 1919 the movement had entered Tanganyika, 
and caught on substantially in the Kasanga, M a m b w e , Ufipa and Mbozi 
areas. Matters came to a head in 1923 when the British accused the Church's 
leaders of vilifying the missionary churches; seventeen m e n were arrested 
and gaoled. This did not deter the followers and the religion continued 
to spread throughout the colonial period. Like M u m b o i s m , it was a religion 
of the masses. 
T h e Watchtower movement was an attempt to provide solutions to the 
problems of colonized rural peoples. By rejecting the authority of the chiefs, 
the missionaries and British officials, and setting up n e w villages for the 
believers, the adherents sought to create new societies where they could 
feel at h o m e . Like the Nomiya Church, it sought to create whole and whole-
some societies to replace those which had been destroyed by colonialism. 
But some of the churches were started with a narrower scope than the 
two discussed above. These latter movements would be identified through 
their concern with single issues. For example, the African National Church 
that thrived in the R u n g w e district of Tanganyika from the 1930s onward 
was set up specifically as a Christian Church that would accommodate 
those w h o had been expelled from the missionary churches because they 
had 'reneged' into polygamy, and to embrace those w h o had not joined 
these mission churches because they were already polygamous. ' ' Likewise, 
the Dini ya R o h o (Holy Ghost Church) was founded among the Abaluyia 
of Kenya in 1927 as a breakaway from the Friends African Mission.12 
T h e followers of Dini ya R o h o insisted that in order to count oneself fully 
a Christian one had to accept 'baptism by the Holy Spirit', speaking in 
tongues, and the free confession of sins. This emphasis on 'baptism by 
the Holy Spirit' also led Alfayo Odongo M a n g o to found his Joroho (Holy 
Ghost) Church 1 3 among the L u o in 1932. But though founded as a result 
of a specific grievance, each religion would then evolve its o w n specific 
doctrine, ritual, and organization 'in the struggle', in response to the specific 
historical experience of each faith. 
Although regarded by m a n y colonial authorities merely as 'impulsive 
negative retorts',14 these religious protest movements were a testimony 
to the strength and vitality of the African spirit, and in a fundamental 
way laid the foundations for the mass nationalist movements of later years. 
Although not often honoured in the annals of nationalism, they were, as 
it were, the 'illegitimate uncles' of African nationalism. A n d the basis of 
their support was the people, the rural masses. 
11. T . O . Ranger, n.d., pp. 16-20. 
12. O . Odinga, 1967, p. 69. 
13. B. A. Ogot in K . J. King and A. Salim (eds), 1971. 
14. J. S. Coleman quoted inj. M . Lonsdale, 1968(b), p. 12. 
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The Young Associations 
M u c h prominence has been given in the recent historiography to the 
educated elites, the Asotni or jfosomo, in the development of African politics 
during these years. ' s This newly emergent group consisted of those few 
m e n (and hardly any w o m e n ) w h o had attended the missionary schools 
like Maseno, Budo , Thogoto and Zanzibar, subsequently becoming 
teachers, catechists, clerks and artisans. Working in opposition to the 
colonial-appointed chiefs, and to the local administration, these people 
organized 'Young' Associations as protest movements through which to 
conduct their political campaigns. These associations therefore had a mass 
following. T h e doyen of them was the Y o u n g Baganda Association, which 
excelled in its opposition to the chiefs and the Kabaka of Buganda. Equally 
prominent was the Young Kavirondo Association in mobilizing peasants 
in Nyanza. A s well, there was the Kikuyu Central Association, which was 
noted for its persistence and organizational ability during these years. T o 
their fortunes w e must n o w turn. 
T h e Y o u n g Baganda Association, for example, emerged as a result 
of the basic tensions in G a n d a society during the time. Generally it can 
be said that political competition in Buganda was very intense during the 
first three decades of this century. Certain factors were contributory to 
this intensity. T h e first was a legal creation of the British colonialists and 
the Protestant Baganda chiefs, namely the Buganda Agreement of 1900. 
This Agreement, whose economic aspects have already been discussed in 
Chapter 7 above, established, inter alia, a treaty relationship between the 
British and the Baganda ruling class. It was through this agreement that 
Buganda enjoyed more autonomy than was available in other areas of East 
Africa. T h e Buganda Agreement gave external protection to the Baganda; 
for that reason political activity in Buganda assumed an introspective form 
and the issues that were raised were those of specific pertinence and 
consequence to Ganda society. T h e internal dynamic for this activity were 
the chiefs. Beneficiaries from the Agreement, having been awarded sub-
stantial personal and official estates, these overlords were to bear the brunt 
of criticism from both the traditional clan-heads (the bataka), the peasants 
(bakopi), and the 'young' m e n . A s the Kabaka of Buganda was the biggest 
individual beneficiary of the Agreement, the questioning eyes, tongues and 
pens of the 'young' m e n did not spare him. There was, indeed, cause for 
political discord in this community, for the Agreement and its consequence, 
the creation of n e w social classes in society, left m a n y groups — the Muslims, 
the Catholics, the bataka and the bakopi — dissatisfied. A n d the demeanour 
of the newly created chiefs left a lot to be desired. They were, in the years 
after 1918, becoming increasingly unpopular. Being colonial bureaucrats 
and not traditional leaders, they were willing to flout the patron-client 
15. A . M . Karani, 1974; B . E . Kipkorir, 1969; G . P. McGregor, 1967; I. N . Kimambo 
and A . J. T e m u (eds), 1969, C h . VI. 
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relationships that had obtained in Buganda in favour of their new masters. 
Moreover, as agents of colonialism they were regarded as agents of some-
times undesirable changes in, and interference with, the traditional ways 
of life. For example, they were meant to enforce health and sanitation 
regulations which were unpopular with the peasants. Those members of 
the western-educated elite w h o were not co-opted by the hierarchy 
exploited these grievances to the full. 
Leading in this revolt were the young m e n , 1 6 the most pre-eminent of 
w h o m was Z . K . Sentongo, an articulate pamphleteer w h o organized the 
immigrant Baganda Community in Nairobi. In 1919 he founded the Y o u n g 
Baganda Association, whose aims were 
1. to improve Uganda in every way; 
2. to give a helping hand to deserved [sic] M u g a n d a w h o m a y be 
in distress; 
3. to settle the best way to enable us to get and maintain our education. 
In their m a n y testimonies and writings, these leaders complained about 
the chiefs in Buganda, accusing them of imprisoning the people without 
trial by jury. Their other grievance was economic: they wanted the m a n y 
restrictions which had been imposed on the cotton trade by the Uganda 
Protectorate government to be removed. Thirdly, they m a d e a characteristic 
demand as new m e n : they asked for an improvement in the education 
facilities then existing, calling for the introduction of government schools, 
expansion in the education facilities for girls, and a higher institution of 
learning in Buganda. 
But if this was a modest beginning, the Young Baganda Association 
was to become more intransigent in the following three years. By 1921 it 
had become racialist and anti-Asian. T h e Asians served as a convenient 
scapegoat for the economic grievances of the period. Writing in the Uganda 
Herald in that year, Sentongo accused the Asians of being the immediate 
exploiters of the Africans. ' W h o but the Indians are exploiting us? - and 
in turn smuggling our hard earned money into India for their o w n benefit 
- robbing us doubly? T h e Indian effort is only to blind the natives' he 
concluded. By 1922 the Young Baganda Association had become anti-
monarchical as well, attacking the chiefs and the Kabaka, and suggesting 
that Uganda should be a republic. In that year Yowasi Paito, Joswa Naluma 
and Yusufu Mukasa, the three of them medical assistants at Namirembe 
Hospital and all of them old boys of B u d o High School, wrote a letter 
attacking the Kabaka Daudi C h w a on grounds of personal immorality, 
for failure to run the Lubiri (palace) properly, and for supporting the 
chiefs. 'The Kabaka is worthless', they wrote. They concluded by asking 
for a constitution for Buganda. Obviously neither the chiefs nor the Kabaka 
would let them get away with all this. A campaign was mounted to discredit 
these elements. For a start, the Lukiko passed a law making it illegal to 
16. D . A . Low, 1971, p. 53-5. 
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abuse the Kabaka, arguing that this was against traditional custom. 
Offenders were to face gaol sentences, and the three letter writers fell victim 
to this law, all of them being imprisoned in July 1922 for the letter they 
had written. Furthermore Kabaka Daudi C h w a himself wrote pamphlets 
in the following years aimed at arousing popular support for himself by 
attacking the young intelligentsia. H e accused them of'foreignization'.17 
This two-pronged attack, coupled with the fact that some of the Associa-
tion's supporters were co-opted by being offered minor chiefly positions, 
undermined the solidarity of the organization which steadily fizzled out. 
T h e Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association18 is a classic product 
of the missionary impact. Its parent body, which was subverted by 
missionary effort, was the Young Kavirondo Association, which had been 
founded in the latter half of 1921 by the alumni of Maseno School in 
Nyanza. T h e issue at stake was the change of status of the colonial territory 
in 1920 from the British East Africa Protectorate to a C r o w n Colony — the 
Kenya Colony and Protectorate. T h e Association's leaders read into the 
transformation an ominous attempt by the British to change the status 
of Africans and possibly to expose the lands of western Kenya to European 
settlement. This territorial concern was married with the local grievances 
to precipitate a strike at Maseno School. Jonathan Okwiri, Jeremiah Awori, 
Reuben O m u l o and Simeon Nyende as teachers took part in this. Very 
soon, word was spread that there would be a public meeting at Lundha 
to discuss the grievances of the L u o and the Abaluyia people. 
This meeting was held on 23 December 1921. T h e outcome was the 
setting u p of the Y o u n g Kavirondo Association ( Y K A ) with Jonathan 
Okwiri as chairman, Benjamin O w u o r G u m b a as secretary and Simeon 
Nyende as treasurer. M o r e importantly, resolutions were passed calling 
for, a m o n g other things, the establishment of a separate legislature for 
Nyanza as an autonomous administrative unit with an elected African 
president; for the election of paramount chiefs for Central and South 
Nyanza; the abolition of the infamous kipande (identity card); the reduction 
of hut tax and poll tax with a view to excluding w o m e n from taxation; 
an increase in wages; the revocation of the C r o w n Colony status and 
reversion to Protectorate status; the granting of individual title-deeds to 
land; the abolition of forced labour, and the dissolution of the labour camps 
at Yala, Rabuor, Nyahera and Pap Onditi; and the building of a govern-
ment school in Central Nyanza. Following this, a delegation went to see 
the provincial commissioner with these resolutions. Subsequently the 
delegation asked to see the governor so as to present these resolutions to 
him in person. T h e commissioner would not oblige the first time nor the 
second, but as tensions were running high the governor finally came to 
meet the petitioners at Nyahera on 8 July 1922. N o n e of the requests were 
immediately granted; but the one lesson that emerged from this experience 
17. ibid., pp. 104-8. 
18. M . Okaro-Kojwang, in B. G . Mcintosh (ed.), 1969. 
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of confrontation was that this nascent elite had demonstrated impressive 
ability at mass mobilization. This was because they were articulating local 
mass grievances. There was a need therefore to contain them. T h e option 
chosen was that of colonial patronage, through an agreeable missionary, 
Archdeacon O w e n . In 1923 the leaders of the Young Kavirondo Association 
felt that he would be a good go-between for them. O w e n on his part found 
opportunity to patronize these people and make of them 'law-abiding' 
citizens. In July 1923 they handed the presidency of their movement, Y K A 
or Piny Owacho as it was more popularly known, to Archdeacon O w e n . 
O w e n proceeded immediately to make this organization respectable by 
subverting it. H e thus shifted the basis of its support from the masses 
to the elites. There was a shift in emphasis away from political agitation 
towards n e w demands for better houses, better food, better clothing, better 
education and better hygiene. M e m b e r s were often required to chant in 
ritual fashion the pledge not to dirty water in springs, to kill so m a n y 
rats a week, to plant two hundred trees a year, not to mix cow's urine 
with milk (a traditional delicacy), to build latrines, to make one bed for 
each hut in the village, not to get drunk, and not to encourage marriage for 
girls before the age of sixteen. In other words, O w e n removed the mass 
political sting from this Association, which from then on took on the 
impotent title of Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association ( K T W A ) . 
O w e n encouraged and organized the now muted leadership, whenever there 
was a political grievance, to write memoranda to the authorities. These 
were often accurate and stung the colonial administration, but precisely 
because they were so elitist and so formalized, they were effete. During 
the period, the m e m o r a n d u m became the basic tool for the struggle, so 
m u c h so that these leaders were referred to as J o - M e m o r a n d u m . 1 9 
T h e Association was rendered even more effete by its split into L u o 
and Abaluyia factions in 1931. T h e L u o wing of the Association limped 
on under O w e n ' s leadership until 1944, its firebrand approach having been 
stifled by O w e n ' s intervention and by the siphoning off of the radical leader-
ship into respectable roles: Jonathan Okwiri and Odindo both became 
chiefs, Simeon Nyende was appointed to the Local Native Council and 
Apindi was the Nyanza representative before the Joint Select Committee 
into the Closer Union in East Africa. Recalcitrants there were, like A d u w o 
Nyandoje and John Paul Olola. T h e latter, a m a n from Alego location, 
was particularly active from 1927 onwards in the Kisumu Chamber of 
Commerce . But these efforts were towards petty-bourgeois economic 
grievances and were a far cry from the comprehensive mass political 
programmes of the early 1920s. A n d yet, in spite of all this, the K T W A 
did serve as an inspiration to a neighbouring area. 
T h e neighbouring area was eastern Uganda, where Erisa Masaba 
founded the Bugishu Welfare Association in the early 1920s. T h e associa-
19. O . Odinga, 1967, pp. 61-94. 
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tion aimed at getting rid of Baganda agents and instituting local leader-
ship, in addition to pledging itself to 'working for the uplift of the Bagishu', 
and keeping a close watch on the K e n y a settlers, in case the latter might 
encroach upon their lands in the M o u n t Elgon areas. Also contemporaneous 
with Masaba's organization and broadly pursuing the same goals was the 
Y o u n g Bagwere Association, set u p to resist Baganda acquisition of the 
lands around M b a l e township, and also to teach the m e m b e r s to 'learn 
to teach properly and to plant our crops properly'. 
M o r e intractable during the period was the Kikuyu Central Association 
( K C A ) , a m o v e m e n t that articulated Gikuyu rural grievances, beginning 
from 1924. Its headquarters was at Kahuhia in M u r a n g a where it was 
launched under the leadership of Joseph Kang'ethe and James Beauttah. 
A s to what it stood for, Beauttah has remarked that, ' O u r main goal in 
the K C A was to get back the land Europeans had taken from us. ' 2 0 
But w h o were its members? T h e K C A was a body representing those 
elements a m o n g the Gikuyu w h o did not fully accept the ideas and practice 
of European dominance. T h e y were m o r e militant in their approach to 
change than the establishment chiefs and mission boys. In a w o r d , the 
K C A stood for dissent. A n d what did its m e m b e r s dissent from? It is 
difficult to put it succinctly as the K C A leaders were never able to articulate 
their objectives with any precision. But in general terms they were 
protesting against the excesses of the colonial situation in so far as these 
manifested themselves in Gikuyu society. T h e racial indignities which the 
G i k u y u suffered as a result of the cultural arrogance of the white rulers 
coupled with the m a n y resented policies and actions of the colonial 
administration c a m e in for constant rapping. 
Something of their attitudes m a y be garnished from the list of grievances 
the K C A leadership presented to the governor w h e n the latter visited 
M u r a n g a in 1925. T h e y protested against the C r o w n L a n d s Ordinance 
of 1915 which had m a d e all Africans tenants at will of the C r o w n . T h e y also 
requested the release of Harry T h u k u , and asked for an appointment of 
a paramount chief'with judicial powers for trying our cases, one w h o should 
be well educated and to be elected by the majority of our people'. T h e 
petition also dealt with the local problems that the colonial administration 
created for the people, such as the compulsory rebuilding of sanitary huts 
to prevent plague and the banning of the growing of cotton and coffee 
by Africans. Finally, it put forward programmes for improvement, asking 
the administration to expand the training facilities for hospital orderlies, 
for the building of a high school, and for the setting u p of a school for 
girls. These requests m a d e little impression on the colonial authorities. 
But official scorn did not deter these leaders. B y 1927 something of 
a rapprochement was m a d e with the K i a m b u politicians, w h e n J o m o 
20. J. Spencer, 1971, p. 94. 
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Kenyatta was asked by the Association to take over the post of general 
secretary, a job which he took up the following year. 
T h e fortunes of the K C A improved in the following two years for reasons 
both local and international. Kenyatta's efforts as party secretary led to 
a cultural revival. In his efforts to build up grass-roots support for the 
Association, Kenyatta appealed to the Gikuyu through Mwigwithania, a 
Gikuyu-language newspaper he founded, to be proud of their cultural 
heritage. T h e pages of the monthly Mwigwithania were full of riddles, 
proverbs and stories which encouraged the readers to think of themselves 
as Gikuyu. This paper also narrated the day-to-day activities of the K C A 
in detail, thus bringing it to the attention of the readers. This cultural 
revival was to be intensified w h e n a major quarrel broke out within the 
churches of Gikuyuland the following year. T h e issue at stake was 
clitoridectomy which has already been discussed in Chapter 20 above. 
This was also the decade of Kenyatta in London. Beginning with the 
petition and evidence of the Kikuyu Central Association to the Hilton 
Young Commission in 1928, the Gikuyu placed their land grievances at 
the centre of their problems. Kenyatta was part of the K C A delegation 
that gave evidence to this commission. T h e gist of their grievance was 
captured in this statement of evidence, which noted that, ' W e have tried 
for m a n y years to make the government give us title deeds for our land 
but w e have not got them and w e cannot k n o w whether it is our land 
or whether it is Crown L a n d . ' 2 1 This concern with security of tenure in 
the African 'reserves' was reiterated by Kenyatta when in 1929 the K C A 
sent him to London to articulate their demands. In London, Kenyatta 
summarized the K C A ' s aims as being the security of their lands; increased 
educational facilities of a practical nature; the abolition of the hut tax for 
w o m e n , and elected representation to the Legislative Council. This theme 
was to be pursued with particular vigour two years later when the Africans 
were invited to submit evidence before the Kenya Land Commission -
a body set up as a result of a parliamentary recommendation in 1931 that 
African land problems should be looked into. T h e K C A took an active 
part in helping the Gikuyu lineages (mbart) to prepare their evidence. A n d 
when the report came out, the K C A marshalled all the Gikuyu political 
groups to draft a unanimous m e m o r a n d u m of rejection and protest. 
Because these protests went unheeded, the question of land assumed the 
central place in Gikuyu politics that it did, leading to the M a u M a u war 
two decades later. 
These 'young' associations did not succeed, and yet it would be unfair 
to state that they failed. Although the system regularly undermined their 
effectiveness by co-opting some of the leadership while detaining others, 
their lasting legacy is that they articulated the grievances of the Africans 
against the colonial system using methods like pamphleteering and abilities 
21. C . G . Rosberg and J. Nottingham, 1966, p. 94. 
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like the capacity to speak the English language a n d Kiswahili to expose 
the basic evils of colonialism. 
Segmentary associations 
T o o m a n y and too diverse to be enumerated were the segmentary associa-
tions formed specifically to deal with the issue of boundaries. Colonial 
regimes did indeed fix the territorial boundaries of K e n y a , U g a n d a , 
Tanganyika , Zanzibar a n d Somaliland in the period before 1933. B u t in 
their attempts to organize the internal administration in the territories, 
the colonial masters created provincial, district, locational and country, 
and sub-location and sub-country boundaries that cut across m a n y ethnic 
groups, clans and lineages. In m a n y instances, lands belonging to one group 
were allocated to n e w owners with n o traditional claims to these areas. 
In both instances, the o u t c o m e w a s agitation: agitation to get back lost 
lands; or to be allowed to rejoin clansmen in a different sub-location; or 
to be given a distinct administrative boundary through the creation of a 
sub-location specifically catering for one clan or sub-clan group. T h e scale 
of contention w a s local, but the intensity and persistence of these seg-
mentary agitations were such that the colonial administration could not 
ignore t h e m . Besides, m a n y of the ' n e w m e n ' found roles to play in these 
internecine quarrels: preparing evidence, litigating in the courts, writing 
m e m o r a n d a to district commissioners, to the colonial governor, or even 
to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. T h e potential for seg-
mentary violence w a s always great in these conflicts, and sometimes the 
feuds ended tragically. 
T h e U g e n y a K a g e r L u o Clan (South B a n k of River Nzoia) Association,22 
which w a s set u p b y the Luo-speaking K a g e r c lansmen in 1932 with a 
view to recovering 'lost territory' from their W a n g a neighbours, represents 
this type of conflict o n a minute scale. B y contrast, the m o r e f a m o u s 
M u b e n d e Banyoro C o m m i t t e e 2 3 persistently sought the return of the 'lost 
counties' of H u y a g a , Bugangaizi, B u w e k u l a , Buruli a n d R u g o n j o b y the 
B a g a n d a to the k i n g d o m of B u n y o r o in U g a n d a . B u t b y and large it w a s 
not possible for the colonizers to satisfy the d e m a n d s emanating from seg-
mentary associations. A n d precisely because these d e m a n d s could not b e 
satisfied, these associations provided avenues for the practice of the politics 
of local focus. A n d because of their persistence the British dismissed all 
of this activity zs fitina — small-scale strongheadedness. B u t factionalism, 
after all, is the very stuff of village politics. 
22. B . A . Ogot in K . J. King and A . Salim (eds), 1971. 
23. J. B . Kyeyune, 1970. 
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Improvement associations and trade unionism 
O f minor political significance during this period were the m a n y c o m -
mercial associations formed by the African farmers and businessmen. Quite 
often they set out with specific aims but because of the day-to-day 
annoyances of the colonial situation, they very soon found themselves acting 
as vehicles of protest against all and sundry that was wrong with the colonial 
system within their areas. Their daily activities thus became a matter of 
contest between the mass leadership and the local representatives of the 
colonial administration. A case in point was the Kilimanjaro Native Planters 
(Coffee) Association ( K N P A ) which was founded in 1925 'to protect and 
promote the interests of the Native Coffee Growers on the mountain'.24 
Partly as a result of the fears of European settlers about organized African 
lobbying, and also as a result of the personality clashes between the leader, 
Joseph Merinyo, and the various British administrative officials and African 
chiefs, this organization found itself pushed to take up other matters like 
land registration, land alienation and use, closer union with Kenya, political 
rights, and representation in the Central Legislative Council and the Moshi 
District Water Board. At the local level, the posture the union took often 
appeared calculated to oppose chiefly authority. This was in fact the case, 
and in this respect it was similar to the m a n y local protest movements 
in East Africa in the mid-1920s. Their existence was an indication that 
a n e w generation of elites had emerged outside the official chiefly elite 
that had been sei up by the colonial authorities fifteen or twenty years 
earlier. These n e w individuals were active not only a m o n g the Chagga 
and Gikuyu but also a m o n g the Langi,25 the K a m b a 2 6 and the H a y a . 2 7 
Their emergence was a signal that one age-group ought to hand over 
authority in the local community to the other. 
Basically what they were saying was that the colonial chiefs should not 
necessarily see themselves as the only vehicles of social change; the n e w 
elites felt that they should also be co-opted into this process. T h u s when 
the Bukoba Bahaya Union was formed in 1924 part of its ambition was 
to advise the people, 'to civilize them'. T h e government clerks and local 
traders in Bukoba w h o formed it — Clemens Kiiza, Suedi Kangasheki, 
Ludovic Kaitaba and Herbert Rugizibwa - stated that the organization 
was launched 'for the establishment of an institution for the development 
of our country and for the seeking of a system for the simple way to civiliza-
tion to our mutual advantage'. T h e two avenues open for the attainment 
of this 'civilization' were through literacy education, and the planting of 
coffee. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s this organization championed these 
causes, and in the process regularly clashed with both those colonial and 
24. S. G . Rogers, 1972 and 1974. 
25. J. Tosh, 1973 and 1978. 
26. J. F. Munro , 1975, Chapters 7 and 8. 
27. G . Hyden, 1969, Chapters 4 and 5. 
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chiefly authorities which they considered to be standing in the way of 
progress. In retrospect, this Union was merely another African trading 
association like the K i s u m u Native Chamber of C o m m e r c e , associations 
set up to try to wrest a little of the privileges that the Asian Associations 
of the period enjoyed. In East African historiography they have been 
described as 'improvement' associations28 led by 'modern' m e n . 2 9 A m o n g 
these m e n have been counted H u g h Martin K a y a m b a , Francis Lwamugira 
and the Harry T h u k u of the late 1930s. Their contribution to the political 
awareness of the African is being debated by historians of East Africa. 
O n the one hand are those scholars w h o emphasize their vision for the 
African people.30 O n the other hand there are those w h o regard these 
modernizers as primarily self-seekers and would deny them any legitimate 
role in African political radicalism.31 O n the whole, the improvers set off 
primarily to defend their o w n and their class interests; and therefore it 
is difficult to accord them a leadership role in the politics of mass activism.32 
Espousing popular causes was to be the task of these elites only in the 
years after the Second World W a r . T h e history of trade unionism clearly 
illustrated this lack of linkage between the modernizers and the masses. 
Resistance a m o n g employed labour, as opposed to trade unionism proper, 
came early to East Africa. O n e of the first challenges the colonial authorities 
faced was h o w to force the Africans to work for them in the settler farms 
and in the newly created sectors of employment like the Kenya-Uganda 
Railways, the Central line in Tanganyika, and the public works depart-
ments. T h e colonial rulers solved this by passing legislation that would 
create a 'contract of service' enforceable by penal sanctions, any infringe-
ment of which was a criminal offence punishable by fine and/or imprison-
ment. Supplementing this legislation, particularly in Kenya, was the 
process whereby all liable African male labour was registered under the 
Native Registration Ordinance, the infamous ordinance that introduced 
the hated kipande to the Africans. But all this did not deter workers from 
striking.33 T h e first known African strike in Kenya took place in M o m b a s a 
in 1902 when fifty police constables downed their batons, followed, in 1908, 
by a strike of African railway workers at Mazeras. In the same year, African 
rickshaw pullers went on strike in Nairobi. Four years later, African boat-
m e n in M o m b a s a went on strike followed by the railway workers in Nairobi. 
A n d so on. These single industry strikes did not involve the exercise of 
forming trade unions, which in any case could have been considered illegal 
then. But they did represent the idea that action could be taken with regard 
28. J. Hiñe, 1969, pp. 123-61; 1979, pp. 4°S-3S-
29. J. Iliffe (ed.), 1973. 
30. J. Iliffe (ed.), 1973; K . K . Janmohamed, 1974. 
31. See E . S. Atieno-Odhiambo, 1973, a review of J. Iliffe (ed.), 1973. 
32. E . S. Atieno-Odhiambo in B . A . Ogot (ed.), 1975, pp. 218-22. 
33. M . Singh, 1969, p. 45. 
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to labour grievances, and were part and parcel of the growing African aware-
ness that was characteristic of the years before 1919. 
This awareness was to mature into full-scale political consciousness in 
the years after the war. T h e economic problems and the hardship faced 
by the Africans in the 1919-22 period led to an appreciation that there 
was a linkage between labour and the overall political economy in which 
the Africans operated. T h e 'young m e n ' w h o were to take up the political 
leadership in these years were by and large urban Africans, and the plight 
of the labouring masses did not escape their notice. T h u s the labour 
grievances were often part of their m e m o r a n d a and rhetoric. For example, 
at the founding of the Y o u n g Kikuyu Association on 11 June 1921, labour 
matters featured prominently. Harry Thuku' s s u m m a r y of the proceedings 
of the day attests to this. H e wrote to the newspapers: 
A meeting of the Y o u n g Kikuyu Association was held at Pangani 
village . . . on Tuesday w h e n the subject was the native wages 
reduction. It was . . . suggested and carried out [that] in order to 
show the native grievances to the Government in the matter of wages 
reduction . . . [the Association should be] in the position of writing 
to the H o n . Chief Native Commissioner, asking him to lay the matter 
before H . E . the Governor.3 4 
This m e m o r a n d u m was duly sent to the chief native commissioner. It asked 
the colonial administration to desist from reducing the wages and to enjoin 
the settlers to do likewise; denounced forced labour; opposed the registra-
tion system; and complained of the high rates of hut tax, a m o n g other 
things. T h e description that fits this organization (as well as its successor 
the East African Association) is that it was 'a political association as well 
as a general workers union'. This description can also be well applied to 
the contemporary Y o u n g Kavirondo Association which likewise argued 
against compulsory labour, and is a fair s u m m a r y of those organizations 
that were involved in the struggle by African workers during this period. 
Recurrently in the 1920s African political activity in Kenya would touch 
on the labour question, arguing against forced labour and demanding higher 
wages and the abolition of tax for w o m e n . These demands , for instance, 
formed part of the African presentation to the O r m s b y - G o r e Commission 
in 1924. Likewise African leaders raised these issues in the m e m o r a n d u m 
that the Kikuyu Central Association presented to the Hilton Y o u n g C o m -
mission in 1928. 
But what of direct trade union organization? T h e colonial administration 
tolerated staff associations rather than trade unions as such, provided the 
staff associations took on a welfare mantle rather than pursuing direct union 
activities. T h e hope was that the emergent skilled African workers would 
form their o w n exclusive elitist clubs. This thinking guided the British 
into permitting the founding of the Tanganyika Civil Servants Union 
34. Quoted in ibid., p. 11. 
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( T C S U ) in 1922 and the K e n y a African Civil Service Association sometime 
before 1933. T h e Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Associa-
tion35 w a s founded by Martin K a y a m b a 'to promote social and 
educational development a m o n g its m e m b e r s ' and 'to foster the welfare 
of its m e m b e r s in the various G o v e r n m e n t Departments ' . It w a s partly 
a trade union and partly a social club w h o s e activities included sports and 
evening classes. This organization w a s renowned for its open elitism and 
w a s largely concerned with elitist privileges. Although K a y a m b a had hoped 
to build a countrywide organization, his Association seems to have faded 
out in the late 1920s as the obsequious K a y a m b a found m o r e favour with 
his masters and m o v e d higher u p the ladder of colonial administration. 
Its achievements, therefore, were limited even while it lasted. 
T h e exact origins of the K e n y a African Civil Service Association are 
obscure, but it did submit an important m e m o r a n d u m to the C o m m i s s i o n 
of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in K e n y a , U g a n d a and 
Tanganyika Territory in Criminal Matters, wh ich w a s set u p in 1933.3 6 
T h e authors of this m e m o r a n d u m were one Newland Gibson, w h o was 
the General Secretary of the Association, Ishmael Ithongo, H . G . Shadrack 
and Albert Awino. This m e m o r a n d u m touched on important matters 
related to the legal system. It requested that all the laws of the country 
should be translated into Kiswahili, asked for an assessor jury in all criminal 
trials, and the repeal of the kipande system. T h e m e m o r a n d u m also 
criticized the provisions of the Vagrancy Ordinance, the Collective Punish-
ment Ordinance, and urged the abolition of payment of tax by widows, 
the unemployed and those over 50 years of age. Apart from this m e m o r a n -
d u m there is a dearth of information as to what else the Association did. 
Equally little is known about the Kenya African Teachers Union, which 
was formed in 1934 under the leadership of Eliud M a t h u and James 
Gichuru. 
But generally it can be stated that these elite associations were a pale 
reflection of the reality of the overall labour situation, which was 
characterized throughout our period by the recurrent resort to strikes in 
the factories, ports and workshops and also in the settler farms. Given 
the official disapproval of trade unionism, and the lack of a communication 
network among the vast unskilled workers and labouring masses, these 
individual strikes at the site of work were the logical avenues of expression. 
That so little is known about them, particularly with reference to Uganda 
and Tanganyika, is perhaps the limitation of the scholar rather than the 
subject of study. But it cannot be overemphasized that the feeling of 
deprivation was recurrent among African labour. 
35. J. Ilifie (ed.), 1973, p. 73. 
36. M . Singh, 1969, pp. 24-45. 
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Efforts at territorial politics 
This narrative has so far been concerned with the politics of local concern 
articulated at various levels. W h e n it comes to the question of African 
attempts at territorial politics, the experience is one of failure, or 
alternatively of lack of serious effort. In a sense that is not derogatory 
since very few Africans regarded themselves as Tanganyikans or Kenyans 
in the inter-war years. Political consciousness had not matured to embrace 
the boundaries of the colonial state. Exceptions there were - m e n like J o m o 
Kenyatta, Akiiki Nyabongo, and Mbiyu Koinange, w h o had the rare 
opportunity of travelling to Europe and the United States and interacting 
with others w h o saw the colonial situation in an imperial perspective. While 
in Britain from 1930 onwards, Kenyatta certainly widened his horizons 
to embrace not only the African cause but the plight of the black m a n 
in general. Similarly Mbiyu Koinange's American education, and more 
so his relations with D r Ralph Bunche, widened his perspectives. B y 1933 
he was writing m e m o r a n d u m to the Colonial Office against injustices being 
meted out to his father Chief Koinange and generally to the Kenya Africans. 
But these m e n were few; what is more, they were away from h o m e , and 
therefore did not have the opportunity to organize the local masses. 
In this context, Harry Thuku's East African Association stood out as 
a unique body in the early 1920s in the sense that it did, at least on paper, 
set its sights on encompassing the whole colonial territory of Kenya and 
beyond. T h e East African Association was founded in 1921 in Nairobi 
by Harry T h u k u , Jesse Kariuki, Job M u c h u c h u and Abdullah Tarrara.37 
Africans from other territories were also prominent, including the 
indomitable Z . K . Sentongo of the Young Baganda Association and an 
unnamed Nyasa m a n from Nyasaland (now Malawi). It was certainly trans-
ethnic, and its n a m e reflects its Kenya-wide concern. But its membership 
was predominantly Gikuyu. It was given life and direction by Harry 
T h u k u , a clerk working in the Treasury. 
T h u k u was one of a number of young Gikuyu then living in Nairobi 
w h o felt the need to organize themselves into a body that would rival the 
chiefly-dominated Kikuyu Association. It has been suggested that these 
young Gikuyu m e n were modelling themselves on the Young Baganda 
Association. M o r e importantly, T h u k u and the young m e n in Nairobi felt 
that there was a need for a Kenya-wide African organization. A s he wrote 
to the East African Standard in 1921, it was felt 'that unless the young 
people of this country form an Association the Native in Kenya will always 
remain voiceless.' This quest for solidarity is what led T h u k u to fraternize 
with the K a m b a , L u o and Ganda young m e n then living in Nairobi. Thus , 
on 1 July 1921, they formally launched the East African Association. T h e 
organization passed resolutions on the subject of kipande, forced labour, 
37. K . J. King, 1971(b). 
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excessive African taxation, and education. T h u k u cabled these resolutions 
directly to the Colonial Office in London. T h e Indian politicians, A . M . 
Jevanjee and B . M . Desai, played a supportive role, helping T h u k u in 
the drafting of the m e m o r a n d u m to the British government and printing 
broadsheets for the Association. These connections with the Asians caused 
m u c h furore among the settlers at the time. Recent research has, however, 
conclusively demonstrated that T h u k u was no pawn in Indian hands, and 
there the issue must for the m o m e n t lie. 
O f more importance for this analysis were the efforts by T h u k u to involve 
non-Gikuyu in his Association at this time. His contacts in Nairobi 
naturally led him to attempts at propagating his Association among the 
K a m b a . But if the K a m b a in Nairobi were enthusiastic, the rural K a m b a 
were not. W h e n T h u k u had a public meeting with Chief Mathendu at 
Iveti in Machakos, the elders rebuffed his overtures, refused to sign the 
papers he had presented, and advised him to return to the Gikuyu 'with 
w h o m the A k a m b a had little in c o m m o n . ' 3 8 T h e situation was different 
in Nyanza, where Thuku's Association found a corresponding body in the 
Young Kavirondo Association. By December 1921 the leaders of the latter 
group were in touch with T h u k u and had assured him that they were 
'struggling' with him for the country, and had contributed financially to 
his funds. T h e relationship was one of equals, and the Young Kavirondo 
Association was in no way subordinate to Thuku's organization.39 It is 
also important to stress that the two associations were only in touch: their 
relations were in no way close, and there is no substantial evidence that 
one influenced the other. T h e link-man between these two organizations 
was James Beauttah, then a m e m b e r of Thuku's Association employed at 
Maseno. In his o w n words: 
There was a large school there [at Maseno] with well-educated African 
teachers, most of w h o m were interested in politics and w h o wanted 
to learn about the E A A . It was the only group I knew of outside 
Nairobi which was concerned with Nationalism. / connected these two 
groups; these future L u o politicians and the supporters of the E A A . 
These people . . . were enthusiastic and contributed 90 rupees to send 
to Nairobi to support the movement. They wanted to join with the 
Kikuyu and the coastal people, and I think I was the one that got 
them interested.40 
T h e proximity of Maasai country to Nairobi, and the tribulations the 
Maasai had experienced at the hands of the British in the first two decades 
with regard to their land, made western-educated Maasai elites natural 
allies in any protest movement taking place in town in the early 1920s. 
All these Maasai elites had variously had education at Thogoto, or at the 
38. J. F. Munro, 1975, p. 126. 
39. M . Okaro-Kojwang in B . G . Mcintosh (ed.), 1969, p. 120. 
40. Quoted in J. Spencer, 1971, p. 10 (emphasis added). 
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African Inland Mission schools in Kijabe and Siyiapei. They became the 
supporters of Harry T h u k u among the Maasai.41 A m o n g them were Maitei 
Ole Mootian and Molonket Ole Sempele. There is little evidence that they 
organized a political movement in the Maasai countryside, as they were, 
by and large, urban workers. Their influence among the rural Maasai was 
to come after 1923 w h e n they were posted back to their districts. It is 
from this h o m e base that they were to organize support for the later Kikuyu 
Central Association. 
It was the personal touch that T h u k u lent to his Association which led 
him to associate with the Baganda. O f special interest to him was the 
Kampala-based Young Baganda Association, whose secretary, Joseph 
Kamulegeya, corresponded with T h u k u on a number of issues. Kamulegeya 
introduced T h u k u to the Black American world, and T h u k u wrote to D r 
W . E . B . D u Bois, Marcus Garvey and the Tuskegee Institute for black 
American aid missions to East Africa. N o lasting associations were created 
however, although Garvey's paper, the Negro World', was sent to T h u k u . 4 2 
All this was fine on paper. But the colonial administration was upset by 
Thuku's populist assertions. O n 14 March 1922 he was arrested, the 
intention being to deport him. While in confinement at the police station 
in Nairobi, his followers and the general African populace in Nairobi w h o 
were apparently on strike from work as well, picketed the police compound. 
T h e inevitable in this kind of colonial confrontation followed; the policemen 
after a while lost their nerve and fired into the crowd, killing twenty-one 
Africans. T h e date was 16 March 1922. 
Following this incident, T h u k u was deported to Kismayu and his 
Association went into disarray. Politics in the Gikuyu countryside from 
this time on took a more ethnic dimension. T h e new organization that 
emerged was the Kikuyu Central Association. British gunpowder put an 
end to any pretensions that the Nairobi Africans had entertained on multi-
ethnic political organization in the inter-war years. 
Prospects in Tanganyika were not m u c h better than in the other 
territories, as the example of the Tanganyika African Association reveals. 
T h e Tanganyika African Association ( T A A ) was founded in Dar es Salaam 
in 1929. Under the leadership of Cecil Matóla, Kleist Sykes, M z e e Bin 
Sudi and Ramadhan Ali, the Association stated its aim as being 'to safeguard 
the interests of Africans, not only in this territory but in the whole of 
Africa'.43 In practice, however, the influence of the T A A did not extend 
beyond Dar es Salaam in the subsequent six years unless some m e m b e r 
was transferred to work upcountry, as happened in 1933 when M a c k Makeja 
was posted to D o d o m a and founded a branch there. Moreover, even within 
Dar es Salaam, its achievements were limited tb building a club house; 
it also unsuccessfully petitioned the government for the appointment of 
41. K . J . King, 1971(a)-
42. K . J. King, 1971(b). 
43. G . G . Hajivayanis, A . C . Mtowa and J. Iliffe in J. Iliffe (ed.), 1973, P- 235. 
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an African town magistrate. Internal rifts denuded its membership in the 
years of 1931 and 1932 and it was not until 1934 that the Zanzibar branch 
took the initiative in reviving the Association. Apart from the fact of colonial 
repression, a legitimate conclusion can be drawn, namely, that in the 
inter-war period, there were politically no Kenyans, or Ugandans, or 
Tanganyikans. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to narrate the extent, nature and limitations 
of African politics and nationalism in East Africa in the period between 
1919 and 1935 through examining the various forms of activism. T h e main 
actors were the masses, while the main organizers of politics, siasa, during 
these years were the 'young' m e n , people w h o had benefited from the 
introduction of missionary education in the first two decades of the century, 
and were competent to articulate African grievances before the colonial 
authorities. T h e y largely concerned themselves with local grievances, 
agitating against those ills that colonialism had brought in its train. These 
people operated at various levels, ranging from the locational baraza or 
public meeting to sending petitions to the colonial governors or the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in L o n d o n . Their attempts at political 
organization were often thwarted by the colonial power, and none of the 
associations succeeded in all their aims. But while they lasted, these 
organizations were a reminder to the colonial authorities that 'the African 
voice' could be heard through channels other than the structure of the 
colonial administration. Yet there were m a n y areas of African grievances 
which did not coalesce into formal organizations; no trade unions emerged 
during this period because few of the leaders attempted to organize such 
movement . This chapter notes the limitations of African activity in the 
period: because of their primarily local focus, they failed to organize 
effective territorial political movements. 
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Deep differences have always marked African political life in such widely 
differing countries as Angola, Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Belgian 
Congo (now Zaire), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Basutoland (now 
Lesotho), Nyasaland (now Malawi), Mozambique , Swaziland, Southern 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) , South West Africa (now Namibia), and the 
Union of South Africa (now Republic of South Africa). These differences, 
still apparent n o w , were considerable in the period between 1919 and 1935. 
O n e reason for these differences was that these countries were parts of 
different colonial empires - the British, Portuguese or Belgian. Another 
was their different political status, with some being colonies, others 
protectorates and one a dominion. Last, but not least, great variations 
existed at the economic level, in turn generating distinct patterns of social 
differentiation. A n d yet, the emergence of the new anti-colonial movements 
in Southern and Central Africa reveal distinctly specific features compared 
with East and West Africa. This chapter examines the changing nature 
of popular protest in Southern and Central Africa with particular attention 
being given to South Africa, the Belgian Congo, and the former Portuguese 
colonies. ' 
The economic and political setting in Southern Africa and 
the Belgian Congo: an overview 
T h e specific features of Southern Africa stem both from the character 
of colonial-capitalist penetration and from the ethnic stratification of 
societies which was more complex than elsewhere in Africa. Nowhere did 
the 'European sector' develop so rapidly, dwarfing the 'traditional' African 
economy. This economic pattern and the complexity of ethnic stratification 
1. A . B . Davidson was primarily responsible for the discussion on the economic and 
political setting in Southern Africa and the Belgian Congo, and the section on popular 
resistance in South Africa and the neighbouring territories. A . Isaacman wrote the sections 
on Mozambique and the Belgian Congo and, together with R . Pélissier, the overview of 
the economic and political setting in Angola and Mozambique. R . Pélissier also wrote the 
section on Angola. 
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are attributable to the ways in which colonization proceeded, which in 
turn was determined by the natural conditions and the vast natural wealth 
of that part of Africa. 
B y 1919 the historical tenor of economic life in most of Southern Africa 
had been upset to a greater degree than in other parts of the continent. 
Millions of people had been drawn into the sphere of capitalist exploitation. 
B y the middle of the 1920s more than 200000 migrant workers, recruited 
from as far away as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, were employed 
in the South African mines.2 Upwards of 60000 labourers worked in the 
copper, tin, diamond and gold mines of the Congo . 3 
Because of the development of European farming and large-scale 
expropriation of land from the peasants in a number of Southern African 
countries, African participation in the production of export crops and 
in trade was thwarted except in sectors of forced production such as cotton 
in the Congo. 4 Similarly, the road was barred to the emergence of a large 
stratum of African capitalist farmers and merchants, which is a feature 
of m a n y other colonies where there were m u c h fewer white settlers. Loss 
of land, strangulation of the peasantry, proletarianization and urbanization 
were thus processes that went faster and deeper in most Southern African 
countries than in other parts of Africa.5 
A permanent and numerically significant proletarian body of African 
and non-European descent was, it has been seen in Chapter 16, forming 
more rapidly in a number of Southern African countries. Its more advanced 
contingents were represented by workers in the industrial cities and ports. 
Mos t of the African labour in mining and in the cities was initially recruited 
from seasonal workers. Yet an increasing number of people came to depend 
on the seasonal occupation for their livelihood, and, over time, a process 
of labour stabilization occurred. As a result, the emergence of an African 
urban proletariat was more advanced there than in most parts of West 
and East Africa. There were even more seasonal workers in white-owned 
farms, with land expropriation rapidly swelling the ranks of the rural 
proletariat. 
T h e emerging intelligentsia went a long way to determine the sense of 
national and political identity. T h e development of the intelligentsia was 
determined by the specific character of European colonization and relative 
access to education. T h e social 'ceiling' for Africans in the south was far 
lower than in West Africa where, in the absence of a permanent body 
of white settlers, Africans found it easier to become clerks or secure a 
job in the civil service. In Southern Africa, whites had monopolized all 
the employment opportunities that might have been open to educated 
2. For statistics on the composition of the South African mine labour force see Centro 
de Estudos dos Africanos, 1977, 24c. 
3. C . Perrings, 1979, pp. 56, 84, 176. 
4. B . Jewsiewicki in M . A . Klein (ed.), 1980. 
5. C . Bundy, 1979; G . Arrighi, 1970; I. R . Phimister and C . van Onselen, 1978. 
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Africans, be they in the administration, the economic sector, the church 
or other spheres of life. 
B y the same token, the intelligentsia in Southern Africa was from its 
inception closer to the people. This was due to the fact that, in these regions, 
it derived from the midst of the indigenous population and was not initially 
recruited, as was sometimes the case in some West African countries, from 
repatriated 'freed' slaves or their descendants. T h e regime of cruel race 
discrimination, of which Africans in Southern Africa were victims without 
exception, inevitably tended to bring the intelligentsia closer to the people. 
African intellectuals there found it more difficult to play the role of inter-
mediaries. 
Another crucial distinguishing feature of anti-colonial protest in 
Southern Africa lies in the fact that opposition to the colonial order was 
recruited, not only from a m o n g Africans, but from a m o n g the sizeable 
non-African populations - the 'coloured people', Indians and progressive 
whites. Consequently, Africans were the main but not the sole anti-colonial 
force, and this left its imprint on the whole character of the struggle.6 
A further circumstance that contributed to the general features of the 
anti-colonial movements in Southern Africa was their internationalist ties. 
In Southern Africa both the trade union movement and early nationalist 
activities received substantial assistance from abroad, while Belgian 
socialists and communists vigorously criticized repressive colonial policies 
in the Belgian Congo. Finally, because Southern Africa was more closely 
linked to the world capitalist economy, there were more contacts with the 
outside world with the result that worldwide changes were more keenly 
felt there. T h e period between 1919 and 1935 saw m a n y such changes. 
O n e could mention the impact of the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia 
and the revolutionary upsurge in the wake of the First World W a r lasting 
until 1923, the beginning of the crisis in the colonial system, the world 
economic crisis of 1929-33, and, towards the end of the period considered 
in this volume, the echoes of the Italian-Ethiopian war which began in 
1935-
Popular protest, nationalism and politics in South Africa and the 
surrounding territories 
Opposition to colonial rule and capitalist exploitation in South Africa took 
four principal forms. T h e first was peasant protest. Often sporadic, isolated 
and largely with low visibility, various expressions of peasant protest were 
nevertheless widespread during the period under examination. In addition, 
m a n y peasants and urban dwellers articulated their opposition to the 
6. Even in this explicitly racist environment, the colonial regime had to rely on loyalist 
chiefs and African police w h o became part of the state apparatus. This alliance undercuts 
any analysis of resistance which views events exclusively through the prism of race without 
reference to class and ethnic factors. 
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culturally arrogant and racist system through the m e d i u m of the 
independent churches which flourished in South Africa. Still others joined 
the African National Congress — the oldest nationalist organization on the 
continent. B y the 1920s an embryonic African working-class movement 
had also emerged - symbolized by the meteoric growth of the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers Union under the leadership of Clements Kadalie. 
In response to increased impoverishment and economic uncertainty 
which accompanied the transformation of m u c h of the rural South African 
area from a peasant economy to a labour reserve, peasants engaged in a 
number of actions to minimize or eliminate increasing political and econo-
mic pressures. Most forms of resistance were designed to protect their land 
and livestock, and to protest against increased taxation and labour demands. 
Often these were individual acts such as flight, tax evasion, violation of 
registration laws and attacks on loyalist chiefs and police.7 In other cases, 
they represented more coherent and organized forms of opposition such 
as the anti-dipping campaign. 
T h e state's effort to enforce more stringent cattle and sheep dipping 
regulations and increase dipping fees provoked widespread peasant 
opposition throughout the Transkei in the period from 1913101917. While 
m a n y peasants acknowledged the necessity to protect their herds from East 
Coast fever, they objected to the excessive taxation at a time of severe 
pressures on the rural economy. Opposition to dipping took a variety of 
forms. In Pondoland the peasants initially refused to pay the tax. In Fingo-
land they organized boycotts and refused to allow anyone to participate 
in the dipping programme. T h e most militant action occurred in East 
Griqualand, where dipping tanks were dynamited and destroyed, and 
protesters attacked police w h o tried to disrupt their campaign. F r o m the 
perspective of rural political organizing, what is most significant is the 
scale of opposition and the inability of loyalist chiefs to control the activities 
of their militant peasant subjects.8 Four years later, rural w o m e n in the 
Transkei organized a series of boycotts against European merchants to 
protest against price manipulation and their refusal to provide basic c o m -
modities on credit. B y 1922 their movement had spread to Northeastern 
Province and East Griqualand where state officials and traders alike c o m -
plained about the 'feminist' agitators. T h e protesters picketed rural shops, 
and - despite threats from the authorities - they forcibly blocked prospec-
tive customers from entering the stores. Ultimately state intervention and 
threats from loyalist chiefs undercut the boycott.9 
7. W . Beinart and C . Bundy in M . A . Klein (ed.), 1980; A . T . Nzula, I. I. Potekhin 
and A . Z . Zusmanovich, 1979, pp. 104-6; E . Roux, 1964, pp. 88-120; A . B . Davidson, 
1972. Here and elsewhere materials are drawn from the collective work entitled the History 
of African National Liberation Struggle, Contemporary Period (Istoriya Natziionalno-
osvoboditelno borby navodor Afriku V novelschee Vremia) which appeared in Russian 
in the Nauka of Moscow edition. 
8. W . Beinart and C . Bundy in M . A . Klein (ed.), 1980, pp. 280-4. 
9. Quoted in ibid., pp. 286-7. 
676 
Politics and nationalism in Central and Southern Africa, 1919-35 
Peasant uprisings surfaced periodically in South West Africa where the 
South African government only began to effectively consolidate its power 
after the First World W a r . Thereafter the government of Jan Smuts cruelly 
put d o w n the Bondelswart people, one of the N a m a cattle-raising peoples 
living in the south. Unrest a m o n g the Bondelswart people had been 
prompted by a rise in taxes. In M a y 1922 a punitive military operation 
was launched against them involving 400 troops armed with machine guns 
and aircraft. Perhaps for the first time in history, African dwellings became 
targets of air raids. About 100 Africans were killed and over 150 gaoled.10 
Three years later an equally cruel treatment was meted out to the 
'coloured community' on the Rehoboth river in the central part of the 
country. In protest against the violations of an agreement signed by the 
colonial authorities with the community during G e r m a n rule, the c o m -
munity refused to comply with the n e w demands of the authorities. T h e 
community's counsel filed a complaint about illegal treatment on the part 
of the authorities with the League of Nations. In April 1925 the village 
was surrounded by troops, as aircraft appeared in the sky above. T h e 
villagers offered to 'surrender' and about 640 of them were taken 
prisoner.11 T h e question of the Bondelswarts and Rehobothers was dis-
cussed at the League of Nations because South West Africa was a mandated 
territory. However , no measures were taken to prevent similar brutalities 
in the future. O n the contrary, w h e n in 1932 the people of Ukuabi in 
Ovamboland (in the north of the country) rebelled, planes and armoured 
cars were used against them. 
Most of the peasant rebellions were spontaneous and narrow in character. 
S o m e of the earliest of the broader-based, more organized movements owed 
m u c h to the Afro-Christian churches and sects. T h e peasants provided 
the social base for these movements , although city-dwellers often took an 
active part in them. 
T h e Afro-Christian churches, or 'independent native churches' are a 
curious phenomenon. It m a y seem odd at first sight that people drew 
ideological inspiration for their struggle against European conquerors from 
the very religion those conquerors imposed on them. Yet this was precisely 
the case and is accounted for by various reasons. T h e first was the character 
of the old African religions. ' T h e local traditional religions of tropical and 
southern Africa - the cults of the early states - were local in character 
and tended to separate rather than unite', wrote D r B . I. Sharevskaya, 
a M o s c o w student of African religions.12 Christianity with its idea that 
all m e n are the children of G o d m a d e it possible for the n e w converts 
to identify with a community larger than an ethnic group. Unity on a 
n e w basis was possible only in a milieu which marked a departure from 
the old forms of unity and saw no way of returning to them. T h e n e w 
10. E. Roux, 1964, pp. 143-4. 
11. R. First, 1963, pp. 101-5. 
12. B. I. Sharevskaya, 1968, pp. 215-16. 
677 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1Ç35 
converts were in just such a milieu. These were, as a rule, people whose 
break with tradition and prevailing custom was most complete. N o wonder 
anti-colonial protest was accompanied by disenchantment with those w h o 
had brought the new faith to them, a disenchantment with the Europeans 
as genuine Christians and with racial discrimination in the established 
churches. There was also a wish to assert themselves and their values in 
this faith and to discard everything associated with the white m a n w h o , 
in their eyes, turned out to be an oppressor, deceiver and an epitome of 
all evil. 
T h e ideology of these churches had m u c h in c o m m o n . There was, in 
the first place, the idea that, in the true teaching of Christ, blacks are 
equal in everything, and that the European missionaries were distorting 
the Bible. Messianism was a feature of Afro-Christian churches, with their 
belief in the second advent of the Saviour - this time a black one. T h e 
second advent, the adherents of these churches and sects believed, would 
usher in a thousand-year rule of good and justice, while colonialists would 
be driven out of Africa. ' 3 
Independent churches, both of the Zionist and Ethiopian varieties, were 
particularly widespread in South Africa and represented an important form 
of dissent. Their numbers spread rapidly. In 1918 there were seventy-six; 
by 1932 the number had increased to 320; and a decade later there were 
more than 800.14 F r o m the standpoint of social movements, the separatist 
Ethiopian churches, with their elected officials, flags, charters and para-
military organizations, represented the assertion, within the framework of 
the Church, of the claim for African self-government. Similarly, the Zionist 
churches were often led by charismatic anti-European prophets w h o held 
out an apocalyptic vision and the hope of a reconstructed society free of 
oppression and white rule. ' 5 
Despite close state surveillance, independent churches periodically 
engaged in explicit insurgent activities. A s early as 1884 Nehemiah Tile, 
a Methodist preacher, had urged his adherents in Tembuland to disregard 
state officials.16 In 1921 an Ethiopian sect known as the Israelites under 
the leadership of Enoch Mgijima forcibly resisted removal from a squatter 
settlement in Queenstown. T h e Israelites contended that the N e w Testa-
ment, a fiction of the white man's , must be disregarded and that if they 
worshipped the ancient Hebraic forms, Jehovah would ultimately liberate 
them from the yoke of oppression. Even as a large police and military 
force approached, the Israelites, armed only with swords and spears, 
remained defiant. 'Jehovah tells us that w e are not to allow you to burn 
our huts, or drive away our people from Ntabelanga, or allow you to arrest 
13. T . Hodgkin, 1956, pp. 93-112. 
14. B. G . M . Sundkler, 1961, p. 76. 
15. ibid.; T . Hodgkin, 1956, pp. 99-100. 
16. E. Roux, 1964, p. 78. 
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the m e n you wish to arrest."7 T h e soldiers, armed with machine guns, 
killed 163 Israelites and wounded 129. 
Other militant independent churches combined an apocalyptic vision 
with an abridged form of Garveyism. T h e most important was the 
Wellington movement named after its founder, Wellington Butelezi, which 
flourished from the early 1920s until the mid-i930s. H e assured his 
followers in the Transkei that American blacks in aeroplanes would come 
to their aid and help to liberate them. After this liberation, Butelezi 
proclaimed, taxes and dipping fees would be abolished and clothing would 
be distributed to all the people. W h e n state officials became aware of his 
radical vision and militant rhetoric, they deported him and arrested several 
of his lieutenants. Nevertheless, his influence persisted and a whole series 
of separatist schools and churches were organized to spread his word. In 
the early 1930s a number of militant adherents refused to pay dipping 
taxes and on occasion attacked state officials.' 8 
By the latter half of the 1930s Afro-Christian movements had passed 
their prime as vehicles of anti-colonial struggle. In most Southern African 
countries, that role was passing to more developed forms of organization 
and struggle. 
Besides the older forms of peasant rebellions and the Afro-Christian 
Church movements, the period 1919-35 also saw the emergence - in 
Southern Africa as well as elsewhere in the continent - of n e w forms of 
African political organization not based on ethnic communities. These were 
the elitist and working-class organizations. T h e first, and by far the most 
important, of these new elitist organizations in Southern Africa was the 
African National Congress ( A N C ) , founded in 1912.19 T h e A N C was a 
major organization which united politically-active Africans, and was 
originally set up as an African organization for all the countries of Southern 
Africa which were part of the British Empire. Its constitutional congress 
was attended by representatives from Rhodesia, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, 
and Swaziland (see Fig. 27.1). Later, national organizations sprang up in 
each of these countries which, as a rule, were under heavy A N C influence. 
M a n y national organizations in Southern, Central and even East Africa 
borrowed not only the n a m e of the A N C but, to varying degrees and at 
different stages, also its structure, programme and rules, methods, strengths 
and weaknesses. T h e A N C was followed, twenty, thirty or forty years later, 
by the setting up of the African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia 
and the African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia, as well as similar 
organizations in Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Basutoland. 
Its precept and example were followed so closely because the A N C was 
17. Quoted in ibid., pp. 136—7. For a detailed discussion of the Israelites, see R . Edgar, 
forthcoming. 
18. W . Beinart and C . Bundy in M . A . Klein (ed.), 1980, pp. 280-4. 
19. For the early history of the African National Congress, see E . Roux, 1964, pp. 74-6; 
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formed at a time w h e n most African countries had hardly any intelligentsia 
or working class not to speak of African political organizations. As the 
intelligentsia and the working class emerged, the eyes of those w h o came 
out for consolidation of Africans in their countries inevitably turned to 
the organizations which existed in the Union of South Africa. A n important 
factor contributing to the spread of this influence was the migration of 
labour to the Union of South Africa which gradually affected the countries 
of Southern and Central Africa namely, Mozambique , Nyasaland, South-
ern Rhodesia, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. Returning to their 
villages they brought with them not only the occupational miners' diseases, 
but also knowledge of the wider world: other places, other peoples and 
n e w forms of unity in the struggle for their rights. 
B y the beginning of the inter-war period the A N C had behind it seven 
years of stormy activity. However, its formative period did not end until 
1925, when it adopted, at its annual conference, the n a m e of African 
National Congress. (Previously, it was called the South African Native 
National Congress.) In the same year the anthem and flag of the Congress 
were adopted. T h e anthem was called Nkosi SikeleP ¿Afrika ('Lord, Bless 
Africa') and the tricolour flag — black, green and gold - symbolized the 
people (black), the green fields and veld (green) and the country's main 
wealth (gold).20 Between 1919 and 1935, the A N C experienced various 
degrees of successful political organizing. In 1926 it initiated a mass 
campaign against a new series of racist Bills, which the government of 
the then South African Prime Minister, J. Hertzog, tried to put through. 
In February 1926 the A N C called a national convention in Bloemfontein 
which sharply condemned all racial segregation, demanded constitutionally 
guaranteed equality of all citizens irrespective of skin colour and decided 
to boycott puppet 'native conferences' being called by the government. 
At the end of the same year - together with a number of other African 
organizations, as well as with the African Political Organization ( A P O ) 
which was the major political organization of the 'Coloured people', and 
the South African Indian Congress, which had been set up shortly after 
the First World W a r (as an amalgamation of pre-existing Natal and Trans-
vaal organizations) - the A N C called the First Non-European Convention 
in Kimberley. T h e participants in the convention rejected 'any policy of 
differentiation on grounds of colour or race'. T h e y condemned the racist 
practices in the country, sharply opposed the n e w Hertzog legislation and 
called for 'closer cooperation a m o n g the non-European sections of South 
Africa'. That marked a breakthrough, an early step towards creating a 
united anti-racist front in Southern Africa.21 
T h e A N C was also active outside the country, contributing to the long-
standing participation of South Africans in the pan-African movement. 
Sol T . Plaatje, one of the A N C founding fathers and leaders, attended 
20. M . Benson, 1966, p. 46. 
21. A . L e m u m o (pseudonym of Michael Marmel), 1971, pp. 60-1. 
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the Pan-African Congress of 1919 in Paris and in February 1927, A N C 
President J. J. G a m e d e visited the Soviet Union. 
However, the late 1920s and early 1930s saw a decline in the activities 
of the A N C . Leadership was then in the hands of moderates w h o feared 
communist influence. It was not until the mid-1930s that there was a 
resurgence of activity in connection with the preparation for the All-African 
Convention to protest against Hertzog's legislation. T h e convention, held 
in Bloemfontein in December 1935, launched a massive campaign against 
the land and election rights bills. A delegation of the convention met 
Hertzog to present the grievances of the African people.22 Yet the 
convention failed to agree on a programme and a single plan of action. 
In neighbouring Southern African countries, the emergence of African 
political organizations proceeded in m u c h the same direction, although 
it did not go as far as in South Africa. As a rule, there were initially 'native 
associations', 'native conventions' and 'welfare societies' which dealt with 
local matters first but gradually expanded the range of their activities. They 
became the vehicles of their communities' day-to-day needs, and collected 
and presented complaints, requests and grievances to the colonial 
authorities. Step by step, they involved the population in political activity 
and evolved into political organizations or contributed to the setting up 
of such organizations. 
In Nyasaland, the first 'native association' sprang up on the eve of the 
First World W a r , and from the late 1920s such associations mushroomed 
throughout the country. In 1933 alone, fifteen were formed in the major 
cities - Z o m b a , Blantyre, L i m o , Lilongwe, Fort Johnston, Karonga and 
Chiradzulu. In Northern Rhodesia, the first 'welfare association' was set 
up in 1923 and was directly modelled on similar organizations in Nyasaland. 
A m o n g its founders was David K a u n d a , the father of Kenneth K a u n d a . 2 3 
In 1930 a similar association was formed in Livingstone, the protectorate's 
administrative centre. Its founders were two civil service employees, Isaac 
Nyirenda and Edward T e m b o (both of Nyasaland extraction). It had a 
membership of 350 and enjoyed the support of the Tonga chiefs. In the 
ensuing period, associations arose in m a n y places, particularly in the Copper 
Belt towns and along the railway track; in Lusaka, Mazabuka, Broken Hill, 
Ndola, C h ô m a , Luanshya, Chinsali, Abercorn, Kasama, Fort Jameson and 
other cities and villages.24 
In Southern Rhodesia, too, political organizations of a n e w character 
came to be formed in the early post-war years. Set up in January 1923, 
the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association sought greater voting rights for 
Africans and the return of seized lands. Its activity was confined to the 
Bulawayo area and several districts in Matebeleland. There was a welfare 
22. ibid., pp. 74-5. 
23. H . S. Meebelo, 1971, pp. 235-43. 
24. R . I. Rotberg, 1966, pp. 115-34. 
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society in Gwelo and a Rhodesian native organization in Mashonaland.25 
In the British protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, 
which were closely linked with the Union of South Africa, anti-colonial 
forces had close A N C associations. A m o n g A N C founders was a Sotho, 
M a a m a Seiso, and a Tswana, Joshua M o l e m a , and the several honorary 
presidents of the A N C elected at its constitutional conference including 
the supreme Basutoland ruler Letsie II and chiefs of the main Tswana 
peoples. T h e A N C newspaper, Abantu Batho, was largely financed from 
the funds m a d e available by the Swaziland supreme ruler. T h e most active 
organization in Basutoland was Lekhotla la Bafo ('League of the Poor'), 
which played an important role there throughout the inter-war period. 
T h e social base of Lekhotla la Bafo was provided by peasants, m a n y of 
w h o m were seasonal miners in Transvaal. T h e organization was headed 
by two brothers, Maphutseng and Josiel Lefela, w h o had formed links 
with the A N C . 2 6 
T h e adherents of the Lekhotla la Bafo considered that the British had 
violated the protectorate agreement with Moshoeshoe and had therefore 
forfeited any legal claim to Basutoland. Partly because of its very radical 
stand and partly because from 1928 it began to draw closer to the C o m -
munist Party of South Africa, it scared the A N C leaders. T h e British 
authorities ordered the chiefs to ban the League meetings. But in August 
1928 Lekhotla la Bafo staged a protest demonstration in Maseru against 
the ban. That was the first mass demonstration in Basutoland history and 
it was attended by several thousand people. W h e n A N C President G u m e d e 
returned from his trip to the Soviet Union, Lekhotla la Bafo invited him 
to address a rally in Basutoland. Subsequently, the organization was for 
a number of years alleged to be 'an instrument of M o s c o w ' and was 
persecuted. Still, it continued its activities.27 
T h e social base of all these early political organizations in Southern 
Africa was not broad. Often it consisted of the members of the educated 
elite w h o had become professionals. T h e associations and societies did not 
often have a clear action programme, and were short-lived. Yet they paved 
the way for other organizations, more numerous, durable and effective. 
Working-class movements in the industrial areas provided another n e w 
form of anti-colonial struggle. People w h o took part in the early strikes 
and the workers' unions which sprang up about the same time, could only 
be called workers with reservations. T h e lives of most of them were still 
heavily anchored in the rural life, at least spiritually, and often economically 
as well. T h e y had no sense of their identity as proletarians. Even so, the 
African proletarian movement traces its origins to those early actions. T h e 
earliest mass protest occurred in 1918-20 in the Union of South Africa. 
25. T . O . Ranger, 1970, pp. 95-109. 
26. E . Roux, 1964, p. 212. 
27. ibid., pp. 212-13. 
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T h e strikes took place in the Transvaal mines, but the strikers were seasonal 
workers w h o came from m a n y countries of Southern and Central Africa.28 
T h e first mass movement occurred in early 1918 with the boycott of the 
company shops through which the mine owners sold food and manufac-
tured goods to workers. T h e boycott was staged by the miners in the eastern 
part of the Witwatersrand, a mining area in Transvaal. 
T h e next strike took place in Johannesburg and involved African sewage 
and garbage collectors. T h e strikers were fewer in number but better 
organized. M e m b e r s of the Industrial Workers of Africa, set up in 1917 
among Johannesburg municipal service employees, probably took part in 
the strike. T h e strike was quelled and its participants were put on trial, 
of w h o m 152 were sentenced to two months of forced labour. However, 
the 'bucket strike' had shown that the labour of any group of African 
workers was essential for the normal life of the continent's largest industrial 
centre. T h e city streets were overflowing with rubbish and sewage, and 
there was a threat of epidemics erupting. 
T h e strike triggered off a wider movement. During the meetings 
protesting against the arrests and unjust sentences, the idea emerged of 
calling a general strike of African workers on 1 July 1918. T h e strike was 
also to be in support of a demand for raising the daily wages of African 
workers by one shilling. T h e African National Congress went along with 
the idea although with some reservations. Faced with this pressure, the 
authorities repealed their sentences on the strikers and Prime Minister 
Louis Botha received an African delegation led by the Zulu Saul Msane , 
the leader of the Transvaal A N C chapter, and heard their grievances. T h e 
general strike was called off. However, on 1 July 15000 Africans working 
in three mines downed their tools. Police forced them into the mines after 
a fierce clash in which workers used axes, picks and lengths of metal pipe 
as their weapons. In the ensuing repressions, Africans and Europeans found 
themselves together in the same dock on charges of inciting the strike. 
These were D . S. Letanka, Vice-President of the Transvaal A N C , L . T . 
M w a b a z a , Director of the Abantu Bat ho newspaper, N . D . Ngojo, H . Kraai 
and A . Cetyiwe, three members of the Industrial Workers of Africa, and 
three white socialist leaders of the South African International Socialist 
League formed in 1915: S. P . Bunting, H . C . Hanscombe and T . P. Tinker. 
In the course of the trial, the prosecutor, basing himself on reports by 
several police agents w h o had infiltrated the Industrial Workers of Africa, 
accused Bunting, Hanscombe and Tinker of provoking the Johannesburg 
and the mine strikes. 
In February 1920, a n e w strike swept twenty-two mines in Transvaal 
in which 71000 African workers took part. They advanced a number of 
demands: a major pay rise (from 2 shillings to 5-10 shillings a day), an 
28. There were smaller industrial protests of mine workers dating back to the beginning 
of the twentieth century. See P. Warwick in E . Webster (ed.), 1978; S. Moroney in 
E . Webster (ed.), 1978. 
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opportunity to get more responsible and better-paying jobs, major improve-
ments in the running of company shops, and the easing of the colour bar. 
T h e strikers displayed remarkable unity. O n e can only wonder h o w these 
people of different ethnic groups, speaking a babble of tongues, were able 
to achieve such a high degree of unanimity. Troops and police were used 
to put d o w n the strike.29 T h e strike was the largest in African history 
until 1946, when an even larger strike took place, also in Transvaal. 
In Rhodesia, the first mass working-class action was recorded in M a y 
1935, in the Copper Belt mines in Northern Rhodesia. Miners demanded 
higher wages and a cut in taxes and protested against poor working 
conditions and various forms of racial discrimination. T h e protest was not 
entirely spontaneous and the manner in which the strikers acted indicated 
the presence among them of a group which tried to give organized leader-
ship to the movement. Leaflets calling for strike action were distributed. 
They were written in the Chibemba language, which was the mother tongue 
of most of the miners. T h e strike started at Muflirá mine on 22 M a y and 
was quelled the next day by troops. However, on 26 M a y the strike spread 
to Nkana mine, and on 28 M a y the Luanshya mine was strike-bound. 
Twenty-eight strikers were killed or wounded in clashes with the troops 
and arrests were m a d e among the workers. T h e strike had repercussions 
well beyond the Copper Belt since it attracted, along with neighbouring 
Katanga, m a n y seasonal workers from other parts of Africa.30 
A s the African proletarian movement was mounting, the militancy of 
the white industrial proletariat was waning. T h e armed uprising of white 
miners in Transvaal early in 1922 was the last major action by white workers 
in South Africa. A s the African proletariat increased, white workers came 
increasingly to be appointed as overseers and evolved into a workers' 
aristocracy. O n the crest of the wave of industrial action which swept 
Southern Africa in the early post-war years, the largest African proletarian 
organization was formed. T h e 1920s saw it reach its peak and decline. 
T h e Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa (ICU) was born 
in January 1919 in Cape T o w n during a strike of African and Coloured 
dock workers. T h e first constituent meeting was attended by less than 
thirty people. But five years later, in 1924, it had a membership of 30000. 
By 1927 it had grown to 100000 (its leader even claimed a figure of 250000), 
with affiliates far beyond the Union of South Africa in Southern Rhodesia 
and other countries. T h e I C U sought to unite the most diverse trades: 
municipal service workers, builders, railwaymen, miners, seamen, farm 
labourers, factory, port and transport workers, as well as people engaged 
29. For a discussion of these strikes see P . L . Bonner in B . Bozzoli (ed.), 1979; E . Roux, 
1964, pp. 132-4; H . J. Simons and R . E . Simons, 1969, pp. 220-43. 
30. R . I. Rotberg, 1966, pp. 161-8. Smaller strikes date back to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
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in trade and the services. T h e I C U had Coloured as well as African workers 
a m o n g its m e m b e r s . 3 1 
T h e Preamble to the I C U Constitution reveals a strong influence of 
socialist ideas: 
Whereas the interests of the workers and those of the employers are 
opposed to each other, the former living by selling their labour, 
receiving for it only part of the wealth they produce, and the latter 
living by exploiting the labour of the workers; depriving the workers 
of a part of the product of their labour in the form of profit, no peace 
can be between the two classes, a struggle must always obtain about 
the division of the products of h u m a n labour until the workers through 
their industrial organizations take from the capitalist class the means 
of production, to be owned and controlled by the workers for the 
benefit of all, instead of for the profit of a few. Under such a system 
he w h o does not work, neither shall he eat. T h e basis of remuneration 
shall be the principle, from every m a n according to his abilities, to 
every m a n according to his needs. 
T h e I C U set itself numerous and diverse tasks. It promised its members 
that it would seek higher wages, better working conditions, pensions, sick 
and unemployment allowances and protection of the workers' rights. T h e 
I C U proclaimed the whole of the African continent to be the field of its 
activity. 
T h e founder and leader of the Union, Clements Kadalie (c. 1896-1951), 
was a seasonal worker w h o came to South Africa from Nyasaland, where 
he had completed a missionary school education which enabled him to 
become a schoolteacher. T h e I C U reached the peak of its influence in 
the mid-1920s, but suffered a sharp decline at the turn of the 1920s and 
1930s because it found itself split into three factions.32 
Socialist influence was also felt in an earlier African proletarian organiza-
tion - the above-mentioned Industrial Workers of Africa. T h e International 
Socialist League had played no small role in its formation and activities. 
T h e League, set up by South African white socialists and working-class 
activists, was gradually coming to realize the need for proletarian solidarity, 
irrespective of the colour of the skin. That became particularly evident 
in 1918-20 in its appeals to black and white workers. During the strike 
of Transvaal African miners in February 1920, socialists were distributing 
a leaflet a m o n g white miners written by one of the League's leaders, 
S. P . Bunting (1873-1936) entitled 'Don't Scab!' It read in part: 
White workers! D o you hear the new army of labour coming? T h e 
31. For an analysis of the I C U , see P. Bonner in E . Webster (ed.), 1978; C . Kadalie, 
1970; S. W . Johns in R . I. Rotberg and A . Mazrui (eds), 1970; K . Luckhardt and 
B . Wall, 1980, pp. 39-46. 
32. C . Kadalie, 1970, pp. 52-3, 61-2. 
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Native Workers are beginning to wake up White workers! D o 
not repel t h e m ! . . . Be on the side of labour, even Native labour against 
our c o m m o n capitalist masters.33 
In an earlier leaflet addressed to African workers entitled ' T o the Bantu 
Workers', the socialists wrote: ' N o matter though you are different in colour 
you are one in kind with the workers of the world. All those w h o work 
for wages are becoming one great brotherhood of labour.'34 
Another leaflet issued in 1918—19 in several languages including English, 
Zulu and Sotho, was addressed to 'Workers of South Africa, Black as Well 
as White' and contained the following appeal: 'The way to get ready is 
to combine in the workshops. Combine as workers, no matter what colour. 
R e m e m b e r that an injury to one is an injury to all, be he black or white.'35 
At the time these appeals were hardly expected to be implemented. 
Workers, black as well as white, were yet numerically too small and too 
unsophisticated. Still, it is important to know that even in these years, 
such ideas were proclaimed on African soil. 
T h e International Socialist League and several other South African 
socialist organizations merged and at a congress in Cape T o w n in 1921 
proclaimed the formation of the Communist Party of South Africa, the 
first Communist Party on the African continent. T h e party set out its goals 
in a manifesto adopted by the first congress. It sought to combine the 
idea of radical social transformation with genuine internationalism that 
marked the thinking of the more progressive members on the international 
task of bringing nearer the time 'when the class war shall have been forever 
stamped out, w h e n mankind shall no longer cower under the bludgeon 
of the oppressor, when the necessaries and amenities of life, the comfort 
and the culture, the honour and the power, shall be to him w h o toils not 
him w h o exploits, when none shall be called master and none servant, 
but all shall be fellow workers in c o m m o n . ' 3 6 
Admittedly, South African communists were unable to come up im-
mediately with a comprehensive programme that would address itself to all 
the specific and complex problems of Southern Africa, and initially they 
might have relied too heavily on European experience. This, in the context 
of South Africa, is understandable. It is accounted for by the membership 
of the Communist Party which initially consisted only of whites, the 
profound impact of the west European, notably British, working-class 
movement and the real complexities of the South African situation. H o w -
ever, by the early 1930s, Africans formed the majority of party membership 
and its general secretary was a Zulu, Albert Nzula (1905-34). National 
liberation became the focus of the Party's effort. 
33. E . Roux, 1944, pp. 46-8. 
34. See Union of South Africa, 1922, pp. 288-9. 
35. See The International, Johannesburg, 25 April 1919. 
36. A . L e m u m o , 1971, pp. 117-20. 
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Popular opposition to colonial rule in the Belgian C o n g o 
Increased state control, a tightening w e b of racist regulations, an elaborate 
patronage policy and a wave of epidemics undercut the effectiveness of 
social protest in the Belgian C o n g o . 3 7 Nevertheless, popular opposition 
continued, although on a smaller scale, and took different forms than it 
had in the preceding period. 
Peasant opposition in the Congo, often sporadic and barely visible, took 
a variety of forms all of which were designed to avoid or minimize the 
disruptive impact of the colonial capitalist system on their way of life. 
T a x evasion continued with great frequency in the years immediately 
following the First World W a r . Thousands of Congolese peasants fled 
across the open borders to the adjacent regions of Angola and the French 
Congo, while others disappeared into the bush just prior to the arrival 
of state tax officials. T h e Angolan border was particularly attractive because 
the Portuguese colonial presence was so minimal and because of historic 
ties that united the Bakongo living on both sides of the frontier. M a n y 
m e m b e r s of the rural population used a similar strategy to avoid working 
on state projects, mines and European plantations. A s one elder w h o was 
ordered to work on the Katanga railway line recalled, ' W e just escaped 
from our village . . . N o b o d y knew where w e had gone, not even the white 
people at the b o m a . W e left our village at night time and headed for the 
Luapula. At the river some good fishermen helped us to cross.'38 Still 
other peasants refused to cultivate the obligatory cotton or rice or planted 
less than the required amounts.3 9 
A s the state apparatus extended into the more remote areas and a 
network of loyalist chiefs was created, however, possibilities of remaining 
outside the colonial-capitalist system diminished substantially/Increased 
state hegemony is reflected by the 400% increase in taxes extracted between 
1917 and 1924 and by the dramatic rise in the number of peasants compelled 
to cultivate cotton.40 A s of 1935 it was estimated that more than 900000 
peasants were enmeshed in the cotton regime. 
Given this shifting balance of power, it is hardly surprising that direct 
confrontations which had frequently occurred in the period preceding the 
37. For a general overview of the colonial period, see B . Jewsiewicki, forthcoming; 
J. Stengers, 1974, pp. 391-440. A discussion of insurgent activities is complicated because 
until recently most historians have assumed that this was a period of quietism and have, 
therefore, focused on the post-Second World W a r era. There is also an economic tendency 
in the literature in general which tends to reduce peasants to mere producers of surplus 
value whose own history lacked any meaning or significance within the colonial-capitalist 
context. Such an interpretation denies them the dignity of historical agents w h o played 
a role in shaping their o w n destinies and instead casts them as either impotent or impassive 
victims. 
38. Quoted in C . Perrings, 1979, p. 153. 
39. B . Jewsiewicki in M . A . Klein (ed.), 1980, pp. 62-8. 
40. B . Fetter, 1976, p. 83; B . Jewsiewicki in M . A . Klein (ed.), 1980. 
690 
Politics and nationalism in Central and Southern Africa, 1919-35 
First World W a r almost disappeared. Occasionally, alienated peasants 
attacked the symbols of oppression - loyalist chiefs, African police and 
tax collectors. Far more hazardous were peasant revolts which were 
reported in the Bas-Congo in the period between 1920 and 1922, in the 
K w a n g o area a decade later,41 and among Pende peasants and workers 
in Kwilu in 1931 (see Fig. 27.2). A sharp increase in taxes, a 50% reduction 
in the price peasants received for their commodities and the decision of 
Unilever to lower wages on its plantations fuelled the popular discontent 
that led to the major uprising in 1931. T h e insurgents gained additional 
adherents when a 'prophet', Matemu-a-Kenenia, revealed that the 
ancestors had instructed Africans to kill or destroy all white animals and 
objects in the land as well as all symbols of European rule as a prelude 
to divine intervention and the end of white domination. T h e movement 
attracted widespread support, but it was immediately suppressed, and more 
than 400 Pende and one European lost their lives in the process.42 
Other religious-political movements attracted even larger peasant fol-
lowings, which m a y be partly due to the fact that the colonial authorities 
had imposed a strict ban on political organizations. Their appeal also 
reflected the growing sense of anxiety and frustration brought on by the 
economic uncertainties of the 1921 recession and the depression a decade 
later. 
T h e largest of these movements was Kimbanguism, named after Simon 
Kimbangu, a Bakongo peasant. A catechist, he proclaimed that he had 
been touched by G o d which gave him the power to cure the sick, combat 
witchcraft and resurrect the dead. T o his followers, w h o were proud to 
have a black Messiah, he declared in 1921 that he was an emissary of 
G o d , a prophet and the son of G o d . Kimbangu's divine quality was 
symbolized in his Bakongo name , Gunza , 'All together'.43 
Kimbangu also proclaimed in a general but vague way that he was to 
deliver Africans from the yoke of colonial oppression. His anti-colonial 
rhetoric, his growing popularity and the militancy of some of his followers 
convinced the Belgian administrators that Kimbangu had to be eliminated. 
O n 14 September 1921, he was arrested and condemned to death. 
Subsequently he was deported to Katanga where he died a martyr thirty 
years later.44 
Although Kimbangu himself was not revolutionary, his followers m a d e 
his movement strongly anti-European rather than simply religious. With 
its slogan, 'Congo to the Congolese', the movement provided an outlet 
for spontaneous popular protest against colonial rule. T h e Kimbanguists 
exhorted the people not to work for the Europeans, not to grow the export 
crops imposed by the colonial administration, not to pay taxes and levies, 
41. A . T . Nzula, I. I. Potekhin and A . Z . Zusmanovich, 1979, pp. 108-11. 
42. ibid.; E . Bustin, 1975, pp. 119-20. 
43. G . Balandier in P. Van den Berghe (ed.), 1965, pp. 443-60. 
44. ibid., p. 450. 
691 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880—1935 
not to send their children to missionary schools, and generally to disobey 
the Belgians.4S Their h y m n s are replete with references to Kimbangu's 
heroic deeds and, according to Belgian officials, they held out the hope 
that Kimbangu and his disciples would 'return to bring white domination 
to an end'.46 
For over two decades there were periodic revivals of Kimbanguism, 
generally at times of severe tension and economic stress. In both towns 
and villages his adherents actively participated in the struggle against 
colonialism, and their propaganda efforts even affected the strikes of rail-
way, white-collar and oil-mill workers in the lower Zaire from 1921 to 
1925. Although cruelly repressed, the Kimbanguists were undaunted. In 
1921 alone, at the dawn of the movement, 37000 people were evicted from 
Bas-Congo but they continued their activities and recruited new adherents 
in the places to which they were exiled. Various offshoots of Kimbanguism, 
themselves often loosely connected, sprang up throughout the Congo, 
where Kimbanguists established links with Afro-Christian churches of 
Nigeria and Uganda and with the opponents of French colonialism in the 
French Congo. 
Another major independent Church movement - the African Watch-
tower, known more commonly in the Congo as Kitawala — appeared at 
about the same time that Kimbangu began his activities. Its initial bases 
of support seem to have been in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and 
Tanganyika, and by 1923 preachers from eastern Northern Rhodesia and 
western Tanganyika had begun to attract a large following in Katanga 
province, primarily in areas adjacent to the Union Minière recruiting 
stations.47 Under the forceful leadership of T o m o Nyirenda, known also 
as M w a n a Lesa - the son of G o d - the Kitawala movement , whose n a m e 
in Swahili signifies 'a means of ruling', adopted an explicit anti-colonial 
posture. Along with militant slogans such as 'Africa for the Africans' and 
'Equality of the Races', Nyirenda and his principal lieutenants urged their 
followers to assassinate Europeans and their African allies, especially 
loyalist chiefs. 
B y 1926 the Kitawala movement was firmly entrenched in southern 
Katanga which had suffered from a number of epidemics and where the 
deleterious effects of labour recruitment were most acutely felt. It also 
extended its influence into the mining areas of Kasai and Kivu, and miners 
returning h o m e after their contracts brought Kitawala into the eastern and 
equatorial regions. Fearing Nyirenda's increased influence and growing 
ties with several dissident chiefs, the colonial authorities dispatched a 
military force in 1926 to capture him. Nyirenda fled to Northern Rhodesia 
45. A History of Africa, Moscow, 1968, pp. 391-2. 
46. G . Balandier in P. Van den Berghe (ed.), 1965, p. 450. 
47. The most important analysis of the Kitawala movement in the Congo is J. Higginson, 
forthcoming. M u c h of the discussion on Kitawala is drawn from this article. 
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where British authorities detained and ultimately executed h i m . 4 8 
A s in the case of K i m b a n g u i s m , the elimination of the prophet did not 
diminish popular support for Kitawala. In the rural areas Kitawala priests 
organized protests against taxation and fanned hostility to appointed chiefs. 
O n e offshoot, led by M u m b a Napoleon Jacob, began to m a k e major inroads 
a m o n g labourers in Elizabethville ( L u m u m b a s h i ) , and railway workers 
and miners employed by U n i o n Minière. Kitawala adherents helped to 
organize the 1931 Elizabethville boycott and five years later played an 
important part in the labour unrest at the U n i o n Minière factory at 
Jadotville. During the Jadotville strike, an outspoken Kitawala m e m b e r 
used religious scriptures to attack the injustices of racial w a g e differentia-
tion. 'It stands out clearly from this book, ' he proclaimed, Bible in hand, 
'that all m e n are equal. G o d did not create the white m a n to rule over 
the black . . . It is not just that the black m a n w h o does the w o r k should 
remain in poverty and misery and that the wages of the whites should 
be so m u c h higher than those of the blacks.'49 In the aftermath of Jadotville 
the state unsuccessfully renewed its efforts to smash Kitawala which 
subsequently played an important role in the Elizabethville strike of 1941 . s ° 
T h e fact that strikes only began in the 1930s suggests that the formation 
of an African working class and an incipient working-class m o v e m e n t 
developed at a m u c n slower rate in the Belgian C o n g o than in South Africa. 
T h e discovery of copper, tin and uranium in Katanga, of diamonds in 
Kasai and of gold in Kilo M o t o precipitated the growth of an industrial 
working class. B y the 1920s over 6 0 0 0 0 labourers were involved in mineral 
extraction. 
A s in other parts of the continent, the initial response of Africans to 
the lower wages and harsh working conditions of the mines was desertion. 
Large n u m b e r s of peasants fled from Katanga and Kasai provinces to avoid 
the agents working for the Bourse d u Travail de Katanga ( B T K ) , the 
industrial labour bureau that recruited and distributed workers within 
Katanga. Still others escaped shortly after their arrival at the mines. A s 
early as 1914 desertion had b e c o m e such a serious problem that the B T K 
introduced a pass system and a finger-printing bureau to trace 'fugitives'.5 ' 
Despite such coercive tactics, desertion continued to be prevalent. In 1918, 
48. ibid. 
49. Quoted in C . Perrings, 1977, p. 50. 
50. J. Higginson, forthcoming. Kimbanguism and Kitawala were not the only religious-
political movements in the Congo. M u v u n g u , Lukusu, M p e w e and other sects which were 
active in the Bandundu province told Africans not to work for the Belgians but rather 
to prepare for the time when the Belgians would be driven out. These were the sentiments 
advocated in the 1930s by the 'Talking Serpent' (or 'Man-Serpent') sect in the Bandundu 
and western Kasai provinces. The 'Black Mission' and Tunzi in Lower Zaire and the 
'Leopard People' movements opposed forced cultivation of export crops in Upper Zaire. 
51. C . Perrings, 1979, p. 153. 
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for example, at the Star and Liksai copper mines, the desertion rate was 
74 and 66.5% respectively. Although desertion declined somewhat in the 
1920s, it continued to run at between 20 and 35% up until the Great 
Depression, w h e n the lack of alternative sources of income m a d e such a 
strategy counterproductive.52 
While thousands fled from the mines, others in Katanga began to 
organize, albeit in the most tentative and sporadic fashion, in order to 
improve the conditions of their employment. In 1921, a large number of 
miners at Luishi, for example, walked off the job and proceeded to 
Elizabeth ville to complain to government officials of ill-treatment and poor 
rations. T w o years later a similar work stoppage occurred at the Kakontwe 
mines.53 
T h e Depression created n e w economic uncertainties. Jobs disappeared, 
wages dropped and working conditions deteriorated, as mining interests 
sought to minimize costs. Despite threats to workers that they would be 
dismissed, however, work stoppages and labour 'riots' erupted at the Union 
Minière mines of Kipushi, Ruashi and M s w e n u Ditu in 1931, temporarily 
paralysing operations.54 In the same year workers organized a boycott in 
Elizabethville to protest against the high prices charged for basic c o m -
modities by the Union Minière company stores and independent European 
merchants. Before it ended, the boycott spread to surrounding regions and 
gained the support of construction workers, carpenters, and bricklayers 
- suggesting a growing labour consciousness.55 T h e district commissioner 
of Haut-Katanga bemoaned this new militancy. 'The Negroes, animated 
by unbounded haughtiness,' he noted contemptuously, 'are becoming more 
and more refractory, no longer obeying passively, they discuss the orders 
they are given and talk back, sometimes insolently.'56 
T h e growing militancy was also reflected in a number of strikes between 
1935 and 1937 involving both miners and other segments of the working 
class in Katanga. Employees protesting against low salaries and racial dis-
crimination closed down the Union Minière factory at Jadotville and the 
tin mines at M a n o n and M w a n z a . Railway workers at N iemba and Kabala 
employed by the Chemin de Fer du Grand Lacs also went on strike, as 
did labourers at the government-owned cotton mill at N i e m b a . 5 7 Although 
the leaders were arrested and the strikes repressed, insurgency sentiment 
and underground networks grew stronger as did a sense of collective self-
confidence. All this set the stage for the great strike of 1941 in which 
several thousand African workers walked off their jobs at tin and copper 
mines throughout Katanga province. Their objective transcended narrow 
52. ibid., p. 171; B . Fetter, 1974, p. 208. 
53. C . Perrings, 1979, pp. 213-35. 
54. J. Higginson, forthcoming, pp. 8-10. 
55. ibid., pp. 9-10. 
56. Quoted in B . Fetter, 1974, p. 217. 
57. J. Higginson, forthcoming, pp. 10-13. 
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economic concerns. 'They did not try to hide their purpose,' noted one 
European observer. 'It was to drive the whites from the country and replace 
the blue flag of Belgium with the black flag of Kitawala in order to signal 
a change in the regime.'58 
A s in the case of a working-class movement , political associations and 
nationalist parties developed m u c h more slowly in the Belgian Congo than 
in South Africa. Indeed, explicit nationalist organizations, such as the 
Association de Bakongo ( A B A K O ) , did not emerge until the late 1950s.59 
During this period, however, closed associations, known as Mben i , 
proliferated. These were brought back to the Belgian colony by African 
servicemen w h o had been stationed in G e r m a n East Africa during the First 
World W a r . T h e M b e n i were essentially dance societies which also 
provided a self-help network for members . T h e leaders often had military 
titles patterned on the European military which created the impression 
that they possessed a certain measure of European power. Although not 
primarily anti-colonial, their songs and dances often ridiculed European 
officials and expressed deep-seated popular resentment against colonial 
rule. Moreover, Africans w h o were considered as supporters of the 
Europeans were barred from joining the M b e n i societies and those closely 
associated with the Europeans could not hold leadership positions.60 
Their explicit criticisms of colonialism and their attacks on loyalists con-
cerned Belgian officials w h o were anxious to stifle all forms of social protest. 
A 1923 government sub-commission concluded that the M b e n i associations 
were becoming radicalized and were open to communist infiltration, and 
three years later all African urban associations, including the M b e n i 
societies, were placed under direct supervision by the colonial regime. T h e 
government also encouraged the Benedictine missionaries to organize 
competing associations, whose members engaged in gang warfare with the 
M b e n i societies. Government harassment, gang warfare, rivalries a m o n g 
and within M b e n i societies, and the urban dislocation created by the 
Depression combined to reduce the influence and significance of these 
societies by the mid-i930s.61 
T h e economic and political setting in Angola and 
Mozambique: an overview 
Despite the distance separating them and the diversity of their peoples 
and economies, the colonial societies of Angola and Mozambique shared 
more in c o m m o n with each other than with their immediate neighbours. 
T h e specific character of Portuguese colonialism and, to a measure, the 
58. Quoted in ibid., p. 60. 
59. See, for example, H . Weiss, 1967; C . Young, 1965. 
60. B . Fetter, 1974, pp. 210-15. 
61. ibid. For a general study of the development and spread of Mbeni societies through-
out Central and East Africa, see T . O . Ranger, 1975. 
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popular opposition which it generated, stem from four sets of factors -
the initial weakness of the colonial state, the progressively authoritarian 
nature of the colonial regime, the lack of Portuguese capital and a con-
comitant dependence upon forced labour and the policy of assimilation. 
B y the eve of the First World W a r appreciable areas of both Angola 
and Mozambique remained outside Lisbon's effective control. Whereas 
the colonial administration was well entrenched in the coastal urban en-
claves such as Luanda, Benguela, Beira and Lourenço Marques and their 
hinterlands, throughout vast interior regions the colonial presence was 
nominal and often depended on an alliance with local chiefs and African 
police whose loyalty was problematical. 
In Angola, for example, as late as 1914, the O v a m b o in the south 
remained effectively independent while revolts smouldered in the adjacent 
region of Ganguela until 1917 and the Lunda homelands of Quioco were 
only occupied in 1920. T o the north opposition in the Congo region con-
tinued until 1915 while D e m b o insurgents defied the colonial state until 
1918.62 
Portugal's position in Mozambique was only slightly better. Several 
northern sultanates and Yao chieftaincies had effectively defied the colonial 
regime until 1914 and the M a k o n d e highlands remained outside the sphere 
of colonial rule as late as 1921. Moreover, during the First World W a r 
w h e n G e r m a n forces from neighbouring Tanganyika invaded northern 
Mozambique , they were greeted as liberators by a number of M a k u a 
chieftaincies which had suffered under the extremely harsh rule of the 
Niassa C o m p a n y . Even in the southern half of the colony, where the colonial 
state was most firmly entrenched, officials feared a massive uprising (see 
Fig. 27.2) ." 
In the aftermath of the war, Lisbon intensified the autocratic nature 
of its rule. T h e initial 'enlightened' policies of the republican government 
(1912-26) gave way to more repressive, although not necessarily more 
efficient, programmes. Inefficient and corrupt, the republican government 
was finally brought d o w n by a conservative alliance of bankers, industrial-
ists, the church hierarchy and the military in 1926 paving the way for 
the fascist government of Antonio Salazar. T o ensure social harmony and 
perpetual colonial rule which Salazar's ultra-nationalist corporate ideology 
envisaged, the colonial regimes, like the government in Portugal, employed 
a vast array of instruments of oppression. Censorship, informers, secret 
police and the military were used to repress any opposition — black or 
white - which surfaced. 
T h e third c o m m o n feature was the particular character of economic 
exploitation in Angola and Mozambique which was shaped by the 
impoverishment of the mother country. Throughout the period under 
62. For a detailed discussion of these revolts, see R . Pélissier, 1977. 
63. For a discussion of African resistance during this period, see A . Isaacman, 1976; 
M . D . D . Newitt, 1981, pp. 57-64. 
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examination, Portugal's ability to extract resources from her African 
colonies depended o n the mobilization a n d control of unfree labour because 
her o w n e c o n o m y , w h i c h w a s both archaic and on the verge of bankruptcy, 
lacked the capacity to export the fixed capital necessary for development. 
A n 1899 government commiss ion, w h o s e task it w a s to analyse the prospects 
for development in Ango la and M o z a m b i q u e , had been unequivocal o n 
this last point: 
W e need native labour, w e need it in order to better the conditions 
of these labourers, w e need it for the e c o n o m y of E u r o p e and for 
the progress of Africa. O u r tropical Africa will not g r o w without the 
Africans. T h e capital needed to exploit it, a n d it so needs to be 
exploited, lies in the procurement of labour for exploitation. A b u n -
dant, cheap, solid labour . . . a n d this given the circumstances, will 
never be supplied b y E u r o p e a n immigrants . 6 4 
T h e state had also introduced a series of tax laws designed to force 
m a n y African agriculturalists off their land and create the beginnings of 
a semi-proletariat. W h i l e the tax laws did provide the colonial administra-
tion with a n e w source of revenue, they failed to generate a cheap labour 
force o n the scale anticipated by the colonial regime. M a n y peasants were 
able to circumvent the labour requirement by cultivating n e w or additional 
cash crops to pay their taxes. Others in M o z a m b i q u e opted to w o r k in 
the mines and plantations of neighbouring South Africa and Rhodesia at 
wages that were 2 0 0 - 3 0 0 % higher than those that the under-capitalized 
Portuguese firms a n d planters offered. 
Since the nascent capitalist sectors in Angola and M o z a m b i q u e were 
unable to attract workers, either with these tax 'incentives' or through 
competitive wages , the colonial state, as has been a m p l y demonstrated in 
Chapter 15 above, h a d to resort to undisguised coercion as early as the 
first native labour code w a s introduced. T h e legal basis for forced labour 
which w a s to continue under varying guises until 1961, w a s delineated 
in Article 1: 
All native inhabitants of the Portuguese overseas are subject to the 
moral and legal obligations to seek to acquire through w o r k , those 
things which they lack to subsist and to improve their o w n social 
conditions. T h e y have full liberty to choose the m e a n s through w h i c h 
to c o m p l y with this obligation, but if they d o not comply in s o m e 
w a y , the public authorities m a y force t h e m to c o m p l y . 6 5 
A n d force t h e m they did. Local administrators had complete discretion 
to determine w h o w a s 'idle', and virtually all chefes des posto supplemented 
their m o d e s t salaries through gifts a n d favours from E u r o p e a n planters, 
merchants , factory owners and farmers in return for African labour. A s 
a result, the rural areas were transformed into large labour reserves. W h e n 
64. Quoted in J. M . da Silva Cunha, 1949, p. 144. 
65. ibid., p. 151. 
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workers were needed to work on settler estates, to build roads, expand 
the ports of Luanda, Lourenço Marques and Beira, lay railway lines, serve 
as domestic servants or for any other private or public tasks, local 
administrators did not hesitate to use their control and their power to satisfy 
labour demands. W o m e n , though legally exempt from forced labour, often 
suffered a similar fate. A n American sociologist visiting Angola and 
M o z a m b i q u e in 1924 observed that: 
w o m e n , even pregnant or with a nursling, are taken for road work 
by Cipaes. In out-of-the-way places the Government builds little 
barracks to house them. N o pay nor food. According to the circum-
scription the term is from one week to five but a w o m a n m a y be 
called out again in the same year. Others in the village bring food 
to them, in some cases a day's journey away. Girls as young as fifteen 
are taken and some are m a d e to submit sexually to those in charge. 
They work under a black foreman w h o uses a stick. T h e y begin work 
at six, stop an hour at noon, and work till sunset. There are some 
miscarriages from heavy work . 6 6 
After 1926 peasants especially in M o z a m b i q u e were also compelled to 
cultivate cotton and sell it at deflated prices to European concessionaire 
companies. Failure to do so was tantamount to a crime and was treated 
accordingly.67 
T h e final distinguishing feature was the policy of assimilation which 
the colonial regime pursued in an effort to co-opt the nascent African 
bourgeoisie by providing them with a veneer of Portuguese culture and 
exemption from some of the most flagrant colonial abuses. Formalized 
under the regime do indigenato, this policy insured that the overwhelming 
majority of Angolans and Mozambicans would be frozen into a subordinate 
race, culture and class position. Under this legislation, Africans were 
divided into two groups. T h e tiny majority w h o could read and write 
Portuguese, had rejected 'tribal customs', and were gainfully employed 
in the capitalist sectors could be classified as assimilados or nao indígenas. 
In principle, at least, they enjoyed all the rights and responsibilities of 
Portuguese citizens. Although it was theoretically possible for any African 
to change his legal status, the constraints imposed by the colonial-capitalist 
system - including the lack of schools, the limited opportunities for paid 
employment and the culturally arrogant assumption of state officials -
effectively precluded this, thereby denying 99% of the African population 
the minimal rights of citizenship.68 
66. E . A . Ross, 1925, p. 40. 
67. A . Isaacman, M . Stephen, Y . A d a m , M . J. H o m e n , E . M a c a m o and A . Pililao, 
1980. 
68. The illusion of assimilation and the corresponding ideology of Lusotropicalism is 
powerfully presented in G . J. Bender, 1978. 
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Popular opposition to colonial rule in A n g o l a 
Regarded as nonentities by the Europeans , subject to corporal punishment, 
and sometimes to arbitrary and venal treatment at the hands of the colonial 
authorities, to the d e m a n d s of labour-recruiters and the collusion between 
government officials and resident Portuguese, Africans b e c a m e outcasts 
in their o w n countries. T h e y did, however , have several m e a n s of escaping 
the pressures that were brought to bear on t h e m . 
T h e first form of resistance consisted of taking u p arms , but this was 
steadily abandoned from the end of the First W o r l d W a r since it was 
ultimately and hopelessly d o o m e d to failure. T h e r e were fewer and fewer 
leaders, most w e a p o n s had been confiscated and g u n p o w d e r w a s , with a 
few exceptions, n o longer available on the open market. T h e second 
alternative w a s to go into hiding. W h e n the situation b e c a m e intolerable, 
entire villages abandoned their fields and m o v e d to areas furthest from 
the reach of the colonial authorities. Peasant flight was particularly c o m m o n 
in the northern and eastern regions which remained effectively outside 
Lisbon's control. S u c h withdrawal could go on for years without being 
detected. 
T h e third solution was even m o r e radical for it was to all intents and 
purposes final. T h e r e is widespread evidence of massive clandestine 
emigration into the Belgian C o n g o , Northern Rhodesia and even South 
W e s t Africa. Often m e m b e r s of the rural population travelled great 
distances through harsh terrain with young children o n their backs to free 
themselves from the tyranny of Portuguese colonial rule. If they were 
caught by the colonial authorities or the local African police, the m e n were 
beaten and imprisoned and the w o m e n sexually abused. 
T h e fourth type of resistance to colonial rule were the religious or 
messianic cults founded by Africans in reaction to the colonial religion. 
T h e r e appears to have been little local initiative behind this metaphysical 
revolt of the Angolans since mos t of the independent churches c a m e 
primarily from the Belgian C o n g o , spilling over into the B a k o n g o region 
of northern Angola. 
Unlike the situation in the Belgian C o n g o , the independent churches 
had a relatively small following and a short life span. T h e revolt of the 
M a f u l u in 1918 is sometimes cited as the first Angolan messianic protest 
to have led to a r m e d revolt.69 Followers of S i m o n K i m b a n g u gained a 
n u m b e r of adherents a m o n g the B a k o n g o living inside the Angolan border. 
T h e colonial state, fearing its popular appeal and the resurgence of B a k o n g o 
nationalism, m a d e a serious effort to suppress K i m b a n g u i s m in 1921 and 
1922. Despite their efforts an underground network continued to operate 
and - as in the Belgian C o n g o - K i m b a n g u acquired an aura of m a r t y r d o m 
after his arrest.70 
69. See R . Pélissier, 1977; W . G . Clarence-Smith, 1979, pp. 88-9. 
70. A . Margando in R . Chilcote (ed.), 1972, pp. 37-9; R . Pélissier, 1978, pp. 165-7. 
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Other more obscure sects surfaced such as Maiaigni, which was detected 
in the Cabinda enclave in 1930 and the short-lived Cassongola movement 
among the M b u n d u between 1924 and 1930. Kitawala also spread from 
the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia into eastern Angola around 
1932. T w o years later a prophetess from the Congo linked to Kimbanguism 
attracted a following in the region of the P o m b o , and in 1936 the Mayangi 
or Nlenvo sect - operating near the Congolese border - forbade all its 
members from fraternizing with whites. Although the data are extremely 
fragmentary, these religious expressions of protest seem to have had a 
minimal impact. Only in the 1950s with the advent of Tokoism did an 
independent Church attract a large permanent following. A n d Tokoism 
exhibited contradictory tendencies portraying white colonialists as evil yet 
preaching passivity.71 
While most of these protests were rurally based, assimilated intellectuals 
and journalists in Luanda and Lisbon spoke out against the abuses of 
colonialism and reaffirmed their Angolan identity. Indeed, a very rich 
tradition of literary protest dates back to the middle of the previous century. 
T h e best known of these proto-nationalists were the canon Antonio José 
de Nacimento (1838-1902), the lawyer and journalist José de Fontes Pereira 
(1838-91), the writer Joaquim Dias Cordeiro da Matta (1857-94) a°d 
possibly the members of an association formed in connection with a 
virulently anti-colonial work entitled Voz d'Angola clamando no deserto 
published in Lisbon in 1901.72 T h e collapse of the monarchy (October 
1910) and the advent of the Republican government was welcomed by 
the assimilados and considerably raised their hopes, for they were acutely 
aware that their o w n status had deteriorated and that clandestine slavery 
continued to exist in their homeland. But even during this wave of 
liberalism, the incipient nationalist feeling a m o n g the more educated 
Africans could be expressed more openly in Portugal than in Angola. 
T h e Liga Ultramarina had been organized in Lisbon in 1910 and was 
followed shortly thereafter by the Liga Colonial. T w o years later, African 
expatriates living in Lisbon from all the colonies founded the Junta de 
Defensa dos Direitos de Africa. In Angola itself, Liga Angolana, a small 
association of Angolan civil servants, gained formal recognition from 
Governor-General Norton de Matos in 1913. Almost immediately a split 
in this association led to the emergence of Gremio Africano. T h e prolifera-
tion of these organizations notwithstanding, all lacked a substantial 
following and had extremely limited influence. 
O f far greater potential importance than the formation of any of these 
associations was the Cuanza Norte 'conspiracy' of 1916-17 which 
momentarily linked a number of alienated intellectuals with M b u n d u 
peasants living in the Luanda hinterland. It was led by Antonio de Assis 
71. A . Margando in R . Chilcote (ed.), 1972. 
72. For a discussion of this tradition of literary protest, see D . L . Wheeler in R . Chilcote 
(ed.), 1972. 
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Júnior (1887-1960), a lawyer, novelist and journalist.73 H e vigorously con-
demned colonial oppression and the preferential treatment given to the 
settler community which he described as 'still composed mainly of m e n 
w h o do not k n o w from whence they came nor where they are going, m e n 
motivated simply by the desire to get all they can, to acquire and grab'.74 
Fearing a growing alliance between assimilados and peasants, and concerned 
about the rash of uprisings, the colonial state acted swiftly. Antonio de 
Assis Júnior was arrested and narrowly escaped being deported. 
In Lisbon, the Junta de Defensa dos Direitos de Africa, led mainly by 
mulattos from Sao T o m é , had very little power. A dissident offshoot of 
the Junta founded the Liga Africana in 1919, to which the Liga Angolana 
de Luanda was affiliated. T h e Junta de Defensa was reorganized as the 
Partido Nacional Africano in 1921, to avoid being taken over by left-wing 
elements. Mutatis mutandis, these two metropolitan groups represented 
the two pan-Africanist trends that prevailed in Portugal at the time, the 
Liga Africana opting for the reformism of D r D u Bois, and the Partido 
Nacional Africano more sympathetic to the philosophy of Marcus 
Garvey.75 
T h e return of the High Commissioner Norton de Matos in 1921, an 
unyielding opponent of the Liga Angolana and the Gremio Africano, left 
both organizations extremely vulnerable. In 1922 he formally clamped d o w n 
on the two associations. H e ordered that Antonio de Assis Júnior be 
arrested, that several influential members of the Liga Angolana be deported, 
and finally that the Liga Angolana be formally dissolved. H e also banned 
'nativist' newspapers and curtailed promotion opportunities for assimilado 
civil servants. After this blow, organized nationalism in Angola went under-
ground. There subsequently appeared sporadic protests against compulsory 
labour in the Luanda-Malange corridor between 1922 and 1925. T h e state 
took the opportunity provided by these protests to smash the last vestiges 
of intellectual dissidence.76 
Conditions became so difficult in Angola that African associations 
adopted a policy of co-operation with the government. T h e Partido 
Nacional Africano went as far as to defend Portugal at the League of Nations 
against charges of forced labour. T h u s when the military dictatorship was 
set up in Lisbon in 1926, followed by the Salazar regime, it found that 
the will to resist on the part of Angolan intellectuals had already been 
broken. 'Purged' of its hard-line elements, the Liga Angolana was allowed 
to reappear in 1929-30 under the n a m e of the Liga Nacional Africana. 
T h e Gremio Africano, which had succumbed to the torrent of restrictions 
in the 1920s, also re-emerged as the Associaçào dos Naturais de Angola 
73. A . de Assis Junior, 1917. 
74. Quoted in D . L . Wheeler in R . Chilcote (ed.), 1972, p. 81. 
75. For a discussion of events surrounding this split, see E . A . Friedland, 1979, 
pp. 119-20. 
76. R . Pélissier, 1978, p. 233. 
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( A N A N G O L A ) . Sapped of their vital force and rendered politically 
impotent, the two organizations were induced to pursue purely social aims. 
Their collapse coincided with the decline in Portugal of the two 'parties' 
claiming to be pan-Africanist. In 1931 they merged and became the 
Movimento Nacionalista Africano (nationalist in the sense of the Portu-
guese nation), and eventually petered out, caught in the implacable strangle-
hold of D r Oliveira Salazar. Watched by the police, in danger of losing 
their jobs, the local leaders of the Liga Nacional Africana and the 
A N A N G O L A suspended their activities for over twenty years (approxi-
mately 1925-45). Inevitably, the decline of the assimilados' political role 
meant that socially, too, they were degraded especially with the arrival 
of an increasing number of white settlers. 
T h e latter tried on m a n y occasions to rise up against metropolitan rule 
(especially in 1924-5), and subsequently against the dictatorial regime 
(notably in 1930), but these attempts only indirectly affected the oppressed 
African population.77 Africans had become foreigners in their o w n country 
and their only apparent function in the eyes of the Europeans was their 
productive capacity. In those circumstances, the few strikes in which they 
took part in the ports (1928) or the railways (1933) were no more than 
flashes in the pan, and came to nothing, for there was no lasting unity 
between white labourers and black unskilled workers. Moreover, black 
workers lacked the support of the African soldiers enrolled in the colonial 
army, and could not look to an alliance with the assimilados w h o had been 
reduced to silence by the authorities. 
Popular opposition to colonial rule in M o z a m b i q u e 
T h e m o d e of popular protest in M o z a m b i q u e was. similar to that in Angola 
though it varied somewhat in scale and intensity. There were fewer armed 
insurrections and the literary tradition and connections with the pan-
Africanist movement were less well developed. T h e n u m b e r of documented 
examples of peasant and worker opposition, on the other hand, is 
appreciably greater in Mozambique than in Angola and independent 
churches were far more numerous and politically significant. 
Peasant opposition posed a recurring challenge to the colonial-capitalist 
system. T o be sure, not all, or perhaps even most, peasants resisted. Divided 
from each other by space, ethnicity, religion, primordial kinship affiliations, 
the tyranny of their work schedule and a host of other factors, individual 
peasants were relatively powerless to mount large-scale opposition which 
lends itself to detailed historical analysis. Their actions tended to be 
isolated, diffused and sporadic, their limited aims and systemic importance 
hard to measure and easy to ignore. Yet, acting within the serious 
constraints imposed by the colonial-capitalist system, Mozambican peasants 
77. A different interpretation is advanced by E . Sik, 1964, Vol. II, pp. 314-15. 
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were able to varying degrees to minimize the disruptive effects of 
Portuguese domination. For them the central arena of struggle was against 
the appropriation of their labour and its products. 
As in the early years of the colonial period, tax evasion recurred with 
great regularity throughout all of rural M o z a m b i q u e . Peasants developed 
a variety of different strategies to reduce or avoid the annual payments. 
Peasants commonly falsified their age or marital status, thereby reducing 
their financial burdens. M a n y young adults claimed to be minors, some-
times temporarily residing in pre-puberty huts w h e n the revenue officials 
arrived. Husbands often hid their junior wives or claimed that they were 
either sisters-in-law or wives of friends w h o had gone away to work. In 
southern M o z a m b i q u e , where hut taxes were the dominant form of 
retribution, extended families gathered together in one hut which they 
claimed to be their exclusive domicile.78 Even after they were assessed 
m a n y peasants continued this duplicity in an effort to postpone, or even 
avoid, paying the taxes. A s late as 1928 one frustrated Portuguese official 
in the central part of the colony noted: 
T h e village headmen and peasants belonging to the populations of 
M a m b o s Cussarara, C h u a u , and Capanga are engaged in an incredible 
campaign of passive resistance. W h e n they are called to bring their 
taxes they come without any m o n e y and negotiate long postponement 
which they invariably exceed, necessitating the use of sepáis to bring 
in the fumos each of w h o m only brings in a small percentage of the 
taxes from their respective villages, and thus it takes m a n y months, 
often an infinite period, before the obligations are liquidated.79 
Other m e m b e r s of the rural population hid in the interior. Official reports 
indicate that w o m e n often claimed that their husbands were dead when , 
in fact, 'they temporarily fled returning to the village shortly after the 
tax collectors or census officials had left.'80 Africans living close to inter-
national frontiers moved back and forth avoiding all tax obligations. 
Thousands of rural Mozambicans compelled to grow cotton or to work 
on settler farms, plantations and state public work projects contested the 
amount of labour they were expected to provide to the colonial-capitalist 
system. In the most extreme action they withheld their labour entirely 
by fleeing to neighbouring colonies. Flight was both arduous and 
dangerous. Nevertheless, by 1919, it was estimated that more than 100000 
northern Mozambicans had resettled in Nyasaland alone.81 Even in the 
south where the state exercised greater control, colonial officials 
78. J. Nunes, 1928, p. 116. 
79. Arquivo de Tete, Documentos Diversos, Circumscriçâo Civil da Maravia, 'Relatório 
do Administracäo Referenate ao A n n o de 1928'; Documento no. 8, Manoel Arnaldo Ribeiro 
to Administrator Manoel Alves, Vianna, undated. 
80. J. Nunes, 1928, p. 116. 
81. L . Vail, 1976, p. 402. 
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acknowledged that 'Africans fleeing the province of Sul de Save because 
of cotton is not something new . . . it was reported that m a n y natives 
abandoned their lands after setting fire to their huts.'82 
Other deserters reluctant to break all links with their families and 
traditional homelands fled to sparsely populated backwater areas. In at 
least a few instances they created permanent refugee communities, 
primarily in rugged mountainous zones or in the coastal swamps , where 
the difficult topography served as a natural barrier against Portuguese pene-
tration. Several of these refugee communities were able to maintain their 
independence for a n u m b e r of years, surviving both the harsh environ-
mental conditions and armed colonial intervention.83 
T h e covert withholding of a portion of their labour probably represented 
the most widespread expression of defiance by cotton-producing peasants 
and rural workers. This strategy was both less risky than desertion and, 
at least for the peasants, provided them with additional opportunities to 
work their gardens. According to official reports peasants, for example, 
rarely planted their cotton fields at the designated time, cultivated the 
m i n i m u m acreage, weeded their plants the required number of times or 
burned their field after the harvest.84 European planters in southern 
M o z a m b i q u e bitterly complained about the 'docility' of their grossly under-
paid labourers, rejecting the proposition of one of their members that 'if 
you contract to pay a pound a month you get pretty fair m e n . ' 8 S T h e 
governor of Inhambane echoed their sentiments, deploring the reluctance 
of the Nguni m e n to perform agricultural tasks which they claimed to be 
'women' s work' . 8 6 
Given the factors which tended to divide both the peasantry and migrant 
workers and frustrate any sense of class solidarity, it is hardly surprising 
that rural resistance rarely took a collective form. Occasionally, however, 
rural dissatisfaction was incorporated in a more radical m o d e of protest. 
F r o m 1917 to 1921 peasants throughout the Zambezi valley, angered by 
forced labour, increased taxation, mandatory cotton production, sexual 
abuses and military conscription, joined in a rebellion directed by descen-
dants of the Barue royal family and Shona spirit med iums . Their objective, 
which they momentarily accomplished, was to liberate their homelands 
and dismantle the oppressive colonial system.87 During the next two 
decades there was also a series of localized peasant uprisings in Erati, 
82. Quoted in A . Isaacman, M . Stephen, Y . A d a m , M . J. H o m e n , E . M a c a m o and 
A . Pililäo, 1980, p. 596. 
83. ibid., pp. 597-9. 
84. ibid. 
85. E . A . Ross, 1925, p. 50. 
86. Districto de Inhambane, Relatório do Governador içij-içis, Lourenço Marques, 
1916, p. 41. 
87. A . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 156-85. 
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Moguincal, and Angoch in northern Mozambique precipitated by taxation 
and forced labour (see Fig. 27.2).88 
W h e r e fear or coercion prevented overt opposition, peasants and rural 
workers often manifested their hostility through cultural symbols which 
were unintelligible to the colonial officials. T h e Chope, living in southern 
Mozambique , for example, developed an entire repertoire of songs 
denouncing the colonial regime in general and the hated tax official in 
particular: 
W e are still angry; its always the same story 
T h e oldest daughter must pay the tax 
Natanele tells the white m a n to leave him alone 
Natanele tells the white m a n to leave m e be 
Y o u , the elders must discuss our affairs 
For the m a n the whites appointed is the son of a nobody 
T h e Chope have lost the right to their o w n land 
Let m e tell you about it 8 9 
T h e work songs of labourers employed by Sena Sugar Estates were even 
more explicitly hostile, often depicting the European overseers in the most 
unflattering sexual terms.90 T o the north the M a k u a and M a k o n d e artists 
ridiculed state officials - both African and European - in highly stylized 
carvings which distorted their features and eliminated their humanity." 
Urban workers like their rural counterparts initially engaged in 
individual and sporadic actions to escape or minimize the n e w capitalist 
economic order. They fled before the labour recruiters arrived at their 
villages, deserted in large numbers, 'loafed' and, on occasion, engaged in 
sabotage of machinery or raw materials. Although such actions continued 
to be a dominant m o d e of protest for chíbalo (forced labour), by the second 
decade of the twentieth century urban wage earners had begun to shift 
their tactics and organize within the n e w system in order to improve their 
conditions of employment. 
Several factors militated against the organized efforts of Mozambican 
workers during this period. First, their numbers were extremely small. 
Mozambique's retarded capitalist sectors employed relatively few perma-
nent labourers. Moreover, the state explicitly prohibited the formation of 
African unions, and the white labour movement , with a few noticeable 
exceptions, remained hostile, embracing the racial and cultural prejudices 
which were part of the official state ideology.92 T h u s , small in number, 
88. J. A . G . de Meló Branquinho, 1966, pp. 81-3, 108, 114, 193. 
89. Quoted in E . Mondlane, 1969, p. 103. 
90. See L . Vail and L . White, 1980, pp. 339-58. 
91. T h e best collection of these carvings is to be found in the M u s e u m de Nampula 
in the city of Nampula. 
92. For an important examination of the white working-class movement see J. Cápela, 
forthcoming. 
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isolated from the larger working-class movement , and facing a hostile 
alliance of state and capital, African workers were clearly in an unenviable 
position. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1911, a small group headed by Francisco 
Domingos C a m p o s , Alfredo de Oliveira Guimares, Agostinho José 
Mathias, attempted to organize the Uniào Africano to include all African 
workers in Lourenço Marques. For them the issues were clear cut. Black 
workers had to organize if they were to survive. They specifically warned 
against the divisive tendencies of ethnicism and the danger posed if those 
workers in better-paying jobs did not unite with c o m m o n day-labourers. 
'In our association there are no distinctions', their pamphlets proudly pro-
claimed. O n the point of working-class struggle and solidarity they were 
equally unequivocal. Despite their eloquence and the power of their 
critiques, strong opposition from the colonial-capitalist state and the white 
trade union movement , plus the apparent lack of unity a m o n g African 
workers, undercut Uniào Africano even before it got started.93 
Despite this initial setback there were a number of sporadic attempts 
to organize African workers in Lourenço Marques. Strikes and work 
stoppages were reported by employees of the Merchants Association in 
1913, tram workers in 1917, railroad technicians in 1918, and employees 
at an engineering firm in 1919.94 
A s in m a n y other parts of Africa, port workers were the most militant 
and relatively best organized sector in the labour force. During the first 
two decades of the twentieth century Lourenço Marques had grown into 
a major centre of international commerce, linking the Transvaal and Swazi-
land as well as southern M o z a m b i q u e to the larger world economy. Despite 
the strategic economic importance of the port and the state's effort to 
prevent any dislocation of traffic, there were seven major strikes between 
1918 and 1921 precipitated by the refusal of the shipping and forwarding 
companies to increase African wages to keep up with the spiralling rate 
of inflation. Between 1918 and 1920, for example, the prices of such basic 
staples as rice, beans, potatoes, and soap had doubled and in the latter 
year a kilogram of rice cost three cents - equal to the average daily salary 
of most port workers.95 
T h e strikes at the port followed a broad pattern. Disgruntled workers, 
organized through informal grass-roots networks, refused to work unless 
their wages were adjusted. They gathered in front of the main entrance 
to the port demanding better salaries and working conditions. T h e colonial 
governor sent in troops to smash the demonstration and arrest the leaders. 
At the same time chíbalo workers were used as strike breakers to keep 
the port going. Quickly the strikes were broken. Even where the employers 
agreed to pay increases, they often reneged upon them as in the case 
93. Os Simples, 24 June 1911. 
94. J. Penvenne, n.d. 
95. Other non-essential commodités increased at an even higher rate. 
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of the 1919 strike. Nevertheless, despite these reversals and the rise to 
power of a fascist government, strikes continued after 1926, though less 
frequently.96 
Perhaps the most bitter port confrontation was the Quinhenta strike 
in 1933. Port officials and handling companies, suffering the effects of 
the world depression, decided to reduce the already low wages of wharf 
workers by between 10 and 30%. This cutback represented five times the 
amount gained in the 1921 strike. W h e n the announcement was m a d e , 
workers walked off the job and refused to return after lunch, leaving the 
port paralysed. Leaders of the strike vowed that they would not return 
until the cuts were rescinded. Faced with a paralysed port, employers 
agreed to the demands and port workers returned only to find themselves 
locked in the port and surrounded by police w h o forced them to unload 
all the ships. Thereafter, it was announced that the cuts would not be 
restored. O n e Lourenço Marques newspaper captured the anger and 
frustration on the wharf. 'Workers with empty bellies faced their boss, 
w h o , with his full belly, answered them with empty promises.'97 
A s in other parts of Southern and Central Africa, independent churches 
offered another institutional framework for workers and peasants to vent 
their hostility against the new social order and the hypocrisy of the 
established Christian churches. A secret government report noted that the 
popularity of the separatist churches was due 'both to the racial discrimina-
tion within the larger society and the insensitivity of the European 
missionaries with regard to the natives'.98 As early as 1918 there were 
seventy-six separatist churches k n o w n to be operating in Mozambique . 
Twenty years later the number had jumped to more than 3 8 0 . " M e m b e r -
ship ranged from a mere handful of adherents to more than 10 000 in the 
case of the Missäo Christa Ethiopia whose network extended throughout 
four provinces. 
Virtually all the independent churches traced their origin to the Zionist 
and Ethiopian movements in neighbouring South Africa and Rhodesia. 
Disgruntled and alienated Mozambican migrant labourers, primarily work-
ing in the mines, found refuge in these churches and when they returned 
h o m e either organized branches or formed autonomous sects modelled after 
their South African and Rhodesian counterparts. Samuel Belize, the 
moving force behind the powerful African Methodist Episcopal Church, 
previously had a long association with a black off-shoot of the Wesleyan 
Mission in South Africa, and Sebastiào Peidade de Sousa modelled the 
96. See, for example, J. Penvenne, forthcoming. M s Penvenne is currently completing 
her doctoral dissertation on the making of the working class in Lourenço Marques which 
should add an extremely valuable dimension to our knowledge of Mozambican labour 
history. 
97. Quoted in J. Penvenne, forthcoming, p. 20. 
98. J. A . G . de Meló Branquinho, 1966, p. 77. 
99. ibid., pp. 73-80. 
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Missao Christa Ethiopia after the Ethiopian C h u r c h to which he belonged 
in D u r b a n . 1 0 0 In other cases, the reputation of a particular apostolic leader 
provided a sufficient incentive for M o z a m b i c a n s to join his flock. Because 
m o s t of the migrant labourers c a m e from the southern half of the colony, 
the independent churches enjoyed their greatest support in the districts 
of Lourenço M a r q u e s , G a z a , I n h a m b a n e and Sofala. 
F r o m the standpoint of social m o v e m e n t s the Ethiopian churches in 
M o z a m b i q u e are of particular interest because they often acted as relatively 
a u t o n o m o u s institutions in which M o z a m b i c a n s could elect their o w n 
officials, have their o w n budgets, constitution, flag and even para-military 
organizations. In short, they represented an arena of 'free space', within 
an enclosed authoritarian system, in which oppressed workers and peasants 
could enjoy a m o d i c u m of self-rule and racial and cultural dignity. T h e 
Zionist churches, o n the other h a n d , derived m u c h of their appeal from 
their apocalyptic vision of divine intervention and the destruction of the 
oppressive colonial order. 
In terms of explicit anti-colonial action, M o z a m b i c a n independent 
churches ran the g a m u t from radicalism to quietism. According to 
confidential government reports, the Methodist Episcopalian C h u r c h , 
based primarily in G a z a and M a n i c a districts, w a s a centre of subversive 
activities. G o v e r n m e n t infiltrators reported that the C h u r c h fostered anti-
white sentiment and explicitly attacked the oppressive colonial regime in 
its services and at clandestine meetings. M o r e o v e r , its officials reputedly 
maintained links with the African National Congress. ' ° l Other government 
inquiries found evidence that the Methodist Episcopalian C h u r c h 
advocated revolt and that its m e m b e r s attacked colonial authorities and 
loyalist chiefs o n several occasions. T h e sect w a s subsequently accused 
of helping to organize a major peasant uprising in M a m b o n e in 1952. S u c h 
insurgent activities, however, s eem to have been the exception. M o s t 
independent churches did not adopt an explicitly anti-colonial p r o g r a m m e , 
choosing instead to limit their opposition to verbal criticism and, in s o m e 
cases, an apocalyptic vision.102 
T h e r e are also tantalizing suggestions of Islamic revisionist m o v e m e n t s 
in northern M o z a m b i q u e w h o s e M u s l i m population had historically 
opposed colonial rule. In the 1920s Islamic holy m e n protested against the 
abuses of forced labour, low wages , and land appropriation in the area 
of Qui lemane . A n u m b e r of M u s l i m chiefs and their followers were also 
involved in uprisings in the early 1930s but the exact cause of the revolts 
remains u n k n o w n . 1 0 3 
U r b a n intellectual protest, although not as deeply rooted in M o z a m b i q u e 
as in Angola, nevertheless b e c a m e an important forum for reformist dis-
100. ibid.; E . Moreira, 1936, pp. 28-9; H . I. F. de Freitas, 1956-7. 
101. H . I. F . de Freitas, 1956-7, Vol. II, pp. 32-5. 
102. ibid., p. 134. 
103. J. A . G . de Meló Branquinho, 1966, pp. 56, 81, 108. 
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course. T h e first, somewhat tentative, call for change came in 1908 with 
the publication of the Lourenço Marques newspaper, O Africano, the 
official organ of Gremio Africano (African Union) - a social and civil 
group founded by the grande familias of colour two years earlier. Despite 
their relatively privileged position and their self-conscious sense of 
importance, the leading families of Gremio Africano took as their mandate 
the responsibility to speak for the oppressed Africans. Indeed, the masthead 
of O Africano boldly proclaimed that it was 'Devoted to the defense of 
the native population of Mozambique ' . Its successor, O Brado Africano 
(The African Voice), pursued a similar objective as the self-defined 
guardian of African peasants and workers. O n the occasion of its seventh 
anniversary, O Brado Africano proudly proclaimed that 'the Africans have 
in Brado Africano their best defense, indeed, their only weapon against 
the injustices which fall upon them. 1 0 4 
In their news stories and commentaries both journals highlighted four 
recurring abuses - chíbalo, the poor working conditions of free African 
labour, the preferential treatment given to white immigrants, and the lack 
of educational opportunities — which to the editors symbolized the very 
essence of colonial oppression. Throughout this period editorials vigorously 
denounced and carefully documented the abuses inherent in the system 
of chíbalo. T h e y protested against the brutal methods used by African sepáis 
to recruit forced labour, the low wages and poor working conditions of 
the chíbalo labourers and the arbitrary and capricious actions of the 
European overseers. T h e editors were particularly incensed by the c o m m o n 
practice of seizing 'African w o m e n to repair and construct roads, not even 
supplying them with food nor paying them a salary', while 'forcing them 
during the rainy season to sleep in mud-huts , beside the road, like 
slaves'.105 
T h e newspapers also unleashed a broadside attack on the conditions of 
employment of free African workers. They deplored the fact that peasants 
and nominally free agricultural workers were compelled to work on Euro-
pean estates 'from sunrise until sunset earning hardly a shilling a month' , 
that Mozambicans working in the South African mines are 'denied the 
right to select their o w n employers . . . and die like flies in the mines', 
that African workers are arrested and beaten if they lack proper identifica-
tion, and that the state used chíbalo labourers to break strikes and drive 
d o w n wages of free workers.106 T h e informal colour bar conventions, 
which froze Africans in the lowest paying jobs while reserving the most 
desirable employment for Europeans, was also the target of several 
editorials. 
T h e protest against the colour bar represented part of a more generalized 
104. O Brado Africano, 24 December 1926. 
105. ibid., 28 February 1925. 
106. ibid.; O Brado Africano, 13 December 1924; 30 July 1927; J. Penvenne, 1978, 
p. 10. 
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hostility towards state policies which favoured white immigrants while 
ignoring the needs of the indigenous population. In one scathing c o m m e n -
tary, O Africano questioned the colonial regime's logic in underwriting the 
expensive white 'riff-raff w h o contributed nothing to the colony. 
T h e c o m m o n Portuguese, w h o is known as mumadji [ c o m m o n 
Portuguese immigrant] among the African population, always leaves 
Portugal with the fixed intention of a short stay in the land of the 
blacks to gather enough savings; and then to save it all to return to 
Portugal, settle in and enjoy the wealth which he managed to 
accumulate, with G o d knows what sacrifices over 2, 3 or 4 years. 
Are they aware there [in Portugal] of the deprivations that those 
m e n suffer in order to save that 300 or 400000 reis? It is a p o e m 
of pain and misery. A veritable madness that some of them live through 
in an effort to fill their suitcases - with those paltry pieces of metal. 
Gold Fever! 
They live in pig-sties, without light, without air, some 4 or 5 
together in order to cut costs. T h e y customarily eat three persons 
from the same meal, because it costs less. In a squalid dinner of soups 
or stews, which are more accurately puddles of w a r m water in which 
some five beans swim hopelessly in search of company . . . I 0 7 
Although the tone of the editorials in both newspapers was cautious 
and reformist, appealing to the goodwill and sense of justice of the colonial 
government, mounting frustrations produced outbursts of anger and even 
implicit threats to the system. This somewhat more defiant tone surfaced 
with greater regularity in the period immediately after the Salazar regime 
(1928-68) imposed its authoritarian rule, smashing any illusion of reform 
and generating a sense of despair even a m o n g the most privileged m e m b e r s 
of the African and mulatto community. A ringing editorial in Brado 
Africano, entitled 'Enough', represents the clearest expression of their rage: 
W e are fed up to the teeth. 
Fed up with supporting you, with suffering the terrible consequences 
of your follies, your demands, with the squandering misuse of your 
authority. 
W e can no longer stand the pernicious effects of your political and 
administrative decisions. 
W e are no longer willing to make greater and greater useless 
sacrifices . . . 
Enough . . . I 0 8 
Yet for all their criticism of colonial abuses and their self-defined role 
as guardians of oppressed Africans, the grande familias lived in a social 
and cultural milieu which was totally apart from that of the workers and 
107. Quoted in J. Penvenne, 1979, p. 10. 
108. O Brado Africano, 27 February 1931. The English translation is taken from 
J. Duffy, 1959, p. 305. 
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peasants w h o returned to their shanty towns, barracks and villages after 
a hard day's labour. Moreover, as members of a nascent colonial 
bourgeoisie, they had very different class interests which often placed 
them at odds with their less privileged counterparts and precluded a more 
radical critique of colonial-capitalism. Intense rivalries between mulatto 
and African segments of the colonial elite further reduced the influence 
of Gremio Africano and helped precipitate its demise.109 
B y the early 1930s these animosities had grown progressively worse 
providing the colonial regime with an opportunity to shatter the last vestiges 
of unity. Appealing to the discontent of the African membership, state 
officials convinced several of them to break away and organize the Institutio 
Negrophilio in 1932. A s an additional incentive, the colonial administration 
provided office space, furniture, books and generous funding while a 
prominent Portuguese businessman, Paulo Gil dos Santos, offered several 
leaders of the n e w organization employment as labour recruiters. Four 
years later the Salazar regime imposed extremely stringent censorship laws 
which effectively silenced O Brado Africano. 
During this period a small n u m b e r of Mozambican intellectuals, living 
in Portugal, helped to form organizations which were linked to the larger 
pan-African movement . T h e most important were the Liga Africana and 
the Partido Nacional Africano. Liga Africana maintained close ties with 
W . E . B . D u Bois' Pan-African Congress, while the latter expressed greater 
sympathy for Garveyism. Neither, however, had any substantial following 
in the colony and their actions were largely symbolic. '1 ° 
Conclusion 
T o s u m up, the Africans of the countries of Southern and Central Africa 
stood up to colonialism and m a d e a substantial contribution to the 
preparation of the liberation movement on the African continent which 
followed after 1935. T h e most advanced forms of anti-colonial protest in 
that period were observed in the Union of South Africa where industrial 
development and the accompanying process of urbanization involved 
Africans in the capitalist economy earlier than in the other African 
countries. Nationalists and political organizations set up in the Union of 
South Africa were used as models in m a n y countries of Southern, Central 
and East Africa. 
109. Interview with Luis Bernardo Honwana, 3 and 4 October 1981; R . Hamilton, 1975, 
pp. 164-7. 
AIIO. E . A . Friedland, 1979, pp. 119-21. 
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Ethiopia and Liberia, 
1914-35: two independent 
African states in the 
colonial era 
M . B . A K P A N based on contributions 
from A. B. JONES and R. P A N K H U R S T 
His Majesty's Government will join with the United States Govern-
ment in making representations in the strongest terms to the Liberian 
Government to induce that Government to lay before the forthcoming 
meeting of the Council of the League of Nations a request for the 
appointment of a Governing Commission [over Liberia] . . . His 
Majesty's Government will also exert strong pressure on the Liberian 
Government to persuade them to apply for a loan under the League 
auspices.1 (British Foreign Office, London, to British Ambassador 
in Washington, D C ; January 1931.) 
I do not want agreements unless they give m e everything, including 
the head of the Emperor [Haile Sellassie] . . . Even if I a m given 
everything I prefer to avenge A d o w a . I a m prepared.2 (Benito 
Mussolini, Italian Fascist leader, August 1935.) 
O n the surface, it would appear that the matters in dispute between 
Ethiopia and Italy could have only academic interests for Liberia. 
But a more profound consideration of the implications inherent in 
the facts surrounding the dispute would convince the most unthinking 
mind that the situation is of the highest significance to a State situated 
as is Liberia. Should the League of Nations be unable to assert its 
moral influence in the maintenance of international decency, decorum 
and security, then the smaller States in the World will become, as 
in fact they have always been, the prey of imperialistic Adventurers.3 
(Edwin J. Barclay, President of Liberia, December 1935.) 
T h e quotations above convey the force of European imperialism against 
Liberia and Ethiopia during m a n y of the inter-war years, and the bond 
that continued to bind Liberians and Ethiopians as Africans and victims 
of European aggression. This chapter discusses, in comparative terms, this 
aggression, the responses of Liberia and Ethiopia to it, and other political, 
economic and social developments that occurred in both countries during 
the period 1915-35. 
1. R . E . Anderson, 1952, pp. 110-11. 
2. E . M . Robertson, 1977, pp. 160-2. 
3. E . J. Barclay, 1935(b), p. 15. 
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Liberia and Ethiopia: socio-cultural developments, 
1915-35 
During this period, Liberia and Ethiopia encountered grave problems of 
national integration and survival resulting partly from vast expansion 
during the previous century and the increased disparateness of their peoples 
and cultures. W h a t major cultural and social changes occurred in both 
countries during this period? 
O f Liberia's population, the Americo-Liberians as a group remained 
politically and economically dominant. Since the late nineteenth century 
their number had reportedly declined owing to a higher death than birth 
rate, and the virtual cessation of immigration of blacks from America. T h e 
situation led to increased intermarriage and liaison, mostly between 
Americo-Liberian m e n and indigenous African w o m e n (many of w h o m 
were educated in the Liberian schools), and a corresponding increase of 
Liberians with mixed Americo-Liberian/indigenous African parentage. In-
variably, such Liberians and indigenous African youths apprenticed to or 
adopted by Americo-Liberian families became assimilated to the Americo-
Liberian socio-cultural milieu.4 
T h e decline in the Americo-Liberian population probably also intensified 
their practice of in-group marriages, and correspondingly the extended 
family system that had developed among them since the late nineteenth 
century. Thus throughout our period, established families like the 
Shermans; the Barclays, Colemans, Coopers, Dennises, Grimeses and 
Morrises; the Greens, Grigsbys, Rosses, Witherspoons and Worrells; the 
Brewers, Dossens, Gibsons and T u b m a n s , mentioned in Chapter 11 of this 
volume, continued to provide most of Liberia's political and economic 
leadership.5 Indeed by the 1920s it became the practice for these families 
to allocate, through some mutual agreement, legislative seats, ministerial 
posts, and other high public positions and patronage m a n y months before 
formal elections to the legislature took place.6 
A s for the indigenous Liberians, the gradual expansion of schools and 
Christian missionary work throughout Liberia somewhat increased their 
literacy, modernization, and assimilation of some aspects of the Americo-
Liberian culture. Indigenous Liberians thus assimilated were regarded as 
'civilized' (or 'semi-civilized') by the Americo-Liberians w h o granted a 
comparatively few of them political and civil rights on an equal footing 
with themselves. A few of those thus favoured rose to prominent public 
or political positions, like D r Benjamin W . Payne, a Bassa m a n trained 
4. C . L . Simpson, 1961, pp. 84, 88; H . A . Jones, 1962, p. 153. 
5. United States National Archives ( U S N A ) , Records of the Department of State relating 
to the Internal Affairs of Liberia (RDSL) , 1909-29, 4/88, U S State Department M e m o -
randum, 16 June 1924. 
6. U S N A , R D S L , 1909-29, 4, Clarke to U S Secretary of State, Monrovia. 
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in medicine in the United States, w h o held a Cabinet position as Secretary 
of Public Instruction for most of the 1910s and 1920s; Henry T o o Wesley, 
a Grebo m a n , w h o was Liberia's Vice-President in the early 1920s; D i d w o 
T w e , a K r u Senator (Plate 28.1); and M o m o l u Massaquoi, a Vai m a n , 
w h o was at various times in the 1920s Acting Secretary of the Interior 
and Liberia's Consul in G e r m a n y . 7 
Nevertheless, even the favoured educated Africans - let alone the mass 
of unenfranchised and largely oppressed indigenous Liberians - were more 
or less dissatisfied with 'Americo-Liberian rule' - as they rightly termed 
the Liberian government. As a rule the educated indigenous Liberians 
sought to reform Liberia's socio-political system to secure a better deal 
for the indigenous Liberians. Only rarely, as in 1930, during the forced 
labour crisis in Liberia, did some of the leading educated indigenous 
Liberians actively seek to overthrow the Americo-Liberians and supplant 
them in the government.8 
Acculturation was, however, not unidirectional. Over the years the 
Americo-Liberians had themselves adapted m a n y aspects of indigenous 
Liberian culture which they had earlier abhorred or decried as super-
stitious or heathenish, such as belief in the efficacy of magic, witchcraft 
and 'native medicine'; initiation into the poro; and the practice of pawning 
persons to meet a debt or other obligation.9 T h e degree of such African-
ization was, however, too limited to blur the main social, economic, political 
and cultural distinctions between the Americo-Liberians as a group, and 
the indigenous Liberians, by the terminal date of this study in 1935. 
A s was the case with Liberia, a major consequence of Ethiopia's vast 
expansion under Menelik was to exacerbate the ethnic diversity of 
Ethiopia's population. Prominent among the peoples incorporated into 
Ethiopia by 1914 through this expansion were the O r o m o w h o numbered 
at least as m a n y as the Amhara-Tigreans and were dispersed over almost 
one half of Ethiopia's territory; the Gurage; Sidama; and Beni Shanguls.10 
T h e Amhara-Tigreans as a group retained their economic, political and 
military dominance over the rest of Ethiopia during our period, a position 
comparable to that of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy in Liberia. Unlike 
the Americo-Liberian minority, however, the Amhara-Tigreans were 
variously estimated at between 33 and 40% of Ethiopia's population.11 
Although they constituted a privileged group, actual economic and political 
7. R . L . Buell, 1947, p. 751. 
8. See below. 
9. Liberian National Archives ( L N A ) , Grand Bassa County File (uncatalogued), Smith 
to King, Lower Buchanan, 14 November 1924. 
ibid., Russell to King, Lower Buchanan, 5 M a y 1928. 
ibid., Harris (for Banks) to King, North Harlandville, 6 August 1928. 
10. E . Ullendorff, i960, pp. 30-44; R . Greenfield, 1965, pp. 98-108; G . W . B . 
Huntingford, 1969, pp. 35-7. 
11. E . Ullendorff, i960, p. 31; G . W . B . Huntingford, 1969, p. 23. 
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power and high status were concentrated in some Ethiopian noble families 
mostly from w h o m the holders of high public office or titles like (in order 
of precedence) negus, betwoded, ras, dajazmach, andfitawrari were recruited. 
It was largely through these noblemen (and the armies they c o m m a n d e d ) 
that Menelik had expanded Ethiopia by conquest. Thereafter he occupied 
the conquered territories with 'garrison settlements' in m u c h the same 
manner as did colonialists from Europe in other parts of Africa.12 Hence 
m a n y of these noblemen and their descendants, as well as descendants 
of the garrison settlements, government officials, 'and even Christian clergy 
not infrequently adopt[ed] the worst possible type of "colonial" approach' 
or racial attitude towards other Ethiopians 'of slightly different ethnic 
groupings'.13 T h e y prided themselves, for example, on being Ethiopia's 
empire-builders — the ' m e n w h o with their knowledge served the country 
and the Emperor and w h o handed Ethiopia d o w n ' through the ages to 
posterity. ' 4 
M u c h the same 'colonial approach' was manifested by the Americo-
Liberians in perceiving themselves as Liberia's nation-builders. As 
President William V . S. T u b m a n put it in M a y 1951, the African repatriates 
to Liberia, schooled in the hardship and lash of slavery in the N e w World: 
Brought here the civilization, education and religion that were to be 
imparted to the natives and with these it was hoped that the two 
elements would build a great solidified and united nation . . . F r o m 
them, feeble as they were, everything that is here has sprung forth 
and grown, including state buildings, colleges, school houses, churches 
and expanding economy, industry, embassies, legations, consulates, 
roads, bridges, et cetera.ls 
T h e self-image of nation- or empire-builder was comparable to the 
European colonial self-image of the 'White M a n ' s Burden' which posits, 
erroneously, that whatever advances are found in the economic, techno-
logical, political and cultural development of Africa - or in 'civilization' 
in its broad meaning - were introduced through European colonization 
of Africa.16 
A m o n g the non-Amhara-Tigreans (that is, the O r o m o , Sidama, Gurage, 
and so on), a significant social and cultural development in the first half 
of the twentieth century has been increased ' Amharization', despite resist-
ance by Muslim, traditional, and other influences. This increased Amhari -
zation owed m u c h to forced Christianization following Menelik's conquests 
and the imposition of imperial administration, Christian education in 
Ethiopian schools, and the prestige of Amharic as Ethiopia's national 
12. R . Greenfield, 1965, pp. 48-9, 119, 136, 460-2. 
13. ibid., pp. 105-6. 
14. Quoted in ibid., p. 107. 
15. W . V . S. Tubman, M a y 1951, in E . R . Townsend (ed.), 1959, pp. 98-9. 
16. L . H . Gann and P. Duignan, 1967, Chapters 15 and 22. 
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language, as well as the activities of traders and Coptic priests from A m h a r a 
and Tigre, and increasing urbanization which attracted labour migrants 
from other parts into the orbit of Amharic culture. ' 7 Manifestations of 
Amharization during our period included to a greater or lesser extent, the 
use of the Amharic language, dress and calendar; changes in religious beliefs; 
modifications in political institutions and structures, and in the system 
of land tenure.18 However, as in Liberia, acculturation was not uni-
directional. S o m e of the Amhara-Tigrean settlers in the more isolated 
garrison settlements were eventually assimilated by the local population.19 
Furthermore, Ethiopian society segmented into various classes and 
groups. These included slaves; peasants;20 nascent intellectuals and c o m -
mercial bourgeoisie w h o supported the Regent, Tafari M a k o n n e n (later 
Emperor Haile Sellassie), and favoured reforms and a strong central govern-
ment;2 1 and a conservative group comprising most of the great nobles and 
high clergy of Ethiopia's Coptic Church. This group, which supported 
Empress Zauditu and favoured regional autonomy, constituted the bulwark 
of Ethiopia's socio-cultural system.22 
Thus , in both Liberia and Ethiopia, ethnic and cultural pluralism and 
social inequality posed serious threats to social stability and harmony, or 
produced actual conflicts during our period (some of which are examined 
in this chapter). 
Political development 
Liberia 
In both Liberia and Ethiopia during our period, strains and stresses 
occurred in the political system and processes in three main spheres: within 
the core, on the periphery, and between the core and periphery. 
A s regards Liberia's core, throughout the 1910s, the True W h i g Party 
firmly held the reins of power with m i n i m u m challenge from a formal 
opposition party. This situation changed somewhat in the 1920s when the 
People's Party, organized in 1922 under the leadership of ex-President 
Daniel B . H o w a r d , seriously challenged the ruling True W h i g Party. Even 
so, there was no question, considering Liberia's largely corrupt political 
culture and the overwhelming political leverage wielded by the ruling party, 
that the People's Party could unseat the True W h i g Party solely through 
the constitutional means of the ballot box. 
Indeed, since the 1890s, formal opposition had become very weak and 
17. W . A . Shack, 1969, pp. 8, 48, 138-9. 
18. G . W . B . Huntingford, 1969, pp. 27-9, 55-8, 68; W . A . Shack, 1969, p. 202. 
19. W . A . Shack, 1969, p. 25. 
20. R . V . Vivo, 1978, pp. 38-9. 
21. R . V . Vivo, 1978, p. 37; R . Greenfield, 1965, p . 147. 
22. R . Greenfield, 1965, pp. 151-2; R . V . Vivo, 1978, pp. 36-8. 
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sporadic, organized mostly on an ad hoc basis, becoming a party only when 
national elections were being held. This lack of continuity was manifested 
in the variety of names which such parties bore: the Union Party, during 
the elections of M a y 1897 and 1899; the People's Party, in M a y 1901; 
the National Union True W h i g Party, in M a y 1911; the People's Party 
in M a y 1921, 1927, and 1931; and the United True W h i g Party, in M a y 
1935. Furthermore, the opposition parties contested for only a limited 
number of the seats in the Legislature. At the elections of 1897, 1903 and 
1905, it fielded no candidates for the presidency or vice-presidency, only 
for the House and Senate. At the elections of 1907 and 1919, the True 
W h i g Party was the only party in the field. Whereas most of the True 
W h i g candidates w o n with large majorities, only a few of the opposition 
candidates w o n . 2 3 
Thus , excepting the 1920s and early 1930s when the People's Party 
seriously challenged the True W h i g Party, Liberia had gradually evolved 
during the twentieth century into a virtual one-party state — one of the 
earliest African countries to do so. 
Various factors contributed to this position. T h e decline, since the late 
nineteenth century, of agriculture and trade which had provided m a n y 
Liberians with means of livelihood, m a d e the Liberian government the 
main employer of labour as well as the source of income and high social 
status for most Liberians.24 Increasingly, therefore, it was important that 
prospective as well as incumbent holders of public or political office should 
support the government which was tantamount to supporting the ruling 
True W h i g Party. Secondly, during the period 1915-35, perhaps even more 
than before, gross corruption and malpractices were resorted to in Liberia's 
public system and political processes. T h e keen competition between the 
True W h i g and People's parties in the 1920s and early 1930s particularly 
exacerbated election malpractices, mostly by the ruling True W h i g Party. 
At the elections of M a y 1927, for instance, President King allegedly polled 
235000 votes, and his People's Party opponent, T . J. R . Faulkner, 9000 
votes, whereas there were not more than 10 000 individuals entitled to vote 
throughout Liberia in that year.25 
Thirdly, as in the nineteenth century, the ruling and opposition parties 
were divided mainly by clashes of personalities or disagreements over the 
sharing of the social surplus and not by any marked ideological or policy 
differences. In 1911, for instance, the People's Party was organized by 
23. U S N A , D U S M 14/88, Lyon to Hay; Monrovia, 13 January 1905; ibid., Lyon 
to Adee, Monrovia, 8 M a y 1905; U S N A , D U S M ( N F ) 405/112, Lyon to Secretary of State, 
Monrovia, 20 M a y 1907; T . J. R . Faulkner, 1927; 'Janus', 'The Defeat of ex-President 
C . D . B . King, at the National Election on 7 M a y 1935 - And why' , in L N A , material 
in unlabelled file. 
24. American Colonization Society M s . (ACS) , Liberian Letters, 28, Stevens to Wilson, 
Monrovia, 1 M a y 1901. 
25. T . J. R . Faulkner, 1927. 
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a splinter group of the True W h i g Party as a consequence of Liberia's 
Vice-President Jerome J. Dossen of Maryland losing his bid for nomination 
as True W h i g presidential candidate to Daniel B . H o w a r d , the National 
Chairman of the party. Similarly in 1927, m a n y True Whigs joined the 
People's Party not primarily because they favoured that party's pro-
grammes , but because they opposed President King's bid for a 'third 
term'.26 In the absence of major ideological or policy differences a m o n g 
Liberians, politics became largely a matter of collaboration or competition 
between the leading, mostly Americo-Liberian, families in the ruling or 
opposition parties to control the social surplus. 
Finally, had the political base of Liberia been broadened to bring in 
the indigenous Liberians, things would have been different. But apart from 
T o o Wesley, T w e , and a few others already referred to, no such political 
developments took place. Liberia's political system therefore remained 
basically conservative, serving mainly the interests of the Americo-Liberian 
elite and perpetuating its political ascendancy. 
Ethiopia 
T h e political situation in Ethiopia during our period contrasted with that 
of Liberia in certain important respects, notably the nature and range of 
political power and privilege. However, regarding the more fundamental 
issues of the structure of the political system, the extent of political change, 
class structure and interests, and foreign imperialist intervention, Ethiopia 
had m u c h in c o m m o n with Liberia. 
Menelik's last years were difficult times for Ethiopia. During his pro-
tracted illness, the Emperor appointed his grandson, Lij Iyasu - a boy 
of twelve — as his successor in mid-1908. 2 7 Later in that year, w h e n he 
became paralysed and lost the power of speech, Menelik appointed his 
former general, Ras T a s a m m a , as Regent. T a s a m m a died in 1911, where-
upon the Ethiopian Council of State declared that Iyasu was old enough 
to act for himself with their guidance. U p to Menelik's death in December 
1913, the power vacuum created by his illness exacerbated political 
intriguing by factions of the Ethiopian nobility and encouraged European 
colonial powers to meddle in Ethiopian affairs.28 
Lij Iyasu, son of Ras Mikael, the ruler of Wallo, was impetuous by 
nature. Besides possessing little of his grandfather's statecraft, he lacked 
a power base outside Wallo, and Menelik's old courtiers, predominantly 
from Shoa, resented him. Gradually opposition crystallized against some 
aspects of his domestic policies, especially his friendship with the Musl im 
population and his foreign policies which centred on support for G e r m a n y , 
26. Anon . , Confidential Diary of Liberian Events ig2&-ç (kept in Executive Mansion) 
(MS). 
27. R . Pankhurst, 1976. 
28. R . Greenfield, 1965, pp. 131-2. 
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Austria-Hungary and Turkey on the outbreak of the First World W a r 
in 1914. It is not surprising, then, that the nobles, the Church dignitaries 
and possibly the Allied delegations in Addis Ababa colluded to depose him 
in September 1916 and to keep him a prisoner from 1921 till his death 
in 1935.29 Menelik's daughter, Zawditu, was thereupon proclaimed 
Empress, and Tafari, son of the deceased Emperor's cousin Ras Makonnen , 
Regent and heir to the throne. Empress Zawditu's coronation, on 11 
February 1917, was followed by a regime of dual authority in which power 
was shared between the Empress and the Regent, each with a palace, a 
distinct group of followers and often conflicting policies. 
T h e advent of Tafari as Regent was an event of importance in that 
he was a resolute leader desirous of resuming Menelik's policy of modern-
ization, as well as of persevering in the late Emperor's efforts to maintain 
Ethiopia's independence. Tafari Makonnen's disposition to a strongly 
personal style of administration partly enabled him to gradually extend 
his power, during his regency, over several crucial areas of the public sector, 
viz: his lieutenants at court, the provinces, the army, the Church and 
Empress Zawditu. O n 7 October 1928, Tafari was crowned Negus, and 
assumed complete control of the government. T h e coronation earned him 
further resentment and opposition by Zawditu and her supporters. In 
March 1930, Zawditu's husband, Ras Gugsa Wolie, rebelled, but was 
defeated with the aid of the Regent's tiny air force. O n the following day, 
Zawditu passed away, and Tafari assumed the imperial title as Emperor 
Haile Sellassie I (Plate 28.2). His coronation took place on 2 November 
1930.30 
Having thus strengthened his political position, Haile Sellassie moved 
on to further modernize Ethiopia's political system by promulgating a 
written constitution in 1931, and increasing the authority of the central 
government at the expense of the old nobility.3 ' T h e constitution provided 
for a bicameral Parliament with a nominated Senate and a Chamber of 
Deputies likewise nominated 'until the people are in a position to elect'. 
Since Haile Sellassie regarded the 1931 Constitution as a landmark in 
Ethiopia's political history, w e m a y ask to what extent it changed Ethiopia's 
political system and, more importantly, what political development 
occurred during our period. A s in Liberia's case, though some political 
changes did take place, they were neither fundamental nor structural. 
Political changes were reflected in the gradual strengthening of the Regent's 
(and then the Emperor's) power at the expense of the old nobility and 
the Church - that is, in increased centralization; the increased application 
of achieved criteria in public appointments coupled with the elimination 
of the most conservative of the Ethiopian nobility; the explicit recognition 
29. ibid., pp. 136-46. 
30. E . W a u g h , 1931; L . Mosley, 1964, pp. 151-63. For a chronological listing of some 
of the principal events of the reign, see S. P. Petrides, 1964, pp. 157-9. 
31. R . Greenfield, 1965, p. 168. 
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of the need for modernization by some Ethiopian leaders including Haile 
Sellassie; and the formal promulgation of a Constitution. 
A s for political development involving fundamental normative, institu-
tional and other structural changes in Ethiopia's political culture, there 
was hardly any during our period. Rather - in spite of increased political 
centralization - social separatism, cultural regionalism, and ethnic chauvi-
nism a m o n g the O r o m o , Sidama, Tigreans and Gurage, for example, 
remained the dominant characteristics of the Ethiopian empire and were 
serious hindrances to national integration.32 
Secondly, the Constitution of 1931 was far from being a radical innova-
tion and had little immediate impact on Ethiopia's political culture. T h e 
constitution left Haile Sellassie's absolute powers intact and largely retained 
the privileged position of the nobility. Haile Sellassie appointed the m e m -
bers of the Senate from that class, while, in turn, the nobles and the 'local 
shums' (chiefs) in turn appointed the C h a m b e r of Deputies.33 Given hardly 
any initiative in legislation or policy-making, and convened and dissolved 
at will by the emperor, the Parliament merely rubber-stamped matters 
placed before it by the emperor.3 4 B y the time of the Italian invasion, 
Parliament was almost defunct.35 Similarly, the ministers were allowed 
hardly any initiative or independence of action. They were appointed from 
outside Parliament and were directly responsible to Haile Sellassie.36 
In all this Ethiopia differed markedly from Liberia. For, although the 
Liberian Constitution granted the Liberian president wide constitutional 
powers, these were far from absolute. T h e Liberian Legislature was 
politically active while the Ethiopian Parliament was docile and complacent. 
T h e most striking contrast was perhaps the absence of political parties 
in Ethiopia, attributed to factors like the historically dominant position 
of the emperor in Ethiopian affairs, and the lack of economic development 
or a westernized elite that could significantly modify Ethiopia's conserva-
tism.37 
T h u s during our period, Liberia and Ethiopia had more c o m m o n features 
than differences in the fundamental determinants of political culture like 
their conservatism; inegalitarian and ascriptive social norms; lack of national 
integration, economic development, or firm commitment to radical social 
change; and more importantly, their tenuous political independence amid 
unfriendly, covetous, imperialist European powers. 
32. E . M . Robertson, 1977, pp. 31-3. 
33. ibid., p. 169. 
34. Quoted in ibid., from J. E . B a u m , 1928. 
35. ibid. 
36. ¡bid. 
37. R . L . Hess and G . Loewenberg in P. J. M . M c E w a n (ed.), 1968, pp. 199-201. 
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Economic and social change in Liberia and Ethiopia, 
1915-35 
Liberia 
In m a n y respects, the years 1915-35 were trying times economically for 
most Liberians and the Liberian government. T h e decline as from the 
late nineteenth century of Liberian trade and agriculture, Liberia's leading 
sectors, drastically curtailed government revenue (derived mostly from 
customs duties), and deprived m a n y Liberians of their principal means 
of livelihood. 
Partly to repay Liberia's mounting debts, including the English loan 
of 1870, and partly to carry out internal development, the Liberian govern-
ment secured a loan of $500000 in 1906 at 6% interest from some English 
financiers. But the n e w loan provided hardly any relief and was cancelled 
in 1912 when a n e w loan of $1700000 was secured to redeem it from 
certain European banks at 5% interest. Liberia's revenues were then split 
into 'assigned revenue', m a d e up primarily of the customs duties, which 
was to be used exclusively to pay interest and the sinking fund on the 
loan of 1912; and the 'internal revenue', m a d e up of various internal fees, 
fines, and taxes raised by the Liberian government (including the hut tax 
levied on the indigenous Liberians) which the Liberian government was 
to use for its essential services including payment of the salaries of govern-
ment employees. T h e collection and management of the 'assigned revenue' 
were entrusted to an 'International Receivership' m a d e up of an American 
as a 'General Receiver of Customs', assisted by French, G e r m a n , and British 
Receivers. 
In actual fact, the proceeds from the 'assigned revenue' fell after the 
outbreak of the First World W a r largely as a result of the contraction 
of trade which followed the withdrawal of the Germans w h o had controlled 
about three-quarters of the Liberian trade.38 Furthermore, as the price 
of coffee, Liberia's principal export, and other Liberian products like cocoa, 
ivory, palm oil and kernels, and piassava fell drastically in the world 
market,39 planters drastically cut production, so that Liberia's exports, 
and, correspondingly, the customs revenue, declined the more. T h u s as 
from 1916, the annual interest and sinking fund on the loan of 1912 could 
not be met regularly or in full.40 Arrears of payment therefore accumulated, 
38. A . Sharpe, 1920, p. 302; U S N A , R D S L 1909-29, 4, Young to U S W a r Department, 
Monrovia, 7 October 1915. 
39. U S N A , R D S L 1909-29, 5, Bundy, 'Quarterly Diplomatic Report', Monrovia 
2 August 1919; ibid., 4, C . Young, ' M e m o of Major Charles Young on Conditions in 
Liberia', Monrovia, 7 October 1915. 
40. D . E . Howard, 1916; U S N A , R D S L 1909-29,4, ' M e m o of Major Charles Y o u n g . . . ' 
op. cit. in note 39. 
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amounting to $178657 by 30 September 1918. At the same time, the 
'internal revenue' hardly sufficed — largely owing to corrupt practices by 
Liberian officials — to meet the Liberian government's essential services, 
like payment of the salaries of government employees, which had already 
been severely cut. 
Thus , faced with bankruptcy, the Liberian government first borrowed 
constantly and extensively from the Bank of British West Africa during 
1917-18.41 T h e n , as from late 1918 to 1921, it tried, in vain, to raise a 
loan of $5000000 from the United States government.42 T h e failure of 
this attempt forced the Liberian government to introduce several measures 
designed to stimulate trade and increase revenue from it. These included 
an upward revision of the tariff, the reopening of the Liberian hinterland 
to foreign traders (closed to foreigners since the outbreak of the First World 
W a r ) , and the raising of port and harbour dues.43 Simultaneously, the 
Liberian government welcomed plans by the Universal Negro Improve-
ment Association, an American-based nationalist movement of N e w World 
blacks led by the Jamaican, Marcus Garvey, to bring capital and black 
immigrants to Liberia to develop her resources. But those plans never 
materialized.44 
Fortunately for Liberia, as from late 1923, the performance of the 
Liberian economy gradually improved. B y selling G e r m a n property con-
fiscated during the First World W a r , the Liberian government realized 
about $I54000.4S Moreover, the fiscal measures introduced in December 
1922, particularly the new tariff, were beginning to pay off.46 A s Liberia's 
foreign trade began to revive, especially after the Germans re-entered it 
in 1922, and the Liberian hinterland was reopened to foreign traders, 
exports rose, and the balance of trade began to shift in Liberia's favour. 
During the first nine months of 1923, for example, the value of exports 
exceeded that of the corresponding period for 1922 by $i690oo.47 
Just as Liberian government finances thus began to recover, even brighter 
prospects for the Liberian economy became foreseeable when in 1926 the 
American, Harvey S . Firestone obtained from the Liberian government 
the right to lease for ninety-nine years up to one million acres in Liberia 
to grow and export rubber, and Liberia secured a loan of $5000000 from 
the Finance Corporation of America to develop infrastructure including 
roads, hospitals and schools, as well as to pay her debts.48 T h e loan, which 
41. R . C . Bannermann, 1920; R . L . Buell, 1947, p. 26. 
42. R . C . Bannermann, 1920; F . Starr, 1925, p. 113; C . D . B . King, 1924, pp. 2-3. 
43. R . L . Buell, 1928, Vol. II, pp. 769--70; U S N A , R D S L 1909-29, 8.882/032/43, Bur 
to American Minister Resident, Monrovia, 1 February 1923. 
44. M . B . Akpan, 1973(a). 
45. R . L . Buell, 1928, Vol. II, p. 767. 
46. C . D . B . King, 1924, p. 9. 
47. C . D . B . King, 1923, p. 7. 
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received United States government support, greatly increased the influence 
of Firestone and the United States in Liberia. 
A s for rubber production, Firestone's investment in two vast rubber 
plantations had a modest though not insignificant impact on the Liberian 
economy in the short run, particularly in employment. First, Firestone 
became the largest employer of labour in Liberia49 (see Plate 28.3). H o w -
ever, most of the Liberian employees were unskilled or semi-skilled, doing 
mainly clearing and planting or working as artisans and mechanics. 
Secondly, Firestone built several health clinics and schools for its Liberian 
(and American) employees, and distributed rubber seedlings to Liberians 
wishing to plant rubber.50 However, for several decades to come, Fire-
stone's rubber production remained largely an enclave activity. It had few 
spread effects over, or linkages with, the largely undeveloped, peasant 
economy of Liberia, particularly rice production in which over 80% of 
the indigenous Liberians were engaged. Only in 1935, when substantial 
exports of rubber commenced, did rubber emerge as Liberia's major export 
commodity (and remained so till 1961 when iron ore superseded it).51 
T h e year 1935 was significant in two other respects. Exploration con-
firmed the presence of iron ore in B o m i Hill, although actual mining and 
production came m u c h later — in 1951.52 It also marked the end of the 
dominance of Britain and Europe as Liberia's principal trade partners, 
and their replacement as from 1936 by the United States - thanks to 
increased exports of Liberian rubber, mostly to America.53 It should h o w -
ever be noted that as the prices of Liberia's major products - palm oil, 
palm kernel, piassava, coffee, cocoa, and kola nuts - fell in the world market 
from the outset of the depression, the volume and value of Liberia's trade 
declined as well. A n d throughout the 1930s the balance of trade was against 
Liberia.54 European firms had dominated Liberia's import-export business 
since the late nineteenth century. A s from the 1920s an increasing number 
of Lebanese and Syrian traders joined them and by the end of our period 
in 1935 controlled m u c h of Liberia's retail trade.55 
In these more or less bleak economic circumstances throughout our 
period (1915-35), the Liberian government was left with perennially meagre 
funds after continuous debt payments and could not effect economic or 
social development of Liberia to any extent. Its road-building programme, 
begun by President Arthur Barclay, was intensified but mostly with forced, 
unpaid indigenous Liberian labour (see Fig. 28.1). T h e labourers also pro-
49. C . D . B . King, 1928, p. 8. 
50. C . M . Wilson, 1971, pp. 137-8. 
51. Liberia Trading and Development Bank Ltd, 1968, pp. 76-^ 7. 
52. R . W . Clower, G . Dalton, M . Harwitz and A . A . Walters, 1966, pp. 197-201. 
53. Republic of Liberia, 1941, pp. 36-40. 
54. Republic of Liberia, 1940, pp. 8, 11. •• 
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vided the hoes, matchets and other equipment for the work. 5 6 During 
the 1920s the Liberian government - for the first time in Liberia's history -
established several elementary schools in the remote Liberian hinterland.57 
Late in 1930 the government also started the Booker T . Washington 
Agricultural and Industrial Institution to train junior and middle-level 
technical and agricultural m a n p o w e r . 5 8 In 1934 it commenced a m u c h -
needed Teachers Training College at Monrovia.59 Existing institutions 
like the Liberia College and the College of West Africa were reportedly 
doing well.60 In August 1927, the central government at Monrovia estab-
lished radio communication with the Liberian coast and with the United 
States by building several radio stations which greatly supplemented the 
existing inefficient Liberian coastal telephone service.6 ' In 1924 the govern-
ment built a hospital at Monrovia. In 1927 it purchased and erected an 
electric power plant at Monrovia which supplied electricity and light to 
the town. 6 2 
American missionary bodies - as they had done since Liberia's found-
ation - contributed by establishing schools, hospitals, as well as churches, 
manned by devotees like the physician and ethnographer, D r George W . 
Harley, and M r s Harley of the Methodist Mission at Ganta.6 3 
However, any significant expansion of education was inhibited as m u c h 
by inadequate government revenue as by the Liberian government's tradi-
tional caution in opening the Liberian hinterland to missionaries, traders 
or other foreigners, some of w h o m might exert influence on the indigenous 
Liberians 'subversive to the Liberian Government' .6 4 
M o r e invidiously, the Liberian government's penury and inability to pay 
salaries to public officers in full or on time partly encouraged them to practise 
corruption and exploitation like filching government funds or extorting 
from the indigenous Liberian population. T h e most notorious malpractice -
the forced shipment of indigenous Liberians to Fernando Po by some 
prominent Americo-Liberians to labour for Spanish planters there -
became a matter of international concern with grave implications for 
Liberia's sovereignty.65 
56. League of Nations, 1930, pp. 147-70. 
57. C . D . B . King, 1922, pp. 23-4; 1924, pp. 5-6. 
58. C . M . Wilson, 1971, p. 154; F. Starr, 1925, pp. 128-9. 
59. E . J. Barclay, 1934, pp. 2-4. 
60. ibid. 
61. C . D . B . King, 1927, pp. 33-6. 
62. A . D . B . Henries, 1963, pp. 90-1. 
63. C . M . Wilson, 1971, p. 154. 
64. U S N A , R D S L , 1909-29,882/00/705, Critchlow to Garvey, Monrovia, 24 June 1921. 
65. See below for discussion of the forced labour crisis in Liberia. 
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Ethiopia 
T h e imposition of feudal levies and the increased exploitation of peasant 
and slave labour in the far-flung provinces conquered by Menelik placed 
substantial funds in the coffers of the Ethiopian government. However, 
Ethiopia, like Liberia, was not undergoing any significant economic de-
velopment. Such economic and social changes as did occur during our 
period were too limited to alter significantly Ethiopia's essentially feudal 
economy and conservative socio-economic fabric. 
T h e principal initiator of economic and social change was the Regent, 
Tafari M a k o n n e n . O n e of his first reforms was the extension of Menelik's 
ministerial system by the establishment in 1922 of a Ministry of C o m m e r c e 
and a Department of Public Works . In 1923, he set up the Berhanena 
Salam, or 'Light and Peace', printing press, which was purchased in 
Germany and supervised by Gabra Krestos Takla Haymanot w h o had been 
educated by Swedish missionaries in Eritrea. This press printed a news-
paper of the same n a m e , founded in 1925, as well as religious and edu-
cational books, and contributed significantly to the development of Amharic 
literature.66 
Reform of Ethiopia's slavery impinged on both Ethiopia's internal 
stability and Ethiopia's relations with foreign powers. Hence it proved 
problematic. Tafari, m u c h preoccupied with international relations, was 
quick to appreciate the advantages which the League of Nations and its 
system of collective security seemed to offer. H e applied for Ethiopia to 
join the organization at its founding in 1919. However, though France 
gave its support, Britain contended that Ethiopia would not be able to 
fulfil its obligations as a member-state, especially those concerning the 
abolition of slavery. Bitter attacks on Ethiopian slavery appeared in the 
Westminster Gazette and other British newspapers, and suggestions were 
m a d e that European powers or the League of Nations should intervene. 
Tafari was probably more concerned with the diplomatic than the 
humanitarian side of the slavery question. H e issued an edict in July 1922 
reiterating the old prohibition on the sale of slaves, meted out stiff punish-
ments to slave traders, and assured the British government of his willing-
ness to protect and educate such slaves as might be freed at sea. O n 
15 September 1924, he issued a proclamation rendering slave raiding 
punishable by death.67 T h e Regent's more incisive approach to slavery 
facilitated Ethiopia's entry into the League which, though still resisted 
by Britain, received support from Italy and France, both of w h o m hoped 
thereby to gain influence in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia, accordingly, became 
a m e m b e r on 23 September 1923, when the Regent signed a declaration 
adhering to the principal international conventions for the suppression of 
slavery. 
66. C . F . Rey, 1927, pp. 28-9. 
67. C . Sandford, 1946, p. 58. 
729 
Africa under Colonial Domination i88a-igjs 
Almost immediately after issuing the anti-slavery decree, the Regent, 
accompanied by two of the principal noblemen, Ras Haylu Takla Haymanot 
of Gojam and Ras Seyoum Mangasha of Tigre, left for Palestine, Egypt, 
France, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Italy, the United Kingdom, Switzer-
land and Greece. H e met the French President, R a y m o n d Poincaré, the 
Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, and the British Prime Minister, Ramsay 
Macdonald, and urged them to grant Ethiopia a port in one of their 
nearby colonial territories. This diplomatic move , which ran counter to 
the interests of the three colonial powers in keeping Ethiopia isolated, 
was, however, fruitless. Tafari returned with only a few vague promises -
and the crown of Emperor Tewodros, returned by the British w h o had 
looted it sixty-six years earlier. 
A s far as Ethiopia's internal affairs were concerned, however, the visit 
has been compared with Peter the Great's stay in Western Europe,6 8 since 
it was very significant in awakening Ethiopian society to the outside world 
and the need to adopt foreign inventions and develop Ethiopia's manpower. 
T h e Regent and Ras Haylu purchased several motor cars and thereby set 
a fashion among the Ethiopian nobility. Consequently the number of 
vehicles in Addis Ababa rapidly increased to several hundred.69 Increasing 
numbers of Ethiopian youths were sent abroad for study, mainly to 
Lebanon, Egypt, France, the United K i n g d o m and the United States. 
A new hospital, the Bet Sayda, was founded by the Regent in 1924, 
and run by a Swede, D r Kurt Hanner.7 0 A couple of years later, Tafari, 
despite opposition from the traditionalists, opened the country's second 
modern educational establishment, the Tafari Makonnen School, run by 
a French headmaster; its curriculum included French, English, Amharic, 
Arabic and scientific and other subjects. Tafari's opening speech referred 
to the 'crying need' for education without which the country could not 
maintain its independence, and called on his compatriots to found schools, 
as the time for mere lip-service to patriotism had passed.71 Other develop-
ments of this period included the engaging, in 1925, of Belgian officers 
to train the Regent's bodyguard, the grant to two Greeks, in 1927, of a 
concession to build a road from Gore to Gambela on the western frontier, 
and the purchase, from France and Germany , in 1929, of the first aero-
planes, the coming of which had hitherto been prevented by the conser-
vatism of some of the nobility. 
After his coronation, Haile Sellassie continued his modernization work, 
and was assisted by three foreign advisers, General Virgin, a Swede, in 
foreign affairs; E . A . Colson, an American, in finance; and M . Auberson, 
a Swiss, in legal matters.72 Development was, however, seriously affected 
68. R . Greenfield, 1965, p. 157. 
69. R . Pankhurst, 1968, pp. 290-1. 
70. L . Farago, 1935, pp. 132-3. 
71. R . Pankhurst, 1962(b), pp. 266-7. 
72. G . L . Steer, 1936, pp. 28-9. 
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by the world economic depression, which led to a fall in exports and a 
decline in foreign investment possibilities. A law was nevertheless pro-
claimed in 1930 for the survey and registration of land, and in the same 
year, a Ministry of Education was established. T h e year 1931 witnessed 
three significant developments. T h e first was the promulgation of the 
written Constitution which has already been discussed. T h e second was 
the replacement of the old Bank of Abyssinia, a foreign-owned private 
company, by a national bank, the Bank of Ethiopia. T h e third was the 
passing of a supplementary law for the gradual eradication of slavery, which 
laid d o w n that all slaves should be freed on the death of their master, 
and envisaged the day 'when slavery shall have completely disappeared'.73 
Efforts were also m a d e to improve communications. A Ministry of Public 
Works was set up in 1932 and road-building was restarted. A temporary 
radio station was put into operation in 1933, and replaced by a more power-
ful one, erected by an Italian company, in 1935. Several new schools were 
opened, the best of which were run by the government, though there were 
also some educational activities by missionaries, particularly in the prov-
inces. B y 1935, Addis Ababa had fourteen government schools, with thirty 
foreign teachers and some four thousand students. Provincial education 
was also initiated by the establishment of government schools at Dessie, 
Gondar, Jijiga, Lakamti, Dire D a w a , Harar, Asba Tafari, A m b o , J i m m a , 
Dabra Marqoa, Makalle and Sálale, while a military college was founded 
in 1934 at Holeta, near Addis Ababa, and run by Swedish officers.74 T h e 
number of students studying abroad rose to several hundred. There were 
also activities in the medical field, mainly by missionaries, notably the 
United Presbyterian Church of North America, the Seventh Adventist 
Mission, and the Italian Catholic Mission, all of which operated hospitals 
in Addis Ababa, while the Sudan Interior Mission ran a leprosarium at 
Akaki.75 Other developments included the creation of a small civil service, 
partly formed with students returning from abroad, which received salaries 
instead of the revenues from fiefs, and the increasing replacement of tribute 
in kind by taxes in cash. A decree to curtail labour services from the peasant 
was enacted in 1934, and legislation for the reform of the land tax in 1935. 
Efforts at modernization were, however, by then overshadowed by the 
impending threat of Italian Fascist invasion.76 
T h u s the period between 1915 and 1935 witnessed a wider spread and 
a greater degree of economic and social change in Liberia and Ethiopia 
than before. However, this change did not amount to m u c h and both 
countries therefore remained economically backward and socially undevel-
oped. Finally, investment by foreign nationals and firms in commercial, 
agricultural and mining enterprises was greater in Liberia than in Ethiopia; 
73. A . L . Gardiner, 1933, p. 202. 
74. E . Virgin, 1936, pp. 117-24; A . Zervos, 1936, pp. 223-32. 
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and while it aided the processes of modernization, it also led to greater 
foreign control of the Liberian economy than was the case in Ethiopia. 
Foreign intervention in Liberia and Ethiopia, 1915-35 
Liberia 
Foreign intervention in Liberia and Ethiopia, already discussed in Chapter 
11, persisted during the period 1915-35. A s in the era of the Scramble 
and partition, the grounds for intervention were provided as m u c h by events 
and circumstances within Liberia and Ethiopia as by those in Europe and 
America. 
First, the Liberian government's penury and perennial indebtedness 
partly led to increased foreign control of Liberia's financial administration 
by the International Receivership, the Bank of British West Africa, and 
Firestone interests supported by the United States government. T h e 
Liberian economy was also dominated by European, American and 
Lebanese firms. Secondly, Liberia's unfavourable economic, social and 
administrative conditions became a major issue in the bitter political rivalry 
between the True W h i g and People's parties and attracted considerable 
international attention. Within Liberia, Faulkner, the opposition leader, 
wooed the support of the indigenous Liberians by denouncing the use 
of forced labour for public works, forced recruitment of labour for export 
abroad, maladministration of the Liberian hinterland and national election 
malpractices.77 H e also travelled to Europe and America, following his 
second election defeat in 1927, both to gain international support, and 
to discredit the True W h i g administration of President King . 7 8 
It was in January 1930 during Faulkner's visit to the United States that 
the influential New York Times reported on maladministration in Liberia. 
Simultaneously, it reported favourably on Faulkner as a 'progressive-
minded citizen'.79 Earlier, too, in 1929, the British press had carried several 
editorials highly critical of the Liberian government. M o r e importantly, 
the reports in both the American and British press and other reports by 
foreign missionaries and visitors accused the Liberian government and 
certain influential Americo-Liberians of practising slavery, recruiting 
forced and indentured labour, and exporting or selling migrant labour to 
European colonies especially to the Spanish island-colony of Fernando 
P o . 8 0 
Britain spearheaded the foreign attack, condemning the exports and 
demanding, as in 1907-9, that to ameliorate the unfavourable conditions 
77. T . J. R . Faulkner, 1926. 
78. A . G . Jones, n.d. 
79. R . E . Anderson, 1952, p. 98. 
80. A . G . Jones, n.d. 
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in Liberia, her government should be placed under European control.81 
T h e United States similarly berated Liberia about 'the so-called "export" 
of labour from Liberia to Fernando P o . . . which seems hardly distinguish-
able from organized slave trade'. She went on to hint that the governments 
of the world might have to consider 'some effective and affirmative action'82 
to terminate the situation! 
Rather indiscreetly, perhaps, President King not only denied the charges 
but also appealed to the League of Nations for an investigation. T h e League 
accordingly appointed a fact-finding Commission to Liberia comprising 
a British dentist, D r Cuthbert Christy, as Chairman; a black American 
sociology professor, D r Charles S. Johnson; and Liberia's ex-president, 
Arthur Barclay. T h e Commission conducted an inquiry for four months 
only, and neither visited Fernando P o nor levied any charges against Spain. 
In the end it filed its Report on 8 September 1930. T h e Report showed 
that while no form of organized slave trading existed, labour was wastefully 
and forcibly recruited for public works, private use and for export with 
the collaboration of the Liberian Frontier Force and high government 
officials.83 T h e Report also examined Americo-Liberian/indigenous 
Liberian relations and the general administration of the Liberian govern-
ment, both of which it found unsatisfactory.84 Hence it recommended to 
the League that Liberia should be placed under a 'capable and warmhearted 
white administration'.85 
In view of the largely deplorable internal conditions in Liberia, most 
of the Commission's findings and recommendations were fair and reason-
able in m a n y respects. However, had the Commission m a d e an objective 
study of contemporary European colonial policies, it would have been less 
harsh on the Liberian government's errors of omission or commission and 
perhaps less ready to endorse 'white administration' of Liberia, since the 
European colonial regimes were equally, if not more, brutal than Liberia 
in some of their policies towards their colonial subjects, including the use 
of forced labour for public works.8 6 
Reacting to the Christy Report, the League of Nations pressed Liberia 
to abolish slavery and the export of labour to Fernando Po, to reorganize 
the Liberian government, and to institute basic reforms to give equal 
opportunities for all Liberians. O n its o w n part the United States govern-
ment expressed 'profound shock' at the 'shocking suppression of the natives' 
revealed in the Report. It urged that in order not to strain traditional United 
States-Liberian relations, the Liberian government must promptly abolish 
'the twin scourges of slavery and forced labor' and carry out 'a compre-
81. ibid. 
82. Republic of Liberia, 1930, p. 1. 
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hensive system of reforms . . . ' 8 7 This statement led to the institution of 
impeachment proceedings by the Liberian Legislature against Vice-
President Allen Yancy (who was a labour recruiting agent) and President 
King (Plate 28.4), both of w h o m resigned in early December 1930 before 
the passage of the Bill of impeachment.88 
T h u s prompted, the new administration of Edwin J. Barclay, w h o 
succeeded President King, decided to implement the recommendations 
of the League. Accordingly, the Liberian Legislature passed several Acts 
between December 1930 and M a y 1931 which abolished the export of 
labour, pawning and domestic slavery; substituted voluntary communal 
labour on public works for forced labour; reopened the entire Liberian 
hinterland to foreign traders, and reorganized the hinterland administra-
tion into three provinces with provincial and subordinate district c o m -
missioners and paramount chiefs.89 
In spite of those reforms - which, of course, the Liberian government 
could not effectively or willingly implement in their entirety - Britain and 
the United States refused to recognize the Barclay administration and con-
ducted their affairs in Liberia through their respective chargés d'affaires. 
Britain in particular persistently attacked Liberia and initiated certain 
measures to terminate her independence. Less than two months after 
Barclay became President, Britain requested the United States to make 
a joint representation 'in the strongest terms' to the Liberian government 
to urge it to petition the League of Nations to appoint a Governing 
Commission which the Christy Report had recommended. 9 0 
T h e joint representation urging 'that the Government of Liberia should 
be committed for a time to an International Governing Commission' which 
would carry out the necessary reforms was m a d e to President Barclay on 
21 January 1931 by the envoys of Britain, the United States and G e r m a n y 
(persuaded by Britain to join in the movement). Barclay and his Cabinet 
promptly and rightly rejected the urging since they considered 'that accept-
ance thereof would not only be a violation of the Constitution of the 
Republic, but would also be tantamount to a surrender of its sovereignty 
and autonomy'.91 Barclay and his Cabinet, however, went on to express 
readiness to seek and accept assistance from the League of Nations, particu-
larly in the form of experts in such fields as economics, judicial organ-
ization, public health, and 'native' administration.92 
Accordingly, the League commissioned another fact-finding mission, 
this time consisting of representatives of eight nations - Britain, France, 
Germany , Italy, Spain, Venezuela, Poland and Liberia - charged with the 
87. Republic of Liberia, 1931(a), pp. 2-3. 
88. A . G . Jones, n.d. 
89. Republic of Liberia, 1931(a), pp. 11-12; 1931(b); E . J. Barclay, 1934. 
90. R . E . Anderson, 1952, pp. 110-11; A . G . Jones, n.d. 
91. E . J. Barclay, 1931, p. 37. 
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responsibility to end slavery and forced labour, and to give technical assist-
ance to Liberia. T h e United States w a s requested to send a representative 
although it was not a m e m b e r of the League . O n c e again a Briton, L o r d 
Robert Cecil, was appointed chairman of the n e w commission. A small 
committee of three persons headed by a French lawyer, Henri Brunot, 
w a s also appointed to advise the mission o n the financial and administrative 
reforms necessary in Liberia to m a k e the League's assistance successful. 
T h e C o m m i t t e e subsequently visited Liberia during J u n e and July 1931 
to investigate conditions, collect data and m a k e a report. 
Like its predecessor, this second commission d r e w u p elaborate plans 
for the improvement of Liberia's internal administration, finances, and 
public health. In January 1932 the Brunot C o m m i s s i o n also presented its 
Report to the League . Its recommendations were similar in m a n y respects 
to those of the Christy C o m m i s s i o n but less unfavourable to Liberia o n 
the whole. Traditional African c o m m u n a l labour w a s to replace forced 
labour for public works; the indigenous Liberians were to be granted an 
undisputed ownership of their lands, the authority and dignity of the 
African chiefs were to be upheld by the Liberian government, and the 
education of the indigenous Liberians and the m e a n s of communicat ion 
with the Liberian hinterland were to be improved. T h e hinterland w a s 
to be divided into three provinces to be administered b y foreign provincial 
and deputy commissioners under w h o m would be Liberian county super-
intendents and district commissioners. T h e commission also suggested that 
for Liberia's finances to improve reasonably, Firestone would have to 
modify the terms of the loan agreement of 192o. 9 3 
This intervention in Liberian affairs by the L e a g u e significantly in-
creased the opposition to the Liberian G o v e r n m e n t of m a n y indigenous 
Liberians, particularly the K r u , G r e b o and Vai. M a n y of t h e m believed 
that the 'white m e n ' would soon take over the Liberian government from 
the Americo-Liberians; hence they ceased to pay taxes or perform forced 
labour o n public projects like road building. Simultaneously, s o m e of t h e m 
revived intra-ethnic conflicts over disputed boundaries, farmlands and 
chieftainships. 
T o maintain peace and order, President Barclay sent a detachment of 
the Liberian Frontier Force to the K r u and G r e b o districts in M a y 1931 
with specific instructions to its Americo-Liberian c o m m a n d e r , Colonel T . 
E l w o o d Davis, that the detachment w a s 'a patrol in force and not a punitive 
expedition'.94 H o w e v e r , in the course of the patrol, fighting broke out 
between the detachment and the K r u of Sasstown led by their paramount 
chief, Juah Nimley , which provided fresh grounds for external intervention 
in Liberian affairs. Several biased reports to the L e a g u e , including 
that of Rydings, the British chargé d'affaires in M o n r o v i a , 9 5 portrayed 
93. B . N . Azikiwe, 1934, p. 165. 
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the detachment as a punitive expedition and charged it with wanton 
destruction of the lives and property of the K r u people. 
Predictably, the United States and British governments reacted to these 
reports by demanding that the Liberian government should put an end 
to the so-called military reprisals against the K r u 'pending the conclusion 
of an arrangement between the League, the United States and Liberia 
for the future administration of the country'.96 T h e Liberian government 
on its o w n part promptly protested to the League against this fresh threat 
by America and Britain against Liberia's sovereignty.97 In addition, 
President Barclay sent a fact-finding commission of three m e n led by 
Winthrop A . Travell, an American employed in Liberia's fiscal service, 
to ascertain the situation on the K r u coast. 
T h e commission's subsequent findings largely refuted the charges of 
wanton destruction m a d e against the Frontier Force detachment.98 A n d , 
fortunately for Liberia, the League reacted not by imposing a foreign 
administration over Liberia as America and Britain had mooted, but by 
sending a representative, D r Melville D . Mackenzie, a British physician, 
to assist the Liberian government in pacifying the K r u . 
Furthermore, on the receipt of the Brunot Report, the League's Liberia 
Committee drew up the 'General Principles of the Plan of Assistance' to 
Liberia. These were adopted on 27 September 1932 by the Committee 
and accepted by the Liberian Government on condition that the nego-
tiations it was to carry out with Firestone were successful. T h e financial 
negotiations took place in London in June 1933 and resulted in a report 
presented by M r Lighthart, the League expert on finance w h o had partici-
pated in them. O n the basis of the 'General Principles' and the Lighthart 
Report, the League's Liberia Committee drew up a 'Protocol' embodying 
the proposed plan of assistance and reforms. These included the employ-
ment of foreign 'specialists' as provincial and deputy commissioners; a 
'Chief Adviser' to the Liberian government appointed by the Council of 
the League with the agreement of the Liberian President, w h o would serve 
as liaison between the Liberian Government and the League; and two 
medical officers for hospital and health work in the Republic. 
If implemented, the recommendations of the League Committee could 
have effected the radical changes in Liberia which the Americo-Liberian 
leaders as a rule feared. They could also have severely encroached on 
Liberia's sovereignty and considerably drained Liberia's finances consider-
ing the wide powers of the 'Chief Adviser' and the high salaries of the 
foreign specialists. Not surprisingly, therefore, President Barclay, while 
96. E . J. Barclay, 1932, pp. 2-4. 
97. ibid., pp. 7-8. 
98. ibid., pp. 9-14. The other members of the Travell Mission were two Liberians: 
Dr F. A . K . Russell of Sinoe and Dr J. F . B . Coleman of Montserrado. Actually the 
commission made a majority report (Russell and Coleman), and a minority report (Travell) 
which was apparently the one the Liberian government accepted. 
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accepting the plan of assistance as embodied in the League's Liberia C o m -
mittee 'Protocol', m a d e some reservations about the powers of the 'Chief 
Adviser' and the expense which the implementation of the plan would 
involve. T h e League Committee, however, refused to revise the plan and 
withdrew it when Liberia — in spite of renewed threats of foreign inter-
vention from the British and American governments - refused to accept 
it in its entirety." 
T h e Liberian government then drew up a 'Three Year Development 
Plan' of internal reforms in Liberia, including modifications to the Loan 
Agreement of 1926 already demanded by the Liberian government. ' ° ° This 
plan w o n the support of the American government under President Franklin 
D . Roosevelt and formed the basis of the negotiations between Firestone, 
the United States and the Liberian government in 1935, during which the 
necessary modifications to the loan were m a d e . T h e most important 
innovation was the principle 'that the cost of Government should be the 
first charge upon the revenues of the country, and not as heretofore when 
the cost of Government was borne out of the residue remaining after the 
cost of the fiscal administration and interest and sinking fund had been 
paid'.101 T h e basic annual 'cost of Government' was fixed at $450000, 
which was duly set aside annually from government revenue to meet the 
essential needs of government in the first place before Liberia's debt pay-
ments should be made . T h e interest on the loan was also reduced from 
7 to
 5 %. 1 0 2 
Not surprisingly, as Liberia's relations with Firestone thus improved, 
Liberian-United States relations correspondingly improved, culminating 
in United States' recognition of the Barclay administration on 11 June 
1935.103 Britain followed suit on 16 December 1936,104 by which event 
the crisis of Liberia's independence could be said to be formally over! 
It is significant to note that although hard-pressed by the powers in 
the League, Liberia had not been without her vocal defenders and sym-
pathizers. Most of them were individual Africans and black Americans 
or black religious, business or intellectual organizations w h o rightly argued 
that internal conditions in the European colonies in Africa were in m a n y 
respects as bad as those in Liberia. Hence they strongly argued that Liberia's 
independence should not be sacrificed for the sake of the white man's 
economic interests exemplified by Firestone. Nor , they argued, should the 
double standard of condemning Liberia but turning a blind eye to white 
oppression in the colonies go unchallenged. Such individuals and organ-
izations included Professor W . E . B . D u Bois; Mordecai Johnson, President 
99. E . J. Barclay, 1934, pp. 2-4. 
100. E . J. Barclay, 1934; R . L . Buell, 1947, pp. 41-4. 
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104. E . J. Barclay, 1937, p. 14. 
738 
Ethiopia and Liberia, igi4~js: two independent African states in the colonial era 
of H o w a r d University; N n a m d i Azikiwe, a Nigerian journalist; the Lott 
Carey Baptist Foreign Mission Society, the A . M . E . Church; the National 
Association for the A d v a n c e m e n t of Coloured People ( N A A C P ) , and a 
section of the Black press like the Baltimore Afro-American. Their exertions 
for Liberia's cause perhaps influenced but did not radically affect the 
United States government's policy towards Liberia in respect of the forced 
labour crisis.105 
Ethiopia 
E v e n m o r e persistent and far m o r e serious in its consequences w a s foreign 
intervention in the internal affairs of Ethiopia during the period under 
review. T h e Tripartite Convention of 1906 which divided Ethiopia into 
British, French a n d Italian spheres of interest w a s an indication that 
European imperialist intervention would sooner or later recur in Ethiopia. 
Menelik's death in 1913, the accession of Lij Iyasu and the events of the 
First W o r l d W a r spurred Italy in particular to revive her imperial designs 
against Ethiopia as from 1913. T h u s between 1913 and 1919 the Italian 
Colonial Ministry vigorously sponsored the implementation of a ' m i n i m u m ' 
or a ' m a x i m u m ' p r o g r a m m e of Italian colonization in Africa. Either pro-
g r a m m e sought particularly to give Italy control of the R e d Sea and to 
m a k e Ethiopia 'the exclusive sphere of influence of Italy'.106 H o w e v e r , 
British and French imperial ambitions in North-East Africa conflicted with 
the Italian p r o g r a m m e . In the end, the crucial Versailles Peace Treaty 
left the Italian p r o g r a m m e largely unrealized.107 
In spite of Italy's colonial ambitions in Ethiopia and the painful memories 
of A d o w a , which m a n y Italians wished to avenge, actual relations between 
Ethiopia and Italy were remarkably good during the Tafari M a k o n n e n 
regency. Italy supported Ethiopia's entry into the League of Nations in 
1923, and w a s one of the countries visited b y Tafari during his epoch-
m a k i n g trip abroad in 1923. 1 0 8 Notwithstanding the friction during 
1925-6 over Italy's continued claim to a sphere of influence in Ethiopia, 
a twenty-year treaty of friendship and arbitration w a s signed between the 
t w o countries o n 2 August 1928 and reinforced b y a convention granting 
Italy the right to construct a road from Assab to Dessie while Ethiopia 
w a s to be given a free zone at the port. T h e s e plans, however, were not 
implemented, for Italian policy began to switch from peaceful penetration 
to military intervention. 
T h e change in Fascist policy occurred in 1930 w h e n Marshal D e B o n o , 
the Italian Minister of the Colonies, urged the Italian Council of Ministers 
to increase his budget for 'expansion beyond the confines of the Father-
105. A . G . Jones, n.d. 
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land'.109 In 1932, he visited Eritrea, and in 1933 held secret talks with 
Mussolini, at which he suggested the invasion of Ethiopia. Mussolini readily 
agreed and ordered him 'to go full speed ahead' and to be 'ready as soon 
as possible'. Steps were accordingly taken to improve the land, sea and 
air communications of the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somalia, while 
Fascist agents began to foment political subversion in Ethiopia.110 T h e 
secrecy surrounding Italy's intentions was abandoned on 18 M a r c h 1934 
w h e n Mussolini, addressing the Fascist Party, demanded that the 'satisfied' 
nations with colonies should abstain from blocking the 'cultural, political 
and economic expansion of Fascist Italy'. 
Mussolini's pretext for invasion was the W a l W a l incident of 1934. A n 
Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission which had been demarcating the 
frontier between Ethiopia and British Somaliland arrived on 23 N o v e m b e r 
at the wells of W a l W a l , 160 k m on the Ethiopian side of the u n -
demarcated frontier with Italian Somaliland, which it found occupied by an 
Italian force. T h e commission's British chief, Colonel Clifford, protested to 
the Italians that their presence prevented his m e n from moving freely in 
Ethiopian territory, but withdrew to avoid an 'international incident'. T h e 
Ethiopians, on the other hand, stayed their ground, and the two armies 
faced each other until 5 December w h e n a shot of indeterminate origin 
precipitated a clash, after which the Ethiopians, w h o were weakly armed, 
retired. Ethiopia invoked the treaty of friendship and arbitration of 1928, 
while Italy, rejecting arbitration, demanded an apology, Ethiopia's recog-
nition of Italian sovereignty over W a l W a l , and an indemnity of 200000 
Maria Theresa dollars. ' 1 1 Britain and France, anxious to avoid a conflag-
ration, urged Ethiopia to agree, but Haile Sellassie, fearing to encourage 
Italy to further expansion, refused, and took the matter to the League 
of Nations on 14 December. Realizing that Ethiopia was unwilling to 
capitulate, Mussolini gave secret orders on 30 December to prepare for an 
invasion, which required considerable preparation on account of Ethiopia's 
size and mountainous terrain. 
T h e League appointed a committee to study the dispute, but Mussolini, 
w h o was n o w almost ready to strike, took little interest in the proceedings. 
T h e League's committee came out with compromise proposals which, in 
an effort to satisfy Italy, proposed placing Ethiopia under international 
control so as to prevent her from endangering the adjacent Italian colonies 
as Mussolini claimed. T h e Duce , however, no longer had any need for 
compromises. O n 2 October, he ordered mobilization, and on the following 
day the Italian army, c o m m a n d e d by D e Bono , crossed the Ethiopian 
frontier from Eritrea, without declaration of war, and Italian aircraft 
109. St Antony's College, University of Oxford, captured Italian documents 112809. 
n o . E . de Bono, 1937, pp. 12-13, 15. 
in . R . Cimmaruta, 1936; A. de La Pradelle, 1936, pp. 149-60; G . W . Baer, 1967, 
pp. 45-ii. 
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bombed A d o w a . A force from Italian Somaliland also attacked from the 
south (see Fig. 28.2). 
T h e invasion, despite its long preparation, provoked world consternation. 
T h e League Assembly met on 9 October and decided by fifty votes against 
one (Italy) with three abstensions (Albania, Austria and Hungary) that 
Italy was the aggressor and had violated the League Covenant. I l2 
Despite this near-unanimous condemnation, the League, dominated by 
the colonial powers of France and Britain, was reluctant to offend Mussolini 
by resort to immediate and total sanctions as advocated by the Soviet Union. 
Instead, the League set up a Coordinating Committee which proposed 
only limited economic sanctions comprising four separate embargoes. These 
sanctions, which were applicable only to M e m b e r States, covered: (1) the 
export of arms and munitions to Italy; (2) loans and credits to Italy; (3) 
the import of all goods from Italy; and (4) the export to Italy of certain 
raw materials, including rubber, bauxite, aluminium, iron ore and scrap 
iron. T h e first of these sanctions was imposed on 11 October and the 
remainder on 18 N o v e m b e r . 1 1 3 These prohibitions, described by Lord 
Keynes as 'comparatively mild economic sanctions',114 proved totally in-
effective. T h e fact, as Winston Churchill noted, was that these were 'not 
real sanctions to paralyse the aggressor, but merely such half-hearted 
sanctions as the aggressor would tolerate'. ' ' 5 
Undeterred by such ineffective measures, and spurred on by repeated 
telegrams from the Duce w h o wanted a quick victory before the League 
realized the need for more resolute action, the Italian army occupied A d o w a 
on 6 October and Makalle on 8 November. Ethiopian resistance then obliged 
the invaders to halt. D e Bono was thereupon recalled and replaced on 
16 November by Marshal Badoglio, w h o , faced with a strong Ethiopian 
counter-offensive, also found it impossible to advance for m a n y weeks. 
In the hope of breaking Ethiopian morale, Mussolini then insisted that 
his troops use poison gas. l l6 
T h e failure of the League's limited sanctions led to demands that they 
be extended, above all to oil which was of crucial importance as Mussolini 
later admitted when he told Hitler that if it had been introduced, he 'would 
have had to withdraw from Abyssinia within a week'.1 1 7 Britain and France 
were, however, resolutely opposed to this as they believed that Mussolini 
would interpret it as an act of war. T h e British and French foreign 
ministers, Hoare and Laval, therefore met in Paris on 7 December to devise 
a new compromise. It had two main principles: first, an 'exchange of 
territories' whereby Ethiopia would cede to Italy the Ogaden and a large 
112. S. Heald (ed.), 1937, pp. 192-3. 
113. ibid., pp. 193-4, 2°3~7- See also L . Villari, 1943, pp. 151-219. 
114. New Statesman and Nation, 28 November 1935. 
115. W . S. Churchill, 1948, pp. 172-3. 
116. A . del Boca, 1969. 
117. P. Aloisi, 1957, p. 324. 
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part of Tigre in exchange for a port on either the Red Sea or the Gulf 
of Aden; second, Italy would be given a 'zone of economic expansion and 
colonization' in the greater part of Ethiopia south of Addis Ababa; this 
area was to remain part of Ethiopia, but Italy was to have exclusive 
economic rights therein. N e w s of this plan, which was a criminal surrender 
to the condemned aggressor and a total abandonment of the League, leaked 
to the French press, and created a storm of indignation in m a n y countries, 
particularly in Britain where Hoare was obliged to resign on 18 
December . 1 1 8 
Ethiopia at the close of 1935 was thus in the forefront of world news 
and the centre of international excitement and indignation. ' ' 9 A British 
Foreign Secretary had fallen for what was considered as Britain's betrayal, 
while in Ethiopia's rugged mountains a powerful Fascist army using the 
most modern weapons of war, including poison gas, was temporarily halted 
by the heroism of Ethiopia's relatively poorly-armed warriors.120 It was 
a case of David and Goliath re-enacted in the greatest colonial war ever 
fought on the continent of Africa. T h o u g h the Ethiopian army was soon 
to be defeated, m u c h fierce fighting lay ahead before the Italians occupied 
Addis Ababa on 6 M a y 1936. This was followed by five long years of 
Italian Fascist usurpation, during four of which the Ethiopian patriots were 
to fight on alone.121 
T h e Duce's invasion evoked instant reaction in and around Africa.122 
In August 1935, a group of Africans and persons of African descent in 
London founded the International African Friends of Abyssinia, whose 
committee included C . L . R . James of the West Indies, D r P . M c D . 
Millard of British Guiana, Marcus Garvey's wife A m y Ashwood Garvey, 
M o h a m m e d Said of Somaliland, and D r J. B . Danquah of the Gold Coast. 
T h e Society's aim, as stated by its secretary, J o m o Kenyatta, was 'to assist 
by all means in their power in the maintenance of the territorial integrity 
and political independence of Abyssinia'.123 
T h e subsequent outbreak of fighting, which placed Ethiopia in the head-
lines of every newspaper, made a deep impact on African thinking. K w a m e 
N k r u m a h , then a student passing through England, recalled that when 
he saw posters declaring 'Mussolini invades Ethiopia' he was seized by 
emotion, and added: 
At that m o m e n t it was almost as if the whole of London had suddenly 
declared war on m e personally. For the next few minutes I could 
118. S. Heald (ed.), 1937. PP- 3l6"-4i3-
119. For a recent account of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, see F . Hardie, 1974. 
120. O n the war see Haile Sellassie, 1936; G . L . Steer, 1936; E . de Bono, 1937; 
P. Badoglio, 1937; R . Graziani, 1938; R . Greenfield, 1965, pp. 196-266; A . J. Barker, 1968; 
A . del Boca, 1969; G . Rochet, 1971; F. Bandini, 1971. 
121. R . Pankhurst, 1970. 
122. W . R . Scott, 1966 and 1972, pp. 132-8; R . Ross, 1972. 
123. New Times and Ethiopia News, 30 January 1954; R . Makonnen, 1973, pp. 112-20. 
See also S. K . B . Asante, 1977. 
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do nothing but glare at each impassive face wondering if these people 
could possibly realise the wickedness of colonialism, and praying that 
the day might come w h e n I could play m y part in bringing about 
the downfall of such a system. M y nationalism surged to the fore; 
I was ready to go through hell itself, if need be, in order to achieve 
m y object.124 
Similar sentiments were aroused all over Africa. T h e Nigerian intel-
lectual, N n a m d i Azikiwe, devoted m u c h space to Ethiopia's struggle in 
his newspapers, the West African Pilot and the Comet, and later recalled 
in his influential work, Renascent Africa, which has been called 'a Bible 
for Africans', the excitement aroused in a typical school in the Gold Coast 
w h e n students heard h o w 'black soldiers, aided by the invisible hand of 
G o d were outwitting and overthrowing their enemiesS 
Ethiopia, the first foreign victim of Italian Fascism, and the rallying 
point for advocates of collective security, was thus at the end of 1935 the 
burning symbol of Africa's awakening from colonial rule. 
T h e outcome for Liberia and Ethiopia of the European 
imperialist intervention 
B y the end of 1936 Liberia had survived foreign intervention with her 
sovereignty intact, whereas Ethiopia had succumbed to it and her sove-
reignty had been terminated - albeit temporarily. W h a t was responsible 
for this difference? 
T h e internal situation in Liberia and Ethiopia up to the time of the 
Italian invasion on 3 October 1935, though of great historical significance, 
was largely irrelevant in the determination of the final outcome of the 
foreign intervention. Indeed, the situation in both countries did not differ 
in any significant respects. T h e central governments of both had internal 
opponents w h o sought to exploit the situation of foreign intervention for 
their o w n purposes by allying with the foreign powers, notably the 
opposition People's Party in Liberia, and feudal nobles like Leul-Ras Hailu 
and Dejazmatch Haile Sellassie G u g s a . I 2 S 
Both countries, although not lacking in ardent patriots ready to defend 
the Fatherland at the cost of their lives, were militarily very weak compared 
with the military might of their potential or actual foreign aggressors. T h e 
Liberian militia of all able-bodied m e n - mostly Americo-Liberians - was 
largely irregularly trained and lacked arms. T h e Frontier Force, Liberia's 
standing army, was similarly poorly trained and armed, and irregularly 
and poorly paid and provisioned. In September 1920, for instance, arrears 
of salaries due to both the officers and m e n of the Force amounted to 
$90689.52, which greatly lowered their morale.126 Discipline and training 
124. K . Nkrumah, 1957, p. 22. 
125. R . Greenfield, 1965, pp. 192-4. 
126. Republic of Liberia, 1920, p . 9. 
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of the Force was reported to be so unsatisfactory that it was 'extremely 
difficult to get an order carried out either in letter or spirit'.127 T h e Force 
numbered altogether 821 m e n in November 1917, 767 in December 1920, 
and 744 in December 1925. In 1935 a Liberian author described Liberia 
as 'not more than an infant' in matters of self-defence: she had no navy 
or air fleet.128 
A s for Ethiopia, her armed forces consisted of feudal levies of the gover-
nors and shums, the troops of the central government, and Haile Sellassie's 
o w n standing a r m y . 1 2 9 Only the last was trained and armed in the modern 
manner. T h e others were ' m e n w h o lack all training other than that afforded 
by their natural aptitude for warfare and their traditions'.130 
Quite clearly, neither Liberia nor Ethiopia was in a position to match 
the might of a European invasion. T h e crucial difference in the survival 
of Liberia and the non-survival of Ethiopia would be that whereas one 
faced a determined, European military intervention, the other did not. 
Following from this, one might ask w h y the intervention occurred in 
the one and not in the other country. In answering this question, it is 
important to bear in mind that up to the end of 1935, neither Liberia 
nor Ethiopia enjoyed any uncompromising sympathy, support or protection 
from the foreign powers within or outside the League of Nations, or of 
the League itself. In spite of its acknowledged, traditional friendship with 
Liberia, the United States demonstrated numerous times over during the 
forced labour crisis that it toed the line of the European colonial powers 
w h o had designs on Liberia's sovereignty, particularly in supporting the 
plan for an international governing commission over Liberia. 
T h e great diplomatic competence of the Liberian Government, particu-
larly of Liberia's brilliant intellectual President, Edwin J. Barclay, and 
Liberia's negotiator in Geneva and Secretary of State, Louis A . Grimes, 
should also be taken into account. B y silencing local opposition by force 
or persuasion, and by most doggedly holding to the principle of self-
determination for Liberia, the Liberian leaders promoted the cause of their 
country's sovereignty. However, since Ethiopian leaders including Haile 
Sellassie were also competent in diplomacy and ardent guardians of their 
country's sovereignty, the survival of Liberia seems to dwell ultimately 
in the fact that Ethiopia had a m a d , blood-thirsty imperial power as a 
neighbour w h o was bent on territorial aggrandizement and above all on 
avenging A d o w a , and therefore on actually attacking Ethiopia. O n the other 
hand, Britain and France already possessed expansive colonial territories 
in Africa and had no A d o w a to avenge and they therefore had no c o m -
pelling motivation to attack and conquer Liberia in the same manner that 
Italy attacked and conquered Ethiopia. 
127. Major M . Staten, 1925. 
128. E . J. Yancy, 1934, pp. 93-9. 
129. R . Greenfield, 1965, pp. 194-5, 199-201. 
130. E . Virgin, quoted in ibid., p. 194. 
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Africa and the N e w World 
R. D . R A L S T O N 
with sections on Latin America and the 
Caribbean by A L B U Q U E R Q U E M O U R Ä O 
Substantial African expatriate communities or influences have affected such 
diverse regions of the world as classical Greece and R o m e ; Portugal (since 
the fifteenth century); the Caribbean; the United States (since the seven-
teenth century); Britain (since the eighteenth century); Canada (particularly 
after the American W a r of Independence); Brazil (particularly since the 
eighteenth century); Saudi Arabia; India; and, occasionally, Turkey. 
Meanwhile, variations on the African diaspora have been represented in 
the coming and going of African traders, sailors, interpreters, educators 
and African students in the Americas, and in the resettlement of black 
North Americans, Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Cubans in Africa. Linkages 
between what became the two principal spheres of the black world - Africa 
and the Americas - were maintained over time through exchanges of per-
sonnel, cultural materials, and political ideology. T h e purpose of this 
chapter is to delineate the interactions between Africans and peoples of 
African descent in the Americas during the colonial period of African 
history. 
African and American black linkages during the period 1880-1935 con-
sisted essentially of five types of activities: (1) back-to-Africa movements 
or black emigration - mostly from North America, but also from the 
Caribbean and Brazil - into parts of Africa (mostly West Africa, but also 
South Africa and the Horn); (2) American evangelism featuring Afro-
American missionaries as 'gospel conductors' in Africa; (3) a renewed 
Middle Passage in the form of a stream of African students matriculating 
at American black schools and universities; (4) several varieties of pan-
Africanist activities, including conferences, organizations and educational, 
literary or commercial activities which put Africans in touch with the black 
world of the Americas and which helped to influence events in colonial 
Africa; and (5) persistence and transformation of African cultural values 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. These five themes will be discussed 
in turn in the five divisions of this chapter. 
Africa and the New World 
Back-to-Africa movements 
Despite a discernible shift in black sentiment away from Liberian emigra-
tion apparent a m o n g North American blacks during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, Afro-Americans continued to display an interest in 
African emigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Indeed, if anything, the emigration tradition championed earlier by blacks 
like Daniel Coker, Lott Cary, John B . R u s s w u r m , Paul Cuffee, Henry 
H . Garnet and Martin R . Delany, was continued and enlarged upon in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1878, for example, the South 
Carolina-Liberian Exodus Joint Stock Steamship C o m p a n y brought 206 
black immigrants to Liberia. In 1881, Henry H . Garnet was appointed 
resident minister and consul-general to Liberia, fulfilling his o w n earlier 
convictions; and in 1889, the St T h o m a s - b o r n West Indian pan-Africanist, 
D r Edward W . Blyden, visited the United States from Liberia on behalf 
of the American Colonization Society ( A C S ) to help generate black support 
for emigration. Moreover, between 1880 and 1900, Bishop Henry NcNeal 
Turner laboured to combine the two traditions long dominant in the modern 
history of African/Afro-American interaction: African emigration and 
Christian evangelism. Similarly, widespread interaction between Africans 
and American blacks occurred because of the return of thousands of 
Brazilian blacks to West Africa until the time of the official abolition of 
slavery in Brazil (1888). U p o n resettlement in or near their previous homes 
in Nigeria, D a h o m e y (now Benin), T o g o and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) , 
the Afro-Brazilians' technical and commercial competence and political 
aspirations seem to have broadly affected the social, economic and political 
conditions there. Possibly because of the absence of differentiation of them-
selves as a corporate community of settlers in their regions - such as was 
the case in Liberia - there were subsequently little differentiation between 
the social and political goals of indigenous Africans and Afro-Brazilians. 
Liberia - although founded by American whites through the A C S long 
before the period of the Scramble — occupies a special place in any con-
sideration of immigration between different spheres of the black world. 
Partly as a result of Blyden's efforts to muster support for A C S programmes, 
a bill to aid black emigrants was debated in the United States Senate in 
1889. Also, by 1892 black applications to the A C S for passage to Liberia 
had increased rapidly and several hundred black farmers from Arkansas 
and Oklahoma arrived in N e w York hoping to be transported to Africa. 
Moreover, in 1893, w h e n he visited Liberia, Bishop Turner glowingly 
reported that 'one thing the Black m a n has here [in Liberia]... is M a n h o o d , 
freedom; and the fullest liberty; he feels like a Lord and walks the same 
way' . 1 A n d again in 1896 he asserted: 'I believe two or three million of 
us should return to the land of our ancestors and establish our o w n nations, 
1. L . Davis, 1974, p. 3. 
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civilizations, laws, customs, style of manufacture . . . and cease to be 
grumblers, chronic complainers and a m e n a c e to the white m a n ' s country 
he claims and is b o u n d to dominate'.2 T h r o u g h Bishop Turner's efforts, 
over 300 Afro-Americans emigrated to Liberia in M a r c h 1896. E v e n the 
young W . E . B . D u Bois — later to be an opponent of emigration as a 
solution to black Americans' problems - endorsed Turner's emigration idea 
as a c o m m e n d a b l e alternative to 'the humiliating experience of begging 
for justice and recognition' in the United States.3 
While in Liberia, Bishop Turner advised what he called American 'black 
capitalists' that 'if they would start trading with Liberia they would be 
worth millions in a few years'. F e w responded, although a group did 
organize the African Deve lopment Society in 1899, the chief objective of 
which was to encourage Afro-Americans to buy land and settle in East 
Central Africa. T h e Society would sell shares or land rights offered by 
African petitioners but only to Afro-American or African purchasers.4 
Bishop Turner also later served as an adviser to the International Migration 
Society ( I M S ) of A l a b a m a , which sent about 500 emigrants to Africa before 
it b e c a m e defunct in 1900. S o m e of the 500 remained in Liberia; others 
returned to the United States. T h o s e w h o remained fared reasonably well; 
evidently m o r e than a few of them prospered. O n the other hand, those 
w h o returned told horror stories of poor land, inadequate food and poor 
living conditions. These stories reduced the likelihood of any large-scale 
Afro-American emigration m o v e m e n t , even though prospects for blacks 
in the United States were declining from 1895 to 1900. Nevertheless, 
n u m e r o u s Afro-Americans evidently continued to give serious consider-
ation to African emigration, just as others in the United States and the 
Caribbean simply m o v e d a w a y from overt discriminatory practices into 
other regions near by. 
After the turn of the twentieth century, the back-to-Africa baton w a s 
picked u p by others. For example, one Captain D e a n , early in the twentieth 
century, hoped to engineer the settlement of American blacks in South 
Africa to fashion a powerful black state there. After the briefest sojourn 
m e a n t to arrange for this settlement, however, white authorities expelled 
D e a n from the C a p e for what were termed 'provocative activities'. A n d 
in 1914, Chief Alfred C . S a m , a Gold Coast African, turned u p in O k l a h o m a , 
persuaded about sixty black farmers that Africa offered t h e m greater oppor-
tunities and sailed with t h e m to Saltpond in the Gold Coast. Finding Chief 
S a m ' s claims to be exaggerated and encountering restrictions from the G o l d 
Coast officials which inhibited the entry of American immigrants, most 
of the O k l a h o m a n s eventually returned to the United States. But n o one 
m a d e so deep an impression as an advocate of emigration on Africans and 
2. ibid., p. 5. 
3. ibid. 
4. A . C . Hill and M . Kilson (eds), 1971, pp. 192-4. 
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American blacks alike as did Marcus Garvey w h o was born in Jamaica 
in 1887. 
Because of his general appeal to black pride, Garvey focused the attention 
of millions of American blacks on Africa in the period following the First 
World W a r . D r D u Bois later observed that 'within a few years [of Garvey's 
rise], news of his m o v e m e n t , of his promises and plans, reached Europe 
and Asia, and penetrated every corner of Africa'.5 His travels in the 
Caribbean, Central and South America and a two-year sojourn in Britain 
persuaded Garvey that the uniform plight of blacks required a militant 
self-help programme. T w o specific aspects of his L o n d o n experience 
affected his thinking; the reading of Booker T . Washington's Up From 
Slavery (1899), because of which he later said he was ' d o o m e d ' to become 
a race leader,6 and his encounter with the Egyptian intellectual D u s e 
M u h a m m e d Ali, a staunch critic of Britain and American African policies 
in his book In the Land of the Pharaohs (1911). D u s e himself had earlier 
travelled and worked briefly as a stage actor and political activist in the 
United States before settling in L o n d o n . 
After returning to Jamaica, in 1914 Garvey founded his project designed 
to advance African emigration and related programmes and called it the 
Universal Negro Improvement and Conservation Association and African 
Communities League (later simply the U N I A ) . At the age of 28, Garvey 
went to the United States attracted by Washington's work, fired by Duse's 
example, and armed with a p r o g r a m m e of race redemption: the establish-
ment of industrial and agricultural schools for blacks in Jamaica, a Black 
Star fleet of ships for c o m m e r c e between blacks in Africa and the Americas, 
and, most of all, a 'central nation for the race'. Liberia, long a focus of 
Afro-American emigrationism, became the lodestone for Garvey's emigra-
tion schemes. 
Garvey sent an emissary to Liberia in M a y 1920, w h o laid out the aims 
of the Association: transfer of U N I A headquarters to Liberia, financial 
aid to Liberia for constructing schools and hospitals, liquidation of Liberia's 
debts, and the settlement of American blacks in Liberia, w h o would help 
to develop agriculture and natural resources.7 T h e Liberian government 
enthusiastically granted U N I A ' s initial request for land outside Monrovia 
and Garvey in turn sent a group of technicians to survey the site and 
erect buildings for between 20000 and 30000 families w h o m he hoped 
to send over the course of two years beginning about 1924. But w h e n 
Garvey's technicians arrived in Maryland County in M a y 1924, they were 
arrested, detained, and in July 1924, deported. It was not long before the 
Liberian government proscribed the U N I A altogether, thus guaranteeing 
the failure of the Garvey colonization scheme in Liberia. 
Meanwhile , in another venue on the other side of the African continent, 
5. W . E . B . D u Bois, 1968, p. 277. 
6. A . J. Garvey (ed.), 1923-5, Vol. I, p. 126. 
7. See M . B . Akpan, 1973(a); F. Chalk, 1967, pp. 135-42. 
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Garvey sent a small mission of skilled technicians in the late 1920s to 
investigate the possibilities of American black emigration to Ethiopia. T h e 
mission, however, encountered less enthusiasm than was anticipated. B y 
the 1930s, there existed a tiny Afro-American community residing in 
Ethiopia. S o m e had come as a result of Garvey's appeals, but m a n y of 
them came because of other factors. Recent, as well as earlier scholarship, 
reveals a good deal about Afro-American and Ethiopian relationships,8 but 
the subject remains an underworked one in African-American relations. 
A black rabbi, Arnold Ford, from Barbados (via N e w York) emigrated 
to Ethiopia in 1930 and entertained in the Tambourine Club with Negro 
spirituals before it was 'closed d o w n by the government for discriminating 
against local Ethiopian clients'.9 While in Harlem, Ford became attracted 
to Garvey's message. It seems, therefore, that although the U N I A depu-
tation failed to establish organizational links with the Horn of Africa as 
with Liberia, it did succeed in orienting a n u m b e r of prospective American 
black emigrants towards service there. Possibly more individual Garveyites 
emigrated to Ethiopia than to Liberia. For despite its greater inaccessi-
bility, Ethiopia's antiquity and grandeur might have 'exercised a stronger 
pull than the bourgeois' - and to Garvey's mind — 'anti-African politics 
of the Americo-Liberian ruling elite'.10 T h u s , w h e n Garvey broke openly 
with the Liberian government, evidently m a n y of his adherents looked 
fondly toward this n e w horizon. 
However, while some American blacks w h o emigrated to Ethiopia in 
and after the 1920s were motivated generally by Garvey, the immediate 
trigger for their actions might have been a chance meeting with Ethiopian 
students or contact with the occasional Ethiopian delegation that went to 
N e w York in the late 1920s 'to solicit trained Negro Colonists for Africa'.11 
Moreover, Ford, like Bishop Turner, believed that American blacks bore 
a special redemptive role vis-à-vis Africa based on their years of suffering 
and exile. Ford himself answered such a call by a delegation of Fälasa 
(black Ethiopian Jews) and left for Ethiopia in 1930 where he evidently 
remained until his death during the time of the Italian-Ethiopian W a r 
(1935-6).I2 T h e majority of the American emigrants Ford encountered 
in Ethiopia when he arrived there were Jamaicans, and, occasionally, other 
Afro-Caribbean folk. A recent account suggests that 'the West Indians 
appear to have been more prepared than some of the Americans to m a k e 
what adjustments were necessary to living in Ethiopia' although both groups 
suffered discrimination from time to time.13 
8. See, for example, C . Coon, 1936; K . J. King, 1972, pp. 81-7; W . R . Scott, 1971. 
9. C . Coon, 1936, p. 137. 
10. K . J. King, 1972, p. 82. 
11. ibid. 
12. But for slightly different chronology see H . Brotz, 1970, p. 12 and W . R . Scott, 
1971. 
13. K . J. King, 1972, p. 82. 
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O f course, even before Garvey's time, other American blacks had 
emigrated to Ethiopia, but as individual settlers. For example, in the 1890s 
Benito Sylvain, a Haitian, brought to the Court of Menelik II a plan for 
a 'Pan-Negro' organization. Clearly, however, the largest waves of American 
black immigrants came in the late 1920s and early 1930s, that is, after 
Garvey's break with the Liberians and through the time of the Emperor's 
accession, with the greatest numbers of these responding to meetings with 
Ethiopian travellers. In the period immediately following the restoration 
of Haile Sellassie in 1941, a n e w trickle of Afro-Americans (possibly twenty) 
c a m e to Ethiopia. T h e period, however, falls beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Suffice it to say that the numbers of black immigrants from the 
Americas to Ethiopia peaked during activities associated with Garvey, Ford 
and the Emperor and were not equalled before or after that era.14 
T h e Afro-Brazilians 
Contacts between Brazil and the west coast of Africa were facilitated by 
the establishment of regular mixed cargo and passenger lines, which thus 
replaced the slave ships. T h e British African C o m p a n y and the African 
Steam-Ship C o m p a n y , to mention but two, regularly plied between the 
ports of Bahía de Todos os Santos and Lagos. According to the Weekly 
Times of 11 October 1890, the steamer Biaffra returned to Lagos after 
its maiden voyage with n o passengers and 400 tons of merchandise on 
board. At that time the volume of trade between the two coasts was quite 
considerable. According to Pierre Verger,15 exports from Brazil 'consisted 
mainly of cigars, tobacco and r u m ' , and imports took the form of 'local 
fabrics, woven from European cotton, cola nuts and palm oil'. Over the 
five years from 1881 to 1885 the average annual value of imports and exports 
was £19084 and £11259 sterling respectively. 
Trade between the two seaboards, apart from its importance as such, 
led to the emergence of an African bourgeoisie m a d e up of former slaves 
from Brazil and C u b a . This m o v e m e n t began at the end of the eighteenth 
century,16 and became more marked after the revolt of the 'Males' (Muslim 
slaves) in 1835. These bands of emigrants settled particularly in the coastal 
cities of Nigeria and D a h o m e y and, to a lesser extent, in T o g o and the 
Gold Coast (see Fig. 29.1). T h e y formed communities in these coastal 
areas, thus avoiding going inland with the exception of those w h o joined 
the Yoruba and Hausa groups and settled not only in Lagos but also in 
inland towns such as Abeokuta. ' 7 A large n u m b e r of emigrants had been 
negros de ganho in Brazil, in other words, slaves living in the cities w h o 
plied their trades (as masons, carpenters, caulkers, and so on) quite freely 
14. See W . R . Scott, 1971. 
15. P. Verger, 1968, p. 623. 
16. C . W . Newbury, 1961, pp. 36-7. 
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and shared their earnings with their masters. Bringing with them their 
technical k n o w - h o w , a few outstanding builders created residential districts 
in Porto N o v o , W h y d a h and in particular Lagos, where the Brazilian 
Quarter18 was built. Here, to this day, in what is n o w Tinubu Square 
and in C a m p o s Square, storeyed houses reminiscent of those of Bahia can 
be found, as well as large buildings such as the Catholic cathedral of Lagos 
or the mosque erected in the town centre. T h e style of these storeyed 
houses is to be seen in a few buildings in inland areas inhabited by the 
Yoruba. In W h y d a h as in Porto Novo , a type of building developed which, 
whether built in the grand manner or in more simple style, followed very 
closely the plan of the 'Casa-Grande' type of structure characteristic of 
the sugar mills or plantations of colonial Brazil. 
In D a h o m e y some of the children w h o attended the schools of the English 
and French missionaries were used as assistants by the colonial admini-
stration, on account of their educational attainments. This group acquired 
a special status by virtue of its members ' religion, housing and clothing 
and the fact that they engaged in the Atlantic trade and served in the colonial 
administration. However, they were not wholly accepted by European 
society19 and were not always on good terms with the autochthonous 
African population owing to their habits and life styles. 
Such groups gradually lost their specifically Afro-Brazilian character-
istics for, although they had brought with them books from Brazil, such 
as the Compendio de Doutrina Christa and O Fabulista da Mocidadem,20 
little by little, in schools, the language of instruction came to be exclusively 
that of the French or English colonizers. Furthermore, the descendants 
of the Yoruba, in order to become more integrated in local society, went 
back to using Yoruba names and some began to attend services in the 
African churches which derived from mission Protestantism. 
In Lagos, the community maintained its identity, for instance, taking 
to the streets on feast days to perform folk dances, following in this the 
example of the Aurora Relief Society which, in 190021 continued to be 
identified with a small middle-class group. With time, however, this group 
lost its distinguishing features. Portuguese, once considered a commercial 
language, was supplanted by English in Nigeria and French in D a h o m e y . 2 2 
A few forms of resistance were recorded, as for instance the appearance 
in 1920 of the newspaper Le Guide du Dahomey in Porto N o v o 2 3 which, 
until 1922, published criticism of the French colonial administration. 
18. D . Araedon in S. O . Biobaku (ed.), 1976, pp. 40-1. 
19. J. M . Turner, 1975, C h . V . 
20. Bouche to Planque, Porto-Novo, 25 January 1869, Societ delle Missione Africane 
Archives, R o m e , entry N o . 21.150, Heading N o . 12/80200 (11/082) (letter from Father 
Bouche to his superior, Father Planque). 
21. Lagos Standard, 8 January 1896 and 2 M a y 1900. 
22. M . C . da Cunha, 1976, p. 33. 
23. J. A . Ballard, 1965, p. 16. 
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Another paper, La Voix du Dahomey,2* published at a later date by the 
descendants of Afro-Brazilians, lamented the difficulty of engaging in 
foreign trade, as had been the practice before the establishment of the 
French administration. 
In the Gold Coast the Afro-Brazilians, although established as a separate 
group on account of their more or less Westernized habits and known 
for that reason as the Tabon, gradually forsook their specifically Brazilian 
traditions, while retaining other cultural traits such as the beating of drums 
on the occasion of such festivities as the two-day-long annual procession 
through the old streets of Accra.25 W h e n the Tabon settled in the country, 
they had to sign a pact of vassalage with a G a chief of Accra. They 
abandoned the use of the Portuguese language very early on, although 
a mixture of G a , English and Portuguese is to be found in their songs. 
T h e rapid integration of the Tabon in the Gold Coast contrasts with the 
rather slow one of the Afro-Brazilians of Lagos, Abeokuta, Porto N o v o , 
W h y d a h and other less important coastal towns in Nigeria, D a h o m e y and 
Togo. 
In Lagos, alongside the Brazilian community, an Afro-Cuban c o m -
munity came into being, composed of the smaller number of individuals 
w h o had returned from Cuba . 
Black American evangelism in Africa 
O n e of the means by which African-American black interchanges were 
nurtured in the colonial period, short of mass migrations, was the coming 
of black missionaries to 'elevate' Africa by Christian evangelism. In the 
main, evangelization took the form of American black missionaries working, 
first, in the service of mainstream, predominantly white denominations. 
For example, the Presbyterian Church sponsored black missionaries in 
French Cameroon as early as 1896. A n d the Reverend William H . Sheppard, 
a black graduate of H a m p t o n Institute, Virginia, prodded the Southern 
Presbyterian Church into undertaking missionary work in the Congo in 
the 1890s, where he represented the Church and quickly found that his 
mission was attracting converts by 'the hundreds' and expanding 'until 
it was one of the most important stations of Christianity'.26 Meanwhile, 
at the turn of the twentieth century, the Seventh-Day Adventists dispatched 
three black missionaries to Nyasaland (now Malawi), and as a result of 
a five-year tour sent three young African adherents, including Daniel 
Sharpe Malekebu, to the American black schools for education. (Not only 
were some of the 'white church' evangelists black, but some white mission-
aries were placed in Afro-American schools to prepare for African service.) 
But black church organizations of their o w n volition and in their o w n right 
24. C . Tardits, 1958, p. 39. 
25. J. M . Turner, 1975, p. 23. 
26. C . Clendenen, R . Collins and P. Duignan, 1966, p. 63. 
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soon b e c a m e the bellwether in, arguably, the mos t effective missionary 
enterprises in Africa. 
Indeed, Afro-Americans in the nineteenth century were exhorted to 
a s s u m e a special stance toward the 'redemption' of African societies. Bishop 
T u r n e r , for one, boldly argued that ' G o d brought the N e g r o to A m e r i c a 
and Christianized h i m so that he might go back to Africa and r e d e e m 
that land'.27 Others alluded to the future political greatness of Africa as 
well as divine mission as compelling reasons for N e w W o r l d blacks to act. 
F o r example , in a 1902 speech, blacks were told, 'if the N e g r o A m e r i c a n 
will but feel his responsibility, face his opportunity and undertake the 
evangelization of Africa in G o d ' s n a m e , u n b o r n millions . . . of Africa's 
sons will witness a transformed continent'.28 
Earlier, in 1884, the African Methodist Episcopal ( A M E ) C h u r c h s p o n -
sored a major s y m p o s i u m o n the question: ' W h a t Should be the Policy 
of Colored Americans T o w a r d Africa?'. In August 1893, African and other 
participants from the United States and E u r o p e attended an A m e r i c a n 
Missionary Association ' W o r l d Congress o n Africa', held in conjunction 
with the Chicago W o r l d Fair of that year. T h e week-long Congress w a s 
intended to promote interest in Afro-Amer ican missionary w o r k in Africa, 
and also in the rights of 'Africans in America ' . 
A t the Congress, Bishop T u r n e r renewed his advocacy of black e m i -
gration to Liberia. Indeed, at least one Liberian ( M o m o l u Massaquoi ) 
attended and participated in the proceedings. A t a subsequent conference 
in D e c e m b e r 1895 on 'Africa and the A m e r i c a n N e g r o ' , in Atlanta's 
G a m m o n Theological Seminary , at least one African delegate (Etna H o l d e r -
ness of Liberia) participated. T h e G a m m o n meetings once again e m p h a -
sized A m e r i c a n black obligations to help Christianize all of Africa: ' T h e r e 
ought to be , and there m u s t be, an unbroken line of Christian workers 
stretching from the C a p e of G o o d H o p e to E g y p t . . . thence Sierra L e o n e 
and Liberia; thence o n w a r d . . . to the S u d a n and the C o n g o State'.29 
A m e r i c a n blacks responded in varying w a y s to this type of call. F o r 
example , in 1930, in a fit of exuberance, an A M E bishop purchased a 
farm of several thousand acres of land in South Africa with the intention 
of settling m e m b e r s of the C h u r c h o n it in an A M E colony. O n the other 
h a n d , black churches in the United States b e c a m e apprehensive over n e w s 
reports carried in the black press in January 1926 to the effect that all 
missionaries were being deported from Liberia. 
A t a m o r e substantial level, however , the A M E and African Methodist 
Episcopal Zion ( A M E Zion) churches a n d the National Baptist Convention 
( N B C ) all deployed black missionaries in Africa throughout the colonial 
period. Early stations of the N B C were set u p in Liberia in 1883, building 
on the still earlier w o r k of Lott Carey. T h e A M E Zion C h u r c h also put 
27. M . M . Ponton, 1917, p. 77. 
28. I. G . Penn and J. W . E . Bowen (eds), 1902, p. 310. 
29. J. W . E . Bowen (ed.), 1896, p. 205. 
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down roots in Liberia in 1878 and in the Gold Coast in 1896. Bishop 
John Bryan Small, of the Caribbean, subsequently organized two annual 
A M E Zion conferences in the Gold Coast and consequently lured J. E . K . 
Aggrey and Franck Osam-Pinanko into Afro-American churches and, 
ultimately into the service of the A M E Zion Church. In 1930, A M E Zion 
missionaries went to work in Nigeria, responding to a request from African 
churches there to affiliate with Zion. Meanwhile, the A M E Church 
sponsored missions in several African venues, including Sierra Leone in 
1886 (building on Daniel Coker's earlier evangelism), in Liberia in the 
1890s (via a personal visit from Henry Turner), and in South Africa in 
1896. Because of its longevity, something more must be said about the 
evolution of A M E mission work in Africa, and particularly about the area 
of the Church's greatest impact - Southern Africa. 
M a n y American blacks w h o responded to the call of their churches in 
the later nineteenth century went to Southern Africa as missionaries and 
with profound effect. A veritable alliance between the schismatic, inde-
pendent African or 'Ethiopian' Church and the A M E Church was c o m -
pleted in-1896, opening a momentous decade in South African black and 
American black history. Although the AME-Ethiopianist union was short-
lived, the A M E Church on the strength of its early penetration remained 
strong in South Africa for the next fifty years. 
Formed out of dissident elements of the Wesleyan Church and other 
'religious malcontents', the Ethiopian or black separatist Church movement 
struggled to sustain itself over its first few years. It was only saved, however, 
by the fortuitous intervention of an African student at Wilberforce Univer-
sity. Charlotte M a n y e — one of several Southern Africans w h o arrived at 
Wilberforce and Lincoln universities in 1895, as part of a so-called 'Zulu 
Choir' - wrote a letter to her sister in South Africa using A M E Church 
stationery. T h e letter triggered the interest of leaders of the Ethiopianist 
movement in securing more information about A M E ; they requested and 
received copies of the A M E Church discipline, h y m n books, and liturgy. 
However, particular interest was shown in possibilities of higher education 
for Africans in the United States. This fortuitous train of events led to 
the dispatch of an Ethiopianist delegation, headed by Reverend James Mata 
D w a n e , to the United States in 1896, and culminated in the formal 
absorption of the 'Ethiopian' Church by the A M E and the formal entry 
of the A M E Church into the foreign missionary field. 
Specifically, D w a n e pressed Afro-Americans to come to South Africa 
and to push the educational mission of the A M E Church, arguing that 
South Africa offered 'educated and consecrated American Negroes their 
greatest field of usefulness'.30 For the time being, however, it would be 
necessary for the mother Church to help out by training African youth 
in American educational institutions. Bishop Turner responded by placing 
30. J. M . Dwane, 1897. 
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a cryptic notice of advice in his paper, The Voice of Missions: 'Take Notice, 
Wilberforce. South Africa coming'. 
Nevertheless, D w a n e and the African leadership considered it the logical 
outcome of the Afro-American connection that it should be turned into 
a development of indigenous schools similar to the ones African students 
were then attending in the United States. H e believed that teachers and 
preachers in the quantity required by the African population should come 
from that school, thereby breaking the total reliance for missionary and 
teaching personnel on overseas schools. In the meantime, Turner visited 
South Africa in 1898, consecrated D w a n e as A M E vicar-bishop and pro-
claimed the intention of the Church to build an A M E College second to 
none among 'previous missionary educational endeavors'. D w a n e , in turn, 
talked of establishing 'The Turner Normal School at Queenstown' or 'The 
Wilberforce of the Dark Continent'. 
Turner devoted the entire issue of Voice of Missions for March 1899 
to publicity for the South African College Campaign. In one article portray-
ing the redemption of Africa as the 'American Negro's Burden', the specifi-
cations of the College took shape: it would be a school for Africans, taught 
by Africans, founded and supported by the A M E missionary department. 
T h e founding faculty would come from African students already studying 
at Wilberforce University, Morris Brown College, Howard University, and 
the Medical Department of Central State College at Nashville, Tennessee. 
T h e issue of non-African direction and dominance in the Church m o v e -
ment proved, however, unendurable for D w a n e . In 1899, he seceded from 
the AME-'Ethiopian' union and thus created a schism within the ranks 
of the black Church in South Africa. Trying to retrieve its missionary 
foothold in South Africa, the A M E General Conference in 1900 appointed 
Levi Coppin as the first Resident Bishop. T h e Church, moreover, was 
aided in its work by Charlotte M a n y e , the Sotho student w h o had triggered 
the AME-Ethiopian affiliation in the first place. M a n y e returned from 
her American studies in 1901 and immediately picked up the South African 
College idea — by founding an A M E mission school among the Pedi in 
the Eastern Cape. By 1908, Charlotte M a n y e Maxeke and her spouse had 
obtained enough money from the Missionary Department to buy land in 
Transvaal, build a hall (named after Bishop Coppin) and to move the school 
(now named Wilberforce Institution) to its permanent location at Evaton. 
Meanwhile in Nyasaland, John Chilembwe, a young Yao N B C convert 
wrote uncertainly in 1905 to his parent Church that 'the mission work 
chiefly depends upon your help'. With a trace of despair, he continued 
in sentiments expressed just ten years before he led an ill-fated rebellion 
against the British in Nyasaland: 'here in British Central Africa it is not 
like it is in South Africa where the people can do something themselves 
for missions . . . I do not know what the future events of this work will 
be.'31 Chilembwe had travelled to America in 1897 for study at the all-
31. J. Chilembwe, 1905. 
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black Virginia Theological Seminary, trained as a minister, and had re-
turned to Nyasaland around 1900 under the auspices of the National Baptist 
Convention. H e worked to set up a mission — about which he wrote the 
above lament - along lines he had observed among American blacks: 'an 
industrial mission in which Africans were trained in the arts and crafts 
as well as taught Christianity'.32 
Bishop Coppin assessed black American Church efforts in Africa in an 
address to the 1916 A M E General Conference. H e noted that: 
T h e h o m e church has built, and assisted in building churches and 
school houses in Africa, West and South. M a n y students have been 
trained in our schools at h o m e , largely or wholly at the expense of 
the Church . . . [because] w e have not been indifferent to the call 
to duty by our kindred beyond the seas; to recognize the debt w e 
o w e to the foreign field in general and to Africa in particular . . . for 
the redemption of Africa where millions are yet in darkness, and to 
grasp the outstretched hand of Ethiopia.33 
Notwithstanding the resistance by white South African political and 
church authorities, the A M E connections sown by Turner, deepened by 
D w a n e , and given firm institutional grounding by the Coppins and the 
Maxekes produced a veritable cornucopia of African students matriculating 
at American schools. Similarly, in British Central Africa, and West Africa, 
African students were encouraged and often subsidized by American black 
churches. T h e latter student sojourns set the stage for a major new phase 
in African and Afro-American interaction in the colonial period, one which 
had great consequences for subsequent African nationalist movements in 
the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the period of missionary-generated 
contacts, in which black American church leaders played the role of 
mentors, was gradually changed to one in which the level, interaction 
and nature of American interests in black America was increasingly 
determined by African initiatives. 
Religious interactions between Brazil and the African coast 
In matters of religion, and with regard more specifically to evangelism, 
w e cannot compare the influence of the North American blacks with that 
of the Afro-Brazilians. While the former were directly or indirectly involved 
in the work of spreading the Gospel, the latter were never committed to 
proselytizing work. Several of them, after arriving in Lagos, succeeded 
in making their way to their countries of origin. Reference is m a d e in 
a few historical documents to Muslim Afro-Brazilians passing through 
Lagos on their way to Hausa country. Verger34 mentions the activity of 
32. G . Shepperson and T . Price, 1958, p. 113. 
33. Quoted in A M E Church Episcopal Handbook, 1963. 
34. P . Verger, 1968, pp. 617-18. 
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the English consul in Lagos, Benjamin Campbell, w h o , in 1858, issued 
passports to Afro-Brazilians expressing a desire to travel to their homelands. 
In Lagos, on the edge of the Brazilian Quarter, a central mosque was erected 
by craftsmen from Brazil (Plate 29.5). 
Furthermore, the Catholics35 built their first church, the Holy Cross 
Church, started in 1879, in Lagos, and sent their children to the schools 
of the French and English missionaries w h o were beginning to use English 
and French for their teaching. 
Thanks to the religious influence exercised intermittently by Portuguese-
speaking priests from the island of Sao T o m é , the community was guided 
and assisted during its initial period by a freed slave k n o w n as Father 
Antonio.36 T h e sons of Afro-Brazilians living in the Brazilian Quarter w h o 
had attended the missionary schools began to work as schoolteachers and 
catechists in the schools and missions that the priests of the African Mission 
Society were establishing in the region, without forgetting other activities 
such as work for the colonial administration.37 These catechists were 
working for the missions, which were of European origin, and not for any 
educational missionary ventures originating in Brazil or resulting from an 
initiative of the Afro-Brazilian community of Lagos. In fact, the language 
of instruction was English and sometimes French. 
For the Afro-Brazilians their Catholicism was a distinguishing feature 
which conferred a special social status, making them the first nucleus of 
an African bourgeoisie in Lagos. 
A large n u m b e r of Afro-Brazilians w h o had returned to Africa, although 
they professed to be Catholics, had never abandoned their traditional 
African religious beliefs. T h u s , w h e n they returned to their homeland, 
their religious practices were invigorated and assumed a more or less 
syncretic form, with the formal aspects of Catholicism resulting from 
religious life in Brazil such as the Catholic Saints being set alongside the 
African divinities of the Yoruba pantheon which they continued to worship. 
' W h a t struck the Catholic missionaries w h e n they landed on the coast of 
Africa was the parity of the respect shown by the Brazilian Africans for 
the religion they had acquired in South America and that handed d o w n 
to them by their forefathers . . . ' . Father Lafite added that 'the Brazilians 
were Christians only in so far as they had been baptized, which did not 
prevent them from invoking the negro divinities . . . ' . T h e Brazilians and 
other converts put their trust in the social benefits resulting from their 
status as Christians rather than in a whole-hearted acceptance of the teach-
ings of the Church . 3 8 
In contrast with what occurred in the United States where conversions 
took place at a deeper level, with several North American blacks becoming 
35. J. F . A . Ajayi, 1965, pp. 199-200, 202. 
36. P . Verger, 1968, p. 618. 
37. M . C. da Cunha, 1976, p. 32. 
38. P . Verger, 1968, p. 601. 
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propagators of the Christian faith, the Afro-Brazilians stood by their African 
religious beliefs. 
T h u s , Afro-Brazilians living in the Brazilian Quarter and forming a 
middle-class nucleus which remained a cohesive and distinct social group 
thanks partly to the Catholic religion, subscribed to the cult of the house-
hold orixas ('gods') a n d consulted b ab alaos if a (diviners).39 W h a t is m o r e , 
African religions still exerted their influence on Brazil from across the 
Atlantic. N i n a Rodrigues 4 0 points out that at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, sailing boats from L a g o s transported Y o r u b a - and English-
speaking N a g o merchants w h o brought with t h e m kola nuts, cowrie shells, 
Y o r u b a jèje ( juju) cult objects, soap, 'sarongs from the coast', and so o n . In 
1888, out of ¿ 8 2 3 7 worth of goods exported from Brazil, p a m oil represented 
only £ 2 6 0 0 ; the remainder w a s m a d e u p essentially of religious or cult 
objects, especially 'coast sarongs' (£3367) , for which there w a s considerable 
d e m a n d in Brazil, kola nuts of t w o kinds (£1525), 'straw from the coast', 
black soap, cowrie shells, 'oris', gourds a n d 'rosary beads'. African cult 
objects a n d articles used in Afro-Brazilian religious ceremonies never ceased 
to be imported into Brazil and gradually c a m e to be m u c h sought after, 
consequently acquiring great value as the n u m b e r s of those practising Afro-
Brazilian syncretism increased. 
The educational impact of the Americas 
W h e n African students lived in America during the colonial period, they 
created the context for a different relationship between Africans and Afro-
Americans and between African students themselves drawn from all over 
the African continent. O n their return h o m e , they also inspired thousands 
of their compatriots to enrol in American schools between 1880 and the 
Second World W a r . T h e number of African students in the United States 
was thereby increased and the time during which Africans as a group were 
in contact with American blacks was prolonged. T h e names of such 
American-educated colonial African students are legion and include recent 
heads of state (such as N n a m d i Azikiwe, K w a m e N k r u m a h , and K a m u z u 
Banda) as well as earlier nationalist or community leaders such as A . B . 
X u m a , John D u b e , Marshall and Charlotte Maxeke, J. E . K . Aggrey, 
Pixley K a Izaka Seme , D . S. Malekebu, Franck Osam-Pinanko, Peter 
Koinange, Ndabaningi Sithole, Eduardo Mondlane and John Chilembwe. 
In time, the expanding pipeline of Africans booking passages to America 
surpassed substantially the flow of black missionaries in the opposite 
direction. What began as an American evangelistic foray into Africa for 
spiritual redemption, in other words, eventually helped build springboards 
for an educational, technical and political revolution. 
It m a y be possible to deduce the impact of American educational 
39. M . C . da Cunha, 1976, p. 33. 
40. N . Rodrigues, 1976, p. 105. 
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experience on colonial Africans and anti-colonial processes by examining 
brief biographies of some of the individual African students. J. E . K . 
Aggrey, for example, went to the United States from the Gold Coast in 
1898 under the direct influence of an American-educated A M E Zion Bishop 
from Barbados. Aggrey was steered to Livingstone College in 
Salisbury, North Carolina, the chief educational institution of the A M E 
Zion Church, with the apparent understanding that he would return directly 
to Africa in the service of the Church. U p o n taking a baccalaureate and 
a divinity degree, however, Aggrey accepted employment in the A M E Zion 
publishing house in Charlotte, became correspondent for one or two black 
newspapers, conducted free classes for black teachers in the vicinity, was 
ordained a Church elder, and was offered a pastorate by two black churches. 
According to his biographer, this pastoral work was 'one of the most 
important incidents in Aggrey's American experiences', because 'it took 
him out of an academic atmosphere and introduced him to the activities 
of the life led by the American Negro'.4 1 Moreover, his connections with 
black America had already been deepened when he married, in 1904, a 
young Afro-American w o m a n , possibly a descendant of Frederick 
Douglass. After twenty-two years work in black America, Aggrey returned 
to Africa on two separate occasions as a m e m b e r of the Phelps-Stokes 
Commission, but died in 1927 shortly after accepting the post of assistant 
vice-principal of the newly created Achimota College in Ghana. A m o n g 
the scores of young Africans on w h o m his impact was felt were N n a m d i 
Azikiwe, K w a m e N k r u m a h , and K a m u z u Banda, all of w h o m later matricu-
lated at American black schools. 
While in the United States, John Chilembwe from Nyasaland was 
exposed to a growing black race-consciousness. Chilembwe was a student 
in Virginia during the time of the race riots in Wilmington, North Carolina, 
in 1898. Also he seems to have travelled back to Africa in the company 
of Reverend Charles S. Morris, an 'Ethiopia-minded' Afro-American 
Baptist and an eyewitness to the Wilmington disorders. George Shepperson 
and T h o m a s Price, in an admirable study, assessed the effects of 
Chilembwe's experiences in a race-conscious America, noting that the 
manner of post-Reconstruction black adjustment to discriminatory legis-
lation 'offered him a pattern of strategy and tactics from which he could 
draw lessons for his o w n reactions to the less distinguished but nonetheless 
effective discriminations against Africans in his o w n land'. Shepperson 
and Price do not argue that Chilembwe derived the very idea of African 
schools, 'independent of Government and European missions', from Afro-
American institutions; only that 'it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
his conception of them was influenced by his experiences in the United 
States'.42 
Although no evidence is available to reveal the nature of his reading 
41. E . Smith, 1929, p. 85. 
42. G . Shepperson and T . Price, 1958, pp. 97-8. 
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while in the United States, Chilembwe lived in America at the time when 
the speaking and writing of Bishop Turner and Booker T . Washington 
were already newsworthy items and those of D u Bois and militant black 
newspapermen, such as T . T h o m a s Fortune, were becoming so. Moreover, 
the Commission set up to investigate the Nyasaland Rising of 1915 alleged 
that m u c h incendiary literature from black America was a factor motivating 
Chilembwe's adherents in that revolt. 
Meanwhile, the Reverend D . S . Malekebu, also from Nyasaland returned 
in 1926 to British Central Africa after studying in the United States. His 
absence had not been nearly so protracted as Aggrey's nor was his return 
so cataclysmic as Chilembwe's, but his emergence as a community leader 
during the colonial period was equally noteworthy. Malekebu had studied 
at the National Training School in D u r h a m , North Carolina, at the M o o d y 
Bible Institute in Chicago, and then took a medical degree at Meharry 
Medical School in 1917. U p o n his return to Nyasaland, in the company 
of his wife, Flora Ethelwyn, a Spelman College graduate from the Congo, 
he reopened Chilembwe's Providence Industrial Mission which the Nyasa-
land Protectorate Government razed to the ground in the aftermath of 
the abortive rebellion of 1915. Moreover, Malekebu founded the Chiradzulu 
Native Association, and got appointed to the Local District Council. In 
short, his construction of a church and a hospital, reconstruction of the 
Chilembwe mission, and his broad-based community work attracted glow-
ing reports. 
N n a m d i Azikiwe - w h o like K a m u z u Banda was prompted to journey 
to America by the ubiquitous James Aggrey and by the m o o d in the United 
States associated with Marcus Garvey — enrolled first at a black preparatory 
school in West Virginia in 1925. W h e n he attended Howard University 
a few years later, Azikiwe studied and worked closely with such black 
scholars as Ralph Bunche, and particularly, Alain Locke and William 
Leo Hansberry on such subjects as Afro-American and pre-colonial African 
history. 
Professor Locke became a personal tutor for Azikiwe w h o , in turn, 
worked as Locke's personal secretary. Published in 1925, Locke's The New 
Negro must have had an enormous impact on the studious Azikiwe, for 
the book was a model of comparative study of black societies and cultures, 
and included evocative contributions by a kaleidoscope of Harlem Renais-
sance writers and scholars: Jean Toomer , Countee Cullen, James Weldon 
Johnson, the Jamaican Claude M c K a y , Langston Hughes, the black Puerto 
Rican emigrant Arthur A . Schomburg, E . Franklin Frazier, and W . E . B . 
D u Bois. Furthermore, contact with the West Indian law student, George 
Padmore, evidently influenced Azikiwe while a student at Howard; Padmore 
spoke to a student rally about political choices in the 1928 United States 
elections. Padmore later contributed political analyses to the pages of 
Azikiwe's African Morning Post, published in the Gold Coast in the 1930s. 
In an address before the Howard University Board of Trustees in 1954, 
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a short time before he became Premier of Eastern Nigeria, Azikiwe told 
of his student days at Howard: 'Here at the Hilltop, I learned the rudi-
ments of the humanities, the anatomy of the social sciences, and the gram-
mar of politics'.43 Professor Hansberry was on hand when Azikiwe was 
elevated to Governor-General of Nigeria in i960. At that time, Hansberry 
paid tribute to Azikiwe as the 'most illustrious of m y former students . . . 
one w h o perceived most clearly the greatness of Africa's past, w h o d e m o n -
strated the great potentialities of the African present'.44 Implicit in his 
praise of Azikiwe was surely something of Hansberry's disappointment 
at the unreceptive and often hostile climate in which his o w n work in 
African history was carried out a m o n g Afro-American faculty and student 
body at Howard . 
W h e n he transferred to Lincoln University in 1930, Azikiwe continued 
his interest in black history and race relations, exhibited a determination 
to secure the appointment of blacks to the all-white faculty and criticized 
'the conventional ambitions of his fellow students and the apparent middle 
class aims of the institution . . .'.4S H e thought it 'an enormity that a college 
for Negroes should have persisted for 86 years before a Negro was appointed 
to the faculty'.46 T h e university authorities grew disenchanted with 
Azikiwe's protest activities (which were publicized not only on campus, 
but in the black Philadelphia Tribune and in Baltimore Afro-American 
newspapers). Consequently, the school refused to recommend Azikiwe for 
a renewal of his student visa; in effect, such a refusal assured the termination 
of his American sojourn. Azikiwe departed for Africa in 1934. B y the time 
K w a m e N k r u m a h enrolled at Lincoln in 1935, at the tail end of the period 
considered here, a number of reforms pressed for by Azikiwe had been 
instituted. 
While travelling in West and Southern Africa with the Phelps-Stokes 
Commission and while lecturing in the Gold Coast as part of his Achimota 
appointment, Aggrey and several others in similar ways reached across 
m a n y African communities and prompted dozens of African youth to seek 
an American rather than a British education. Azikiwe, Banda and N k r u m a h 
became the three most well-known of those touched by Aggrey. T h e ex-
periences of these m e n also illustrate the pan-African or pan-black aspects 
of their American days. Yet these aspects of African interaction with blacks 
of the diaspora do not wholly explain the activities of the American-
educated Africans on their return h o m e . Nor are they adequately explained 
in currently available scholarship. W h a t appears to have occurred, particu-
larly among Africans in British colonies, was an altered perspective of the 
American-educated African colliding with an inhospitable colonial 
43. B . N . Azikiwe, 1961, p. 13. 
44. K . A . B . Jones-Quartey, 1965, p. 76. 
45. Horace M a n n Bond Papers, Lincoln University (Pennsylvania). 
46. H . M . Bond, in J. A . Davis (ed.), 1958, p. 257. 
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reception (which was prompted by educational experiences completely 
outside the colonial orbit).47 
American education, however, was not universally or categorically 
opposed or disdained in the African colonies. Indications are that industrial 
or vocational training was welcomed by the colonial entrepreneur since 
it enabled him to secure well-trained artisans to drive motor lorries, build 
his houses, and manage his mechanical or electrical plant. Government 
officials and white missionaries encouraged this kind of training for different 
reasons: government officials because they believed that the commercial 
and economic development of the territory would be advanced, missionaries 
because they believed that Booker T . Washington's 'practical education' 
approach built character and would help to raise the general moral standard 
of African life. 
That the Afro-American component of the experience of those Africans 
w h o studied in the United States contributed to the distinctiveness of those 
experiences m a y be seen in the following two examples. T h e Reverend 
John D u b e , later first President-General of the African National Congress 
(1912-17), w h o was sometimes referred to as the 'Booker T . Washington 
of South Africa', in a talk in N e w York City, explicitly affirmed the value 
for him of Washington's Tuskegee model. Indeed, D u b e founded an 
'indigenous Tuskegee' in Zululand to train the mind, the hand, and the 
heart of Zulu youth in the Washington manner. Obstacles hindering Dube's 
efforts were formidable. They included problems in fund-raising because 
of South African suspicions of 'disturbing influences' emanating from the 
'Ethiopian' activities of Bishops Turner, D w a n e , and Coppin. 
After his o w n nine-year stay in the United States, Azikiwe returned 
in 1934 not to his native Nigeria, but to the Gold Coast where he settled 
temporarily after being refused positions in Nigeria (as a teacher at Kings 
College, Lagos) and in the Liberian diplomatic service. President Barclay 
of Liberia rejected Azikiwe's application with the curt reminder that he 
was not a Liberian and, therefore, knew rather less than required about 
the republic to discharge the duties in question. With characteristic zeal, 
however, Azikiwe set out to make himself such an authority on Liberia 
that even the Americo-Liberian citizenry would be envious. B y the end 
of 1931, he was knowledgeable enough on the subject to read a paper on 
Liberia at the annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Negro 
Life and History. In the paper, he came to Liberia's defence and con-
demned Western critics. In 1934 he published his book Liberia in World 
Politics. 
Pan-Africanism: political and cultural aspects 
Besides these educational exchanges, a series of pan-Africanist organizations 
and conferences, as well as commercial and literary or cultural activities 
47. See R . D . Ralston, forthcoming, for development of this argument. 
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put Africans in touch with American blacks and helped to influence events 
in colonial Africa. T h e activities of four persons dominated the develop-
ment of formal, organized pan-Africanism during the colonial period. T h e 
first was Booker T . Washington, founder and principal of Tuskegee 
Institute, the educational model for m a n y African and Caribbean c o m -
munities. T h e second was D r W . E . B . D u Bois w h o , as editor of the 
magazine The Crisis and 'father' of the pan-African Congress movement, 
per se, m a d e Africa a subsidiary activity of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People ( N A A C P ) . Marcus Garvey, w h o used 
his U N I A not only to forge an emigrationist movement but to promote 
organizational or political solidarity between all peoples of African descent 
was the third, and the last was Aimé Césaire w h o (in concert with other 
Caribbean blacks such as Léon D a m a s of Cayenne, D r Jean Price-Mars 
of Haiti, and the Senegalese poet-politician Leopold Senghor) propounded 
a cultural variant of pan-Africanism of black group-consciousness, called 
négritude, largely within the Francophone black world. 
While the pan-Africanist interest, involvement, and impact of Washing-
ton and Tuskegee on Africa and on enrolled and aspiring African students 
were considerable, those aspects of Washington's work are not well known. 
T h e reputation and resources of Tuskegee, however, were brought to Africa 
by African and American alumni and, often, by numerous African visitors 
to Tuskegee or correspondents with Washington w h o had never been 
matriculated students. Consequently, through the media of numerous 
international conferences, visitations, and technical missions, m a n y 
Africans were touched by the 'Tuskegee Spirit' or drew upon Tuskegee's 
and other American black resources. 
In keynoting the pan-Africanist 'International Conference on the Negro', 
convened at Tuskegee in the spring of 1912, Washington stressed the theme 
of an exchange of techniques and resources between blacks in Africa and 
America. ' T h e object of calling this Conference at Tuskegee', he declared, 
'is to afford an opportunity for studying the methods employed in helping 
the Negro of the United States, with a view of deciding to what extent 
Tuskegee and Hampton methods m a y be applied to conditions . . . in 
Africa'.48 A m o n g those attending the 1912 Conference were delegates from 
the Gold Coast (J. E . Casely Hayford, author of the influential Ethiopia 
Unbound published the year before, and a representative of the Aborigines 
Rights Protection Society), British East Africa, Liberia (F. E . T . Johnson), 
Nigeria, Ruanda (now Rwanda) , Portuguese East Africa (now M o z a m -
bique), and South Africa (Rev. Isaiah Sishuba, of the Ethiopian Church, 
Queenstown). 
Although African interest in Tuskegee was fired by the 1912 Conference, 
the repatriation of African students and news of earlier Tuskegee projects 
had already kindled m u c h interest. For example, a Tuskegee mission to 
48. The Tuskegee Student, 1912. 
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Togoland (now Togo) had arrived in 1901 at the invitation of the G e r m a n 
colonial government; the mission was designed to improve African methods 
of cotton cultivation. Success of the mission led to further invitations for 
missions to Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Zanzibar and Sudan; and to 
Washington being invited to set up shop in South Africa. 
Related Tuskegee/Washington pan-Africanist activities included meet-
ings of the Negro Business League in 1908, at which Washington showed 
his appreciation of pan-Africanism for African/Afro-American interchange. 
As he introduced five Liberian envoys w h o were seeking American financial 
assistance, Washington emphasized that 'they are here in the United States 
on an official visit, not merely as envoys of their land, but as representatives 
of the entire Negro race . . .',49 Although little real commerce resulted 
between Africans and Afro-Americans, the African Union C o m p a n y (a 
shipping line founded in 1913 by Washington's aide Emmet t Scott) was 
meant to promote the trading of African products on the world market. 
Evidently, this idea of a shipping line to Africa particularly attracted Garvey 
to Washington. 
T h e meeting of African and American blacks at Tuskegee as well as 
Tuskegee projects caused the spreading of the 'Tuskegee Spirit' in an almost 
geometric progression. T h e work in Nigeria of a graduate of the Phelps 
Hall Bible Training School at Tuskegee provides a very small example 
of this. In a letter to the faculty, he reported that 'I have put before m y 
people the plan of establishing a school like Tuskegee and they gladly 
consented. O n e of them has given 50 acres of land and $1000 to start 
with right away'; he continued, 'I a m starting to build two or three houses 
and then begin at once to preach the Tuskegee spirit'.50 
John D u b e and D . D . T . Jabavu were two of the long list of African 
notables w h o passed over c o m m o n ground provided in Tuskegee. D u b e , 
during his years in the United States as a student at Oberlin and in N e w 
York, became associated with both Atlanta educator, John H o p e , and Booker 
T . Washington at Tuskegee. D u b e returned to South Africa in 1899, and 
established Ohlange Institute, openly patterned after Tuskegee. S u b -
sequently, Jabavu, then a student at the University of London, spent about 
six weeks in 1913 at Tuskegee, observing agricultural techniques, en route 
to other black institutions in the South. 
In addition, a series of annual graduation exercises, called 'African 
Rhetoricals' were organized at Tuskegee to respond to specific African 
agenda needs such as the raising of funds to support a Tuskegee Chapel 
in Liberia. T h e exercises usually featured African and Afro-American 
students at the Institute in speech and song. In the exercises of 1916, 
speeches ranged from ' T h e Development of the Cocoa Industry on the 
Gold Coast', and the 'Possibilities of the Development of Agriculture in 
49. Liberian Bulletin, 1908, pp. 64-5. 
50. Southern Letter, 1917. 
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South Africa' by A . B . X u m a , 5 ' to 'Religion and Social Life in Madagascar'. 
Pan-Africanism as an organized political movement also became an 
important linkage between colonial Africans and American blacks. In 1900, 
Henry Sylvester Williams, a Trinidadian lawyer, organized in London the 
first of a series of pan-African conferences to which delegates went from 
the United States, the Caribbean, South America and Africa. Moreover, 
Williams, admitted as an 'advocate of the Supreme Court in the colony 
of the Cape of Good H o p e ' to practise law in South Africa from 1903-4, 
participated in various African political protest activities. Williams is also 
known to have become involved in the Diamond Jubilee Celebration of 
Liberian independence, when, at the behest of President Barclay, he took 
up in 1907 the cause of N e w World emigration to Liberia. 
Unquestionably, however, it was the three Pan-African Congresses, 
following Williams' conference, convened by W . E . B . D u Bois in various 
European capitals (Paris, 1919; London, Brussels and Paris, 1921; London 
and Lisbon, 1923) which dominated the organized pan-Africanist m o v e -
ment. D u Bois himself, in turn, dominated these next three Congresses. 
H e convened the first in Paris in 1919, while in France to cover the Paris 
Peace Conference for The Crisis, to collect information for a proposed 
'History of the American Negro in T h e Great W a r ' ; and to lobby for the 
political rights of 'the Darker races living within the U . S . as well as 
throughout the rest of the world'.52 A m o n g the resolutions adopted at 
the Paris Congress in 1919 was a resolution calling for self-determination 
for Africans. 
At the second Pan-African Congress convened in 1921, D u Bois attended 
in the company of Walter White; the Afro-American artist Henry O . 
Tanner; Jessie R . Fauset, a black editorial writer for The Crisis and the 
most prolific of the Harlem Renaissance novelists; Afro-American concert 
singer Roland Hayes; and Blaise Diagne from Senegal. T h e 1923 Congress 
drew attendance from America, the Caribbean and Africa. Besides D u Bois, 
Rayford Logan and A M E Bishop Vernon of the United States, Chief 
A m o a h III of the Gold Coast and K a m b a Simango of Portuguese East 
Africa attended and helped to formulate several substantive resolutions 
plus a general call for 'the development of Africa for the benefit of 
Africans'.53 T h e Congress also called for representation on the League of 
Nations Mandates Commission, 'an institute to study the Negro problem', 
the restoration or improvement of black rights throughout the black world, 
and a freeing of Abyssinia, Haiti and Liberia from 'the grip of economic 
monopoly and usury at the hands of money-masters of the world'.54 D u 
Bois personally took the resolutions to Geneva to place them before the 
League. 
51. A . B . X u m a is the subject of a biography being prepared by the author. 
52. The Crisis, 1921, pp. 119-20. 
53. The Crisis, 1924, p. 120. 
54. ibid., p. 121. 
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Possibly because of the statement of concern for Liberia, President 
Coolidge asked D u Bois to represent the United States at the inauguration 
of the Liberian president in 1923. While in Liberia, on what was his first 
visit to Africa, D u Bois m a y have spoken out against Garvey's brand 
of emigrationist pan-Africanism, for not long afterwards the Liberians 
rejected the U N I A plan. 
However, despite sectarian criticism of himself and of the U N I A , Garvey 
became the focus of m u c h pan-Africanist interest in the United States, 
the Caribbean, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa and, most of all, 
Southern Africa between 1916 and the mid-ig30s. Indeed, by the end 
of the First World W a r , Garvey's militant newspaper, The Negro World -
under the editorship of Hubert Harrison, a Caribbean journalist living 
in N e w York - struck a responsive chord among the black masses in N e w 
York, throughout North America, and in Africa. Garvey's message to all 
was: organize, buy black, support the Black Star Steamship Line (which 
could take black emigrants to Africa and bring back raw materials), and 
help drive whites out of Africa. H e stressed that: 
W e are the descendants of a suffering people. W e are the descendants 
of a people determined to suffer no longer . . . W e do not desire what 
has belonged to others, though others have always sought to deprive 
us of that which belonged to us . . . T h e other races have countries 
of their o w n and it is time for the 400,000,000 Negroes [of the world] 
to claim Africa for themselves.55 
Whereas D u Bois was a greater pan-African force among black intellectuals 
outside Africa, and Washington was better known among rural artisan 
classes, Garvey's influence fell equally upon the submerged black masses 
of all strata both outside and inside Africa. Garvey received m u c h of his 
o w n pan-Africanist inspiration from the Egyptian intellectual, Duse 
M u h a m m a d Ali, while in England in 1912 and from reading, also in London, 
Washington's autobiography, Up From Slavery. 
Initially organized around the idea of setting up a Tuskegee-type school 
in Jamaica, Garvey's U N I A became the organizational link between large 
numbers of Africans and American blacks outside Africa, and, through 
The Negro World, achieved substantial pan-African effect within Africa. 
Between 1920 and 1938, eight U N I A conventions were held. T h e first 
five, with Garvey in charge, were held in N e w York City in August of 
each year from 1920 to 1924, the next two, following Garvey's deportation 
from the United States, took place in Jamaica in 1929 and 1934, and the 
eighth and last, in Canada, in 1938. 
Beginning with the first convention, Garvey advocated the creation of 
special schools to teach technical education to blacks in Africa and the 
Americas, the development of 'economic opportunities in agriculture, 
55. Quoted in E . D . Cronon, 1962, p. 65. 
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industry, and commerce' in order to promote commerce between blacks, 
the launching of the Black Star Steamship Line to facilitate that commerce, 
and the establishment of a daily newspaper 'in several large cities of the 
world to shape sentiment in favour of the entire Negro race', especially 
in London, Paris, Berlin, Cape T o w n , N e w York, Washington, D C , the 
Gold Coast and the Caribbean. For Garvey the implementation of this 
programme, potentially, could unify 'every unit of the Negro race through-
out the world into one organized body'.5 6 Contemporaries felt that Garvey's 
message literally 'reverberated inside Africa' and that 'from his narrow 
vantage point in Harlem [he] became a world figure'.57 
In 1917, J. E . Casely Hayford, the Gold Coast intellectual, used the 
general impetus from Garveyism to found the National Congress of British 
West Africa, the inaugural session of which was held in Accra in March 
1920. Elsewhere, J o m o Kenyatta remembered that in 1921 'Kenya national-
ists, unable to read, would gather round a reader of The Negro World, 
and listen to an article 2 or 3 times . . . [and] then . . . run various ways 
through the forest, carefully to repeat the whole story... to Africans hungry 
for some doctrine which lifted them from the servile consciousness in which 
Africa lived'.58 Garvey himself wrote editorials and long articles for The 
Negro World, as it secured a readership m u c h larger than its actual circula-
tion of about 200000. 
In Nyasaland, the establishment of auxiliaries of the U N I A was resisted 
by colonial authorities as well as some African leaders, such as Clements 
Kadalie, founder of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. 5 9 
Notwithstanding the socialist Kadalie's apparent opposition to the 'Africa 
for the Africans' posture of the U N I A , Garvey possibly directly contacted 
African students, including Nyasalanders, then studying in the United 
States. Consequently, the British Colonial Office conducted an intensive 
investigation of Nyasaland students, for example the activities of D r D . S. 
Malekebu as a medical student in the 1920s at the black Meharry Medical 
College. Moreover, upon his return to Africa, Malekebu initially was denied 
entry to Nyasaland and therefore went for a time to Liberia. In part, fear 
of a re-emergence of the revolutionary spectre of John Chilembwe caused 
British colonial authorities to reject a proposed 'tour of Nyasaland and 
other areas of East Africa by Garvey and some of his associates' in the 
1920s. Because of the possibility that Garvey's influence might spread via 
more informal means, such as the return of migrant workers from South 
Africa60 and his vaunted newspaper, the authorities effectively banned The 
Negro World by 1922. Authorities m a y have felt particularly provoked 
because of such articles in the paper as a later one referring to K a m u z u 
56. A . C . Hill and M . Kilson (eds), 1971, p. 241. 
57. J. H . Clarke, 1964, p. 15. 
58. C . L . R . James, 1963, p. 396. 
59. S. W . Johns in R . I. Rotberg and A . A . Mazrui (eds), 1970. 
60. For references to South African branches of the U N I A , see The Negro World, 1927. 
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Banda, then a recent graduate of the University of Chicago, as 'heir 
apparent to the chieftaincy of 25 000 African natives in Nyasaland'.61 
Garvey's widow, A m y Jacques Garvey, has explained h o w meanwhile 
Garvey's influence truly travelled in mysterious ways: ' F r o m other parts 
of Africa, [besides Liberia] both Seamen and Students have been indoctrin-
ated in Garveyism in England, France, and the U S A and on their return 
h o m e , quietly and secretly spread the gospel of Unity and Freedom; some 
have become leaders, others have created dedicated followers by their 
teaching and inspired faith'.62 Garvey's influence became apparent in the 
area of mission schools attended by Azikiwe. K w a m e N k r u m a h later con-
fided that no literature had m a d e a greater impact on him while a student 
in the United States than Garvey's Philosophy and Opinions (1923). 
While Garvey and D u Bois were stirring the black world politically 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century, a broadly influential 
Africa-oriented cultural efflorescence was taking place. T h e reaffirmation 
of black culture took hold in Europe, the Caribbean and West Africa, 
particularly, led by the French-language African and Caribbean students 
in Paris w h o were drawn into the Pan-African Congress movement, the 
programmes of the U N I A and the general excitement of the Harlem 
Renaissance. 
In short, the interaction between Francophone Caribbean blacks (such 
as Aimé Césaire of Martinique, whose famous poem Cahier d'un Retour 
au Pays Natal was published in 1939) and West African intellectuals (such 
as the Senegalese poet-politician Leopold Senghor) forged the négritude 
movement. Based on a belief in a c o m m o n cultural heritage among all 
African and African-descended peoples, the négritude writers tried to re-link 
the spheres of the black world. 
T h e concept oî négritude was strongly influenced by the black experience 
overseas, and by the writings and intellectual vigour of the Harlem 
Renaissance. In turn, the Renaissance movement was fuelled by a rising 
cultural identification with Africa. Countee Cullen wondered poetically 
'What is Africa to M e ? ' in his poem called 'Heritage', while Langston 
Hughes in his poem 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers' mentions h o w he built 
his hut near the Congo and it lulled him to sleep.63 Both greatly influenced 
Senghor and the négritude writers. 
But it was another Jamaican, Claude M c K a y , whose poetry helped to 
unify cultural and political pan-Africanism, when he insisted through the 
vehicle of his poetry that blacks should acknowledge, and protest against 
their c o m m o n suffering and assert their dignity. Particularly telling was 
a defiant M c K a y poem, later used without credit by Winston Churchill 
during the Battle of Britain, called 'If W e Must Die'. M c K a y , like Garvey 
and thousands of African students, began his sojourn in the United States 
61. The Negro World, 1932, p. 8. 
62. A . J. Garvey, 1963, p. 258. 
63. Quoted in C . H . Rollins, 1970, p. 19. 
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because of an interest in Tuskegee, but soon left and joined the millions 
of blacks w h o turned up in N e w York in the 1920s. 
Occasionally, colonial African interaction with black America was ex-
pressed in popular literature and thought in a symbolic form. Various 
African communities occasionally focused their millennial dreams of 
deliverance from colonial subjugation on American black populations. For 
example, in the millennial penumbra surrounding the disastrous Xhosa 
cattle sacrifice of the mid-nineteenth century, Africans widely believed 
that traditional lands and property and relatives would be returned via 
black intervention from across the seas. Again in 1910, during the time 
of the formation of the Union of South Africa, newspaper accounts told 
of an African bishop n a m e d Msiqinya w h o claimed to be a messiah from 
black America. T h e theme was repeated in 1921 w h e n Enoch Mjigima, 
a Garveyite and leader of a group calling itself the Black Israelites, 
established contact with the Afro-American Church of G o d and Saints 
of Christ during the Bulhoek rebellion and in the Wellington prophecy 
(see Chapter 27). Mjigima at the time had corresponded with Garvey and 
wished to set up a branch of the U N I A in South Africa. 
O n e of two lurid, fictionalized versions of the Afro-American millennial 
theme in the early twentieth century was a novel called Préster John (1910). 
Written by a white m a n , the novel portrayed an overseas-educated African 
clergyman leading an enormous revolt against the whites. It created an 
immediate sensation in Southern Africa. For some, it was the blueprint 
followed by Chilembwe in the Nyasaland Revolt five years later. A second 
novel entitled Bayete! appeared in 1923 and dramatized the prospect of 
Afro-American influences in Southern Africa, playing upon the fear of 
Afro-American influences held by South African whites. 
Amidst the scare over the two prophetic movements (Msiqinya and 
Mjigima/Wellington) and the two millennial novels (Préster John and 
Bayete!) came two apparent reifications of the Afro-American messianic 
theme in the form of the emergence of the Garvey movement and the 
Phelps-Stokes visit to Southern Africa of James Aggrey. Although he was 
a Fante from the Gold Coast, Aggrey was widely perceived as the advance 
guard of the black invasion emphasized so strongly in African, Cape 
Coloured, and white oral traditions. A contemporary account validated 
the popular beliefs: 
T o understand the fervid reception accorded to Aggrey in the Transkei 
and the effectiveness of his speeches over, at least, m a n y minds, it 
is necessary to remember that there, as elsewhere on the African con-
tinent, a number of inhabitants were looking to America for re-
demption from their troubles. Aggrey was supposed by some to be 
the herald of an invading band of Negroes - they thought all Americans 
were Negroes - w h o would drive the Whites of South Africa into 
the sea.64 
64. E. Smith, 1929, p. 181. 
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In short, Aggrey's appearance seemingly dovetailed with Garvey's boast 
of resettling millions of American blacks in Africa and defeating colonial-
ism there, and thereby, kindled long-standing hopes and fears. 
During the period under consideration a few black Brazilians in Brazil 
were actively involved in the struggle to secure the emancipation of slaves 
(i888).6S These included Luis da G a m a (1830-85), André Reboucas (1838-
98) and José do Patrocinio (1853-1905). A m o n g studies relating to the 
African contribution in Brazil, mention should be m a d e of the work by 
Manuel Raimundo Querino (1851-1923) w h o lived in Sào Salvador da 
Bahía and whose m a n y publications included O Africano como colonizador 
e costumes africanos no Brasil. Solano Trinidade (1908-73)66 brought the 
concept of pan-Africanism and négritude into Brazilian poetry. Mention 
can also be made of the role of the Afro-Brazilian press, with the launching 
of the newspaper O Menelick in 1915, in Sao Paulo, and m a n y others, 
such as Getulino (1923-26) in Campinas, O Clarim da Alvorada (1924-32) 
in Sào Paulo, founded by José Correia Leite and Jayme de Aguiar, and, 
later, A Voz da Raca (1933-7), t n e organ of a political movement known 
as the Negro-Brazilian Front. 
T h e persistence and transformation of African cultural 
values in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Several authors67 draw attention to the African presence in American and 
the Caribbean countries, which they assess in terms of the percentage of 
descendants of Africans in the total population of each country. Three 
main groups can be identified on the basis of this criterion. 
T h e first group consists of countries where the majority of the population 
is black. This is true of Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados, 
for example. T h e second group comprises countries where the proportion 
of the population of African origin is insignificant in demographic terms. 
This is the case in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, among 
others. T h e third group includes Brazil and Cuba, where blacks have played 
a key role in the economy,6 8 have exercised considerable cultural influence, 
and where the ethnic configuration is largely the result of cross-breeding. 
Finally, mention should be m a d e of two other groups of countries. T h e 
first consists of countries such as Colombia, Panama and Nicaragua, which 
contain small, somewhat tightly-knit population groups of African origin. 
T h e second group consists of those countries which have groups of African 
origin which have not undergone an integration process in the N e w World, 
such as Surinam where the Bonis, the Djukas, the Saramacas and the Akwas 
65. D . B . Porter, 1978; S. M . Couceiro, 1974; H . L . Alves, 1976. 
66. M . Andrade, 1959, pp. 97-9. 
67. For example, L . B . Rout Jr, 1976. 
68. J. H . Rodrigues, 1964, Vol. I, p. 51. 
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are found, and Jamaica, Santo D o m i n g o and even Haiti and Cuba , the 
h o m e of the maroons. Living in the forest, groups in Suriname and in French 
Guiana have retained more or less intact their fundamental cultural values 
and a certain social organization. T h e maroons were communities of run-
away slaves w h o took refuge in the mountains of those countries, thus 
cutting themselves off from contact with the colonizers. At least a good 
portion of these communities succeeded in maintaining themselves isolated 
from the former colonizers. Later on, in Suriname, French Guiana and, 
to a certain extent, in Jamaica, they held themselves aloof from what could 
be called the 'national community'. 
F r o m the demographic standpoint, the composition of the population 
of each country should be carefully checked with reference to three main 
groups: the population of African origin, that of European origin and, lastly, 
that of local origin — the 'Amerindians'. T h e demographic survival of each 
group as such and the result of cross-breeding between several different 
groups, as the case m a y be, should also be considered. 
T h e distribution of each group by social category, regardless of other 
indicators such as schooling, should then be studied, and this will provide 
a basis for analysing changes in the position of the population of African 
origin. This approach was used by Octavio Ianni and Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso69 to study the process by which former slaves entered the free 
labour market and, subsequently, their integration into the urban economy. 
This type of analysis makes it possible to evaluate the extent to which 
the population of African origin is integrated in the economic systems and 
societies of South America. However, it leaves on one side the continuing 
prestige of African cultural values in the N e w World, although of course 
one m a y hold the view that this can only be measured by using a racial 
criterion or that it is not an important variable. 
Here there are two conflicting schools of thought. T h e position taken 
by M . J. Herskovits70 regarding the 'reinterpretation' of African culture 
as reflected in continuing cultural elements, provoked the black North 
American sociologist, E . Franklin Frazier7 ' to draw attention to the central 
problem of integration in society as a whole. A s Frazier saw it, Herskovits' 
theory could lead to the conclusion that the persistence of African cultural 
values might be regarded as evidence supporting the racialist argument 
that blacks cannot be assimilated. In the United States, on account of 
various factors including the work of the Protestant churches, the former 
slaves lost most of their traditional African cultural values and became 
part of the Anglo-Saxon cultural world. 
T h e parallel between North America and South America and the 
Caribbean in terms of the African presence and particularly of African 
cultural values is not conclusive, for the situations were very different in 
69. O . Ianni, 1962; F . H . Cardoso, 1962. 
70. M . J. Herskovits, 1941, 1948, 1966(a), 1966(b), 1966(c). 
71. E . F . Frazier, 1949. 
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view of the different ways in which the former slaves became 'integrated' 
in those regions, even from one country to another. 
F r o m the cultural standpoint, whereas in the United States conversion 
to the Protestant religion led to the forsaking of cultural traditions and 
to the emergence of a n e w outlook, in Latin America and the Caribbean 
African cultural values persisted to varying degrees or underwent a process 
of transformation. 
Methodologically, two forms of presence should be distinguished: the 
cultural presence of Africa and the Negro presence in the physical sense. 
Evidence m a y be found of either form of presence, or of both simul-
taneously, depending on the situation and the type of colonial process 
involved. 
T h e problem of colour distinctions arises in different ways, for, according 
to Roger Bastide, 'whether the colour line is institutionalized, as in the 
United States, or not, the result is the same. T h e Blacks live or tend to 
live in a separate world, in a world apart. T h e y feel "different" from others 
and they are forced - or prefer (the reasons matter less to us than the 
consequences) - to "keep themselves to themselves'".72 
Historical analysis reveals that, through the years, rather than the 
dichotomy between 'African culture' and 'black culture' being accentuated, 
as the result of a series of social changes, what occurred was cultural trans-
formation in varying degrees according to the situation. In Haiti, for 
example, where the black population is in the majority, a characteristically 
African religion was influenced by the structural realities of Haitian society 
and the role of the half-castes, and underwent a series of changes set in 
motion by n e w 'gods' that met the requirements of the n e w situation. In 
the neighbouring islands, as a result of Protestant mission work, a 'black 
culture' had already taken shape in various movements such as that of 
the Rastafarians (a Messianic wave of reaction against the white overlord 
in which African imagery was thinly veiled, Haile Sellassie being cast as 
Messiah). O n the other hand, in Jamaica, with the Sasabonsan cult, of 
Asante origin, elements of 'African culture' persisted during that historical 
period, subsequently vanishing to give w a y to spirit-based cults involving 
a large dose of magic, as was the case in 1894 of the 'Jamaica Baptist 
Free Church', a sect founded by Bed ward. 
In those parts of the Americas exposed to the teachings of Catholicism, 
a form of syncretism based on the co-existence of European and African 
cultural features arose. In such situations being a Catholic did not involve 
radical changes as was the case in situations where Protestantism was 
dominant. 
A feature of this syncretism was observance of Catholic feast days and 
saints' days, together with recourse to the orixas and to voodoo. T h u s , 
the feast days of the gods coincided with the dates of the Catholic saints' 
72. R. Bastide, 1967, p. 199. 
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days. Bastide asserts that syncretism is no more than a white mask for 
Negro gods. T h e values of the two religions interpenetrate in varying 
degrees. In Brazil, for instance, a series of Catholic sacraments, such as 
baptism, are repeated not only for ritualistic purposes but also to give the 
individual additional strength. This acculturation of values of European 
origin marks even the forms closest to the African sources, such as 
candomblé, macumba and other cults, some of which are close to, or even 
characterized by, magic. In the case oimacumba, attention should be drawn 
to the presence of Amerindian values, the acculturation here being of a 
threefold variety. 
Examples of syncretism involving Amerindian culture can be seen in 
the West Indies, particularly in Honduras, where a mestizo people has 
emerged as the result of interbreeding between Amerindian w o m e n and 
Africans referred to as black Caribs.73 These Africans were the descendants 
of the Igbo and Efik and, subsequently, of the Fante, Asante, F o n and 
Congo. 
T h e 'African societies' gradually turned into 'black societies', varying 
in the strength of their connection with Africa and in their integration 
in society as a whole, in the sense of gaining full citizenship. 
F r o m the social standpoint, integration in society as a whole was keyed 
to the following variables: the type of society of the white colonizer; the 
form of land exploration; the religion of the colonizer - Protestant or 
Catholic; the percentage of Amerindians in the population and the degree 
of integration in the economic process imposed by the regime of the 
colonizer, either during the colonial period proper or following the attain-
ment of independence by the Americas. 
T h e forms of resistance already noted during the colonial period, w h e n 
small numbers of fugitive slaves including half-castes banded together and 
attempted to live outside the system imposed by the colonizer, emerged 
in the late eighteenth century. These groups maintained the values typical 
of African societies. T h e isolation or integration of these 'runaways' in 
terms of the national society varied in the nineteenth century with the 
degree of development of the country concerned and with the stage reached 
in the socio-economic evolution from a world characterized by the rural 
values of an economy centred on plantations, farms and sugar mills to 
forms more closely resembling the type of economy existing at the end 
of the century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
T h e integration of blacks into rural society varied according to the re-
quirements of agriculture, the shortage or availability of labour and the 
size of the contingents of migrants from Europe, some of these contingents 
arriving for the express purpose of finding work within the labour system, 
as in Brazil in the coffee plantations. This integration is revealed in a variety 
of ways, encompassing the songs of African religious groups in Cuba and 
73. R . Coelho, 1964. 
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Brazil, the r h y t h m of African instruments74 which were effectively incor-
porated in the musical culture, the art of African cooking, the utilization 
of certain African techniques as, for example, in Haiti, the use of agricultural 
implements such as the hoe a m o n g others, and the transmission of religious 
values and philosophies of life. Despite the break imposed by the practice 
of slavery, African culture survived and, w h a t is m o r e , created a n e w 
culture. 
Conclusions 
W h a t were the effects of colonial African and American black interaction? 
O n l y African populations of certain regions were initially involved in inter-
action with A m e r i c a n and Caribbean blacks. T h o s e regions involved early 
in our period were the ones which b e c a m e the focus of Amer ican black 
emigration or evangelism, particularly W e s t Africa, South Africa, and the 
H o r n . Peoples of other regions b e c a m e involved because of the penetration 
of their region by pan-Africanist projects, Amer ican black writings, folk-
lore, and the like, or m o r e importantly, because of the initiatives of school 
leavers w h o went , in growing n u m b e r s from all over the African continent, 
to America for higher education. 
Perspectives were undoubtedly affected b y direct and substantial inter-
action of Africans within a particular black environment or set of influences. 
Exactly h o w m u c h is anybody's guess. T h e effect of colonial African 
experience with Amer ican blacks appears, nevertheless, unique and vital 
in terms of subsequent social and political activities. For s o m e , the American 
black c o m p o n e n t within African nationalist ideology and strategies 
emerging during the colonial period was striking and unequivocal. In the 
view of others, for example s o m e African students, interactions within 
American black arenas were disappointing a n d unrewarding. T h e caustic 
assessment of one such visitor illustrates the latter point: ' O n e of the things 
I had decided to find out during m y stay in America w a s the condition 
of the descendants of former slaves brought here from Africa . . . I feel 
safe in saying that, so far as economic and material progress are concerned 
the Negro in America is on the average ahead of the W e s t African, but 
w h e n it c o m e s to integrity and genuine m a n h o o d , the Amer ican N e g r o 
is far below h i m . ' 7 5 
Another view w a s that m a n y Afro-American missionaries w h o viewed 
Africans as 'poor heathen savages' must bear s o m e of the responsibility 
for perpetuating a distorted and pernicious picture of Africa and Africans 
in the minds of their fellow American blacks. In other words , in their 
sedulous campaign to recruit Amer ican black workers for foreign missions, 
missionary churches undoubtedly s u c c u m b e d occasionally to the tempta-
74. F. Ortiz, 1950. 
75. A . E . Ani-Okokon, 1927, p. 10. 
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tion of portraying an exotic, erotic and socially inferior Africa m u c h in 
need of great sacrifice, hard work, and alien redemption. 
In broad pan-Africanist terms, however, the evidence seems clear that 
African political and ideological visions were expanded and technical 
expertise was improved because of colonial African interactions with 
American blacks. T h e much-heralded black emigration schemes trumpeted 
by Garvey, whose ubiquitous publications reached deep into Africa, were 
only one example of a leitmotif which brought American blacks within 
the world view of African peoples. T h e themes of African redemption 
through American black missionaries were another. 
Africans themselves, however, created the context of their next 
interaction with American blacks as they matriculated at American, largely 
Afro-American, schools and attended pan-African conferences and the 
like. Consequently, m a n y Africans underwent a technical-educational-
political experience alien to their colonial world. W h e n they re-entered their 
o w n worlds, m a n y felt driven to resolve questions of ideology, cultural 
definition, educational values, political power, and pan-African unity or 
consciousness, guided by n e w perspectives. 
Viewed against such an historical backdrop, the numerous pan-African 
conferences, Tuskegean educational and technical projects, the négritude 
movement and the occasional focus on American blacks in African millen-
nial dreams, all illustrate the consistency of the pan-African theme among 
American and Caribbean blacks. They also show the variability of African 
responses to the N e w World overtures and ultimately the shaping by 
Africans themselves of these overtures to fit African specifications. 
In s u m , the populations of the African diaspora and the motive charac-
terizing the m a n y interactions between persons of the first and second 
black worlds included two visions. O n e was a vision of the union of religious 
forces a m o n g black populations in Africa and America or the reconstruction 
of Africa through importation of American and Antillean black technical 
expertise, initiated at the behest of American blacks. Another reflected 
the transformation of Africans from predicate to subject during the colonial 
period. T h e latter was a vision of the spiritual redemption, social recon-
struction, and political reformation of African communities through the 
repatriation of African personnel and the energizing of African resources. 
Because of this vision, Africans had been educated in American schools, 
or sent to participate in technical and commercial activities; others were 
touched by American black writings or by anti-colonial ventures organized 
a m o n g blacks of the diaspora. This latter vision seemed not so m u c h to 
discard as simply to vindicate and to reorientate to an African perspective 
the idealism implied in the earlier vision. 
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A. A D U B O A H E N 
B y 1935, as is evident from the earlier chapters of this volume, colonialism 
had been firmly fastened on Africa like a steel grid, and it looked as if 
it was going to remain there forever. However, colonialism proved just 
as ephemeral as any other institution created and maintained by force. 
Within a matter of only some forty-five years from 1935, the colonial system 
had been uprooted from over 90% of Africa and confined only to that 
part of the continent south of the L i m p o p o River. That is to say, colonial-
ism lasted in most parts of Africa for under a hundred years, indeed from 
the 1880s to the 1960s. In the history of a people and a whole continent, 
this is a very brief span indeed. H o w and w h y this incredible feat of the 
uprooting of colonialism was accomplished, or, to quote the words of 
Margery Perham, w h y this 'astonishingly rapid emancipation since 1950' ' 
form two of the main themes of the concluding volume of this History. 
In the concluding chapter of this volume, however, w e would like to address 
ourselves to two main questions. First, what legacies did colonialism 
bequeath to Africa, or what impact did it make on Africa? T h e second 
question is, in view of this impact or balance sheet, what is the significance 
of colonialism for Africa? Does it constitute a revolutionary or important 
episode in the history of the continent? W a s it a major break with the 
past of the continent, or was it, after all, a mere passing event which did 
not constitute a break in the history of the continent? O r as L . H . G a n n 
and Peter Duignan have posed the same question, what is 'the place of 
the colonial era within the wider context of African history'?2 
The colonial impact 
Probably nothing has become as controversial a subject as the impact of 
colonialism on Africa. T o some writers on Africa such as G a n n , Duignan, 
Perham and P. C . Lloyd, its impact was on balance either a blessing or 
at worst not harmful for Africa. 
1. M . Perham, 1961, p. 24. 
2. 'Epilogue' în L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1970, p. 526. 
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Lloyd, for instance, has no hesitation about the beneficial nature of the 
colonial impact. 'It is easy to cavil today,' he states: 
at the slow rate of economic development during the half-century* 
of colonial rule . . . Nevertheless, the difference between the condition 
of African society at the end of the nineteenth century and at the 
end of the Second World W a r is staggering. T h e colonial powers 
provided the infrastructure on which progress in the 'independence' 
period has depended: a fairly efficient administrative machine, reach-
ing d o w n to villages in the most remote areas; a network of roads 
and railways; and basic services in health and education. West African 
exports of primary products brought considerable wealth to the 
people.3 
In her Reith Lectures in 1961, Margery Perham also argued: that, ' T h e 
critics of colonialism are mainly interested in to-day and to-morrow but 
w e must remind them that our vanishing empire has left behind it a large 
heritage of history which is loaded with bequests good, bad and indifferent. 
This neither they nor w e can easily discard.'4 It is interesting to note that 
another English historian, D . K . Fieldhouse, has arrived at the same con-
clusion in a book published as recently as 1981: 'It would thus appear 
that colonialism deserves neither the praise nor the blame it has often 
been given for, if it did relatively little to overcome the causes of poverty 
in the colonies, neither did it make them poor for the first time. Empire 
had very significant economic effects, some good, some bad . . .'5 
Finally, G a n n and Duignan, w h o have devoted themselves virtually to 
the defence of colonialism in Africa, concluded in 1967 that 'the imperial 
system stands out as one of the most powerful engines for cultural diffusion 
in the history of Africa; its credit balance by far outweighs its debit 
account'.6 A n d in their introduction to the first volume of the five-volume 
work entitled Colonialism in Africa which they jointly edited, they again 
concluded: ' W e do not share the widely-held assumption that equates 
colonialism with exploitation . . . W e accordingly interpret European im-
perialism in Africa as an engine of cultural transformation as well as of 
political domination.'7 
Others, mainly African, black and Marxist scholars and especially the 
development and underdevelopment theorists, have contended that the 
beneficial effect of colonialism in Africa was virtually nil. T h e black 
Guyanese historian, Walter Rodney, has taken a particularly extreme 
position. A s he contends: ' T h e argument suggests that, on the one hand, 
there was exploitation and oppression, but, on the other hand, colonial 
3. P. C . Lloyd, 1972, pp. 80-1. 
4. M . Perham, 1961, p. 24. 
5. D . K . Fieldhouse, 1981, p. 105. 
6. L . H . Gann and P. Duignan, 1967, p. 382. 
7. 'Introduction' in L . H . Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 1969, pp. 22, 23. 
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governments did m u c h for the benefit of Africans and they developed 
Africa. It is our contention that this is completely false. Colonialism had 
only one hand - it was a one-armed bandit.'8 
Such are the two main opposing assessments of colonialism in Africa. 
F r o m the available evidence, however, it would appear that a m u c h more 
balanced assessment is necessary and this is what is attempted here. A s 
will be shown below, the impact of colonialism was positive as well as 
negative. However, it should be emphasized right from the beginning that 
most of the positive effects were not deliberately calculated. They were, 
by and large, rather accidental by-products of activities or measures 
intended to promote the interests of the colonizers, as M . H . Y . Kaniki 
and A . E . Afigbo have pointed out above (Chapters 16 and 19), or were 
the outcome of changes which were inherent in the colonial system itself; 
or, to borrow Ali Mazrui's phrase, the positive effects were 'by default, 
by the iron law of unintended consequences'.9 O n the negative side, it 
should also be pointed out that there could indeed be reasons, good, bad 
or indifferent, w h y certain things were not done - for instance, w h y , as 
Fieldhouse has striven hard to show, forced labour was used, industrial-
ization was not promoted, agriculture was not diversified or w h y medical 
services were inadequate,10 but from the point of view of the colonized 
African, they were negative effects all the same. Let us begin, then, by 
drawing up the balance sheet in the political field beginning first with 
the positive and then the negative aspects. 
T h e impact in the political field 
T h e first positive political impact was the establishment of a greater degree 
of continuous peace and stability following the consolidation of colonialism 
in Africa than before. T h e nineteenth century, as seen already, was the 
century of the Mfecane and the activities of the Swahili-Arab and Nyamwez i 
traders such as Tippu Tip and Msiri in Central and Southern Africa, of 
the Fulani djihäds and the rise of the Tukulor and Mandingo empires 
in the Western Sudan, of the disintegration of the O y o and Asante empires 
in West Africa; and all this caused a great deal of instability and in-
security. But, then, conditions in Europe during the same period were 
not so very different either. This was the period of the Napoleonic wars, 
the 'intellectual' revolutions, the G e r m a n and Italian wars of unification, 
the Polish and Hungarian uprisings and the imperial rivalries culminating 
in the First World W a r . In Africa, while it should be admitted that the 
first two or three decades of the colonial era, that is from 1880 to the 
1910s even intensified this state of instability, violence and disorder and, 
as Caldwell has shown, caused wholesale and unpardonable destruction 
8. W . Rodney, 1972, p. 223. 
9. A . A . Mazrui, 1980, p. 41. 
10. D . K . Fieldhouse, 1981, pp. 67-8, 71-4, 88-92. 
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and loss of population - the population of Belgian C o n g o was reduced 
by half during the first forty years of colonial rule, the Herero by four-fifths, 
the N a m o by half and that of Libya by 750 ooo 1 1 - not even the anti-
colonial and Marxist schools would deny the fact that after the colonial 
occupation and the establishment of various administrative machineries, 
such wars of expansion and liberation came to an end, and most parts 
of Africa especially from the end of the First World W a r onwards enjoyed 
a great degree of continuous peace and security. Such conditions were 
definite assets since they greatly facilitated normal economic activities and 
social and physical mobility in each colony, which greatly accelerated the 
pace of modernization through the diffusion of n e w ideas, n e w techniques, 
n e w tastes and n e w fashions. 
T h e second positive political impact is the very geo-political appearance 
of the modern independent states of Africa. T h e colonial partition and 
conquest definitely resulted, as A . E . Afigbo has pointed out above (Chapter 
19), in a revolutionary reshaping of the political face of Africa. In place 
of the hundreds of independent clan and lineage groups, city-states, king-
d o m s and empires, without any clearly marked boundaries, were n o w 
established fifty n e w states with, in most cases, fixed boundaries, and it 
is rather significant that the boundaries of the states as laid d o w n during 
the colonial era have not undergone any changes since independence. 
Thirdly, the colonial system also introduced into most parts of Africa 
two n e w institutions which again rather significantly have been maintained 
since independence, namely, a n e w judicial system and a n e w bureaucracy 
or civil service. There is no doubt that in practically all the independent 
states except the M u s l i m ones, the higher courts of judicature introduced 
by the colonial rulers have been retained; in the former British colonies 
not only in form (including, despite the climate, even the wigs and gowns), 
but also in content and ethos. 
T h e machineries introduced for the administration of the colonies also 
steadily led, though in m a n y areas rather belatedly, to the emergence of 
a civil service whose membership and influence increased with the years. 
T h e importance of this particular legacy varied from one colonial system 
to the other. There is no doubt that the British bequeathed a better trained, 
numerically larger and more experienced bureaucracy to her colonies than 
the French, while the record of the Belgians and the Portuguese is the 
worst in this respect. 
T h e final positive impact of colonialism was the birth not only of a 
n e w type of African nationalism, but also of pan-Africanism. T h e former, 
as w e have seen, was the fostering of a sense of identity and consciousness 
a m o n g the various classes or ethnic groups inhabiting each of the n e w 
states, or, as in the French West African colonies, a cluster of them; while 
the latter was a sense of identity of black m e n the world over. T h e vehicles 
for the articulation of the former were, as B . O . Oloruntimehin has shown 
11. B. Davidson, 1964(b), p. 37; 1978(b), p. 150. 
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above (Chapter 22), various movements, political parties, youth leagues 
and associations, religious sects and newspapers, while those of the latter 
were the various Pan-African Congresses discussed by R . D . Ralston above 
(Chapter 29). But important as this legacy was, it is a typical example 
of the accidental by-products rather than deliberate creations of the colonial 
presence. N o colonial ruler ever set out to create and nurture African 
nationalism. 
But if there were positive effects, even greater were the negative ones. 
In the first place, important as the development of nationalism was, not 
only was it an accidental by-product, but it was not the result of a positive 
feeling of identity with or commitment or loyalty to the new nation-state, 
but a negative one generated by a sense of anger, frustration and humiliation 
caused by some of the oppressive, discriminatory, humiliating and exploi-
tative measures introduced by the colonial rulers. With the overthrow of 
colonialism, then, that feeling was bound to lose, and indeed has lost, 
its m o m e n t u m and the problem that has faced the rulers of independent 
African states has been h o w to replace this negative response with a positive 
and enduring feeling of nationalism. 
Secondly, while admitting that the new geo-political set-up that emerged 
was an asset even though an accidental one, it nevertheless created far 
more problems than it solved. T h o u g h , as both A . E . Afigbo and G . N . 
Uzoigwe have shown (Chapters 2 and 19), the boundaries of the states 
that emerged were not as arbitrary as is generally believed, there is no 
doubt that m a n y of the states that emerged were artificial creations, and 
this artificiality has created a number of problems that are bound to bedevil 
the future development of the continent. T h e first of these is the fact that 
some of these boundaries cut across pre-existing ethnic groups, states and 
kingdoms and this has caused widespread social disruption and displace-
ment. T h e Bakongo are, for instance, found divided by the boundaries 
of Angola, Belgian Congo (now Zaire), French Congo (now Congo) and 
G a b o n . Today, some of the E w e live in Ghana, some in T o g o and some 
in Benin; the Somali are shared among Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and 
Djibouti; the Senufo are found in Mali, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. 
T h e examples can be multiplied. O n e important consequence of this 
situation has been the chronic border disputes that have plagued the 
relations between some independent African states - such as those between 
Sudan and Uganda; between Somalia and Ethiopia; between Kenya and 
Somalia; between Ghana and Togo; and between Nigeria and Cameroon. 
Secondly, because of the arbitrary nature of these boundaries, each African 
nation-state is m a d e up of a medley of peoples with different cultures, 
traditions of origin and language. T h e problems of nation-building posed 
by such a medley of peoples have not proved to be easily soluble. 
Another outcome of the artificiality and arbitrariness of the colonial 
divisions was that the states that emerged were of different sizes with 
unequal natural resources and economic potentialities. While some of the 
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states that emerged from the partition are giants such as Sudan, Nigeria 
and Algeria, others were midgets like T h e Gambia , Lesotho, Togo and 
Burundi. While Sudan and Zaire have areas of 2.5 million sq k m and 
2.4 million sq k m respectively, the area of T h e Gambia is only 10350 sq k m , 
that of Lesotho 29 200 sq k m and that of Burundi 28 800 sq k m . Unfor-
tunately, there are far more states of small or m e d i u m size than the other 
way round.12 Secondly, and worse still, while some states have very long 
stretches of sea coast, others such as Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, 
Zambia, Uganda , Malawi, are landlocked. Thirdly, while some states have 
very rich natural resources such as Ghana, Zambia, Zaire, Ivory Coast 
and Nigeria, others such as Chad , Niger and Upper Volta have not been 
so fortunate. Finally, while some such as T h e Gambia , have borders with 
only one other state to police, others have four or more and Zaire as m a n y 
as ten, a situation which poses serious problems of ensuring national security 
and checking smuggling. T h e problems of development posed by the lack of 
or limited natural resources, limited fertile land and lack of access 
to the sea for those independent African states which inherited these u n -
fortunate legacies can be readily imagined. 
Another important but negative political impact of colonialism was the 
weakening of the indigenous systems of government. In the first place, 
as S. Abubakar has recently pointed out and as is evident from m a n y of 
the chapters above, most of the African states were acquired as a result 
of the conquest and deposition or exile of the then rulers which 'certainly 
brought into disrepute the whole business of chieftaincy, especially during 
the period before the First World W a r ' . 1 3 S o m e of the colonial powers, 
such as the French as w e have seen already, also abolished some of the 
traditional monarchies and ruling families altogether, appointed people as 
chiefs w h o had no right to such posts and turned all of them into admini-
strative officers. T h e British and the Belgians retained the traditional rulers 
and their institutions and even, as R . F . Betts has shown (Chapter 13), 
created some where they did not exist and tried to administer the colonies 
through them. However, the colonial officials on the spot became, in effect, 
dictators instead of advisers to these traditional rulers and used them also 
to enforce some of the measures deemed obnoxious by their subjects such 
as forced labour, direct taxes and compulsory recruitment of m e n for the 
colonial armies. This manipulation of the institution of chieftaincy resulted 
in loss of prestige and respect of the traditional rulers in the eyes of their 
subjects. T h e colonial records, as recent research into rural politics in the 
inter-war years in Ghana has shown, 1 4 are full of revolts and rebellions 
by the young m e n against their chiefs and even their destoolment. Besides, 
the colonial system of administering justice in which subjects could appeal 
to the colonial courts further weakened not only the authority but also 
12. A . A . Mazrui, 1980, p. 90. 
13. S. Abubakar in O . Ikime (ed.), 1980, p. 451. 
14. P. Jenkins (ed.), 1975. 
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the financial resources of the traditional rulers.1 s Furthermore, the spread 
of the Christian religion undermined the spiritual basis of the authority 
of the kings. In all these ways, then, the colonial system, in accordance 
with its o w n interests, at times weakened or even destroyed the traditional 
rulers and at times allied with them and used them. But in both cases, 
the colonial system finally diminished their authority. 
Another negative impact of colonialism in the political field was the 
mentality that it created a m o n g Africans that government and all public 
property belonged not to the people but rather to the white colonial rulers 
and could and should therefore be taken advantage of at the least oppor-
tunity. This mentality is evident from the Ghanaian saying that Oburoni 
ade see a, egu po mu, or, aban wotwuu no adze wonnsua no meaning that 
if the white man's property gets damaged, it should simply be d u m p e d 
into the sea, or government should be dragged on the ground rather than 
carried aloft. Both sayings imply that nobody should be concerned with 
what happens to government property. This mentality was the direct 
product of the remote and esoteric nature of the colonial administration 
and the elimination of an overwhelming majority of Africans, both educated 
and uneducated, from the decision-making process. It is important to note 
that this mentality is still with most Africans even after decades of 
independence and is part of the explanation for the reckless way in 
which government property is handled in m a n y independent African 
countries. 
A product of colonialism and one which is often ignored by most 
historians, but which has turned out to be of crucial and fundamental 
importance, was, as is evident from R . E . Betts' contribution (Chapter 13), 
a full-time or standing army. A s has been amply demonstrated, most 
traditional African states south of the Sahara did not have standing armies. 
In the whole of western Africa, it was only D a h o m e y that had a standing 
army with its unique female wing, the famous Amazons . In most cases, 
there was not a dichotomy between civilians and soldiers. Rather, all adult 
males, including even members of the ruling aristocracy, became soldiers 
in times of war and civilians in times of peace. T h u s , one of the most 
novel institutions introduced by each colonial ruler was the professional 
army. These armies were originally created, most of them in the 1880s 
and 1890s, first for the conquest and occupation of Africa, then for the 
maintenance of colonial control, and, finally, for the prosecution of global 
wars and the suppression of independence movements in Africa. After the 
overthrow of the colonial rulers, these armies were not disbanded but were 
taken over by the new independent African rulers and they have turned 
out to be the most problematic of the products of colonialism since, as 
W . Gutteridge has admitted, the armed forces have 'operated in the longer 
term against the stability of the ex-colonies'. ' 6 Indeed, as will be seen 
15. R. Addo-Fening, 1980, pp. 509-15. 
16. W . Gutteridge, 1975. 
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in the next volume, as a result of their repeated and often unnecessary 
and unjustifiable interventions in the politics of independent African states, 
those armies have become the heaviest of the millstones round the necks 
of African governments and peoples. 
T h e final and probably the most important negative impact of colonial-
ism was the loss of African sovereignty and independence and with them 
the right of Africans to shape their o w n destiny or deal directly with the 
outside world. As early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
states of Africa such as Benin and the Congo could send embassies and 
missions to the courts of European kings. Even until as late as the 1890s, 
as w e have seen already, some African states could deal with their European 
counterparts as equals. T h e Asantehene, the King of Matabeleland and 
the Queen of Madagascar sent diplomatic missions to the Queen of England 
in the 1890s. Colonialism put an end to this and thereby deprived African 
states of the opportunity of acquiring experience in the conduct of inter-
national relations and diplomacy. 
But the loss of independence and sovereignty meant far more to Africans 
than this. It meant, above all, the loss of their right to control their o w n 
destiny, plan their o w n development, manage their economy, determine 
their o w n strategies and priorities, borrow freely from the outside 
world at large the latest and most appropriate technology, and generally 
manage or even mismanage their o w n affairs and derive inspiration and 
a sense of fulfilment from their successes, and lessons and experience from 
their failures. In short, colonialism deprived Africans of one of the most 
fundamental and inalienable rights of a people, the right of liberty. 
Moreover, as Rodney has shown, the seventy-year period of colonialism 
in Africa was the very period which witnessed tremendous and decisive 
developments and changes in both the capitalist and socialist countries. 
It was that period, for instance, that saw the entry of Europe into the 
nuclear age and the age of the aeroplane and the motor vehicle. H a d Africa 
been in control of her o w n destiny, she could have benefited from or even 
been part of these phenomenal changes. But colonialism completely isolated 
and insulated her from these changes and kept her in a position of 
dependency. It is clearly in this loss of independence and sovereignty, in 
this denial of the fundamental right to liberty and in this political isolation 
imposed on Africa by colonialism that w e see another of the most pernicious 
political impacts of colonialism on Africa. 
T h e impact in the economic field 
T h e impact in the political field, then, was important though of mixed 
blessing. Equally and even more so was the impact in the economic field. 
T h e first and most obvious and profound of the positive impacts here, 
as is evident from m a n y of the chapters above, was the provision of an 
infrastructure of motor roads, railways, the telegraph, the telephone and 
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in some cases even airports. These did not exist in pre-colonial Africa 
where, as J. C . Caldwell has shown, until the colonial era, 'nearly all land 
transport was by h u m a n porterage' (Chapter 18). This basic infrastructure 
had been completed in Africa by the 1930s and not m a n y new miles of, 
say, railways have been built since then. This particular development is 
more than of economic interest since it facilitated movement not only of 
goods, new cash crops and troops but also of peoples and this latter factor 
helped to minimize parochialism, regionalism and ethnocentricism. 
Equally important and significant was the impact of colonialism on the 
primary sector of the economy. As is obvious from above, every effort 
was made to develop or exploit some of the rich natural resources of the 
continent, and this was attended by some significant successes. It was during 
the colonial period that the full mineral potential of Africa was realized 
and the mining industry definitely boomed, while the cultivation of cash 
crops such as cocoa, coffee, tobacco, groundnuts, sisal and rubber spread. 
It was certainly during the colonial period that Ghana became the world's 
leading producer of cocoa while by 1950 farm crops were accounting for 
50% of the gross domestic product of French West Africa. It should be 
emphasized, as M . H . Y . Kaniki has done above (Chapter 16), that in 
West Africa these cash crops were produced by the Africans themselves, 
clear evidence of their willingness and ability to adapt and respond to the 
right incentives. A s J. Forbes M u n r o has shown, most of these fundamental 
economic changes took place during the two decades from the mid-1890s 
to 1914 'when the infrastructural foundations of most contemporary 
national economies were laid d o w n by colonial governments and commerce 
between Africa and the rest of the world grew at an historically unprece-
dented rate'.17 
This economic revolution had some far-reaching consequences. T h e first 
one was commercialization of land which m a d e it a real asset. Before the 
colonial era, there is absolutely no doubt that huge tracts of land in m a n y 
parts of Africa were not only underpopulated but also under-utilized. T h e 
introduction and spread of cash crops and the mining industries put an 
end to all this. Indeed, such was the pace of the utilization of virgin forests 
that, in m a n y parts of Africa, the colonial administration created forest 
reserves to prevent further encroachment. Secondly, the economic revolu-
tion led to an increase in the purchasing power of some Africans and with 
it an increase in their demand for consumer goods. Thirdly, the growing 
of cash crops by Africans enabled individuals of whatever social status, 
especially in the rural areas, to acquire wealth. 
Another significant revolutionary impact of colonialism in m a n y parts 
of the continent was the introduction of the m o n e y economy. As W . Rodney 
has pointed out above (Chapter 14), every sector of the African community 
including even the pastoral groups, w h o were noted for their conservatism, 
17. J. F . Munro, 1976, p. 86. 
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had been d r a w n into the m o n e y e c o n o m y by the 1920s. 1 8 Again, the effects 
of this shift were very significant. In the first place, even b y the 1930s, 
a n e w standard of wealth had been introduced which w a s based not only 
on the n u m b e r of sheep or c o w s or y a m s one possessed but o n actual 
cash. Secondly, people were engaged in activities not for subsistence alone 
but also to earn m o n e y which, in turn, led, as will be seen later, to the 
emergence of a n e w class of w a g e earners and salaried groups. Thirdly, 
the introduction of the m o n e y e c o n o m y led to the c o m m e n c e m e n t of 
banking activities in Africa, which have b e c o m e another significant feature 
of the e c o n o m y of independent African states. 
T h e introduction of currency a n d with it banking activities a n d the 
tremendous expansion in the v o l u m e of trade between colonial Africa and 
E u r o p e in turn led to what A . G . H o p k i n s has described as the completion 
of'the integration of W e s t Africa into the e c o n o m y of the industrial world' 
through 'the creation of conditions which gave Europeans and Africans 
both the m e a n s a n d the incentive to expand and diversify legitimate c o m -
m e r c e ' . 1 9 This w a s true of the other parts of Africa also, and so b y 1935, 
the e c o n o m y of Africa had b e c o m e inextricably tied to that of the world 
in general and to that of the capitalist e c o n o m y of the colonial powers 
in particular. T h e years after 1935 merely deepened this link and not even 
independence has fundamentally altered this relationship. 
W a s the colonial impact o n Africa in the economic field, then, such 
a very enviable one? Far from it, a n d m o s t of the present-day developmental 
problems facing African countries can be traced to this. 
In the first place, as M . H . Y . Kaniki has pointed out above (Chapter 
16), the infrastructure that w a s provided b y colonialism w a s not as adequate 
nor as useful as it could have been. M o s t of the roads and railways were 
constructed not to o p e n u p the country but merely to connect the areas 
having mineral deposits and potentialities for the production of cash crops 
with the sea or, to quote Fieldhouse, 'to link internal areas of production 
to the world c o m m o d i t y market ' , 2 0 a n d there were hardly any feeder or 
branch roads. N o r were they m e a n t to facilitate inter-African travel and 
communicat ion . S u c h infrastructure as w a s provided w a s m e a n t , then, to 
facilitate the exploitation of the resources of the colonies and to link t h e m 
with the metropolitan countries but not to p r o m o t e the over all economic 
development of Africa nor to p r o m o t e inter-African contacts. In the second 
place, such economic growth as occurred in the colonies w a s based on 
the natural resources of the area a n d this m e a n t therefore that areas not 
naturally e n d o w e d were totally neglected. This led to sharp economic 
differences in the s a m e colony. T h e s e differences, in turn, accentuated 
and exacerbated regional differences and sentiments which have been a 
great imped iment in the w a y of nation-building in independent Africa. 
18. See Chapter 14 above. 
19. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 235. 
20. D . K . Fieldhouse, 1981, p. 67. 
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A s an eminent economist has pointed out, 'tribal differences might dis-
appear easily in the m o d e r n world if all tribes were equal economically. 
W h e r e they are vastly unequal, tribal difference is called in to add protection 
to economic interest.'21 
Thirdly, a typical feature of the colonial e c o n o m y w a s the total and 
deliberate negligence or discouragement of industrialization and the pro-
cessing of locally produced raw materials and agricultural products in most 
of the colonies. A s Fieldhouse has pointed out, 'Probably n o colonial 
government had a department of industry before 1945' . 2 2 Simple and basic 
items such as matches, candles, cigarettes, edible oil, even lime and orange 
juice all of which could easily have been produced in Africa were imported. 
All African states were, therefore, in accordance with the workings of the 
colonial capitalist e c o n o m y , turned into markets for the consumption of 
manufactured goods from the metropolitan countries and producers of raw 
materials for export. It is this total neglect of industrialization by the 
colonial powers and their mercantile and mining companies which should 
be chalked u p as one of the most unpardonable indictments against colonial-
ism. It also provides the strongest justification for the view that the colonial 
period was the era of the economic exploitation rather than the development 
of Africa. O n e of the important effects of this neglect of industrialization 
w a s that, to a greater extent even than in the political field, few Africans 
were trained to take over from the Europeans. 
Fourthly, not only was industrialization neglected but such industries 
and crafts as had existed in Africa in pre-colonial times were almost 
destroyed. It should be emphasized that Africa's pre-colonial industries 
produced all that Africans needed including building materials, soap, beads, 
iron tools, pottery and above all cloth. H a d these manufacturers been 
encouraged and promoted through the modernization of productive 
techniques, as w a s done in India between 1920 and 1 9 4 5 , " Africa could 
not only have increased her output but could have steadily improved her 
technology. But these crafts and industries were all virtually killed as a 
result of the importation of cheap commodities produced o n a m a s s basis 
into Africa. African technological development w a s thereby halted and was 
never resumed until after independence. 
Fifthly, even though agricultural crops c a m e to constitute the m a i n source 
of income for mos t African states, no attempts were m a d e to diversify 
the agricultural e c o n o m y of the colonies. O n the contrary, as has been 
s h o w n in s o m e of the earlier chapters, by 1935, the production of only 
single or at best two cash crops had b e c o m e the rule - cocoa in the G o l d 
Coast, groundnuts in Senegal and T h e G a m b i a , cotton in S u d a n , coffee 
and cotton in U g a n d a , coffee and sisal in Tanganyika, etc. T h e period 
after the Second W o r l d W a r did not see any improvement in this area 
21. W . A . Lewis,' 1965, pp. 24-5. 
22. D . K . Fieldhouse, 1981, p. 68. 
23. ibid., pp. 92-5. 
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hence mos t African states, o n the attainment of independence, found t h e m -
selves saddled with m o n o c r o p economies and were therefore highly sensitive 
to the prevailing international trade conditions. Colonialism did indeed 
complete the integration of African economies into the world international 
economic order but in a very disadvantageous and exploitative m a n n e r and 
this has not been altered ever since. 
T h e heavy reliance on cash crops h a d another disastrous effect, which 
w a s the negligence of the internal sector of the e c o n o m y of Africa. T h e 
e c o n o m y of Africa had always been divided, as M . H . Y . Kaniki has pointed 
out above (Chapter 16), into t w o major sectors - the internal sector which 
produced both for the subsistence of producers and for the h o m e market 
a n d the export sector which catered for the long-distance and caravan trade. 
Both sectors were given equal emphasis in pre-colonial times with the result 
that neither food nor fish w a s imported to feed anyone. H o w e v e r , because 
of the concentration on the production of cash crops during the colonial 
era, the internal sector w a s virtually neglected and Africans were in fact 
compelled to ignore the production of food for their o w n consumption 
in favour of the production of cash crops for export even w h e r e , as Field-
house has observed, it w a s u n e c o n o m i c to d o so.2 4 F o o d therefore had 
to be imported which the ordinary people had to b u y , usually at high 
prices, to feed themselves. Th i s , for instance, w a s what h a p p e n e d in T h e 
G a m b i a w h e r e the G a m b i a n s were m a d e to a b a n d o n the cultivation of 
rice in favour of the production of groundnuts, and rice therefore had 
to be imported. 2 5 In G u i n e a , Africans in the Futa Jallon area were c o m -
pelled to produce rubber w h i c h led to a shortage of rice in 1911. Rice 
therefore h a d to be imported and bought with the m o n e y earned from 
rubber. E g y p t , which for centuries exported grains a n d foodstuffs, 
w a s compelled to import maize and wheat from the beginning of the 
twentieth century onwards owing to her excessive concentration on the 
production of cotton for export. T h e s a m e thing happened in the G o l d 
Coast w h e r e cocoa production w a s so m u c h emphasized that foodstuffs 
had to be imported. This is evident from the lament of A . W . Cardinall, 
one of the sympathetic colonial officials in the 1930s, that the country 
could have itself produced half 'the fresh fish, rice, maize, a n d other meal , 
beans, salted and fresh m e a t , edible oils, spices and fresh vegetables 
[imported], or in other w o r d s w o u l d have saved 2 0 0 0 0 0 p o u n d s ' . 2 6 It w a s 
this neglect of food production coupled with forced labour w h i c h caused 
so m u c h malnutrition, severe famine a n d epidemics in s o m e parts of Africa 
during the early colonial days, especially in the areas of French Africa, 
as C . Coquery-Vidrovitch has pointed out above (Chapter 15). T h u s , 
under the colonial system, Africans were in mos t cases m a d e to produce 
w h a t they did not c o n s u m e and to c o n s u m e w h a t they did not produce, 
24. ibid., p. 88. 
25. W . Rodney, 1972, pp. 257-8. 
26. Quoted by M . Crowder, 1968, p. 348. 
793 
Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-jgjS 
clear evidence of the lopsided and exploitive nature of the colonial economy. 
In those parts of Africa where Africans were not allowed to grow cash 
crops such as Kenya and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) , as Colin 
Leys has shown, 'within the space of a generation they had effectively 
been converted from independent peasants, producing cash crops for the 
n e w markets, into peasants dependent on agricultural wage-labour'.27 
Sixthly, the commercialization of land already referred to led to the illegal 
sale of communal lands by unscrupulous family-heads and to increasing 
litigation over land which caused widespread poverty especially among the 
ruling houses. In East, Central and Southern Africa, as has been shown 
in m a n y of the earlier chapters, it also led to large-scale appropriation of 
land by Europeans. In South Africa 89% of land was reserved for whites 
w h o constitute 21% of the population, 37% of land in Southern Rhodesia 
for only 5.2%, 7 % of Kenya for less than 10% of the population, 3 % 
in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) for only z\°/0 of the population, and 
all these lands were the most fertile in each country.28 Such appropriation 
could not but cause m u c h bitterness, anger and frustration and constituted 
the fundamental cause of the serious explosion that occurred in Kenya 
known as M a u M a u . 
T h e colonial presence also led, as has been pointed out above, to the 
appearance on the African scene of an increasing number of expatriate 
banking, shipping and trading firms and companies, and from the 1910s 
onwards their amalgamation and consolidation into fewer and fewer oligo-
polies. Since it was these trading companies that controlled the export 
as well as the import trade and fixed the prices not only of imported c o m -
modities but also of the exports produced by the Africans, the huge profits 
that accrued from these activities went to the companies and not to the 
Africans. Moreover, there was hardly any tax on profits nor were there 
any regulations compelling the companies to invest part of their profits 
locally or to pay higher rents for concessions. Neither the local colonial 
administrations nor the African landowners therefore benefited directly 
from their activities. T h e other consequence of this development was of 
course the elimination of Africans from the most profitable and important 
sectors of the economy altogether. T h e African merchant princes of the 
second half of the nineteenth century therefore virtually disappeared from 
the scene while their descendants merely had to become the employees 
of the expatriate firms and companies in order to survive. Here again, 
as in the industrial field, the emergence of a class of Africans with business 
experience and managerial skills was prevented. 
Colonialism, as Rodney has pointed out, also virtually put a stop to 
inter-African trade. Before the colonial era, a great deal of trading went 
on between African states and long-distance and caravan trading activities 
were a very c o m m o n feature of the economies of Africa. But with the 
27. C . Leys, 1975, p. 31. 
28. M . J. Herskovits, 1962, pp. 147-50; A . Sampson, i960, pp. 46-7. 
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establishment of colonialism, such inter-African short- a n d long-distance 
trade w a s discouraged if not b a n n e d altogether as, in the w o r d s of R o d n e y , 
'the arbitrary political boundaries of each colony were generally taken to 
m e a n the limit of the economies ' , 2 9 a n d as the flow of trade from each 
colony w a s reoriented towards the metropolitan country. T h e elimination 
of m u c h of this age-long inter-African trade a n d commercia l relations thus 
prevented the strengthening of old links a n d the deve lopment of n e w ones 
that could have proved of benefit to Africans. F o r the s a m e reason, Africa 
w a s also prevented f rom developing direct trading links with other parts 
of the world such as India and C h i n a . 
Finally, whatever economic g r o w t h w a s achieved during the colonial 
period w a s done at a p h e n o m e n a l a n d unjustifiable cost to the African 
- w h a t with forced labour, migrant labour (which, says Dav idson , 'probably 
did m o r e to dismantle pre-colonial cultures a n d economies than m o s t other 
aspects of the colonial experience put together'),30 compulsory cultivation 
of certain crops, compulsory seizure of land, forced m o v e m e n t s of p o p u -
lations with the consequential dislocation of family life, the pass system, 
the high mortality rate in the m i n e s a n d o n the plantations, the brutality 
with w h i c h African resistance and protest m o v e m e n t s generated b y these 
measures were suppressed, etc. A b o v e all, the monetary policies pursued 
b y the colonial powers towards their colonies - tying their currencies to 
those of the colonial powers , introducing tariffs a n d keeping all foreign 
exchange earnings in the metropolitan capitals - while ensuring stable a n d 
fully convertible currencies, led to the freezing of colonial assets in the 
metropolitan capitals instead of their being realized a n d invested in the 
colonies. T h e repatriation of savings a n d deposits of Africans by the banks 
and the discrimination practised against Africans in the granting of loans 
further i m p e d e d African development . 
F r o m the above, it can be safely concluded, in spite of the protestations 
of G a n n a n d D u i g n a n , that the colonial period w a s a period of ruthless 
economic exploitation rather than of e c o n o m i c development in Africa, a n d 
that the impact of colonialism in Africa in the economic field is easily 
the bleakest of all. 
T h e i m p a c t in the social field 
Finally, w h a t is the record of colonialism in the social field? T h e first 
important beneficial social effect w a s the overall increase of the population 
of Africa during the colonial period b y about 3 7 . 5 % , as J. C . Caldwell 
has s h o w n (Chapter 18), after its decline during the first t w o or three 
decades of colonialism. Th i s increase, according to Caldwell, w a s d u e to 
the establishment of a n economic base, the spread of roads and railways 
which ensured the rushing of food to famine areas, a n d the campaigns 
29. See Chapter 14 above. 
30. B . Davidson, 1978(b), p. 113. 
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launched against epidemic diseases such as sleeping sickness, bubonic 
plague and yellow fever. 
Closely connected with this and the second social impact of colonialism 
was urbanization. As A . E . Afigbo has emphasized (Chapter 19), urban-
ization was of course not unknown in pre-colonial Africa. T h e kingdoms 
and empires of Africa had such capitals or political centres as K u m b i Saleh, 
Benin, Ile-Ife, Kumasi , G a o and Great Zimbabwe; such commercial centres 
as K a n o , Jenne, Sofala and Malindi, and such educational centres as 
Timbuktu, Cairo and Fez. But there is no doubt that as a result of colonial-
ism, the pace of urbanization was greatly accelerated. Completely new 
towns such as Abidjan in Ivory Coast, Takoradi in the Gold Coast, Port 
Harcourt and Enugu in Nigeria, Nairobi in Kenya, Salisbury (now Harare) 
in Southern Rhodesia, Lusaka in Northern Rhodesia and Luluabourg in 
the Kasai Province of the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) came into existence. 
Moreover, as Caldwell has shown above (Chapter 18), the population 
of both the already existing towns and those of the n e w ones grew by 
leaps and bounds during the colonial era. T h e population of Nairobi, 
founded in 1896 as a transit depot for the construction of the Uganda 
Railway, increased from a mere handful to 13145 in 1927 and to over 
25000 by 1940. T h e population of Casablanca rose from 2026 in 1910 
to 250000 in 1936; that of Accra in the Gold Coast from 17892 in 1901 
to 135926 in 1948; that of Lagos from 74000 in 1914 to 230000 in 1950, 
that of Dakar from 19800 in 1916 to 92000 in 1936, and to 132000 in 
1945; and finally that of Abidjan from only 800 in 1910 to 10 000 in 1914, 
and to 127000 by 1955. It is quite clear from these figures that this rapid 
growth of urban population in Africa took place after the First World W a r , 
and especially during the period 1919 and 1945, which has been described 
as the heyday of colonialism in Africa. Moreover, these towns grew so 
rapidly during this period simply because they were either the new capitals 
or administrative centres of the colonial regimes - for instance Abidjan, 
Niamey, Nairobi, Salisbury and Lusaka; or the new harbours, railway 
termini or crossroads such as Takoradi, Port Harcourt, Bamako and 
Bulawayo or the new mining and commercial centres such as Obuasi, Jos, 
Luluabourg, Kimberley and Johannesburg. 
There was undoubtedly also an improvement in the quality of life par-
ticularly for those living in the urban centres. This, as Caldwell has shown 
(Chapter 18), was the product of the provision of hospitals, dispensaries, 
pipe-borne water, sanitary facilities, better housing and the abolition of 
such practices as domestic slavery by the colonial rulers as well as the 
increase in employment opportunities. 
T h e spread of Christianity, Islam and western education was another 
important impact of colonialism. There is no doubt that taking advantage 
of the peace and order as well as the patronage and in some areas the 
positive encouragement provided by colonialism, Christian missionaries 
and Muslim clerics pushed their activities further and further inland. As 
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K . Asare O p o k u has shown (Chapter 20), Christianity and Islam gained 
far more ground during the colonial period than had been the case during 
the previous three or four centuries put together. It was during this period 
that Christianity gained a firm foothold in East and Central Africa at times 
following or at times being followed by the flag and trade. Islam also spread 
rapidly in West and East Africa as a result of the general improvement 
of communications during the colonial period and the patronage of both 
the French and the British rulers. It should be emphasized, as O p o k u 
has done, that these gains were not m a d e at the expense of traditional 
religion. W h a t colonialism did, then, was to strengthen and perpetuate 
religious pluralism in Africa and thereby enrich her religious life. 
Closely associated with the spread of Christianity was that of western 
education. As has been shown in m a n y of the chapters above, the Christian 
missions were mainly responsible for this. It should, however, be borne 
in mind that they could operate mainly because of the grants they received 
from the colonial administrations. Certainly, by the end of the colonial 
regime, there were relatively few areas without at least elementary schools. 
T h e spread of western education had far-reaching social effects a m o n g 
which was an increase in the n u m b e r of the westernized educated African 
elite, an elite which n o w constitutes the ruling oligarchy and the backbone 
of the civil service of African states. 
Another important colonial impact, a mixed blessing as will be shown 
later, was of course the provision of a lingua franca for each colony or 
set of colonies. In all the colonies, the mother tongue of the colonial power, 
either in its pure or pidgin form, became the official and business language 
and in m a n y cases the main means of communication between the numerous 
linguistic groups that constitute the population of each colony. It is signifi-
cant that except in North Africa, Tanzania, Kenya and Madagascar, these 
languages have remained the official languages even to this very day. 
T h e final beneficial social impact was the n e w social structure that 
colonialism introduced into some parts of Africa or whose development 
it accelerated in other parts. As A . E . Afigbo has pointed out (Chapter 19), 
though the traditional social structure allowed for social mobility, its class 
structure appeared to give undue weight to birth. T h e n e w colonial order 
on the other hand, emphasized individual merit and achievement rather 
than birth. This change together with the abolition of slavery, the intro-
duction of western education, Christianity and Islam, the expansion of 
cash-crop agriculture which facilitated the acquisition of wealth in some 
areas and the m a n y other avenues for advancement that the n e w colonial 
order introduced, radically altered the traditional social structure. T h u s , 
by the 1930s, in place of the pre-colonial social classes of the traditional 
ruling aristocracy, the ordinary people, domestic slaves and a relatively 
small educated elite, had emerged a n e w society that had become more 
sharply divided than before into urban and rural dwellers, each of which 
was differently stratified. T h e urban dwellers had become divided into 
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three main sub-groups: the elite or as others call them the administrative-
clerical-professional bourgeoisie; the non-elite or, as Lloyd prefers to call 
them, the sub-elite, and the urban proletariat. T h e elite was subdivided 
into three groups: the bureaucratic elite of civil servants, the professional 
elite of doctors, lawyers, architects, surveyors, professors, etc., and the 
commercial elite of managers of the expatriate firms and companies and 
private traders and businessmen. T h e sub-elite consisted of brokers, 
middlemen, clerks, teachers, nurses and junior civil servants, while the 
urban proletariat consisted of the wage-earners, store assistants, drivers, 
mechanics, messengers, tailors, bricklayers, etc. In the rural areas, there 
emerged for the first time in m a n y parts of Africa n e w classes, namely, 
a rural proletariat of landless Africans, and peasants. T h e former consisted 
of those Africans especially in East and Southern Africa, whose lands had 
been alienated by the Europeans but w h o were not allowed to reside 
permanently in the urban and industrial centres and were therefore c o m -
pelled to spend their lives shunting between the urban and rural areas, 
mainly as migrant labourers. T h e peasants were those described by John 
Iliffe as people w h o 'live in small communities, cultivate land they o w n 
or control, rely chiefly on family labour, and produce their o w n subsistence 
while also supplying larger economic systems which include non-
peasants'.3 ' S o m e members of the latter class became quite wealthy through 
the production of cash crops for sale which led to the development of 
what has been described as rural capitalism.- Iliffe has described this 
'peasantization' as 'a once-for-all transformation comparable in impact to 
industrialisation'. It should be emphasized that since mobility within this 
n e w structure was based more on individual effort and attainment rather 
than on ascription, it was a considerable improvement on the traditional 
social structure. 
But if colonialism did have some positive social impact, it did have some 
negative, indeed some seriously negative ones too. T h e first of these was 
the creation and widening of the gap between the urban centres and rural 
areas that developed during the colonial period. T h e phenomenal growth 
of the population of the urban centres that w e noted above was not the 
result of the natural increase of the urban population but rather of what 
has been described as 'push-pull forces',32 the continuous pull of young 
m e n and w o m e n to the urban centres by the need for education and employ-
ment and the push from the rural areas, as C . Coquery-Vidrovitch has 
shown above (Chapter 15), by famine, epidemic, poverty and taxation. 
Moreover, since the Europeans tended to live in the urban centres, all 
those facilities that improved the quality of life enumerated above were 
established only in those areas. T h e rural areas were therefore virtually 
neglected, which, in turn, accentuated the drift from one to the other. 
A huge gap exists even today between urban and rural areas in Africa 
31. J. Iliffe, 1979, P- 273-4-
32. F . Wilson in M . Wilson and L . Thompson (eds), 1971, p. 132. 
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and there is n o doubt that it w a s the colonial system that originated a n d 
widened this gap . 
N o r did the migrants find the urban centres the safe a n d rich haven 
that they h a d expected. In n o t o w n were the Africans accepted as equals 
a n d fully integrated. M o r e o v e r , n o w h e r e did a majority of t h e m find jobs 
or decent a c c o m m o d a t i o n . M o s t of t h e m found themselves c r o w d e d into 
the suburbs a n d the shanty t o w n s in w h i c h u n e m p l o y m e n t , juvenile delin-
quency, drunkenness , prostitution, crime a n d corruption b e c a m e their lot. 
Colonialism did not only impoverish rural life, but it also bastardized urban 
life. It is not surprising then that m e m b e r s of this group b e c a m e the storm-
troopers of the nationalist m o v e m e n t s after the Second W o r l d W a r . 
A second serious social legacy has been the E u r o p e a n a n d Asiatic settler 
problem. T h o u g h there w e r e E u r o p e a n settlers in the N o r t h African states 
and in S o u t h Africa before the colonial era, there is n o doubt that not 
only did the n u m b e r of these people increase but E u r o p e a n a n d Asiatic 
settlers w e r e also introduced into East a n d Central Africa a n d parts of 
W e s t Africa during the colonial days. A s M . H . Y . Kaniki has s h o w n above 
(Chapter 16), the n u m b e r of Europeans in K e n y a rose from only 596 in 
1903 to 9 5 4 in 1905, to 5 4 3 8 in 1914 a n d to 16663 m x 9 2 9 ; t n a t m Southern 
Rhodesia increased from 1 1 0 0 0 in 1901 to over 3 5 0 0 0 b y 1 9 2 6 , 3 3 and that 
in Algeria f rom 3 4 4 0 0 0 in 1876 to 9 4 6 0 0 0 in 1936. B u t in m a n y areas 
in East, Central and N o r t h Africa, w h a t m a d e their presence so inimical 
to Africans w a s that the E u r o p e a n s c a m e to occupy m o s t of the fertile 
lands, while the Asiatics monopol ized the retail and wholesale trade. In 
W e s t Africa, too, the Asiatics - Syrian, L e b a n e s e a n d Indians — w h o s e 
population increased from only 28 in 1897 to 276 in 1900, 1910 in 1909, 
3000 in 1929 a n d to 6000 b y 1935 also drove out their African competitors. 
B y 1935, this E u r o p e a n a n d Asiatic p r o b l e m had a s s u m e d very serious 
proportions for Africa a n d it has not been entirely resolved to this day. 
Fur thermore , though colonialism did introduce s o m e social services as 
has been pointed out already, it m u s t be emphasized that not only were 
these services grossly inadequate a n d unevenly distributed in each colony, 
but they w e r e all by a n d large m e a n t primarily for the benefit of the few 
white settlers a n d administrators, hence their concentration in the towns . 
R o d n e y has s h o w n that in Nigeria in the 1930s whereas there were twelve 
m o d e r n hospitals for 4 0 0 0 E u r o p e a n s in the country, there were only 
fifty-two for Africans n u m b e r i n g over 4 0 million.34 In Tangany ika b y 1920, 
the ratio of beds to population w a s approximately 1:10 for the E u r o p e a n 
Hospital a n d 1:400-500 for the African Hospital in D a r es S a l a a m . 3 5 
In the field of education, w h a t w a s provided during the colonial days 
w a s grossly inadequate, unevenly distributed a n d badly orientated and 
therefore not as beneficial as it could have been for Africa. Five different 
33. See Chapter 16 above. 
34. W . Rodney, 1972, p. 223. 
35. D . E . Ferguson in M . H . Y . Kaniki (ed.), 1980, p. 326. 
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types of educational institutions were established under colonial rule: 
primary, secondary, teacher-training, technical and university. But while 
m a n y primary schools had been established by i860 in British West Africa, 
it was not until 1876 that the first secondary schools, Mfantsipim and the 
Methodist High School, were established in the Gold Coast and Nigeria 
respectively, both by the Wesleyan Missionary Society, while the British 
colonial administration did not establish its first secondary school 
(Achimota College) in the Gold Coast until 1927. In the Italian colony 
of Libya, as it has been pointed out already, there were only three secondary 
schools for the Libyans by 1940, two in Tripoli and one in Benghazi. It 
was not until after the Second World W a r that technical schools and univer-
sity colleges were established in most parts of Africa. A n d significantly, 
only one university college each was established in the Gold Coast in 1947, 
in Nigeria in 1948, in Uganda in 1950, in Senegal and Madagascar in 1950, 
in Salisbury in 1953, in Congo Leopoldville in 1954 and Elizabethville 
in 1956. In other words, university and technical education was not intro-
duced into Africa until towards the end of the colonial era. 
Moreover, nowhere and at no level did the facilities provided meet the 
demand nor were they evenly distributed. As even Lloyd admits, as late 
as the mid-i930S, 'government expenditure everywhere remained low, 
amounting in the mid-i930S to only 4 % of total revenue in Nigeria and 
the French territories, and 7 % in G h a n a ' . 3 6 Nor were these schools and 
institutions properly distributed in each colony. Most of the post-primary 
institutions were found in the main urban centres and in some countries 
most of the secondary schools were found in one town. In the Gold Coast 
for example about 80% of the secondary schools were found in Cape Coast. 
In Uganda, by 1920, there were 328 elementary schools in Buganda and 
only 34, 24 and practically none in the Western, Eastern and Northern 
provinces respectively.37 Facilities for education were so inadequate and 
so unevenly distributed, because the colonial powers did not aim at pro-
moting education for its o w n sake or for the sake of the Africans, but 
rather, to quote one African scholar, 'to produce Africans w h o would be 
more productive for the [colonial] system'.38 
Besides its grossly inadequate nature numerically and its uneven dis-
tribution, the curricula provided by all these institutions were determined 
by the colonial rulers and were closely modelled on, if not carbon copies 
of, those of the metropolitan countries and therefore irrelevant to the needs 
of the continent. N o less an authority than the Governor of the Gold Coast 
from 1919 to 1927, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, testified in 1920: ' O n e of the 
greatest mistakes of the education in the past has been this, that it has 
taught the African to become a European instead of remaining African. 
This is entirely wrong and the Government recognizes it. In future, our 
36. P . C . Lloyd, 1972, p . 79. 
37. T . B . Kabwegyere, 1974, p. 179. 
38. ibid., p. n o . 
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education will aim at making an African remain an African and taking 
interest in his o w n country.'39 
But though Guggisberg did establish Achimota College to m a k e good 
this promise, not m u c h was achieved since education in the country con-
tinued to be controlled by the Christian missions whose primary aim was 
to produce people w h o could read the Bible in English or in the vernacular 
as well as teachers and priests. 
T h e impact of this inadequate, lopsided and wrongly orientated edu-
cation on African societies has been profound and almost permanent. First, 
it left Africa with a huge illiteracy problem, a problem whose solution 
will take a long time. Secondly, the educated elite that was produced was 
by and large an alienated elite, an elite that adored European culture and 
civilization and looked d o w n on African culture, that had n e w tastes in 
food, drink, clothing, music, dance and even games, an elite so brilliantly 
lampooned by the radical Ghanaian scholar and nationalist, Kobina Sekyi 
in his play The Blinkards. Another gap thereby came to exist between this 
elite and the rest of the masses which has still not been bridged. M o r e -
over, though the membership of this elite increased in the 1940s and 1950s 
with the increase in educational facilities and the establishment of university 
colleges, it nevertheless remained extremely small throughout the colonial 
era. However , since the elite came to include the wealthiest people and 
since they came to occupy the highest posts available both during and 
after the colonial era, they came to wield power and influence totally out 
of proportion to their number and relations between them on the one hand 
and the traditional elite on the other became strained during the colonial 
days and have never really been healed ever since. 
Furthermore, the explanation of phenomena such as death, rainfall and 
sickness in natural and scientific terms also struck at the very roots of 
African religious beliefs, sanctions and taboos and thereby shook the 
foundations of African societies bringing in its trail a sense of uncertainty, 
frustration and insecurity - an atmosphere so brilliantly captured by Chinua 
Achebe in his novel Things Fall Apart. This sense of insecurity and frus-
tration, often heightened by the series of economic crises that occurred, 
especially in the 1920s and 1930s and after the war, led, especially in the 
towns, to a high incidence of crime, divorce, delinquency and violence. 
It was this same situation that partly accounts in the religious field for 
the rise of the millenarian and Ethiopian or syncretic churches that have 
already been discussed. 
T h e neglect of technical and industrial education and the emphasis on 
liberal and clerical training and the consequent love for white-collar jobs 
also created a m o n g the educated folk disdain for manual labour and agricul-
tural work which is still with us. Furthermore, the uneven nature of the 
distribution of educational facilities prevented a uniform process of 
39. Quoted by R . Addo-Fening, 1980. 
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modernization in each colony, which further accentuated differences and 
tensions between ethnic groups and regions. These have remained in m a n y 
areas and underlie some of the civil wars and rivalries that have occurred 
in some independent African states. T h e neglect of higher education and 
technical training also compelled some Africans w h o could afford to do 
so, to send their children to the metropolitan countries as well as to the 
United States, and it was such people w h o , partly from their varying 
experiences of racial discrimination and, even more important still, their 
deeper appreciation of the evil nature of the colonial system, became on 
their return, as will be shown in the next volume, the most bitter critics 
of the system and the leaders of the anti-colonial or nationalist movements. 
Beneficial as the lingua franca which was promoted through the edu-
cational system was, it had the regrettable consequence of preventing the 
development of some of the indigenous languages into national languages 
or lingua franca. T w i , Hausa and Swahili could easily have been developed 
as the national languages of the Gold Coast, Nigeria and the three British 
East African colonies respectively. In fact, as Kabwegyere has shown, an 
attempt was m a d e by the colonial administrators of British East Africa 
to develop Swahili into a lingua franca in the 1930s and 1940s but this 
attempt was countermanded by the Colonial Office. T h e reason given for 
this merits quotation: 
. . . T h e development of a lingua franca has very little connection with 
immediate expediency, being essentially concerned with enduring 
values and hence with a penetration which however gradual shall 
steadily become co-extensive with the country. Applying this criterion 
neither Swahili nor G a n d a nor any other vernacular has admissible 
claims.40 
A n d this advice went on to add that only English should be recognized 
'as the inevitable lingua franca of the future, a fact which general and 
education policy should admit without delay'. It is doubtful if any of the 
other colonial powers even ever considered this possibility. With the 
departure of the colonial powers, w h o could have been credited with some 
objectivity in this exercise and w h o also had the power to enforce any 
such language policy, and with the unfortunate upsurge and hardening 
of ethnic and regional sentiments since independence in m a n y African 
countries, the question of an indigenous lingua franca has become an 
extremely sensitive one, and it is not surprising that only a few African 
governments have been able to touch it so far. 
Another highly regrettable social impact of colonialism was the deterior-
ation that it caused in the status of the w o m a n in Africa. This is a new 
theme which needs further research but there does not appear to be any 
doubt that w o m e n were inhibited from joining most of the activities intro-
40. Quoted by T . B. Kabwegyere, 1974, p. 218. 
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duced or intensified b y colonialism such as Western education, cash-crop 
farming in s o m e parts of Africa, m a n y of the professions and job oppor-
tunities such as law, medicine, mining, etc. N o r were they, partly as a 
result of this exclusion, given any place in the n e w colonial political set-up. 
E v e n in matrilineal societies, partly because of the spread of Islam and 
partly because of the n e w emphasis o n individual achievement, s o m e 
families began to m o v e towards the patrilineal system.41 T h e colonial 
world, as Iliffe has pointed out, w a s indeed a m a n ' s world and w o m e n 
were not encouraged to play any meaningful role in it. 
M o r e o v e r , as a result of colonialism, the African himself was looked 
d o w n u p o n , humiliated, and discriminated against both overtly and 
covertly. Indeed, as A . E . Afigbo has contended above (Chapter 19), one 
of the social impacts of colonialism ' w a s the general depression of the status 
of Africans'. Ali M a z r u i also emphasized this legacy of humiliation imposed 
o n the African by the triple sins of the slave trade, apartheid and colonial-
ism in his recent Reith Lectures. 'Africans,' he said, 'are not necessarily 
the most brutalized of peoples, but they are almost certainly the most 
humiliated in m o d e r n history'.42 T h u s , although, as has been pointed out 
above, the m e m b e r s of the educated elite admired European culture and 
went out of their w a y to identify with it, yet they were never accepted 
as the equal of their European counterparts, they were barred from the 
societies of the Europeans and were prevented from living in the European 
quarters of the towns , parts which S e m b e n e O u s m a n e has called 'the 
Vatican' in his novel God's Bits of Wood.*3 
Instead of growing weaker with the progress of colonial rule, this dis-
crimination, which w a s propped u p b y the bogus racial theories and the 
Social Darwinist ideas of the day, g r e w in intensity, culminating in South 
Africa in the i n h u m a n and bogus philosophy of apartheid. T h e educated 
elite therefore b e c a m e disgruntled and bitter and it is not surprising that 
they were the first to develop a strong consciousness of the iniquities and 
exploitative and discriminatory nature of the colonial system and increas-
ingly questioned the moral and legal basis for its continued existence. It 
w a s this very class produced by the colonial and missionary presence that 
w a s to lead the campaign for the overthrow of the colonial system. S o m e 
historians such as M . H . Y . Kaniki have concluded that 'colonialism . . . 
produced its o w n grave-diggers', while Robin M a u g h a m has maintained 
that 'on the tombstone of the British E m p i r e ' [in which this racial dis-
crimination w a s mos t overt] ' m a y be written "Lost by snobbery".'4 4 Both 
conclusions are unexceptionable. This racial discrimination also created 
in s o m e Africans a deep sense of inferiority which Afigbo has defined above 
41. J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 300. 
42. A . A . Mazrui, 1980, pp. 23-45. 
43. S. Ousmane, 1962, p. 162. 
44. M . H . Y . Kaniki, 1980 (a) in M . H . Y . Kaniki (ed.), 1980, p. 10; R . F. R . M a u g h a m , 
1961, p. 84. 
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quite succintly as 'a tendency to lose confidence in himself and his future -
in short, a state of mind which at times encouraged an uncritical imitation 
of [and one m a y add subservience to] European powers' (Chapter 19). 
This feeling of inferiority has not entirely disappeared even after two 
decades of independence. 
Even worse still was the impact of colonialism in the cultural field. 
Indeed, as it was declared at the Second Congress of Negro Writers and 
Artists in R o m e in March-April 1959, 'among the sins of colonialism, one 
of the most pernicious because it was for a long time accepted by the 
West without discussion, was the concept of peoples without culture'.45 
But this should not surprise us. A s P. Curtin and others have pointed 
out, 'The European movement into Africa coincided with the nineteenth-
and twentieth-century peak of racism and cultural chauvinism in Europe 
itself.46 T h e Europeans w h o moved into Africa during this period, 
especially between 1900 and 1945 - missionaries, traders, administrators, 
settlers, engineers and miners alike - were generally imbued with this spirit 
and therefore condemned everything African - African music, art, dance, 
names, religion, marriage, systems of inheritance, etc. T o be admitted into 
a Church, an African had not only to be baptized but had to change his 
n a m e and renounce a whole range of traditional practices. Even the wearing 
of African dress was banned or discouraged in certain areas and those 
educated people w h o insisted on wearing African clothes were branded 
as having 'gone native'. Throughout the colonial period, therefore, African 
art, music, dancing and even history were all not only ignored but even 
positively discouraged or denied. Those were the days when Professor A . 
P . Newton could write 'Africa has practically no history before the coming 
of Europeans . . . [since] history only begins when m e n take to writing',47 
and Sir Reginald Coupland could endorse five years later the view that 
until the nineteenth century: 
the main body of the Africans, the Negro peoples w h o remained in 
their tropical homeland between the Sahara and the Limpopo , had 
had . . . no history. They had stayed, for untold centuries, sunk in 
barbarism. Such, it might almost seem, had been nature's decree . . . 
So they remained stagnant, neither going forward nor going back. 
Nowhere in the world, save perhaps in some miasmic swamps of South 
America or in some derelict Pacific Islands, was h u m a n life so stagnant. 
T h e heart of Africa was scarcely beating.48 
Such views were not nature's decree but rather products of the fertile 
imagination of these chauvinist European historians; Africa's heart was 
45. Anon., 1959, P- 3-
46. P. Curtin, S . Feierman, L . Thompson, J. Vansina, 1978, p. 484. 
47. A . P. Newton, 1923, p. 267. 
48. R . Coupland, 1928, p. 3. 
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beating except that the Europeans were then too deafened by their o w n 
prejudices, preconceptions, arrogance and jingoism to hear it. 
It should be quite obvious from the above analysis that those scholars 
w h o are of the opinion that colonialism was an unmitigated disaster for 
Africa and that it caused nothing but underdevelopment and backwardness 
have overstated their case. Equally guilty of overstatement are those colonial 
apologists, such as G a n n , Duignan and Lloyd w h o see colonialism as an 
unqualified blessing for Africa as well as those like Perham and Fieldhouse 
w h o see the record as a balanced one. A more accurate judgement in this 
writer's opinion is not that colonialism did not do anything positive for 
Africa, it indeed did. But Europeans did m a k e huge profits in Africa through 
mining companies, trading houses, banks, shipping lines, plantations and 
concession companies. Moreover governments held substantial foreign 
reserves from the colonies in metropolitan countries which must have 
provided some of the capital for metropolitan development. Finally, metro-
politan industries benefited from cheap raw materials obtained from the 
colonies and profits m a d e from the export of manufactured goods. W h e n 
all this is compared with what the African owners of the land, peasant 
agriculturalists and mine labourers obtained, and the fact that whatever 
infrastructural and social facilities that were provided had to be paid for 
by the colonies themselves, one cannot but marvel at the raw deal which 
colonialism thrust on Africans. Moreover, whatever colonialism did for 
Africans in Africa, given its opportunities, its resources and the power 
and influence it wielded in Africa at the time, it could and should have 
done far more than it did. A s even Lloyd admits: 'So m u c h more might 
perhaps have been done had the development of backward territories been 
seen by the industrial nations as a first priority'.49 It is precisely because 
colonial rulers not only did not see the development of Africans as their 
first priority, but did not see it as a priority at all that they stand condemned. 
It is for these two reasons that the colonial era will go d o w n in history 
as a period of growth without development, one of the ruthless exploitation 
of the resources of Africa, and on balance of the pauperization and 
humiliation of the peoples of Africa. 
T h e significance of colonialism for Africa 
This leads us on, then, to the second question posed at the beginning 
of the chapter, namely, the real significance of colonialism for Africa. Does 
it constitute a break with Africa's past or was it just a mere episode in 
its history, an episode which is of limited importance and which did not 
affect the course of African development? Here again, conflicting answers 
have been given to this question. T o some historians, indeed a very large 
number , including the Marxist and the development and anti-development 
49. P. C. Lloyd, 1972, p. 80. 
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theorists but for very different reasons, though colonialism was a short 
interlude, it nevertheless was of great significance for Africa and left an 
indelible impression on Africa. A s R . Oliver and N . Atmore contend: 
'Measured on the time-scale of history, the colonial period was but an 
interlude of comparatively short duration. But it was an interlude that 
radically changed the direction and m o m e n t u m of African history.'50 G a n n 
and Duignan also regard the colonial era 'as most decisive for the future 
of Africa'.51 T h e answer of the Marxists and the underdevelopment 
theorists is neatly s u m m e d up in the title of Rodney's book, namely, How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa. O n the other hand, there are others w h o 
regard the colonial impact as skin-deep and that colonialism did not con-
stitute any break with the African past. In a series of publications,52 
J. F . A . Ajayi has consistently maintained that the impact of colonialism 
on Africa has been exaggerated, that colonialism 'represents only an episode 
in a long and eventful history', and did not cause any break in continuity, 
that Africans retained some control over their o w n destinies and 'to the 
extent to which Africans retained initiative, the ability of Europeans to 
m a k e entirely new departures in African history was limited'. Hopkins 
has also maintained that the 'colonial era has ceased to be regarded as 
the sole substance of African history and there are sound reasons for 
thinking that colonial rule itself had a less dramatic and a less pervasive 
economic impact than was once supposed'. H e has insisted that colonial-
ism did 'not create modernity out of backwardness by suddenly disrupting 
a traditional state of low-level equilibrium' and that 'the main function 
of the new rulers was to give impetus to a process of economic development 
which was already under way ' . 5 3 
T o this author, there is really no simple yes or no answer to this question 
since the impact of colonialism varied from area to area and from theme 
to theme. There is no doubt that in the economic field, the colonial impact 
was by and large decisive and fundamental and affected both the rural 
and urban areas. In virtually all parts of Africa, the m o n e y economy had 
become the rule rather than the exception by the end of the colonial period 
and status even in the rural areas was being assessed not only in terms 
of birth and number of wives and children but also in terms of cash and 
the quantity of cash crops that one was producing each season. Further-
more, with the introduction of cash crops, land assumed a value that it 
had not had in pre-colonial days while individual effort and achievement 
came to be regarded far more than the communalism of the traditional 
order. T h e African economy also became integrated deeper into the world 
50. R . Oliver and A . Atmore, 1972, p. 275. 
51. 'Introduction' in L . H . G a n n and P. Duignan (eds), 1969, p. 23. 
52. J. F . A . Ajayi in L . H . G a n n and P. Duignan (eds), 1969; M . Crowder and J. F . A . 
Ajayi in J. F . A . Ajayi and M . Crowder (eds), 1974; J. F . A . Ajayi in T . O . Ranger 
(ed.), 1968(c). 
53. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, pp. 167, 206, 235. 
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economy in general and the capitalist economy in particular than before 
and this had effects that can probably never be undone. Unfortunately, 
this integration was effected in a very disadvantageous and exploitative 
manner for Africa and not even twenty years of independence have funda-
mentally altered the situation which has n o w become k n o w n as neo-
colonialism. 
But granting all this, is Perham correct in her assessment that the main 
impact of colonialism was to confront Africa with twentieth-century 
Europe?5 4 or should w e uphold the view of Hopkins here? There is every 
reason to reject Perham's view in favour of that of Hopkins. It should 
be emphasized that apart from the infrastructural changes - the motor 
roads, railways, the telephone and the telegraph - introduced by colonial-
ism, all the other economic changes - the introduction of cash crops as 
well as a m o n e y economy and the consequent break-down in the traditional 
communalism of life, the integration of the economy of Africa into the 
world economic system and urbanization — were all going on before the 
colonial era. W h a t colonialism did, as both Caldwell and Afigbo have rightly 
emphasized (Chapters 18 and 19) and as Hopkins has contended, was to 
greatly accelerate the pace of this change and thereby hasten and intensify 
rather than begin the confrontation between Africa and Europe. But 
colonialism not only accelerated the pace of change but did so in a way 
which sought to deny the Africans themselves, w h o were most intimately 
affected, any meaningful and beneficial role. Furthermore, and this is where 
I part company with Hopkins, so rapid and so deep was this change 
that not only was the impact on the Africans really traumatic but it ended 
up landing the economy of Africa on a course - and a very unhealthy 
and exploitative one — from which it could not and has not deviated. It 
is in these respects and not in its confrontation with twentieth-century 
Europe that the full impact of colonialism in the economic field should 
be seen. 
Fundamental and destined to be lasting and felt by all members of the 
society, also, was the impact of colonialism in the political field. A s w e 
have already seen, the very physical appearance of the independent states 
of Africa is the creation of colonialism. With the adoption of the principle 
of the sanctity of national boundaries by the Organization of African Unity, 
this appearance is not likely to be altered. Secondly, even though indepen-
dence has been regained, there is no doubt that there has been a fundamental 
and permanent shift in the source of political power and authority. In 
pre-colonial days, power was exercised by the traditional elite of kings, 
queens, family, clan and religious heads. But colonial rulers were compelled 
to restore African independence and sovereignty, as will be seen in the 
next volume, not to the traditional ruling elite but to the new elite or 
m e m b e r s of the upper and lower middle classes, the creation of the colonial 
54. M . Perham, 1961. 
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system, a n d this situation is never going to b e reversed. If anything, the 
chances of African traditional regal institutions being abolished altogether, 
as for example they have been in G u i n e a , are m u c h greater than their 
retention let alone their rehabilitation. Thirdly, it w a s colonialism that gave 
birth to African nationalism w h i c h w a s the product of the sense of anger, 
resentment, bitterness, frustration and alienation generated b y the colonial 
system. Fourthly, one colonial legacy w h i c h again has already played such 
a decisive role in the politics of post-colonial Africa is the a r m y . Th i s 
institution is not likely to b e abolished a n d , as will be seen in the next 
v o l u m e , it has already changed the course of the history of m a n y an African 
country, a n d it s e e m s as if it has not completed its political innings yet. 
' T h e m a n o n horseback', to b o r r o w Finer's phrase,5 5 is going to be with 
us for a long time and will serve as a constant reminder, if ever w e need 
one , of the colonial episode. Finally, it appears that the judicial and political 
institutions — the courts, parliaments, regional and district commissioners, 
etc. - are going to be retained even though s o m e modifications a n d 
adaptations have been and will continue to b e m a d e . Probably m o r e than 
in the economic field, then, the impact of colonialism in the political field 
w a s really fundamental a n d in m a n y respects has proved of lasting c o n -
sequence. 
O n the other h a n d , in the cultural and social field, the impact of colonial-
ism w a s relatively neither profound nor p e r m a n e n t . S u c h changes as w e r e 
introduced in the cultural field, such racial discrimination as w a s practised, 
a n d such condemnat ion of African culture as w a s preached even in the 
heyday of colonialism, were all confined primarily to the coastal areas a n d 
the urban centres, and never penetrated into the rural areas w h e r e life 
ran gaily o n very m u c h as before. African dance , art, mus i c a n d traditional 
religious systems held their o w n and such borrowings a n d adaptations as 
were m a d e b y Africans w e r e not only selective but also, to b o r r o w M . J. 
Herskovits' terminology, 'additive' and not necessarily 'substitutive'.56 
T h u s , in the rural areas a n d even to s o m e extent in the u r b a n ones, n e w 
beliefs, n e w gods , n e w utensils, n e w artefacts a n d n e w objects were a d d e d 
to the old ones. Certainly, in these areas, m a n y Christians did and still 
d o retain their belief in their traditional gods. Indeed, in the field of religion, 
if anything, it w a s the E u r o p e a n religion that w a s rather Africanized as 
is obvious f rom the rituals, h y m n s , music a n d even doctrines of s o m e of 
the syncretic a n d millenarian churches a n d not the other w a y round. W h a t 
is even m o r e important, the g r o u n d that w a s lost even in the urban centres 
in the field of culture has virtually been regained. T o d a y , African art, mus ic 
a n d dance are not only taught in educational institutions of all kinds but 
are n o w in b o o m in Africa a n d gaining recognition in E u r o p e . T h u s , as 
far as the cultural field is concerned, colonialism w a s certainly a m e r e 
episode a n d its impact skin-deep and very ephemeral . 
55. S. E . Finer, 1962. 
56. M . J. Herskovits, 1962, p. 379. 
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Finally, in the social field, the significance of colonialism here is clearly 
a mixed one. O n the one hand, the foreign or colonial linguae francae are 
going to be retained for a very long time if not for ever. Secondly, the 
n e w classes created by colonialism and 'founded on western criteria of 
schooling and civilization, instead of on the African criteria of wealth and 
prestige'57 are bound to remain and in fact increase in complexity. Already, 
two n e w groups have been added since independence. O n e is the 
political elite m a d e up of the leading m e m b e r s of the political parties that 
have been mushrooming in Africa and w h o have become the prime 
ministers, presidents, ministers, ambassadors, etc. T h e other is the military 
elite m a d e up of present and ex-officers of the armed forces of each 
independent state. T h e m e m b e r s of these elite groups are definitely 
different from the people of the rural areas in terms of their dress, life 
style, tastes and status. N o w , had these elite groups constituted a good 
percentage of the population of Africa, one would have accepted their 
formation as yet another crucial and fundamental change introduced by 
colonialism. But as indicated already, the urban or elitist groups constituted 
by the end of the colonial era only a small fraction of the population, at 
most about 20%. T h e remaining people were the rural dwellers w h o 
remained predominantly illiterate and maintained their traditional beliefs, 
values and standards. Indeed, such civilization or socialization that colonial-
ism introduced was essentially an urban phenomenon, and did not really 
affect the rural people, and, since the latter constitute the overwhelming 
majority of the population of every African state, w e can safely and reason-
ably conclude that the colonial impact here, interesting as it is, was 
extremely limited. 
In conclusion, then, though there is no doubt that colonialism was a 
mere chapter in the numerous chapters of the long history of the continent, 
a mere episode or interlude in the m a n y faceted and variegated experiences 
of the peoples of Africa, lasting as it did no more than eighty years anywhere, 
it is nonetheless an extremely important episode politically, economically 
and even socially. It marks a clear watershed in the history of Africa and 
the subsequent development of Africa, and therefore its history has been 
and will continue to be very m u c h influenced by the colonial impact on 
Africa, and destined to take a course different from what it would have 
taken had there not been any colonial interlude. T h e most expedient course 
of action for African leaders to embark upon today, then, is not to write 
off colonialism but rather to be conversant with its impact, and to try 
to redress its shortcomings and its failures. 
57. C. D . Moore and A. Dunbar, 1969, p. 125. 
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